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The Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki – Ministry for Children applied to remove an Authority proceeding (personal grievances brought by employee Dahlea Reisima) to the Employment Court, on the basis that the Court already had before it related proceedings between the same parties arising from an earlier Authority determination. The key legal questions were whether the grounds for removal under s 178(2)(c) and/or (d) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 were satisfied. The Authority granted removal, finding sufficient overlap in issues, evidence, and parties to justify the matter being determined by the Employment Court.

Applicant: The Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki – Ministry for Children (employer)
Respondent: Dahlea Reisima (employee)

Applicant: Hamish Kynaston, Louise Robertson and Josephine Ripley, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Allan Halse, advocate for the respondent

Dahlea Reisima was employed at a youth justice residence operated by Oranga Tamariki. An earlier Authority proceeding resulted in a 2024 determination (file 3203959) in which one unjustified disadvantage grievance was upheld and the rest dismissed. Ms Reisima challenged that determination to the Employment Court (a non-de novo challenge), and a directions conference was held in April 2026. Ms Reisima also lodged a new Authority application (file 3427904) raising a further chain of personal grievances, including matters relating to protected disclosures under the Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act 2022 and return-to-work plans, involving different Oranga Tamariki staff. Oranga Tamariki applied to remove the new Authority proceeding to the Employment Court, arguing there were same or similar or related issues between the two proceedings. Ms Reisima opposed removal, contending the two proceedings involved different events, different timeframes, and different staff, and that she would be disadvantaged by losing access to the Authority's informal and cost-effective process.

1. Whether removal to the Employment Court was warranted under s 178(2)(c) of the Act (Court already has before it proceedings between the same parties involving the same or similar or related issues) — Status: Established (paras [9], [15]-[18], [30]-[43]).

The test under s 178(2)(c) requires that the Court already have proceedings between the same parties involving the same, similar, or related issues; a holistic consideration of subject matter and factual connection is sufficient, and issues need not be identical (citing Randwick Meat Co Ltd v Burns [2015] NZEmpC 188 at [27]; Flight Attendants and Related Services (NZ) Association Inc v Air New Zealand [2013] NZEmpC 125 at [42]; Sheath v The Selwyn Foundation [2015] NZEmpC 226 at [11]). The Authority found that while the two proceedings concerned different chains of events, Ms Reisima's own statement of problem expressly tied the two chains together — describing a continuous pattern of conduct, shared managers, and overlapping subject matter including allegations of theft, abuse, bullying by the residence management team, return-to-work history, and retaliatory conduct. At least three witnesses likely to give evidence in the Court were also named in the current proceeding. The Authority concluded there were similar or related issues and a strong argument for evidentiary overlap, satisfying s 178(2)(c).

2. Whether removal to the Employment Court was warranted under s 178(2)(d) of the Act (in all the circumstances, the Court should determine the matter) — Status: Established (paras [10], [20], [39]-[43]).

Section 178(2)(d) gives the Authority a broader discretion to order removal if it is of the opinion that, in all the circumstances, the Court should determine the matter. The Authority found that the continuing themes in Ms Reisima's employer's conduct across both chains of grievances could more readily be considered by a single decision-making body examining the full period. It was more efficient use of judicial resources and less burdensome on parties and witnesses for one institution to conduct one hearing rather than two hearings in two different institutions. The Authority was satisfied there was a sound basis for removal under this ground as well.

3. Whether factors favouring retention in the Authority (informality, cost, loss of challenge right, mediation opportunity) outweighed the case for removal — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[38]).

Ms Reisima argued that removal would deprive her of the Authority's informal and cost-effective process, the right to challenge an Authority determination to the Court, and the opportunity for mediated settlement via an Authority direction (citing Dollar King v Jun [2020] NZEmpC 91). The Authority acknowledged these as factors to balance against removal but found them insufficient to justify retaining the matter: Ms Reisima was already committed to a Court process in the challenge proceedings, and the Court also has power to direct mediation under s 188(2) of the Act.

4. Whether removal was warranted under s 178(2)(a) or (b) of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [28]).

Ms Reisima referred to s 178(2)(a) and (b) grounds (important questions of law or matters of such nature and urgency as to be in the public interest) in the context of suggesting the Authority should be reluctant to remove matters not meeting those criteria. The Authority resolved the application on ss 178(2)(c) and (d) and did not need to separately analyse ss 178(2)(a) and (b).

5. Whether a non-publication order should be made — Status: Not reached (paras [5]-[6]).

Ms Reisima's representative raised the possibility of a non-publication order in the context of the Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act 2022. The Authority set a deadline for any such application, but no application was received, so the Authority proceeded without a non-publication order. The issue was not substantively determined.

6. Whether Ms Reisima had a potential retaliation grievance under s 103(1)(k) of the Act arising from Oranga Tamariki's removal application — Status: Not reached (para [5]).

Ms Reisima's representative raised the possibility of a retaliation grievance in connection with the removal application. The Authority noted this was not before it in the current proceeding and no amended statement of problem had been lodged in file 3427904 to that effect.

The application for removal was upheld in full; the proceedings in file 3427904 are to be removed to the Employment Court.

None ordered (this was a procedural removal application; the substantive personal grievances in file 3427904 have not been investigated and remain to be determined by the Employment Court).

Dr Rachelle Williamson, a consultant specialist anaesthetist employed by Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora (HNZ) since 2004, was dismissed on 3 March 2026 following a lengthy investigation into her unauthorised access of patient records. She applied for interim reinstatement pending resolution of her personal grievance claims of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal. The Authority found she had a seriously arguable case of unjustified dismissal but only a weakly arguable case for permanent reinstatement due to the effect of recent statutory amendments (ss 123B and 123C of the Employment Relations Act 2000), and declined interim reinstatement on the overall justice assessment.

Applicant: Rachelle Jenny Williamson (employee — consultant specialist anaesthetist)
Respondent: Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora (employer)

Applicant: Anthony Drake and Jared Higby, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Shaun Brookes and Michael Henderson-Rauter, counsel for the Respondent

Dr Williamson had been employed by HNZ and its predecessors since 2004 and appointed as a consultant specialist anaesthetist in December 2011. In October 2024, HNZ received a complaint alleging she had accessed patient records without clinical justification — including records of a person connected to her father's estate litigation, her brother's records, her own records, and approximately 52 other patient files — and had used that access to visit a patient in hospital. HNZ conducted an investigation from November 2024 through to March 2026, during which Dr Williamson acknowledged much of the conduct, attributed it to extreme personal stress from family litigation, and apologised. HNZ's final decision to dismiss Dr Williamson on notice was issued on 3 March 2026, to take effect 3 June 2026. Dr Williamson went on medical leave after receiving the first letter from HNZ and was not at work during her notice period; she had sought to agree a return-to-work plan but HNZ did not engage with that. The parties attended mediation without resolution, and Dr Williamson applied for interim reinstatement pending a substantive hearing of her personal grievances.

1. Whether the Authority should grant urgency to the interim reinstatement application — Status: Established (paras [8]).

The Authority applied its standard approach to urgency for interim reinstatement applications and found no sufficient reason to depart from it. Urgency was assigned notwithstanding HNZ's opposition, consistent with standard practice in such matters.

2. Whether the law applicable to remedies (including the recent amendments via ss 123B and 123C) is determined by the date of dismissal or the date of the underlying conduct — Status: Established (paras [52]-[54]).

Dr Williamson argued that because her conduct and HNZ's investigation predated the amendments (in force from 21 February 2026), the amended provisions should not apply. The Authority applied the principles in Ramkissoon v Commissioner of Police [2018] NZCA 304 and Allen v C3 Ltd [2012] NZEmpC 124, concluding that the personal grievance and the right to claim reinstatement arose at the time of dismissal (3 March 2026), which was after the amendments came into force. Accordingly, ss 123B and 123C must be considered.

3. Whether Dr Williamson has a seriously arguable case that her dismissal was unjustified — Status: Established (paras [43]-[51]).

The test requires assessing whether HNZ's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances (s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000). The Authority found it arguable that Dr Williamson's conduct was less serious than in Shaw v Bay of Plenty District Health Board [2022] NZEmpC 10, noting her acknowledgement, her personal circumstances, and her lengthy record. It found serious arguability in several procedural defects: HNZ's significant delays in completing the process, failure to provide a transcript of the investigation meeting, arguably inadequate responses to information requests about comparable cases (with disparity of treatment being a recognised grievance basis), arguably insufficient basis for Mr Hood's conclusions about lack of contrition and irrecoverable trust and confidence, possible reliance on undisclosed material, and characterisation of Dr Williamson's conduct as "use of private information for personal gain" — a more serious concern that had apparently never been put to her. The Authority concluded Dr Williamson has a seriously arguable case of unjustified dismissal.

4. Whether Dr Williamson has a seriously arguable case for permanent reinstatement, having regard to ss 123C and 125 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (weakly arguable only) (paras [55]-[65]).

Section 125 requires reinstatement wherever practicable and reasonable as the primary remedy; however, s 123C (in force from 21 February 2026) bars reinstatement where the employee's actions contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance. The Authority interpreted "contributed" consistently with its meaning in s 124, following Xtreme Dining Ltd v Dewar [2016] NZEmpC 136, as requiring culpable or blameworthy conduct creating the situation. It found HNZ had a strongly arguable case that Dr Williamson contributed to the situation (she had admitted inappropriate access in breach of applicable standards), noting HNZ appeared in a stronger position than the employer in McMillan and ANOR v Qube Ports NZ Limited [2026] NZERA 262. Dr Williamson had only a weakly arguable case that s 123C would not bar reinstatement. The practicability and reasonableness of reinstatement under s 125 (following Smith v Fletcher Concrete & Infrastructure Ltd [2020] NZEmpC 125) was noted as strongly arguable in Dr Williamson's favour, but this was outweighed by the s 123C analysis.

5. Whether the balance of convenience favours interim reinstatement — Status: Partially established (paras [66]-[71]).

The Authority considered both the prejudice to Dr Williamson (risk to clinical currency and professional reputation from ongoing exclusion from public health practice, which might not be adequately remedied by compensation) and the risks to HNZ (public confidence, safeguarding of patient information, departmental cohesion). It distinguished Chand v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand [2024] NZERA 58 on the facts, finding that Dr Williamson's privacy breaches were unlikely to deter patients in the way racist conduct might. HNZ's concern about fitness to return to work could be addressed by a medical clearance condition. Overall, the balance of convenience favoured Dr Williamson, but not strongly.

6. Whether, in the overall interests of justice, interim reinstatement should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [72]-[74]).

Standing back, the Authority weighed the seriously arguable unjustified dismissal claim (favouring Dr Williamson) against the weakly arguable case for permanent reinstatement (favouring HNZ) and the balance of convenience (moderately favouring Dr Williamson). The most significant factor was HNZ's strongly arguable case that the amended statutory provisions (s 123C) would prevent reinstatement as against Dr Williamson's weakly arguable case that they would not. The overall interests of justice did not support granting interim reinstatement.

7. HNZ's jurisdictional argument that ss 123B and 123C bar the Authority from awarding any remedies — Status: Not reached as a discrete jurisdictional determination (paras [4], [55]-[56], [60]-[61]).

HNZ raised ss 123B and 123C as a jurisdictional bar to remedies. The Authority addressed these provisions only in the context of assessing the arguable case for permanent reinstatement at the interim stage, rather than resolving the jurisdictional question finally. The matter is reserved for the substantive investigation meeting.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [76]).

The Authority reserved costs without further comment, to be addressed at a later stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was dismissed; a substantive investigation meeting will be timetabled to determine the personal grievance claims and the jurisdictional issues.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination on interim reinstatement only. Costs are reserved. The substantive hearing — including the personal grievance claims of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal, and the jurisdictional issues under ss 123B and 123C — remains to be determined.

[COSTS ONLY]

Glenice Cooper (employee) successfully claimed unjustifiable dismissal against Success Realty Limited (employer) in a substantive determination dated 3 December 2025. This costs determination resolves outstanding matters arising from that earlier decision, including Ms Cooper's costs claim against SRL, Mr Fraser-Jones's costs claim against Ms Cooper, a non-publication request by SRL, and Ms Cooper's query about the bonus sum and holiday pay. The Authority awarded Ms Cooper $4,000 in costs (a modest reduction from the $4,500 daily tariff), declined to award costs to either SRL or Mr Fraser-Jones, declined to order additional holiday pay on the bonus, and directed that the substantive determination be reissued with a third party's name removed.

