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[CONSENT]

Applicant: Linda Hamilton (employee)
Respondent: Hollyer Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Luke Acland, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Jonny Sanders, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Hamilton brought a personal grievance claim of unjustified dismissal against Hollyer Holdings Limited. The employer admitted the dismissal was unjustified. The parties reached a confidential settlement and jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination, making the settlement terms orders of the Authority.

Ms Hamilton was employed by Hollyer Holdings Limited and was dismissed in circumstances she considered unjustified. Hollyer Holdings Limited admitted that the dismissal was unjustified. The parties negotiated a resolution and entered into a confidential settlement agreement. They then jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination to give the settlement terms the force of Authority orders. The contents of the settlement agreement are subject to a non-publication order pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Ms Hamilton was unjustifiably dismissed — [Established (by admission)]
2. Non-Publication Order: Whether the terms of the settlement agreement should be subject to a non-publication order under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Established]

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Hollyer Holdings Limited admitted that the dismissal was unjustified. No contested hearing was required. The Authority accepted the admission and the parties' agreed resolution.
2. Non-Publication Order: Pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority made a non-publication order covering the contents of the settlement agreement, consistent with the parties' request for confidentiality.

The claim was resolved by consent, with the employer admitting unjustified dismissal and the parties' confidential settlement agreement becoming orders of the Authority.

The specific terms of the remedy are confidential and subject to a non-publication order. The settlement agreement terms have been made orders of the Authority by consent. No publicly disclosed figures are available.

Applicant: Paul McMillan (employee/first applicant) and Dion Robin (employee/second applicant)
Respondent: Qube Ports NZ Limited (employer)

Applicant: Simon Mitchell KC and Angus Drumm, counsel for the applicants
Respondent: Alastair Espie and Bridget Craig, counsel for the respondent

Two Terminal Tractor operators at the Port of Gisborne were dismissed (or had future engagement refused) following a coordinated refusal to work with a particular loader operator on 8 January 2026, which Qube treated as serious misconduct. Both applicants sought interim reinstatement pending a substantive investigation of their unjustified dismissal grievances. The Authority granted interim reinstatement to the permanently employed applicant (McMillan) but declined it for the casual applicant (Robin), whose uncertain employment status undermined the balance of convenience in his favour.

Paul McMillan commenced permanent employment with Qube on 22 May 2023 and Dion Robin commenced on 6 July 2023 under a casual "as-and-when required" arrangement, though Robin disputes his true status. Both raised safety concerns about a particular loader operator on multiple occasions in 2024 and 2025, which Qube investigated but largely concluded were not substantiated by CCTV evidence. On 8 January 2026, all three TT operators on shift — including both applicants — refused to work with the loader operator before vessel loading commenced; Qube treated this as coordinated serious misconduct. Following fact-finding meetings and a disciplinary process, McMillan was dismissed on 27 February 2026 and Robin was told he would not be re-engaged; both raised personal grievances on 3 March 2026. The parties attended mediation without resolution and agreed to have the Authority determine the preliminary question of interim reinstatement based on affidavit evidence and submissions.

1. Applicable Law / Transitional Provisions: Whether the new ss 123B and 123C of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (inserted 21 February 2026) apply to the applicants' grievances, given the dismissals occurred on 27 February 2026 but most disciplinary events preceded the amendments — [Established (amendments apply)]
2. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (McMillan): Whether McMillan has an arguable (non-frivolous) case for unjustified dismissal, including whether his refusal to work was protected under s 83 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 — [Established]
3. Arguable Case — Robin's Employment Status: Whether Robin has an arguable case that he was employed on an ongoing rather than truly casual basis, which is a prerequisite to any unjustified dismissal claim — [Partially established (weakly arguable only)]
4. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (Robin): Whether Robin has an arguable case for unjustified dismissal, contingent on his employment status — [Partially established (weakly arguable, contingent)]
5. Arguable Case — Permanent Reinstatement: Whether the applicants have an arguable case for permanent reinstatement, including whether ss 123B and 123C bar reinstatement as a remedy — [Established (for both, but Robin's case is contingent and weaker)]
6. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of convenience favours granting or refusing interim reinstatement for each applicant — [Established for McMillan; Not established for Robin]
7. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case supports granting interim reinstatement for each applicant — [Established for McMillan; Not established for Robin]
8. Costs: Whether costs should be determined at this interim stage — [Not reached (reserved)]

1. Applicable Law / Transitional Provisions: The Authority applied s 33 of the Legislation Act 2019, which preserves existing legal rights against the effect of legislative amendment, and held that an unjustified dismissal cause of action does not arise until termination occurs. Because termination happened on 27 February 2026 — after ss 123B and 123C came into force on 21 February 2026 — the amendments apply. The Authority also found no evidence to support the applicants' allegation that Qube deliberately delayed its decision until after the amendments came into force. This outcome is consistent with earlier Employment Court authorities (Allen v C3 Ltd; Ramkissoon v Commissioner of Police) interpreting equivalent provisions of the Interpretation Act 1999.
2. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (McMillan): The threshold for an arguable case is low — the claim must not be merely frivolous or vexatious. McMillan raised substantive arguments: that his refusal was protected by s 83 of the HSWA as a response to a genuine belief in serious health and safety risk, and that procedural defects (AI-generated transcripts with factual errors, non-disclosure that the loader operator had been spoken to) were relevant to justification. The Authority found these arguments were not frivolous and that McMillan met the threshold for an arguable case of unjustified dismissal.
3. Arguable Case — Robin's Employment Status: The Authority identified that Robin's dismissal claim depends entirely on whether he was in ongoing employment. Robin's written agreements described him as casual "as-and-when required," but he produced income summaries and payslips suggesting consistent full-time hours. The Authority noted this is a fact-specific assessment requiring examination of multiple factors and found the untested evidence provided a "weakly arguable" case that Robin was in ongoing employment — sufficient to proceed but not compelling.
4. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (Robin): Contingent on Robin's employment status, the Authority found he also had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal on the same substantive grounds as McMillan, but the strength of that case is tempered by the unresolved status question.
5. Arguable Case — Permanent Reinstatement: Under s 125 of the Act, reinstatement is preferred where practicable and reasonable. The Authority could not confidently conclude at this interim stage that ss 123B or 123C would bar reinstatement, as the conduct's characterisation as "serious misconduct" or "misconduct" remained untested. Qube's evidence about prior safety investigations was incomplete, and the finding of coordinated refusal was disputed. The Authority found the parties appeared capable of re-establishing a productive relationship, noting the loader operator was on day shifts; both applicants met the arguable case threshold, though Robin's case remained contingent on his status.
6. Balance of Convenience: For McMillan, the Authority weighed his significant personal hardship (age, family, financial circumstances), against Qube's operational concerns. It found Qube had previously accommodated rostering arrangements that kept McMillan away from the loader operator, and that the balance favoured McMillan. For Robin, the uncertainty around his casual status and his expectation of ongoing work meant the Authority was not satisfied the balance favoured him in the interim period.
7. Overall Justice: The Court of Appeal's formulation (NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd) treats overall justice as a global check on earlier conclusions. For McMillan, all prior factors supported interim reinstatement and overall justice confirmed that outcome. For Robin, the contingent and weak nature of his status argument, and the balance of convenience not favouring him, meant overall justice did not support interim reinstatement.
8. Costs: The Authority reserved costs for determination after the substantive investigation meeting or when the matter otherwise concludes.

