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[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive remedies determination issued on 9 March 2026 in favour of employees Duane Farrell and the Corrections Association of New Zealand (CANZ) against the Department of Corrections. The parties were unable to agree on costs and filed memoranda. The Authority awarded $4,500 in costs to the applicants, applying the standard daily tariff with an uplift for factual complexity.

Applicant: Duane Farrell (employee) and Corrections Association of New Zealand (union, second applicant)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: Jim Roberts and Kirby Kleingeld, counsel for Applicants
Respondent: John Rooney and Pema Gyeltshen, counsel for the Respondent

The Authority had previously issued a substantive remedies determination on 9 March 2026 ([2026] NZERA 143), finding that Corrections had failed to keep Mr Farrell safe at work and had breached the relevant collective agreement, with six established personal grievances. Costs were reserved at that stage, with a timetable set for memoranda if the parties could not agree. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed submissions. The applicants sought $12,000 as a contribution toward actual costs of $16,494.57 (or $19,064.70 including related correspondence), citing factual complexity, multiple grievances, complex payroll calculations, and the fact that they were wholly successful. Corrections submitted that costs should be $2,250 (half the notional daily tariff), arguing the claimed amount was excessive and that factual complexity in submissions was not a basis for departure from the tariff.

1. Whether costs should follow the event in favour of the successful applicants — Status: Established (paras [2], [5]).

The Authority confirmed the general principle that costs follow the event under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act, consistent with its equity and good conscience jurisdiction. As Mr Farrell and CANZ were wholly successful in the underlying proceeding, Corrections was required to contribute to their costs. The Authority noted that costs awards are discretionary, must be principled, are not punitive, and are generally modest.

2. Whether the appropriate starting point for costs is the standard daily tariff of $2,250 — Status: Established (para [5]).

The Authority applied the standard daily tariff approach as the notional starting point, arriving at $2,250 for the remedies investigation conducted on the papers. This was consistent with the approach signalled in the substantive determination and accepted as the baseline by both parties.

3. Whether the factual complexity of the matter warranted an uplift above the standard daily tariff — Status: Established (para [6]).

The Authority accepted that factual complexity in determining remedies — given the number and discrete nature of the matters, including six personal grievances, complex payroll calculations involving allowances, KiwiSaver, overtime, call-out payments, and ACC interactions — justified increasing the starting point. The Authority doubled the tariff to $4,500, rejecting the applicants' submission for $12,000 (equivalent to three notional days) as too high, while rejecting Corrections' submission that no uplift was warranted.

The costs claim was partially upheld; the applicants were awarded $4,500 in costs, being the standard daily tariff doubled to reflect factual complexity, rather than the $12,000 sought.

Costs: $4,500 ordered to be paid by the Respondent (Corrections) to the Applicants within 21 days of the date of this determination (6 July 2026). No other remedy ordered (this determination addresses costs only; substantive remedies were dealt with in [2026] NZERA 143).

Jiancheng Zhang, an interior installer employed by Homelovers Group Limited (HGL), brought a claim for unpaid overtime wages. HGL's director admitted that Mr Zhang had not been paid for all overtime hours worked. The Authority found that HGL owed Mr Zhang wage arrears of $5,984.37 for unpaid overtime, plus additional annual holiday pay, and ordered payment within 28 days.

Applicant: Jiancheng Zhang (employee, interior installer)
Respondent: Homelovers Group Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Lixin Gu (director of HGL, appearing for the respondent)

Mr Zhang was employed by HGL as an interior installer from 1 April 2024 to 3 November 2024. His individual employment agreement provided that if he worked more than 30 hours per week, he would be paid for overtime at his usual hourly rate of $29.66. Mr Zhang received wages by direct credit and cash payments for overtime worked. HGL's director conceded that Mr Zhang had not been paid for all overtime hours he worked. Over the employment period, Mr Zhang worked 619.5 overtime hours, entitling him to $18,374.37 in overtime pay, but he received only $12,390 in cash, leaving a shortfall of $5,984.37 according to HGL's own records. Both parties attended the investigation meeting and gave evidence under oath.

1. Whether HGL owed Mr Zhang wage arrears for unpaid overtime — Status: Established (paras [9]-[14]).

The relevant test was straightforward contractual entitlement: clause 5.2(e) of the individual employment agreement required HGL to pay Mr Zhang for all overtime at his usual hourly rate of $29.66. The Authority reviewed records provided by both parties and calculated that Mr Zhang worked 619.5 overtime hours, generating an entitlement of $18,374.37. Against cash payments of $12,390 already made, HGL's own records confirmed a shortfall of $5,984.37, which the Authority accepted and ordered to be paid.

2. Whether additional annual holiday pay was owing as a consequence of the wage arrears — Status: Established (paras [14]-[15]).

Under section 25(2) of the Holidays Act 2003, annual holiday pay must be recalculated to reflect any wage arrears owing to the employee. The Authority applied this provision and calculated that $478.75 in additional annual holiday pay was owed to Mr Zhang as a direct consequence of the unpaid overtime wages. HGL was ordered to pay this amount.

3. Whether either party was entitled to costs — Status: Dismissed (para [16]).

Neither party was legally represented, and the Authority applied the standard approach that costs lie where they fall in such circumstances. No costs award was made to either party.

The claim was upheld, with HGL ordered to pay wage arrears, annual holiday pay, and reimbursement of the filing fee.

- Wage arrears (unpaid overtime): $5,984.37
- Annual holiday pay (consequential, per s 25(2) Holidays Act 2003): $478.75
- Reimbursement of filing fee: $71.55
- Total ordered: $6,534.67
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination (3 July 2026).
- No costs awarded to either party.

Alexander Semenoff (applicant/employee) claimed he was unjustifiably dismissed by Stan Semenoff Transport Limited (SSTL), a company wholly owned by his father Stanley Semenoff, in February 2025, and sought interim reinstatement. The threshold legal question was whether Alexander Semenoff was employed by SSTL at all at the relevant time, given that from June 2021 payments had been made to his company Lacomi Limited rather than to him personally via payroll. The Authority found he was not an employee of SSTL in February 2025, meaning it lacked jurisdiction to hear his claims, and dismissed the application.

Applicant: Alexander Semenoff (alleged employee)
Respondent: Stan Semenoff Transport Limited (employer)

Applicant: David Luttig, advocate
Respondent: Stanley Semenoff and Carlo Lang

Alexander Semenoff was employed by SSTL from around 2001 and remained on its payroll until May/June 2021. In May/June 2021, following negotiations between Alexander and his father Stanley Semenoff (SSTL's sole owner), Alexander was removed from the SSTL payroll and payments were redirected fortnightly to Lacomi Limited, a company he partly owned, via GST invoice. The parties disputed whether this change was initiated by Alexander (SSTL's position) or was a purely administrative change that did not alter his employment status (Alexander's position). After June 2021, Alexander was also a director and shareholder of Kings Quarry Limited and Pebblebrook Properties Limited alongside Stanley Semenoff, and claimed he performed work across the Semenoff Group as an employee of SSTL. On 10 February 2025, Stanley Semenoff wrote to Alexander stating payments to Lacomi would cease immediately, citing cashflow pressure and asserting Alexander had not performed work for SSTL for at least 12 months. Alexander raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal on 16 February 2025; SSTL denied any employment relationship existed.

1. Whether Alexander Semenoff was employed by SSTL in February 2025 — Status: Dismissed (paras [32]-[45]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which requires determination of the "real nature" of the relationship between the parties, having regard to all relevant matters including the parties' intentions but without treating any label as determinative, informed by the Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 34 control and fundamental tests. The Authority found that after June 2021, Alexander Semenoff requested payment be made to Lacomi, was absent from SSTL for extended periods pursuing his own businesses, was not subject to SSTL's control, operated as an economically independent actor with directorships and shareholdings in related companies, and did not perform a specific role for SSTL. The payments to Lacomi were characterised as serving the dual purpose of compensating him as an independent contractor across the Semenoff Group and providing family financial support, partly because of Alexander's status as Stanley's son. Although Alexander represented himself to others as "Operations Manager" within the group, the Authority found this was adequately explained by his independent contractor/Kings Quarry role and did not overcome the weight of evidence against employment status. The Authority concluded he was not an employee of SSTL in February 2025.

2. Whether interim reinstatement should be ordered — Status: Not reached (para [46]).

Because the Authority found Alexander Semenoff was not employed by SSTL, it had no jurisdiction to consider the interim reinstatement application or any other substantive claims. This issue was therefore not reached.

3. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [47]-[49]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, SSTL may lodge and serve a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the written determination, with Alexander Semenoff having 14 days thereafter to reply. Costs would ordinarily be assessed on the Authority's standard notional daily rate, subject to any factors warranting adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in full — the Authority found Alexander Semenoff was not employed by SSTL in February 2025 and accordingly had no jurisdiction to hear the interim reinstatement application or any other matter.

None ordered. Costs are reserved pending agreement between the parties or a separate costs memorandum process.

Brent Colyer, an electrician employed by New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) since October 2005, raised personal grievances for unjustified action causing disadvantage and constructive dismissal following a disciplinary process arising from a crane isolation breach in August 2024 that resulted in a written warning. The key legal questions were whether NZAS's disciplinary process was unjustified, whether Mr Colyer's subsequent resignation constituted a constructive dismissal, and what remedies were available. The unjustified disadvantage grievance succeeded and $18,000 compensation was awarded, but the constructive dismissal grievance was dismissed.

Applicant: Brent Colyer (employee)
Respondent: New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (employer)

Applicant: Mary-Jane Thomas, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Gillian Service and Nicola Whiteman, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Colyer had been employed by NZAS as an electrician since October 2005 — nearly 20 years at the time of the events. On 28 August 2024, while inspecting a gantry crane, he failed to isolate a nearby 35-tonne crane as required by signage at the site, and also did not wear required PPE when he subsequently isolated the 35-tonne crane. An incident report was produced the following day, triggering an internal investigation led by Superintendent Tony Dixon, which Mr Colyer later alleged was conflated with a disciplinary investigation without adequate notice to him. The disciplinary process that followed was disputed: Mr Colyer received a letter on 30 September 2024 headed as an "investigatory" meeting despite the investigation being complete, was not provided the Investigation Report in advance, and was inadvertently given a draft report containing a pre-determined sanction. NZAS ultimately issued a written warning on 4 October 2024; after further discussions and agreed amendments to the warning, Mr Colyer resigned on 21 October 2024, claiming the events constituted a constructive dismissal and unjustified action causing disadvantage. NZAS maintained its process was fair and that the isolation breach was a genuine safety matter warranting disciplinary action.

1. Whether NZAS's disciplinary process was unjustified and constituted a breach of the duty of good faith — Status: Established (paras [53]–[55]).

