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Applicant: Lee and Anor (role not determinable from document)
Respondent: JMT Magical Food NZ Limited and Ors (role not determinable from document)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

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1. All legal issues — Status: Not reached (no paragraphs available).

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None determinable — the determination text was not provided.

Geetha Arunthayaparan, a Senior Solicitor employed by Legal Associates Limited (LAL) since 2016, claimed constructive dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage following a series of incidents beginning on 1 July 2024 involving her employer's partner, Ashima Singh. The key legal questions were whether LAL's conduct amounted to workplace bullying, unjustifiable disadvantage across multiple grounds, and a constructive dismissal when Ms Arunthayaparan resigned on 13 December 2024. All claims were dismissed in full.

Applicant: Geetha Arunthayaparan (employee, Senior Solicitor)
Respondent: Legal Associates Limited (employer)

Applicant: Jayanthi Vallipuram, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Shelley Kopu, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Arunthayaparan commenced employment with LAL on 9 June 2016 as a law clerk and progressed to Senior Solicitor in the Property team, working on a commission basis; both Raj Singh (director) and Ashima Singh (partner) had been supportive of her career development, including her intention to set up her own legal practice via the "Stepping Up" programme. On 1 July 2024, a dispute arose in the office over the use of a Landonline (LINZ) application, leading to two heated exchanges between Ms Arunthayaparan and Mrs Singh — first in an impromptu team meeting and then in a boardroom meeting convened by Mr Singh. Following these events, Mr Singh suggested Ms Arunthayaparan work from home while he travelled overseas, which she agreed to; she subsequently raised formal complaints of bullying, unsafe workplace conditions, and loss of income, and LAL commenced a disciplinary investigation into her conduct during the 1 July meetings. Ms Arunthayaparan raised two personal grievances (14 August 2024 and 6 September 2024), repeatedly declined to engage with LAL's investigation process or return to the office, and ultimately resigned on 13 December 2024, claiming she had been left with no choice. LAL denied all claims, asserting it had acted in good faith throughout and that the resignation was voluntary.

1. Whether Ms Arunthayaparan was unjustifiably disadvantaged by workplace bullying by Mrs Singh — Status: Dismissed (paras [83]-[95]).

The Authority applied the Worksafe New Zealand definition of bullying, which requires repeated and unreasonable behaviour creating a health and safety risk; a single incident does not qualify. There was no evidence of any bullying complaint or pattern of conduct by Mrs Singh in the preceding nine years of employment; the incidents of 1 July 2024 arose in circumstances where Ms Arunthayaparan was also an active and agitated participant who interrupted Mrs Singh and called her "toxic." The Authority found the events did not constitute bullying and dismissed this head of the disadvantage claim.

2. Whether Ms Arunthayaparan was unjustifiably disadvantaged by the working-from-home arrangement and alleged loss of income — Status: Dismissed (paras [96]-[116]).

Under s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority required an unjustifiable action by the employer that affected the employee's terms and conditions to her disadvantage. Ms Arunthayaparan had agreed to the work-from-home arrangement, had previously worked from home, was set up to do so, and completed five settlements during the relevant period. Commission payments in September and November 2024 exceeded those in June 2024 (the month before the incident); commission was not guaranteed and varied by nature. LAL also offered a separate office area to reduce contact with Mrs Singh, which Ms Arunthayaparan declined. The Authority found no unjustifiable disadvantage from working from home or any proven loss of income caused by LAL's conduct.

3. Whether Ms Arunthayaparan was unjustifiably disadvantaged by a retaliatory disciplinary process — Status: Dismissed (paras [117]-[126]).

The Authority held that a fair and reasonable employer is entitled to investigate workplace incidents following a complaint, and that commencing a disciplinary process in these circumstances was a reasonable response. LAL gave Ms Arunthayaparan multiple opportunities to provide her account (with deadlines extended on three occasions), but she did not engage. The investigation was concluded without disciplinary consequence to Ms Arunthayaparan, and LAL engaged a professional HR company to manage workplace culture. The Authority found the process was not retaliatory and disclosed no unjustifiable disadvantage.

4. Whether Ms Arunthayaparan was unjustifiably disadvantaged by LAL's failure to provide a second reference to the Law Society in November 2024 — Status: Dismissed (paras [127]-[131]).

The Authority noted that LAL had willingly provided positive references in October 2023 and was not contractually obliged to provide a second reference. Ms Arunthayaparan did not explain to Mr Singh why a further reference was required, and the failure to provide one did not impede her ultimately receiving approval to practise on her own account (granted shortly after, on 17 December 2024). There was no evidence of actual disadvantage to Ms Arunthayaparan's terms and conditions of employment, and this head of claim was dismissed.

5. Whether Ms Arunthayaparan was unjustifiably disadvantaged by the late completion of client transactions resulting in a client complaint — Status: Dismissed (paras [132]-[136]).

Ms Arunthayaparan alleged Mrs Singh deliberately withheld solicitor certificates to sabotage her work. Mrs Singh said she had not signed incomplete documentation, consistent with her professional responsibility. The Authority found it was not credible that Mrs Singh would deliberately take a step that would also damage LAL's own professional reputation, and dismissed this head of the disadvantage claim.

6. Whether Ms Arunthayaparan was constructively dismissed by LAL — Status: Dismissed (paras [137]-[150]).

The Authority applied the three-limbed test from Auckland Shop Employees IUOW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd and the two-part breach-of-duty test from Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial Local Authorities Officers IUOW (CA), as well as the "borderline" standard from Wellington Clerical Workers IUOW v Greenwich. Because the Authority found no unjustifiable disadvantage on any ground, there was no employer breach of duty sufficient to justify resignation. Additionally, following Harrod v DMG World Media (NZ) Ltd, the Authority found Ms Arunthayaparan knew she could have discussed matters further with Mr Singh, who remained open to resolution throughout. The Authority found LAL did not pursue a course of conduct aimed at coercing resignation and determined the constructive dismissal claim was not established.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [151]-[154]).

Costs were not determined. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If not resolved, LAL may file a memorandum on costs within 14 days of the determination, with Ms Arunthayaparan having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual notional daily rate unless particular circumstances warranted adjustment, with reference to PBO Ltd v Da Cruz and Fagotti v Acme & Co Limited.

All claims — constructive dismissal, unjustifiable disadvantage (bullying, working from home/loss of income, retaliatory disciplinary process, failure to provide reference, and late completion of client transactions) — were dismissed in full.

None ordered. Costs are reserved, with a timetable set for memoranda if the parties cannot agree.

Wenpeng Yu, a Chinese Cuisine Chef employed for just one week at Golden Rooster NZ Trading Ltd (an Auckland Chinese restaurant), brought claims for unjustified dismissal, unpaid wages, annual holiday pay, a Minimum Wage Act breach, and compensation for hurt and humiliation. The key legal questions were whether Mr Yu was dismissed or abandoned his employment, whether he was underpaid below the minimum wage, and what remedies were appropriate. The Authority found Mr Yu was unjustifiably dismissed and awarded compensation, lost wages, and annual holiday pay, but dismissed the Minimum Wage Act breach claim.

Applicant: Wenpeng Yu (employee, Chinese Cuisine Chef)
Respondent: Golden Rooster NZ Trading Ltd (first respondent, employer); Qiaoyun Lin (second respondent, sole company director)

Applicant: Aimee Cai, advocate
Respondent: David Liu and Candy Lin, counsel for the Respondents

Wenpeng Yu, a work visa holder, was recruited by Golden Rooster NZ Trading Ltd — a Chinese restaurant in Auckland — after pre-employment negotiations via WeChat with the restaurant's operational manager Zhuolun He (husband of director Qiaoyun Lin). Mr Yu signed an individual employment agreement on 24 April 2024 for the role of Chinese Cuisine Chef at $29.66 gross per hour, working a minimum of 30 hours per week; the agreement contained no 90-day trial clause. He commenced employment on 20 May 2024 and worked for only one week, with his employment ending on 26 May 2024; the restaurant paid him $1,400 net in cash and claimed he had abandoned his employment. Mr Yu denied abandonment, asserting he was dismissed without cause or process, and WeChat messages from 28 May 2024 showed him referring to being dismissed and seeking to return for a discussion, while Mr He's later messages in June 2024 invited Mr Yu to return to work, undermining the abandonment narrative. Mr Yu also alleged he worked 74 hours that week (placing his effective rate below the minimum wage), whereas the respondents maintained he worked 63 hours.

1. Admissibility of post-investigation meeting evidence (screenshots of phone calls and job advertisements) — Status: Established (paras [2]–[6]).

The Authority exercised its broad power under s 160(1)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) to call for evidence during the investigation meeting. The respondents objected on the grounds the material was available before the meeting and they had no opportunity to challenge its reliability. The Authority overruled the objection, noting that the respondents' counsel (not present at the IM) were given an opportunity to comment, mitigating any prejudice, and that, in any event, little turned on the new material.

2. Whether Mr Yu was unjustifiably dismissed or abandoned his employment — Status: Established (paras [16]–[23]).

The applicable test is that under s 103A of the ERA: whether the employer's actions and manner of acting were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority preferred Mr Yu's account, relying heavily on WeChat communications: Mr Yu's message of 28 May 2024 described being "dismissed," and Mr He's failure to correct this characterisation, coupled with his subsequent invitation in June 2024 for Mr Yu to return, was inconsistent with abandonment. The respondents' claimed evidence of phone contact attempts lacked any supporting records and was given no weight. The Authority found Mr Yu was dismissed because the respondents were unhappy with his productivity, but this concern was never communicated to him, denying him access to information and an opportunity to respond, in breach of the good faith duty at s 4(1A) of the ERA. A fair and reasonable employer could not have acted this way, and the dismissal was unjustified.

3. Whether the employer breached the Minimum Wage Act 1983 — Status: Dismissed (para [31]).

Mr Yu claimed he worked 74 hours, resulting in an effective hourly rate of $18.91 — below the minimum wage of $23.15. The respondents said he worked 63 hours, consistent with the $1,400 net payment made. The Authority preferred the respondents' evidence on hours worked, noting the cash payment was consistent with 63 hours at $29.66 per hour less PAYE and ACC. As Mr Yu did not record his hours in writing and failed to establish he worked the claimed 74 hours, the MWA breach claim was not made out.

4. Compensation for hurt and humiliation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the ERA — Status: Established (paras [24]–[25]).

Compensation under this head is for the effects of the grievance on the employee, not a penalty. Mr Yu suffered loss of sleep and inability to support his wife and two children in China. Taking into account the brevity of employment (one week) and the available evidence, the Authority awarded $7,500.

5. Lost wages under ss 123(1)(b) and 128(2) of the ERA — Status: Established (paras [26]–[29]).

Where a personal grievance causes lost remuneration, the Act authorises reimbursement of the lesser of the actual loss or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Mr Yu could not return to his Hamilton employer (who had found a replacement) and, lacking a vehicle, could not find Auckland work; he resumed employment in July 2024. The Authority found he actively sought work as a work visa holder and ordered four weeks' lost wages (27 May – 30 June 2024) at $29.66 × 30 hours × 4 weeks = $3,559.20. Interest was not awarded as it was not sought.

6. Annual holiday pay entitlement under s 23 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (para [30]).

Mr Yu was entitled to 8% of gross earnings as annual holiday pay on termination. The $1,400 payment did not include annual leave. The Authority ordered payment of 8% annual leave on Mr Yu's gross wages, though the precise dollar amount was not specified in the determination.