The claim was partially upheld: McMillan's application for interim reinstatement succeeded; Robin's application for interim reinstatement was declined.

McMillan: Interim reinstatement ordered — to be restored to payroll within two days and rostered to work within seven days of 30 April 2026; reinstatement is subject to an undertaking by McMillan to abide by any order for damages Qube may sustain through the reinstatement. This is a provisional/interim remedy only; the substantive grievance remains to be determined.
Robin: No remedy ordered at this interim stage.
Costs: Reserved.

Applicant: Darin Jonker (employee)
Respondent: Wainuiomata High School Board (employer)

Applicant: Darin Jonker in person
Respondent: Paul Robertson and Dew James-Powys, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Jonker, a fixed-term teacher at Wainuiomata High School, was dismissed for serious misconduct on 16 January 2026 after an independent investigation found he had harassed his manager. He applied for interim reinstatement pending a substantive Authority investigation, claiming his fixed-term agreement was unlawful and that he was a permanent employee. The Authority declined interim reinstatement, finding neither a strongly arguable case of permanent employment nor a sufficiently compelling case to justify reinstating him into a role that had in any event expired.

Mr Jonker was employed as a fixed-term full-time teacher from 19 February 2025 to 27 January 2026, initially in Hard Materials and Hospitality, later also performing some PE classes on a temporary basis. He had applied for a permanent PE teaching role but was unsuccessful; WHS offered him the fixed-term role instead due to an ongoing school redevelopment project. In September 2025, Mr Jonker's manager raised a harassment complaint against him after he responded to her performance concerns with a high volume of aggressive emails; Mr Jonker simultaneously complained of bullying by the Principal and manager. An independent investigator found harassment by Mr Jonker was established and his bullying complaint unsubstantiated; WHS then commenced a disciplinary process. Mr Jonker was dismissed on 16 January 2026 for serious misconduct and filed an application in the Authority on 14 January 2026 seeking, among other things, interim reinstatement and a declaration that the fixed-term agreement was unlawful.

1. Arguable Permanent Employment: Whether there is a seriously arguable case that Mr Jonker was a permanent employee rather than a fixed-term employee, in particular whether the fixed-term agreement complied with s 66 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
2. Arguable Unjustified Dismissal: Whether there is a seriously arguable case that Mr Jonker was unjustifiably dismissed — [Partially established]
3. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of convenience supports granting interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
4. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case supports interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
5. Arguable Permanent Reinstatement: Whether there is a seriously arguable case that Mr Jonker would be permanently reinstated at a substantive hearing — [Dismissed]
6. Costs: Whether costs should be determined — [Reserved]

1. Arguable Permanent Employment: The Authority applied the two-stage serious-question-to-be-tried test from Hussain v Auckland Transport [2025] NZEmpC 274, requiring an arguable case for unjustified dismissal and for reinstatement. The Authority found that contemporaneous documents clearly showed Mr Jonker accepted a fixed-term offer on 18 February 2025, referred to his "year contract" in his own emails throughout employment, and only raised permanent employment status after receiving a standard reminder letter about the approaching end of his fixed term. The reason given in the letter of offer — an existing redevelopment project creating staffing and curriculum uncertainty — appeared on its face to be genuine and based on reasonable grounds under s 66. The Authority concluded it was not strongly arguable that Mr Jonker was a permanent employee.
2. Arguable Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority assessed whether there was a seriously arguable case of unjustified dismissal arising from the disciplinary process. Mr Jonker's objections focused on procedural matters (terms of reference, involvement of the then-Presiding Member, and concurrent investigation of complaints) rather than the substance of the conduct alleged. The Authority noted Mr Jonker had participated in and accepted the investigation process before withdrawing immediately upon receiving the draft report recommending findings against him, and did not appear to have engaged with the substance of the disciplinary process. The Authority found the unjustified dismissal claim was only weakly arguable but could not be entirely discounted.
3. Balance of Convenience: The Authority applied the principle from Savage v Wai Shing Ltd [2019] NZEmpC 141 that interim relief should maintain the last settled position between parties. Mr Jonker's fixed-term role had expired on 27 January 2026 in any event, meaning there was no existing role to return him to; reinstatement would require WHS to create a new unfunded position at the expense of existing staff, students, and projects. The Authority found the balance of convenience clearly favoured WHS.
4. Overall Justice: The Authority applied the principle from Port of Wellington Ltd v Longwith [1995] 1 ERNZ 87 (CA) that in some cases, particularly alleged unjustified dismissal, the state of the employment relationship may itself preclude reinstatement. With unresolved performance concerns, conduct concerns, and reciprocal complaints still in play, and with no indication from Mr Jonker as to how those matters could be managed in practice, the overall justice also pointed against interim reinstatement.
5. Arguable Permanent Reinstatement: The Authority noted that Mr Jonker expressly did not seek permanent reinstatement. This itself pointed away from interim reinstatement being appropriate. In any event, the Authority assessed that prospects of permanent reinstatement were weak given all the circumstances.
6. Costs: The Authority reserved costs, encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves, and indicated that if asked, costs would be assessed on the usual daily tariff basis absent circumstances justifying adjustment.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Kulwinder Singh (employee/claimant)
Respondent: Tauranga Mount Taxis Limited (employer/respondent)

Applicant: Ajay Sharma, advocate
Respondent: Ken Patterson, counsel

This is a costs determination following the Authority's January 2022 dismissal of Mr Singh's employment claims for want of jurisdiction. The respondent sought indemnity costs or an uplifted award, while the applicant argued costs should lie where they fall. The Authority awarded $5,500 in costs to the respondent, applying the standard daily tariff with a moderate uplift.