The Authority assessed whether NZAS's conduct was unjustified under s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, applying the standard of whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as NZAS did. The Authority found multiple failings: (a) the investigation into the isolation incident was covertly transformed into a disciplinary conduct investigation without informing Mr Colyer; (b) the investigation was inadequate — no written statements were obtained from witnesses and PPE requirements were not properly verified despite Mr Colyer's disagreement; (c) a concern about Mr Colyer's working relationship with a colleague was introduced by HR without being properly investigated or clearly articulated in the disciplinary letter; (d) the letter of 30 September 2024 mislabelled the meeting as investigatory when it was disciplinary and omitted the Investigation Report; and (e) the accidental provision of the draft report containing a pre-determined sanction caused Mr Colyer reasonable distress. The Authority concluded these failings rendered NZAS's disciplinary process unjustified and in breach of the duty of good faith.

2. Whether Mr Colyer's resignation amounted to a constructive dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]–[60]).

The Authority applied the three-part test from the established constructive dismissal case law (Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths [1985]; Wellington etc Clerical Workers v Greenwich [1983]; Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District [1994]): the breach must be sufficiently serious to warrant resignation, resignation must be reasonably foreseeable in response to the breach, and the employee must in fact have resigned in response to the breach. While the Authority accepted the first limb was satisfied — the procedural breaches were sufficiently serious — it was not satisfied that resignation was reasonably foreseeable, given that Mr Colyer had accepted the written warning, negotiated its terms, and then raised no further concerns for eleven days before resigning. Additionally, Mr Colyer's resignation letter cited broader grievances (hostile work environment, lack of respect for his expertise, deteriorating conditions over two years), indicating his resignation was not solely caused by the disciplinary process. The constructive dismissal grievance therefore failed.

3. Whether NZAS's unjustified actions caused disadvantage to Mr Colyer's employment, establishing an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance under s 103(1)(b) — Status: Established (paras [61]–[63]).

Having found NZAS's actions unjustified, the Authority assessed whether a disadvantage to Mr Colyer's employment resulted. The Authority found that the unjustified disciplinary process resulted in a written warning that made Mr Colyer's employment less secure, constituting a clear disadvantage. The personal grievance for unjustified action causing disadvantage was accordingly established.

4. Whether Mr Colyer was entitled to lost remuneration as a remedy — Status: Dismissed (para [65]).

The Authority considered the remedies available under s 123 of the Act. Since Mr Colyer had not lost any remuneration as a direct result of NZAS's unjustified actions (he remained employed until his own resignation), he was not entitled to a lost wages award under s 123(1)(b). This aspect of his claim was not pursued further.

5. Whether Mr Colyer was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [66]–[69]).

The Authority applied the framework from Stormont v Peddle Thorp Aitken Ltd [2017], Waikato District Health Board v Archibald [2017], and Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] — identifying the impact and effects of the unjustified actions, assessing the harm caused, and quantifying that harm. Evidence from Mr Colyer and his partner established he suffered humiliation, felt physically ill, lost trust, became withdrawn, experienced sleep and appetite disruption, and felt distressed during the process. The Authority quantified the harm at $18,000, consistent with comparable cases.

6. Whether Mr Colyer's conduct contributed to the situation warranting a reduction in remedies under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [70]–[71]).

The Authority was required under s 124 to consider whether Mr Colyer behaved in a culpable or blameworthy manner that contributed to his grievances, applying Xtreme Dining Ltd v Dewar [2016]. The Authority found no contributory behaviour by Mr Colyer and therefore made no reduction to the compensation award.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [74]–[77]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Colyer may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with NZAS having 14 days to respond. Costs, if determined, will be assessed on the Authority's standard daily tariff basis subject to any adjustment factors.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified action causing disadvantage grievance succeeded and $18,000 compensation was awarded; the constructive dismissal grievance was dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $18,000 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, with no deductions.
Lost wages: None ordered (not applicable — no lost remuneration resulted from the unjustified actions).
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Costs: Reserved — parties to attempt resolution; failing agreement, Mr Colyer to file memorandum within 28 days.

E Tū Incorporated (a union) applied to the Employment Relations Authority for facilitated bargaining with Resene Paints Limited under s 50B of the Employment Relations Act, following serious difficulties concluding a new Collective Agreement. The key legal question was whether one or more statutory grounds under s 50C(1) justified a reference to facilitation. The Authority accepted the application, finding the ground of unduly protracted bargaining under s 50C(1)(b) was made out.

Applicant: E Tū Incorporated (union)
Respondent: Resene Paints Limited (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney and Finn O'Dwyer-Cunliffe, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Paul McBride, counsel for the Respondent

E Tū initiated bargaining with Resene for a new Collective Agreement on 20 May 2025, with a bargaining process agreement entered into on 28 August 2025. The parties held seven in-person bargaining meetings between August and November 2025, and attended two mediation sessions in December 2025 and March 2026. Between 15 October 2025 and 10 April 2026, union members took strike action on 13 occasions. An impasse arose, particularly regarding E Tū's position that wages be set at a "living wage" and the fact that coverage had not yet been agreed. E Tū alleged multiple good faith breaches by Resene, including failure to provide requested information under s 34, unlawful deduction of monthly incentive payments from striking workers, discriminatory provision of sports tickets to non-members only, and revocation of pre-approved leave coinciding with planned strike action. Resene denied all good faith breaches, characterised the bargaining as limited given this was a new (not rolled-over) collective, and maintained that its pay proposals were reasonable. The matter was determined on the papers by consent.

1. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(a) — serious, sustained failure to comply with the duty of good faith that undermined bargaining — was established — Status: Not reached (paras [3], [20], [23]-[24]).

The Authority noted that the evidence regarding alleged good faith breaches (including withholding information under s 34, MIP deductions, sports ticket discrimination, and revocation of pre-approved leave) was in dispute between the parties and could not be resolved on the papers at this stage. The Authority found it unnecessary to determine this ground because only one statutory ground needed to be made out, and s 50C(1)(b) was established instead.

2. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(b) — bargaining being unduly protracted and extensive efforts (including mediation) having failed to resolve difficulties — was established — Status: Established (paras [18]-[24]).

The test requires satisfaction that bargaining has been unduly protracted and that extensive efforts, including mediation, have failed to resolve difficulties preventing conclusion of a collective agreement. The Authority applied a common sense assessment of the factual situation, drawing on Service & Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc v Sanford Limited [2012] NZEmpC 168 at [42], which cautions against finding reasons to refuse facilitation where the overall position makes it desirable. The Authority found that seven bargaining meetings, two mediations, 13 days of strike action, multiple unresolved disputes, and an entrenched impasse on the living wage issue — with no sign of the parties converging — collectively satisfied this ground.

3. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(c) — one or more protracted or acrimonious strikes or lockouts — was established — Status: Not reached (paras [3], [23]-[24]).

E Tū raised this ground, pointing to 13 days of strike action and alleging acrimony. Resene characterised the strikes as limited and low-key. As with s 50C(1)(a), the Authority did not need to resolve this ground having already found s 50C(1)(b) made out.

4. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [26]).

The Authority made no order as to costs, without elaborating on reasons.

The application for facilitated bargaining was upheld; the reference to facilitation under s 50C(1)(b) was accepted.

No monetary remedy ordered. The Authority accepted the reference to facilitation and directed that a case management conference be convened to arrange facilitation proceedings. In accordance with s 50D of the Act, the facilitating member will be a different member of the Authority from the one who accepted the reference. No costs order was made.

Sidney Yu and Jing Tham, two working holiday visa holders, were employed as casual nursery assistants by Queenstown Nursery Limited (QNL). The central dispute concerned whether their employment was truly day-to-day casual with no guaranteed future work, or whether a specific assignment of at least three further weeks had been agreed, giving them a right to work until 23 April 2025. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified, awarded each applicant lost wages for four unworked days (including a public holiday) and $2,000 compensation for humiliation.

Applicant: Sidney Yu and Jing Tham (employees/nursery assistants)
Respondent: Queenstown Nursery Limited (employer)

Applicants: Self-represented (applicants in person)
Respondent: Matthew Jones (sole director of QNL, appearing for the respondent)

Ms Tham and Mr Yu applied online in late March 2025 for casual nursery assistant roles with QNL and commenced work on 31 March 2025 on an agreed paid trial day, after which they were invited to continue. No written individual employment agreements were provided. On 6 April 2025, in response to Ms Tham's query, the sole director Mr Jones emailed confirming there was "at least the next three weeks" of Monday–Wednesday work, which the applicants say they relied upon and turned down other work opportunities. After working through to 15 April 2025, the applicants were told by email that evening that work was ending due to dropping temperatures; the applicants disputed this, having evidence that other casual workers continued beyond that date. Mr Jones later acknowledged (first to the Authority, then at the investigation meeting) that the real reason the applicants were selected for termination was inefficiency, though no performance concerns had ever been raised with them. The applicants raised a personal grievance, attempted mediation (which did not proceed as the respondent failed to attend), and lodged their claim in the Authority on 15 July 2025.

1. Whether the casual employment was based on a day-by-day assignment of work or whether an agreed assignment extended four working days beyond 15 April 2025 — Status: Established in favour of applicants (paras [27]-[28]).

The Authority examined the nature of the arrangement, including the absence of written employment agreements, the on-site communication practice about daily work prospects, and crucially the 6 April 2025 email from Mr Jones confirming "at least three more weeks" of work. The Authority found that while day-to-day communication did occur, the 6 April 2025 email constituted a clear offer of work extending to at least 23 April 2025. The Authority further noted that the respondent's own stated reason for termination (weather) was inconsistent with other casual workers continuing to work, and that the true reason (inefficiency) had not been disclosed at the time. The Authority concluded the applicants were entitled to be paid for the four remaining days they ought to have worked.

2. Whether the dismissal on 15 April 2025 was unjustified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31]).

Section 103A requires the Authority to assess whether a fair and reasonable employer could have dismissed in all the circumstances, considering both substantive reasons and procedural fairness. The Authority found the substantive reason given at the time (weather) was not genuine, as others continued working, and the real reason (inefficiency) was never raised with the applicants at any stage, including after the paid trial day which they had passed. Mr Jones's evidence about performance problems was vague and second-hand. No process was followed to raise or address any efficiency concerns. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified on both substantive and procedural grounds.

3. Whether the respondent breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (para [31]).

The Authority found that the employer's failure to disclose the real reason for terminating the applicants (inefficiency) at the time of dismissal, instead citing weather, breached the duty of good faith owed to employees under s 4 of the Act. This finding reinforced the overall conclusion of unjustified dismissal but did not result in a separate remedy.

4. Whether the applicants were entitled to lost wages for four unworked days under s 128 of the Act, including one day as a public holiday under s 12 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [32]-[36]).

The Authority accepted that other workers continued in employment until at least May 2025 (per Mr Jones's own evidence), confirming the applicants would have worked the four remaining days. For the public holiday (Easter Monday 21 April 2025), the Authority found this was an "otherwise working day" under s 12 of the Holidays Act 2003 because the employment terms specified Monday–Wednesday work, no exclusion for public holidays was ever communicated or documented, and but for the unjustified dismissal the applicants would have been entitled to work that day or receive payment for it. Lost wages were calculated at $26.50 per hour × 8 hours × 4 days = $848.00 gross each.

