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Juliet Hull, former CEO of Sleaktek Limited (a biodegradable coating start-up), brought claims of unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, breach of good faith, and wage/holiday arrears after her employment was terminated in June 2024, ostensibly by redundancy. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal and alleged disadvantages were justified, whether counterclaims of serious misconduct against Ms Hull had any foundation, and what remedies (including penalties against the company and its sole director, Robert Lawrence) were appropriate. The Authority upheld Ms Hull's claims in full, dismissed all counterclaims, and awarded substantial compensation, wage arrears, penalties, and a declaration under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 against Mr Lawrence personally.

Applicant: Juliet Hull (employee, former Chief Executive Officer)
Respondent: Sleaktek Limited (first respondent, employer) and Robert Lawrence (second respondent, sole director)

Applicant: Angela Evans and Tanya Preston
Respondent: Robert Lawrence (for the respondents)

Ms Hull was engaged by Sleaktek from October 2022, initially on a fixed fee, then as an employee and CEO from approximately early 2023 with a salary of $200,000 per annum. Sleaktek was a start-up developing a waterproof biodegradable coating, and Ms Hull was instrumental in raising funds and managing the business. By early April 2024, following positive product testing results and amid discussions about future investment and CAP tables, Mr Lawrence (sole director) stopped paying Ms Hull's salary without her agreement, citing insolvency risk, and began a process culminating in a letter dated 11 June 2024 purporting to terminate her employment by redundancy, while simultaneously raising unparticularised allegations of serious misconduct. Ms Hull raised personal grievances of unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage, and sought wage arrears, holiday pay, and penalties; Sleaktek and Mr Lawrence counterclaimed for damages, return of shares, and expenses on grounds including blackmail, hostile takeover, and failure to bring in funds. Mediation on 30 May 2024 did not resolve matters.

1. Was Ms Hull unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [60]-[71], [73]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test (what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances), assessing whether Sleaktek sufficiently investigated, raised concerns, gave Ms Hull a real opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered her explanations. While there was some factual basis for concern about the company's finances, Sleaktek failed on every other limb: it did not properly raise the restructure with Ms Hull, did not genuinely consider her proposed alternatives (salary reduction, deferred salary, further funding from Mr Kanji and the Craigs), and the meeting on 17 April 2024 was not adequate consultation. Critically, Mr Lawrence's own statements that he wanted Ms Hull "out" regardless of available funding showed the process was predetermined, undermining any claim of genuine business-driven redundancy. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified.

2. Was the termination date 11 June 2024 (as opposed to 20 March 2024 as later argued by respondents) — Status: Established (paras [72]-[73]).

Mr Lawrence submitted in post-hearing submissions that Ms Hull had ceased employment on 20 March 2024 and had been overpaid. The Authority rejected this, noting Sleaktek continued to engage with and direct Ms Hull through to June 2024 and conducted a redundancy process up to 11 June 2024; it was appropriate to hold Sleaktek to its own correspondence.

3. Was Ms Hull justifiably dismissed for serious misconduct (allowing unsecured loan rather than SAFE Note) — Status: Dismissed (paras [75]-[80]).

The SAFE Note issue was determined by Mr Lawrence himself and Mr Craig in direct discussions; any arrangement concluded was between them, not through Ms Hull. Contemporaneous correspondence confirmed Mr Lawrence congratulated everyone on the outcome at the time. The Authority found the allegation that Ms Hull should have compelled Mr Craig to invest via a SAFE Note fundamentally overstated her role and was not made out on the facts.

4. Was Ms Hull justifiably dismissed for serious misconduct (the "blackmail" text message to Mr Craig) — Status: Dismissed (paras [81]-[92]).

The Authority examined the text message from an employment law perspective (Ms Hull's obligations to her employer). It found: (a) Ms Hull reasonably believed Mr Lawrence had already resigned as director based on his own written statements; (b) the text was drafted, shown to, and approved by Mrs Lawrence before being sent; and (c) Ms Hull was thus carrying out a reasonable instruction from her employer's authorised representative. Mr Craig's reply contained no conditions tied to Mr Lawrence's departure. No breach of employment obligations occurred.

5. Was Ms Hull justifiably dismissed for serious misconduct (the "begging email" to a potential funder) — Status: Dismissed (paras [93]-[102]).

Mr Lawrence alleged Ms Hull's February 2023 email to a funder mentioning her own financial sacrifices caused the funder to decline investment. The Authority found the email was a truthful account of circumstances typical of a start-up CEO, that the funder declined for its own stated reasons (timeline to sales commencement) after full due diligence, and that Mr Lawrence had accepted those reasons at the time and raised no concern until over 12 months later, after he had already decided he wanted Ms Hull "out."

6. Was Ms Hull's sole duty to bring in funds, and did her failure to do so amount to serious misconduct — Status: Dismissed (paras [103]-[111]).

Ms Hull's employment agreement and attached position description listed seven broad categories of duties encompassing overall management, board collaboration, financial oversight, and ESG culture — not merely fundraising. Mr Lawrence acknowledged Ms Hull had brought in significant funds and performed other duties but claimed she had not done enough. The Authority found this allegation was not made out on the facts.

7. Did Ms Hull attempt a hostile takeover of Sleaktek via the CAP table discussions — Status: Dismissed (paras [112]-[117]).

Contemporaneous email correspondence, including Mr Lawrence's own positive email to Mr Craig after the meeting, confirmed these discussions were part of ongoing planning involving all parties (including Mr Lawrence himself), and no concluded agreement was reached or intended. The allegation was not made out.

8. Did Ms Hull conduct a secret pre-meeting with Mr Craig in breach of Mr Lawrence's instructions — Status: Dismissed (paras [118]-[119]).

The Authority preferred the evidence of Ms Hull and Mr Craig that Ms Hull arrived early and the brief period before others arrived was used for preparation rather than a separate secret meeting. No breach of instructions occurred.

9. Was the procedural and substantive test for serious misconduct dismissal met (s 103A, s 103) — Status: Not established (paras [120]-[121]).

As a completeness finding, the Authority noted that none of the alleged misconduct matters were put to Ms Hull before the dismissal decision, she was never invited to respond, and the correspondence did not identify what the allegations were. Even if any misconduct had been substantively arguable, the process was entirely absent, meaning s 103A was not satisfied in any event.

10. Did Ms Hull suffer unjustified disadvantage arising from a predetermined restructure process — Status: Established (paras [122]-[124]).

Under s 103 of the Act, an unjustified disadvantage arises where the employee's employment or any condition of it is affected to her disadvantage by an unjustifiable action of the employer. Mr Lawrence stated openly that the restructure was needed regardless of available funding to get Ms Hull "out," demonstrating predetermination. Ms Hull was deprived of any real opportunity to advocate for alternatives. The Authority found this disadvantage established.

11. Did Ms Hull suffer unjustified disadvantage from Mr Lawrence speaking negatively about her in front of third parties — Status: Established (paras [125]-[126]).

On at least two undisputed occasions (the meeting with Sleaktek's lawyer in late March 2024, and the 17 April 2024 meeting with the Craigs), Mr Lawrence publicly questioned Ms Hull's integrity and competence. Mrs Lawrence herself later apologised and maintained this view at the investigation meeting. The Authority found these public criticisms deprived Ms Hull of her right to fair treatment and damaged her professional relationships; the unjustified disadvantage was established.

12. Other alleged grounds of unjustified disadvantage (preventing Ms Hull from performing duties; threatening or unreasonable written/verbal statements; making misconduct findings without justification) — Status: Not reached (para [127]).

The Authority considered these matters were already addressed in its findings on unjustified dismissal and the dismissed misconduct allegations, and found it unnecessary to make further findings.

13. Did the respondents breach the statutory duty of good faith owed to Ms Hull — Status: Not reached (paras [128]-[129]).

The Authority noted that good faith submissions were addressed by the underlying findings on unjustified dismissal and disadvantage and the employment agreement breaches; it found no need for separate further findings on good faith.

14. Did contribution under s 124 of the Act apply to reduce remedies — Status: Dismissed (paras [130]-[135]).

The test (from Goodfellow v Building Connexion Ltd [2010] NZEmpC 82) requires that the employee's conduct be both causative of the outcome and blameworthy (a breach of duty). The Authority found Ms Hull's conduct was neither: her actions did not breach her obligations, the dismissal was ostensibly on a "no-fault" redundancy basis, and Sleaktek's later shift to alleged misconduct did not establish blameworthy contribution. No reduction was applied.

15. Was Ms Hull entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)) for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [139]-[140]).

The Authority accepted Ms Hull's evidence of personal and professional distress, reputational harm from repeated public misconduct allegations, need for medical treatment and medication, significant lifestyle changes, and having to seek employment in Australia. The contradictory and unresolved justifications for dismissal and the absence of any consultation process were also weighed. An award of $35,000 was made (against the $50,000 sought).

16. Was Ms Hull entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings for unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [141]).

Recognising the public nature of Mr Lawrence's comments (but that the audience was limited to Sleaktek's lawyer and investors), the degree of predetermination, and the need to avoid "double dipping," the Authority awarded $10,000 (against the $50,000 sought).

17. Was Ms Hull entitled to lost wages under s 123(1)(b) and s 128 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [142]-[144]).

Ms Hull lost remuneration as a result of the unjustified dismissal. The Authority awarded three months' ordinary time remuneration of $50,000 gross (at $200,000 p.a.), and declined to award more than the s 128 cap given the separate notice period award.

18. Was Ms Hull entitled to wage arrears for the period 1 April to 11 June 2024 and holiday pay on those arrears — Status: Established (paras [145]-[146]).

Ms Hull had a contractual entitlement to salary throughout her employment. Sleaktek's unilateral decision to stop paying her (as confirmed by contemporaneous correspondence from Mr Lawrence) was not excused by lack of funds in the absence of any agreement. The Authority awarded $38,717.93 gross in unpaid salary plus $3,097.43 in holiday pay (8%), totalling $41,815.36 gross.

19. Was Ms Hull entitled to a contractual notice period of 4 weeks — Status: Established (paras [147]-[149]).

Ms Hull's employment agreement provided for a 4-week notice period on redundancy. Sleaktek could not rely on its later (unestablished) serious misconduct allegations to avoid this contractual entitlement. The Authority also exercised discretion under s 128(3) given the length of time Ms Hull took to find new employment and her need to relocate to Australia. Awarded: $15,384.61 gross plus $1,230.77 holiday pay, totalling $16,615.38 gross.

20. Was Ms Hull entitled to unpaid annual holiday pay on termination under the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [150]-[156]).

Annual holiday pay is a statutory minimum entitlement under the Holidays Act 2003 (s 6) that cannot be contracted out of. Using payslip records (accrual of 16 hours/month, consistent with 5 weeks p.a. as per the employment agreement schedule), and a daily rate of $769.20, and deducting 14 days leave already taken from a 50-day entitlement over 2 years, the Authority awarded $27,692.28 gross (ss 27 and 83 Holidays Act 2003; s 132 ERA).

21. Should a penalty be awarded against Sleaktek for breach of the employment agreement (failure to pay wages) under s 134(1) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [157]-[163]).

The failure to pay wages was a breach of the employment agreement and of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983. Applying the Nicholson v Ford [2018] NZEmpC 132 penalty factors, the breach was intentional, specific, ongoing, and deliberate (confirmed by Mr Lawrence's correspondence). A starting point of $20,000 was discounted by 20% for the nature of the withholding and more significantly for the start-up's limited means, resulting in a total penalty of $7,000: $5,000 to Ms Hull and $2,000 to the Crown.

22. Should a penalty be awarded against Mr Lawrence personally under s 134(2) of the Act for aiding/abetting breach of the employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [164]-[167]).

Mr Lawrence, as managing director, made and confirmed in writing the decision to cease paying Ms Hull's salary and directed payment to others in preference to her. He had the requisite knowledge to be found to have incited, aided, or abetted the breach. Given the individual penalty cap of $10,000 under s 135, his government superannuation income, and the historically modest awards under this section, a penalty of $1,500 (all to Ms Hull) was imposed.

23. Should Mr Lawrence be declared a "person involved in a breach of employment standards" under s 142W of the Act — Status: Established (paras [168]-[172]).

The Authority found all elements of s 142W satisfied: the failure to pay wages was a breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (an employment standard under s 5); Mr Lawrence was an officer (sole director) of Sleaktek; and he was knowingly and directly concerned in the breach by virtue of his decision-making control over the company. The declaration was made.

24. Should leave be granted under s 142Y to recover monies from Mr Lawrence personally if Sleaktek cannot pay — Status: Established (paras [173]-[176]).

Having made the s 142W declaration and found a default in payment of wages constituting a breach of employment standards, the Authority granted leave for Ms Hull to recover any monies payable by Sleaktek from Mr Lawrence personally to the extent Sleaktek is unable to pay.

25. Should interest be awarded on unpaid wages, holiday pay, and notice payments — Status: Established (paras [177]-[178]).

The Authority has power to award interest under clause 11 of Schedule Two of the Act, informed by the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016. Interest was awarded on the unpaid salary, unpaid annual holiday pay, and contractual notice payments (subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of the orders), running from 11 June 2024 to the date of payment in full, calculated via the Civil Debt Calculator.

26. Sleaktek's counterclaim for $150,000 damages for hurt and humiliation — Status: Dismissed (paras [180]-[183]).

Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) is only available to employees with an established personal grievance, not to employers and not to limited liability companies. The Authority found it had no power to make such an award in favour of Sleaktek.

27. Sleaktek's counterclaim for $100,000 in general damages — Status: Dismissed (paras [184]).

The claim was unparticularised. The Authority treated it as connected to the serious misconduct allegations (misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary obligations, defamation, conspiracy, blackmail), all of which were dismissed above. No award was made.

28. Sleaktek/Mr Lawrence's claim for reimbursement of power bills and lease fees — Status: Dismissed (paras [185]-[187]).

These were business expenses of Sleaktek incurred (partly after Ms Hull's dismissal) by Mr Lawrence and Mr Kanji in the course of ongoing product work. Ms Hull did not commit Sleaktek to these expenses and was not found in breach of any obligations. She was not personally liable for Sleaktek's business outgoings.

29. Sleaktek's claim for return of shares in Sleaktek Holdings Limited gifted to Hull Corporate Trustee Limited — Status: Dismissed (paras [188]-[192]).

The shares were gifted by Mrs Lawrence's company (Tisane Limited) to Hull Corporate Trustee Limited — a transaction between third parties not party to Ms Hull's employment agreement. There was no written agreement conditioning the gift on Ms Hull's continued employment or performance. The claim of acquisition under false pretences was unsupported by evidence. Additionally, the Authority questioned its jurisdiction over third parties not party to the employment relationship. No orders were made.

30. Sleaktek's claim for $30,000 costs against Ms Hull — Status: Not reached (paras [198]-[200]).

Costs were reserved for all parties. The Authority encouraged negotiation between the parties, with a process for lodging memoranda if needed.