7. Contribution/reduction under s 124 of the ERA — Status: Dismissed (not explicitly discussed as a separate finding; issue listed at para [9](v) but no reduction applied).

Although contribution under s 124 was identified as an issue, the Authority made no reduction to any remedy, implicitly finding no contributory conduct by Mr Yu warranted reduction.

8. Personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage — Status: Not reached (para [1], [9]).

Mr Yu also raised an unjustified disadvantage grievance, but the determination does not separately address or resolve this claim beyond the unjustified dismissal finding. It appears subsumed within or superseded by the dismissal finding, and no distinct ruling was made on it.

9. Personal liability of second respondent Qiaoyun Lin — Status: Dismissed (para [32]).

The Authority found Ms Lin was not Mr Yu's employer. Under ss 142Y and 142W of the ERA, compensation and lost remuneration cannot be imposed on a director personally. While wages and money payable could theoretically be recovered from her in her personal capacity, the Authority declined to grant Mr Yu leave under s 142Y to pursue Ms Lin for annual leave payment, concluding it would be uneconomical given the modest amount involved.

10. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [34]–[36]).

Costs were reserved with parties encouraged to resolve the matter between themselves. A memorandum process was outlined for determination on the Authority's usual daily tariff basis if needed.

The claim was partially upheld: unjustified dismissal established and remedies of compensation, lost wages, and annual holiday pay ordered; the Minimum Wage Act breach claim was dismissed; personal liability of the second respondent was declined.

- Compensation (hurt and humiliation, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $7,500 (no deduction), payable by Golden Rooster NZ Trading Ltd by 23 October 2026.
- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b)): $3,559.20 (no deduction; 4 weeks × 30 hours × $29.66/hr), payable by Golden Rooster NZ Trading Ltd by 23 October 2026.
- Annual holiday pay: 8% of Mr Yu's gross wages (amount unspecified), payable by Golden Rooster NZ Trading Ltd by 23 October 2026.
- MWA penalty: None ordered (claim dismissed).
- Wage arrears: None ordered (MWA breach not established).
- Reinstatement: Not ordered.
- Costs: Reserved; parties to attempt resolution; failing that, memorandum process initiated by Mr Yu within 21 days.
- Second respondent (Ms Lin) personal liability: Declined.

[CONSENT]

Schindler Lifts NZ Limited (the employer) applied for urgent interim orders against Mason Tai, a former employee. The parties reached agreement and jointly requested that the agreed terms be made orders of the Authority. The determination gives effect to that consent, with remaining issues reserved for future investigation.

Applicant: Schindler Lifts NZ Limited (employer)
Respondent: Mason Tai (former employee)

Applicant: Daniel Church, counsel
Respondent: Monique Stephens, Nishita Ganatra and Jignasha Kumar, advocates

Schindler Lifts NZ Limited applied to the Employment Relations Authority for urgent interim orders against Mason Tai, described as a former employee of the company. The nature of the underlying dispute and the specific content of the urgent interim orders sought are not detailed in the determination. The parties reached agreement, recording the terms in a signed joint memorandum dated 22 September 2026. Both parties' representatives signed the memorandum and jointly requested that its terms be converted into binding orders of the Authority. The remainder of the issues between the parties had not been resolved and were to be progressed by the Authority separately. No dispute as to costs arose in connection with this consent determination.

1. Whether the agreed terms of the parties' joint memorandum should be made binding orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [1]-[3]).

The Authority has the power to give effect to agreements reached between parties by making them orders of the Authority, rendering them binding and enforceable. The parties jointly requested this course by submitting a signed memorandum dated 22 September 2026. The Authority accepted the joint memorandum and made the agreed terms orders of the Authority. The signed memorandum is held on the Authority's file.

2. Whether any remaining issues between the parties are resolved by this determination — Status: Not reached (para [4]).

The determination expressly notes that the remainder of the issues between the parties are still to be investigated. Those issues were not addressed in this consent determination and will be progressed separately by the Authority in due course.

3. Whether costs should be ordered in connection with this consent determination — Status: Dismissed (para [5]).

The parties confirmed in their joint memorandum that costs were not in issue for this consent determination. Accordingly, the Authority made no order as to costs.

The application for urgent interim orders was resolved by consent, with the agreed terms made binding orders of the Authority; remaining issues and costs were reserved.

The specific terms of the consent orders are not disclosed in the determination (the signed joint memorandum is held on file). No costs order was made in relation to this consent determination. Remaining issues between the parties are subject to further investigation.

Xuefeng Yang, a Chinese national recruited to work as a construction worker in New Zealand for ERA Home Limited, brought claims arising from alleged unlawful recruitment premiums, unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, and breaches of his individual employment agreement (IEA) and good faith obligations. The central dispute concerned whether an employment relationship was ever formed, whether ERA Home received unlawful premiums, and whether personal grievance remedies and penalties were warranted. The Authority found that an employment relationship was formed, upheld the personal grievance claims for unjustified dismissal and disadvantage, and imposed a penalty on ERA Home, but dismissed the unlawful premium claim and the claim against director Junwen Long personally.

Applicant: Xuefeng Yang (employee)
Respondent: ERA Home Limited (first respondent, employer) and Junwen Long (second respondent, sole director of ERA Home Limited)

Applicant: May Moncur, advocate for the applicant
Respondent: Kevin Lin, advocate for the respondents

Xuefeng Yang was recruited from China in early 2023 to work as a construction worker for ERA Home Limited, an Auckland-based construction company, after paying RMB 100,000 to a Chinese agency for the employment opportunity and AEWV processing. He signed an IEA on 3 May 2023 setting his wage at $29.66 NZD per hour for a minimum of 30 hours per week, and arrived in New Zealand on 4 June 2023, where he was met at Auckland Airport by ERA Home employee Yanzhe Zhang. Mr Yang says he was required to pay a $1,000 NZD "introduction fee" before being given work, commenced work at a Queen Street construction site on 8 June 2023 being paid $18/hour in cash, and was summarily dismissed approximately 20 days later on 2 July 2023 for allegedly "not obeying orders." ERA Home disputed that Mr Yang ever became its employee, that it received any premium payments, or that it dismissed him, with director Mr Long claiming he was unaware of Mr Yang's existence until the personal grievance was raised. Mediation and investigation meetings occurred over an extended period, with the matter partly heard across multiple dates in 2025 and 2026.

1. Whether an employment relationship was formed between Mr Yang and ERA Home — Status: Established (paras [20]-[26]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which includes within the definition of "employee" a person intending to work (defined as one who has been offered and accepted work as an employee). ERA Home argued Mr Yang never reported to the company, was never on its payroll, and never received a site induction. The Authority found that the IEA's commencement condition — visa approval and arrival in New Zealand within seven days — had been met, Mr Zhang (who met Mr Yang at the airport) was an ERA Home employee, and Mr Yang had commenced actual work at a construction site operated by ERA Home. The Authority was satisfied Mr Yang met the statutory definition of employee and could pursue claims under the Act and the WPA.

2. Whether the respondents sought or received an unlawful premium under s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Dismissed (paras [27]-[29]).

Section 12A(1) WPA prohibits an employer or person engaged on their behalf from seeking or receiving any premium in respect of employment. The Authority noted that the Employment Court has held payments in return for visa support can constitute unlawful premiums (citing Labour Inspector v Newzealand Fusion International Ltd [2019] NZEmpC 181). However, the Authority found there was insufficient evidence to establish that ERA Home, Mr Long, Qiwen Long, or anyone authorised by them sought, received, authorised, or benefited from the RMB 100,000 paid to the Chinese agency. The claim under s 12A WPA accordingly failed.

3. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of s 12A of the WPA — Status: Dismissed (para [31]).

Because the underlying s 12A WPA claim was not made out, the associated penalty claim did not arise for consideration and was declined.

4. Whether ERA Home breached Mr Yang's IEA and whether a penalty under s 134 of the Act should be imposed on ERA Home — Status: Established (paras [32]-[33], [39]-[42]).

The Authority was satisfied that Mr Zhang acted for and on behalf of ERA Home, and that ERA Home breached the IEA by failing to provide work on the agreed terms, paying below the agreed hourly rate, failing to pay wages fortnightly into a nominated account, and summarily dismissing Mr Yang without notice or process. The Authority globalised the IEA breach and good faith breach into one representative breach, noting ERA Home's status as an accredited employer, Mr Yang's vulnerability as a migrant on an employer-tied visa, and the serious consequences of the breach (Mr Yang having to return to China). A penalty of $3,000 payable to the Crown was imposed, below the $20,000 maximum for a company.

5. Whether ERA Home breached good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act and whether a penalty should be imposed — Status: Established (paras [35]-[38], [39]-[42]).

The Authority found ERA Home's multiple failures — including underpayment, failure to pay fortnightly by bank transfer, and summary dismissal without process — breached the good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act. This breach was globalised with the IEA breach for penalty purposes (see issue 4 above).

6. Whether Mr Long aided or abetted ERA Home's IEA and good faith breaches such that a penalty should be imposed on him under s 134 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [34]).

The Authority considered whether Mr Long, as sole director and controlling mind of ERA Home, had sufficient knowledge of the essential facts establishing ERA Home's breaches to be found to have incited, aided, or abetted those breaches. While Mr Long had reviewed and authorised the IEA and knew a visa had been granted, there was no evidence he was aware Mr Yang had arrived in New Zealand and commenced work. The evidence was insufficient to establish Mr Long's liability and the penalty claim against him was not made out.

7. Whether leave should be granted to recover monies from Mr Long as a person involved in employment standards breaches under ss 142W–142Y of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [43]-[45]).

The Act permits recovery from a person involved in employment standards breaches where the employer cannot pay, contingent on prior leave from the Authority. The Authority found that Mr Long held a qualifying position as director but, mirroring its finding on the penalty claim, that the evidence was insufficient to show he had knowledge of the essential facts establishing ERA Home's contraventions. Additionally, because the premium claim failed, leave could not be granted to recover those amounts from Mr Long. The claim for leave was declined.

8. Whether Mr Yang had a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [46]-[50]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, asking whether ERA Home's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. By denying the employment relationship and failing to investigate allegations against Mr Yang, raise concerns with him, give him an opportunity to respond, or genuinely consider any explanation, ERA Home failed all four procedural fairness factors in s 103A(3). The dismissal was found unjustified, with fundamental defects causing unfair treatment.

9. Whether Mr Yang had a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (para [51]).

The Authority found the unjustified disadvantage grievance was made out on the basis that ERA Home failed to pay Mr Yang the agreed IEA hourly rate of $29.66, instead paying him $18 per hour in cash.

10. Whether lost wages should be awarded as a remedy — Status: Partially established (paras [53]-[55]).

Section 123(1)(b) and s 128(2) of the Act allow reimbursement of lost wages up to three months' ordinary time remuneration. The Authority was unable to award lost wages for the shortfall during Mr Yang's active employment (as he had not identified the precise underpayment figure), but awarded nine weeks' lost wages covering the period from dismissal (2 July 2023) to departure from New Zealand (3 September 2023), calculated at 30 hours per week at $29.66/hour, totalling $8,008.20, plus 8% annual holiday pay on that amount.

11. Whether compensation for hurt, humiliation, and distress should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [56]-[57]).

The Authority accepted Mr Yang's evidence of significant financial loss and psychological harm and, cross-referencing comparable cases, awarded $23,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act.