The Authority dismissed Mr Singh's claims against Tauranga Mount Taxis Limited on 14 January 2022 for lack of jurisdiction. The parties were unable to agree on costs and filed memoranda. The respondent incurred actual costs of $9,821.39 and sought either indemnity costs or an uplift to $9,000 (two days' tariff), citing the applicant's repeated failure to identify the correct respondent despite being told the named entity was incorrect, improper attempts to join individuals and other entities without grounds or leave, and failure to provide supporting evidence despite three case management conferences where this was directed. The applicant argued costs should lie where they fall, contending the matter was determined on the papers, the claimed costs were disproportionate, and that the invoices were not actually incurred by the respondent.

1. Costs Lie Where They Fall: Whether it was appropriate to make no costs order against the unsuccessful applicant — [Dismissed]
2. Appropriate Starting Point: What the correct tariff-based starting point for the costs award should be where the matter was determined on the papers — [Established]
3. Indemnity Costs: Whether the applicant's conduct warranted an award of indemnity costs — [Dismissed]
4. Uplift on Tariff: Whether the applicant's conduct justified a moderate uplift above the base daily tariff — [Established]
5. Costs Actually Incurred: Whether the invoices provided were actually incurred by the respondent — [Established]

1. Costs Lie Where They Fall: The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event. The applicant was unsuccessful and had actively pursued multiple claims against the respondent and associated persons over a considerable period without providing supporting evidence despite having opportunities to do so. There was no principled reason to depart from the usual costs approach.
2. Appropriate Starting Point: The Authority applied its established daily tariff approach (set out in PBO Limited v Da Cruz and confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited), with the current rate being $4,500 for the first day. Although the matter was determined on the papers, the Authority selected a full day's tariff as the starting point because the respondent was required to file in-depth submissions and documentation to explain the legal relationships between multiple entities, much of which the applicant himself failed to provide.
3. Indemnity Costs: The Authority declined to award indemnity costs, affirming that costs in the Authority are intended to be modest and a contribution only, not a full indemnity, consistent with settled principles.
4. Uplift on Tariff: The Authority found a moderate uplift of $1,000 was appropriate. The applicant's conduct — including repeated failures to provide documents or grounds for his claimed relationship despite multiple case management conferences, and his improper mid-process attempt to add individual respondents without leave before abandoning that claim — materially increased the respondent's costs.
5. Costs Actually Incurred: The Authority rejected the applicant's submission that the invoices were not incurred by the respondent. Given the overlapping relationships between the respondent, its sole shareholder (a provident society), and the board members/directors named by the applicant, the invoiced costs were consistent with the evidence and properly attributed to the respondent.

The claim for costs lying where they fall and for indemnity costs were both dismissed; a costs award of $5,500 (base tariff of $4,500 plus $1,000 uplift) was ordered in favour of the respondent.

Costs: $5,500 (inclusive) payable by Kulwinder Singh to Tauranga Mount Taxis Limited within 28 days of the determination date. No other remedies ordered.

Applicant: Diana Zhao (employee)
Respondent: DSV Air & Sea Limited (employer)

Applicant: Martin Lyttleton, advocate
Respondent: Simon Martin, counsel

Diana Zhao was made redundant from her Customer Services Manager role at DSV Air & Sea Limited on 30 September 2025, following a brief restructuring process. She applied for interim reinstatement, arguing her dismissal was unjustified due to inadequate consultation, lack of genuine commercial reason, and failure to properly consider redeployment. The Authority granted interim reinstatement, finding a serious question to be tried on both unjustified dismissal and permanent reinstatement, and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Ms Zhao.

Diana Zhao commenced employment with DSV Air & Sea Limited on 23 March 2020 as Customer Services Manager. On 27 August 2025, DSV presented Ms Zhao with a workplace change proposal to merge three departments, disestablishing her position and that of another manager, and creating a new Customer Experience Manager role. Ms Zhao interviewed for the new position on 2 September 2025 but was told the following day that she was unsuccessful and there were no suitable redeployment options; her employment ended on 30 September 2025. She raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal on 24 October 2025, and DSV responded in December 2025. Ms Zhao applied for interim reinstatement on 6 March 2026, some six months after dismissal, arguing the process was rushed, consultation was inadequate, redeployment was not properly explored, and the new role was substantially the same as her former role. DSV conceded there was a serious question to be tried on unjustified dismissal but disputed that reinstatement was practicable or reasonable.

1. Serious Question – Unjustified Dismissal: Whether there is a serious question to be tried in relation to Ms Zhao's claim of unjustified dismissal by reason of redundancy — (Established)
2. Serious Question – Permanent Reinstatement: Whether there is a serious question to be tried in relation to Ms Zhao's claim for permanent reinstatement, having regard to delay, availability of the role, alleged relationship breakdown, and subsequently discovered misconduct — (Established)
3. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of convenience favours granting interim reinstatement, considering adequacy of damages, preservation of status quo, relative strength of parties' cases, and alleged post-employment misconduct — (Established, in Ms Zhao's favour)
4. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case favours the making of an interim reinstatement order — (Established, in Ms Zhao's favour)