5. Whether the applicants were entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [37]-[40]).

The applicants claimed humiliation including from allegedly being exploited as migrant workers and from losing other job opportunities. The Authority did not accept the claim that real job opportunities were actually lost, nor that the exploitation narrative was established to the required level. However, the Authority accepted genuine humiliation arose from discovering they had been singled out and given a false reason at the time, which was later confirmed by Mr Jones's acknowledgment of the inefficiency basis. The dismissive response to their grievance also added to their humiliation. An award of $2,000 per applicant was made, taking into account the limited duration of the employment and the absence of evidence of ongoing financial stress.

6. Whether the applicants contributed to the grievance such that remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [41]).

The Authority found no evidence that either applicant had contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance, and no reduction in remedies was warranted.

7. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [42]).

Both applicants were self-represented. The Authority declined to make any order for costs in those circumstances.

The claim was upheld: both applicants succeeded in establishing unjustified dismissal and were awarded lost wages and compensation for humiliation; the contribution and costs issues were resolved in favour of no reduction and no costs order respectively.

For Sidney Yu:
- Lost wages (s 128 ERA 2000 / s 12 Holidays Act 2003): $848.00 gross (4 days × 8 hours × $26.50)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i) ERA 2000): $2,000.00 (non-taxable)

For Jing Tham:
- Lost wages (s 128 ERA 2000 / s 12 Holidays Act 2003): $848.00 gross (4 days × 8 hours × $26.50)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i) ERA 2000): $2,000.00 (non-taxable)

All payments to be made within 28 days of the determination date.
Costs: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.

Amanda Bradley, a Manager Region Training employed by Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ), brought a personal grievance alleging unjustified disadvantage arising from FENZ's failure to facilitate her access to the FireSuper occupational superannuation scheme. The key legal questions were whether the collective agreement conferred automatic eligibility to join FireSuper, whether the grievance was raised in time, and whether FENZ's conduct in handling her application amounted to an unjustified disadvantage. The Authority found no automatic entitlement under the collective agreement but upheld a narrow disadvantage grievance based on FENZ's poor and inconsistent communication, awarding $5,000 compensation.

Applicant: Amanda Bradley (employee — Manager Region Training, Te Kei Region)
Respondent: Fire and Emergency New Zealand (employer)

Applicant: Tim Cleary, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Tayna Kennedy, counsel for the Respondent

Amanda Bradley commenced employment with FENZ as a Manager Region Training (MRT) for the Te Kei Region on 6 November 2023, covered by the FENZ/FECA Collective Employment Agreement. Her employment offer made no mention of eligibility for the FireSuper occupational superannuation scheme, and KiwiSaver was the only superannuation option referenced. In February 2024, Ms Bradley applied to join FireSuper, triggering a prolonged and at times inconsistent exchange with FENZ and the scheme's trustees (FireSuper Trustee Limited), during which FENZ gave conflicting and unclear information about eligibility criteria. The FireSuper trustees declined Ms Bradley's application in September 2024, having sought (after the fact) confirmation from FENZ about whether her role qualified. Ms Bradley and FECA raised the matter first as a dispute and later as a personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage, which FENZ resisted on jurisdiction and timeliness grounds. FENZ's core position was that eligibility was governed solely by the FireSuper Trust Deed and the trustees' discretion, not by the collective agreement, and that FENZ had not improperly influenced or blocked her application.

1. Whether the terms and conditions of Ms Bradley's employment included automatic eligibility to access the FireSuper scheme (interpretation of cl 8(a) of the collective agreement) — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]–[62]).

The Authority applied the objective approach to contractual interpretation summarised in Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2014] NZSC 147, focusing on the plain and natural meaning of the text. Clause 8(a) of the collective agreement expressly made entitlement to participate in FireSuper "subject to meeting the eligibility criteria for the Fund or being otherwise approved for participation by the Trustees." The Authority found this language unambiguously links eligibility to external Trust Deed criteria or trustee discretion, not to collective agreement membership alone. The contextual history — that the prior (2018–2021) collective agreement had provided a bare, all-encompassing entitlement — confirmed the parties had deliberately moved to a more restrictive, externally governed entry point. The Authority therefore found no breach of contract and no automatic eligibility.

2. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to determine the employment relationship problem (threshold jurisdiction issue) — Status: Established (paras [3], [55], [68], [73], [79]).

FENZ argued the Authority lacked jurisdiction because the eligibility question was governed by the FireSuper Trust Deed, an external document, not the employment agreement. The Authority accepted it could not interpret the Trust Deed or direct the trustees, but held it had jurisdiction to examine FENZ's own conduct — including how FENZ communicated with Ms Bradley and whether FENZ exercised its acknowledged influence over the trustees in a justified manner. The Authority relied on s 160(3) of the Act (allowing it to address the employment relationship problem without being confined to the category the parties gave it) and Clarkson v Department of Child Youth and Family Services (EmpC, 2004) to take a broad perspective.

3. Whether Ms Bradley raised her personal grievance within the statutory 90-day timeframe under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [63]–[69]).

The Authority applied the principles from Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132 on the informal and accessible nature of raising a grievance, holding that no particular formula of words is required and that the totality of communications may constitute raising a grievance. The Authority found that Ms Bradley and FECA's communications from 28 February 2024 onwards were sufficient to put FENZ on notice of a personal grievance relating to her FireSuper access. The later formal categorisation as an unjustified disadvantage grievance (November 2024) was held irrelevant to the timing question. As an alternative finding, the Authority noted FENZ may have consented to the grievance by agreeing to attend mediation in September 2024.

4. Whether Ms Bradley was unjustifiably disadvantaged by FENZ's failure to influence or facilitate her access to FireSuper, or by FENZ's categorisation of her role as non-operational/non-ranked — Status: Partially established (paras [70]–[84]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test (whether FENZ's actions were those a fair and reasonable employer could have taken in all the circumstances), noting that FENZ had demonstrable influence over the trustees' eligibility decisions through the Trust Deed mechanism allowing FENZ to submit lists of qualifying roles. On the substantive question of whether FENZ was unjustified in not categorising MRT as a Black Watch or ranked/operational role, the Authority found FENZ's operational decision had internal logic and was within its legitimate discretion, and declined to find unjustified disadvantage on that basis. However, the Authority found FENZ's handling of Ms Bradley's queries from the outset was characterised by very poor, slow, inconsistent, and at times inaccurate communication, which breached the good faith obligation to communicate actively and constructively (s 4 of the Act). This narrow aspect of the disadvantage grievance was upheld.

5. Whether FENZ breached any obligations (including good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act) owed to Ms Bradley — Status: Established (para [84]).

The Authority found FENZ breached its good faith obligation to communicate in a timely and accurate manner, causing Ms Bradley unnecessary distress and uncertainty about her place in the organisation, her retirement investment decisions, and her trust and confidence in her employer. The communication was described as "unaccountably inconsistent, confusing and inaccurate" on what should have been a straightforward matter.

6. Whether Ms Bradley contributed to the circumstances giving rise to her personal grievance under s 124 of the Act, justifying reduction of any remedy — Status: Dismissed (para [86]).

The Authority considered whether Ms Bradley's own conduct contributed to the circumstances and found no contributing factor that would reduce the award.

7. Remedy — quantum of compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (para [85]).

The Authority awarded $5,000 as compensation for hurt, humiliation, and distress resulting from FENZ's poor communication, described as an "unfortunate saga of muddled and poor employer-employee communication."

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [88]–[90]).

The Authority reserved costs. Ms Bradley's counsel may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; FENZ has 14 days to reply. Costs will be determined on the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances justify adjustment.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified disadvantage grievance was upheld on the narrow ground of FENZ's poor and inconsistent communication, while the substantive claims of automatic FireSuper eligibility under the collective agreement and unjustified failure to categorise the MRT role as Black Watch/operational were dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, distress): $5,000 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, to be paid without deductions.
Reinstatement: No.
Lost wages: None ordered.
Contribution reduction: None applied.
Costs: Reserved — subject to memoranda process as described.

[CONSENT]

ABT (applicant/employee) brought a claim against JJV (respondent/employer) before the Employment Relations Authority. During the investigation meeting on 1 July 2026, the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement, the terms of which were then recorded as orders of the Authority by consent. Non-publication orders were granted over the parties' identities and the terms of the settlement.

Applicant: ABT (employee — identity suppressed)
Respondent: JJV (employer — identity suppressed)

Applicant: Heather Stephens, advocate
Respondent: Andrew Foster, counsel

ABT filed an application with the Employment Relations Authority raising an employment relationship problem against JJV. The nature of the underlying dispute is not disclosed in the determination. An investigation meeting was held in Hamilton on 1 July 2026. During that meeting, the parties advised they had reached a full and final settlement on agreed terms. At the parties' joint request, the settlement terms were incorporated into a consent determination and became orders of the Authority. Both parties also sought confidentiality over the settlement terms and non-publication orders regarding their identities.

1. Whether the parties' settlement agreement should be recorded as orders of the Authority by consent — Status: Established (paras [1]-[3]).

The parties jointly requested that the terms of their signed settlement agreement be made orders of the Authority. The Authority accepted the settlement and, by consent, gave it the status of a formal determination and orders. No merits of the underlying claim were examined or determined.

2. Whether confidentiality should apply to the terms of the settlement — Status: Established (paras [4], [7]).

The parties requested that the settlement terms remain confidential. The Authority accepted this request; the original signed settlement is held on the Authority's file but is not attached to the published determination. An order prohibiting publication of the settlement's terms and content was made pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 to the Employment Relations Act 2000.

3. Whether non-publication orders should be made over the parties' names and identifying information — Status: Established (paras [5]-[7]).

The parties advanced grounds for non-publication of their identities. The Authority considered those grounds and, having regard to the parties' circumstances, found it appropriate to grant the orders sought. Pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 to the Employment Relations Act 2000, orders were made prohibiting publication of the parties' names, witness names, and any information likely to lead to their identification. Randomly generated three-letter strings were used in place of actual names.

The matter was resolved by consent; the settlement agreement was recorded as orders of the Authority, with confidentiality and non-publication orders granted.

The specific terms of the remedy are confidential and not disclosed in the determination. The settlement is recorded as full, final, and binding in respect of all employment-related matters between the parties. The settlement terms are held on the Authority's file and are not published.

Joyce Ungco (employee) brought personal grievance claims — including unjustified dismissal, sexual harassment, and unjustified disadvantage — against Stephen George Bennett (individual) and his now-deregistered company, Protect and Build Limited. The key preliminary questions were whether Mr Bennett should be joined personally to the proceedings under s 221 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether Ms Ungco should be granted leave under s 142Y(2) to pursue Mr Bennett personally for unpaid wages and entitlements given the company's insolvency. Both preliminary issues were resolved in Ms Ungco's favour, with the substantive merits reserved for a future investigation meeting.