Applicant: Glenice Cooper (employee)
Respondent: Success Realty Limited (employer)

Applicant: Fiona Dalziel, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Jeremy Sparrow, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Cooper was employed by Success Realty Limited (SRL), and her unjustifiable dismissal claim was upheld in a substantive determination issued on 3 December 2025, in which she was awarded lost wages, a bonus sum, and compensation. A preliminary determination had previously established that SRL, not Mr Fraser-Jones (her effective manager), was her employer, resulting in Mr Fraser-Jones being removed as a party. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves following the substantive determination. Ms Cooper sought costs against SRL including a 50% uplift for complexity; SRL resisted this and sought $4,500 in costs against Ms Cooper, citing her unreasonable rejection of three Calderbank offers. Mr Fraser-Jones (as a non-party) separately sought $5,500 in costs from Ms Cooper in relation to the preliminary employer-identity determination. Ms Cooper also raised concerns about the quantum of the bonus paid and sought an order for 8% holiday pay on that bonus.

1. Whether Ms Cooper, as the successful party, is entitled to a costs award against SRL at the Authority's daily tariff — Status: Established (paras [8], [17]).

The Authority applies a daily tariff approach as its starting point: $4,500 for the first hearing day and $3,500 for subsequent days, as set out in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. Because Ms Cooper was the successful party in a one-day investigation meeting, the starting point was an award of $4,500 against SRL in her favour. The Authority noted costs are intended as a modest and reasonable contribution, not as punishment.

2. Whether a 50% uplift on the daily tariff was warranted due to complexity of the matter — Status: Dismissed (paras [10]-[11], [18]).

Ms Cooper sought an uplift on the basis of complexity, including the need to determine the identity of her employer, the reconciliation of payments, and unexplained bonus discrepancies. The Authority declined, finding the unjustified dismissal claim was not unusually complex, particularly given concessions made by SRL during the process; the investigation meeting also ran for less than the allotted full day. The starting point of $4,500 was maintained as appropriate.

3. Whether Ms Cooper's rejection of SRL's Calderbank offers justified a reduction in (or reversal of) costs in SRL's favour — Status: Partially established (paras [13]-[22]).

SRL argued that Ms Cooper unreasonably declined three Calderbank offers, each of which would have left her financially better off, warranting a costs order of $4,500 in SRL's favour rather than in Ms Cooper's. The Authority rejected an outright reversal of the costs presumption, finding it inappropriate to award costs to the unsuccessful party or reduce Ms Cooper's entitlement to zero. However, the Authority accepted that Ms Cooper's rejection of three offers meriting settlement recognition warranted a modest reduction, while also crediting genuine evidence of her desire for vindication in a small community. A reduction of $500 was applied, resulting in a final costs award of $4,000 to Ms Cooper.

4. Whether Mr Fraser-Jones (a non-party) was entitled to a costs award against Ms Cooper in relation to the preliminary employer-identity determination — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]-[28]).

Mr Fraser-Jones sought $5,500 in costs, claiming he was the successful party in the preliminary determination and that Ms Cooper caused unnecessary delay and complexity. The Authority raised concerns about the propriety of ordering costs in favour of a non-party, and noted that Mr Fraser-Jones had not applied promptly (filing over a year after his removal from proceedings) and had not sought leave to file late or provided reasons for the delay. The Authority also noted the preliminary matter was decided on the papers without an investigation meeting, making it common for costs to lie where they fall in such circumstances, and that Mr Fraser-Jones had at times represented himself as Ms Cooper's employer, justifying the Authority proceeding. Costs between Ms Cooper and Mr Fraser-Jones were directed to lie where they fall.

5. Whether SRL's request for a non-publication order removing a named employee from the substantive determination should be granted — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31]).

SRL sought removal of the name of an employee who was neither a party nor a witness from the substantive determination. Ms Cooper did not dispute this. The Authority accepted it was appropriate in the circumstances and directed that the substantive determination be reissued with that individual's name removed.

6. Whether the quantum of the bonus sum paid by SRL to Ms Cooper was correctly calculated — Status: Dismissed (paras [32]-[33]).

Ms Cooper queried the bonus amount, suggesting it was smaller than prior similar payments. SRL provided details showing the bonus was calculated by reference to the amount payable to Mr Fraser-Jones. Upon reviewing the information provided, the Authority was satisfied the calculation was supported and explained, and made no further orders.

7. Whether holiday pay at 8% should be awarded on the bonus sum — Status: Dismissed (paras [34]-[35]).

Ms Cooper sought an order for 8% holiday pay on the bonus amount. SRL objected on the basis this had not been pleaded in the statement of problem nor ordered in the substantive determination, characterising it as a new and late pleading. The Authority confirmed the claim had not been pleaded or previously ordered and declined to award it in the costs determination without the matter having been properly put to the test.

The application for costs was partially upheld: Ms Cooper was awarded $4,000 in costs against SRL; all other costs applications and the holiday pay claim were dismissed.

Costs: SRL ordered to pay Ms Cooper $4,000 (inclusive) as a contribution to costs within 28 days of the date of this determination.
No costs awarded to SRL against Ms Cooper.
No costs awarded to Mr Fraser-Jones against Ms Cooper.
No order for 8% holiday pay on the bonus sum.
Non-publication: The substantive determination to be reissued with the named employee's name removed.

[COSTS ONLY]

Nicholas Pilcher (employee) succeeded in a personal grievance claim against Brandt Tractor Limited (employer) in an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 273), and this costs determination resolves how much Brandt must contribute toward his legal costs. Mr Pilcher sought approximately $48,000 (75% of actual costs), while Brandt argued only the standard daily tariff should apply. The Authority awarded an uplift above the standard tariff, ordering Brandt to pay $11,000 plus the filing fee of $71.55.

Applicant: Nicholas Pilcher (employee)
Respondent: Brandt Tractor Limited (employer)

Applicant: Jemani Sherson, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Alastair Hall, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Pilcher had previously succeeded in a personal grievance claim against Brandt Tractor Limited, with the Authority issuing a substantive determination on 4 May 2026 awarding lost wages and compensation in his favour. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves but were unable to do so, prompting this costs determination. Mr Pilcher sought an uplift to approximately $48,000 (75% of actual legal costs), citing Brandt's delays in responding to the grievance, late disclosure of documents including anonymous complaints and a harassment policy, and Brandt's failure to accept a Calderbank settlement offer made in August 2024. Brandt argued that its conduct was reasonable, that robust litigation defence is not grounds for an uplift, and that the standard daily tariff should apply. The investigation meeting ran for two days, giving a base tariff of $8,000.

1. Whether costs should follow the event (i.e., whether Mr Pilcher as the successful party is entitled to a costs award) — Status: Established (paras [7]-[8]).

The well-established principle under s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 is that costs generally follow the event. The Authority found no good reason to depart from this usual practice, and accordingly confirmed that Mr Pilcher was entitled to recover some of his actual costs from Brandt. The starting point was $8,000 based on the two-day investigation meeting using the daily tariff ($4,500 for day one, $3,500 for day two).

2. Whether the daily tariff should be adjusted upward due to Brandt's conduct in the proceedings — Status: Partially established (paras [10]-[25]).

The Authority may adjust the daily tariff where a party's conduct has unnecessarily increased the other party's costs, as established in PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808. Mr Pilcher identified four grounds for uplift: delayed response to the grievance, delayed disclosure of the harassment policy, late provision of anonymous complaints requiring interlocutory steps, and failure to accept the Calderbank offer. The Authority accepted that some of Brandt's conduct — particularly repeated challenges to admissibility, rebuttal evidence, and document disclosure — was unreasonably protracted and cumulatively increased Mr Pilcher's costs, though it noted both parties contributed to evidential issues and some factors raised did not warrant uplift. The Authority declined to award the full 75% uplift sought but found more than a minimal uplift was warranted.

3. Whether Brandt's failure to accept the Calderbank offer of 16 August 2024 justifies an uplift in costs — Status: Established (paras [16]-[20]).

A Calderbank offer is effective for costs purposes where the offeree rejects an offer that would have produced a better outcome than the final determination. The Authority found the August 2024 offer was a valid Calderbank offer, noting the total offer was approximately $10,000 more than the Authority ultimately awarded in remedies (excluding legal costs). Although the offer was inclusive of legal costs that were not separately specified, the Authority considered it adequate to warrant uplift. Brandt was legally represented at the time and was on notice of the consequences of non-acceptance; the offer was made over a year before the hearing. The Authority cited Stevens v Hapag-Lloyd (NZ) Limited [2015] NZEmpC 137 and Bluestar Print Group (NZ) Ltd v Mitchell [2010] NZCA 385 in support of the public interest in encouraging early resolution.

4. Whether the appropriate costs award is approximately $48,000 (75% of actual legal costs) as sought by Mr Pilcher — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]-[25]).

While the Authority accepted that Mr Pilcher's actual legal costs significantly exceeded the amount sought in the costs application, it held that Brandt's conduct did not warrant an uplift to that level. The principle that costs awards in the Authority should generally remain modest was applied, citing Reid v Ngati Rangi Trust [2021] NZEmpC 110. The Authority awarded $11,000 (an uplift above the base $8,000 tariff), which it noted was less than 25% of actual incurred legal costs, distinguishing the case from egregious conduct cases such as RPW v H [2019] NZERA 367.

The costs application was partially upheld: Mr Pilcher was awarded costs of $11,000 plus the filing fee, representing an uplift above the standard tariff but substantially less than the amount sought.

Costs: $11,000 plus the Authority filing fee of $71.55, payable by Brandt Tractor Limited to Mr Pilcher within 28 days of the determination. No other remedies were ordered in this costs determination (substantive remedies were addressed in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 273).

[COSTS ONLY]

Garth Cunningham, a former IT employee of HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited, had previously lost personal grievance claims for unjustified dismissal and bullying, and had been ordered to pay HealthAlliance $10,000 in costs. He successfully obtained a reopening of that costs determination on the basis that his July 2023 submissions had not been considered. On reopening, the Authority examined those submissions and the additional arguments but reached the same conclusion, confirming the original $10,000 costs award.

Applicant: Garth Cunningham (employee/former employee)
Respondent: HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited (employer)

Applicant: Garth Cunningham in person (self-represented)
Respondent: Richard Upton, counsel for HealthAlliance N.Z. Ltd

Mr Cunningham was employed by HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited, which provided specialist IT services to northern district health boards (now subsumed under Health New Zealand). He pursued personal grievances for unjustified dismissal and bullying, both of which were dismissed in the substantive determination ([2023] NZERA 296). HealthAlliance was awarded $10,000 costs as a contribution to its legal costs in the 2023 costs determination ([2023] NZERA 771), which included a $2,000 uplift from the notional daily tariff of $8,000 based on HealthAlliance's rejected Calderbank offer of $8,000 tax-free plus an expanded certificate of service. Mr Cunningham's 14 July 2023 submissions — which appeared not to have been before the original costs decision-maker — included a counter-Calderbank offer focused on reinstatement, reliance on the Heath v Auckland City Council precedent, and claims of financial hardship. Mr Cunningham successfully obtained a reopening of the costs determination ([2026] NZERA 159), leading to the present investigation. Both parties maintained their earlier positions.

1. Whether the Authority's costs determination should be reopened and reconsidered on its merits — Status: Established (already determined in prior reopening determination) (paras [2]-[5]).

The reopening was already granted in [2026] NZERA 159, which found that Mr Cunningham's 14 July 2023 submissions had not been demonstrably before the original decision-maker. The present determination carries out that reopening investigation under clause 4(2) of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act), noting that a different Authority Member may conduct a reopening investigation. The reopening itself was established; the present determination addresses its substance.

2. Whether the notional daily tariff of $8,000 is the correct starting point for costs — Status: Established (paras [12]).

Costs jurisdiction in the Authority is discretionary and must be exercised in a principled manner under Schedule 2, clause 15 of the Act. Following PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135, costs generally follow the event and are commonly based on a notional daily tariff. As HealthAlliance succeeded entirely in the substantive matter, the starting point of $8,000 (being $4,500 for day one and $3,500 for day two) was confirmed as correct and undisputed.

3. Whether Mr Cunningham's financial hardship should reduce or eliminate the costs award — Status: Dismissed (paras [9]-[10], [13]).

Mr Cunningham outlined his financial difficulties in his July 2023 submissions, including unemployment, use of savings, borrowing, and a legal bill of approximately $12,075. The Authority found there was insufficient documentary evidence to establish that a costs award would cause him undue hardship, noting that very little documentary proof was provided and that his outstanding legal bill was less than $700 by June 2023.