1. Serious Question – Unjustified Dismissal: The test requires an arguable claim that the dismissal was unjustified. DSV conceded this threshold was met, and the Authority agreed, noting arguable issues around whether consultation was adequate, whether genuine commercial reasons were established, whether Ms Zhao should have been redeployed into the substantially similar Customer Experience Manager role, and whether DSV provided the selection matrix in advance of the interview. The issue was established.
2. Serious Question – Permanent Reinstatement: Following Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, a serious question must also be shown as to whether permanent reinstatement is practicable and reasonable. The Authority weighed delay (Ms Zhao applied six months after dismissal and three months after DSV's grievance response) against DSV's own delay in responding to the grievance. The Authority found the role's non-existence and relationship tensions were not conclusive barriers: citing Idea Services Limited v Wills [2025] NZEmpC 28 and Genesys Telecommunications Laboratories [2019] NZEmpC 113, it held that if DSV failed to properly consider redeployment, it could not credibly argue reinstatement was impracticable. DSV's size (155 NZ employees; ~11,800 Asia Pacific) also supported this. Alleged relationship breakdown and Ms Zhao's comments did not reach the threshold of a reinstatement barrier per Humphrey at [45]. The issue was established.
3. Balance of Convenience: The Authority applied the test from Stellar Elements New Zealand Limited v Amesbury [2024] NZEmpC 36, considering adequacy of damages, status quo, and relative strength of cases. Ms Zhao had a strong arguable case on unjustified dismissal given the speed of the process, the interview matrix question, the similarity of roles, and DSV's redeployment obligations. She had demonstrated efforts to find alternative employment and had means to satisfy the undertaking under s 127(2) of the Act. The only factor favouring DSV was unsubstantiated post-employment misconduct allegations that had not been put to Ms Zhao or investigated. Overall, the balance of convenience favoured Ms Zhao.
4. Overall Justice: Standing back and assessing the totality of the circumstances, the Authority found the overall justice favoured interim reinstatement. Ms Zhao lost her position through no fault of her own, the redundancy consultation was brief, DSV's redeployment process was arguably deficient, and any delay was partly attributable to DSV's own delayed grievance response. The interim reinstatement order was granted.

The application for interim reinstatement was upheld: all four issues were resolved in Ms Zhao's favour.

Reinstatement: Yes — DSV ordered to reinstate Ms Zhao to its payroll within 5 days of the determination date, and to place her in a position no less advantageous than her former position within 28 days.
Mediation: Directed within 21 days of the determination.
Case management conference: To be convened following mediation to progress to a substantive investigation meeting.
Costs: Reserved.
Note: This is an interim reinstatement order only; the substantive merits of the unjustified dismissal claim remain to be determined.

Applicant: Harish Kumar Anandan (employee)
Respondent: Baiju Rajan (director of Indigo Traders Limited, now in liquidation)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: No appearance

Mr Anandan sought recovery of unpaid final wages and holiday pay totalling $1,128.96 gross from his former employer Indigo Traders Limited (in liquidation), and sought leave to recover those amounts directly from Indigo's director, Baiju Rajan. The Authority found that Indigo had breached employment standards by failing to make the payments, and that Mr Rajan was sufficiently involved in those breaches to be personally liable. Mr Rajan was ordered to pay the full amount owed, plus interest, to the extent Indigo cannot pay.

Mr Anandan worked for Indigo Traders Limited, a furniture retailer, from July 2025 until January 2026, reporting directly to Mr Rajan, who was also responsible for payroll. In January 2026, Mr Anandan and other staff were told their employment was ending due to Indigo's financial difficulties and store closures. Two final payslips were issued — one dated 14 January 2026 for ordinary pay of $672.00, and one dated 28 January 2026 for holiday pay of $456.96 — but neither amount was deposited into Mr Anandan's bank account. Mr Anandan emailed Mr Rajan on 24 February 2026 requesting payment; Mr Rajan telephoned and promised payment within a day or two but none was made. After a follow-up email on 3 March 2026 went unanswered, Mr Anandan lodged his application with the Authority. Mr Rajan was served with all documents and given notice of the investigation meeting but did not engage at any stage.

1. Unpaid Final Pay and Holiday Pay: Whether Indigo failed to pay Mr Anandan his final ordinary pay and holiday pay, and the amount owing — [Established]
2. Employment Standards Breach: Whether Indigo's failure to pay constituted a breach of employment standards under s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 and relevant provisions of the Holidays Act 2003 — [Established]
3. Director Liability (s 142W ERA): Whether leave should be granted to recover the unpaid amounts directly from Mr Rajan as a person involved in the employment standards breaches, under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Established]
4. Interest: Whether Mr Anandan is entitled to interest on the amounts owing — [Established]
5. Experience Letter: Whether the Authority could order Indigo or Mr Rajan to provide Mr Anandan with an experience letter — [Dismissed]
6. Costs: Whether any costs order should be made — [Dismissed]

1. Unpaid Final Pay and Holiday Pay: The Authority accepted Mr Anandan's unchallenged oral evidence and documentary evidence, including the two payslips and his bank transaction history showing no wages received from Indigo after 1 January 2026. The Authority was satisfied that Indigo failed to make either of the two payments identified in the payslips, totalling $1,128.96 gross.
2. Employment Standards Breach: Applying s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (which requires wages to be paid) and the relevant provisions of the Holidays Act 2003 (which require holiday pay on termination), the Authority found that Indigo had breached both statutes. The failure to make the payments constituted breaches of employment standards.
3. Director Liability (s 142W ERA): Under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a person involved in an employer's breach of employment standards may be personally liable. The Authority found that Mr Rajan, as the director responsible for payroll, had knowledge of the essential facts establishing the breaches; he was also personally on notice of the defaults before Indigo went into liquidation, had acknowledged the obligation by promising payment, but failed to ensure it was made. Leave was accordingly granted to recover the monies from Mr Rajan to the extent Indigo cannot pay.
4. Interest: The Authority found Mr Anandan was entitled to interest on the unpaid amounts under the applicable interest provisions, calculated from 29 January 2026 (the day after his last pay day should have occurred) until full payment is made, using the Ministry of Justice civil debt interest calculator.
5. Experience Letter: Mr Anandan had requested an experience letter, but the Authority noted it does not have jurisdiction to order the provision of such a letter and so declined the request.
6. Costs: The Authority stated there was no issue as to costs and made no costs order.

The claim was upheld: Mr Rajan is personally liable to pay the outstanding wages and holiday pay to the extent Indigo Traders Limited (in liquidation) cannot pay them, plus interest.