12. Whether a reduction for contribution under s 124 of the Act should be applied — Status: Dismissed (para [58]).

The Authority found no basis to reduce remedies for any contributory conduct on Mr Yang's part, and personal grievance remedies were not reduced.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [61]-[63]).

Costs were reserved, with the parties encouraged to resolve the issue themselves. A timetable was set for costs memoranda if agreement could not be reached.

The claim was partially upheld: personal grievance claims for unjustified dismissal and disadvantage were established and remedies awarded; a penalty was imposed on ERA Home; but the unlawful premium claim, the penalty claim against Mr Long personally, and the persons-involved leave application were all dismissed.

Lost wages: $8,008.20 (nine weeks at 30 hours/week at $29.66/hour, covering 2 July – 3 September 2023), plus 8% annual holiday pay on that amount.
Compensation (hurt, humiliation, distress): $23,000.
Penalty: $3,000 payable by ERA Home to the Crown bank account (globalised penalty for IEA breach and good faith breach under ss 4 and 134 of the Act).
All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination date.
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Costs: Reserved.

Herewini Dickson, a long-serving employee of approximately 30 years with Ballance Agri-Nutrients Limited, was dismissed on 23 January 2025 following an investigation into an alleged breach of a Safety Operating Procedure (SOP) while acting as a safety watch. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal and a prior suspension were unjustified, and what remedies were appropriate. The Authority found both the dismissal and the suspension unjustified, and awarded compensation for hurt and humiliation, lost wages, and also applied a 30% contribution reduction.

Applicant: Herewini Dickson (employee)
Respondent: Ballance Agri-Nutrients Limited (employer)

Applicant: William Lynch, advocate
Respondent: James Hakaria, counsel

Herewini Dickson commenced employment with Ballance Agri-Nutrients Limited in 1996 on a casual basis, transitioning to a permanent position as Acidulation Plant Operator in 2004, and worked at Ballance's Mount Maunganui manufacturing facility for approximately 30 years. On 9 January 2025, while acting as a safety watch for a colleague (Dylan Tetenburg) performing maintenance work on the acidulation plant, Mr Dickson was alleged to have breached clause 7.4.4 of the Acidulation General Guarding SOP by being on his phone and lacking line of sight of Mr Tetenburg. That same day, Mr Dickson was abruptly suspended without prior notice of the purpose of the meeting or the allegations against him. Following a disciplinary process, Ballance classified the incident as a "HiPo" (High Potential) event and dismissed Mr Dickson on 23 January 2025. Mr Dickson raised personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage (suspension) and unjustified dismissal, seeking compensation for hurt and humiliation and lost remuneration. Ballance argued the dismissal was justified as a fair and reasonable response to a serious health and safety breach, and that any procedural flaws were minor.

1. Whether Mr Dickson was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [12]-[63]).

The statutory test under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 requires consideration of whether the employer's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority found that while Ballance reasonably established Mr Dickson had breached clause 7.4.4 of the SOP (a one-off act of negligence amounting to serious misconduct), the investigation was procedurally flawed: Ballance failed to provide Mr Dickson with Mr Tetenburg's statement, which was directly relevant to the HiPo classification and the assessment of seriousness. Furthermore, Mr Dickson was not informed that the event had been classified as a HiPo incident until the day of dismissal, and Ballance did not adequately consider alternatives to dismissal or properly account for Mr Dickson's approximately 30 years of service and otherwise exemplary record. The dismissal was therefore unjustified.

2. Whether Ballance sufficiently investigated the allegation against Mr Dickson — Status: Established (not sufficient) (paras [16]-[39]).

Under s 103A(2)(a), the employer must sufficiently investigate the allegations before dismissing. Ballance provided Mr Dickson with statements from Mr Stucki and Mr Liddle but failed to disclose Mr Tetenburg's statement, which bore directly on Mr Tetenburg's proximity to the conveyor belt — a finding central to the HiPo classification. Mr Tetenburg himself told the Authority he had no safety concerns given his proximity to the belt. Mr Dickson was thus denied the opportunity to respond to a critical aspect of the case against him, rendering the investigation insufficient.

3. Whether Ballance genuinely considered Mr Dickson's explanation before dismissing him — Status: Established (yes, partially) (paras [40]-[51]).

The Authority found that Ballance did genuinely consider Mr Dickson's submissions regarding his partial line of sight, phone distraction due to a family emergency, and length of service, and that a fair and reasonable employer could find his conduct amounted to serious misconduct. However, this finding was qualified by the broader conclusion that the overall dismissal was nonetheless unjustified due to procedural failures concerning the HiPo classification and alternatives to dismissal.

4. Whether Ballance considered alternatives to dismissal — Status: Dismissed (alternatives not considered) (paras [52]-[62]).

Even where serious misconduct is established, dismissal is not automatic (citing Emmerson v Northland District Health Board and Secretary for Justice v Dodd). The Authority found Ballance's preliminary outcome and dismissal letters did not address alternatives to dismissal, and it was not clear that Mr Dickson's 30-year tenure and exemplary record were adequately taken into account. This failure contributed to the finding of unjustified dismissal.

5. Whether Mr Dickson was unjustifiably disadvantaged by the suspension — Status: Established (paras [64]-[72]).

The Authority applied the principle that both the decision to suspend and the process followed to reach it must be fair and reasonable (citing Graham v Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd). Ballance did not advise Mr Dickson of the purpose of the meeting, the nature of the allegations, or that suspension was being contemplated before the meeting of 9 January 2025. The suspension letter followed within approximately 43 minutes. These were significant procedural defects resulting in unfair treatment, establishing an unjustified disadvantage grievance.

6. Whether Mr Dickson is entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [73]-[81]).

Compensation is assessed by reference to the nature and extent of harm caused to the employee (citing Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited). Mr Dickson gave evidence of significant emotional impact: shock, anger, confusion, sleeplessness, and financial strain. The Authority awarded $2,500 (before contribution) for the unjustified suspension and $14,000 (before contribution) for the unjustified dismissal.

7. Whether Mr Dickson is entitled to lost remuneration under s 128 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [82]-[87]).

The Authority is required to award the lesser of actual remuneration lost or three months' ordinary time remuneration, subject to contribution. Applying the mitigation framework from Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation, the Authority found Mr Dickson was not actively job-seeking in the 13-week post-dismissal period, but that this was reasonable given his 30-year career abruptly ending in contested circumstances and the negative impact of dismissal. A full 13-week award was made (before contribution).

8. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for contributory conduct — Status: Established (paras [88]-[92]).

The Authority considered whether Mr Dickson's own conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to dismissal. Applying Yang v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand, the Authority found Mr Dickson had breached a health and safety SOP at a safety-sensitive site, amounting to serious misconduct and warranting a 30% reduction across all remedies (citing Bly v FutureCo Limited for comparative purposes).

9. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Not reached (paras [95]-[97]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a process set out if they cannot agree, and the Authority indicating it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if called upon.

The claim was partially upheld: both the unjustified dismissal grievance and the unjustified disadvantage (suspension) grievance were established, with remedies awarded subject to a 30% contribution reduction; costs were reserved.

- Compensation (unjustified dismissal, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $9,800 (after 30% contribution reduction from $14,000)
- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage/suspension, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $1,750 (after 30% contribution reduction from $2,500)
- Lost remuneration (s 128): $18,773.49 gross (representing 13 weeks' wages after 30% contribution reduction)
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; if not resolved, Mr Dickson may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days; Ballance has 14 days to reply
- All payments to be made within 28 days of the determination date

GYB, a compliance officer employed by public sector organisation XDF, was suspended on full pay on 5 August 2026 pending an investigation into allegations that she disclosed confidential information to third parties. GYB applied for interim reinstatement to the workplace, raising a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage. The Authority declined the application, finding that while GYB had a weakly arguable case on the disadvantage grievance, she failed to establish a serious question to be tried on permanent reinstatement, and both the balance of convenience and overall justice weighed against granting interim reinstatement.

Applicant: GYB (employee, compliance officer)
Respondent: XDF (employer, public sector organisation)

Applicant: Michael O'Flaherty, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Sarah Wadworth, counsel for the Respondent

GYB has been employed by XDF as a compliance officer on a full-time permanent basis. On 5 August 2026, XDF suspended GYB on full pay pending an investigation into allegations that she disclosed confidential information to third parties — alleged conduct spanning April 2025 to July 2026. GYB contends that XDF failed to disclose relevant audit findings when making the suspension decision, that the original basis for suspension has since been abandoned following an amended terms of reference issued on 21 August 2026, that the suspension is unduly long, and that XDF did not comply with its own suspension policy. XDF maintains it followed a fair process, substantially complied with its suspension policy, and that reinstatement is not practicable because GYB's role requires access to IT systems containing the very categories of confidential information at issue. GYB raised a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage on 7 August 2026 and lodged an application with the Authority on 17 August 2026 seeking interim reinstatement. Both parties also jointly sought non-publication orders, which were granted on an interim basis.

1. Whether interim non-publication orders should be granted in respect of party names and identifying information — Status: Established (paras [7]-[14]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from MW v Spiga Ltd [2024] NZEmpC 147: first, whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected; second, whether those consequences justify a departure from open justice. The Authority found that, while the investigation remains on foot and no findings have been made, there is no public interest in publishing party names, and GYB's potential reputational harm weighed in favour of non-publication. Orders were granted on an interim basis pending the substantive investigation meeting, under Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act).

2. Whether there is a serious question to be tried in relation to GYB's personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage — Status: Partially established (weakly arguable) (paras [22]-[30]).

The threshold for a serious question to be tried is low — the claim must not be vexatious or frivolous (Jung v Asian Savour World Pty Limited [2026] NZEmpC 82). The Authority found it arguable that XDF did not provide GYB with sufficient information (including audit findings) at the suspension meeting on 5 August 2026, and noted the established principle that an employer must generally give notice of and seek an employee's views on a suspension proposal (E TU Incorporated v Singh [2024] NZEmpC 84). However, the claim was characterised as only weakly arguable because correspondence suggested XDF substantially complied with its suspension policy, alternatives to suspension were considered, and reasons were provided — and a further issue arose as to the extent of the good faith obligation under s 4(1A)(c) of the Act in the suspension context (XYZ v ABC [2017] NZEmpC 40).

3. Whether there is a serious question to be tried in relation to permanent reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [31]-[42]).

Following Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, the serious question analysis in an interim reinstatement application requires a sub-issue assessment of whether permanent reinstatement is arguable. GYB argued the fundamental basis for suspension had changed following the amended terms of reference, but the Authority found the scope of the investigation had not materially changed — it remained focused on alleged disclosure of confidential information to third parties. The Authority accepted that reinstatement was reasonable in terms of impact on third parties but held it was not practicable because GYB's role requires access to XDF's IT systems, creating an ongoing risk of further disclosure (WXN v Auckland International Airport Ltd [2021] NZEmpC 205). GYB's proposed undertakings not to disclose further emails were considered but not accepted as sufficient to address this risk.

4. Whether the balance of convenience favours granting interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [43]-[53]).

The Authority considered the adequacy of damages, preservation of the status quo, and relative strength of the cases (Stellar Elements New Zealand Limited v Amesbury [2024] NZEmpC 36). The Authority acknowledged the reputational and mental health impacts of the suspension on GYB, but weighed these against the fact that GYB is suspended on full pay, EAP and wellbeing support have been offered, statutory remedies remain available if the suspension is ultimately found unjustified, the investigation is progressing in a timely manner, and a draft report could be issued as early as October 2026. The balance of convenience was found to weigh against granting interim reinstatement.