4. Whether HealthAlliance's Calderbank offer should be disregarded because Mr Cunningham was genuinely seeking reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [14]-[22]).

Mr Cunningham relied on Heath v Auckland City Council, where a genuine desire for reinstatement or vindication was held to reduce the weight of declined Calderbank offers. The Authority acknowledged that pursuit of non-monetary remedies such as reinstatement or vindication can be relevant to Calderbank analysis, following Bluestar Print Group (NZ) Ltd v Mitchell [2010] NZCA 446 and Farrimond v Caffe Coffee (NZ) Ltd [2017] NZCA 34. However, citing Fifita v Dunedin Casinos Ltd, the Authority held this principle presupposes some degree of success or vindication in the outcome. As Mr Cunningham's grievances were entirely unsuccessful — no reinstatement, no upheld grievance, and nothing constituting vindication — the Calderbank offer retained its full force and its rejection was unreasonable.

5. Whether the $2,000 uplift from the tariff in respect of the Calderbank offer was appropriate — Status: Established (paras [18]-[22]).

The Authority exercised its discretion to assess the quantum of uplift. Having found the Calderbank rejection unreasonable and no basis in the substantive outcome for treating Mr Cunningham as partially vindicated, the Authority found the $2,000 uplift awarded in the original 2023 costs determination was not unreasonable, and confirmed it.

6. Whether a direction to mediation regarding costs was appropriate — Status: Dismissed (para [15]).

Mr Cunningham had sought a direction to mediation to resolve the costs issue. While the Authority has wide power to direct matters to mediation, it noted this would be most unusual where only costs are outstanding, and in any event the request was not maintained at the time of the reopening, so no direction was made.

7. Whether costs of the reopening proceedings themselves should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [24]).

It is unusual in the Authority to award costs on costs applications. No further costs award was made in respect of the reopening work. The Authority noted that Mr Cunningham had already been ordered to receive reimbursement of his reopening filing fee from HealthAlliance.

The claim was dismissed on reopening; the original costs award of $10,000 payable by Mr Cunningham to HealthAlliance was confirmed in full.

Costs confirmed (on reopening): Mr Cunningham is to pay HealthAlliance $10,000 as a contribution to its legal costs, as originally ordered in the 2023 costs determination ([2023] NZERA 771). No additional award or variation was made. No costs of the reopening proceedings were ordered, save that Mr Cunningham's reopening filing fee had already been ordered reimbursed by HealthAlliance in prior proceedings.

[COSTS ONLY]

Kandy Zea (applicant/employee) brought claims against The Salvation Army (respondent/employer) in the Employment Relations Authority. Two days before a scheduled two-day investigation meeting, Ms Zea withdrew all her claims. The Salvation Army sought costs for preparation expenses incurred, and the Authority awarded $4,000 as a contribution toward those costs.

Applicant: Kandy Zea (employee)
Respondent: The Salvation Army (employer)

Applicant: Ronald Jones, advocate
Respondent: Alan Davis, counsel

An investigation meeting was scheduled for 29 and 30 April 2026 following a case management conference on 11 February 2026. On 27 April 2026, just two days before the meeting was due to commence, Ms Zea's advocate advised the Authority that she was withdrawing all her claims. The Salvation Army (TSA) applied for costs, submitting it had incurred $7,733.55 in preparation costs for the investigation meeting. TSA's counsel had begun preparation as early as 20 February 2026. Ms Zea made no submissions in response to the costs application. TSA's earlier settlement proposal (made around 12 February 2026) was not made on a "save as to costs" basis and therefore did not constitute a valid Calderbank offer.

1. Whether The Salvation Army is entitled to a costs award following Ms Zea's late withdrawal of her claims — Status: Established (paras [5]-[14]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, guided by the Authority's Practice Direction and principles set out in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135. The general principle is that costs follow the event, and the starting point is the notional daily tariff rate. Although the investigation meeting did not actually proceed, the Authority was satisfied that TSA had genuinely incurred preparation costs for a two-day hearing. The Authority applied a pro-rata approach, awarding half the two-day daily tariff ($8,000 total) given that TSA was spared the costs of actual attendance at the meeting, resulting in an award of $4,000.

2. Whether TSA's settlement proposal constituted a valid Calderbank offer justifying an uplift in costs — Status: Dismissed (para [7]).

A Calderbank offer must be made on a "save as to costs" basis to be valid: Reid v Ngati Rangi Trust [2021] NZEmpC 110 at [15]. TSA's settlement proposal made around 12 February 2026 was not offered on that basis, and accordingly it did not qualify as a valid Calderbank offer. This issue therefore did not provide any additional basis for increasing the costs award.

The costs application was upheld in part; Ms Zea is ordered to pay The Salvation Army $4,000 as a contribution toward legal costs.

Costs: $4,000 payable by Ms Zea to The Salvation Army within 28 days of the date of the determination (19 June 2026). No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination).

Jinghui (Jeffery) Peng was employed by Portland Horticulture (2021) Limited as a seasonal casual worker from 3 January 2025, but had his engagement terminated on 21 January 2025 when the client (GGX) advised Portland he was no longer required. Mr Peng argued he was not truly a casual employee in practice and had been unjustifiably dismissed; Portland contended he was genuinely casual and the engagement simply ended when client work dried up. The Authority found Mr Peng was a casual employee and that no unjustified dismissal occurred, dismissing the personal grievance in its entirety.

Applicant: Jinghui (Jeffery) Peng (employee)
Respondent: Portland Horticulture (2021) Limited (first respondent, employer); Kar Yan Eng (second respondent, director)

Applicant: David Kim, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Raymond Wheeler for the Respondent

Mr Peng was employed by Portland Horticulture (2021) Limited from 3 January 2025 as a seasonal casual employee, placed at the greenhouse operation of a third-party client (anonymised as GGX) to pick and pack cucumbers. The job advertisement and pre-employment communications referred to approximately three months of work, but the individual employment agreement (IEA) clearly stated casual terms, including no obligation on either party regarding the offer or acceptance of further work, and a termination clause accepting no payment if the client ended the engagement early. On 20 January 2025 GGX lost an external contract and advised Portland it no longer needed Mr Peng; on 21 January 2025 Portland emailed Mr Peng advising no further work was available. Mr Peng raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal, contending that in practice he operated as a fixed-term employee given a regular six-day-per-week roster, mandatory sick-leave reporting, and the retention of other workers. Portland and GGX witnesses gave evidence that rosters were set weekly based on availability and fluctuating production needs, and that Mr Peng had freedom to decline shifts and even applied for other casual work during the engagement. Post-employment social media comments by Mr Peng describing himself as a "casual worker" were also placed in evidence.

1. Whether Mr Peng was a casual employee or, in practice, a fixed-term/permanent employee — Status: Established (casual status confirmed) (paras [10]-[34]).

The Authority applied the test from Baker v St John Central Regional Trust Board and Jinkinson v Oceana Gold (NZ) Ltd, requiring assessment of the real nature of the employment relationship by examining the parties' initial intentions and how the relationship actually operated. The IEA contained standard casual clauses, including no obligation to offer or accept work and holiday pay on a pay-as-you-go basis; Ms Eng had explained the variable and weather-dependent nature of the work at interview; and rostering evidence from two independent GGX supervisors showed weekly scheduling based on availability and production need, with Mr Peng able to (and sometimes choosing to) decline days. Mr Peng's own post-employment social media comment describing himself as a "casual worker" undermined his re-characterisation as a fixed-term employee. The Authority concluded that both the intent of the parties and the practical operation of the relationship were consistent with casual employment.

2. Whether Mr Peng was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [35]-[38]).

The Authority applied the principle from Rush Security Services Ltd v Samoa that a failure to engage a casual employee for a further period does not, without more, constitute a dismissal; a dismissal occurs only if employment is terminated mid-engagement. While Mr Peng's engagement did end mid-week (the roster ran Monday to Sunday), the IEA's termination clause expressly provided that if the client ended the engagement early no payment would be owed for the unworked period, and Mr Peng had signed that clause with an opportunity to take advice. The Authority was satisfied this contractual term precluded an unjustified dismissal claim arising from the mid-engagement termination in these circumstances.

3. Whether remedies were available (compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) and lost wages up to 10 weeks) — Status: Not reached (para [39]).

Because Mr Peng's personal grievance was dismissed, the Authority made no findings on remedies.

4. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for Mr Peng's contributory blameworthy conduct — Status: Not reached (para [39]).

As no grievance was established and no remedy was ordered, the question of contribution reduction did not arise.

5. Whether leave should be granted to recover employment standards entitlements from Ms Eng personally as a person involved in any breach under s 142W of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [39]).

This issue was contingent on a breach being established; given the grievance was dismissed and no breach found, this issue was not addressed.

6. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Conditional/Reserved (paras [40]-[42]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Portland may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Peng having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in its entirety: Mr Peng was found to be a casual employee and no unjustified dismissal was established.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending negotiation between the parties or, if unresolved, determination on the Authority's usual daily tariff basis following filing of memoranda.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from a substantive Employment Relations Authority decision ([2026] NZERA 168) in which all claims by employee Liye Zhu against her former employer and two associated individuals were dismissed in full. The key legal questions concern whether costs should be awarded to the successful respondents, the appropriate quantum of the costs contribution, and how costs should be apportioned among the three respondents. The Authority awarded $16,000 plus GST (double the notional starting tariff) on a joint and several basis against Ms Zhu, primarily because she unreasonably rejected four Calderbank settlement offers.

Applicant: Liye (Lily) Zhu (employee)
Respondent: The Diligent Company Limited (first respondent, employer); Yi (Jacqui) Shi (second respondent, director/shareholder); Zhongzhu (Eason) Peng (third respondent, shareholder/adviser)

Applicant: Self-represented (former advocate withdrew; no submissions filed)
Respondent: Marty Braithwaite, advocate for the Respondents

Ms Zhu was employed as a Sales Assistant by The Diligent Company Limited (trading as The Vaping Warehouse) from 26 August 2023 to 15 March 2024. She brought an extensive range of claims including breaches of employment standards and her employment agreement, good faith breaches, sexual harassment and failure to address it, discrimination, adverse action for a health and safety reason, unjustifiable disadvantage, and constructive dismissal. She also sought to hold the individual respondents personally liable for any wage arrears. All claims were dismissed in the substantive determination. The respondents sought indemnity costs of $22,324.20 GST inclusive. Ms Zhu's advocate withdrew prior to the costs process and Ms Zhu (now living in Australia) filed no costs submissions despite being given the opportunity to do so. The respondents had made four Calderbank settlement offers between August 2024 and August 2025, all rejected by Ms Zhu, each offering a payment greater than the nil she ultimately received.

1. Should the respondents be awarded costs at all — Status: Established (paras [9], [14]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Costs are discretionary and must be exercised on a principled basis and not used to punish a party or express disapproval unless conduct increased actual costs. The usual principle is that a successful party is entitled to a contribution towards actual legal costs. As all three respondents were wholly successful, no reason existed to depart from this principle and an entitlement to a costs contribution was confirmed.

2. What actual costs and disbursements did the respondents incur — Status: Established (para [15]).

The respondents provided invoices establishing actual legal costs of $22,324.20 GST inclusive, comprising $22,453.20 incurred up to and including the two-day investigation meeting and $871.00 incurred afterwards (including preparation of costs submissions). The Authority accepted this evidence as establishing the actual costs base.

3. What is the notional starting tariff — Status: Established (para [16]).

The Authority applies a notional daily tariff approach: $4,500 for the first day of an investigation meeting and $3,500 for each subsequent day. The investigation meeting ran for two days, producing a notional starting tariff of $8,000. No authorities beyond the general tariff framework were cited for this calculation.

4. Should the notional starting tariff be decreased — Status: Dismissed (para [17]).

No party identified, and the Authority was not independently aware of, any factors warranting a reduction of the notional starting tariff. The tariff was therefore not decreased.

5. Should the notional starting tariff be increased — Status: Established (para [26]).

The Authority considered multiple grounds advanced by the respondents for an uplift: Ms Zhu's failure to attend the first mediation, unreasonable rejection of four Calderbank settlement offers (the last made after her evidence was filed), failure to provide claim details until directed, the allegedly reckless pursuit of claims with no prospects of success, and the alleged incompetence and obstructive conduct of her advocate. Relying on PBO Limited v Da Cruz and Fagotti v Acme & Co. Limited, the Authority found it appropriate to double the notional starting tariff to $16,000, primarily because a "steely approach" to the rejection of multiple reasonable Calderbank offers was warranted and all parties would have been better served by acceptance of any of those offers. The Authority did not separately address each ground but treated the cumulative unreasonable rejection of settlement offers as the determinative factor.