Applicant: Joyce Ungco (employee)
Respondent: Stephen George Bennett (individual, sole director and shareholder of Protect and Build Limited)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: Respondent in person

Ms Ungco was engaged as a sponsored immigrant in January 2024, initially without an individual employment agreement, in circumstances complicated by a personal relationship and shared accommodation with Mr Bennett. It is alleged that Mr Bennett initially paid Ms Ungco from his personal bank account, and that once a formal individual employment agreement was in place naming his company Protect and Build Limited as employer, Mr Bennett continued to direct her work and personally administered pay and leave matters. Ms Ungco alleges she was unjustifiably dismissed, sexually harassed, and unjustifiably disadvantaged in her employment. Mr Bennett denies the grievance claims and asserts Ms Ungco was lawfully made redundant due to the company's insolvency, and that any harassment claims arise from a domestic relationship breakdown rather than an employment context. Protect and Build Limited has since been deregistered and is unable to meet any remedies. At a directions teleconference on 3 June 2026, the Authority identified two threshold questions — joinder of Mr Bennett and leave to pursue him for unpaid entitlements — to be resolved on the papers before a substantive hearing scheduled for 22–23 September 2026 in Christchurch.

1. Whether Mr Bennett should be joined as a party to the proceedings under s 221 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to enable the Authority to more effectively determine the merits of Ms Ungco's application — Status: Established (paras [4], [5], [6]).

Section 221 of the Act permits the Authority to join a person as a party where doing so would enable the Authority to more effectively determine the matters in dispute. Given the disputed identity of the employer (personal payments by Mr Bennett, his direction of Ms Ungco's work, and his administration of pay and leave matters alongside the company's nominal role), and the personal nature of the alleged harassment, the Authority found that joining Mr Bennett in his personal capacity was necessary to effectively determine the employment relationship issues and the personal grievance claims. No liability findings were made at this stage.

2. Whether the Authority should grant leave under s 142Y(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 for Ms Ungco to pursue Mr Bennett personally for any wages or other money owed, given the company's inability to pay — Status: Established (paras [4], [7], [8], [9], [10]).

Section 142Y of the Act allows an employee to seek to recover unpaid wages or other money from a person who is not the employer, where the default results from a breach of employment standards and that person was "involved in the breach" within the meaning of s 142W. The Employment Court in Lawton v Pencil Holdings Limited (in Liq) [2021] NZEmpC 199 confirmed that it is not a precondition to proceed against the primary violator — liability of an involved person is separate — but the breach and the person's involvement must still be proved. The Authority found that the circumstances disclosed a substantive issue as to Mr Bennett's personal involvement, particularly given his sole directorship and the company's failure to meet minimum employment obligations, and accordingly granted prior leave for Ms Ungco to pursue Mr Bennett for any entitlements that may be established at the substantive hearing.

3. Whether costs should be determined — Status: Not reached (para [13]).

Costs were reserved pending the conclusion of the substantive investigation meeting scheduled for 22–23 September 2026. No costs determination was made at this preliminary stage.

Both preliminary issues were resolved in the applicant's favour: Mr Bennett was joined as a party to the proceedings and prior leave was granted for Ms Ungco to pursue him personally for any unpaid entitlements, with all substantive merits and costs reserved for a future hearing.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination only. Substantive claims (unjustified dismissal, sexual harassment, unjustified disadvantage, and wage/entitlement recovery under s 142Y) will be determined at an investigation meeting on 22–23 September 2026 in Christchurch. Costs reserved until conclusion of the investigation meeting.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive Employment Relations Authority decision issued on 12 May 2026, in which Layth Abu-Laban (employee) succeeded against Everest Corporation Limited (employer) and ECL's counterclaims all failed. The key legal questions are whether a costs uplift above the daily tariff is warranted based on the weakness of ECL's counterclaims and the existence of a Calderbank offer that ECL failed to beat. The Authority awarded Mr Abu-Laban $6,200 (inclusive of GST) in costs plus the filing fee of $71.55.

Applicant: Layth Abu-Laban (employee)
Respondent: Everest Corporation Limited (employer)

Applicant: Danny Gelb, advocate
Respondent: Abdullah Khan

The substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 292, issued 12 May 2026) ordered ECL to pay Mr Abu-Laban $15,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and $13,258 (gross) under s 128(2) of the Act. ECL's counterclaims — including alleged poor workmanship and poor performance — were all dismissed, partly because the matters raised had not been addressed during the employment relationship and no documentary evidence was provided. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination and the parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, but were unable to do so. Mr Abu-Laban made a Calderbank offer on 7 July 2025 seeking $10,000 under s 123(c)(i) plus $3,500 (plus GST) towards legal costs; the substantive outcome was more favourable to Mr Abu-Laban than that offer. Mr Abu-Laban then applied to the Authority to determine costs.

1. Whether costs should be awarded and whether they should follow the event — Status: Established (paras [6]-[7]).

The Authority applied the standard principles under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and the Authority's Practice Direction, as articulated in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135. Costs are discretionary but generally follow the event. The starting point is the notional daily tariff, set at $4,500 for a one-day investigation meeting. Because Mr Abu-Laban was the successful party and ECL succeeded on none of its counterclaims, costs were awarded in Mr Abu-Laban's favour.

2. Whether an uplift on the daily tariff was warranted due to the weakness of ECL's counterclaims and the additional hearing time they caused — Status: Established (paras [8]-[9]).

The Authority applied the principle from JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175 that conduct which increases costs unnecessarily can justify an uplift. The counterclaims advanced by ECL — alleging poor workmanship and performance — had not been raised during the employment relationship and were unsupported by documentary evidence; three additional respondent witnesses were called, adding unnecessary hearing time. A modest uplift of $500 was granted on this basis.

3. Whether the Calderbank offer justified a further uplift on the daily tariff — Status: Established (paras [10]-[14]).

The Authority acknowledged, following Reid v Ngati Rangi Trust [2021] NZEmpC 110, that a Calderbank offer can be taken into account in costs decisions in the Authority, though costs should remain modest. Applying the public interest principle from Stevens v Hapag-Lloyd (NZ) Limited [2015] NZEmpC 137, the Authority noted that there is a public interest in encouraging parties to resolve disputes before a hearing. ECL failed to accept the Calderbank offer and the final outcome was more favourable to Mr Abu-Laban than the offer. Balancing the need for modesty against those factors, the Authority applied a further uplift of $1,200.

4. Whether the filing fee should be reimbursed — Status: Established (para [17]).

The Authority ordered ECL to reimburse Mr Abu-Laban the filing fee of $71.55 as a separate order alongside the costs award.

The costs application was upheld; ECL is ordered to pay Mr Abu-Laban $6,200 (inclusive of GST) in costs plus $71.55 in filing fees.

Costs: $6,200 (inclusive of GST), comprising the $4,500 daily tariff plus a $500 uplift for the unnecessary counterclaims and additional witnesses, plus a $1,200 uplift for the Calderbank offer. Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55. Both amounts payable within 28 days of the date of this determination (2 July 2026).

GND (employee, account manager) brought claims against YKB (employer, business materials supplier) for unjustified disadvantage, unjustified constructive dismissal, breach of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and breach of his individual employment agreement, following his suspension and subsequent resignation after allegations of indecent acts. The key legal questions were whether YKB's disciplinary process was procedurally fair and whether GND's resignation constituted a constructive dismissal. All of GND's claims were dismissed; however, YKB established that it had overpaid GND by $4,008.58, which he must repay.

Applicant: GND (employee, account manager)
Respondent: YKB (employer, business materials supplier)

Applicant: Nita Sadie, advocate
Respondent: David France, counsel

GND commenced full-time employment with YKB on or about 28 February 2022 as an account manager, having worked within YKB's group of companies since March 2019 — a total of approximately seven years with no prior disciplinary record. On 1 December 2025, YKB received a complaint from a German tourist that a man in a YKB-branded vehicle had performed an indecent act at a public carpark at Snells Beach; the vehicle was traced to GND. GND was called to a meeting that afternoon and suspended on full pay pending investigation; a second allegation of indecent conduct — involving the partner of a neighbouring customer — emerged at a further disciplinary meeting on 12 December 2025. At the conclusion of the 12 December meeting, GND penned a resignation letter stating it was effective immediately and that the parties mutually agreed to part ways; GND contends the resignation was coerced by the area manager, which YKB denies. GND raised personal grievances of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal on 22 December 2025, and the matter proceeded to investigation before Member Peter Fuiava on 21 May 2026. YKB also claimed it had inadvertently overpaid GND following his resignation due to payroll timing and a subsequent payroll error.

1. Non-publication order of applicant's name and associated identities — Status: Established (paras [1]-[5]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from MW v Spiga [2024] NZEmpC 147: first, whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected from publication; second, whether those consequences are significant enough to depart from open justice. The determination references two serious and salacious allegations of indecent conduct involving GND; the Authority took into account the best interests of GND's three school-aged children, the reputational interests of his wife (the sole income earner), and the privacy of the neighbouring customer and his partner. The Authority found cumulative adverse consequences outweighed the open justice principle and granted a permanent non-publication order of GND's name under Sch 2 cl 10 of the Act, also depersonalising the respondent's and all witnesses' names; access to the Authority file is otherwise prohibited without leave from the Chief of the Authority.

2. Unjustified disadvantage — whether GND was disadvantaged by the area manager's failure to disclose the meeting's purpose in the 1 December telephone call — Status: Dismissed (paras [32]-[35]).

The test for unjustified disadvantage under s 103(1)(b) requires that conditions of employment were affected to the employee's disadvantage by unjustifiable employer action. The Authority assessed credibility using a multi-factor framework (citing Teo v The Surrey Hotel [2025] NZERA 229), noting there were no other witnesses to the call and the contemporaneous letter did not resolve the dispute. The Authority found that GND, given the unusual nature of the call from a senior manager he rarely dealt with and the close proximity of a subsequent Police call, knew or reasonably ought to have known the 1 December meeting concerned a serious matter. This claim was dismissed.

3. Unjustified disadvantage — whether GND was disadvantaged by lack of disclosure of written statements and supporting documents prior to/at the 1 December meeting — Status: Dismissed (paras [36]-[37]).

The Authority applied the standard of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances, noting the complaint had been received only hours before the meeting. The Authority found it was unrealistic to expect YKB to produce written witness statements from complainants who were potential Police witnesses and not readily accessible. The claim for unjustified disadvantage due to want of disclosure failed.

4. Unjustified disadvantage — whether the suspension without prior consultation constituted unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[44]).

The Authority accepted that YKB failed to consult GND before suspending him, in breach of s 4(1A)(b) and s 4(1A)(c) of the Act (the duty to be active and constructive and to provide information and an opportunity to comment). However, the Authority found that the seriousness of the allegations warranted urgent action; GND himself accepted the seriousness warranted investigation, expressed no disapproval at the time, and said he did not want to hinder his employer's process. The Authority concluded GND had implicitly agreed to the suspension and that his employment had not in fact been disadvantaged as a result; accordingly the personal grievance claim of unjustified disadvantage arising from the suspension could not succeed.