31. Costs generally — Status: Reserved (paras [198]-[200]).

Costs were reserved for both parties, to be determined on the usual daily tariff basis if not resolved between the parties, with the applicant able to lodge a memorandum within 28 days.

32. Whether the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 should be taken into account (raised by respondents) — Status: Not reached.

The respondents raised this in their counterclaim statement. The Authority did not address this provision separately, having disposed of all misconduct and counterclaims on the facts and on employment law grounds.

Ms Hull's claims were upheld in full; all respondents' counterclaims were dismissed; remedies including compensation, wage arrears, holiday pay, penalties, and a s 142W declaration were awarded.

- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings — unjustified dismissal): $35,000 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings — unjustified disadvantage): $10,000 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Combined HHD order as stated in the orders: $45,000 without deduction (to Ms Hull)
- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b) / s 128 — 3 months at $200,000 p.a.): $50,000 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Unpaid wage arrears (1 April–11 June 2024) plus 8% holiday pay thereon: $41,815.36 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Contractual notice period (4 weeks) plus 8% holiday pay: $16,615.38 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Unpaid annual holiday pay on termination: $27,692.28 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Penalty against Sleaktek (s 134(1) — breach of employment agreement/Wages Protection Act): $7,000 total — $5,000 to Ms Hull; $2,000 to Crown account
- Penalty against Mr Lawrence personally (s 134(2) — aiding/abetting breach): $1,500 to Ms Hull
- Declaration: Mr Lawrence is a person involved in a breach of employment standards under s 142W ERA 2000
- Leave granted under s 142Y for Ms Hull to recover any monies payable by Sleaktek from Mr Lawrence personally to the extent Sleaktek is unable to pay
- Interest: On unpaid salary/holiday pay arrears, notice period, and annual holiday pay on termination — running from 11 June 2024 to date of payment in full, calculated via the Civil Debt Calculator
- Reinstatement: Not sought / not ordered
- Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve; applicant may lodge memorandum within 28 days if needed
- Remedies against Ms Hull: None ordered (all counterclaims dismissed)

Khajen S. Raj Kumar, a management accountant employed by Steel and Tube Holdings Limited from March 2022, brought a personal grievance alleging unjustifiable dismissal and disadvantage following the disestablishment of his role through redundancy in December 2024. The key legal questions were whether the redundancy was substantively genuine and procedurally fair under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether S&T breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act. All claims were dismissed; the Authority found the redundancy genuine and the process substantially fair.

Applicant: Khajen S. Raj Kumar (employee/management accountant)
Respondent: Steel and Tube Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Heather Stephens, advocate
Respondent: Joshua Kimpton, counsel

Mr Kumar was employed as a management accountant in S&T's distribution division from 7 March 2022, supporting financial reporting and business performance analysis. On 18 November 2024, he was invited to a meeting the following day at which S&T presented a workplace change proposal that identified his role as the only position proposed for disestablishment, as part of a broader cost-reduction exercise across multiple divisions. Mr Kumar was given an opportunity to provide feedback and did so, including a counterproposal to expand the scope of his role. A decision meeting on 28 November 2024 confirmed the redundancy; his employment ended on 13 December 2024. Mr Kumar raised a personal grievance on 28 February 2025, alleging the redundancy was not genuine (asserting his role was core and the decision predetermined), that S&T failed to provide all relevant information, failed to properly consider his feedback, and failed to adequately explore redeployment. S&T denied all claims, asserting genuine business reasons and a fair process.

1. Whether the redundancy was substantively justified (genuine business reason) — Status: Established (paras [22]-[30]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, asking whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as S&T did, and following Grace Team Accounting Ltd v Brake [2014] NZCA 541 that redundancy must rest on valid and demonstrable commercial reasons and cannot be a pretext. S&T provided evidence of publicly listed financial results, internal financial briefings, prior redundancies (including another management accountant in a different division), and seven simultaneous change proposals across the business. The Authority accepted that task redistribution—though it reallocated rather than eliminated duties—was a genuine cost-saving measure and that S&T was entitled to reorganise regardless of Mr Kumar's disagreement. The redundancy was found to be substantively justified.

2. Whether the restructure process was carried out in a fair and reasonable manner (procedural justification under s 103A) — Status: Established (paras [31]-[40]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test with reference to Simpson Farms v Aberhart [2006] ERNZ 825 on the obligation to genuinely consult and keep an open mind. S&T gave written notice of the meeting, invited a support person, allowed Mr Kumar to record the meeting, extended the consultation period on request, and expressly stated no final decision had been made. The claim of predetermination was rejected after detailed review of transcripts; the Authority accepted Mr Smyth saw disestablishment as a likely but not foregone conclusion, and was genuinely open to alternatives. While the process was somewhat rushed and feedback could have been discussed in more detail, no procedural defects were significant enough to render the dismissal unjustified.

3. Whether S&T provided all relevant information to Mr Kumar (good faith obligation under s 4) — Status: Dismissed (paras [41], [47]).

The Authority noted the obligation under s 4 to provide all relevant information so employees can meaningfully influence the decision, drawing on Grace Team Accounting Ltd v Brake. It found Mr Kumar had access to publicly available financial results, internal financial meeting information, and S&T commenced the first consultation meeting by referencing those financials openly. The assertion that no verifying data was provided was not supported by the evidence.

4. Whether S&T genuinely considered Mr Kumar's feedback — Status: Partially established as a deficiency but not sufficient to vitiate justification (paras [42], [47]-[48], [53]).

The Authority acknowledged that, given the effort Mr Kumar put into his feedback and the short timeframe, it would have been more respectful to discuss the feedback in more detail. However, the transcript of the 28 November 2024 meeting showed S&T had met and considered the feedback before making its decision. This procedural shortcoming was minor and would not have changed the outcome.

5. Whether redeployment opportunities were adequately considered — Status: Partially established as a deficiency but not resulting in unfairness (paras [43]-[46]).

S&T committed in its written proposal to actively explore redeployment opportunities but in practice relied on Mr Kumar to monitor the careers page himself without actively investigating alternatives. The Authority found S&T did not fully meet the obligation it set for itself. However, because there were no suitable alternative positions available at the relevant time, Mr Kumar was not treated unfairly in practice, and the deficiency did not affect the outcome.

6. Whether S&T breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [47]-[50]).

The Authority briefly addressed this, finding no evidence of any breach of good faith by either party. Both parties were professional, responsive, and communicative; Mr Kumar had access to all relevant information; meetings were conducted respectfully; and EAP and HR support was offered. The Authority declined to award a penalty because any procedural defects identified were not deliberate, serious, sustained, or intended to undermine the employment relationship.

7. Whether S&T breached Schedule 2 of the employment agreement (dispute resolution processes) — Status: Dismissed (para [51]).

The Authority found no evidence of a breach of the dispute resolution processes in the employment agreement; the parties had attended mediation.

8. Whether remedies (lost wages and s 123(1)(c)(i) compensation) should be awarded — Status: Not reached (para [56]).

As all personal grievance claims were unsuccessful, no remedies were considered.

9. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [56]).

This issue did not arise as no remedies were awarded.

10. Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs — Status: Reserved (paras [57]-[59]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, S&T may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Mr Kumar having 14 days to reply. Costs, if determined, would be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis.

All of Mr Kumar's claims were dismissed in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending potential memoranda from the parties.

Pawan Kumar, a Financial Adviser employed by Enva Financial Limited (EFL), brought a personal grievance claim of constructive dismissal after resigning with his last day being 31 January 2025. The sole preliminary issue before the Authority was whether Mr Kumar had established exceptional circumstances justifying leave to raise his personal grievance out of time under s 114(4) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, given the grievance was lodged 33 days after the 90-day statutory deadline. The Authority found that Mr Kumar had not established exceptional circumstances and declined to grant leave, effectively ending his personal grievance claims.

Applicant: Pawan Kumar (employee, former Financial Adviser)
Respondent: Enva Financial Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Michael Smythe, counsel for the Respondent

Pawan Kumar was employed as a Financial Adviser by Enva Financial Limited from 27 March 2024, with his last working day being 31 January 2025, when he resigned in disputed circumstances. Mr Kumar lodged an application with the Authority on 3 June 2025 asserting he had been constructively dismissed. EFL responded that Mr Kumar had not raised a personal grievance within the statutory 90-day timeframe (which would have expired approximately 1 May 2025) and did not consent to it being raised out of time. Separately, EFL made a counter-application on 17 June 2025 claiming Mr Kumar had breached post-employment obligations. The parties agreed to resolve the preliminary time-bar issue by written submissions, which were received on 22 May 2026. Mr Kumar argued that EFL's post-resignation conduct, including alleged bad faith negotiations and economic pressure, as well as his deteriorating mental health (supported by a GP consultation note of 31 May 2025), constituted exceptional circumstances; EFL denied this and argued the sole purpose of the late grievance was to hinder its recovery of money owed.

1. Whether Mr Kumar raised his personal grievance within the statutory 90-day timeframe under s 114(1) and (2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [3], [21]).

The 90-day timeframe is a statutory requirement under s 114(1) of the Act. The Authority found that Mr Kumar did not raise a personal grievance within 90 days of his last working day (31 January 2025), with his application being lodged 33 days late. There was no suggestion or documentation that Mr Kumar sufficiently identified a personal grievance while employed or within the statutory period.

2. Whether Mr Kumar established exceptional circumstances to justify leave to raise the personal grievance out of time under s 114(4) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]–[20]).

The Authority applied the Supreme Court's formulation in Creedy v Commissioner of Police [2008] 1 ERNZ 109, which defines "exceptional circumstances" as those that are unusual, outside the ordinary course, or uncommon — not requiring uniqueness or rarity. Mr Kumar advanced two grounds: (a) that EFL's alleged bad faith conduct and post-resignation economic pressure deterred him from pursuing a grievance; and (b) that his mental health deterioration prevented him from raising the grievance in time under s 115(b) of the Act. The Authority rejected both grounds: EFL's post-employment conduct could not engage the good faith duty (per Balfour v The Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2007] ERNZ 808), and the medical evidence (a GP note of 31 May 2025) post-dated the expiry of the limitation period and showed Mr Kumar was functioning normally — contrary to his claim of a "physiological collapse." The Authority found exceptional circumstances were not established.

3. Whether it would be just to grant leave under s 114(4)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [17]–[20]).

Even if exceptional circumstances had been found, the Authority considered whether it was just to grant leave, examining the length of the delay, prejudice to EFL, and the merits of the underlying claim. The 33-day delay was found not insignificant and inadequately explained. Granting leave would unduly prejudice EFL. Mr Kumar had not raised his concerns with EFL during employment, and there was controversy about potential post-employment breaches on his part that could severely restrict any remedy. The Authority found Mr Kumar's prospects of establishing constructive dismissal were too remote to allow the matter to proceed.

4. EFL's counter-claim for breach of post-employment obligations — Status: Not reached (para [4], [23]).

EFL filed a separate application on 17 June 2025 claiming Mr Kumar had breached post-employment obligations. This matter was not determined in the preliminary hearing and remains unresolved. The Authority encouraged the parties to resolve all outstanding issues, including EFL's counter-claims, on a mutually agreed basis.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [22]–[26]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to negotiate resolution of costs (and all outstanding matters) between themselves. If unresolved, EFL may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Kumar having 14 days to reply. The Authority will assess costs on its usual daily tariff basis if required.

The claim was dismissed: the Authority declined to grant leave for Mr Kumar's personal grievance to proceed out of time, finding he had not established exceptional circumstances under s 114(4) of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

None ordered. Costs are reserved, with a process outlined for the parties to resolve costs by agreement or by memoranda to the Authority within specified timeframes.

[COSTS ONLY]

Dilpreet Kaur and Amanda Gilbert (employees) brought employment claims against Summerset Group Holdings Limited (employer), which were dismissed in a substantive determination dated 7 May 2026. This determination deals solely with the question of costs following that dismissal. The Authority awarded the respondent $4,500 in total costs contribution, split equally between the two applicants at $2,250 each.

Applicant: Dilpreet Kaur and Amanda Gilbert (employees)
Respondent: Summerset Group Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate
Respondent: Greg Cain, counsel

Both applicants had their employment claims dismissed by the Authority in a substantive determination issued on 7 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 285). The investigation meeting was held over one day, concluding at approximately 3.30 pm, with written closing submissions filed afterwards. Following the dismissal of their claims, the parties were unable to agree on costs and filed memoranda for the Authority to determine the matter. The respondent sought costs at the standard daily tariff of $4,500 for one hearing day. The applicants opposed any costs award, arguing their claims were brought in good faith, were not frivolous, and that an award would cause them undue financial hardship following their redundancies; they provided no supporting financial evidence for that hardship claim.

1. Whether costs should follow the event in favour of the successful respondent — Status: Established (paras [8]-[10]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The applicable principles, drawn from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135 at [114], are that costs should be modest and represent a reasonable contribution to costs actually and reasonably incurred, not a punishment. The Authority held that costs follow the event and, as the respondent was the successful party, it was entitled to a contribution to its costs.

2. Whether the standard daily tariff of $4,500 was the appropriate starting point — Status: Established (paras [3]-[5], [11]-[12]).

The Authority's well-known daily tariff approach sets $4,500 for the first hearing day and $3,500 for subsequent days. Given the investigation meeting was concluded by approximately 3.30 pm and written submissions followed, the Authority determined that the standard one-day tariff of $4,500 properly applied. The respondent sought no adjustment upward or downward from that starting point.

3. Whether costs should lie where they fall (i.e., no award) because the applicants' claims were brought in good faith and were not frivolous — Status: Dismissed (paras [13]-[15]).

The applicants argued that their claims were legitimate, of sufficient complexity to warrant a formal hearing, and that a costs award would act as a punishment or deterrent to employees raising genuine concerns. The Authority rejected this, noting that the applicants themselves acknowledged the complexity of the issues, and that costs regimes are a well-established part of litigation. The Authority found no basis to decline an award that would otherwise properly be made.

4. Whether a downward adjustment to costs should be made on the ground of the applicants' financial hardship — Status: Dismissed (paras [16]-[18]).

The applicants submitted they were not in a financial position to meet a significant costs award without undue hardship following their redundancies. The Authority found this submission to be unsupported: no detail of the financial difficulties was provided, no definition of "undue hardship" was given, and no supporting financial evidence was filed. The Authority declined to make any downward adjustment on the basis of financial hardship where it was asserted but not evidenced.

5. How the costs award should be apportioned between the two applicants — Status: Established (para [19]).

Both applicants' claims were determined in a single investigation meeting and the Authority considered that time was evenly divided between them. Accordingly, the $4,500 award was split equally, with each applicant liable for $2,250.

The costs application was upheld in favour of the respondent; each applicant was ordered to pay $2,250 as a contribution to the respondent's costs.