5. Whether the overall justice of the case requires interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [54]-[59]).

Applying the overall justice assessment required by NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90, the Authority weighed GYB's health impacts and the arguable procedural shortcomings in the suspension process against XDF's substantial compliance with its suspension policy, the impracticability of reinstatement given IT access requirements, the timely progress of the investigation, and the expectation that the investigation would conclude within a reasonable timeframe. The Authority noted the substantive hearing would be set for November 2026 and directed XDF to prioritise the investigation. Overall justice did not favour granting interim reinstatement.

6. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [61]).

The Authority reserved costs without further comment, meaning the question of costs will be determined at a later stage.

GYB's application for interim reinstatement was declined in full; costs were reserved.

None ordered at this stage. Interim reinstatement declined. Non-publication orders granted on an interim basis pending the substantive investigation meeting. Costs reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive decision in which the Employment Relations Authority dismissed Dr Duncan Connors' employment relationship problem against the Vice Chancellor of the University of Otago, finding it frivolous with no prospect of success. The University sought costs of $6,750 (based on the daily tariff for a one-day investigation meeting plus a 50% uplift), while Dr Connors argued costs should lie where they fall. The Authority awarded costs of $3,375, applying the daily tariff at three-quarters of a one-day investigation meeting with no uplift.

Applicant: Duncan Connors (employee/former employee)
Respondent: The Vice Chancellor of the University of Otago (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Malcolm Couling, counsel for the Respondent

In a substantive determination dated 7 August 2026 ([2026] NZERA 536), Member Peter van Keulen dismissed Dr Connors' employment relationship problem, finding it frivolous and having no prospect of success, on the University's application to dismiss. Costs were reserved at that stage to allow the parties to attempt agreement. The parties were unable to agree on costs, prompting this determination. The University sought $6,750 in costs, arguing the on-the-papers application equated to a one-day investigation meeting's worth of work, noting Dr Connors had lodged 22 pages of submissions and 350 pages of material, and sought a 50% uplift on the basis the claim was meritless and frivolous and that Dr Connors had breached confidentiality and mediation privilege. Dr Connors argued costs should lie where they fall, contending the matter was resolved at a preliminary stage without an investigation meeting, that the University had not established the work equated to a full day, and that his conduct did not cause unnecessary cost.

1. Whether costs should lie where they fall rather than follow the event — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]-[9]).

The Authority confirmed the starting principle is that costs follow the event, meaning a successful party is presumed entitled to costs. An exception exists where policy reasons apply, such as the matter being a test case or having wider public interest. The Authority found Dr Connors' submissions did not elevate this matter into one where costs should lie where they fall, and the University, having succeeded, was entitled to a costs award.

2. What quantum of the daily tariff should apply to the on-the-papers application — Status: Partially established (paras [10]-[11]).

The Authority applies its daily tariff by assessing what an on-the-papers application corresponds to in terms of an investigation meeting. Generally, on-the-papers applications correspond to half a day's tariff, with more complex matters warranting a full day. The Authority accepted some complexity given the unique nature of the application and the volume of material (22 pages of submissions and 350 pages of documents) supplied by Dr Connors, but was not satisfied the work equated to a full day. Accordingly, it applied three-quarters of the daily tariff — an intermediate and unusual step — arriving at $3,375.

3. Whether a 50% uplift to the daily tariff was warranted due to the meritless/frivolous nature of the claim and Dr Connors' conduct (including alleged breach of confidentiality and mediation privilege) — Status: Dismissed (paras [12]-[14]).

The University argued the meritless and frivolous nature of the claim, plus Dr Connors' willingness to breach confidentiality and mediation privilege, justified a 50% uplift. The Authority accepted the claim was meritless and frivolous and acknowledged the conduct concerns, but found: (a) the additional work caused by the volume of material was already accounted for by applying three-quarters rather than half the daily tariff; and (b) a costs award cannot be punitive or used as a deterrent for conduct — it can only reflect actual costs incurred. No uplift was applied.

The costs claim was partially upheld: the University was awarded costs at three-quarters of the daily tariff ($3,375), with no uplift.

Costs: $3,375 payable by Dr Connors to the University of Otago as a contribution to its costs. No other remedies ordered.

Janet Ashe, a former teacher at Tomarata School, brought claims of constructive dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage against the Board of Trustees. The Board raised two preliminary objections: that Ms Ashe had already elected to pursue the same claims before the Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT), and that her claims were out of time. The Authority upheld the first objection, finding it lacked jurisdiction under s 112 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 because Ms Ashe had already made her election to use the Human Rights Act 1993 pathway, and the second issue was not reached.

Applicant: Janet Ashe (employee/former teacher)
Respondent: The Tomarata School Board of Trustees (employer)

Applicant: Janet Ashe, self-represented
Respondent: Jess Keating, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Ashe was employed as a teacher at Tomarata School until her dismissal on 17 June 2022. Following her dismissal, the Board filed a mandatory report with the Teaching Council on 2 August 2022. On 14 November 2022, Ms Ashe raised a personal grievance alleging unjustifiable disadvantage arising from the mandatory report. On 9 June 2023, Ms Ashe filed a complaint under the Human Rights Act 1993 with the HRRT, encompassing a range of allegations including unjustified dismissal, the mandatory report, retaliation for protected disclosures, forced leave without pay, and other matters. On 10 December 2025, Ms Ashe lodged a Statement of Problem with the Authority raising an identical list of allegations. Ms Ashe subsequently attempted to amend her HRRT claim (on 10 December 2025 and 6 July 2026) to narrow it to one privacy breach issue and redirect remaining claims to the Authority, but the HRRT did not accept that amendment as of 4 August 2026. The matter before the Authority was determined on the papers without oral evidence.

1. Whether the claims before the Authority are the same as those already before the HRRT, thereby depriving the Authority of jurisdiction under s 112 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [11]-[24]).

Section 112 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 provides that where circumstances giving rise to a personal grievance also entitle an employee to complain under the Human Rights Act 1993, the employee may elect one pathway only; if they file a complaint under the HRA, they may not exercise any rights under the Act in relation to the same subject matter. Comparing the HRRT Statement of Claim filed in June 2023 and the Statement of Problem lodged with the Authority in December 2025, the Authority found that the lists of allegations were identical, engaging the same subject matter. Ms Ashe argued that the jurisdictional question requires comparison of the subject matter of the grievance (not merely overlapping facts), and that the primary documents showed different matters; however, the Authority rejected this, finding the subject matter was the same. The Authority also noted that Ms Ashe's attempt to amend her HRRT claim to separate the issues had not been accepted by the HRRT. Accordingly, the Authority determined it had no jurisdiction to proceed.

2. Whether Ms Ashe's claims were raised outside the statutory time limit — Status: Not reached (para [25]).

Having determined it lacked jurisdiction on the basis of Ms Ashe's prior election under s 112, the Authority found it unnecessary to consider whether the claims were also out of time, and made no finding on this issue.

3. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [26]-[29]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If they could not, the Board was directed to file and serve a memorandum on costs within 14 days of the determination, with Ms Ashe permitted to reply within 14 days of service. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual notional daily rate, referencing PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135.

The application was dismissed in full on the basis that the Authority lacked jurisdiction, as Ms Ashe had already elected to pursue her claims before the Human Rights Review Tribunal under s 112 of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

None ordered. The Authority dismissed the claims for want of jurisdiction. Costs are reserved pending further memoranda from the parties.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following an earlier substantive decision in which Nisha Thakkar's unjustified disadvantage claims against her employer LS Travel Retail New Zealand Limited were partially upheld. The determination also resolves a dispute about the correct calculation of lost wages awarded in that earlier decision. The Authority accepted the employer's wage calculation, declined to order further wage payments, and awarded Ms Thakkar $2,000 in costs (plus the application fee reimbursement), reduced from a higher starting point primarily due to mixed success and a rejected Calderbank settlement offer.

Applicant: Nisha Thakkar (employee)
Respondent: LS Travel Retail New Zealand Limited (employer)

Applicant: Ruth Katsui, representative for the applicant
Respondent: Anne Wilson, counsel for the respondent

In the earlier substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 376, issued 12 June 2026), the Authority partially upheld Ms Thakkar's personal grievance claims, finding unjustified disadvantage in relation to guaranteed hours and good faith breaches for the period 27 November 2023 to 5 April 2024, but dismissing her constructive dismissal and penalty claims. Costs were reserved, and the parties were invited to resolve costs between themselves but could not do so. On 3 July 2026, LS Travel paid $8,000 compensation and $3,515.83 net wages ($4,791.55 gross) to Ms Thakkar, but Ms Thakkar disputed whether the wage calculation was correct, arguing hours worked outside her contractual Times and Days of Work should not offset her guaranteed-hours shortfall. LS Travel maintained its calculation was correct, relying on time and wage records from the common bundle to arrive at a shortfall of 178.8 hours. The parties also exchanged submissions on costs, with Ms Thakkar seeking $7,500 (including a 20% uplift) and LS Travel seeking either a costs award of $2,250 in its favour or an order that costs lie where they fall, relying on a Calderbank offer of $10,000 made on 9 September 2025 that Ms Thakkar had rejected.

1. Whether LS Travel's calculation of the lost wages shortfall ordered in the earlier determination was correct — Status: Established in favour of LS Travel (paras [3]-[13]).

The Authority was asked to interpret paragraph [65] of its earlier determination, specifically whether the guaranteed 40 hours per week had to be provided at the contractual Times and Days of Work (Tuesday–Saturday, 12.30pm–8.30pm) so that hours worked outside those windows could not reduce the shortfall, or whether any hours worked could count toward the 40-hour guarantee. The Authority accepted LS Travel's interpretation: the entitlement was to 40 hours per week, and hours actually worked (including outside the contractual window) could be counted toward that guarantee. The Authority also accepted that any additional disadvantage from working outside guaranteed shifts had been remedied by the earlier compensation award. No further wage payments were found to be owing.

2. Whether Ms Thakkar was entitled to costs, and if so in what amount — Status: Partially established (paras [14]-[29]).

The Authority applied the established costs principles under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act, including that costs generally follow the event, awards are modest, and a notional daily tariff is used. The Authority found Ms Thakkar had mixed success (two disadvantage claims upheld, constructive dismissal and penalty claims dismissed), and applying the Employment Court's guidance in Coomer v JA McCallum and Son Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 156 that mixed success is nonetheless success, determined Ms Thakkar should receive a costs award. The Authority set the starting point at 1.5 investigation days ($6,250), reduced it to $5,500 to reflect partial failure and unsuccessful claims, and then further reduced it to $2,000 in light of Ms Thakkar's rejection of LS Travel's Calderbank offer of $10,000 (which, had it been accepted, would have placed her in a better or equivalent financial position while avoiding substantial preparation and hearing costs). The Authority noted the costs claim for clarification of the wages calculation was reasonable and made no deduction for it.