- Ordinary time pay: $672.00 (gross)
- Holiday pay: $456.96 (gross)
- Total: $1,128.96 (gross), payable by Mr Rajan to the extent Indigo cannot pay, within 14 days of the determination
- Interest: Accruing on the above amounts from 29 January 2026 until full payment, calculated using the Ministry of Justice civil debt interest calculator
- Experience letter: Not ordered (no jurisdiction)
- Costs: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not applicable

Applicant: Smita Nalawade (employee)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Inland Revenue Department (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney and Duncan Allan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Nalawade, a Customer Services Officer at IRD, was dismissed on 19 December 2025 for serious misconduct after accessing a taxpayer's account without a valid business reason and failing to disclose that access after recognising it was an error. She applied for interim reinstatement pending a substantive hearing on her unjustified dismissal claim. The Authority declined the interim reinstatement application, finding that while Ms Nalawade had a low-threshold arguable case for unjustified dismissal, she had only a weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement, the balance of convenience favoured IRD, and overall justice supported declining the application.

Ms Nalawade was employed as a Customer Services Officer with IRD for approximately three years. On 24 October 2025, she received a forwarded email advising staff that a particular taxpayer (Taxpayer A) was being managed by Complaints and that staff should not access his account without a valid business reason. Within two minutes of receiving the email, Ms Nalawade accessed Taxpayer A's account, spending approximately four minutes reviewing various sections. She stated she believed Taxpayer A may have been a customer she had previously dealt with and wanted to check for any outstanding actions, but upon accessing the account she realised it was not the same person and exited without using or sharing the data. Subsequently, after receiving reminders and attending a team meeting where her Team Lead indicated no one should have accessed the account, Ms Nalawade recognised her error but did not disclose her access. IRD discovered the access through active monitoring, commenced a disciplinary investigation, and dismissed Ms Nalawade on 19 December 2025 (confirmed by letter dated 23 December 2025) for serious misconduct, citing the unauthorised access and her failure to proactively disclose it. Ms Nalawade raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and applied for interim reinstatement; mediation did not resolve the matter.

1. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Ms Nalawade has established an arguable case (not frivolous or vexatious) that her dismissal was unjustified — [Established]
2. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Whether Ms Nalawade has established an arguable case that she would be permanently reinstated if successful in her unjustified dismissal claim — [Dismissed]
3. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of inconvenience and detriment favours granting or declining interim reinstatement — [Dismissed (favours IRD)]
4. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the matter supports granting interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
5. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded at this stage — [Not reached]

1. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: The threshold is low — the claim must simply not be frivolous or vexatious, as established in Brooks Homes Ltd v NZ Tax Refunds Ltd [2013] NZSC 60 and affirmed in Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36. The Authority noted Ms Nalawade's explanation that she believed she had a legitimate business reason to access the account, that the access was brief, and that there was no finding of improper motive or misuse of data. On the basis of the untested affidavit evidence, the Authority found this threshold met, concluding Ms Nalawade has an arguable case that she was unjustifiably dismissed.
2. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Following Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, an applicant must separately establish an arguable case for permanent reinstatement. Applying Hong v Auckland Transport [2019] NZEmpC 54, reinstatement must be both practicable and reasonable. The Authority accepted IRD's submission that Ms Nalawade's role requires continuous, largely unmonitored access to sensitive taxpayer accounts, making trust and confidence essential, and that the circumstances — including her failure to disclose her error — significantly undermined that trust. On the untested evidence, the Authority found Ms Nalawade had only a weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement, insufficient to support an interim order.
3. Balance of Convenience: Applying X v Y Limited [1992] 1 ERNZ 863, the Authority weighed the prejudice to each party. Ms Nalawade argued financial hardship, personal difficulties, restricted future employment prospects due to Workforce Assurance Standards, and loss of income. However, the Authority noted the absence of evidence about her financial position or mitigation steps, and that garden leave or payroll reinstatement raised concerns about Ms Nalawade's ability to repay damages if unsuccessful. IRD also cited cost-saving obligations as a government agency. Balancing these considerations, the Authority found the balance of convenience favoured not reinstating Ms Nalawade on an interim basis.
4. Overall Justice: Described by the Court of Appeal in NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90 as a global check on the earlier analysis. The Authority found that, notwithstanding Ms Nalawade's lack of improper motive, the seriousness of the breach of fundamental obligations around taxpayer confidentiality and the failure to disclose her error meant the overall justice of the case supported declining interim reinstatement.
5. Costs: The Authority reserved costs for determination following the substantive investigation meeting and its outcome, or until the matter otherwise ceases to be before the Authority. No decision was made at this stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full; the substantive unjustified dismissal claim remains to be determined at a hearing scheduled for October.

None ordered at this stage (this is a preliminary determination on interim reinstatement only). Costs reserved pending outcome of the substantive investigation.

Applicant: Punipuao Fatu (employee)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Inland Revenue Department (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney and Duncan Allan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Fatu, a Customer Services Officer with 36 years of service at IRD, was dismissed on 19 December 2025 for serious misconduct after accessing a taxpayer's account without a valid business reason, despite express instructions not to do so. She applied for interim reinstatement pending a substantive hearing on her unjustified dismissal personal grievance. The Authority found she had a low-threshold arguable case for unjustified dismissal but declined interim reinstatement, finding the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured the IRD.

Ms Fatu had been employed as a Customer Services Officer at IRD for 36 years when she was dismissed on 19 December 2025 for serious misconduct. On 24 October 2025, IRD's Complaints Management team instructed staff via email not to engage with a specific taxpayer (Taxpayer A), and Ms Fatu's Team Lead forwarded this message along with a separate reminder not to access accounts without a valid business reason. Despite these instructions, Ms Fatu accessed Taxpayer A's account at 3:45 p.m. that same day, conducting a comprehensive search and viewing significant confidential information. Ms Fatu explained she was checking whether Taxpayer A was a customer she had previously spoken to and transferred; she did not disclose her access to her Team Lead, saying she felt ashamed. IRD discovered the access through its internal monitoring system, conducted an investigation meeting on 3 December 2025, and after receiving written responses from Ms Fatu and her union (PSA), decided that her conduct amounted to serious misconduct warranting summary dismissal. Ms Fatu grieved her dismissal and sought both interim and permanent reinstatement; mediation did not resolve the dispute.