Costs: $4,500 total awarded to the respondent — Dilpreet Kaur ordered to pay $2,250 and Amanda Gilbert ordered to pay $2,250, each within 28 days of the date of the determination.
No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination).

This determination concerns an application by employee MHT for a permanent non-publication order in proceedings against employer KAZ. Following the Authority's earlier refusal of interim reinstatement and a subsequent successful mediation resolving the substantive employment dispute, the only remaining issue was whether the interim non-publication order should be made permanent. The Authority granted the permanent non-publication order, finding that the ends of justice warranted departure from open justice given the sensitive health matters involved.

Applicant: MHT (employee)
Respondent: KAZ (employer)

Applicant: Fiona Dalziel, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Rachel Webster, counsel for the Respondent

MHT brought employment relationship claims against KAZ and sought interim reinstatement pending the Authority's substantive investigation. By a determination dated 24 June 2026, the Authority declined the application for interim reinstatement and made an interim non-publication order protecting the names and identifying details of both parties, pending further order. Following that interim determination, the parties attended mediation and resolved the substantive dispute. The only matter remaining for the Authority's determination was whether the interim non-publication order should be made permanent. MHT submitted in favour of a permanent order, citing sensitive health matters and the absence of any public interest in the parties' identities. KAZ did not oppose the making of a permanent non-publication order.

1. Whether a permanent non-publication order should be made in respect of the names and identifying details of the parties — Status: Established (paras [10]–[15]).

The Authority applied the test from MW v Spiga Ltd [2024] NZEmpC 147 at [87] and [92], affirming that open justice is of fundamental importance and may only be departed from to the extent necessary to serve the ends of justice or where the administration of justice may weigh against full openness. The test is not simply whether specific adverse consequences would follow from publication, but whether departure from open justice is necessary in all the circumstances. The Authority was satisfied that there was reason to believe specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected if the parties were identified, particularly given the involvement of sensitive health matters, and that there was no legitimate public interest in the identity of the parties (notwithstanding some possible public interest in the proceeding itself). The permanent non-publication order was granted under cl 10(1) of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

2. Whether costs should be awarded in respect of the non-publication application — Status: Dismissed (para [17]).

The Authority made no order as to costs on the non-publication application, directing that costs shall lie where they fall. No reasons beyond this direction were stated.

The application for a permanent non-publication order was upheld; costs were not awarded to either party.

Non-publication: A permanent order is made under cl 10(1) of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000 prohibiting publication of the names and/or any identifying details of the parties.
Costs: None ordered; costs lie where they fall.

Lyndal Midgley (applicant/employee) has a dispute against The Priory in New Zealand of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem (respondent/employer). This determination is solely a preliminary procedural ruling made at a case management conference, issuing non-publication orders in respect of a witness's identity and medical evidence, and the fact and content of a confidential Record of Settlement relating to another individual. No merits issues have been decided at this stage.

Applicant: Lyndal Midgley (employee)
Respondent: The Priory in New Zealand of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in Person)
Respondent: Chloe Luscumbe, counsel for the Respondent

Lyndal Midgley has filed an employment relationship problem against her employer, The Priory in New Zealand of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem. The underlying merits of the dispute have not yet been addressed. A case management conference was held on 7 August 2026 at which procedural matters were agreed between the parties. Two non-publication orders were consented to: one concerning the identity and medical evidence of a witness referred to as FSK, and one concerning the fact and content of a confidential Record of Settlement relating to another individual, Adam Craven. The rationale for both orders was agreed upon and accepted by the Authority Member.

1. Whether a non-publication order should be made in respect of the identity and medical evidence of witness FSK — Status: Established (paras [1], [3], [4]).

The Authority applied Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which grants power to make non-publication orders. The Member accepted that identifying the witness and disclosing her medical evidence would cause distress and harm to her. Accordingly, the witness is to be referred to only by the initials FSK (bearing no relationship to her actual name), and all identifying details and medical evidence about her are subject to a non-publication order.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made in respect of the fact and content of the Record of Settlement relating to Adam Craven — Status: Established (paras [2], [3], [4]).

Again applying Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Member accepted there is a recognised public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of mediated settlements. The fact and content of the Record of Settlement relating to Adam Craven, which is subject to confidentiality under its own terms, are not to be published.

The determination was upheld in full as a preliminary procedural ruling; both non-publication orders were granted by consent.

None ordered on the merits. Two non-publication orders were made under Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000: (1) prohibiting publication of the name, identifying details, and medical evidence of witness FSK; and (2) prohibiting publication of the fact and content of the Record of Settlement relating to Adam Craven. The substantive merits of the employment dispute remain to be determined.

Alaa Abdelmeguid Imbarak Abdelmeguid (Sheikh Alaa), an imam employed by North Shore Islamic Trust (NSIT), brought claims for unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, wage arrears, and penalties following NSIT's March 2022 communication that it would not pursue his return to New Zealand. NSIT counterclaimed for repayment of an air ticket advance and damages for alleged pre-employment misrepresentation. The Authority dismissed all of Sheikh Alaa's claims and NSIT's misrepresentation claim, but ordered Sheikh Alaa to repay the $6,510.80 air ticket advance to NSIT.

Applicant: Alaa Abdelmeguid Imbarak Abdelmeguid (employee/imam)
Respondent: North Shore Islamic Trust (employer/charitable trust operating a mosque)

Applicant: Arunjeev Singh, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: John Burley, counsel for the Respondent

Sheikh Alaa, an Al-Azhar-trained imam, was employed by NSIT from 24 July 2019 under a series of successive fixed-term individual employment agreements (IEAs), with a base salary of $33,000 per annum. He had previously been associated with NSIT since 2016 under an Al-Azhar envoy programme. On 29 May 2021 he departed New Zealand for Egypt on planned annual leave; due to COVID-19 border restrictions and the decline of his critical purpose visa (CPV) application, he was unable to return. NSIT actively supported his visa efforts but, with Ramadan approaching and no prospect of return, on 11 March 2022 wrote to Sheikh Alaa advising it would seek another imam, which Sheikh Alaa characterised as a dismissal. Sheikh Alaa claimed wage arrears for alleged excess hours worked (55 vs 40 per week), unpaid wages while overseas, holiday pay, public holiday pay, and notice pay, and alleged unjustified disadvantage through failures to keep wage/time records and to provide suitable accommodation. NSIT denied dismissal occurred, asserted the employment relationship had ended or was frustrated, and counterclaimed for repayment of an air ticket advance and damages for pre-employment misrepresentation about Sheikh Alaa's Al-Azhar stipend.

1. Whether wage arrears of $20,424.13 (gross) were due for the period 24 July 2019 – 29 May 2021 (claimed on basis of 55 hours/week worked vs 40 hours/week paid) — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[38]).

The applicable test required Sheikh Alaa to establish each hour worked beyond the agreed 40-hour week for which payment was sought. The only IEA specifying hours (12 March 2019) recorded 40 hours/week, and the parties' successive IEAs were drafted with Sheikh Alaa's active involvement. No contemporaneous records (diary, timesheets) supported the 55-hour claim; Sheikh Alaa's own expert witness (Imam Fouda) confirmed an ordinary imam workload was 32–40 hours/week; and Sheikh Alaa's claim was characterised as a retrospective reconstruction rather than based on verifiable facts. The claim was dismissed.

2. Whether wage arrears of $14,444.42 (gross) were due for the period 1 August 2021 to 10 December 2021 (while Sheikh Alaa was overseas) — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[43]).

The governing IEA (4 February 2021) required Sheikh Alaa to be physically present in New Zealand to discharge his duties, including leading prayers at the mosque and residing at the provided accommodation. There was no evidence he sought or was directed to perform duties from Egypt, and he had not applied for an extended leave of absence as permitted under the IEA. The Authority was satisfied the express terms of the IEA, read in context, made New Zealand presence a condition of employment, and Sheikh Alaa could not establish he had performed contractual duties from Egypt entitling him to wages.

3. Whether annual leave and holiday pay arrears of $7,189.47 were due for 2019–2021 — Status: Dismissed (para [44]).

This claim was contingent on the success of the wage arrears claim at issue 1. Because no additional hours beyond 40 per week were established, no additional holiday or leave pay entitlement arose. The claim was dismissed without separate analysis.

4. Whether public holiday pay of $5,581.88 was due — Status: Dismissed (paras [45]-[48]).

The IEAs provided that public holiday pay was triggered only when Sheikh Alaa was "called out to work" on a public holiday by NSIT. There was no direct evidence he was ever directed by NSIT to work on a public holiday. The Authority held the specific "called out to work" provision governed over the general duty to lead prayers, and in the absence of any such direction, the claim failed.

5. Whether notice pay of $14,300 was due — Status: Dismissed (addressed as part of unjustified dismissal analysis at paras [49]-[55]).

Notice pay was premised on a finding of dismissal. Because the Authority found there was no dismissal (and no extant employment agreement at the relevant time), this claim necessarily failed.

6. Whether Sheikh Alaa was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [49]-[55]).

The test requires an existing employment relationship at the time of the alleged dismissal. The Authority found the IEA signed 19 March 2020 expired on 30 June 2021, and the 4 February 2021 IEA could not come into effect on 1 July 2021 because Sheikh Alaa could not perform his obligations (he was in Egypt). The parties' conduct — Sheikh Alaa not being paid, not seeking payment, not being directed to work, and both parties focused on his immigration status — was consistent with no extant agreement. Alternatively, if the 4 February 2021 IEA did come into effect, the Authority found the doctrine of frustration (citing DQJ v Commissioner of Inland Revenue Department [2025] NZEmpC 10) applied, as it was impossible for Sheikh Alaa to perform his obligations and all reasonable options had been exhausted. Accordingly, there was no dismissal.

7. Whether Sheikh Alaa was unjustifiably disadvantaged by NSIT's failure to maintain wage and time records — Status: Dismissed (paras [56]-[60]).

Under s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, an employer must keep wage and time records. However, the personal grievance must arise during employment. There was no evidence Sheikh Alaa ever requested his wage and time record during his employment; a pay slip summary was provided when he requested one for immigration purposes in March 2021. Because the breach (if any) was never triggered by a request during employment, the personal grievance was not established.

8. Whether Sheikh Alaa was unjustifiably disadvantaged by NSIT's failure to provide suitable accommodation — Status: Dismissed (paras [61]-[67]).

Sheikh Alaa alleged the shared bathroom facilities posed a risk of embarrassment and that there were pest problems, but acknowledged he never raised these concerns with NSIT (for fear of jeopardising NSIT's support for his residency application). The Authority found NSIT was unaware of the concerns, that any tangible risk from the bathroom configuration had not been objectively established, and that pest eradication steps had been taken. The personal grievance was not established.

9. Whether remedies for unjustified disadvantage should be awarded ($20,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Not reached (para [7](ii)).

Because neither unjustified disadvantage claim was established, the question of compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) did not arise.

10. Whether remedies for unjustified dismissal should be awarded ($40,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Not reached (para [7](iv)).

Because no unjustified dismissal was established, the question of compensation did not arise.

11. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for Sheikh Alaa's contributory/blameworthy conduct — Status: Not reached (para [7](v)).

As no grievances were established, the question of reduction for contributory conduct was moot.

12. Whether penalties should be imposed for: (a) failure to keep wage/time records (s 130(1) ERA); (b) failure to maintain good faith obligations (s 4 ERA); (c) failure to pay minimum wage (s 6 Minimum Wage Act 1983); (d) failure to pay public holiday entitlements (s 46 Holidays Act 2003); (e) failure to pay wages under the employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [68]).

No breaches of statutory duty or employment agreement were established in respect of any of Sheikh Alaa's claims. Accordingly, no basis for imposing penalties existed and the claim was not taken further.

13. Whether Sheikh Alaa was required to repay NSIT $6,510.80 for the air ticket advance — Status: Established (para [69]).

There was no dispute that this sum had been advanced to Sheikh Alaa by NSIT for the purpose of purchasing a return air ticket to New Zealand. The Authority ordered repayment within 21 days of the determination, noting that whether Sheikh Alaa received a refund on the ticket was irrelevant to his obligation to repay the advance.

14. Whether Sheikh Alaa breached his good faith obligations towards NSIT by misrepresenting that his Al-Azhar stipend had ceased, thereby inducing NSIT to pay him a salary it would not otherwise have paid (claim for damages of up to $129,000) — Status: Dismissed (paras [70]-[72]).

NSIT claimed actionable misrepresentation, seeking recovery of $30,000 plus approximately $99,000 in salary paid. The Authority found the evidence of what was represented, to whom, and what was understood was too fragmented to establish an actionable misrepresentation. Even if misrepresentation were established, NSIT had received the benefit of Sheikh Alaa's services and failed to undertake due diligence or negotiate a repayment mechanism. The claim was dismissed. A preliminary issue also arose as to whether pre-employment representations fell within the scope of an employment relationship problem (noted in footnote 3), but was not separately resolved given the dismissal of the substantive claim.

15. Whether either party was entitled to costs — Status: Reserved (para [74]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, NSIT was to lodge a costs memorandum within 14 days, with Sheikh Alaa to reply within a further 14 days. The Authority indicated it would apply the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in its entirety; NSIT's counterclaim for air ticket repayment was upheld, but its misrepresentation/damages claim was dismissed.

Repayment by Sheikh Alaa to NSIT: $6,510.80 (air ticket advance), payable within 21 days of the date of determination.
All of Sheikh Alaa's claims (wage arrears, holiday pay, public holiday pay, notice, unjustified dismissal and disadvantage compensation, penalties): None ordered.
NSIT's misrepresentation/damages claim: None ordered.
Costs: Reserved; process set out for parties to resolve or seek determination.

[COSTS ONLY]

Rex Matthews (employee/applicant) brought an unjustifiable dismissal claim against Napier City Automotive Limited (employer/respondent), which was dismissed in full by the Authority's earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 116). This costs determination resolves the outstanding costs question following that dismissal. The Authority applied the standard daily tariff for a two-day investigation meeting, rejecting both the respondent's application for an uplift and the applicant's application for a downward adjustment, awarding $8,000 in costs against the applicant.

Applicant: Rex Matthews (employee)
Respondent: Napier City Automotive Limited (employer)

Applicant: Justin Cameron, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Jol Bates, counsel for the Respondent

The Authority's substantive determination, issued on 20 March 2026, dismissed Rex Matthews' claim of unjustifiable dismissal against Napier City Automotive Limited. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed memoranda on the issue. Matthews advised he had filed a challenge to the Authority's determination in the Employment Court and sought a deferral of the costs determination pending a stay application; however, no stay application had been made before the court by the time the costs determination was issued. The investigation meeting was held over two days with parties, counsel, and witnesses attending in person, though the second day concluded at 12:30 pm. The respondent sought $11,000 (tariff plus uplift) citing significant document volume and complete success, while the applicant sought $6,250 (tariff with downward adjustment for the half-second day), citing no unusual complexity and late production of documents by the respondent.