3. Whether LS Travel's Calderbank offer should affect the costs award — Status: Established (paras [27]-[29]).

LS Travel submitted a Calderbank offer of $10,000 (made 9 September 2025, open until 30 September 2025) which Ms Thakkar rejected and then counter-offered above her ultimate recovery. The Authority accepted the offer was made on a proper Calderbank basis and in full and final settlement, with a reasonable period for acceptance. Since the offer was slightly less than (but very close to) Ms Thakkar's total recovery ($11,515), and acceptance would have avoided substantial costs of preparation, hearing, and subsequent proceedings, the rejection of the offer was given significant weight, resulting in a further reduction of the costs award to $2,000.

4. Whether LS Travel should receive a costs award in its favour — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]-[26]).

LS Travel argued it was the largely successful party and sought $2,250 in costs against Ms Thakkar, or alternatively that costs should lie where they fall. The Authority rejected this, finding that Ms Thakkar did achieve success on her disadvantage claims and that success could not have been achieved without bringing proceedings. A costs award in LS Travel's favour was therefore not appropriate.

The claim for further wage payments was dismissed; Ms Thakkar's application for costs was partially upheld, with costs ordered at $2,000 (plus application fee reimbursement of $71.55), and LS Travel's cross-application for costs was dismissed.

Costs awarded to Ms Thakkar: $2,000 (reduced from starting point of $6,250, then $5,500, due to mixed success and rejected Calderbank offer).
Reimbursement of Authority application fee: $71.55.
Total payable by LS Travel to Ms Thakkar within 14 days: $3,500 (noting the determination states $3,500 in the outcome paragraph at [30], which appears to reflect a rounding or combination figure — the body calculates $2,000 costs plus $71.55 fee; the operative order is $3,500 plus $71.55 as stated at paragraph [30]).
No further wage payments ordered.
No reinstatement ordered.

[CONSENT]

The parties, identified only by the pseudonyms OTH (applicant/employee) and IRV (respondent/employer), reached a confidential settlement resolving an employment dispute of unspecified nature. The Authority was asked to record the agreed settlement terms as consent orders, making them final, binding, and enforceable. A non-publication order was also made to preserve confidentiality.

Applicant: OTH (employee — pseudonym; actual name suppressed)
Respondent: IRV (employer — pseudonym; actual name suppressed)

Applicant: Alison Bendall
Respondent: Russell Drake and Jana Laxon

The parties were in an employment relationship, the nature and duration of which are not disclosed in this determination. A dispute arose in connection with their employment relationship and/or the ending of it, but the specific claims are not described, as confidentiality orders suppress that information. The parties reached a negotiated settlement and recorded its terms in a signed settlement agreement held on the Authority's file. Both parties requested that the settlement terms remain confidential and that a non-publication order be made. The matter was dealt with on the papers (no hearing held), and the parties jointly applied for a consent determination to formalise the settlement as binding orders of the Authority.

1. Whether the Authority should issue a consent determination recording the parties' settlement agreement as orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [2]-[4]).

The Authority has the power under the Employment Relations Act 2000 to record agreed settlement terms as consent orders, rendering them final, binding, and enforceable. The parties jointly requested this, and the Authority issued the consent determination accordingly. The determination notes that the terms cannot be challenged, and that any future non-compliance may be addressed only by way of a compliance order application; no further action may be taken in respect of matters connected to the employment relationship or its ending.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made protecting the parties' identities, witness names, and settlement terms — Status: Established (paras [5]-[7]).

Pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 to the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority made an order prohibiting publication of the parties' names, witness names, and any information that might lead to their identification or reveal the nature of the claims, together with an order prohibiting publication of the settlement terms and content. The parties' names are replaced throughout with randomly generated letter strings bearing no resemblance to actual names. The original signed settlement agreement is held on the Authority's file and not attached to the determination.

The matter was resolved by consent; a consent determination was issued recording the parties' settlement as final, binding, and enforceable orders of the Authority, accompanied by a non-publication order.

The specific terms of the settlement (and any remedies contained within it) are confidential and not disclosed in this determination. The settlement agreement is held on the Authority's file. No remedy details are publicly available.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following an earlier substantive decision (Paul Adams v EverEdge Global Ltd [2026] NZERA 509) in which Paul Adams succeeded in his constructive dismissal claim against EverEdge Global Limited. The sole question before the Authority here is the quantum and entitlement to a costs award in favour of the successful applicant, including whether EverEdge's argument that Mr Adams' conduct in late disclosure of documents should disentitle him to costs. The Authority awarded Mr Adams $8,000 in costs plus the Authority's filing fee of $71.55.

Applicant: Paul Adams (employee)
Respondent: EverEdge Global Limited (employer)

Applicant: Scott Worthy, counsel for Paul Adams
Respondent: Michael O'Brien, counsel for EverEdge Global Ltd

In the substantive determination issued on 29 July 2026, the Authority found that Paul Adams was constructively and unjustifiably dismissed by EverEdge Global Limited, and awarded him seven months' lost wages, $30,000 compensation, wage arrears, KiwiSaver contributions, and a $7,500 good faith penalty. EverEdge's counterclaim was withdrawn at the start of the investigation meeting before any evidence was heard. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs by agreement but could not do so, leading to written submissions being filed. EverEdge argued that Mr Adams' conduct — specifically his initial reliance on a 2014 employment agreement and failure to disclose a February 2024 employment agreement and covering assignment letter until approximately 14 months after filing his claim — should disentitle him to any costs award. Mr Adams sought costs on a tariff basis reflecting one and a half days of investigation hearing plus an uplift for post-hearing written submissions.

1. Whether Mr Adams, as the successful party, is prima facie entitled to a costs award — Status: Established (paras [12]-[13]).

The Authority referred to the principles in PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 (confirmed in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135), which provide that costs generally follow the event, the Authority's costs jurisdiction is consistent with its equity and good conscience jurisdiction, and awards are typically modest and based on a notional daily tariff. The Authority noted that Mr Adams was the successful party and was therefore prima facie entitled to costs, and that no objection was raised to costs being incurred through his personal company (Arrakis Ltd) while he resided in the Netherlands.

2. Whether the appropriate tariff starting point and any uplift for written post-hearing submissions should apply — Status: Established (paras [14]-[16]).

The Authority applied the notional daily tariff of $4,500 for the first day and $3,500 for subsequent days, giving a starting point of $6,250 for the one-and-a-half-day investigation meeting. The Authority accepted the uplift to $8,000 was warranted because post-hearing written submissions were filed. The Authority also noted independently that EverEdge's conduct in lodging a counterclaim and then withdrawing it at the start of the investigation meeting provided an additional basis for an uplift.

3. Whether Mr Adams' late disclosure of the 2024 employment agreement and assignment letter should disentitle him to any costs award — Status: Dismissed (paras [17]).

The Authority applied the Da Cruz principle that costs are not to be used as an expression of disapproval for a party's conduct unless that conduct actually increased the costs incurred. EverEdge did not clearly explain how the late disclosure impacted costs, and the Authority noted that EverEdge could have sought further mediation or resolution discussions after receiving the documents in January 2026, several months before the April 2026 investigation meeting. No established impact on costs was demonstrated, so disentitlement was not warranted.

4. Whether Mr Adams is entitled to reimbursement of the Authority's filing fee — Status: Established (para [19]).

The Authority briefly noted that, in the absence of detailed information about other disbursements, Mr Adams was entitled to reimbursement of the Authority's filing fee of $71.55, which was ordered accordingly.

The costs application was upheld; Mr Adams was awarded $8,000 in costs plus $71.55 for the filing fee, and EverEdge's argument that Mr Adams' conduct should disentitle him to costs was dismissed.

Costs contribution: $8,000.00 (payable by EverEdge Global Limited to Paul Adams within 21 days of 21 September 2026)
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55
Total ordered: $8,071.55
Note: This is a costs-only determination; the substantive remedies were ordered in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 509.

[COSTS ONLY]

This determination concerns costs arising from a preliminary ruling in which the Employment Relations Authority declined Darin Jonker's application for interim reinstatement against Wainuiomata High School Board. The sole question is whether and in what amount costs should be awarded following the respondent's success in that preliminary proceeding. The Authority awarded costs of $4,500 to the respondent, applying its standard daily tariff.

Applicant: Darin Jonker (employee)
Respondent: Wainuiomata High School Board (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (Darin Jonker in Person)
Respondent: Paul Robertson & Dew James-Powys, counsel for the Respondent

Darin Jonker brought a claim against Wainuiomata High School Board that included an application for interim reinstatement. On 29 April 2026, the Authority issued a preliminary determination declining that interim reinstatement application, with the respondent being the successful party. The matter was determined "on the papers" by direction of the Authority and consent of both parties, with affidavit evidence and written submissions filed by each side. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed memoranda. The respondent sought $4,500 (the standard daily tariff for a one-day investigation meeting), noting its actual costs exceeded this amount and pointing to what it described as a disorganised presentation and voluminous filings by Mr Jonker. Mr Jonker opposed any costs award, arguing his application was not improper or unreasonable and that costs should lie where they fall.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to the respondent following its success in the interim reinstatement proceeding — Status: Established (paras [5]-[7]).

The Authority applied the settled principle that costs follow the event, as set out in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135 at [114]. The principle is that costs are to be modest and represent a reasonable contribution to costs actually and reasonably incurred. Because the respondent was the successful party and its position was accepted by the Authority, it was entitled to a contribution to the costs it incurred defending that position.

2. Whether the Authority's daily tariff of $4,500 is the appropriate quantum — Status: Established (paras [8]-[11], [15]).

The Authority adopted its standard daily tariff approach as the starting point, with the current rate being $4,500 for the first day of hearing. The Authority noted that both parties put effort into their evidence and submissions and that those submissions were of assistance to the Authority. Despite the matter being determined on the papers rather than at an in-person hearing, the Authority found the one-day tariff to be an appropriate starting point.

3. Whether costs should lie where they fall (as argued by the applicant) — Status: Dismissed (paras [12]).

The Authority's Practice Direction identifies specific categories of matters — such as bargaining facilitation, collective bargaining, fixing terms of a collective agreement, and paid parental leave — where a direction that parties bear their own costs is common. The present case does not fall into any of those categories, nor is it similar to them, so the presumption in favour of the daily tariff remained.

4. Whether any adjustment to the daily tariff award should be made — Status: Dismissed (paras [13]-[14]).

The Authority considered whether any upward or downward adjustment was warranted, noting that neither party argued for one. On balance, the Authority found that neither party had acted in a way that unreasonably prolonged the matter to a degree requiring reflection in the costs award, and accordingly no adjustment was made.

The costs claim was upheld in full in favour of the respondent; Darin Jonker is ordered to pay $4,500 as a contribution to costs.

Costs: $4,500 payable by the applicant (Darin Jonker) to the respondent (Wainuiomata High School Board) within 28 days of the date of this determination. No other remedies ordered (this determination addresses costs only).

Shan Bin (Winston) Lin, a bus driver trainee employed by Ritchies Transport Holdings Limited, was dismissed on 13 July 2026 after failing to demonstrate the competency required to safely drive a passenger bus independently. Mr Lin applied for interim reinstatement to his former role. The Authority found that while Mr Lin had a weakly arguable case for unjustified dismissal, he had an equally weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement, the balance of convenience strongly favoured Ritchies due to public safety concerns, and overall justice did not support granting interim reinstatement.