5. Breach of good faith under s 4 of the Act (and associated penalty under s 4A) — Status: Dismissed (paras [42]-[43]).

Although the Authority found YKB technically breached s 4(1A)(b) and (c) by failing to consult before suspending GND, it held that the circumstances (gravity of the allegations, need for urgent action) meant the breach could not attract a penalty under s 4A, as the respondent did not act deliberately or with intent to undermine the employment agreement or relationship. No penalty was imposed.

6. Breach of individual employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [63]).

The Authority noted in its conclusion that the breach of contract claim had not been made out, without detailed separate analysis, given its findings on the other claims. No specific contractual breach was established.

7. Whether the area manager downplayed the seriousness of GND's situation, causing him unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[48]).

GND alleged the area manager's reassuring manner gave him a false sense of security, causing him not to obtain representation. The Authority found this assertion implausible given YKB's two written letters, which clearly stated the allegations were serious, that summary dismissal was possible, and which explicitly encouraged him to bring a support person or representative. The Authority gave no weight to GND's assertion about an unrecorded telephone call on 9 December that allegedly downplayed the situation.

8. Whether the Police not proceeding with charges affected the fairness of YKB's process — Status: Dismissed (paras [49]-[50]).

The Authority held that criminal and employment processes are separate; the Police's decision not to proceed was due to the tourists being unable to remain in New Zealand, not because of a "misunderstanding" as GND contended. YKB was entitled to continue its disciplinary process based on the complaint it had received and its own reputational and policy interests.

9. Whether the opinion of GND's former line manager (that GND was not the type to commit an indecent act) should be given weight — Status: Dismissed (para [45]).

The former line manager was not called as a witness and the evidence was therefore uncorroborated opinion evidence; the Authority gave it no weight.

10. Unjustified constructive dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [51]-[57]).

The Authority applied the three categories of constructive dismissal from Auckland Shop Employees Union IUOW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372: (i) resign or be dismissed, (ii) deliberate course of conduct to coerce resignation, (iii) employer breach causing resignation. The Authority preferred the evidence of the area manager and line manager, who said no decision had been made, that the investigation would have continued, and that GND did not have to resign. The two written letters had made clear no decision was yet made. The Authority also found that GND's secret audio recording of his line manager the following day did not support the forced resignation narrative. Applying Mikes Transport Warehouse v Vermuelen [2021] NZEmpC 197, the Authority found GND — an experienced seven-year employee — had voluntarily resigned and did not seek to retract the resignation. The constructive dismissal claim was dismissed.

11. Whether the without prejudice discussion at the 12 December meeting was procedurally improper — Status: Dismissed (paras [54]-[55]).

GND's advocate submitted there was no basis for a without prejudice discussion, citing s 57 of the Evidence Act 2006 (referenced in the determination as the Evidence Act 2026, likely a typographical error). The Authority held that s 57 does not require an existing dispute before a without prejudice discussion can occur; it governs privilege for settlement/mediation communications. The Authority rejected the submission that the without prejudice discussion demonstrated a predetermined outcome.

12. Post-employment interference claims (prospective employer references and alleged harassment at GND's home) — Status: Dismissed (paras [61]-[62]).

GND alleged YKB had interfered with his post-employment job search via personal connections to prospective employers, and that an unidentified male had approached his mother-in-law making reference to the indecency allegations. The Authority found GND conceded he had no proof; the allegations were speculative and could not be taken further.

13. YKB's counterclaim — overpayment of wages — Status: Established (paras [58]-[60], [63]).

YKB claimed it had inadvertently overpaid GND: once due to the timing of its monthly payroll run on the day of resignation (12 December 2025), and again due to a payroll error on 14 January 2026 that paid GND as if still employed. GND argued he had been promised two months' notice in lieu, but the Authority found no express provision for this in the resignation letter (which stated immediate effect) and that cl 15 of the employment agreement did not support the claim in the absence of express agreement. The Authority found YKB entitled to recover $4,008.58, leaving the repayment mechanism to be agreed between the parties, to be revisited in a costs determination if necessary.

14. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [64]-[65]).

The Authority reserved costs to allow the parties to negotiate a repayment plan for the overpayment. The Authority's preliminary view is that the notional tariff for a one-day fixture of $4,500 is likely to be adopted as a starting point, subject to adjustment. YKB may lodge a costs memorandum within 21 days if the parties cannot agree; GND has 14 days to reply from service of that memorandum.

All of GND's claims (unjustified disadvantage, unjustified constructive dismissal, breach of good faith, and breach of contract) were dismissed; YKB's counterclaim for overpayment of $4,008.58 was upheld.

None ordered in favour of the applicant.
Repayment to respondent: GND is required to repay YKB $4,008.58 representing inadvertent overpayment of wages following his resignation. The parties are directed to first discuss repayment arrangements between themselves; if no agreement is reached, the matter may be revisited in a costs determination.
Costs: Reserved. Preliminary view is that the $4,500 daily tariff (one-day fixture) will be the starting point. YKB may file a costs memorandum within 21 days if parties cannot agree; GND has 14 days to reply.

Filisi Beswick, a sales officer employed by Friendly Loans Limited (FLL) for over nine years, was dismissed on 29 October 2024 on the ground of medical incapacity after approximately three weeks' absence following a hospital visit for blurred vision and migraines. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal was unjustified, whether a deduction of $2,439.09 from her final pay was unlawful, and what remedies were appropriate. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified, the deduction unlawful, and awarded compensation for hurt and humiliation, lost wages, and reimbursement of the deducted sum.

Applicant: Filisi Beswick (employee)
Respondent: Friendly Loans Limited (employer)

Applicant: Joseph Slade, advocate
Respondent: John Pritchard (director of FLL, self-represented)

Ms Beswick was employed as a sales officer by FLL from 17 August 2015 until 29 October 2024 — a period of over nine years. On 4 October 2024 she attended hospital with blurred vision and migraines and received medical certificates rendering her unfit for work, with a driving restriction of one month. From 14 October 2024 she was on annual leave, as her sick leave was exhausted. FLL required her to produce a medical clearance certificate, a negative Covid-19 test, and confirmation of a valid driver's licence before returning, which she had not fully provided by 22 October 2024. On 29 October 2024 Ms Beswick emailed FLL confirming she had a negative Covid-19 test, a valid licence, and an updated medical certificate, and requested a face-to-face meeting; FLL responded by terminating her employment that same day under the employment agreement's medical incapacity clause. FLL also deducted $2,439.09 from her final pay, representing the outstanding balance of a personal loan FLL had made to her in May 2024, which Ms Beswick contended was unlawful. The matter did not proceed to mediation and was heard by the Authority at an investigation meeting on 12 May 2026.

1. Whether Ms Beswick was unjustifiably dismissed by FLL — Status: Established (paras [9]-[41]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, asking whether FLL's actions and processes were those of a fair and reasonable employer in all the circumstances. Applying case law including Dunn v Waitemata District Health Board [2014] NZEmpC 201, Lal v The Warehouse Limited [2017] NZEmpC 66, and Sheridan v Pact Group [2026] NZEmpC 51, the Authority held that a fair and reasonable employer must give the employee reasonable time to recover, conduct a proper inquiry into prognosis, seek meaningful input from the employee, and consider alternatives to dismissal. The Authority found FLL failed on all four counts: it could not establish Ms Beswick was incapable of performing her duties on 29 October 2024 (given her email confirming medical clearance, a valid licence, and a negative Covid test); it did not seek input from her before dismissing her; it dismissed after only approximately three weeks' absence (largely on annual leave); and it did not consider alternatives such as working from home. The dismissal was therefore unjustified.

2. Whether FLL unlawfully deducted $2,439.09 from Ms Beswick's wages and/or annual holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [42]-[50]).

The Authority considered whether the deduction was authorised under clause 7.6 of the employment agreement (a general deductions clause) and whether s 5(1A) of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA) had been complied with. The Authority held that clause 7.6, being a general deductions clause, did not capture a distinct commercial loan arrangement between the parties; moreover, s 5(1A) WPA prohibits a specific deduction pursuant to a general deductions clause without prior consultation with the employee, which did not occur. A separate clause about settling "staff or credit accounts" was noted but not treated as a general deductions clause. The deduction was therefore unlawful under s 11 of the WPA.

3. Whether Ms Beswick should be reimbursed the $2,439.09 unlawfully deducted — Status: Established (para [50]).

Having found the deduction unlawful, the Authority ordered FLL to pay Ms Beswick $2,439.09 pursuant to s 11 of the WPA within 28 days, as the statutory consequence of a finding of unlawful deduction.

4. Whether Ms Beswick was entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [51]-[55]).

The Authority applied the principle that compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) is for emotional harm suffered as a result of the grievance, not a punitive measure (Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield [1993] 1 ERNZ 344). It accepted that the dismissal had a substantial negative impact on Ms Beswick's emotional health: she was dismissed within three weeks of a hospitalisation, was unable to meet with her employer to explain her condition (contrary to her Tongan cultural values), and felt denied a fair hearing. Having regard to comparable cases (Davey v Prime Range Meats Limited [2012] NZERA; Drylie v Mana Cruising Club Inc [2019] NZERA 469), the Authority awarded $12,000.

5. Whether Ms Beswick was entitled to reimbursement of lost wages under s 128 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [56]-[59]).

The Authority considered Ms Beswick's failure to secure new employment until May 2025. It noted she was medically unfit for work for the three months following dismissal (supported by medical certificates dated November 2024 and February 2025) and was also struggling emotionally with the circumstances of her dismissal. Applying Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190 and Nath v Advance International Cleaning Systems (NZ) Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 101, the Authority found it was reasonable for Ms Beswick not to seek alternative work in that period and that medical unfitness alone does not automatically preclude a three-month lost wages award. WINZ payments received were put to one side (Judea Tavern Limited v Jesson [2017] NZEmpC 82). The Authority awarded the equivalent of three months' salary: $9,997 (gross).

6. Whether remedies should be reduced due to Ms Beswick's contribution under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [60]-[72]).

The Authority identified Ms Beswick's delayed communication with FLL (a two-day gap from 27–28 October 2024) as the only potential basis for a contribution reduction, and asked whether that conduct was culpable or blameworthy (Yang v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand [2025] NZEmpC at [63]). Applying a balancing exercise, the Authority found the delay was short, Ms Beswick was on annual leave during the period, she was not warned her employment was at risk, FLL itself made no contact on those two days, and FLL had an obligation to seek meaningful input before dismissing. No reduction was applied.

7. Whether either party is entitled to an award of costs — Status: Not reached (paras [74]-[76]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Beswick may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with FLL having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its standard daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claims were upheld in full: unjustified dismissal was established, the wage deduction was found unlawful, no contribution reduction was applied, and remedies were awarded on all heads claimed.