1. Whether the costs determination should be deferred pending a stay application filed in the Employment Court — Status: Dismissed (paras [7]-[8]).

The applicant's counsel advised that a challenge and stay application had been or would be filed in the Employment Court, and requested deferral. The Authority noted that no stay application had actually been made before the court at the time of issuing this determination, and considered it proper to resolve and dispose of the costs application so as to bring all matters before the Authority to an end.

2. Whether an uplift above the standard two-day tariff ($8,000) was warranted — Status: Dismissed (paras [9]-[10], [17]-[21]).

The Authority applied the principles from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135 at 114, that costs awards are to be modest and represent a reasonable contribution, not a punishment. The respondent argued that significant documentation, complex business records, and success on all points justified an uplift to $11,000. The Authority rejected this, finding the documentation was not irrelevant or unusually complex, was directly related to the applicant and the employment relationship, and did not extend hearing time beyond what was reasonably expected. The Authority also cautioned against an uplift that could be seen as inappropriately penalising the applicant for losing, and noted that the early conclusion of the second day already effectively incorporated something equivalent to an uplift within the standard tariff.

3. Whether a downward adjustment from the two-day tariff was warranted — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[12], [22]-[24]).

The applicant argued that the second day of the investigation meeting was effectively a half-day (concluding at 12:30 pm), justifying a reduction of $1,750, and also criticised the respondent for late production of point-of-sale records and lack of written policies. The Authority rejected these arguments, finding that neither the late production nor the policy deficiencies extended hearing time or rose to the level of inappropriate or delaying conduct sufficient to reduce the tariff. The Authority noted that the matter was scheduled for two full days and counsel and the Authority needed to set aside that time regardless.

4. Determination of the appropriate costs award at the standard tariff for a two-day investigation meeting — Status: Established (paras [4]-[6], [15], [24]-[25]).

The Authority applied the standard daily tariff of $4,500 for the first hearing day and $3,500 for the second and subsequent days, consistent with its settled approach as a starting point for costs. As neither an uplift nor a downward adjustment was warranted, the two-day tariff of $8,000 was held to be the appropriate and reasonable contribution to costs. Matthews was ordered to pay $8,000 to the respondent within 28 days.

The costs application was resolved in favour of the respondent at the standard two-day tariff, with neither an uplift nor a downward adjustment applied.

Costs: $8,000 (inclusive), payable by Rex Matthews to Napier City Automotive Limited within 28 days of the date of this determination (20 August 2026). No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination following dismissal of the substantive claim).

[COSTS ONLY]

Mark John Betti (employee/applicant) brought an interim reinstatement application against G & S Brothers Limited (employer/respondent), which was declined in an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 251). Costs were reserved in that determination. This costs determination resolves the quantum of costs payable by Mr Betti to the respondent, with the Authority applying its standard daily tariff approach and ordering a total costs award of $6,250.

Applicant: Mark John Betti (employee)
Respondent: G & S Brothers Limited (employer)

Applicant: Conor Lennon, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Paul McBride, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Betti brought an application for interim reinstatement to the payroll of G & S Brothers Limited, which was declined by the Authority in a determination dated 28 April 2026 ([2026] NZERA 251). No other orders were made in that determination, and costs were reserved. The matter was determined on the papers following written submissions from both parties, with no in-person hearing. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed memoranda. The respondent sought indemnity costs of $12,000 plus GST (or alternatively $7,500 as a reasonable contribution), arguing the matter involved specific factual and legal issues, required onerous preparation, and that the applicant's claims had no reasonable prospect of success. The applicant submitted that only half a day's tariff ($2,250) should be awarded, arguing that the matter being determined on the papers reduced costs, and that an uplift was not justified merely because the application failed.

1. Whether indemnity costs should be awarded against the applicant — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]).

The Authority applied the principles established in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, as confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135 at 114, that costs should be modest and are not to be used as punishment. The Authority found the applicant's position was not so unmeritorious or frivolous as to warrant indemnity costs. The Authority also noted that costs awards are a contribution to costs incurred, not a reimbursement, and rejected the respondent's submission that the District Court or Employment Court cost scales should guide the assessment.

2. Whether the appropriate starting point for costs was the first day's daily tariff ($4,500) — Status: Established (paras [17]).

The Authority applied its standard daily tariff approach (currently $4,500 for the first day, $3,500 for subsequent days) as the starting point. Although the matter was determined on the papers, the Authority found this did not mean no costs award was appropriate, recognising that written submissions reduced hearing time but still required substantive work. The Authority assessed the matter as not a simple one, but not so complex as to require an in-person hearing, and set the starting point at $4,500 (equivalent to the first day's tariff).

3. Whether an uplift on the starting tariff figure was warranted — Status: Partially established (paras [18]-[22]).

The Authority considered whether conduct or other factors justified an uplift. It rejected indemnity costs and did not accept the respondent's submission that an award approaching two days' tariff was appropriate. However, it found that some uplift was warranted because substantive and meaningful submissions were required and there was an element of urgency to the proceedings as requested by the applicant. The Authority applied an uplift equivalent to half of the second day's tariff ($1,750), while remaining mindful that costs should be modest and not used to punish an unsuccessful applicant.

4. Whether GST should be included in the costs award — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]).

The Authority ordered that no GST would be awarded on the costs sum, resulting in a total costs award of $6,250 inclusive.

The costs application was partially upheld; Mr Betti is ordered to pay $6,250 to G & S Brothers Limited as a contribution to costs, with no GST awarded.

Costs: $6,250.00 (inclusive, no GST) payable by the applicant (Mark John Betti) to the respondent (G & S Brothers Limited) within 28 days of the date of the determination. No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination following the decline of the interim reinstatement application).

Paul Brendon Brown, a long-serving butcher employed by Alliance Group Limited since 1987, was summarily dismissed on 30 January 2026 after failing a second workplace drug test, despite having disclosed his use of prescribed medicinal cannabis to Alliance. The key legal questions were whether his conduct constituted serious misconduct, whether the dismissal process and substantive decision met the fair and reasonable employer standard under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether reinstatement and other remedies were appropriate. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified on both procedural and substantive grounds, ordered reinstatement (subject to an occupational health assessment), awarded $25,000 compensation for hurt and humiliation, and granted lost wages for the period from dismissal to the investigation meeting, with no reduction for contributory conduct.

Applicant: Paul Brendon Brown (employee/butcher)
Respondent: Alliance Group Limited (employer)

Applicant: Mary-Jane Thomas and Sam Welsh (counsel — firm not stated)
Respondent: Shaun Brookes and Amiria Bates (counsel — firm not stated)

Paul Brendon Brown commenced employment with Alliance Group Limited at the Mataura meat works in 1987, most recently as an A-grade butcher. Following a serious workplace injury in 2016 that caused chronic pain, Mr Brown was prescribed medicinal cannabis oil in 2022 and disclosed this prescription to Alliance's occupational health nurse and production manager. He failed a drug (saliva) test in July 2025, was issued a final written warning (not contested), placed on a Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Contract, and required to complete a counselling course tailored to recreational drug users. On 27 August 2026 [sic, presumably 2025 contextually, but the determination records a test on 27 August 2026 and dismissal on 30 January 2026 — the chronology in the document is internally complex], Alliance administered a targeted (not random) drug test and Mr Brown again returned a non-negative result. A brief disciplinary meeting on 30 January 2026 followed, lasting approximately 22 minutes; the decision to summarily dismiss was announced at that meeting. Mr Brown raised his prescription cannabis use and his intention to consult his GP about alternatives, but Alliance did not conduct any meaningful investigation into those contextual factors. Mr Brown raised a personal grievance through his union on 10 February 2026, mediation failed, and the matter proceeded to investigation meeting on 29–30 June 2026. Mr Brown sought reinstatement and compensatory remedies; Alliance opposed reinstatement on safety and trust grounds and raised a separate chair-pulling incident as subsequently discovered misconduct.

1. Whether Alliance conducted a sufficient investigation of the allegations against Mr Brown, satisfying s 103A(3)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (breach found) (paras [51]-[58]).

The Authority applied the s 103A(3) framework, which requires the employer to sufficiently investigate allegations given its available resources. Alliance had access to in-house counsel and group HR resources and was held to a high standard. The Authority found the investigation was extremely limited, concentrating only on the testing documentation, and failed to interview co-workers about signs of impairment, explore how Mr Brown's prior prescription disclosure was managed, or seek independent medical advice on the effects of his medication. Ms Wilson conceded in evidence that the investigation was very limited. The Authority found Alliance did not satisfy the investigation requirement of s 103A(3)(a).

2. Whether Alliance raised issues of concern with Mr Brown prior to deciding to dismiss, satisfying s 103A(3)(b) — Status: Partially established (paras [58]).

The Authority found Alliance fulfilled only the bare minimum of identifying concerns and holding a meeting with Mr Brown, but the process quickly morphed from an investigation into a disciplinary meeting without genuine reflection. The concerns were not adequately raised in a way that allowed meaningful engagement with Mr Brown's contextual explanations. While the threshold requirement of raising concerns was technically met, the overall process was inadequate.

3. Whether Mr Brown was afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to identified concerns, satisfying s 103A(3)(c) — Status: Dismissed (breach found) (paras [52]-[58]).

Although Mr Brown and his union organiser were present at the meeting and Mr Brown spoke at length, the Authority found the meeting was too brief and the decision to dismiss had effectively been made before genuine deliberation occurred. Mr Brown raised legitimately mitigating circumstances that were not adequately considered. The Authority rejected Alliance's submission that Mr Brown had a full opportunity to respond when represented.

4. Whether Alliance genuinely considered Mr Brown's explanation before deciding to dismiss, satisfying s 103A(3)(d) — Status: Dismissed (breach found) (paras [37]-[38], [54]-[58]).

The Authority found the decision to dismiss had effectively been made before any genuine reflection. Mr Caughey communicated the dismissal decision unequivocally during the meeting and did not consider Mr Brown's disclosed prescription cannabis use as a mitigating factor. Ms Wilson said managers had very limited discretion and that termination was automatic after a second failed drug test. The Authority found too much emphasis was placed on a rigid, simplistic application of the drug policy.

5. Whether Mr Brown's conduct constituted serious misconduct justifying summary dismissal (substantive justification) — Status: Dismissed (paras [59]-[72]).

Applying the two-step test from Emmanuel v Waikato District Health Board [2019] NZEmpC 81, the Authority considered whether the conduct was capable of amounting to serious misconduct and whether dismissal was warranted in all circumstances. The Authority found that given Mr Brown had disclosed his prescription use, was not observed exhibiting impaired behaviour, and Alliance had not established that he knowingly took medication in a manner he knew or ought to have known would cause a non-negative result, serious misconduct was not objectively established. A prior non-contested warning could not convert automatically into serious misconduct. The Authority also considered Australian Fair Work Commission decisions (Gauci v DPWorld Brisbane Pty Ltd; Mills v Glamorgan Spring Bay Council) as persuasive, noting that where prior disclosure of medicinal cannabis is known, the employer must consider individual circumstances and alternative options. Alliance's failure to consider these factors meant the substantive conclusion of serious misconduct could not be sustained.

6. Whether Alliance's drug and alcohol policy, and its obligation to manage safety risks in a safety-sensitive environment, justified dismissal under s 103A(4) — Status: Dismissed (paras [65]-[70]).

Alliance submitted that the safety-sensitive nature of the work (heavy machinery, abattoir environment) provided additional justification. The Authority acknowledged the legitimacy of drug testing in safety-sensitive environments, referencing Sharp v BCS Infrastructure Support Pty Ltd [2015] FWCFB 1033 and Gauci. However, it distinguished those cases on the basis that Alliance knew of Mr Brown's disclosed prescription for a lengthy period, had not established he was impaired, and had not genuinely explored alternatives. The safety justification did not override the obligation to consider individual medical circumstances consistent with good faith obligations.

7. Whether an issue of subsequently discovered misconduct (the chair-pulling incident) arose, and whether it could inform reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [78]-[82]).

Alliance raised evidence of a 22 January 2026 incident where Mr Brown allegedly pulled a chair from under a co-worker causing a minor injury. The Authority found Alliance had sufficient knowledge of the incident before the dismissal and chose not to include it in the disciplinary process, concluding they had insufficient evidence to put it to Mr Brown. The Authority held no issue of subsequently discovered misconduct arose. The Authority also declined to make an order permitting Alliance to investigate the chair incident post-reinstatement, as this would licence an investigation of a matter that was not dealt with at the time.

8. Whether reinstatement was practicable and reasonable under ss 123(1)(a) and 125 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [73]-[87]).

The Authority applied Christieson v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2021] NZEmpC 142, noting practicability and reasonableness are distinct considerations, and Lewis v Howick College Board of Trustees [2010] NZCA 320 on the onus resting with the employer. Alliance argued safety concerns made reintegration impractical. The Authority found no insurmountable practical difficulties and noted that, as trust and confidence had not been legitimately destroyed, Alliance had no practical or reasonable basis to oppose reinstatement. Reinstatement was ordered subject to an occupational health assessment.

9. Whether lost wages should be awarded under s 123(1)(b) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [89]-[90]).

The Authority found that given the unjustified summary dismissal and reinstatement order, Mr Brown's inability to find alternative employment in his area was reasonable. Lost wages were awarded for the period from 30 January 2026 (last working day) to 29 July 2026 (six months), to be calculated on the average of the preceding 12 months' total earnings.

10. Whether compensation for hurt, humiliation, and loss of dignity should be awarded under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [91]-[93]).

Mr Brown gave evidence of anxiety, depression, loss of purpose, and despair following his abrupt summary dismissal after 38 years' employment. The Authority accepted this evidence and found the dismissal caused genuine humiliation and loss of dignity, notwithstanding that Alliance management had treated Mr Brown with dignity during the disciplinary meeting itself. The Authority awarded $25,000.

11. Whether any remedy should be reduced due to Mr Brown's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [94]-[96]).

The Authority applied the framework from Maddigan v Director General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190. Given the finding that no serious misconduct was established and no evidence of reckless disregard for safety, the Authority found it would be conceptually inconsistent to treat Mr Brown's failing of a second drug test as a contribution to his personal grievance. No reduction was applied.

12. How costs should be dealt with — Status: Reserved (paras [98]-[101]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. A process was set out for filing and replying to a costs memorandum within 28 and 14 days respectively if needed.

The claim was upheld in full: the dismissal was found unjustified on both procedural and substantive grounds, reinstatement was ordered (subject to occupational health assessment), lost wages were granted, $25,000 compensation was awarded, and no reduction for contributory conduct was applied.