1. Applicability of New Legislation: Whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 affects the availability of reinstatement as a remedy for Ms Fatu — [Not reached]
2. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Ms Fatu has an arguable case (not frivolous or vexatious) that she was unjustifiably dismissed — [Established]
3. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Whether Ms Fatu has a more than weak arguable case that she would be permanently reinstated if her dismissal claim succeeded — [Dismissed]
4. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of prejudice between the parties favours granting or declining interim reinstatement — [Dismissed (favours IRD)]
5. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case supports granting interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
6. Interim Reinstatement Order: Whether interim reinstatement under s 127 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 should be granted — [Dismissed]
7. Costs: Whether costs should be determined at this stage — [Not reached/Reserved]

1. Applicability of New Legislation: The IRD raised as a preliminary issue whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 precludes reinstatement as a remedy. The Authority declined to resolve this question in the interim determination, citing the urgency of the proceedings and the complexity of the legal question. The Authority noted that Ms Hornsby-Geluk conceded the issue was best addressed in a substantive determination, and potentially by the Employment Court if challenged.
2. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the low threshold from Brooks Homes Ltd v NZ Tax Refunds Ltd [2013] NZSC 60 and Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36, requiring only that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious. Ms Fatu argued that her access of Taxpayer A's account was an error of judgement and that dismissal was a disproportionate outcome given her 36 years of unblemished service. The Authority found that, at this low threshold and on untested affidavit evidence, Ms Fatu had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal.
3. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Applying Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59 and Hong v Auckland Transport [2019] NZEmpC 54, the Authority noted reinstatement must be both practicable and reasonable. IRD argued it had lost confidence in Ms Fatu and that monitoring her continuous access to taxpayer accounts would be impractical. The Authority found Ms Fatu had only a weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement, insufficient to support an interim order.
4. Balance of Convenience: Applying X v Y Limited [1992] 1 ERNZ 863, the Authority weighed Ms Fatu's financial hardship and limited employment prospects (including being subject to Workforce Assurance Standards for three years) against IRD's concerns about cost, accountability, and the difficulty of recovering any interim salary payments if the substantive claim fails. The Authority found the balance of convenience favoured not reinstating Ms Fatu, noting the absence of evidence about her financial position or mitigation efforts, and IRD's cost-saving obligations as a government agency.
5. Overall Justice: Applying NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90, the Authority described overall justice as a global check on the analysis of the earlier issues. Ms Fatu argued there was no improper motive and IRD could manage reinstatement with no real risk. IRD argued the breach of a fundamental business rule justified dismissal and that overall justice favoured it. The Authority found overall justice supported declining the application.
6. Interim Reinstatement Order: Having found that Ms Fatu did not have a strongly arguable case for reinstatement and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured the IRD, the Authority declined to grant interim reinstatement under s 127 of the Act. The matter will proceed to a substantive investigation.
7. Costs: The Authority reserved costs for determination following the substantive investigation or until the matter otherwise concludes, making no costs order at this stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was dismissed in full; the matter will proceed to a substantive investigation of the unjustified dismissal personal grievance.

None ordered at this preliminary stage. Costs reserved pending the substantive investigation.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: John Pio (employee)
Respondent: Strautmann Hopkins Limited (first respondent/employer) and Hopkins Farming Group Limited (second respondent)

Applicant: Erin Burke, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: Paul McBride, counsel for the First Respondent; Peter McCarthy, director of Hopkins Farming Group Limited (self-represented for Second Respondent)

This is a costs-only determination following a substantive decision issued on 19 March 2026 ([2026] NZERA 164) in which Mr Pio succeeded in his personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and was awarded $72,184 in compensatory remedies. Costs were reserved in both the substantive determination and an earlier preliminary determination ([2025] NZERA 261). The Authority awarded costs in favour of Mr Pio against both respondents: $8,179.55 from Strautmann Hopkins Limited and $1,000 from Hopkins Farming Group Limited.

Mr Pio brought a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal against Strautmann Hopkins Limited (SHL) and a separate penalty action against Hopkins Farming Group Limited (HFG). A preliminary determination in May 2025 maintained HFG's joinder to the proceedings and dismissed HFG's application to have the action struck out as frivolous and vexatious; costs were reserved at that stage. The substantive investigation meeting ran for two full days, and Mr Pio ultimately prevailed, receiving $72,184 in remedies. Mr Pio's total legal costs incurred across the proceedings were $42,936.56. He sought costs on a solicitor-client basis or significantly above tariff, relying in part on a without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs settlement offer made to SHL (which was not extended to HFG). HFG opposed any costs award against it and cross-sought costs of up to $20,000 on the basis that it had successfully defended the penalty action.

1. Costs against SHL: Whether SHL should pay a contribution to Mr Pio's costs following his success in the substantive proceeding — [Established]
2. Costs against HFG (penalty action): Whether HFG should pay a contribution to Mr Pio's costs in relation to the preliminary determination — [Established]
3. HFG's cross-claim for costs: Whether HFG was entitled to a costs award against Mr Pio on the basis that the penalty action against it was baseless or an abuse of process — [Dismissed]
4. Solicitor-client or elevated costs: Whether the circumstances warranted costs above the Authority's standard tariff scale — [Dismissed]
5. Effect of without-prejudice offer: Whether Mr Pio's settlement offer elevated his entitlement to costs — [Dismissed]

1. Costs against SHL: The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event. Using the daily tariff of $4,000 per hearing day, and noting the investigation meeting ran two full days, the notional starting point was $8,000. No factors were found to justify increasing or reducing that figure; matters such as file reconstruction, adjournments, and information provision did not unreasonably inflate costs. The Authority awarded $8,000 plus disbursements of $179.55.
2. Costs against HFG (penalty action): Although HFG ultimately succeeded in defending the penalty action in the substantive determination, it had failed in its earlier application to have itself removed from the proceedings (the cl 12A dismissal application). The Authority found that Mr Pio incurred real costs in the preliminary matter and that HFG's unsuccessful opposition to joinder warranted a contribution. Given the matter was resolved on the papers, a modest award of $1,000 was reasonable.
3. HFG's cross-claim for costs: HFG sought up to $20,000 in costs, arguing the penalty action was baseless and that Mr Pio had improperly conflated the two respondents. The Authority rejected this, noting no supporting evidence of qualifying professional costs or expenses was provided, that executive time of a director is not routinely compensable in costs, and that the preliminary determination had already upheld joinder of HFG. No costs award was made in HFG's favour.
4. Solicitor-client or elevated costs: Mr Pio sought costs on a full indemnity basis or significantly above tariff. The Authority declined, finding no exceptional circumstances that would justify departure from the standard tariff approach. Awards are generally modest and the Authority applied its usual daily rate.
5. Effect of without-prejudice offer: Mr Pio argued his settlement offer should elevate the costs award. The Authority found the offer was ineffective because it was approximately $10,000 higher than the total remedies ultimately awarded, meaning the outcome did not beat the offer. The offer was also directed only to SHL and did not extend to HFG as a separate legal entity.