- Reimbursement of unlawful deduction: $2,439.09 (under s 11 WPA), payable within 28 days.
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings: $12,000 (under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000), payable within 28 days.
- Lost wages: $9,997 (gross) (representing 3 months' salary, under s 128(2) of the Act), payable within 28 days.
- Total monetary orders: $24,436.09.
- Reinstatement: Not ordered.
- Costs: Reserved; parties to attempt resolution, with process for Authority determination if needed.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from a personal grievance claim by Jeanette Go (employee) against Point Limited (employer) following a flawed redundancy process. The substantive merits were resolved in a prior determination ([2026] NZERA 369), with costs reserved. The key question was the appropriate level of costs contribution, including whether any reduction was warranted due to Ms Go's unsuccessful preliminary determination on employer identity. The Authority ordered Point Limited to pay Ms Go $2,750.00 as a contribution to costs.

Applicant: Jeanette Go (employee)
Respondent: Point Limited (employer)

Applicant: Pamela Greenlee, advocate
Respondent: Danny Gelb, advocate

Ms Go brought a personal grievance claim against Point Limited arising from a flawed redundancy process, which was resolved in a substantive determination dated 11 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 369). In that determination, costs were reserved to allow the parties to negotiate the issue between themselves. The parties were unable to agree, and Ms Go filed submissions seeking a costs contribution of $6,000.00. The investigation meeting ran for slightly over half a day. A preliminary determination had previously found that Point Limited was Ms Go's employer, though Ms Go had been the unsuccessful party in that preliminary matter; the Authority noted in that earlier determination that Point's communications had been confusing. Point Limited argued for modest costs, citing its success in the preliminary matter, its early concession of substantial liability, the limited live issues, and the claimed amount being disproportionate.

1. Whether Ms Go, as the successful party in the substantive investigation, was entitled to a costs contribution — Status: Established (paras [11], [15]).

The Authority applied the well-settled principles from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, which confirm that costs are discretionary, consistent with the Authority's equity and good conscience jurisdiction, generally follow the event, and should be modest and reasonable. Ms Go succeeded in the substantive investigation and costs ordinarily follow that result. The Authority ordered Point Limited to pay a costs contribution accordingly.

2. Whether the quantum of costs should reflect one and a half days of advocate time (preparation, attendance, and post-hearing submissions), as claimed at $6,000.00 — Status: Dismissed (paras [4]–[5], [12], [14]).

Ms Greenlee sought $6,000.00 based on one and a half days of advocate time, exceeding the standard daily tariff of $4,500.00. The Authority noted it does not ordinarily award costs for preparation time or for costs submissions. Taking into account the length of the investigation (slightly over half a day) and the nature of the issues, the Authority found $6,000.00 disproportionate and awarded the lesser sum of $2,750.00.

3. Whether the costs award should be reduced due to Ms Go's lack of success in the preliminary determination regarding the identity of the employer — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]–[7], [13]).

Point Limited argued that Ms Go's failure in the preliminary employer-identity determination warranted a reduction in any costs award in her favour. The Authority acknowledged that Ms Go was the unsuccessful party in that preliminary stage but noted its earlier observation that Point's own communications had been confusing. Giving little weight to the preliminary determination outcome, the Authority declined to make a significant reduction on this basis, though the overall modest award implicitly reflects the totality of circumstances.

The costs application was partially upheld; Ms Go was awarded $2,750.00 as a contribution to costs, less than the $6,000.00 sought.

Costs contribution: $2,750.00 payable by Point Limited to Jeanette Go, pursuant to clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were determined in [2026] NZERA 369).

[COSTS ONLY]

Wiremu Caldwell (employee) brought claims against the Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki, which were dismissed in a prior determination dated 2 June 2026. This determination deals solely with costs following that dismissal. The parties resolved costs by consent, resulting in an order requiring Mr Caldwell to pay $8,875.00 to the respondent.

Applicant: Wiremu Caldwell (employee)
Respondent: The Chief Executive, Oranga Tamariki (employer)

Applicant: Andrew McKenzie, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Hamish Kynaston, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Caldwell brought employment claims against Oranga Tamariki, the details of which were addressed in an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 340) dated 2 June 2026, in which his claims were dismissed. Following that dismissal, the parties negotiated costs and reached agreement, confirmed by a joint memorandum of counsel dated 30 June 2026. No investigation meeting was held; the matter was dealt with on the papers. The agreed costs figure of $8,875.00 was submitted to the Authority for formalisation as a consent order.

1. Costs — Status: Established by consent (paras [2]-[3]).

The parties resolved costs by agreement and confirmed the terms in a joint memorandum of counsel dated 30 June 2026. No contested costs analysis was required. The Authority adopted the agreed figure and issued it as a formal order, making it a binding determination of the Authority. The order requires Mr Caldwell to pay $8,875.00 to the respondent.

The costs determination was made by consent, ordering Mr Caldwell to pay $8,875.00 to the respondent.

Costs: $8,875.00 payable by the applicant (Mr Caldwell) to the respondent, ordered by consent.

Ronald Shea, a truck driver employed by Stland Contracting Limited (STL) for approximately three months, claims he was unjustifiably dismissed and unjustifiably disadvantaged through bullying conduct, failure to provide a safe workplace, and non-payment of his final pay and notice entitlement. STL was placed into liquidation shortly after the dismissal and made no appearance in the proceedings. The Authority upheld all grievances and ordered STL to pay a total of $45,600 in lost wages, notice pay, hurt and humiliation compensation, and costs.

Applicant: Ronald Thomas Shea (employee)
Respondent: Stland Contracting Limited (In Liquidation) (employer)

Applicant: Jordan Grey, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

Ronald Shea commenced employment with STL on 17 January 2025 as a truck driver (and later rural contractor), working under a partly incomplete individual employment agreement (IEA) at $40 per hour. The IEA required 14 days' notice on termination by either party. During the first two months of employment, STL's financial position deteriorated, with half its truck fleet being taken off the road, and Shea's working hours dropped from approximately 70 hours per week to around 25 hours per week by March 2025. On 18 March 2025, during a heated telephone call initiated by Shea to discuss future work, STL (through its guiding hand, Richard Hartstone) told Shea there was no more work, constituting a dismissal without any process. Separately, Hartstone had engaged in repeated bullying conduct from around mid-February 2025, including use of an unwanted nickname, pressure to breach NZTA work-time logbook rules, and exploitation of a traumatic incident from Shea's past. Shea raised personal grievances on 5 May 2025; STL was placed into liquidation on 19 May 2025 and did not participate in the Authority's proceedings.

1. Whether the employment ended by dismissal or by some other means (e.g. resignation) — Status: Established (paras [23]-[25]).

The Authority applied the principle that dismissal is an unequivocal act amounting to a "sending away" at the employer's initiative (citing Wellington Clerical Union v Greenwich), while resignation is a unilateral act by the employee not requiring employer consent (citing Mikes Transport Warehouse v Vermuelen). The Authority found that Shea did not resign during the 18 March call, and that STL's statement that there was no further work constituted a clear sending away. The Authority concluded the employment ended by dismissal.

2. Whether Shea's dismissal was unjustified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [26]-[33]).

The objective test under s 103A requires consideration of whether the employer's actions, and how it acted, were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances (citing Wilson-Grange Investments v Guerra). The IEA required procedural fairness before termination, and while STL had genuine business grounds to commence a workplace change process by March 2025, it failed to do so entirely, instead dismissing Shea by telephone without any process. Citing Williams v S & M Haulage Ltd, the Authority found that significant procedural deficiencies causing material unfairness rendered the dismissal unjustified.

3. Whether Shea suffered an unjustified disadvantage in his employment through non-payment of final pay and contractual notice — Status: Established (paras [34]-[35], [45]-[50]).

The Authority treated the failure to pay final pay and notice as inextricably linked to the unjustified dismissal grievance, relying on the same factual matrix. The IEA expressly provided for 14 days' notice on termination, and the evidence showed Shea was ready, willing, and able to work that notice. Remedies for these disadvantages were addressed under ss 123(1)(b) and 123(1)(c)(ii) of the Act.

4. Whether Shea suffered an unjustified disadvantage through workplace bullying and failure to provide a safe workplace — Status: Established (paras [35]-[42]).

The Authority applied the WorkSafe definition of bullying (repeated and unreasonable behaviour directed at a worker that can lead to physical or psychological harm), as used in Hawkins v Sailors' Corner Ltd. The Authority found that Hartstone's conduct from around mid-February 2025 — including repeated use of an unwanted nickname, pressure to breach the NZTA work-time rules, and exploiting Shea's past trauma by implying he deserved it — was repeated, unreasonable, and caused actual harm. The Authority found STL's workplace became psychologically unsafe and that, given Hartstone's central role in the business, STL was on notice; its failure to address the conduct amounted to an unjustified disadvantage.

5. Whether post-employment conduct (misrepresentations to WINZ and an outstanding civil debt) could ground any remedy — Status: Dismissed (paras [43]-[44]).

The Authority held that remedies must relate to the employment relationship (citing Collins v Guan Holdings Ltd). The alleged misrepresentations to WINZ occurred after employment ended, and the outstanding civil debt was not sufficiently connected to the employment relationship. These matters were excluded from the remedies assessment.

6. Quantification of lost wages and notice pay reimbursement — Status: Established (paras [45]-[50]).

Under ss 123(1)(b) and 123(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, and considering the duty to mitigate (citing Argosy Imports Ltd v Lineham), the Authority assessed that Shea's employment was not likely to have continued for a further three months given STL's precarious financial position and its liquidation approximately two months later. The Authority calculated lost wages using the IEA's indicative hours (10 hours per day, 4–5 days per week) at $40 per hour: two months' lost wages (400 hours = $16,000 gross) and 14 days' notice (140 hours = $5,600 gross) were ordered.

7. Compensation for hurt and humiliation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [51]-[53]).

The Authority found Shea suffered genuine harm from both the unsafe workplace (bullying) and the manner and nature of his dismissal. Aggravating factors included Hartstone's repeated use of an unwanted nickname and references to Shea's past trauma. The Authority awarded $8,000 for the failure to provide a safe workplace and $15,000 for the unjustified dismissal, totalling $23,000.

8. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [54]).

The Authority found that Shea did not contribute in any blameworthy way to the situation giving rise to his grievances. No reduction was applied.

9. Costs — Status: Established (paras [55]-[59]).

The Authority applied the principles from PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz, including that costs follow the event, awards should be modest, and actual costs form the upper limit. No evidence of Shea's actual costs was provided and the proceedings were relatively short and uncomplicated. The Authority awarded a modest contribution of $1,000 toward Shea's costs.

The claims were upheld in full: unjustified dismissal established, unjustified disadvantage (bullying and unsafe workplace) established, and all remedies awarded without any contributory reduction.