Reinstatement: Yes — permanent reinstatement to the position and seniority formerly occupied under s 123(1)(a), with Mr Brown placed back on the payroll from 23 August 2026 at his current equivalent wage; subject to completion of a specialist occupational health assessment before returning to active duties. If not completed by 2 October 2026, leave was granted for the parties to return to the Authority.
Lost wages: To be calculated on the average of the preceding 12 months' total earnings prior to dismissal, for the period 30 January 2026 to 29 July 2026 (approximately six months), under s 123(1)(b) — exact dollar amount not yet fixed.
Compensation (hurt/humiliation/loss of dignity): $25,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i), without deductions.
Contribution reduction: None.
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; process prescribed for Authority determination if required.

Four employee applicants (Amit Verma, Nishal Nikesh Lal, Siddhanth Prasad, and Mukeshwar Prasad) sought recovery of unpaid wage arrears and other entitlements from Ameer Akhtar Ali personally, following prior Authority determinations finding their employer Fiji Food Distributors Limited (FFDL) liable for employment standards breaches. The key legal question was whether Ali, as a person involved in those breaches, could be held personally liable for the wage arrears under ss 142W and 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000, given that FFDL had since gone into liquidation. The Authority found Ali personally liable and ordered payment of the full wage arrears and unlawful premium totalling over $464,000, plus interest and costs.

Applicant: Amit Verma (First Applicant/employee), Nishal Nikesh Lal (Second Applicant/employee), Siddhanth Prasad (Third Applicant/employee), Mukeshwar Prasad (Fourth Applicant/employee)
Respondent: Ameer Akhtar Ali (director of Fiji Food Distributors Limited/person involved in employment standards breaches)

Applicant: Rupert Ward, counsel for the Applicants
Respondent: No appearance

The four applicants were employees of Fiji Food Distributors Limited (FFDL), of which Ameer Akhtar Ali was a director. In a first determination dated 20 October 2025 (Prasad and Ors v Fiji Foods Distributors Limited and Ors [2025] NZERA 659), the Authority found FFDL had committed various breaches of employment standards including failure to pay wages and statutory entitlements, and that FFDL had unlawfully obtained a premium payment from Amit Verma to secure his employment. A second determination dated 21 April 2026 ([2026] NZERA 239) fixed the quantum of penalties against FFDL and granted each applicant leave to recover wage arrears from Ali personally under ss 142W and 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act), as a person involved in the breaches. Neither the awards nor the penalties from those determinations were paid, and FFDL subsequently went into liquidation. On 12 June 2026, the applicants applied for orders against Ali personally; Ali did not participate in the proceedings, did not file a statement in reply or brief of evidence, and made no appearance, though the Authority was satisfied he had been served.

1. Whether Ameer Akhtar Ali is personally liable for wage arrears and the unlawful premium as a person involved in FFDL's breaches of employment standards under ss 142W and 142Y of the Act — Status: Established (paras [5], [7]).

Section 142W of the Act provides that a person involved in a breach of employment standards may be held liable, and s 142Y permits recovery against such a person where the Authority grants prior leave. The Authority had already granted that leave in the second determination ([2026] NZERA 239). On the uncontested evidence before it (including a sworn affidavit from Nishal Nikesh Lal), the Authority found Ali was indeed a person involved in the identified breaches of failing to pay wages and statutory entitlements, and in obtaining an unlawful premium from Verma. Ali was therefore found personally liable to pay the amounts established in the first determination.

2. Whether recovery of penalties from Ali personally was available to the applicants under s 142X of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [5]).

Section 142X(2) of the Act confines recovery of penalties against a person involved in a breach to actions initiated "only by a Labour Inspector." Accordingly, the applicants could not themselves pursue recovery of the penalties ordered against FFDL from Ali personally. The Authority noted this limitation expressly and made no penalty order against Ali.

3. Whether Amit Verma could recover the unlawful premium payment from Ali personally — Status: Established (paras [5], [7], [8]).

The Authority confirmed that while penalty recovery by applicants from Ali was barred under s 142X(2), the unlawful premium of $8,000 paid by Verma to secure employment was recoverable as a monetary amount (not a penalty) from Ali personally. This was included in the order against Ali pursuant to ss 142Y and 137 of the Act.

4. Whether interest was payable on the unpaid wage arrears — Status: Established (para [9]).

The Authority ordered interest on the unpaid wage arrears in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016, running from 20 October 2025 (the date of the first determination) until actual payment. No contrary submissions were received.

5. Whether a costs contribution should be ordered against Ali in favour of the applicants — Status: Established (paras [11]–[12]).

Costs are at the Authority's discretion. The applicants were fully successful in establishing Ali's personal liability and obtaining compliance orders. Counsel sought a contribution toward costs of preparing the application, submissions and representation. The Authority found no reason to decline a costs order and fixed a contribution of $1,500 payable within 28 days.

The claims were upheld in full; Ameer Akhtar Ali was ordered to pay wage arrears totalling $456,363.35 plus an $8,000 unlawful premium reimbursement to Amit Verma, interest, and a $1,500 costs contribution.

Wage arrears ordered against Ameer Akhtar Ali personally:
- Siddhanth Prasad: $85,918.52
- Nishal Nikesh Lal: $136,802.31
- Amit Verma: $161,552.59 (wage arrears) + $8,000 (reimbursement of unlawful premium)
- Mukeshwar Prasad: $72,090.93
Total monetary orders: $464,363.35
Interest: Payable on unpaid wage arrears in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016 from 20 October 2025 until payment.
Payment deadline: All orders to be met by no later than 25 September 2026.
Reinstatement: No.
Costs: $1,500 payable by Ameer Akhtar Ali within 28 days of the determination.
Penalties: Not ordered against Ali (recovery limited to Labour Inspectors under s 142X(2) of the Act).

Matthew Apperley, a retail worker, brought claims against his employer Scott and Rickets Limited (SRL) arising from an incident on 26 December 2024 when he felt unwell at work and says he was refused sick leave. He sought remedies for constructive dismissal and breach of good faith, as well as raising subsidiary issues about Privacy Act compliance, victim impact statements, and welfare checks. The Authority dismissed all claims, finding no breach of duty occurred and that SRL had engaged actively and in good faith with Mr Apperley's concerns throughout.

Applicant: Matthew Craig Apperley (employee)
Respondent: Scott and Rickets Limited (employer)

Applicant: Paula Kay, advocate
Respondent: Julie Simpson, advocate

Mr Apperley commenced employment with SRL in 2020, working in stock and the garden area. On 26 December 2024 (a public holiday), he attended work, felt unwell, and spoke to duty manager Ms Jakki Hamer about going home. Mr Apperley claimed he was told by both Ms Hamer and duty manager Mr Daniel Craig that he could not take sick leave or go home because it was a public holiday; both managers denied this. Mr Apperley remained at work for his full shift, and the following day tested positive for Covid-19 and was granted paid sick leave without issue. Mr Apperley subsequently raised concerns with SRL management, received multiple apologies and confirmations of his sick leave entitlements from senior managers, but SRL declined his request for $5,000 compensation. Mr Apperley resigned from SRL on 10 April 2025 after securing a new job as a forklift driver, thanking management warmly on his way out, and then filed a personal grievance claim for constructive dismissal and breach of good faith.

1. Whether SRL breached its obligations by refusing Mr Apperley's request to take sick leave — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[47]).

The Authority considered whether SRL actively refused a clear entitlement to sick leave under the Holidays Act 2003. Applying the evidence, the Authority found that the situation was more likely a miscommunication or misunderstanding than an unambiguous refusal: Ms Hamer's evidence was that she did not refuse sick leave and matters did not reach that point; Mr Apperley himself did not forthrightly insist on going home, did not re-approach any of the several floor managers during the day, worked his full shift without complaint, and appeared in good spirits. The Authority also noted that when Mr Apperley made an unambiguous sick leave request the following day, it was promptly granted — consistent with SRL being aware of and willing to meet its obligations. On balance, no breach of duty was found.

2. Whether Mr Craig told Mr Apperley that sick leave could not be taken on a public holiday as a separate breach — Status: Dismissed (paras [48]-[50]).

The Authority examined whether this allegation — that Mr Craig baldly stated company policy was to refuse sick leave if a staff member had clocked in on a public holiday — was made out on the facts. The Authority found this implausible in light of the evidence of multiple senior managers who described such a policy as both unlawful and fundamentally inconsistent with how SRL operated as a 7-day business. The Authority further noted the internal inconsistency this would create with Ms Hamer's own conduct. This claim was not established.

3. Whether SRL breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by disregarding Mr Apperley's concerns when raised — Status: Dismissed (paras [51]-[65]).

The Authority assessed SRL's conduct against the s 4 good faith obligation to be active, constructive, and responsive. It found that SRL promptly met with Mr Apperley after receiving his email of concern, provided acknowledgment of his sick leave rights, offered personal apologies from three senior managers including the Operations Manager and General Manager Retail, committed to raising the matter with the senior leadership team, and continued to engage seriously every time Mr Apperley raised the issue again. The Authority found that SRL's refusal to pay $5,000 did not amount to disregarding Mr Apperley, as he had no entitlement to that sum; his reliance on advice relayed from his father was not a proper basis for such a claim. No breach of good faith was established.

4. Whether Mr Apperley was constructively dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[39], [62]-[67]).

The Authority applied the test from Weston v Advkit Para Legal Services Ltd [2010] NZEmpC 140, requiring a breach of duty sufficiently serious to make the resignation reasonably foreseeable, and the principle from NZ Woollen Workers IUOW v Distinctive Knitwear NZ Ltd (1990) ERNZ Sel Cas 791 that there must be a repudiatory breach indicating the employer does not intend to be bound by the contract. Having found no breach of either the sick leave or good faith obligations, the constructive dismissal claim necessarily failed. The Authority additionally noted that Mr Apperley had resigned only after securing a new job, expressed positive sentiments on leaving, and never told any manager he was resigning due to loss of trust — further indicating the ending of employment was not at the employer's instigation.

5. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 — Status: Dismissed (para [36]).

The Authority noted that it has no jurisdiction under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 and accordingly did not consider submissions made under that Act, instead confining its analysis to employment relationship problems under the Employment Relations Act 2000.

6. Whether Privacy Act 2020 obligations were breached in relation to CCTV footage — Status: Dismissed (paras [68]-[69]).

The Authority noted it has no jurisdiction under the Privacy Act 2020. It also considered whether Information Privacy Principles 10 and 11 were properly engaged and found they were not: there was no evidence that CCTV footage had been disclosed to third parties (Principle 11) or used for a purpose other than that for which it was collected (Principle 10). No further consideration was warranted.

7. Whether a victim impact statement was required to be filed — Status: Dismissed (paras [70]-[72]).

The Authority found that criminal sentencing procedures (victim impact statements) have no place in civil employment tribunal proceedings. Further, Mr Apperley had been given multiple opportunities throughout the process to place impact evidence before the Authority and had done so at each stage; no further action was required.

8. Whether SRL failed to conduct welfare checks — Status: Dismissed (para [73]).

The Authority found that no obligation had been identified by Mr Apperley with sufficient particularity. On the evidence, SRL's duty managers had given Mr Apperley lighter duties, observed him working normally throughout the day, and noted he appeared in good spirits. Given that neither party was aware at the time that Mr Apperley had Covid-19, no additional welfare measures were required.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [75]-[77]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. A process was prescribed: if agreement cannot be reached, the respondent may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with the applicant having 14 days to reply. The Authority noted that the investigation meeting took less than a full day and that it would assess costs on a scale upwards or downwards as appropriate.

All claims were dismissed in their entirety; no orders were made.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending agreement between the parties or further memoranda.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive decision in which Benjamin Fuller's employment claims against Super Cheap Auto (New Zealand) Pty Limited (SCA) were entirely unsuccessful. SCA, as the successful party, applied for a costs award exceeding the standard daily tariff, relying on an effective Calderbank offer and alleged misconduct by Mr Fuller's advocate. The Authority awarded costs of $10,000, representing an uplift above the standard tariff but well below the $25,000–$28,000 sought by SCA.

Applicant: Benjamin Fuller (employee)
Respondent: Super Cheap Auto (New Zealand) Pty Limited (employer)

Applicant: Lawrence Anderson, advocate
Respondent: Emma Crowley, counsel

In a substantive determination dated 2 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 335), the Authority dismissed all of Mr Fuller's employment claims and awarded no remedies, reserving costs. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves, and SCA applied for a costs award. SCA's actual in-scope legal costs were $61,857.13 (exclusive of GST). SCA had made a settlement offer of $5,000 on 24 November 2025 (the Calderbank offer), which expired on 5 December 2025 without acceptance. SCA submitted that rejection of the offer, the conduct of Mr Fuller's advocate (including resisting mediation, non-compliance with Authority directions on redactions, and a "scattergun" approach to claims), and unnecessary expansion of issues during the investigation all justified a significant uplift from the tariff. Mr Fuller accepted SCA's entitlement to costs at the standard tariff ($4,500) but opposed any uplift, arguing the offer was reasonably rejected because it did not address the status of a final written warning, and that no causal connection was established between any alleged misconduct and additional costs.

1. Whether costs should be awarded in favour of SCA as the successful party, and what the appropriate starting point is — Status: Established (paras [3]–[4], [22]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Costs are discretionary, must be used in a principled manner (citing PBO Limited v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Faggotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135), and generally follow the event. The standard daily tariff is $4,500 for the first day of an investigation meeting and $3,500 for each subsequent day. Because SCA was wholly successful, the Authority accepted the starting point of $5,375 (reflecting one investigation day plus applicable adjustments) as the base tariff figure.

2. Whether the Calderbank offer justified an uplift above the daily tariff — Status: Partially established (paras [23]–[25]).

The Authority accepted that SCA's offer of $5,000 made on 24 November 2025 was a valid and effective Calderbank offer: it was clear, gave reasonable time for acceptance, and explained the consequences of non-acceptance. The key question was whether rejection was unreasonable at the time. Mr Fuller argued the offer did not resolve the status of a final written warning, which was central to him, and that the offer was expressed inclusive of costs without identifying the costs portion. The Authority accepted the warning issue was a matter of genuine significance, but noted that Mr Fuller ultimately obtained nothing. On balance, the rejection was a relevant factor supporting some uplift, but did not justify anything approaching the level SCA sought.

3. Whether the conduct of Mr Fuller's advocate (resisting mediation, non-compliance with redaction directions, and "scattergun" approach to claims) justified a further costs uplift — Status: Partially established (paras [26]–[28]).

The Authority acknowledged that considerable time and effort was spent on procedural and evidential disputes, some requiring Authority intervention, and that aspects of the advocate's approach prolonged procedural issues. However, the Authority found that SCA had not identified with sufficient precision the additional costs caused by that conduct, and was not satisfied that a substantial uplift on this basis was warranted. Separately, the Authority accepted that Mr Fuller's expansion of claims during the investigation required additional replies, evidence, and submissions from SCA beyond what would otherwise have been necessary, and that SCA's costs were thereby increased.