6. How should costs be apportioned among the three respondents — Status: Established (para [28]).

The respondents did not specify how costs should be apportioned between them individually. The Authority therefore awarded costs to all three respondents jointly and severally, leaving it to the respondents to apportion the sum among themselves as they see fit.

The costs claim was upheld in part: the respondents were awarded $16,000 plus GST (being double the notional starting tariff), ordered to be paid by Ms Zhu within 28 days, on a joint and several basis among the three respondents. The full indemnity amount of $22,324.20 sought was not awarded.

Costs: $16,000.00 plus GST, payable by Ms Zhu to the three respondents jointly and severally within 28 days of the date of this determination (18 June 2026). No other remedies were ordered (this is a costs-only determination following dismissal of all substantive claims).

[COSTS ONLY]

Keith Gorrett (employee) brought a costs application against Skibo Limited (employer) following a substantive determination in which the Authority found he had been unjustifiably dismissed but awarded him no remedy due to his wholly contributory conduct. The sole legal question was whether, and in what amount, costs should be awarded to the successful applicant notwithstanding that finding of full contribution. The Authority awarded Mr Gorrett $2,250 plus the filing fee of $71.55.

Applicant: Keith Gorrett (employee)
Respondent: Skibo Limited (employer)

Applicant: Dave Cain, advocate
Respondent: Allan Gray

In the substantive determination issued on 22 April 2026 (Gorrett v Skibo Limited [2026] NZERA 241), the Authority found that Mr Gorrett had been unjustifiably dismissed but declined to award any remedy on the basis that his conduct had wholly contributed to the dismissal and awarding a remedy would not be consistent with the Authority's obligation to act in equity and good conscience. Costs were reserved and the parties were encouraged to resolve the issue between themselves. The parties were unable to agree, and Mr Gorrett brought a formal costs application. Skibo submitted that costs should lie where they fall, apparently relying on Mr Gorrett's contributory conduct. The investigation meeting in the substantive matter was half a day in duration.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to Mr Gorrett at all, given that the substantive determination found his conduct wholly contributed to the dismissal and no remedy was awarded — Status: Established (paras [7]–[10]).

The Authority applied the principle that it is wrong in principle to deprive an employee who has been found unjustifiably dismissed of a costs award simply because there has also been a substantial finding of contribution, citing Kostic v Dodd [2007] CC 14/07 at [104]. The Authority further held, relying on White v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 451 at [37], that it would be inappropriate to take Mr Gorrett's blameworthy conduct into account a second time in the costs assessment. The Authority concluded that costs generally follow the event and that the finding of unjustifiable dismissal entitled Mr Gorrett to a costs contribution.

2. Whether the costs award should be adjusted upward or downward from the notional daily tariff starting point — Status: Dismissed (paras [5]–[9]).

The Authority applied the principles from Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135 and JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175, which identify factors such as unnecessary or unreasonable conduct, complexity, and conduct increasing costs as potential grounds for adjusting the tariff. The Authority found no relevant factors arising from the investigative process that would justify either an increase or a decrease from the starting-point tariff. The half-day investigation meeting meant the starting point was half the daily tariff rate of $4,500, equalling $2,250.

The costs application was upheld; Mr Gorrett was awarded $2,250 as a contribution to legal costs plus the filing fee of $71.55.

Costs contribution: $2,250 (equivalent to half the daily tariff rate, reflecting a half-day investigation meeting), payable by Skibo Limited to Mr Gorrett within 28 days of the determination date.
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55.
No other remedies ordered (substantive remedies were declined in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 241).

[CONSENT]

AFT, a former employee of BQM, brought an application in the Employment Relations Authority. The parties reached a full and final settlement of all matters at the investigation meeting on 17 June 2026 and requested that the settlement terms be made orders of the Authority. The Authority granted that request, made non-publication orders in respect of the parties' identities and settlement terms, and deemed the matter withdrawn with no costs order.

Applicant: AFT (former employee)
Respondent: BQM (employer)

Applicant: AFT, in person (self-represented)
Respondent: CZR, for the respondent

AFT was a former employee of BQM who brought an application in the Authority (the nature of the underlying claims is not disclosed in the determination). The parties attended an investigation meeting on 17 June 2026 and reached a full and final settlement of all matters between them on that day. The settlement was recorded in a written settlement agreement signed by both parties. The parties jointly requested that the settlement terms be made orders of the Authority and that confidentiality apply to those terms. The signed settlement agreement is held on the Authority's file but is not attached to the public determination.

1. Whether the settlement terms should be made orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [2]–[3]).

The parties jointly requested that their signed settlement agreement be converted into orders of the Authority. The Authority accepted this request and declared the terms of the settlement to be full, final, and binding in respect of all employment-related matters between the parties, with those terms now constituting orders of the Authority. No contested legal test was applied; the outcome was by consent.

2. Whether non-publication orders should be made in respect of the parties' identities and settlement terms — Status: Established (paras [4]–[7]).

The parties requested confidentiality for the settlement terms, and the Authority granted non-publication orders pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 to the Employment Relations Act 2000 with the parties' consent. Randomly-generated letter strings were used to identify all parties and the respondent's in-house representative, bearing no resemblance to actual names. Orders were made prohibiting publication of the parties' names, any identifying information, and the content of the settlement.

3. Whether costs should be determined — Status: Dismissed (para [8]).

The Authority noted that, having made the consent orders, the matter was deemed withdrawn from the Authority with no issues as to costs between the parties. No costs award was made or sought.

The application was resolved by consent: the settlement was made an order of the Authority, non-publication orders were granted, and the matter was deemed withdrawn with no costs order.

The settlement terms (undisclosed, held on file) were made orders of the Authority by consent. No separate remedies were ordered by the Authority. Costs: nil (no costs as between the parties).

[COSTS ONLY]

Datarail Limited (formerly Trust Codes Global Limited) brought a costs application against former employee Christina Worley following a substantive determination in which Worley was found to have breached her employment agreement (though not to the extent claimed), resulting in a $3,000 penalty. Both parties sought costs contributions, with the employer seeking indemnity costs and out-of-pocket expenses, and the employee seeking a contribution on the basis that none of the specific claims were fully made out and the employer's conduct unnecessarily increased costs. The Authority declined both claims and ordered that all costs and expenses lie where they fall.

Applicant: Datarail Limited, formerly Trust Codes Global Limited (employer)
Respondent: Christina Worley (employee)

Applicant: Paul Ryan (self-represented, as the Applicant)
Respondent: Greg Lloyd, counsel for the Respondent

In the underlying substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 233, issued 20 April 2026), the Authority found that Ms Worley breached a clause of her employment agreement relating to email deletions and ordered her to pay a $3,000 penalty to TCGL under s 124 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority did not find direct or compelling evidence that Ms Worley had taken, shared, or was using confidential information or intellectual property in breach of her confidentiality obligations. Costs were reserved and the parties were unable to reach agreement following negotiation. The investigation meeting ran for two days in January 2026. In May 2025, TCGL made a without prejudice save as to costs settlement offer (undertakings plus $4,000 forensic contribution), which Worley declined; Worley's counteroffer on similar terms without the monetary payment was in turn declined by TCGL. TCGL, which was self-represented, sought indemnity costs or alternatively an expenses award totalling $9,067.27 (including forensic, expert witness, Microsoft recovery costs, and the filing fee), while Ms Worley sought a contribution to her legal costs on the basis that TCGL's conduct, including five interlocutory applications and failure to produce supporting evidence, unreasonably increased her costs.

1. Whether TCGL was the successful party entitled to costs — Status: Dismissed (paras [7]-[8], [20]-[22]).

The Authority found that both parties could claim limited success: TCGL established a lesser property breach through email deletions but failed on its primary claim regarding breach of confidentiality obligations and use of intellectual property. Applying the principle from Coomer v JA McCallum and Son Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 156 that the Authority must "stand back and look at things in the round" in cases of mixed success, the Authority concluded that no party had clearly prevailed overall, making a straightforward costs-follow-the-event award inappropriate.

2. Whether TCGL was entitled to indemnity costs — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[16]).

TCGL argued that Ms Worley's failure to meaningfully engage from the outset, her flat denial of all allegations, and her refusal of the May 2025 settlement offer justified an exceptional indemnity costs award. The Authority applied the test in Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [2009] 3 NZLR 400, which requires that a party behave badly or very unreasonably to justify indemnity costs, and confirmed such an award is exceptional. While the Authority accepted the matter could have resolved at minimal cost with earlier constructive engagement by Ms Worley, it found the high threshold in Bradbury was not met.

3. Whether TCGL was entitled to recover out-of-pocket expenses (forensic costs, Microsoft recovery costs, expert witness costs, filing fee) — Status: Partially established (paras [9]-[11]).

The Authority distinguished between the categories of expenses claimed. Forensic and Microsoft recovery costs ($3,245.72 combined) were declined on the basis that they were costs of business incurred in evidence-gathering prior to filing proceedings, not costs of taking the proceeding itself. The expert witness expenses (Mr Saint's costs) were found to be a direct and reasonable expense incurred in the proceeding, though not adequately particularised by invoice; the Authority was satisfied on the basis of Mr Saint's email that those expenses were legitimate. However, in light of the overall mixed success and conduct findings, no costs order was ultimately made in TCGL's favour (all costs to lie where they fall).

4. Whether Ms Worley was entitled to a contribution to her legal costs on the basis of TCGL's conduct — Status: Partially established in principle but ultimately not ordered (paras [17]-[19], [22]-[23]).

The Authority accepted that Ms Worley was entitled to a contribution in principle, noting that TCGL declined a reasonable June 2025 counteroffer, sought to introduce unsupported issues, failed to produce evidence on the majority of claims despite directions, made five interlocutory applications (including one post-determination), and incurred expert witness expenses after the undertakings offer. The Authority acknowledged Ms Worley's legal costs significantly exceeded the notional daily tariff. However, applying the principle from Flannigan v Cushman & Wakefield New Zealand Ltd [2023] NZERA 330 and Rodionov v Ozone Technologies Ltd [2018] NZEmpC 56 that mixed success can justify each party bearing their own costs, and noting both parties' conduct contributed to unnecessary costs, the Authority exercised its discretion to order no costs award at all.

5. Whether the Authority's general costs principles under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and the Da Cruz principles applied — Status: Established (paras [6], [20]).

The Authority confirmed the applicable framework: costs are discretionary, must be principled, are guided by the principles in PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 (EmpC) (including that costs follow the event, awards are modest, conduct increasing costs can adjust awards, and equity and good conscience apply case by case), and are not punitive. These principles were applied throughout the analysis.

Both costs claims were dismissed; all costs and expenses are to lie where they fall.

None ordered. Each party bears their own costs and expenses.

[CONSENT]

Angelo Esguerra (employee) brought an employment relationship problem against Shinetec (New Zealand) Pty Limited (employer). The parties resolved the dispute on their own terms during the investigation, and the settlement agreement was converted into orders of the Authority by consent. The terms of settlement are subject to a non-publication order and are not disclosed in the determination.

Applicant: Angelo Esguerra (employee)
Respondent: Shinetec (New Zealand) Pty Limited (employer)

Applicant: May Moncur, advocate
Respondent: Melissa Johnston, counsel

Angelo Esguerra brought an employment relationship problem against Shinetec (New Zealand) Pty Limited. The specific nature of the dispute, the employment history, and the issues in contention are not disclosed in the determination. During the investigation process, the parties reached a private resolution on their own terms pursuant to section 149 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The parties jointly requested that the terms of settlement be incorporated as orders of the Authority. The settlement agreement is held on the Authority file and its contents are subject to a non-publication order under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Act. There is no issue as to costs.

1. Whether the settlement agreement reached between the parties should be incorporated as orders of the Authority by consent — Status: Established (paras [1]-[3]).

The Authority has the power under section 149 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to record agreed terms of settlement as its orders. The parties jointly requested this, and the Authority duly made the terms of the settlement agreement its orders by consent. No contested legal analysis was required given the consensual resolution.

2. Whether the contents of the settlement agreement should be subject to a non-publication order — Status: Established (para [4]).

Pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the contents of the settlement agreement are subject to a non-publication order. This was applied at the request of (or by operation of the Act in respect of) the parties, and the settlement agreement is held on the Authority file rather than published.

3. Whether costs should be awarded to either party — Status: Dismissed (para [1]).

The parties confirmed there is no issue as to costs, so no costs were sought or ordered.