- Notice pay: $5,600 gross (140 hours at $40/hour), less lawful deductions, payable within 28 days (s 123(1)(c)(ii))
- Lost wages: $16,000 gross (400 hours at $40/hour), less lawful deductions, payable within 28 days (s 123(1)(b))
- Hurt and humiliation compensation: $23,000 (comprising $8,000 for unsafe workplace/bullying and $15,000 for unjustified dismissal), payable without deduction within 28 days (s 123(1)(c)(i))
- Costs: $1,000 contribution toward Shea's costs
- Total ordered: $45,600 gross (plus deductions where applicable)
- Reinstatement: Not ordered

[COSTS ONLY]

Mary Bastion (employee) brought an employment relationship problem against Cashmere Primary Te Pae Kereru School Board (the Board), which was struck out in December 2025 on jurisdictional grounds. The Board then sought a costs award, while Ms Bastion argued no costs should be awarded due to the Board's refusal to attend mediation and the circumstances of her dismissal. The Authority awarded the Board $4,500 in costs, applying the daily tariff at the one-day rate without uplift or reduction.

Applicant: Mary Bastion (employee)
Respondent: Cashmere Primary Te Pae Kereru School Board (employer)

Applicant: Elizabeth Lambert
Respondent: Paul Robertson and Joy Walpole

Mary Bastion had an employment relationship problem with the Board arising from her dismissal, which she characterised as a no-fault termination related to her choice not to be vaccinated against COVID-19. In a determination dated 22 December 2025 ([2025] NZERA 841), the Authority struck out her claim on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate the problem. Costs were reserved at that time to allow the parties to negotiate, but they were unable to agree. The Board sought costs of $6,750 based on the daily tariff for one day plus an uplift, citing the complexity and convoluted nature of Ms Bastion's Statement of Problem and the absence of reasonable prospects of success. Ms Bastion opposed any costs award, arguing that the Board had unreasonably refused to attend mediation and that the COVID-19 vaccination dismissal context should weigh against a costs order. The matter was determined on the papers.

1. Whether the Board is entitled to a costs award following the successful strike-out of Ms Bastion's claim — Status: Established (paras [6]-[9]).

The Authority's power to award costs is found in clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and the starting principle is that costs follow the event. The Authority considered whether the circumstances resembled GF v OO [2022] NZEmpC 1, where a public policy rationale led costs to lie where they fell in COVID-19 employment cases involving public sector employers and a bankrupt applicant, but found that reasoning inapplicable here. Absent any policy reason or special circumstance justifying that costs lie where they fall, the Authority was satisfied the Board was entitled to costs as the dispute was resolved in its favour.

2. Whether the daily tariff should be applied at the one-day rate for an on-the-papers determination — Status: Established (paras [10]-[11]).

The Authority applied its standard approach of equating on-the-papers work to a proportion of an investigation meeting day, referencing the same methodology used in Michael Knowler v CablePrice (NZ) Limited [2026] NZERA 15. Normally, on-the-papers applications are assessed as equivalent to half a day, but the complexity and confused nature of Ms Bastion's Statement of Problem justified a full one-day equivalent, producing a base figure of $4,500.

3. Whether an uplift to the daily tariff was warranted due to the complexity of the problem — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[13]).

The Board argued that the complex and convoluted nature of the employment relationship problem justified an uplift above the standard daily tariff. The Authority rejected this, finding that the additional difficulty had already been accounted for by applying the full one-day rate rather than the usual half-day rate for on-the-papers matters; a further uplift was therefore unnecessary.

4. Whether the daily tariff should be reduced or eliminated due to the Board's lack of reasonable prospect of success argument — Status: Dismissed (para [12]).

The Board argued that Ms Bastion's claim had no reasonable prospect of success, which it submitted justified an uplift. The Authority did not accept that characterisation, implicitly declining to treat the absence of reasonable prospects as a basis for any adjustment.

5. Whether the daily tariff should be reduced or set to zero due to the Board's refusal to attend mediation — Status: Dismissed (paras [14]-[16]).

Ms Bastion argued, citing Englebeck v AG [2000] EMHNZ 216, Open Systems Ltd v Pontifex [1995] 2 ERNZ 211, and Gallagher Group v Walley [1999] 1 ERNZ 490 (CA), that the Board's refusal to attend mediation was unreasonable and should result in costs being reduced to nil. The Authority was not persuaded those authorities supported reducing costs to zero for a party's refusal to attend mediation. More importantly, the Board's decision not to attend mediation was found not to be unreasonable given the jurisdictional issues in the case, and that position had been affirmed by the Authority itself when it declined to direct the parties to mediation.

The Board's application for costs was partially upheld: costs were awarded at the one-day daily tariff rate of $4,500 without uplift or reduction.

Costs: $4,500 payable by Ms Bastion to the Board as a contribution toward its costs. No other remedies ordered.

[COSTS ONLY]

Kelvin Taylor (applicant/employee claimant) brought a claim against Destro Limited asserting he was a casual employee; that claim was dismissed in a preliminary determination which found he was an independent contractor. This costs determination addresses Destro's entitlement to a costs award following its success, including whether its late application should be accepted and whether Mr Taylor's financial hardship should reduce the award. The Authority granted Destro leave to file its costs application one day late, awarded costs of $1,500.00 (reduced from the $2,250.00 notional starting tariff to reflect Mr Taylor's financial hardship).

Applicant: Kelvin Lewis Taylor (worker/claimant)
Respondent: Destro Limited (employer/engager)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Matthew Hutchinson and Grace Guy, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Taylor claimed he was employed by Destro Limited as a casual employee. In a preliminary determination dated 25 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 319), the Authority found that Mr Taylor was more likely than not engaged as an independent contractor, dismissing his employment claim. The preliminary determination directed Destro to file any costs submissions by 5pm on 22 June 2026. Destro emailed Mr Taylor on the morning of 23 June 2026 proposing a consent costs contribution of $2,250.00, and when no agreement was reached, filed its costs application with the Authority at 4.48pm on 23 June 2026 — one day late. Mr Taylor opposed the late application and argued against any costs order on the grounds of the late filing, his lodged challenge to the preliminary determination, and his financial inability to pay. Destro sought the notional half-day investigation tariff of $2,250.00, while Mr Taylor sought either no award or a significant reduction.

1. Whether Destro should be granted leave to pursue a costs application filed one day out of time — Status: Established (paras [11]-[14]).

The Authority has a discretion to grant leave for a late filing. The delay was only 24 hours and caused no prejudice to Mr Taylor, who was able to be heard on the costs application. Leave was accordingly granted.

2. Whether Destro was entitled to an award of costs — Status: Established (para [15]).

The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event, meaning the successful party is entitled to a contribution towards its actual legal costs. No reason to depart from that principle was identified. Destro, as the successful party, was entitled to recover a contribution from Mr Taylor.

3. What quantum of costs should be awarded, including the appropriate notional starting tariff — Status: Established (paras [16]-[17]).

Because the preliminary jurisdiction issue was determined on the papers, the matter was treated as equivalent to a half-day investigation meeting. The current tariff for a first day of investigation is $4,500.00, giving a half-day notional starting point of $2,250.00. Destro did not seek increased costs, so the starting tariff was not increased.

4. Whether the notional costs tariff should be reduced to nil or significantly reduced because Mr Taylor had lodged a challenge to the preliminary determination — Status: Dismissed (para [19]).

The Authority held that the lodging of a challenge is not a relevant factor in assessing costs. This argument was rejected without further adjustment.

5. Whether the notional costs tariff should be reduced due to Mr Taylor's financial hardship — Status: Partially established (paras [18], [20]-[26]).

The Authority applied the costs assessment principles from PBO Limited v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co. Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. Financial hardship of an unsuccessful party is not ordinarily a reason to decline costs altogether, and Mr Taylor had been warned at the case management conference of potential adverse costs consequences. However, the Employment Court had accepted evidence of Mr Taylor's financial hardship and waived his filing fee for lodging his challenge; the Authority accepted the same information (while protecting his privacy) and reduced the notional starting tariff by $750.00 to $1,500.00 to balance Destro's entitlement against Mr Taylor's financial position.

The costs application was upheld in part: Destro was awarded costs of $1,500.00, reduced from the $2,250.00 notional starting tariff to reflect Mr Taylor's financial hardship.

Costs: $1,500.00 ordered to be paid by Mr Taylor to Destro within 28 days of the date of this determination (26 June 2026), as a contribution towards Destro's actual legal costs relating to the jurisdiction dispute.
No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination).

Ilalio Solomona, a fitness instructor employed by Auckland Council at the Birkenhead Pool and Leisure Centre since May 2022, was summarily dismissed on 7 February 2025 for failing to declare a conflict of interest arising from his personal training business and for uploading social media videos filmed at the leisure centre to promote that business. The key legal questions were whether Mr Solomona was unjustifiably dismissed, whether he was unjustifiably disadvantaged, and whether Auckland Council breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority upheld the unjustified dismissal claim, dismissed the unjustified disadvantage claim, found a breach of good faith, and awarded remedies subject to a 10% contributory reduction.

Applicant: Ilalio Solomona (employee/fitness instructor)
Respondent: Auckland Council (employer)

Applicant: Robert Morgan, advocate
Respondent: André Lubbe, counsel

Mr Solomona commenced employment as a fitness instructor at Auckland Council's Birkenhead Pool and Leisure Centre on 3 May 2022, having already been operating his own personal training business since 2019. During the recruitment process, Mr Solomona answered "no" to conflict of interest questions, and throughout his employment he completed periodic conflict of interest declarations without ever disclosing his business. In approximately June 2023, Mr Solomona filmed short videos of leisure centre customers at the facility and posted them to social media to support his personal training business; Auckland Council's management became aware of these videos at least 12 months before initiating any disciplinary action, and the centre manager was aware of his business no later than November 2024. Auckland Council issued a disciplinary invitation letter on 17 January 2025 (handed to Mr Solomona on 3 February 2025) relying on internal policies — including a Conflict of Interest Guide that did not directly apply to his situation — and held disciplinary meetings on 5 and 7 February 2025, at which Mr Solomona apologised but maintained he did not understand the allegations; he was summarily dismissed on 7 February 2025. Mr Solomona raised a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal, arguing Auckland Council delayed unreasonably in raising concerns, relied on inapplicable policies, and did not give him a fair opportunity to respond; Auckland Council maintained the dismissal was justified and the process was fair.

1. Whether Mr Solomona had a written employment agreement and what its terms were — Status: Established (paras [16], [48]–[49]).

The Authority found on the evidence that Mr Solomona did have written terms and conditions of employment, including a conflict of interest provision preventing him from undertaking other business activities that might create a conflict, interfere with his duties, or undermine Auckland Council's interests. This finding was significant because it confirmed Auckland Council had a specific contractual basis it could have relied on in the disciplinary process but chose not to, instead relying on policies that did not squarely apply; the terms were also relevant to the contributory conduct analysis.