4. Whether SCA should be awarded costs for preparation of its costs memorandum — Status: Dismissed (para [30]).

SCA sought $3,000 for costs in preparing its costs memorandum. The Authority noted that costs for costs memoranda are not ordinarily awarded and was not satisfied there was a basis to depart from that approach. This claim was declined.

The claim for costs was partially upheld: SCA is awarded costs of $10,000 (above tariff but well below the amount sought), with no award for costs memorandum preparation.

Costs: $10,000 payable by Benjamin Fuller to Super Cheap Auto (New Zealand) Pty Limited within 28 days of the date of this determination (19 August 2026). No award for costs of preparing the costs memorandum.

Paula Cameron, a former worker at Sureplan Financial Limited, sought to raise personal grievances including sexual harassment arising from her engagement with Sureplan, which she claims began around mid-2015 and ended by late 2016. The central legal question was whether Ms Cameron raised her personal grievances within the 90-day statutory time limit under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority determined that Ms Cameron had sufficient awareness of her employee status and potential claims by December 2016, that her grievances were raised well outside the 90-day limit, and that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify granting leave to raise them out of time — resulting in dismissal of the claims.

Applicant: Paula Cameron (employee/former worker)
Respondent: Sureplan Financial Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (in person)
Respondent: John Schell for the Respondent

Ms Cameron was engaged by Sureplan Financial Limited at some point before July 2015, on what she believed at the time to be an independent contractor basis. The engagement appears to have ended by late 2016, as evidenced by an email Ms Cameron sent to John Schell (Sureplan's director) on 2 December 2016. Ms Cameron contended she did not become aware she was an employee (rather than a contractor) until 2024, when she studied an Advanced Employment Law paper, and that she raised her personal grievance within 90 days of that realisation. Sureplan disputed this timeline, relying on Ms Cameron's own December 2016 email as evidence that she had understood her employment status and contemplated legal action well before 2024. Sureplan also declined to consent to the grievances being raised out of time. The matter was determined on the papers by agreement of both parties.

1. Whether Ms Cameron raised her personal grievances within the 90-day statutory time limit under s 114(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[19]).

Section 114(1) of the Act requires an employee to raise a personal grievance within 90 days of the date the action occurred or came to the employee's notice, whichever is later. The Authority examined Ms Cameron's December 2016 email to Mr Schell and found it contained explicit references to herself as an "employee," references to Sureplan as her "employers," statements about having studied law, having consulted a lawyer, and having contemplated suing Sureplan for "hurt and humiliation." The Authority found these statements demonstrated that Ms Cameron had sufficient legal understanding by December 2016 to regard herself as an employee and to contemplate a personal grievance claim under s 123(1)(c) of the Act. Accordingly, the Authority determined that Ms Cameron's personal grievance was raised significantly outside the 90-day time limit.

2. Whether Ms Cameron should be granted leave to raise her personal grievances outside the 90-day statutory time limit under ss 114(3), 114(4), and 115 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [20]-[25]).

Under s 114(3)-(4), where an employer does not consent, an employee may apply to the Authority for leave to raise a personal grievance out of time; the Authority may grant leave only if satisfied that the delay was occasioned by exceptional circumstances and that it is just to do so. The Authority noted firstly that Ms Cameron had made no specific application for leave under s 114(3). The Authority found no evidence of exceptional circumstances to explain the delay, and further found that given the absence of exceptional circumstances and the substantial passage of time since the events in question, it would not be in the interests of justice to allow the claims to proceed. Leave was refused under ss 114(4) and 115.

3. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [26]-[30]).

The Authority noted that the matter was resolved on the papers and suggested the parties may wish to let costs lie where they fall. However, if costs are sought, Sureplan may lodge a memorandum on costs within 14 days of the determination, with Ms Cameron having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual notional daily rate (per PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135) unless particular circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claims were dismissed in their entirety; Ms Cameron's personal grievances were found to have been raised outside the 90-day statutory time limit and leave to raise them out of time was refused.

None ordered. Costs reserved, with a process set out for any costs memoranda to be filed within 14 days of the determination.

DLF, a disabled person receiving individualised funding (IF) for disability support services, claimed to be an employee (or, alternatively, a homeworker) of the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), which administers the IF scheme. The key legal questions were whether the administrative work DLF performs in managing their IF arrangement constitutes employment or homeworker status under the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority dismissed both claims, finding that the relationship was one of a funded recipient of disability support services rather than an employment relationship.

Applicant: DLF (disabled individual and individualised funding recipient — name suppressed)
Respondent: The Ministry of Social Development (government agency)

Applicant: Jane Carrigan, advocate
Respondent: Bronwyn Heenan, Tim Bremner and Isabella Peacock-Price, counsel

DLF has received individualised funding (IF) — a form of disability support funding — since 1998, making them one of the earliest participants in the scheme. Under IF, DLF recruits, trains, rosters, supervises and approves hours for their personal caregivers, and manages related administrative tasks including compliance requirements, record maintenance, and host engagement; DLF argued this constituted work performed for MSD. MSD's position was that DLF is merely a recipient of disability support funding who chose IF over other available options, and that the administrative work is a consequence of that choice rather than an employment relationship. A significant event occurred in 2018 when an audit of DLF's IF administration was conducted, resulting in DLF being required to appoint an agent — an experience DLF described as demonstrating MSD's ultimate authority over their arrangements. By consent, the determination addressed only the threshold question of whether DLF is an employee of MSD, with remaining issues (whether DLF is an employer and whether MSD is a controlling third party) reserved for later determination if necessary.

1. Whether DLF is an employee of MSD under s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]-[26]).

The Authority applied the Supreme Court's approach in Raiser Operations BV v E tü [2025] NZSC 162, requiring determination of the real nature of the relationship by reference to the Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 34 framework, examining: (i) terms of engagement and parties' intentions; (ii) how the relationship operated in practice; and (iii) the relationship assessed as a whole using common law indicia of control, integration, and the fundamental test. The documents — including outcome plans, support assessments, and the flexible support service agreement — contained no reference to an employment relationship between DLF and MSD, and no indication of an intention to create one. While the Authority accepted DLF is not in business on their own account, it found that the administrative duties DLF performs arise as a consequence of receiving IF rather than as obligations owed to MSD as employer, and that looking at the relationship in the round, an employment relationship was not established.

2. Whether DLF is a homeworker under s 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [27]-[32]).

The Authority applied the homeworker test from Lowe v Director-General of Health [2017] NZSC 115, which requires: (i) that the person was engaged, employed or contracted by the other party; (ii) in the course of that party's trade or business; and (iii) to do work in a dwellinghouse. DLF failed to establish two key elements. First, DLF is the recipient of care — not a person contracted to provide caregiving services — so the engagement contemplated by s 5 could not be established. Second, the administrative duties DLF relies upon (including advertising for staff on electronic platforms and public noticeboards, and communicating with the host) are not confined to a dwellinghouse, and it would be artificial to cleave off only the in-home tasks from the broader IF-related work.

3. Non-publication order in respect of DLF's name and identifying details — Status: Established (para [7]).

The Authority exercised its discretion under clause 10, schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to grant a non-publication order over DLF's name and identifying details. The application was unopposed, and the Authority found there was no public interest in publication given DLF's individual circumstances.

4. Whether DLF is an employer and whether MSD is a controlling third party — Status: Not reached (para [4]).

By consent of both parties, the determination addressed only the threshold question of DLF's employee status. These remaining issues were reserved and were not reached because the foundational question of DLF's employment status was resolved against DLF.

Both claims — that DLF is an employee under s 6 and a homeworker under s 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — were dismissed.

None ordered.

A Labour Inspector brought claims against NZ Dream Contracting Limited (NZ Dream), its sole director Gurpreet Singh, and his father Harbant Singh, arising from the employment of two migrant workers — Kulvinder Singh and Jaskaran Singh — who each paid NZD $52,000 in premiums to secure their Accredited Employer Work Visas (AEWVs) and employment with NZ Dream in 2023. The key legal questions were whether those payments constituted unlawful premiums under s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA), whether the Authority had jurisdiction over payments made in India, and whether Gurpreet and Harbant were personally liable. The claims against NZ Dream and Gurpreet were upheld in full; the personal liability claim against Harbant for penalties and secondary recovery was dismissed on the ground that he was not an officer of NZ Dream.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector (Senior Labour Inspector Stella Gong, employed by MBIE)
Respondent: NZ Dream Contracting Limited (first respondent, horticultural labour supply employer); Gurpreet Singh (second respondent, sole director and shareholder of NZ Dream); Harbant Singh (third respondent, father of Gurpreet Singh)

Applicant: Rebecca Denmead and Rhys Boyd, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Arunjeev Singh, counsel for the Respondents

NZ Dream Contracting Limited is a New Zealand-registered horticultural labour supply company that became an Accredited Employer in February 2023, enabling it to sponsor Accredited Employer Work Visas (AEWVs) for overseas workers. In early 2023, Gurpreet Singh (NZ Dream's sole director) arranged for two migrant workers from India — his cousin Kulvinder Singh and Jaskaran Singh — to be employed by NZ Dream, with each required to pay 26 lakh Indian rupees (approximately NZD $52,000) as a condition of obtaining employment and visa support. Payments were made partly in India (to Harbant Singh and his wife's joint bank account, and in cash at Harbant's home) and partly in New Zealand (cash delivered by Jaskaran's brother Maninderpal to Gurpreet). Both complainants made complaints to the Labour Inspectorate in November 2023; the investigation was conducted by Senior Labour Inspectors Williams and then Gong, who gathered extensive documentary, banking, and witness evidence corroborating the premium payments. The respondents denied all claims, asserting that payments were loan repayments or unrelated transactions, but provided no corroborating documentation and did not call a key witness (Satwant Kaur, Gurpreet's mother) despite being asked to do so.

1. Assessment of credibility of witnesses — Status: Established (paras [43]-[54]).

The Authority assessed all witnesses' credibility, preferring the evidence of the Labour Inspector's witnesses (Kulvinder, Jaskaran, Maninderpal, Mandeep, Kalveer, Manjit, and Sarabjit) over that of the respondents' witnesses. The complainants gave detailed, consistent, and corroborated evidence supported by bank records, WhatsApp messages, video footage, and multiple corroborating witnesses, while Gurpreet and Harbant offered only stark denials with no supporting documentation. Gurpreet's credibility was further undermined by his blatant breaches of Accredited Employer obligations and his implausible explanations for documented events. On the balance of probabilities, the Authority found the Labour Inspector's witnesses' accounts more likely to be correct.

2. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction over premium payments made in India — Status: Established (paras [55]-[67]).

The respondents relied on Mehta v Elliot [2003] 1 ERNZ 451, in which the Employment Court held it lacked jurisdiction over premiums paid in India. The Authority followed the reasoning in Arushi v Isher Enterprises Limited & Ors [2024] NZERA 615, which held that post-Mehta legislative changes (including 2004 amendments to Authority and Court Regulations providing extra-territorial reach) and the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v New Zealand Basing Ltd [2018] 1 NZLR 245 had undermined the Mehta position. The Authority found jurisdiction was established because: NZ Dream is a New Zealand company; the requests for premium originated from Gurpreet in New Zealand; the employment agreements were made in New Zealand; the employment was to be wholly performed in New Zealand; and two of Jaskaran's premium payments were made in New Zealand. The Mehta decision was not treated as a bar to recovery.

3. Whether NZ Dream sought and/or received a premium from Kulvinder in breach of s 12A of the WPA — Status: Established (paras [68]-[90]).

Section 12A of the WPA prohibits an employer or person engaged on its behalf from seeking or receiving any premium in respect of employment, whether from the employee or any other person. Applying the two-step test from Zhou v Axis International Trading Company Ltd [2017] NZERA Auckland 353, the payment must be a condition of obtaining/continuing employment and must not benefit the employee other than by securing employment. The Authority found that Kulvinder paid NZD $52,000 (26 lakh) to NZ Dream (via Harbant's joint bank account and cash to Satwant): 10 lakh paid in May 2023 into Harbant's joint account, and 16 lakh cash collected by Harbant and passed to Satwant on 11 June 2023. The timing of payments relative to visa processing, Gurpreet's control over the LIA relationship, and corroborating bank records and WhatsApp communications all established these were premium payments. The respondents' loan repayment alternative narrative was unsupported and rejected.

4. Whether NZ Dream sought and/or received a premium from Jaskaran in breach of s 12A of the WPA — Status: Established (paras [92]-[108]).

Applying the same s 12A WPA test, the Authority found that Jaskaran paid NZD $52,000 (26 lakh) in three tranches: $10,000 cash delivered by Maninderpal to Gurpreet in Te Puke on 18 July 2023; approximately $22,000 (11 lakh) paid in cash by Jaskaran and his father to Harbant at Harbant's home in India on 5 August 2023 (captured on video); and $20,000 cash collected by Gurpreet from Maninderpal's workplace on 7 August 2023. Evidence from Maninderpal, Mandeep, Manjit, Sarabjit, bank statements, voice recordings, and a recorded phone call with Gurpreet all corroborated Jaskaran's account. The respondents' alternative explanations (including Harbant's "property transaction" claim) were rejected as unsupported.

5. Whether Kulvinder and Jaskaran can recover the premiums paid — Status: Established (paras [109]-[112]).

Under s 12A(2) of the WPA, a person who has paid a premium may recover it from the employer as a debt, and a Labour Inspector may bring proceedings on their behalf. The Authority confirmed that the Labour Inspector can recover from NZ Dream the total premiums of NZD $52,000 (Kulvinder) and NZD $52,000 (Jaskaran), totalling NZD $104,000. Recovery from persons involved in non-compliance (Gurpreet) under s 11A(3) of the WPA is available to the extent NZ Dream is unable to pay, per s 11A(4)(b).

6. Whether NZ Dream breached employment standards under s 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [114]-[115]).

Section 5 of the Act defines "employment standards" to include minimum protections such as those under the WPA. NZ Dream's requesting and receiving of premiums from both complainants in breach of s 12A of the WPA constituted a breach of employment standards.

7. Whether Gurpreet Singh was "a person involved in" NZ Dream's breaches of employment standards under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [116]-[135]).

Section 142W of the Act provides that an individual is "a person involved in a breach" if they aided, abetted, counselled, procured, induced, were knowingly concerned in, or conspired in the breach. For a company, the individual must be an "officer" (s 142W(2)-(3)), which includes a director. As NZ Dream's sole director, Gurpreet was an officer. The Authority found Gurpreet was the controlling mind of NZ Dream, directly solicited premiums from both complainants, communicated with the LIA on their behalf to control visa processing, and personally received cash premium payments. He aided, abetted, procured and was knowingly concerned in NZ Dream's breaches of s 12A. He also conspired with Harbant, Satwant and Ramanjit to effect those breaches.

8. Whether Harbant Singh was "a person involved in a breach of employment standards" under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [121], [140]-[142]).