The claim for costs was partially upheld: Mr Pio was awarded costs against both respondents; HFG's cross-application for costs was dismissed.

Costs awarded to Mr Pio:
- From Strautmann Hopkins Limited: $8,000 (contribution to professional representation costs for the substantive determination) plus disbursements of $179.55
- From Hopkins Farming Group Limited: $1,000 (contribution to professional representation costs for the preliminary determination)
- HFG's cross-application for costs: None ordered
- No costs ordered on a solicitor-client or elevated basis

Applicant: Jeanette Go (employee)
Respondent: Point Limited (employer)

Applicant: Pam Greenlee, advocate
Respondent: Danny Gelb, advocate

Jeanette Go, an Estimator employed by Point Limited, was made redundant in October 2024 following a restructuring of the Estimation Department. Point Limited conceded the redundancy process was flawed — principally in failing to disclose selection criteria, interviewing only Ms Go among the team, and issuing a dismissal letter prepared before the final consultation meeting had concluded. The Authority awarded $18,000 compensation for unjustifiable dismissal and disadvantage, plus four weeks' lost wages of $5,769.23, but declined to impose penalties given Point Limited's early acknowledgment of the process failures.

Ms Go was employed as an Estimator from 2019, initially by Tamaki Building Supplies Limited, which was subsequently acquired and restructured so that Point Limited became her employer. She was based in East Tamaki while the rest of her team was based in Avondale. From late 2023 and through 2024, incoming plans for estimation declined significantly due to the economic climate, and various measures were taken to manage reduced workload. On 3 October 2024, management initiated a formal restructuring consultation, with Ms Go being the only team member to provide feedback; she proposed a reduced-hours arrangement across the team as an alternative to redundancy. Two consultation meetings were held (15 and 17 October 2024), but the dismissal letter dated 17 October had already been prepared and signed before the second meeting concluded, and the selection criteria applied had never been disclosed to any team member. Ms Go's employment ended on 17 October 2024. Point Limited conceded at an early stage that the process was flawed, so the investigation focused solely on the quantum of compensation and lost wages.

1. Quantum of Compensation: What amount of compensation is appropriate for unjustifiable dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage arising from the flawed redundancy process under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act? — (Established)
2. Quantum of Lost Wages: What amount of lost wages is appropriate under s 124 of the Act, given that the underlying redundancy was genuine but the process was flawed? — (Partially established)
3. Penalties: Whether penalties should be imposed on Point Limited for breaches of its duties under the Act? — (Dismissed)
4. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded and, if so, in what amount? — (Conditional/Reserved)

1. Quantum of Compensation: The Authority applied s 123(1)(c)(i), which permits compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings. The Authority accepted that the redundancy had a genuine business rationale (declining workload acknowledged even by Ms Go), but found significant process failures: non-disclosure of selection criteria, no interviews of other team members, failure to properly consider the reduced-hours proposal (partly because Mr Aro misunderstood it), failure to discuss redeployment, and a pre-prepared dismissal letter. The Authority accepted evidence from Ms Go and her sister that she suffered ongoing stress, sleep difficulties, social withdrawal, and required medication, while noting that the litigation process itself also contributed to her stress. Weighing those factors, the Authority awarded $18,000.
2. Quantum of Lost Wages: The Authority noted that lost wages are not typically awarded in a genuine redundancy situation. However, because the hasty process meant dismissal may have been delayed had a proper process been followed — though it would not have changed the ultimate outcome — a modest award was warranted. The Authority awarded four weeks' gross salary ($75,000 ÷ 52 × 4 = $5,769.23), declining Ms Go's claim for 19 months of lost wages.
3. Penalties: The Authority noted that penalties are punitive in nature and are not awarded to remedy the applicant's loss. Because Point Limited acknowledged the process failures at an early stage and Ms Go had been compensated, the Authority concluded it was not appropriate to impose penalties in these circumstances.
4. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unable to do so, Ms Go could file a costs memorandum within 14 days of the determination's issue, with Point Limited having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual notional daily rate unless particular circumstances required adjustment, citing PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135.

The claim was partially upheld: compensation and a modest lost wages award were granted, but penalties were declined and costs were reserved.

- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, distress): $18,000.00 (under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act)
- Lost wages: $5,769.23 gross (four weeks at $75,000 per annum, under s 124 of the Act)
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs: Reserved
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Dianne Olive Kelso (employee)
Respondent: Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (employer)

Applicant: Elizabeth Lambert, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: Anne Wilson, counsel (firm not stated)

This is a costs determination following a preliminary finding on 3 March 2026 that Ms Kelso had failed to raise her personal grievance within the 90-day statutory timeframe and had not established exceptional grounds to extend it. Health New Zealand sought $3,000 in costs as the wholly successful party. The Authority awarded a modest contribution of $1,500, reflecting the straightforward nature of the proceeding and the fact that costs cannot be used as punishment.

In the preliminary determination ([2026] NZERA 124), the Authority found Ms Kelso had not raised her personal grievance within the 90-day period required by s 114(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and had not established exceptional grounds under s 114(4) to allow the matter to proceed out of time. The investigation was conducted entirely on the papers by way of written submissions, with no investigation meeting held. Health New Zealand, as the wholly successful party, applied for a costs contribution of $3,000. Ms Kelso's advocate opposed, arguing that novel Covid-era issues warranted costs lying where they fall, relying on GF v OO [2022] NZEmpC 292/2021.