2. Whether Auckland Council breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [50]–[55]).

The Authority applied the good faith obligations in s 4, noting (citing the Court of Appeal in Auckland City Council v New Zealand Public Service Association Inc [2004] 2 NZLR 10) that parties must be active and constructive in maintaining a productive employment relationship. The Authority found Auckland Council had knowledge of both the videos and Mr Solomona's business well before initiating disciplinary proceedings yet failed to have an open, constructive conversation with him about its concerns before jumping straight to a formal disciplinary process. This failure to address concerns proactively — when the nature of the issues warranted an earlier discussion — was inconsistent with the duty of good faith. The issue was raised by the Authority itself under s 160(3) of the Act as central to the problem, with both parties given the opportunity to address it.

3. Whether Mr Solomona was unjustifiably disadvantaged in his employment — Status: Dismissed (paras [56]–[59]).

Mr Solomona advanced two unjustified disadvantage claims: receiving only two days' notice of the disciplinary meeting, and not having concerns raised with him in a timely manner. The Authority found these matters were better characterised as going to the fairness of the dismissal process rather than constituting standalone unjustified disadvantage. They were therefore addressed within the dismissal justification analysis rather than as separate disadvantage claims, and the unjustified disadvantage grievance was not established.

4. Whether Mr Solomona was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [60]–[67]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test: whether the employer's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority found the process was substantively unfair in two key respects: Auckland Council relied on policies (particularly the Conflict of Interest Guide) that did not properly apply to Mr Solomona's situation rather than his contractual obligations, leaving him confused and unable to mount a meaningful response; and Auckland Council raised issues it had known about for a significant period without having first addressed them in good faith. While the two-day notice period was not itself found to be unfair (as Mr Solomona indicated willingness to proceed and the Authority accepted the meeting would have been postponed on request), the overall process fell below the standard of a fair and reasonable employer, resulting in a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal.

5. Whether lost wages should be awarded and in what amount — Status: Established (paras [69]–[73]).

Under ss 123 and 128 of the Act, the Authority may order reimbursement of lost wages up to three months' ordinary time remuneration, with discretion to award more under s 128(3). The Authority found Mr Solomona was well placed to mitigate his losses, as he was already contracted to a franchise gym (from December 2023) and could invest further efforts in his personal training business following dismissal. Limited evidence was provided of mitigation steps. Accordingly, a just award was four weeks' ordinary time remuneration of $2,224.00 (gross) before the contribution reduction.

6. Whether compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings should be awarded under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [74]–[77]).

The Authority applied the test from Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, requiring quantification of harm from humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings. Mr Solomona gave evidence of depression, mental and emotional difficulty, and feeling mistreated, though no supporting evidence was adduced. The Authority accepted the emotional setback was significant but noted Mr Solomona's entrepreneurial aptitude and assertive approach meant the impact was not as acute as it might have been for others; a just award was $15,000.00 before the contribution reduction.

7. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Established at 10% (paras [78]–[83]).

Section 124 required the Authority to consider whether Mr Solomona's own blameworthy or wrongful conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to his grievance. The Authority found two relevant matters: first, Mr Solomona's failure to formally declare his competing business despite his employment agreement's conflict of interest provision, even though he had disclosed it informally to his line manager (the informal disclosure meant continuing the business was not at the level of wrongful behaviour); and second, his decision to film leisure centre customers for his own social media without proper authorisation, which was inconsistent with his obligation to support and protect his employer's business interests. A 10% reduction to all remedies was applied.

8. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Reserved (paras [86]–[88]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue themselves. A procedure was set out whereby Mr Solomona could lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days if agreement was not reached, with Auckland Council having 14 days to reply. The Authority noted it would ordinarily apply its standard notional daily rate unless particular circumstances warranted adjustment.

The unjustified dismissal claim was upheld (with good faith breach also established), the unjustified disadvantage claim was dismissed, and remedies were awarded subject to a 10% contributory reduction.

Lost wages: $2,001.60 (gross) (four weeks' ordinary time remuneration of $2,224.00, reduced by 10%)
Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i): $13,500.00 ($15,000.00 reduced by 10%)
Both amounts payable within 28 days of the determination date.
Reinstatement: Not ordered (not sought).
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; timetable set for memoranda if required.

[COSTS ONLY]

Raheel Reddy (employee) successfully established an unjustified dismissal personal grievance against Studio Image Limited (employer) in a substantive determination issued on 22 May 2026. This costs determination addresses Mr Reddy's application for a costs award following the parties' failure to resolve costs between themselves. The Authority awarded Mr Reddy $3,875.00 as a contribution to costs plus $71.55 for the lodgement fee, applying the notional daily tariff with adjustments for the early conclusion of the hearing, claims withdrawn during proceedings, and the respondent's rejection of a pre-litigation settlement offer.

Applicant: Raheel Reddy (employee)
Respondent: Studio Image Limited (employer)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate
Respondent: Sidhant Thapa

Mr Reddy was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed by Studio Image Limited in a substantive oral determination issued on 22 May 2026 (written record issued 26 May 2026: [2026] NZERA 323). He was awarded compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, lost wages, holiday pay on those lost wages, and Studio Image was ordered to comply with KiwiSaver obligations. In March 2025, Mr Reddy made a settlement offer of $11,000.00 in total, which Studio Image did not accept; the remedies ultimately awarded exceeded that sum. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves, prompting Mr Reddy to apply for a costs award. Studio Image accepted that costs should follow the event but opposed an uplift, citing its purportedly poor financial position without providing supporting evidence.

1. Whether Mr Reddy, as the successful party, is entitled to a costs award — Status: Established (paras [5]-[7]).

The Authority's power to award costs arises under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and is discretionary, to be exercised on a principled basis: PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808; Faggotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. The governing principles include that costs generally follow the event, awards are modest, and the daily tariff provides the starting point. Because Mr Reddy was the successful party in the substantive matter, the Authority confirmed he was entitled to a costs consideration.

2. Whether the full daily tariff of $4,500.00 should be awarded without reduction, given the investigation meeting concluded early (approximately 2.30 pm) and that Mr Reddy withdrew a number of claims during proceedings — Status: Partially established (paras [17]-[23]).

The Authority acknowledged that the daily tariff is intended as a contribution to overall work including preparation and post-meeting matters, not merely hearing time. However, the Authority also noted that the early finish may have reduced the length of post-meeting work and that withdrawing claims during the hearing rather than from the outset may have increased preparation work unnecessarily. Stepping back overall, the Authority reduced the tariff to three-quarters of the daily rate ($3,375.00), finding this fair and appropriate in the circumstances.

3. Whether an uplift of 50% of the daily tariff was warranted to reflect Studio Image's rejection of Mr Reddy's settlement offer — Status: Partially established (paras [9]-[12], [24]-[25]).

Mr Reddy sought a 50% uplift on the basis that he made a settlement offer of $11,000.00 in March 2025 that Studio Image declined, and that the remedies ultimately awarded exceeded that amount. The Authority agreed that an upward adjustment was appropriate to reflect the rejection of a valid settlement offer, consistent with the principle that conduct increasing costs unnecessarily can be taken into account. However, the Authority declined to grant the full 50% uplift sought, instead applying a flat uplift of $500.00 as a proportionate acknowledgment of the rejected offer.

4. Whether Studio Image's alleged poor financial position should reduce or preclude a costs award — Status: Dismissed (para [15]).

Studio Image submitted that its financial position was not strong and raised impecuniosity as a factor. The Authority rejected this submission because Studio Image provided no evidence or actual financial information to support its assertion. A bare, unsupported claim of financial difficulty was insufficient to influence the costs award.

5. Whether conduct of either party unreasonably increased the other's costs — Status: Dismissed (para [13]).

The Authority found no evidence that the conduct of either party had unreasonably increased the costs of the other, so this factor had no impact on the award in either direction.

6. Whether Mr Reddy should be reimbursed for the Authority lodgement fee — Status: Established (para [30]).

The Authority found it appropriate to order reimbursement of the lodgement fee paid by Mr Reddy to file his application, and included $71.55 in the order accordingly.

The costs application was upheld in part: Mr Reddy was awarded $3,875.00 as a contribution to representation costs plus $71.55 for the lodgement fee, based on three-quarters of the daily tariff plus a $500.00 uplift for the rejected settlement offer.

Costs contribution: $3,875.00 (three-quarters of the $4,500.00 daily tariff = $3,375.00, plus $500.00 uplift for rejection of settlement offer).
Lodgement fee reimbursement: $71.55.
Total ordered: $3,946.55, payable by Studio Image Limited to Raheel Reddy within 28 days of the date of this determination (26 June 2026).
No other remedy ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were ordered in [2026] NZERA 323).

[CONSENT]

TOC (employee/applicant) and VZE (employer/respondent) appeared before the Employment Relations Authority at an in-person investigation meeting in Kerikeri on 25 June 2026. During the meeting, the parties settled all employment relationship problems on agreed terms and asked the Authority to record those terms as a consent determination. The Authority issued the consent determination, making the settlement final, binding, and enforceable, and granted a non-publication order over the terms of settlement.

Applicant: TOC (employee)
Respondent: VZE (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Stephen Corlett and Philippa Couldwell, counsel for the Respondent

TOC brought employment relationship problem claims against VZE, the nature of which are not disclosed in the determination. The parties attended an in-person investigation meeting in Kerikeri on 25 June 2026. During the meeting, the parties informed the Authority they had reached a full and final settlement of all claims — known and unknown, present and future — arising from their employment relationship. The parties signed an Agreed Terms of Settlement document on 25 June 2026 and jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination incorporating those terms as orders of the Authority. The specific terms of the settlement are subject to a confidentiality agreement between the parties and have been the subject of a non-publication order.

1. Whether the Authority should record the parties' agreed settlement terms as a consent determination and make them orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [2]-[5]).

The parties jointly requested, pursuant to their settlement agreement, that the Authority issue a consent determination. The Authority accepted that the parties had settled all issues and recorded the agreed terms as orders of the Authority under the Employment Relations Act 2000, making them final, binding, and enforceable. No further challenges to those claims may be brought.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made over the terms of the settlement — Status: Established (paras [7]-[8]).

The parties agreed the settlement terms were to remain confidential to themselves and their professional advisers. The Authority was satisfied there was no countervailing public interest requiring publication. Accordingly, the Authority made a non-publication order pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, prohibiting publication of the terms of the settlement, subject to the condition that the order does not apply to employment institutions.

3. Whether non-compliance with the consent determination may be addressed — Status: Established (para [6]).

The Authority noted that failure to comply with the settlement terms and/or the consent determination may be addressed by way of a compliance order application, but that no other action may be taken regarding any matters connected to the parties' employment relationship and/or its ending.

All employment relationship problems were resolved by consent; the consent determination was issued recording the settlement as final, binding, and enforceable orders of the Authority.

The specific remedy terms are confidential and subject to a non-publication order. The agreed settlement terms recorded in the Agreed Terms of Settlement document signed on 25 June 2026 are incorporated as orders of the Authority. No publicly disclosed monetary amounts, reinstatement, or other specific remedies are stated in the determination.