Applicant: Shan Bin (Winston) Lin (employee/bus driver trainee)
Respondent: Ritchies Transport Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Matt McGoldrick and Angela Black, counsel for the respondent

Mr Lin, a New Zealand citizen with claimed experience as a chauffeur and Uber driver, was employed by Ritchies as a Driver – Urban from 20 April 2026. He had no prior bus driving experience in New Zealand. Ritchies conducted a structured training programme and three separate assessments — two internal (20 and 21 May 2026) and one external (9 June 2026) arranged at Mr Lin's own request — each of which concluded he was not competent to safely drive a passenger bus independently, citing concerns including harsh braking, excessive speed, poor lane positioning, roundabout navigation errors, and poor hazard perception. Ritchies followed a process involving written notice of concerns, adjourned and reconvened meetings with Mr Lin and his union representative, interviews with two coaches Mr Lin nominated, provision of assessment results before further meetings, and a detailed final termination letter dated 13 July 2026. Mr Lin disputed the assessments as biased and inconsistent, raised concerns about a language barrier, alleged the vehicle used in the external assessment was defective, and argued he was not offered sufficient training or a performance improvement process. Ritchies strongly opposed reinstatement on safety grounds, including obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015.

1. Whether there is a seriously arguable case for unjustified dismissal — Status: Partially established (weakly arguable) (paras [25]-[41]).

The threshold for this element of interim reinstatement is low: whether there is an arguable case that Ritchies did not act as a fair and reasonable employer could have in all the circumstances, applying s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority noted three independent assessors unanimously found Mr Lin not competent to drive safely, and that on procedural fairness grounds the process appeared thorough, with the main remaining question being whether Ritchies should have applied a formal performance improvement plan or issued warnings before dismissal. Noting conflicting evidence and Mr Lin's language barrier, bias, defective vehicle, and insufficient training arguments (which could not be fully resolved on untested evidence), the Authority accepted a weakly arguable case existed. Mr Lin's case was characterised as, at best, only weakly arguable.

2. Whether there is a seriously arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Partially established (very weakly arguable) (paras [42]-[49]).

The Authority assessed the feasibility and practical workability of re-imposing the employment relationship, citing Angus v Ports of Auckland [2011] NZEmpC 122 and Air New Zealand Ltd v Hudson. On the evidence, returning Mr Lin to independent bus driving was not safe or practicable; he had already received more training than most trainees; his employer had no trust and confidence in his ability or openness to feedback; and at least one trainer believed he would never be able to drive a bus safely. Any reinstatement could only be to a training role, raising further questions about his ability to progress. The Authority found Mr Lin had, at most, a very weakly arguable case for permanent reinstatement.

3. Whether the balance of convenience favoured granting interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [50]-[63]).

The Authority weighed Mr Lin's financial hardship, professional continuity, and career aspirations against Ritchies' safety obligations. Mr Lin's financial evidence was not well documented and damages were considered an adequate remedy for financial loss. Against this, Ritchies' public passenger transport obligations (including to school children), its Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 duties, and the consistent evidence of four trainers/assessors (including one stating he would report safety concerns to NZTA if Mr Lin were reinstated) were highly influential. The Authority also noted that any interim reinstatement would require supervised training by the same individuals against whom Mr Lin had made serious allegations, going beyond merely strained circumstances. The balance of convenience significantly favoured Ritchies.

4. Whether overall justice required interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [64]-[68]).

Taking a step back, the Authority assessed the overall merits of Mr Lin's grievance as not particularly strong, the balance of convenience as significantly favouring Ritchies, and the third-party public safety interest — particularly the safe carriage of passengers including children — as a substantial additional factor against reinstatement. The Authority found nothing in the overall justice assessment that would support granting interim reinstatement and declined the application.

5. Whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 provisions (including contribution by the employee) applied — Status: Not reached (paras [7], [43]).

The Authority raised this issue given Mr Lin's dismissal occurred after the Amendment Act came into force. Ritchies confirmed it did not consider it realistic to rely on contribution where the issue was competence to drive, which would not be regarded as culpable or blameworthy conduct. The Authority noted it was not argued that Mr Lin's situation was impacted by the amendments and proceeded without applying those provisions.

6. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [71]).

Ritchies sought costs. Following the Authority's usual practice, costs for interim applications are dealt with together with costs on the substantive investigation if necessary. Costs were reserved.

The application for interim reinstatement was dismissed in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending the substantive investigation if that proceeds. The parties were directed to attend mediation within 20 working days of the determination, after which, if matters remain unresolved, Mr Lin may contact the Authority to pursue the substantive grievance at a case management conference.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from an earlier Employment Relations Authority decision (issued 25 June 2026) in which Itania Nikolao failed in her claims against the Waikato Regional Council concerning a record of settlement. The Waikato Regional Council, as the successful party, applied for a costs award. The key legal questions concerned the appropriate level of costs, whether indemnity costs were warranted, and whether the costs decision should be deferred pending a challenge. The Authority ordered Ms Nikolao to pay $2,700 as a contribution toward the Council's costs.

Applicant: Itania Nikolao (employee/former employee)
Respondent: Waikato Regional Council (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Andrea Dunseath, counsel for the respondent

The underlying dispute concerned a record of settlement between Ms Nikolao and the Waikato Regional Council. In its substantive determination of 25 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 409), the Authority found that no orders were warranted to enforce the record of settlement and that Ms Nikolao had not established a basis to amend it. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs by agreement, but could not do so. The Council applied for costs of $3,750 plus GST ($4,312.50), representing its full legal costs. The Council argued Ms Nikolao's case was fundamentally misconceived, that she had increased costs by apparently amending her claim after submissions were filed, and that she had rejected both a Calderbank offer (made shortly after proceedings were lodged) and a post-determination settlement offer of $2,500, in both cases without explanation or counter-offer. Ms Nikolao opposed the application, sought deferral of costs pending her challenge to the Authority's determination, disputed that her case was hopeless or improperly brought, and referred to her financial hardship, noting she had been unemployed since late 2023.

1. Whether the costs determination should be deferred pending Ms Nikolao's challenge to the Authority's substantive determination — Status: Dismissed (paras [14]).

A challenge to an Authority determination does not operate as a stay of proceedings under s 180 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority noted it is not its usual practice to defer costs determinations until after an Employment Court challenge is resolved, and no basis was identified to justify a different approach here.

2. Whether indemnity costs should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (paras [16]).

Indemnity costs require a high bar to be met, as established in Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [2009] 3 NZLR 400 (CA). The Authority was not satisfied that bar had been reached in this case, notwithstanding the Council's argument that the case was fundamentally misconceived.

3. What the appropriate level of costs contribution should be, including whether Ms Nikolao's conduct or the Calderbank offer warranted an upward adjustment — Status: Established/Partially established (paras [13]–[20]).

The Authority applied the principles from PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 (confirmed in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135), including that costs generally follow the event, awards are modest, and conduct that unnecessarily increases costs may be taken into account. The starting point for a matter resolved without an investigation meeting is approximately half the notional daily tariff of $4,500 (i.e., around $2,250). The Authority found upward adjustment was warranted because Ms Nikolao's approach generated more communications than usual and because the Calderbank offer, if accepted, would have left her in a better financial position than the outcome of the determination. However, indemnity costs were declined and costs on the costs submissions were not awarded. Ms Nikolao's financial hardship was also taken into account, with the payment period extended to 50 days to allow her to make arrangements. The Authority awarded $2,700 as a contribution to costs.

4. Whether costs on the making of costs submissions should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (paras [18]).

The Authority noted that costs on costs submissions are not usually awarded in the Authority, and that an unaccepted offer to settle costs would not usually warrant such an award. Nothing in the circumstances justified a different approach.

The claim for a full or indemnity costs award was partially upheld; Ms Nikolao is ordered to pay $2,700 as a contribution to the Waikato Regional Council's costs.

Costs contribution: $2,700 payable by Itania Nikolao to the Waikato Regional Council within 50 days of the date of this determination (21 September 2026). No other remedy ordered. Note: the extended payment period was granted in recognition of Ms Nikolao's financial circumstances.

Jan Zawadzki (employee/applicant) brought a claim against Hydroxsys (NZ) Limited (employer/respondent) for wage arrears and expenses. Before the substantive investigation meeting, the parties sought a preliminary determination on whether a binding settlement agreement had been reached between them. The Authority found that because the parties had never reached a meeting of minds on the share options component — which was integral to the settlement from the outset — no binding settlement agreement existed.

Applicant: Jan Zawadzki (employee)
Respondent: Hydroxsys (NZ) Limited (employer)

Applicant: Kate Tennant, counsel
Respondent: Simon Macpherson, representing the Respondent

Jan Zawadzki brought claims against Hydroxsys (NZ) Limited for wage arrears and expenses arising from his employment (and subsequent engagement as an independent contractor). Prior to the investigation meeting scheduled for 27 August 2026, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations beginning with a Calderbank offer from Hydroxsys on 17 July 2026, which included payment of eight months' salary, shares, and ancillary payments. A counteroffer was made on 20 July 2026, and subsequent correspondence in late July suggested the parties were moving toward agreement, with Hydroxsys on 29 July 2026 purporting to accept Mr Zawadzki's additional settlement terms and a draft record of settlement circulated. However, from 5 August 2026 onwards, Mr Zawadzki's lawyers raised concerns about the share options agreement, and by 17–18 August 2026 Mr Zawadzki had rejected the proposed share terms and indicated he wished to proceed to the Authority. Hydroxsys contended that all essential and material terms had been agreed and that the share options were merely ancillary; Mr Zawadzki's position was that no binding agreement had been concluded because agreement on the shares had never been reached.

1. Whether a binding settlement agreement was reached between the parties — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]–[26]).

The applicable legal test is whether there was a meeting of minds on all essential terms of the agreement. The Authority reviewed the full course of correspondence and the unsigned Record of Settlement, noting that the initial Calderbank offer of 17 July 2026 clearly included shares as part of the settlement from the outset — not as a mere ancillary matter. The unsigned Record of Settlement itself contained conflicting clauses (clause 13 suggested wages only were being addressed, while clause 11 stated full and final settlement of all employment-related claims). Viewing the correspondence as a whole, the Authority found that the parties had never reached agreement on the share options component, and therefore there was no meeting of minds and no binding settlement agreement had been concluded.

2. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [27]).

The Authority reserved costs pending determination of the substantive matter (wage arrears and expenses claims) before the Authority. No costs order was made at this stage.

The preliminary claim that a binding settlement agreement existed was dismissed; the matter will proceed to the substantive investigation meeting.

None ordered at this stage. The substantive claims (wage arrears and expenses) remain to be determined. Costs are reserved pending the outcome of the substantive matter.

[COSTS ONLY]

This determination concerns a costs application by two of the respondents — Caltado Missio and Peter Win — following a substantive determination in which the Authority found they were not personally liable for employment standards breaches owed by their insolvent employer, Aether Pacific Pharmaceutical Limited (in liquidation). The key question was whether costs should follow the event in favour of the successful respondents, or lie where they fall given the circumstances of the underlying claim. The Authority ordered the applicant, Christo Jooste, to pay $2,250 in total to Mr Missio and Mr Win as a contribution to their costs.