The matter was resolved by consent, with the parties' settlement agreement incorporated as orders of the Authority; no costs were awarded.

The specific terms of the settlement are not disclosed, as they are subject to a non-publication order under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The settlement agreement is held on the Authority file. Costs: nil (no issue as to costs).

Hayden Sarcich, a senior employee at Fulton Hogan Limited (FHL), was summarily dismissed on 10 February 2026 following an employment investigation that found two allegations of serious misconduct substantiated: falsifying and approving an improper personal invoice causing approximately $12,000 loss to FHL, and accepting subcontractor-funded personal travel without proper disclosure. Mr Sarcich sought interim reinstatement pending substantive determination of his personal grievance, arguing the dismissal was both procedurally flawed and substantively unjustified. The Authority found he had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal but only a weakly arguable case for reinstatement, and ultimately declined the interim reinstatement application on the basis that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured FHL.

Applicant: Hayden Sarcich (employee)
Respondent: Fulton Hogan Limited (employer)

Applicant: Richard Roil, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: John Gray Smith and Kirsty McDonald, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Sarcich was employed by FHL from 2022, progressing through roles including Drainage Manager, Contracting Divisional Manager, and ultimately a senior position in Major Projects on the Otaki to north of Levin project. An employment investigation commenced in October 2025 into four allegations relating to his earlier role as Contracting Divisional Manager; two allegations (golf trip and unexplained absences) were ultimately not substantiated, while two were found proven — falsifying and approving invoices for concrete delivered to a private property (causing ~$12,000 loss) and accepting subcontractor-funded personal travel to the USA without formal disclosure. Mr Sarcich disputed both findings, arguing he was at arm's length from the concrete arrangement, had verbally notified his manager about the USA trip, and was treated inconsistently compared to another employee who received similar subcontractor-funded travel but was dealt with more leniently. He also raised procedural challenges, including late disclosure of five witness statements and the non-disclosure of a statement from Angela Howell (not provided to him or the decision-maker during the process). After his summary dismissal on 10 February 2026, Mr Sarcich raised a personal grievance and filed for interim reinstatement; the parties failed to resolve the matter at mediation.

1. Whether Mr Sarcich has established an arguable case for unjustified dismissal (the threshold for interim reinstatement) — Status: Established (paras [31]-[43]).

The applicable threshold is low — the applicant need only show the claim is more than frivolous and vexatious (NZ Tax Refunds v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90). The Authority identified several matters supporting an arguable case: conflicts in evidence about the concrete invoice (including a potential uninterviewed witness and contested credibility findings); a material conflict between Mr Sarcich and his manager about whether the manager knew of the USA trip; the late disclosure of five witness statements containing potentially relevant contextual information about informal regional practices; the post-meeting disclosure of Angela Howell's statement (never provided to the decision-maker); and a failure to reassess overall seriousness once two allegations fell away. The Authority was satisfied the threshold was met on the untested affidavit evidence.

2. Whether Mr Sarcich has an arguable case that permanent reinstatement would be practicable and reasonable — Status: Partially established (weakly arguable) (paras [44]-[56]).

The Authority applied the test in Hong v Auckland Transport [2019] NZEmpC 54, which requires reinstatement to be both practicable (capable of being successfully carried out) and reasonable (balancing the prospective interests of the parties). Mr Sarcich proposed a range of conditions including changed reporting lines, removal of delegated financial authority, and separation from the relevant subcontractors. However, the Authority found the conduct in issue went to governance, integrity, and judgment rather than isolated procedural failings — concerns that would be universal regardless of which role Mr Sarcich occupied. Critically, a subsequently discovered email of 9 September 2025, in which Mr Sarcich prepared questions for a subcontractor (the same one that funded the USA trip) to ask FHL and a client, raised further concerns about judgment and conflicts of interest and was found to potentially undermine the case for reinstatement. The case for reinstatement was therefore characterised as only weakly arguable at this stage.

3. Whether the balance of convenience favoured granting or refusing interim reinstatement — Status: Resolved in favour of FHL/refusal (paras [57]-[63]).

The Authority weighed the prejudice to each party. Mr Sarcich identified significant harm: loss of income, continuity of service, professional reputation, and stigma from summary dismissal for serious misconduct. FHL identified the burden of oversight controls in a governance-sensitive regulated environment and reputational risks. The Authority noted that compensation would be available if Mr Sarcich ultimately succeeded and that the substantive matter would be heard in approximately three months. Considering also the nature of the conduct allegations and the 9 September email, the balance of convenience was found to weigh against interim reinstatement. Even on the question of interim reinstatement to payroll only, FHL's reputational concerns and potential loss were sufficient to tip the balance in its favour.

4. Whether overall justice favoured granting interim reinstatement — Status: Resolved in favour of FHL/refusal (paras [64]-[66]).

As a final check, the Authority stepped back and considered the overall strength of each party's case. While Mr Sarcich had an arguable (if weakly arguable) case for reinstatement, FHL's concerns about governance and the unresolved issues around the 9 September email tipped the overall justice in FHL's favour. The application for interim reinstatement was declined.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [68]).

The Authority reserved costs pending a final determination on the substantive matters. No costs order was made at this stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full; costs were reserved pending the substantive hearing.

None ordered at this stage. Costs reserved pending final determination of substantive matters. The Authority indicated it would contact the parties to timetable evidence for the substantive hearing.

Devon Whitham, a former employee of Brutalitees Limited (trading as Brutal Ink, a tattoo and piercing shop in New Plymouth), claimed unjustified dismissal following a heated meeting on 19 September 2024 in which she was told she was not welcome back and subjected to abusive language. The key legal questions were whether an employment relationship existed, whether the dismissal was unjustified, whether statutory employment standards were breached, and whether the second respondent (sole director Christine Dawson) could be held personally liable. The Authority found in Ms Whitham's favour on the unjustified dismissal claim and statutory breaches against the first respondent, but declined to find the second respondent personally liable as employer or to grant leave for recovery of arrears from her personally.

Applicant: Devon Whitham (employee)
Respondent: Brutalitees Limited (first respondent, employer); Christine Dawson (second respondent, sole director and majority shareholder)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

Ms Whitham began working at Brutal Ink in May 2024 after responding to a Facebook post advertising a "Piercing Apprentice" role. She was initially told the role would be unpaid during training, and after approximately one month began receiving wage payments by bank transfer. She performed piercings and general shop duties using the business's tools and equipment, with her hours and days set by Christine Dawson. On 10 July 2024 she was sent a Contractor Agreement (which she signed on 9 August 2024), but the Authority found the real nature of the relationship was one of employment. From around September 2024, Ms Whitham had not been paid for several weeks of work, and on 19 September 2024 she attended a meeting with Dawson and another person (Josh) at which she was told she was not getting paid and was not welcome back, accompanied by threats and abusive language. No prior warnings had been given, and the dismissal occurred in the same meeting in which concerns were first raised. The respondents filed a Statement in Reply but neither attended the investigation meeting nor provided evidence, and the matter proceeded by formal proof.

1. Whether an employment relationship existed between Ms Whitham and the first respondent (Brutalitees Limited) — Status: Established (paras [34]-[47]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, requiring determination of the "real nature of the relationship" on an objective and intensely factual basis, with reference to control, integration, and whether the worker was in business on their own account (citing Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc [2025] NZSC 162 and Pilgrim v Attorney-General (No 2) [2023] NZEmpC 277). Despite the Contractor Agreement, the Authority found that Dawson exercised a high degree of control over hours and pay, Ms Whitham was fully integrated into the business, carried no commercial risk, did not issue invoices, and used the employer's tools. The contractual label was disregarded pursuant to s 6(3)(b). The Authority concluded that Ms Whitham was an employee, not an independent contractor.

2. Whether an employment relationship existed between Ms Whitham and the second respondent (Christine Dawson) personally, or as joint employer — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[47]).

The Authority acknowledged Ms Whitham's submissions regarding Dawson personally managing the relationship, the use of personal contact details, and the absence of PAYE deductions, but found these were insufficiently persuasive. Payments on record showed the first respondent as payer; a company must act through agents; Josh also had some management role; and the absence of PAYE indicated a potential tax breach rather than personal employment. Stepping back, the Authority found the employment relationship was with Brutalitees Limited alone.

3. Whether Ms Whitham was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [48]-[55]).

The Authority applied the s 103A(2) objective test of whether BL's actions and conduct were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in the circumstances. The four procedural requirements under s 103A(3) were assessed, as well as the good faith obligations in s 4(1A)(c). The recording of the 19 September 2024 meeting confirmed that Ms Whitham was not advised of the meeting's purpose, was not warned her employment was at risk, was not given a genuine opportunity to respond, and the dismissal occurred within the same meeting that concerns were raised. The Authority found the dismissal both procedurally and substantively unjustified.

4. Whether a reduction in remedies for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act was warranted — Status: Dismissed (paras [66]-[68]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's own actions contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance, and to reduce remedies accordingly if so. While the Statement in Reply listed alleged wrongdoings by Ms Whitham, no witness statements or corroborating evidence were provided by the respondents, and the Authority was satisfied with Ms Whitham's answers when questioned. No warnings had ever been issued to Ms Whitham, so the alleged conduct was never raised with her. The Authority made no reduction.

5. Whether Ms Whitham was entitled to compensation for lost wages under s 123(1)(b) — Status: Established (paras [57]-[59]).

Under s 128 of the Act, an employee with a personal grievance is entitled to the lesser of actual lost remuneration or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Ms Whitham claimed 25 hours per week at the minimum wage of $23.15/hour for 13 weeks post-dismissal ($7,523.75). The Authority was satisfied she had met her obligation to mitigate loss and ordered payment of the full claimed amount.

6. Whether Ms Whitham was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [60]-[65]).

The Authority assessed the harm caused by the dismissal, noting Ms Whitham's anxiety, fear of encountering Dawson, social withdrawal, depression, sleep difficulties, and being compelled to move house twice due to threats made at the meeting. The Authority accepted the plausibility of this impact given Dawson's physical threats and the abusive language used. Applying guidance from Stormont v Peddle Thorp Aitken Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 71, Waikato DHB v Archibald [2017] NZEmpC 132, and Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, the Authority awarded $15,000.

7. Whether Ms Whitham was owed unpaid wages and holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [69]-[71]).

Ms Whitham calculated gross wages of $10,417.50 for 18 weeks at 25 hours per week at $23.15/hour, received $3,701.68, and sought the balance of $6,715.82 less $231.50 for two days' sick leave, totalling $6,484.32 in unpaid wages. Holiday pay was calculated at 8% of total gross earnings ($10,417.50 = $833.40). In the absence of any rebuttal evidence from BL, both amounts were ordered.

8. Whether penalties should be awarded for statutory breaches (failure to provide a written employment agreement, failure to maintain wage and time records, and non-payment of wages and holiday pay) — Status: Established (paras [72]-[81]).

The Authority was satisfied that three breaches under the Act were made out, each attracting a maximum penalty of $20,000 against a company (s 135(2)). Applying Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited [2016] NZEmpC 143 and s 133A factors (nature, culpability, deterrence), the Authority adopted a global approach and imposed a total penalty of $1,500 ($500 per breach). Half ($750) was ordered payable to Ms Whitham and half ($750) to the Crown, reflecting that while the Crown is the default recipient, the fundamental nature of the wage non-payment breach supported some payment to the employee.

9. Whether leave should be granted under s 142Y to recover wage and holiday pay arrears from the second respondent personally — Status: Dismissed (paras [84]-[87]).

Section 142Y(2) requires that recovery from a person involved in the breach is available only to the extent the employer is unable to pay. Ms Whitham submitted the first respondent was due to be removed from the Companies Register as an indicator of insolvency, but provided no supporting evidence and the Register contained no correspondence to that effect as at the determination date. The Authority therefore could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that BL was unable to pay, and declined to grant leave.

10. Whether a penalty should be imposed against the second respondent under s 142X as a person involved in a breach — Status: Not reached (paras [5], [84]-[87]).

Although Ms Whitham sought a penalty against Christine Dawson under s 142X, the Authority's analysis focused on the s 142Y leave application and concluded that the employment relationship was with the first respondent alone. No separate determination on a s 142X penalty against the second respondent was made, as the personal liability pathway was not established.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [88]-[90]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter between themselves. If not resolved, Ms Whitham may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with the respondents having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff approach.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, unpaid wages and holiday pay awarded, humiliation compensation awarded, and penalties imposed against the first respondent; claims against the second respondent personally were dismissed.