Because Harbant was not an officer of NZ Dream (as required by s 142W(2)-(3) of the Act), he could not be treated as a "person involved in a breach of employment standards." Despite his active role in receiving and facilitating premium payments, the statutory framework did not extend personal liability under s 142W to non-officers of a corporate employer. The claim that Harbant was a person involved in breach of employment standards was therefore dismissed.

9. Whether Gurpreet, on behalf of NZ Dream, sought or received a premium from the complainants or any other person under s 12A(1) of the WPA — Status: Established (paras [122]-[127]).

As NZ Dream's controlling mind and sole director, Gurpreet was "a person engaged on behalf of the employer" within s 12A(1) of the WPA. The evidence established he arranged for NZ Dream to seek and receive premiums from both Kulvinder and Jaskaran, and personally received cash payments from Maninderpal (as "any other person") on Jaskaran's behalf. He was the driving force behind the premium scheme and controlled the LIA and visa process to extract payments.

10. Whether Gurpreet was "a person involved in non-compliance" with s 12A of the WPA for purposes of s 11A(3)-(5) — Status: Established (paras [128]-[136]).

Section 11A(5) of the WPA links "person involved in non-compliance" to the s 142W test. Because Gurpreet is a director (officer) of NZ Dream and was found to have aided, abetted, procured and been knowingly concerned in NZ Dream's breach of s 12A, he falls within s 11A(5). This means the Labour Inspector can recover from Gurpreet personally the premiums paid by both complainants, to the extent NZ Dream defaults on repayment.

11. Whether Harbant, on behalf of NZ Dream, sought or received a premium from the complainants or any other person under s 12A(1) of the WPA — Status: Established as a factual matter but not giving rise to personal liability (paras [137]-[139]).

The Authority found as fact that Harbant received 10 lakh payments into his joint bank account from Kulvinder, arranged the Bunty loan for the 16 lakh payment, drove Kulvinder to collect the cash, and received 11 lakh in cash from Jaskaran and his father at his home in India. Harbant therefore did, on behalf of NZ Dream, seek and receive premium payments. However, this factual finding did not translate into personal liability under s 11A(3) of the WPA because Harbant was not an officer of NZ Dream (see issue 8 and 12 below).

12. Whether Harbant was "a person involved in non-compliance with s 12A" of the WPA for purposes of s 11A(3)-(5) — Status: Dismissed (paras [140]-[142]).

Because Harbant was not an officer of NZ Dream as required by s 142W(2)-(3) of the Act, he did not fall within s 11A(5) of the WPA. Accordingly, premiums received by him cannot be recovered from him personally under s 11A(3), and no penalty can be imposed on him personally under s 13A(3) of the WPA.

13. Whether NZ Dream defaulting on repayment allows recovery from Gurpreet personally — Status: Established (conditionally) (paras [143], [150]-[152]).

Under s 11A(3) and (4) of the WPA, and s 142Y(1) of the Act, if NZ Dream is unable to repay the premiums, Gurpreet is personally liable to repay any shortfall to the Labour Inspectorate. The Authority ordered Gurpreet to either procure NZ Dream's full repayment of NZD $104,000 within 28 days, or advise the Labour Inspector in writing of NZ Dream's inability to pay (with proof), following which his personal liability to repay any unpaid balance is activated.

14. Whether penalties should be imposed on the respondents for breaches of s 12A of the WPA — Status: Partially established (paras [144]-[145]).

Section 13(1) and (3) of the WPA, and s 13A(3) of the WPA, permit penalties to be imposed on an employer and any person involved in the contravention. The Authority held that penalties should be imposed on NZ Dream and Gurpreet, as the breaches were serious. No jurisdiction to impose penalties on Harbant personally exists, as he was not an officer of NZ Dream within the meaning of s 142W(3) of the Act. The quantum of penalties is reserved for a subsequent determination (the third investigation meeting if necessary).

15. What costs and disbursements should be awarded — Status: Reserved (para [146]).

The Labour Inspector, as the successful party, is entitled to costs and disbursements. However, costs were reserved pending determination of the remaining substantive and penalty claims. No costs order was made in this determination.

The claims were upheld in full against NZ Dream Contracting Limited and Gurpreet Singh (second respondent); the claim for personal liability (secondary recovery and penalties) against Harbant Singh (third respondent) was dismissed on the basis he was not an officer of NZ Dream.

Premium repayment ordered: NZ Dream Contracting Limited is ordered (within 28 days) to repay NZD $52,000 to Kulvinder Singh and NZD $52,000 to Jaskaran Singh (total NZD $104,000) via the Labour Inspectorate.
Personal liability of Gurpreet Singh: Gurpreet Singh is ordered (within 28 days) to either procure NZ Dream's full repayment of NZD $104,000, or advise the Labour Inspector in writing of NZ Dream's inability to pay (with proof); if NZ Dream defaults, Gurpreet must personally repay any outstanding amount under s 142Y(1) of the Act.
Penalties: To be determined in a subsequent (third) investigation meeting. No penalty amount fixed in this determination.
Costs: Reserved sine die pending resolution of remaining substantive and penalty claims.
Reinstatement: No.
Harbant Singh: No remedy or penalty ordered against Harbant personally.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs-only determination following a substantive decision in which Nata Venceslau Dos Santos (employee) succeeded on unjustifiable dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage claims against Nresh Group Limited (employer). The key questions were whether the employer's Calderbank offer should reverse the usual costs-follow-the-event principle, whether an uplift was warranted due to the former representative's conduct, and how to reflect the mixed outcome. The Authority ordered Nresh to pay $6,000 in costs plus the application filing fee.

Applicant: Nata Venceslau Dos Santos (employee)
Respondent: Nresh Group Limited (employer)

Applicant: Sheridan Climo and Zachary Pentecost, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: Mark Donovan, counsel (firm not stated)

In a prior determination dated 9 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 363), Mr Dos Santos was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed and unjustifiably disadvantaged by Nresh Group Limited, with remedies totalling $30,217.83 gross awarded (comprising $25,000 compensation, $1,440 lost wages, $2,698.15 wage arrears, $891 public holiday pay, $188.68 interest, and a $1,500 penalty). The Authority reserved costs at that time, and the parties were unable to resolve them. On 18 September 2025, before the investigation meeting, Nresh made a Calderbank (without prejudice save as to costs) offer of $30,000 net, which Mr Dos Santos rejected. Mr Dos Santos argued for a $15,000 uplift from the tariff, citing substantial legal costs, success on principal claims, and conduct by Nresh's former representative that allegedly increased costs unnecessarily. Nresh argued that the net value of remedies awarded was less than the rejected settlement offer and that the mixed outcome (Mr Dos Santos succeeded on only 2 of 7 claims) warranted either a costs award in Nresh's favour or no order as to costs.

1. Whether costs should follow the event given the substantially successful party — Status: Established (paras [20]–[22]).

The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event, citing PBO Limited v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Faggotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. The Authority found Mr Dos Santos was the substantially successful party because the claims on which he succeeded were central to the dispute and produced significant remedies; success is not assessed on a purely numerical basis. However, his failure on several discrete claims (health and safety disadvantage, unpaid travel time, unpaid overtime, unpaid rest breaks, and breach of contract) justified moderation of costs that might otherwise have been awarded to a wholly successful party.

2. Whether the Calderbank offer should reverse the ordinary costs-follow-the-event principle and result in a costs award in Nresh's favour — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]–[25]).

The Authority applied the principle that a Calderbank offer reverses costs liability only where rejection was unreasonable in all the circumstances. At the time of the offer, liability was still disputed and Mr Dos Santos was pursuing claims that were ultimately vindicated. Although the financial outcome was not materially superior to the offer, the non-monetary aspects of the outcome (findings in his favour, establishment of claims) could not be ignored. The Authority was not persuaded that rejection of the offer was so unreasonable as to justify ordering Mr Dos Santos to pay a contribution to Nresh's costs, despite the closeness of the financial comparison.

3. Whether a substantial uplift or indemnity-style costs award was warranted due to the conduct of Nresh's former representative — Status: Dismissed (para [26]).

The Authority considered whether the conduct of Nresh's former representative (correspondence between November 2024 and January 2025) justified an uplift. It declined, finding the conduct pre-dated the Authority application and occurred before Nresh engaged its current representative. The Authority agreed that the complained-of conduct was a matter for the Law Society complaints process and should not influence a costs award; the circumstances did not justify either indemnity costs or a significant uplift from the ordinary tariff approach.

4. Whether the outcome was so mixed as to displace costs following the event entirely — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]–[22]).

Nresh argued that Mr Dos Santos succeeded on only 2 of 7 claims and that the unsuccessful claims significantly increased costs. The Authority, applying Coomer v JA McCallum and Son Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 156, noted that mixed success is still success and that a party need not succeed on every claim to be treated as the successful party. The mixed result was relevant as a moderating factor on quantum rather than a reason to deny costs altogether.

5. Whether the penalty awarded should be included in the comparison with the Calderbank offer — Status: Dismissed (not determinative) (paras [12], [24]).

Nresh submitted that the $1,500 penalty should be excluded from the comparison as it is punitive and discretionary in nature, making the net remedies less than the $30,000 offer. The Authority did not expressly resolve this question as a standalone issue but noted the non-monetary aspects of the outcome were also relevant to the comparison, and ultimately declined to shift costs liability regardless.

6. Quantum of costs to be awarded — Status: Established (paras [27]–[28]).

The Authority applied the daily tariff starting point: $4,500 for day one and $3,500 for day two (total $8,000 for a two-day meeting). Taking into account the mixed outcome and the failure to achieve a materially better result than the Calderbank offer, the Authority reduced the tariff figure to $6,000 as an appropriate reflection of both factors. This is consistent with the principle that costs awards should generally be modest.

The claim for costs was partially upheld: Nresh Group Limited is ordered to pay costs of $6,000 plus the Authority application fee, with the applicant's request for an uplift and Nresh's request for a reversal of costs both dismissed.

Costs: $6,000 payable by Nresh Group Limited to Mr Dos Santos within 14 days.
Authority application fee reimbursement: $71.55.
No other remedies ordered (substantive remedies were addressed in the prior determination [2026] NZERA 363).

Yiping Yin, a chef employed by Sert Holdings Limited (SHL) from March 2019, brought claims for wage arrears, unpaid annual holiday pay, and unpaid alternative holidays following the permanent closure of Caravanserai bar and eatery in early 2025 and the end of his employment on 18 February 2025. Because SHL was placed into liquidation, the central legal questions included whether its sole director, Mehmet Yasar Sert, was personally liable as a person involved in breaches of employment standards, and whether leave should be granted to recover sums from him personally. The Authority upheld the core claims, found Mr Sert personally liable, and ordered him to pay Mr Yin a total of $29,363.93.

Applicant: Yiping Yin (employee/chef)
Respondent: Sert Holdings Limited (In Liquidation) (First Respondent, employer) and Mehmet Yasar Sert (Second Respondent, sole director)

Applicant: Aimee Cai, advocate
Respondent: Mehmet Yasar Sert (self-represented for the Respondents)

Yiping Yin commenced employment with SHL in March 2019 as a chef at Caravanserai, a bar and eatery in Auckland city, with an hourly rate of $26.50 and working hours of 2pm to midnight (an unsigned individual employment agreement dated 2 July 2021 was in evidence). On 19 January 2025, a water pipe burst above Caravanserai causing significant damage; Caravanserai permanently closed on 4 February 2025, and Mr Yin's employment concluded on 18 February 2025. Mr Yin alleged SHL owed him wage arrears for days worked between 19 January and 18 February 2025, outstanding annual holiday pay, and payment for six alternative holidays not provided when he worked on public holidays. Mr Sert argued the water damage was an intervening event frustrating the employment agreement and that SHL could not advance work, and he also disputed the quantum of holiday pay; he further raised an allegation (unsupported by evidence) that Mr Yin had not devoted all working hours to SHL's business. SHL was placed into liquidation by the High Court on 28 May 2026, triggering the question of whether Mr Sert was personally liable under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act).

1. Whether SHL owed Mr Yin wage arrears for days worked between 19 January and 18 February 2025 — Status: Established (paras [14]-[27]).

The Authority calculated Mr Yin's daily entitlement at $251.75 based on his $26.50/hr rate over a 9.5-hour shift. It found Mr Yin worked ten days in that period, generating an entitlement of $2,517.50; SHL had paid $2,311.52 via bank transfer between 25 February and 4 April 2025, leaving an outstanding balance of $205.98. The Authority rejected Mr Sert's frustration argument for this earlier period (prior to permanent closure), accepting that work was performed and wages were due.

2. Whether the doctrine of frustration discharged SHL's obligation to provide work and pay wages from 4 February 2025 onwards — Status: Established (paras [23]-[25], [35], [38]).

Applying the principle from Karelrybflot v Udovenko [1999] NZCA 331 and DQJ v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2025] NZEmpC 10, the Authority held that frustration requires impossibility of performance and will not be easily invoked. It found that from 4 February 2025 permanent closure made performance impossible, so SHL was discharged from providing work or paying wages for that period; accordingly no wage arrears were owed for the post-4 February period, and there was no breach of the notice clause (cl 25.2) or roster clause (cl 8.1) for that period.

3. Whether SHL breached s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA) — Status: Established (paras [28]-[29]).

Section 4 of the WPA requires wages to be paid when they become payable. The Authority found Mr Yin worked ten days but SHL did not pay his wages at the time they became due, constituting a breach of s 4 WPA. This breach also constituted a breach of an employment standard under s 5 of the Act.

4. Whether SHL breached clause 8.1 (roster/hours) of the individual employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [35]).

The Authority found no breach of cl 8.1 because, from 4 February 2025, the employment contract was frustrated by the impossibility of SHL performing its obligations following permanent closure; SHL was not required to roster Mr Yin during this period.

5. Whether SHL breached clause 11.1 (annual holidays) of the individual employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [37], [46]-[53]).

Clause 11.1 incorporated the Holidays Act 2003 (HA03) obligations. The Authority found SHL breached cl 11.1 by failing to pay Mr Yin outstanding annual holiday pay upon termination, as required by s 56(2) of the HA03 and s 27(2) of the HA03. SHL did not produce holiday and leave records, which prejudiced Mr Yin's ability to quantify his claim precisely (s 83(3) HA03); the Authority relied on the sample payslips provided.

6. Whether SHL breached clause 12.1 (public holidays/alternative holidays) of the individual employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [36], [51]-[53]).

Clause 12.1 incorporated HA03 public holiday obligations. The Authority found that while Mr Yin was paid time and a half for six public holidays worked (per payslips covering 17 June 2024 to 3 February 2025), he was not provided with six alternative holidays as required by s 56(2)(a) of the HA03, constituting a breach of cl 12.1 and s 56 HA03.

7. Whether SHL breached clause 25.2 (notice provisions) of the individual employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [38]).