Applicant: Christo Jooste (employee/claimant)
Respondent: Caltado Missio (First Respondent), P[eter] Win (Second Respondent), Bruce Whall (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson (advocate) — firm not stated
Respondent: Brett Edwards and Scott McKenna (counsel for First and Second Respondents)

In a substantive determination dated 4 August 2026 ([2026] NZERA 522), the Authority found that Caltado Missio, Peter Win, and Bruce Whall were not personally liable for money owed to Christo Jooste by his employer, Aether Pacific Pharmaceutical Limited (in liquidation), for breaches of employment standards, as they were not "persons involved" in those breaches. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination to allow the parties to negotiate, but no agreement was reached. Mr Missio and Mr Win each applied for costs of $4,500 based on a full day's investigation meeting tariff, noting their actual legal aid repayment obligations exceeded that amount. Mr Jooste argued costs should lie where they fall, emphasising that an employment standards breach by APP was established, that APP's liquidation left him with little recourse, that the statutory claim against the respondents was permissible (if ultimately unsuccessful), and that he had engaged in no conduct that unnecessarily increased costs. In the alternative, Mr Jooste submitted that if any costs were to be awarded, the amount should be $2,250 between both respondents, reflecting a half-day tariff. The matter was dealt with on the papers.

1. Whether costs should lie where they fall rather than follow the event — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]–[10]).

The Authority confirmed the normal starting point is that costs follow the event, meaning the successful respondents would be entitled to costs. The applicant argued that the particular circumstances — an established breach by APP, APP's liquidation forcing a statutory claim against the respondents as individuals, and the absence of any unreasonable conduct — made it equitable for each party to bear their own costs. The Authority acknowledged this was a credible and compelling argument but held it fell short of establishing a basis for departing from the costs-follow-the-event rule: the matter had no unusual or extraordinary features elevating it to a test case or matter of wider public interest, nor was there any party conduct (good or bad) warranting that departure. The Authority concluded this was an unremarkable employment relationship problem and the respondents were entitled to a costs award.

2. Quantum of costs: whether the daily tariff should apply and at what rate — Status: Established (paras [12]–[14]).

The Authority applied the standard daily tariff framework under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The investigation meeting lasted half a day, making the applicable tariff $2,250 (half of the $4,500 full-day rate). The Authority found no reason to depart from the normal daily tariff approach. While each respondent had sought $4,500 individually, the Authority was satisfied that $2,250 each was the appropriate starting point based on the half-day duration and the nature and extent of analysis required; however, having regard to the overall circumstances and the fact that both respondents were jointly represented, the Authority awarded $2,250 in total between them rather than $2,250 each.

The costs application was partially upheld: Mr Jooste is ordered to pay $2,250 in total (not $2,250 each) to Mr Missio and Mr Win as a contribution to their costs.

Costs: $2,250 payable by the applicant (Christo Jooste) to the First and Second Respondents (Mr Missio and Mr Win) in total, to be apportioned between them as they see fit. No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination).

Niels Hunefeld, a Design Lead employed by JNCTN Limited from November 2021, was made redundant in March 2025 following a company restructure. He brought claims for unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage (arising from the failure to provide a written job description), holiday pay arrears, and statutory penalties. The Authority dismissed the unjustified dismissal claim and the holiday pay claim but upheld the unjustified disadvantage claim and awarded $10,000 compensation, plus a $2,000 penalty for failure to provide accurate leave records.

Applicant: Niels Hunefeld (employee, former Design Lead)
Respondent: JNCTN Limited (employer)

Applicant: Niels Hunefeld in Person (self-represented)
Respondent: Not provided (representatives named in the determination are described as giving evidence and oral closing submissions, but no counsel name is explicitly stated for the respondent's legal representation)

Niels Hunefeld was employed by JNCTN Limited as a Design Lead from 22 November 2021 until he was made redundant on 18 March 2025. During his employment, JNCTN hired a dedicated UX Designer and asked Mr Hunefeld to perform brand and marketing work; Mr Hunefeld was never provided with a written job description. In January 2025, JNCTN announced a company-wide restructure, proposing to disestablish Mr Hunefeld's role and a Country Lead role on the basis that all design and marketing work would be sourced from the United States as the company pivoted to the US market. Mr Hunefeld disputed the genuineness of the restructure, arguing his role was not truly surplus, no financial information was provided, and the lack of a job description created uncertainty and disadvantage. He also claimed his final payslip showed 65 days of accrued annual leave but JNCTN only paid out 29 days, reducing the balance by 36 days, which he said were improperly withheld; JNCTN responded that those 36 days had already been taken as paid leave and were erroneously showing in a flawed payroll system. The matter proceeded to an investigation meeting on 19 May 2026 in Wellington, with final submissions received by 24 June 2026.

1. Was Mr Hunefeld unjustifiably dismissed (personal grievance for unjustified dismissal)? — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[33]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, asking whether JNCTN's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority found JNCTN had sufficiently investigated its business needs before proceeding with redundancies, had raised concerns with Mr Hunefeld and provided opportunities to respond (including a general all-hands meeting and a one-on-one meeting), and had genuinely considered his feedback. The Authority accepted JNCTN's evidence that the restructure was driven by a genuine commercial decision to shift all design and marketing functions to the US, rather than by the hiring of a UX Designer or changes to Mr Hunefeld's duties, and that a fair process was followed. The claim was dismissed.

2. Did the post-redundancy hire of a new staff member amount to a failure to redeploy Mr Hunefeld or evidence that the redundancy was not genuine? — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[33]).

Mr Hunefeld argued that JNCTN hired a new person approximately 37 days after his employment ended, performing work similar to his own, showing no genuine surplus of work. JNCTN's evidence, accepted by the Authority, was that the new hire was a communications and public relations writing role focused on soft skills and external stakeholder communication — materially different from Mr Hunefeld's design role. JNCTN had also considered redeployment at the time of dismissal. The Authority accepted JNCTN's evidence and dismissed this claim.

3. Was Mr Hunefeld unjustifiably disadvantaged by the failure to provide him with a written job description? — Status: Established (paras [34]-[39]).

The Authority considered the unjustified disadvantage limb under s 103 of the Act and noted that s 65 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 makes a job description a mandatory element of every individual employment agreement. JNCTN admitted no written job description was ever provided. The Authority found the failure was unjustified (as it was a statutory obligation that JNCTN, as a cognisant employer, should have met) and that it caused Mr Hunefeld genuine distress, uncertainty, and injury to feelings in a dynamic employment environment. The Authority awarded $10,000 compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings.

4. Should any remedy for the unjustified disadvantage be reduced for contributory conduct by Mr Hunefeld under s 124 of the Act? — Status: Dismissed (para [39]).

The Authority considered whether Mr Hunefeld's own blameworthy actions contributed to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance. It found that the disadvantage arose solely from JNCTN's failure to provide a job description, an obligation it accepted it had not met, and that no conduct of Mr Hunefeld contributed to this. No reduction was applied.

5. Are any arrears of holiday pay owing to Mr Hunefeld under the Holidays Act 2003? — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[49]).

Mr Hunefeld relied on his March 2025 payslip showing 65 days accrued leave and claimed he was owed payment for 65 days (approximately $25,000 plus interest). JNCTN engaged Deloitte to review payroll records and established that the payroll system had incorrectly failed to attribute 36 days of leave (11 days over December 2023–January 2024 and 25 days in September–October 2024) that Mr Hunefeld had in fact taken and been paid for. Both parties accepted the leave spreadsheet (rather than the payroll system) as the accurate record, and Mr Hunefeld himself accepted in submissions that he had taken those 36 days. The Authority held that a mistaken payslip balance does not create an obligation to pay twice for leave already taken. In reply submissions, Mr Hunefeld shifted to arguing JNCTN had miscalculated his leave entitlement (20 days rather than 25 days per year), but even on his own revised calculations he appeared to have been overpaid. No arrears were owing and no orders were made.

6. Should a penalty be awarded for the failure to provide a written job description (breach of s 65 of the Act)? — Status: Dismissed (para [50]).

The Authority found there had been an admitted breach but declined to award a separate penalty for this matter, considering the compensation remedy already awarded ($10,000) adequately addressed the impact of the breach and that a further penalty on the same ground was not appropriate.

7. Should a penalty be awarded for failure to provide holiday and leave records and/or failure to pay annual leave correctly on termination (breach of the Holidays Act 2003)? — Status: Established (paras [51]-[59]).

The Authority found JNCTN knew before Mr Hunefeld's employment ended that its payroll system showed inflated leave balances, yet it delayed his final pay (not received until 22 March 2025) and failed to communicate with him in good faith about why his leave balance was being adjusted. This failure to provide adequate explanation and delay in payment — despite JNCTN already having sought professional advice — was found to breach the Holidays Act 2003 in respect of providing holiday and leave records. Applying the framework in s 133A of the Act and authorities including Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited, A Labour Inspector v Prabh Limited, and A Labour Inspector v Daleson Investment Limited, the Authority assessed the breach as intentional in the sense of deliberate inaction, with non-monetary loss. Starting from a 50% penalty level suggested by Preet for record-keeping failures, and adjusting downward for proportionality and consistency, the Authority set a total penalty of $2,000: $1,000 payable to Mr Hunefeld and $1,000 payable to the Crown.

8. Should Mr Hunefeld be awarded solicitor/client costs? — Status: Dismissed (paras [60]-[62]).

Mr Hunefeld sought $14,603.85 in solicitor/client costs, citing JNCTN's conduct around leave records, an inadequate certificate of service, and alleged deficiencies in JNCTN's statement in reply. The Authority declined, finding an award on a solicitor/client basis was not warranted, that post-employment conduct was not an appropriate basis for a costs award, and that JNCTN's statement in reply did not materially or improperly increase hearing time. Costs were reserved on the standard (daily tariff) basis.

9. Was there a claim for medical costs? — Status: Not reached (para [63]).

The statement of problem referenced a claim for medical costs but Mr Hunefeld did not pursue this in submissions. The Authority made no further orders on this point.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal claim and holiday pay arrears claim were dismissed; the unjustified disadvantage claim (failure to provide a job description) was upheld; a penalty for failure to provide accurate leave records was awarded; the solicitor/client costs claim was dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i)): $10,000 payable to Mr Hunefeld within 28 days.
Penalty (failure to provide accurate leave records — Holidays Act 2003): $2,000 total — $1,000 payable to Mr Hunefeld and $1,000 payable to the Crown, both within 28 days.
Lost wages: None ordered (no monetary loss from the disadvantage claim established; dismissal claim dismissed).
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Solicitor/client costs: Not ordered.
General costs: Reserved. Parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if unresolved, Mr Hunefeld may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination.

AZU, a Corrections Officer employed by the Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections at Mt Eden Corrections Facility (MECF), was arrested as part of a major police corruption investigation (Operation Jasper) and faces 11 criminal charges including bribery and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. Following his arrest, Corrections stopped paying him on the basis that court-imposed bail conditions prevented him from attending work. AZU applied for interim reinstatement, an interim injunction to halt any employment process, and name non-publication. The Authority declined both the interim reinstatement and the interim injunction, finding that while arguable questions existed, the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Corrections, particularly given the availability of an alternative immigration remedy.