- Unpaid wages: $6,484.32 gross (total wages owing of $6,715.82 less $231.50 for two days' sick leave)
- Holiday pay: $833.40 gross (8% of total gross earnings of $10,417.50)
- Lost wages (grievance): $7,523.75 gross (13 weeks post-dismissal at 25 hours/week at $23.15/hour)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings: $15,000.00
- Penalty payable to Ms Whitham: $750.00
- Penalty payable to the Crown: $750.00
- All amounts payable by Brutalitees Limited within 28 days of the determination date
- Leave to recover from second respondent personally under s 142Y: Declined
- Reinstatement: Not sought/not ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; process outlined if not resolved

Rachel Hankins, an accountant employed on a fixed-term contract by Huhtamaki Henderson Limited (HHL) to cover maternity leave, brought multiple employment relationship problems including unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, discrimination, and a protected disclosure claim. The Authority found that HHL had validly established the fixed-term agreement but prematurely terminated it and unlawfully cut off IT access before the term expired. The claims for discrimination, laptop-return disadvantage, bullying, and protected disclosure were all dismissed; the unjustified dismissal and IT-access disadvantage claims were upheld and remedied.

Applicant: Rachel Hankins (employee/accountant)
Respondent: Huhtamaki Henderson Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Tim Mackenzie, counsel for the Respondent

Rachel Hankins commenced employment with HHL on 6 August 2024 as an accountant under a fixed-term agreement due to end on 15 August 2025, to cover the maternity leave of a permanent employee. On 6 August 2025, HHL's finance manager sent Ms Hankins an email with the subject "End of fixed term contract – confirmation", requesting return of company property by 8 August 2025, advising there was no handover required, and wishing her well for the future. Ms Hankins' access to HHL's IT system was terminated at 3:14pm on 12 August 2025, three days before the contracted end date, and HHL confirmed she would be paid through to 15 August 2025. Ms Hankins contended the fixed-term agreement was not genuine, that her employment was prematurely terminated, that she was disadvantaged by loss of IT access and demands to return her laptop, that she was discriminated against on grounds of ethical belief and employment status, and that HHL retaliated against her for making a protected disclosure about internal accounting concerns. HHL maintained the fixed-term arrangement was properly established, that communications about return of property were legitimate administrative steps, and denied any unlawful conduct.

1. Whether HHL satisfied the fixed-term requirements under s 66(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [17]-[26]).

The Act requires an employer to have genuine reasons based on reasonable grounds for engaging an employee on a fixed-term basis and to advise the employee of when/how employment will end and why (s 66(2)). The Authority applied the test from Morgan v Tranzit Coachlines Wairarapa Limited [2019] NZEmpC 66, noting that sincerity and absence of improper motive are helpful markers of genuineness. Although Ms Hankins' role was broader than the incumbent's cost-accounting function, the Authority found that covering maternity leave is a genuine reason for a fixed-term arrangement and that HHL had properly notified Ms Hankins of the end date and reason. HHL therefore satisfied the s 66(2) requirements.

2. Whether HHL unjustifiably dismissed Ms Hankins by terminating her employment prior to the expiry of the fixed term — Status: Established (paras [27]-[44]).

The Authority applied the objective test from Cornish Truck & Van Limited v Gildenhuys [2019] NZEmpC 6 at [45]: whether it was reasonable for someone in Ms Hankins' position to consider her employment had been terminated. The Authority found that the combination of the 6 August email (confirming conclusion of engagement, no handover required, farewell language), the demand to return property by 8 August, and the removal of IT access on 12 August objectively constituted dismissal before the 15 August expiry date. The employment agreement required one month's notice or payment in lieu if terminated early; no legal basis for early termination existed. Ms Hankins was unjustifiably dismissed.

3. Whether Ms Hankins was unjustifiably disadvantaged by HHL terminating her IT system access prior to the expiry of the fixed term — Status: Established (paras [45]-[49]).

The Authority found that Ms Hankins had a right to continue working until 15 August 2025 and that HHL had no legal basis for removing her IT access before that date. Removal of IT access prevented her from performing her duties. HHL's action therefore constituted an unjustified disadvantage.

4. Whether Ms Hankins was unjustifiably disadvantaged by HHL requiring her to return a company-owned laptop — Status: Dismissed (paras [50]-[55]).

Although the Authority accepted Ms Hankins had a right to retain the laptop temporarily to access evidence for her personal grievances, it found that because Ms Hankins had not actually returned the laptop, the alleged disadvantage had not crystallised. Accordingly the personal grievance claim in respect of the laptop was not made out.

5. Whether Ms Hankins was unjustifiably disadvantaged by HHL bullying and harassing her regarding return of the company device — Status: Dismissed (paras [56]-[58]).

The Authority applied the test from FGH v RST [2018] NZEmpC 60 at [201], requiring repeated, unreasonable behaviour directed at a person creating a risk to health and safety. HHL's requests for return of the laptop were not unreasonable and did not create a risk to Ms Hankins' health and safety. The bullying and harassment claim failed.

6. Whether Ms Hankins was discriminated against by HHL on the grounds of ethical belief and/or employment status — Status: Dismissed (paras [59]-[63]).

Ms Hankins relied on s 21(k) of the Human Rights Act 1993. The Authority found that Ms Hankins' understanding of "ethical belief" (which in law refers to absence of religious belief) and "employment status" (which in law means being unemployed) did not correspond to the factual circumstances she described. The discrimination claim was not established.

7. Whether Ms Hankins made a protected disclosure under the Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act 2022 and, if so, whether HHL retaliated — Status: Dismissed (paras [64]-[71]).

The Authority applied the five-part framework from Kavallaris v Inframax Construction Limited [2024] NZEmpC 212 at [56] and focussed on whether Ms Hankins' concerns amounted to "serious wrongdoing" as defined in s 10 of the PDA. Ms Hankins raised concerns about internal accounting process inconsistencies (stock adjustments, product codes, approval processes), described by her as aimed at supporting accuracy and shared accountability. The Authority found these concerns related to internal accounting processes and did not meet the statutory threshold for serious wrongdoing. No protected disclosure was made and the retaliation claim therefore failed.

8. Whether Ms Hankins is entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [72]-[83]).

The Authority assessed compensation as the emotional harm suffered by the employee as a result of the personal grievance, not as a punitive measure (Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield [1993] 1 ERNZ 344; Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited [2023] NZEmpC 179 at [41]). For the IT access disadvantage, Ms Hankins felt her work had no value and that she was a "waste of space"; an award of $3,500 was appropriate. For the unjustified dismissal, Ms Hankins felt isolated and shocked by the unilateral early termination; an award of $8,000 was appropriate, having regard to comparable cases (Tillmans Fine Furniture Ltd v Rookes [2025] NZEmpC 152; McGregor v Waimakariri District Council [2012] NZERA Christchurch 54).

9. Whether Ms Hankins is entitled to reimbursement of lost remuneration under s 128 of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [84]-[90]).

The Authority applied the principle from Faitala v The Pacific Island Business Development Trust [2026] NZEmpC 53 at [74] that allowance must be made for the likelihood that employment would have ended anyway. Because the fixed-term agreement was validly constituted and would have expired on 15 August 2025, and because Ms Hankins was paid through that date, there was no general lost remuneration. However, HHL was required to pay the contractual notice equivalent of four weeks' salary given the early termination, and this amount was ordered.

10. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [91]).

The Authority found that Ms Hankins did not contribute to the situations giving rise to her personal grievance claims. No reduction in remedies was required.

11. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Dismissed (paras [93]-[94]).

Ms Hankins was unrepresented. The Authority ordered that costs lie where they fall, with no award made to either party.

The claims for unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage (IT access) were upheld; the claims for unjustified disadvantage (laptop return and bullying), discrimination, and protected disclosure were dismissed.

Compensation (unjustified disadvantage — IT access): $3,500 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act, payable within 28 days.
Compensation (unjustified dismissal): $8,000 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act, payable within 28 days.
Lost remuneration: 4 weeks' salary (equivalent amount — exact dollar figure not stated in the determination), payable within 28 days.
Contribution reduction: None applied.
Costs: None ordered; costs lie where they fall.
Reinstatement: Not ordered (not sought).

NZEI Te Riu Roa Incorporated (a union) brought a pay equity claim against the Secretary for Education. Following an earlier determination declining the Secretary's jurisdictional challenge, the Secretary applied under s 177 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to refer a question of law to the Employment Court and to suspend the Authority's investigation pending the Court's opinion. The Authority agreed to refer the question and suspended its investigation accordingly.

Applicant: NZEI Te Riu Roa Incorporated (union/employee representative body)
Respondent: Secretary for Education (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney, counsel for the Applicants
Respondent: Megan Vant, counsel for the Respondent

NZEI Te Riu Roa Inc raised a pay equity claim against the Secretary for Education under the Pay Equity Act 1972 (specifically s 2AAC(b) and s 3(1)(b)). In an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 7), the Authority declined the Secretary's challenge to jurisdiction, finding it could not determine at that stage that no effective remedy was available, as factual matters remained uninvestigated. The Secretary challenged that earlier determination in the Employment Court and simultaneously applied under s 177 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 for referral of a question of law to the Court, seeking also to delay the Authority's investigation pending the Court's opinion. NZEI did not object to the referral but asked instead for full removal of the matter under s 178. The matter was determined on the papers by consent, with both parties filing written submissions in April 2026.

1. Whether the Secretary's application for referral of a question of law under s 177 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 should be granted — Status: Established (paras [6]-[14]).

Section 177 permits the Authority to refer a question of law to the Employment Court during an investigation. Unlike s 178 (removal), s 177 does not require the question to be an "important question" but it must be a genuine question of law rather than a mixed question of law and fact. The Authority found that the question posed — whether a pay equity claim settlement satisfies an employer's obligation under s 2AAC(b) for 10 years such that no actionable breach can arise during that period — was a pure question of law arising from a novel statutory framework (the Pay Equity Act 1972) not previously considered by the Authority or the Court. The Authority was satisfied the question overlapped with the challenge already before the Employment Court and that referral at this preliminary stage was appropriate and efficient, following guidance in Nelson v Porirua Community Law Research Centre Inc [1993] 2 ERNA 1109 that referral is apposite when the issue arises before or early in the hearing.

2. Whether NZEI's alternative application for full removal of the matter under s 178 should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [2], [6]).

NZEI submitted that since no investigation had commenced, s 177 was inapplicable and the Authority should instead remove the entire matter under s 178(1). The Authority did not accede to this request, instead proceeding under s 177 referral. The Authority implicitly found that an investigation was already underway given that a preliminary jurisdictional issue had been determined, rendering s 177 available. No separate analysis of s 178 removal criteria was conducted.

3. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to investigate the underlying employment relationship problem (pay equity claim) — Status: Established (paras [7], [10]).

The Authority confirmed (consistently with its earlier determination [2026] NZERA 7) that the matter was properly before it, as the Authority has exclusive jurisdiction to determine employment relationship problems under s 161(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and can deal with any question connected with any Act arising during an investigation (Schedule 2, clause 1). This jurisdictional foundation was a necessary prerequisite to any s 177 referral.

4. Whether the Authority's investigation should be suspended pending the Court's opinion — Status: Established (para [14]).

As a consequential order following the s 177 referral, the Authority suspended its investigation of the application until the Employment Court's opinion is received, avoiding the risk of inconsistent findings and promoting procedural efficiency.

The application for referral of a question of law to the Employment Court was upheld, and the Authority's investigation is suspended pending the Court's opinion; NZEI's alternative request for full removal was not granted.

None ordered. The determination is procedural/interlocutory in nature. The Authority suspended its own investigation pending receipt of the Employment Court's opinion on the referred question of law. No substantive remedies were addressed.

Robert Dignum, a Systems Engineer employed by Veolia Water Services (ANZ) Pty Ltd since 1997 (through a predecessor company), brought a personal grievance claim after Veolia replaced his written-off company ute with a lower-specification vehicle that he argued did not meet his personal and family needs and was inconsistent with his agreed remuneration package. The key legal questions were whether Dignum's employment agreement (expressly or impliedly) entitled him to a higher-specification vehicle, and whether Veolia's allocation of a "tool of trade" vehicle constituted an unjustifiable disadvantage. The Authority found in Dignum's favour on the disadvantage claim, ordering compensation for lost remuneration in an amount to be agreed by the parties, but declined to award compensation for humiliation or to impose a penalty.