The Authority found no breach of the notice clause because the employment was frustrated; SHL was not required to provide notice on the facts found.

8. Whether penalties should be imposed on Mr Sert for aiding and abetting breaches of the individual employment agreement (cls 11.1 and 12.1) — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[42]).

The Authority found that cls 11.1 and 12.1 merely record SHL's statutory obligations under the HA03. Under s 76(1A) of the HA03, an action to recover a penalty against a person involved in a failure to comply with certain HA03 provisions may only be brought by a Labour Inspector, not by an employee. Accordingly, Mr Yin could not personally recover penalties against Mr Sert on this basis.

9. Whether SHL breached s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 (MWA) — Status: Dismissed (para [43]).

While the issue was raised in Mr Yin's statement of problem and submissions, the Authority found there was insufficient evidence to establish a breach of s 6 MWA.

10. Whether SHL breached s 130(2) of the Act (obligation to provide wages and time record) — Status: Established (paras [44]-[45]).

SHL failed to provide Mr Yin with his wages and time record. The Authority found this was a breach of s 130(2) of the Act.

11. Whether SHL breached s 27(2) and/or s 56 of the HA03 (annual holiday pay and alternative holidays) — Status: Established (paras [46]-[54]).

SHL did not pay Mr Yin outstanding annual leave at the end of the employment relationship (Mr Sert accepted this, disputing only the quantum), constituting a breach of s 27(2) HA03. The Authority found SHL also breached s 56 HA03 by failing to provide six alternative holidays for public holidays worked. Insufficient evidence existed to establish non-payment for other public holidays beyond the six identified.

12. Whether SHL breached employment standards within the meaning of s 5 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [55]-[60]).

The Authority found SHL breached: (a) s 4 WPA; (b) minimum entitlement provisions under the HA03; and (c) ss 81 and 82 HA03. The Authority also rejected Mr Sert's submission that SHL could offset amounts owed to Mr Yin by amounts allegedly owed by Mr Yin for not devoting all working hours to SHL's business, noting SHL is in liquidation (requiring liquidator consent), no evidence existed that this was raised during the employment, and Mr Yin was entitled to his statutory entitlements in any event.

13. Whether Mr Sert was a "person involved" in the breaches of employment standards under s 142W of the Act — Status: Established (paras [61]-[65]).

Under s 142W of the Act, a person is involved in a breach if they aided, abetted, counselled, or procured it, with knowledge of the essential facts establishing the contravention, per A Labour Inspector v Southern Taxis Limited [2021] NZCA 705 at [59]. The Authority found Mr Sert knew Mr Yin had not been paid wages for the ten days worked, knew outstanding annual leave had not been paid (which he conceded), and knew no alternative holidays had been provided; Mr Sert therefore had the requisite knowledge and was a person involved in the employment standard breaches.

14. Whether leave should be granted to Mr Yin to recover wages or other money from Mr Sert personally under s 142Y(2)(b) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [66]-[68]).

Section 142Y allows an employee to seek leave to recover from an individual personally where SHL is unable to pay. The Authority reviewed the first liquidators' report (dated 3 July 2026) and was satisfied SHL could not pay the sums owed. Leave was granted, and Mr Sert was ordered to pay: (a) wage arrears $205.98; (b) outstanding holiday pay $27,647.45; (c) payment for alternative holidays $1,510.50.

15. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Not reached/Reserved (paras [70]-[72]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if unable to do so, Mr Yin may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Mr Sert having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the usual daily tariff unless circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was substantially upheld: SHL was found to have breached s 4 WPA, s 27(2) and s 56 HA03, s 130(2) of the Act, and employment standards; Mr Sert was found personally liable as a person involved in those breaches and ordered to pay Mr Yin a total of $29,363.93; claims for wage arrears for the post-4 February period (frustration), breach of notice clause, breach of roster clause, MWA breach, and penalties against Mr Sert were dismissed.

Wage arrears: $205.98 (gross), payable by Mr Sert personally within 28 days.
Outstanding annual holiday pay: $27,647.45 (gross), payable by Mr Sert personally within 28 days.
Payment for alternative holidays: $1,510.50 (gross), payable by Mr Sert personally within 28 days.
Total payable by Mr Sert: $29,363.93 (gross).
Penalties against Mr Sert: None ordered (employee cannot bring penalty claim under HA03 — Labour Inspector only).
Costs: Reserved.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.

Mikayla Zhang (employee) brought personal grievance claims for unjustified disadvantage against Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora – Waitematā (her employer), arising from alleged exclusion from workplace communications during leave periods in October–November 2025 and the Christmas 2025/2026 period. The key legal questions were whether those grievances were raised within the 90-day statutory timeframe and whether a penalty claim was commenced within the 12-month limit. The Authority found the personal grievances were not raised within time and are outside its jurisdiction, but the penalty claim may proceed.

Applicant: Mikayla Zhang (employee)
Respondent: Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora – Waitematā (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (in person)
Respondent: Anthony Russell, counsel for the Respondent

Mikayla Zhang is employed by Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora – Waitematā. A prior Authority determination dated 11 March 2026 ([2026] NZERA 152) ruled that Ms Zhang could not rely on events prior to March 2024 other than as context, as those matters had been settled. Ms Zhang was directed to file a second amended statement of problem, which she did on 30 April 2026, raising three new matters: exclusion during annual leave in October 2025 (matter F), a hostile management response in November 2025 (matter G), and continuing exclusion over Christmas leave into 2026 (matter H). Health NZ raised jurisdictional objections, arguing these grievances were filed outside the 90-day notification period and that it had not consented to late raising. Ms Zhang argued that a 3–4 November 2025 email exchange constituted timely raising of grievances F and G, and that her ongoing exclusion amounted to a continuing course of conduct not requiring fresh notification. Ms Zhang also clarified her penalty claim was limited to events in October–December 2025 and January 2026.

1. Whether personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage (matters F and G: October and November 2025) were raised within the 90-day statutory timeframe under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[25]).

Under s 114, a personal grievance must be raised within 90 days of the action occurring or coming to the employee's notice, by making the employer sufficiently aware that the employee alleges a grievance they want addressed (Creedy v Commissioner of Police; Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic). The Authority reviewed the 3–4 November 2025 email exchange on which Ms Zhang relied and found that, objectively read, the emails raised operational queries that were answered during the exchange and did not convey a complaint of the type amounting to a personal grievance — Ms Zhang did not reference a term of employment, did not express devastation or concern about conduct, and appeared satisfied with responses. The 30 April 2026 second amended statement of problem, being more than 90 days after 4 November 2025 and not received by HNZ before then, was out of time; HNZ did not consent to late raising. Matters F and G are outside the Authority's jurisdiction.

2. Whether personal grievance for matter H (continuing exclusion — Christmas leave and into 2026) was raised within the 90-day statutory timeframe — Status: Dismissed (paras [26]-[30]).

Ms Zhang argued that actions taken by HNZ during her Christmas 2025/2026 leave without her knowledge or involvement, discovered in April 2026, formed part of a continuing course of conduct. The Authority accepted that the crystallisation point of Ms Zhang's dissatisfaction was 16 June 2026, when HNZ's manager provided an explanation Ms Zhang considered deficient, as confirmed by her July 2026 affidavit. However, no personal grievance in relation to this matter had been raised within 90 days of any identifiable event, and the second amended statement of problem was filed before HNZ provided the 16 June email, meaning no personal grievance arising from the Christmas leave period was properly before the Authority. Notably, Ms Zhang had not advanced a claim that exceptional circumstances occasioned any late raising.

3. Whether the law on continuing course of conduct permits the Authority to consider earlier incidents outside the 90-day period — Status: Not reached (para [7]).

The Authority noted the applicable principle from Premier Events Group Ltd v Beattie (No 3) [2012] NZEmpC 79 that in disadvantage grievances, events outside the 90-day period may be considered as part of a course of conduct connected to events within the period. However, because the Authority found that no qualifying personal grievance was raised within time at all, this principle had no operative application in this case.

4. Whether a penalty claim under s 135 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was commenced within the 12-month limitation period — Status: Established (paras [31]-[32]).

Section 135(5) of the Act imposes a 12-month limitation period for penalty claims. Ms Zhang clarified her penalty claim is limited to events in October–December 2025 and January 2026, and conceded she cannot bring a penalty claim for early 2025 events. HNZ argued the substantive threshold of serious, sustained, and deliberate breach of good faith could not be met, but the Authority noted that determination of those facts awaits investigation. The penalty claim for October–December 2025/January 2026 events is within time and before the Authority for investigation.

5. Whether either party is entitled to an award of costs — Status: Conditional (para [33]).

Costs were reserved. No determination on costs was made at this stage.

The claims for personal grievance relating to matters F, G, and H were dismissed as out of time and outside the Authority's jurisdiction; the penalty claim for October–December 2025/January 2026 was found to be within time and will proceed to investigation; costs were reserved.

None ordered at this stage. The penalty claim proceeds to further investigation. Costs are reserved.

Kevin Whelan, a long-serving IT manager of 23 years at Lindisfarne College, was dismissed in September 2024 following a disciplinary process arising from his showing CCTV accident footage to students and making an inappropriate remark about the accident victim. The key legal questions were whether his dismissal and suspension were unjustified, and whether the college's failure to honour his collective agreement notice entitlements amounted to an unjustified disadvantage. The dismissal and suspension were found justified, but the failure to comply with notice provisions under the collective agreement was upheld as an unjustified disadvantage, resulting in awards of lost wages and compensation.

Applicant: Kevin Whelan (employee, IT manager)
Respondent: The Board of Trustees of Lindisfarne College (employer)

Applicant: David Oliver, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Gretchen Stone, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Whelan worked as IT manager at Lindisfarne College for approximately 23 years. In August 2024, he showed CCTV footage of a car-bicycle accident on school grounds to two students involved in the incident, and made a remark to the effect of "you should have backed up and finished him off," which he described as a clumsy joke. Following a complaint from the student and his parents, the Rector Mr Hakeney initiated a disciplinary process, suspending Mr Whelan on pay and ultimately dismissing him on 4 September 2024 for serious misconduct. Mr Whelan was paid four weeks' wages in lieu of notice rather than being permitted to work out his notice as required under the collective agreement, resulting in a short-payment of approximately $717.92 gross. Mr Whelan raised personal grievances for unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage arising from suspension, and unjustified disadvantage arising from the failure to allow him to work out his contractual notice period.

1. Whether Mr Whelan was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [26]-[40]).

The test of justification under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 requires consideration of whether the employer sufficiently investigated, raised concerns, gave the employee a reasonable opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered explanations before making its decision. The Authority found all procedural requirements were met: allegations were sufficiently investigated, clearly stated and understood, Mr Whelan was given multiple opportunities to respond in writing and in person, and the college genuinely considered his explanations. On the substantive question, the Authority found — by a fine margin — that dismissal for the inappropriate remark (which could be seen as condoning violence toward a young accident victim) was within the range of outcomes reasonably available to a fair and reasonable employer, particularly given the college's special character, its values, and the vulnerability of the student audience.

2. Whether the college's failure to interview additional witnesses (groundskeeper and second student) rendered the dismissal unjustified — Status: Dismissed (paras [36]-[37]).

Mr Whelan argued that the failure to interview the groundskeeper and the other student present undermined the adequacy of the investigation. The Authority found this was not required as neither person was a witness to the disputed conduct in the office, the groundskeeper was not involved, and the factual matters in dispute were narrow and sufficiently understood between the parties without additional witnesses.

3. Whether the dismissal was improperly based on Mr Whelan's showing of CCTV footage without policy authority — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]).

Mr Whelan submitted that because there was no CCTV policy prohibiting him from showing footage to students, the showing of footage could not be valid grounds for dismissal. The Authority accepted Mr Hakeney's evidence that the primary reason for dismissal was the inappropriate remark, not the showing of the footage per se, and accordingly rejected this submission.

4. Whether there was sufficient evidence that the student complainant suffered genuine distress — Status: Established (paras [39]).

Mr Whelan challenged whether the student's distress was sufficiently evidenced. The Authority accepted the student's written statement as credible and found it conveyed real distress experienced by the student as a result of Mr Whelan's comment.

5. Whether Mr Whelan was denied access to relevant video footage, rendering the process unfair — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]).

Mr Whelan argued he was not given access to relevant footage. The Authority found he had access to the CCTV footage at relevant times and was given the opportunity to view the student's cell phone recording of his comment but declined. Further, no significant factual dispute existed that footage would have resolved.

6. Whether the suspension constituted an unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (paras [41]-[47]).

Under s 103 of the Act and clause 8.4.1(d) of the collective agreement, suspension on pay was permitted where the matter was sufficiently serious. The Authority found the letter of 23 August 2024 adequately set out the conduct of concern, Mr Whelan was given notice of the proposed suspension and two opportunities to respond before the decision was made, and the college was not required to actively prompt him for a response when none was forthcoming. Suspension was in accordance with the collective agreement and did not amount to an unjustified disadvantage.

7. Whether the failure to allow Mr Whelan to work out his notice period (or pay him the correct entitlement) constituted an unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [48]-[56]).

The collective agreement provided that on dismissal for serious misconduct, an employee was entitled either to instant dismissal or to work out their notice period, with any alternative requiring agreement. The college instead paid four weeks in lieu without proper authority and without offering Mr Whelan the opportunity to agree to an alternative, resulting in a short-payment of $717.92. The Authority found the college failed to comply with its collective agreement obligations, could not explain the non-compliance, and this amounted to an unjustifiable action causing Mr Whelan an unjustified disadvantage in terms of both lost wages and the inability to work out his notice.

8. Whether remedies should be reduced for Mr Whelan's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [60]).

The Authority considered contribution under s 124 in respect of the unjustified disadvantage finding (notice). It found Mr Whelan played no part in the college's failure to comply with its collective agreement notice obligations and made no reduction to the remedy.

9. Whether the Authority should make recommendations under s 123(1)(ca) for establishment of a CCTV surveillance policy — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]).

Mr Whelan sought a recommendation that the college establish a CCTV policy. The Authority declined to make this recommendation because no particular workplace conduct or practice was a significant factor in the personal grievance that was made out. The Authority also noted a CCTV policy had already been implemented by the college following the events.

10. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [63]-[65]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, the applicant may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with the respondent having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would determine costs having regard to factors that may move an award upwards or downwards.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage (suspension) claims were dismissed, but the unjustified disadvantage claim relating to the failure to comply with collective agreement notice provisions was established and remedies were ordered accordingly.

Lost wages (short-paid notice): $717.92 gross, ordered under s 132 of the Act.
Compensation for hurt and humiliation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $12,000 (without deduction), in respect of the unjustified disadvantage (notice) claim only.
No reduction for contribution (s 124).
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Recommendation for CCTV policy: Declined.
Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; process for lodging memoranda set out.
All sums payable within 28 days of the determination date.