Applicant: AZU (employee, Corrections Officer — name suppressed)
Respondent: Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: Edmond Carrucan, counsel
Respondent: Michael Kilkelly and Sean Kinsler, counsel

AZU was employed as a Corrections Officer at MECF under a letter of offer dated 3 May 2023, and holds a work visa (expiring 29 July 2028) that restricts him to working for Corrections in Auckland only. On 20 May 2026, he was arrested as part of Operation Jasper — a police corruption investigation — and charged with five counts of corruption-related offending (later extended to 11 charges), with a trial scheduled for February 2028. Bail conditions initially included a prohibition on being within 100 metres of MECF; Corrections subsequently stopped paying AZU, characterising the arrangement as leave without pay due to his inability to attend work rather than a suspension. On 3 June 2026, AZU obtained a District Court variation removing the 100-metre condition, but a non-association condition preventing contact with 16 co-defendants (mostly MECF staff) remained. AZU commenced proceedings on 30 June 2026 seeking interim reinstatement, an interim injunction halting any employment process, and name non-publication; Corrections opposed the applications, arguing frustration of the employment agreement and that interim relief would amount to public funds underwriting wages while AZU awaits trial on serious charges. AZU argued he had been effectively suspended without pay, that frustration did not apply given Corrections' size and the geographical reach of his visa, and that his family's financial hardship tipped the balance of convenience in his favour.

1. Non-publication of AZU's name — Status: Established (paras [2]-[3]).

AZU had been granted interim name suppression in the District Court as part of Operation Jasper proceedings. The Authority granted a concurrent non-publication order under Schedule 2, clause 10 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act), reflecting the existing suppression order in the criminal proceedings.

2. Interim injunction to halt any employment process — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[14], [28]-[49]).

The Authority's power to grant an interim injunction derives from s 162 of the Act, which permits orders that the High Court may make in contractual matters. The three-step test requires assessment of: (a) a serious question to be tried; (b) balance of convenience; and (c) overall justice, with regard to the Act's object of promoting good faith. Applying this test, the Authority found that while arguable questions existed (see issues 3 and 4 below), the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Corrections, and declined the application.

3. Serious question to be tried — whether AZU has been suspended without pay (threshold issue for interim relief) — Status: Partially established (paras [28]-[34]).

The collective agreement (cl 11.1.8) permits suspension pending investigation for sufficiently serious offending but is silent on pay during suspension; it is generally accepted that suspension without pay is a serious step not justifiable absent express agreement except in very exceptional circumstances (Singh v Sherildee Holdings Ltd). AZU argued that being placed on unpaid leave due to bail conditions was in substance a suspension without pay, and the Authority accepted the principle that the substance of an arrangement can override its form. The Authority found this a weakly arguable case — a serious question to be tried at the low threshold — but not a strong one, giving no weight to a Crown prosecutor's comment about suspension.

4. Serious question to be tried — whether AZU's employment agreement has been frustrated — Status: Established (paras [35]-[37]).

The doctrine of frustration exists in New Zealand employment law (Karelrybflot v Udovenko [2000] 2 NZLR 24 (CA)) but requires a high threshold of impossibility or radically different performance and must be kept within very narrow limits (DQJ v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2025] NZEmpC 10). The Authority found that, while remaining bail conditions (particularly the non-association condition) may prevent AZU from returning to MECF, Corrections is a large employer and AZU's work visa allows him to work for Corrections at other Auckland prisons; this created a serious (though narrow and not particularly strong) question as to whether frustration had actually occurred. Because a finding of frustration would extinguish the right to pursue an unjustified dismissal grievance, a cautious approach at the interim stage was warranted.

5. Balance of convenience — Status: Resolved in favour of Corrections/Respondent (paras [38]-[44]).

The Authority weighed AZU's financial hardship (sole breadwinner, family in New Zealand on student visas, ineligible for MSD support, exhausting funds, work visa tied to Corrections) against Corrections' submission that public funds should not underwrite wages for a staff member facing serious criminal charges for alleged on-duty offending over a two-year period. Applying Brooks Homes Ltd v NZ Tax Refunds Ltd [2013] NZSC 60, the availability of an alternative remedy is a significant factor; the Authority found AZU had an alternative avenue via an application to the Minister of Immigration under s 61 of the Immigration Act 2009 for a visa variation enabling him to seek employment elsewhere. Although damages were not an adequate remedy given immediacy of financial need, the balance of convenience favoured Corrections given this alternative pathway.

6. Best interests of AZU's children under Article 3(1) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child — Status: Considered, did not alter outcome (paras [47]-[49]).

The Authority was required to treat children's best interests as a primary (though not paramount) consideration under the Convention (Puli'uvea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 3 NZLR 538 (CA); Yev Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76). AZU's three children (aged 11, 17, and 18) are Tongan citizens who recently arrived in New Zealand on student visas, with the two older children at a critical stage of secondary schooling. The Authority found their best interests were served by remaining in New Zealand in shared parental care, and that this consideration actually supported AZU pursuing an s 61 visa variation rather than reinstatement, making it a factor favouring Corrections rather than AZU.

7. Overall justice of the case — Status: Resolved in favour of Corrections/Respondent (paras [45]-[49]).

Standing back and assessing the matter in the round (NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd at [12], [47]), the Authority found that AZU's cases on both suspension and frustration were weak; an alternative immigration remedy was available; granting interim reinstatement would set a problematic precedent of funding wages during serious criminal proceedings; and the overall justice favoured declining both applications.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [50]).

The Authority reserved costs but noted that if AZU is legally aided, costs may well lie where they fall under s 45 of the Legal Services Act 2011.

9. Other personal grievances (adequate breaks, health incidents, failure to follow Tikanga/Pasifika values, failure to pay on time, alleged demotion) — Status: Not reached (para [5]).

These additional personal grievances were noted for completeness but were not the subject of the present preliminary determination and may need to be investigated if and when brought before the Authority in a substantive investigation.

Both the application for interim reinstatement and the application for an interim injunction were declined; the non-publication order was granted.

Interim reinstatement: Not ordered.
Interim injunction: Not ordered.
Non-publication order: Granted (AZU's name suppressed concurrently with District Court suppression order under Schedule 2, clause 10 of the Act).
Costs: Reserved (may lie where they fall if AZU is legally aided).
Note: This is a preliminary/interim determination only; substantive personal grievance claims (including those relating to breaks, health incidents, Tikanga/Pasifika values, pay, and alleged demotion) remain to be investigated.

KRL, a Fijian national working as a Corrections Officer at Mt Eden Corrections Facility, was arrested in May 2026 on serious corruption and drug trafficking charges arising from Operation Jasper. Following his arrest, his employer (the Department of Corrections) placed him on leave without pay due to bail conditions preventing him from attending his workplace. KRL applied for an interim injunction and compliance order to require Corrections to continue paying him; both applications were declined, with the Authority finding that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Corrections, and that alternative immigration pathways should be explored first.

Applicant: KRL (employee, Corrections Officer — name suppressed)
Respondent: Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: Simon Mitchell KC and Angus Drumm, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Michael Kilkelly and Sean Kinsler, counsel for the Respondent

KRL, a work visa holder from Fiji, commenced employment as a Corrections Officer at Mt Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) on approximately 22 April 2024. On 20 May 2026, he was arrested as part of Operation Jasper — a major Police corruption investigation — and charged with 10 (later 16) counts broadly relating to bribery, corruption, and drug trafficking allegedly committed during his employment. His court-imposed bail conditions included a prohibition on going within 100 metres of MECF and restrictions on contacting numerous co-defendants, effectively preventing him from attending his workplace. Corrections wrote to KRL on 26 May 2026 advising that, because his bail conditions prevented him from working, he would not be paid unless he used annual leave; KRL did not respond and was placed on leave without pay from 28 May 2026. KRL raised a personal grievance on 3 June 2026 alleging unjustified disadvantage, which Corrections denied, and Corrections also raised the possibility that the employment contract may have been frustrated. KRL commenced proceedings in the Authority on 24 June 2026 seeking an interim injunction (to require continued payment) and a compliance order; a direction to mediation did not resolve matters, and oral submissions were heard on 20 August 2026.

1. Whether KRL's name should be suppressed (non-publication order) — Status: Established (para [3]).

The Authority granted a non-publication order under Schedule 2, clause 10 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act) by directions dated 26 June 2026. The order was confirmed to continue until further order of the Authority. The determination confirms this order remains in force.

2. Whether a serious question to be tried exists in relation to KRL being effectively suspended without pay — Status: Established, but assessed as weakly arguable (paras [21]-[28]).

The threshold for a serious question to be tried is low — the applicant need only show the claim is not vexatious or frivolous and has some arguable prospect of success (X v Y Ltd v NZ Stock Exchange [1992] 1 ERNZ 863). The collective agreement (cl 11.1.8) permitted suspension for serious offences but was silent on pay during suspension; it is generally accepted that suspension without pay is not justifiable absent express agreement except in truly exceptional circumstances (Singh v Sherildee Holdings Ltd). KRL argued that Corrections had, in substance, suspended him without pay regardless of the label used. The Authority accepted this raised a serious question to be tried but characterised the argument as not particularly strong.

3. Whether a serious question to be tried exists in relation to frustration of KRL's employment contract — Status: Established (paras [29]-[32]).

Frustration applies to employment relationships (Karelrybflot v Udovenko [2000] 2 NZLR 24 (CA)) but requires a high threshold of "impossibility of performance or radically different performance" and must be kept within "very narrow" limits (DQJ v The Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2025] NZEmpC 10). KRL argued that bail conditions are temporary and variable and do not render performance permanently impossible. Corrections argued that the bail conditions had fundamentally altered the employment relationship. The Authority found a serious question existed specifically as to whether KRL's employment at some other Corrections facility had ended due to frustration, noting that Corrections is a large employer and KRL's work visa did not preclude working at other Auckland prisons. The Authority adopted a cautious approach given that a finding of frustration would extinguish KRL's unjustified dismissal rights.

4. Whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the interim injunction — Status: Dismissed (i.

e. balance found to favour Corrections) (paras [33]-[39]).
The balance of convenience requires assessing the impact on each party if relief is granted or not, with the merits being relevant (Brooks Homes Ltd v NZ Tax Refunds Ltd [2013] NZSC 60). KRL argued severe financial hardship as the sole income earner for his wife and three children, none of whom are eligible for welfare benefits due to their temporary visa status. Corrections argued that continuing to pay KRL from public funds for up to two years while he awaits trial for serious offending would be prejudicial and create an unacceptable precedent. The Authority accepted damages would not be an adequate remedy given the passage of time until the 2028 trial, but found that the appropriate remedy lay in KRL seeking a section 61 Immigration Act 2009 visa variation to enable him to pursue alternative employment, rather than remaining on Corrections' payroll.

5. Whether the overall justice of the case favoured granting the interim injunction — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[45]).

The overall justice assessment is a final check on the earlier analyses (NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd). The Authority noted KRL had a weakly arguable suspension case and a relatively stronger (but still narrow) frustration case. The Authority also considered the best interests of KRL's three children as required by Article 3(1) of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, treating this as a primary but not paramount consideration; it found the children's interests could be served by remaining with their mother either in New Zealand or Fiji. The overall justice favoured declining both the interim injunction and the compliance order, particularly given the availability of an alternative immigration pathway.

6. Whether a compliance order should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [4], [45]).

The application for a compliance order was considered alongside the interim injunction application. For the same reasons that the interim injunction was declined — primarily the balance of convenience and overall justice favouring Corrections, and the existence of an alternative remedy via immigration — the compliance order application was also declined.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [46]).

Costs were reserved. The Authority noted that if KRL is legally aided, costs may lie where they fall pursuant to section 45 of the Legal Services Act 2011.

Both applications (interim injunction and compliance order) were dismissed; the overall result favoured the Respondent at this preliminary stage.

None ordered at this stage. Costs reserved (may lie where they fall if KRL is legally aided). This is a preliminary determination only; the substantive investigation meeting into KRL's personal grievance claims has not yet been heard.