Applicant: Robert Paul Dignum (employee — Systems Engineer)
Respondent: Veolia Water Services (ANZ) Pty Ltd (employer)

Applicant: Mary Jane Thomas, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Sarah Ongley, counsel for the Respondent

Robert Dignum has been employed continuously since 1997 (by Veolia's predecessor, United Water, and then by Veolia from 2012 as a Systems Engineer in Queenstown). In 2007–2008, Dignum's remuneration package was restructured so that full private use of a company vehicle replaced his annual bonus, superannuation, health cover, life cover, and overtime payments, with the vehicle provided in accordance with the company's Motor Vehicle Policy. Over the years Dignum was allocated three double-cab utility vehicles in Queenstown, the last being a five-seater Mazda BT50 GTX (with no company signage) from August 2021. That vehicle was written off in a September 2024 accident (through no fault of Dignum), and Veolia replaced it with a two-and-a-half-door Mitsubishi Ute carrying company signage and GPS monitoring — a vehicle Dignum immediately complained was inadequate for family use and inconsistent with his agreed terms. Despite extensive exchanges, mediation, and a meeting with senior management, Veolia maintained that the Mitsubishi Ute was correctly allocated under its vehicle selection policy for Dignum's "Technical Professional" category, and declared the matter "not open to negotiation." Dignum raised a personal grievance on 4 February 2025 and applied to the Authority on 17 July 2025, arguing unjustifiable disadvantage and seeking a replacement vehicle, compensation for distress, reimbursement of foregone income, and a penalty.

1. Whether the express or implied terms of Dignum's employment entitled him to a company vehicle meeting his personal and family needs — Status: Established as an express (incorporated) term (paras [17]-[23], [27]-[31]).

The Authority applied the objective interpretation principles for employment agreements as set out by the Supreme Court and the Employment Court in Godfrey Hirst New Zealand Ltd v National Distribution Union and Le Gros v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd, focusing on the text of the agreement and relevant background. The IEA itself contained no specification as to vehicle type, but cl 34 expressly incorporated company policies into the IEA, and successive written variations confirmed the vehicle was provided "in accordance with the [United Water/Veolia] Motor Vehicle Policy." The Authority rejected Dignum's counsel's argument that the entitlement rested on unwritten custom and practice, finding instead that the Motor Vehicle Policy was an express incorporated term governing vehicle allocation. The Authority found that Veolia's own policy, properly applied, did not support categorising Dignum's vehicle as a "Tool of Trade" vehicle given the agreed remuneration structure, and that past allocation practice (providing vehicles above the "Tool of Trade" category) was consistent with the bargain struck.

2. Whether Dignum was unjustifiably disadvantaged by the allocation of a lower-specification replacement vehicle — Status: Established (paras [32]-[36]).

Under s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, an unjustifiable disadvantage requires that the employer's actions or omissions disadvantaged the employee in a manner not consistent with how a fair and reasonable employer would have acted in the circumstances. The Authority found that while Veolia had applied its vehicle selection policy consistently in a formal sense, it had not acted as a fair and reasonable employer by declining to exercise its admitted discretion to allocate a higher-specification vehicle, which would have been consistent with past practice and with the agreed basis on which Dignum had foregone other remuneration benefits. The Authority found Dignum had "bought the right" to a higher-specification vehicle and that allocating a "Tool of Trade" vehicle without the corresponding policy concession (that the vehicle value is not counted as part of remuneration) was unjustifiably disadvantageous. Accordingly, the disadvantage was established.

3. Whether Dignum was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [37]).

The Authority considered whether the circumstances warranted a compensatory award for hurt and humiliation. Noting that Dignum had at all material times continued to have access to a company vehicle for private use (even if of a lower specification), the Authority found that the facts did not make out a case for compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) and declined to award it.

4. Whether a penalty should be imposed on Veolia for breaching Dignum's employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [38]).

The Authority considered whether to order a penalty for a breach of the employment agreement. It found that Veolia had not committed an explicit breach because it had legitimately applied its own vehicle selection policy, even if the application was inconsistent with the broader contractual context and past practice. On that basis, imposition of a penalty was found to be inappropriate.

5. Whether Dignum was entitled to compensation for lost remuneration/benefits under s 123(1)(c)(ii) of the Act — Status: Established, quantum to be determined (para [39]-[40]).

The Authority found that by allocating the vehicle on a "Tool of Trade" basis without the corresponding policy concession that its value would not be counted against Dignum's remuneration, Dignum had lost the benefit of remuneration he had foregone. Dignum conservatively quantified this loss at $13,500 per year as an ongoing loss from September 2024. The Authority directed the parties to agree on the quantum, reserving leave for Dignum to apply to the Authority to determine the amount if agreement could not be reached.

6. How costs should be dealt with — Status: Reserved (paras [41]-[43]).

Costs were reserved. If the parties cannot resolve costs between themselves, Dignum may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with Veolia having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would ordinarily be assessed on its standard daily tariff basis, subject to adjustment for relevant circumstances.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustifiable disadvantage claim (lost remuneration) was established, but the claims for hurt and humiliation compensation and for a penalty were dismissed.

Lost remuneration (s 123(1)(c)(ii)): Compensation for the value of the downgraded vehicle provision from the date of allocation (September 2024) and ongoing, conservatively estimated by Dignum at $13,500 per year — amount to be agreed by the parties; leave reserved to return to the Authority if agreement is not reached.
Compensation for humiliation/distress (s 123(1)(c)(i)): None ordered.
Penalty: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not applicable/not sought.
Costs: Reserved.

Wiremu Caldwell, a Residential Youth Worker employed by Oranga Tamariki – Ministry for Children at a secure youth justice residence, was summarily dismissed on 5 August 2024 following a lengthy investigation into serious misconduct including screening inappropriate content for young persons, sexualised language, protocol breaches, and intimidatory conduct. Mr Caldwell brought unjustified dismissal and disadvantage grievances challenging the investigation process and dismissal. All claims were dismissed; the Authority found the dismissal was justified and OT's process met the standard of a fair and reasonable employer under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

Applicant: Wiremu Caldwell (employee — Residential Youth Worker)
Respondent: The Chief Executive, Oranga Tamariki – Ministry for Children (employer)

Applicant: Andrew McKenzie, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Hamish Kynaston and Raukura Doyle, counsel for the respondent

Mr Caldwell was employed under a collective employment agreement as a Residential Youth Worker at Te Puna Wai (TPW), a secure youth justice residence housing up to 40 young persons. In March 2023, prior to the investigation leading to his dismissal, the residence manager addressed seven complaints about Mr Caldwell's language and behaviour and issued a letter of expectations. In June 2023, the Office of the Children's Commissioner (OCC) made an unannounced visit to TPW and raised urgent concerns about Mr Caldwell, including allegations of screening sexual content for young persons, running a "masturbation programme," sexualised comments to young persons, and intimidatory conduct. OT commenced a formal investigation, stood Mr Caldwell down immediately on 15 June 2023, and engaged external legal counsel as investigator; 23 interviews were conducted and Mr Caldwell was interviewed in November 2023. A parallel police investigation concluded with no criminal action taken. The decision maker, Ms Fairie, accepted most but not all investigation findings, concluded there was cumulative serious misconduct, and summarily dismissed Mr Caldwell on 5 August 2024. Mr Caldwell challenged the dismissal as unjustified and raised three disadvantage grievances relating to his stand-down, the widening of the investigation Terms of Reference, and reinvestigation of matters previously addressed in the March 2023 letter of expectations.

1. Non-publication order — Status: Established (paras [1]-[2]).

The Authority exercised its discretion under Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to prohibit publication of any information identifying young persons in the custodial care or formerly in the custodial care of Oranga Tamariki. The starting point of open justice was considered, and no impediment was found to making this narrow order protecting vulnerable young persons' identities.

2. Disadvantage grievance — whether OT disadvantaged Mr Caldwell by standing him down without consultation or reasons — Status: Dismissed (paras [113]-[123]).

The Authority applied the principle from Booth v Big Kahuna Holdings Limited [2014] NZEmpC 134 that sudden expulsion from the workplace without consultation can be unfair, but also acknowledged from Graham v Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [2005] ERNZ 587 that immediate safety concerns may justify suspension without prior consultation. The Authority accepted OT's submission that the urgency and seriousness of the OCC's concerns — involving allegations of sexual misconduct toward vulnerable young persons — justified the immediate stand-down without prior consultation, and that Ms Lavender attempted to handle the matter discreetly to minimise humiliation. The matter was subsequently rectified through consultation about paid suspension on 16–21 June 2023. The Authority also noted that an OT Chief Executive's press conference statement characterising stood-down employees as "no longer part of OT" was "mis-spoken" but that Mr Caldwell was not named and was represented, and this did not materially alter the outcome.

3. Disadvantage grievance — whether OT disadvantaged Mr Caldwell by unilaterally changing the Terms of Reference — Status: Dismissed (paras [124]-[126]).

The Authority found the TOR expressly provided for the investigator to bring emerging issues to the decision maker's attention and for the investigation to be widened accordingly, with Mr Caldwell to be advised of any amendments. The additional allegation that was added (regarding sexist and derogatory comments about women in front of young persons) was put to Mr Caldwell in detail with reference to interview transcripts, and he had a full opportunity to respond through his representative. No unfair disadvantage was established.

4. Disadvantage grievance — whether OT disadvantaged Mr Caldwell by reinvestigating matters already dealt with in the March 2023 letter of expectations — Status: Dismissed (paras [127]-[135]).

The Authority examined each of the seven complaints addressed in March 2023 and found that, with minor exceptions, the subsequent investigation addressed materially different or broader conduct than what had been dealt with previously. As to the 10 February 2023 TikTok incident (complaint six), the March 2023 process had not addressed the masturbating young person or the female staff member present; a full investigation was warranted and was ultimately to Mr Caldwell's benefit. As to one specific phrase in complaint four ("Fuck no, I raw dog that shit…"), this may have been reinvestigated, but the Authority found this was at most a minor procedural defect that did not result in unfairness given the breadth of other substantiated findings. The claim was unsuccessful.

5. Whether OT sufficiently investigated the allegations before dismissing Mr Caldwell (s 103A(3)(a)) — Status: Established in favour of OT (paras [136]-[142]).

The Authority applied the s 103A objective justification test and found OT's investigation had the hallmarks of a thorough and detailed process: 23 interviews, a 103-page report with 74 attached documents, all material shared with Mr Caldwell, no confidential interviewees, and the investigator carefully weighing allegations against responses. The Authority distinguished Campbell v Commissioner of Salford School [2015] NZEmpC 122, where generalised allegations and investigator bias were found; here allegations were specific, focused on conduct, and no bias was established. The allegation of the investigator "building a case" was rejected.

6. Whether OT raised its concerns and gave Mr Caldwell a reasonable opportunity to respond before dismissing him (s 103A(3)(b) and (c)) — Status: Established in favour of OT (para [143]).

The Authority found that if anything the process provided Mr Caldwell with more than adequate notice of concerns and opportunity to respond: he received full documentation including all 23 interview transcripts, had Ms Gemmel from NUPE represent him throughout, provided a 48-page written submission in response to the draft report, and was given further opportunity to respond to the proposed outcome. No deficiency was found under these s 103A factors.

7. Whether OT genuinely considered Mr Caldwell's explanation before dismissing him (s 103A(3)(d)) — Status: Established in favour of OT (paras [144]-[157]).

The Authority found that decision maker Ms Fairie spent several weeks considering all material and made genuine changes: she excluded the 10 February TikTok incident (previously dealt with in March 2023) and removed a sub-allegation Mr Isaako had addressed informally. While her final decision lacked express specificity about which allegations constituted serious misconduct, the Authority accepted she referenced the investigation report sufficiently. Mitigating factors raised for Mr Caldwell — an alleged undiagnosed condition affecting communication, concussion affecting memory, lack of training, and claims of a cohort of staff targeting him — were all assessed and rejected as not constituting matters a fair and reasonable employer was required to treat as mitigating in the circumstances.

8. Whether the decision to summarily dismiss for serious misconduct was justified under s 103A — Status: Established in favour of OT (paras [156]-[157]).

Applying the s 103A objective test, the Authority found the cumulative substantiated findings — inappropriate screenings of adult-rated content, sexualised language to and in front of young persons, derogatory language about women in front of young persons, protocol breaches (including use of personal cell phone in units), and telling others he was untouchable — were sufficient for a fair and reasonable employer in OT's position to conclude serious misconduct had occurred and that trust and confidence in Mr Caldwell as a Residential Youth Worker had been lost. The unsubstantiated masturbation "programme" allegation was noted but did not affect the overall outcome given the breadth of other findings.

9. Remedies (reinstatement, compensation, lost wages) — Status: Not reached (para [158]).

Having found all grievance claims unsuccessful, the Authority expressly declined to consider any of the remedies sought by Mr Caldwell, including permanent reinstatement, compensation for personal grievance, and lost wages.

10. Contribution under s 124 of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [158]).

The question of whether any remedy should be reduced due to Mr Caldwell's contributory conduct did not arise because no grievance was upheld and no remedy was ordered.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [159]-[161]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If not resolved, OT may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Caldwell having 14 days to reply. The Authority noted it would apply the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

All claims were dismissed; the unjustified dismissal grievance and all three disadvantage grievances were unsuccessful, and no remedies were ordered.

None ordered. Remedies were not considered because all claims failed. Costs are reserved pending agreement between the parties or a further determination.

Natalie Butler-Smith, a part-time permanent farm assistant, brought personal grievance claims against her employer, the DG and DV Cavey Partnership, following her dismissal in February 2024 — just days before she was due to return from parental leave. The key legal questions concerned whether her dismissal was unjustified, whether she was owed unpaid wages, notice pay, and compensation for humiliation, and whether a penalty should be imposed for failure to provide wage and time records. The Authority upheld the unjustified dismissal claim and awarded compensation, lost wages, unpaid wages, and notice pay, but declined to impose a penalty without further explanation from the Partnership.

Applicant: Natalie Butler-Smith (employee)
Respondent: David and Dale Cavey t/a DG and DV Cavey Partnership (employer)

Applicant: William Lynch, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

Ms Butler-Smith was employed as a part-time permanent farm assistant by the DG and DV Cavey Partnership from around August 2022. She fell pregnant during her employment and went on parental leave in mid-August 2023, with her baby born on 6 September 2023. During her parental leave, she attended the workplace approximately twice a month to assist with paperwork — approximately two hours per month — for which she was not paid. Her confirmed return date was 19 February 2024, but on 13 February 2024, she was called to a meeting and verbally dismissed on the basis that having a baby on the farm created health and safety issues; written confirmation followed on 20 February 2024. The Partnership did not appear at the investigation meeting, did not engage in the proceedings, and failed to provide wage and time records despite Ms Butler-Smith's request. Ms Butler-Smith gave evidence of the significant emotional, financial, and parenting impact of the unexpected dismissal while she was in a vulnerable state as a first-time mother.

1. Whether the Authority should proceed in the absence of the Respondent — Status: Established (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

The Authority considered whether to proceed without the Partnership's attendance. Satisfied that the Partnership was aware of the investigation meeting and had been sent an audiovisual link, the Authority adjourned for 15 minutes to allow the Partnership to contact it; when no contact was made, the Authority determined it was appropriate to proceed in the Partnership's absence.

2. Whether Ms Butler-Smith's dismissal was unjustified — Status: Established (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

The applicable test under the Employment Relations Act 2000 requires an employer to have acted as a fair and reasonable employer could in the circumstances, including consulting the employee before reaching a decision. In the absence of any response or justification from the Partnership, the Authority accepted Ms Butler-Smith's uncontested evidence. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified: there was no consultation with Ms Butler-Smith, merely a blunt determination that having a baby on the farm was unsafe, with no opportunity to explore alternatives or the validity of that conclusion.

3. Whether Ms Butler-Smith contributed to her personal grievance (s 124, Employment Relations Act 2000) — Status: Dismissed (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee contributed in any blameworthy way to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance. On the uncontested evidence, the Authority found Ms Butler-Smith did not contribute in any blameworthy way to her dismissal, and accordingly no reduction to remedies was applied.

4. Whether Ms Butler-Smith was entitled to unpaid wages for attendance at the workplace during parental leave — Status: Established (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

Ms Butler-Smith claimed $192.00 for approximately two hours per month of paperwork work performed at the workplace over four months during parental leave for which she was not paid. Because the Partnership failed to provide wage and time records despite request, the Authority accepted Ms Butler-Smith's evidence and awarded the claimed sum in full.

5. Whether Ms Butler-Smith was entitled to lost wages for the 13-week period of unemployment following dismissal — Status: Established (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

Ms Butler-Smith claimed $9,360.00 based on an hourly rate of $24/hour at an average of 30 hours per week for the 13 weeks she was unable to find employment following dismissal. With no contradicting evidence from the Partnership and no records provided, the Authority accepted her evidence and awarded the full claimed amount.

6. Whether Ms Butler-Smith was entitled to payment in lieu of notice — Status: Established (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

Ms Butler-Smith's Employment Agreement provided for a four-week notice period. The Partnership dismissed her without honouring this entitlement. The Authority accepted her claim of $2,880.00 representing four weeks' pay and awarded the full sum.

7. Whether Ms Butler-Smith was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Partially established (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

Section 123(1)(c)(i) permits compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings arising from an unjustified dismissal. Ms Butler-Smith sought $25,000.00. The Authority found her evidence of emotional impact to be poignant, noting the significant effect of an unexpected dismissal on a first-time mother in a vulnerable state, affecting her parenting and sense of wellbeing. The Authority awarded $20,000.00 (below the claimed $25,000.00), reflecting its assessment of the seriousness of the impact.

8. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (failure to provide wage and time and leave records) — Status: Dismissed (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

Section 130 of the Act requires employers to maintain and provide wage and time records. Ms Butler-Smith sought a penalty against the Partnership for its failure to provide those records. The Authority declined to impose a penalty in the absence of the Partnership, stating it was reluctant to do so without further explanation, leaving open the possibility that the issue may be revisited.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (no specific paragraph numbers in the document).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Butler-Smith may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days; the Partnership then has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if called upon to determine costs.

The unjustified dismissal claim was upheld, with compensation, lost wages, unpaid wages, and notice pay awarded in full or near-full; the penalty claim under s 130 was declined without further explanation.

- Unpaid wages (work during parental leave): $192.00
- Lost wages (13 weeks' unemployment): $9,360.00
- Notice pay (4-week contractual notice period): $2,880.00
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $20,000.00
- Total ordered: $32,432.00, payable within 28 days
- Penalty (s 130 breach): None ordered (declined without further explanation; not foreclosed)
- Costs: Reserved

Raheel Reddy, a barber employed by Studio Image Limited from May 2023 to September 2024, claimed unjustified dismissal and breach of good faith after his employment was terminated by text message. The key legal questions were whether a dismissal occurred (as opposed to a resignation), whether it was unjustified, whether a good faith penalty was warranted, and what remedies should be awarded after any contributory conduct reduction. The Authority found Mr Reddy was unjustifiably dismissed and awarded lost wages and compensation for humiliation, reduced by 20% for contributory conduct, but declined to impose a good faith penalty.

Applicant: Raheel Reddy (employee/barber)
Respondent: Studio Image Limited (employer)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson (advocate)
Respondent: Sidhant Thapa (self-represented — sole director of the respondent)

Mr Reddy was employed as a barber at Studio Image's Auckland barbershop from 26 May 2023 until 17 September 2024. On 17 September 2024, Mr Reddy texted the director, Mr Thapa, to say he would be late arriving as he was viewing a replacement car following a motor vehicle accident the prior week; he later advised he would arrive by 1:30 pm. Before he arrived, Mr Thapa sent him a text message paying out his remaining leave, instructing him to collect his tools by the next day, and wishing him well — effectively dismissing him by text. Studio Image contended Mr Reddy had resigned or that his conduct (persistent lateness and poor attendance) justified ending the relationship, and sought to introduce post-employment video evidence and client statements, which the Authority rejected as irrelevant. Mr Reddy acknowledged he had previously received warnings for punctuality and attendance issues, and on the day in question was late to work. Mr Reddy raised claims for unjustified dismissal remedies, a good faith penalty, and costs; he withdrew earlier claims for penalties under s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983, and s 27 of the Holidays Act 2003 during the investigation meeting.

1. Whether a dismissal (rather than resignation) occurred — Status: Established (paras [22]-[31]).

The Authority applied the established legal principle that a dismissal occurs where there is a "sending away" of an employee at the employer's initiative, citing Wellington, Taranaki and Marlborough clerical Etc IUOW v Greenwich (1983). Despite Studio Image's contention that Mr Reddy resigned, the Authority found Mr Thapa's text messages — paying out accrued leave, instructing collection of tools by the next day, and expressing that he no longer wanted Mr Reddy there — were all consistent with a sending away. Post-employment video evidence and unsolicited client statements were rejected as irrelevant to how the relationship ended. The Authority accepted Mr Reddy's evidence that he was dismissed on 17 September 2024.

2. Whether the dismissal was unjustified under s 103A of the Act — Status: Established (paras [32]-[38]).

The Authority applied the s 103A(2) test of whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as Studio Image did in all the circumstances. Studio Image failed every minimum procedural fairness requirement under s 103A(3): it did not sufficiently investigate its concerns (s 103A(3)(a)), did not raise concerns with Mr Reddy before dismissing him (s 103A(3)(b)), did not give him any opportunity to respond (s 103A(3)(c)), and deprived him of any chance to be heard (s 103A(3)(d)). The dismissal was effected summarily by text message without any process. The Authority also found a breach of the good faith obligation under s 4(1A)(c) to provide access to relevant information and an opportunity to comment. The dismissal was found to be unjustified.

3. Whether Mr Reddy was entitled to lost wages under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [40]-[46]).

Under s 123(1)(b) and s 128, an employee is entitled to reimbursement of lost remuneration, subject to a default cap of three months unless the Authority exercises its discretion to award more. Mr Reddy sought 19 weeks' lost wages but provided no cogent reason to exceed the three-month cap, so the Authority declined to award beyond that period. The Authority also found that Mr Reddy's claimed 38.5-hour working week was not supported by his payslips, which showed an average of 36.21 hours per week in his final three months. Lost wages were awarded on that corrected basis at $30.00 per hour for 13 weeks, totalling $14,121.90 (gross).

4. Whether Mr Reddy was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [47]-[51]).

The Authority found Mr Reddy suffered harm under each head in s 123(1)(c)(i), including stress, uncertainty, and emotional distress from feeling his commitment was unrecognised. Applying the principle from Wikaira v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZEmpC 175 that awards should be fair, realistic, and not miserly, and having regard to comparable cases, the Authority assessed compensation at $13,500 before the contribution reduction.

5. Whether Studio Image breached the duty of good faith warranting a penalty under s 4A of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [52]-[55]).

The Authority acknowledged aspects of Studio Image's conduct may have fallen short of its good faith obligations, particularly its duty under s 4(1A)(b) to be active and constructive in maintaining a productive employment relationship. However, the threshold for a s 4A penalty is high — the breach must be deliberate, serious, and sustained (s 4A(a)) or intended to undermine the employment relationship (s 4A(b)(iii)). The Authority exercised its discretion to decline a penalty, satisfied that the personal grievance remedies already awarded adequately addressed the good faith failures.

6. Whether Mr Reddy's contributory conduct should reduce his remedies under s 124 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [56]-[61]).

The Authority applied the four-step test from Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190, finding Mr Reddy's conduct (persistent punctuality and attendance issues, including on the day of dismissal, and prior warnings for the same conduct) was blameworthy and contributed to the situation giving rise to the dismissal. The Authority assessed the conduct as not in the upper range of blameworthiness and applied a 20% reduction, confined to the s 123(1)(c)(i) compensation award only (reducing it from $13,500 to $10,800), not to the lost wages award.

7. Whether penalties under s 130 of the Act, s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983, and s 27 of the Holidays Act 2003 should be awarded — Status: Not reached (para [12]).

Mr Reddy withdrew these claims during the investigation meeting and the Authority recorded the withdrawal for completeness. No determination was made on their merits.

8. Costs — Status: Not reached/Reserved (paras [63]-[65]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue themselves. If unresolved, Mr Reddy may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Studio Image having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances warrant adjustment.

The claim was partially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, lost wages and compensation awarded (reduced by 20% contribution on the latter), but the good faith penalty was declined and the s 130/Wages Protection Act/Holidays Act claims were withdrawn.

Lost wages: $14,121.90 (gross), being 36.21 hours/week × $30.00/hour × 13 weeks, under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 of the Act, plus 8% holiday pay and KiwiSaver compliance if applicable.
Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $10,800 (being $13,500 reduced by 20% for contributory conduct) under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act.
Good faith penalty: None ordered.
Costs: Reserved — parties to negotiate; if unresolved, Mr Reddy to file memorandum within 28 days of determination date.
All amounts payable within 28 days of the written record of the oral determination (26 May 2026).