1. Costs Award: Whether costs should be awarded to Health New Zealand as the successful party, and if so, in what amount — [Established]
2. Costs Lie Where They Fall: Whether the circumstances (including the Covid-era novel issues argument) justified departing from the default position that costs follow the event — [Dismissed]

1. Costs Award: The Authority confirmed its discretion to award costs under s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Act, guided by the principles in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, including that costs are not punitive and must be consistent with the Authority's equity and good conscience jurisdiction. Applying the notional daily rate framework (currently $4,500 for the first day), the Authority noted the matter was handled entirely on the papers and was relatively straightforward. The Authority acknowledged some additional costs were incurred by HNZ in defending the application, including responding to an element (breach of contract) that was well-settled as unfeasible, but found only a modest award of $1,500 was warranted in all the circumstances.
2. Costs Lie Where They Fall: Ms Kelso's advocate argued by analogy with GF v OO that novel Covid-era issues should cause costs to lie where they fall. The Authority rejected this argument, finding no parallel with that case, which concerned a substantive matter. Nothing novel arose in the Authority's consideration of whether the personal grievance should proceed out of time, so no basis existed to depart from the default position that costs follow the event.

The application for costs was partially upheld; Ms Kelso was ordered to pay $1,500 as a contribution to Health New Zealand's costs.

Costs: $1,500 payable by Ms Kelso to Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora within 28 days of the determination being issued. No other remedies ordered.

Applicant: Kyle Horsefield (employee)
Respondent: Eurocars Limited t/a Oceanic Cars and Car4Every1 (employer)

Applicant: Adrian Plunket, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: John Wood, advocate (firm not stated)

Kyle Horsefield was employed as a Sales Representative by Eurocars Limited for approximately nine days before being summarily dismissed by text message on 21 November 2024. The central dispute was whether he was a permanent or casual employee, and whether his dismissal was justified. The Authority found he was a permanent employee, his dismissal was both procedurally and substantively unjustified, and ordered Eurocars to pay $12,345 in combined lost remuneration and distress compensation.

Mr Horsefield commenced employment with Eurocars on 12 November 2024, having responded to a job advertisement and signed a casual individual employment agreement (IEA). He worked for approximately six days before being dismissed by text on 21 November 2024, which stated the company needed someone who came to work on time and that his "casual employment" was terminated. During his brief employment, Mr Horsefield attended pre-arranged physio appointments (recovering from a broken ankle), a family lawyer appointment about his grandmother's will, and had one day off to support his stepfather in hospital — all of which had been disclosed to and approved by Eurocars. Mr Horsefield contended he was a permanent employee who had been unjustifiably dismissed, while Eurocars argued he was a casual worker who had simply not been offered further work. No witness appeared for Eurocars at the investigation meeting as the sole director was overseas on the day, and his written statement was untested and unsworn. The Authority proceeded with the investigation meeting in Eurocars' absence, noting the respondent had known about the hearing date for nearly six months.

1. Signed Employment Agreement: Whether Mr Horsefield had a signed written IEA — [Partially established]
2. Terms and Conditions: What were the terms and conditions of Mr Horsefield's employment, in the absence of a signed IEA — [Established]
3. Permanent vs Casual Status: Whether Mr Horsefield was a permanent or casual employee — [Established (permanent)]
4. Good Faith Breach (pre-dismissal): Whether Eurocars breached its s 4 good faith obligations by failing to clearly communicate the nature and terms of the employment relationship — [Established]
5. Employment Agreement Breach: Whether Eurocars breached clause 18.1 of the IEA by failing to give one hour's notice or pay in lieu before ending employment — [Established]
6. Penalty for Good Faith Breach: Whether a penalty should be imposed for the good faith breach — [Dismissed (withdrawn by applicant)]
7. Penalty for Employment Agreement Breach: Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of the IEA — [Dismissed]
8. 90-Day Time Limit: Whether Mr Horsefield raised his unjustified dismissal grievance within the 90-day limit under s 114(1) of the Act — [Established]
9. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Mr Horsefield's summary dismissal was justified under the s 103A(2) test — [Established (unjustified)]
10. Remedies: What remedies should be awarded for the unjustified dismissal — [Established]
11. Contributory Conduct: Whether remedies should be reduced under s 124 due to Mr Horsefield's contributory conduct — [Dismissed]
12. Costs: What costs and disbursements should be awarded — [Reserved]

1. Signed Employment Agreement: Despite specific requests, only an unsigned IEA was produced. The Authority could not confirm a signed version existed but proceeded on the basis the document recorded agreed terms.
2. Terms and Conditions: Mr Horsefield gave uncontested evidence that he printed, signed, and delivered the IEA before his first day of work on 12 November 2024. The Authority was satisfied the unsigned IEA lodged reflected the agreed terms and conditions of employment.
3. Permanent vs Casual Status: The Authority applied the principle that attaching a "casual" label does not determine the true nature of the relationship; the totality of the circumstances must be assessed. Eurocars' conduct — expecting Mr Horsefield to attend work at designated times, terminating because he was "unreliable," and Mr Durgesh's own statement about intending to employ him through November and December 2024 — demonstrated mutual ongoing obligations. The Authority found there was a permanent employment relationship with no fixed hours, on an "as required" basis.
4. Good Faith Breach (pre-dismissal): Under s 4 of the Act, employers must be responsive, communicative, and not mislead employees. Eurocars failed to clearly communicate that Mr Horsefield's role was limited to a specific time period, failed to specify working days and hours, and failed to inform him his pre-existing appointments would be problematic — all in breach of s 4 good faith obligations.
5. Employment Agreement Breach: Clause 18.1 of the IEA required one hour's notice or one hour's pay in lieu before termination. The text message dismissal on 21 November 2024 was an immediate, unilateral ending of employment without notice or payment, constituting a clear breach of clause 18.1.
6. Penalty for Good Faith Breach: Mr Horsefield withdrew this claim during the investigation meeting, so it was not pursued or determined.
7. Penalty for Employment Agreement Breach: The Authority noted that the breach of the IEA (failure to give notice) formed part of the dismissal grievance and was addressed within that claim. The specific facts did not warrant imposition of a penalty, so this claim was dismissed.
8. 90-Day Time Limit: Mr Horsefield raised his grievance within eight days of dismissal, well within the 90-day statutory requirement under s 114(1). No issue arose on this point.
9. Unjustified Dismissal: Applying the s 103A(2) objective test, the Authority assessed whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as Eurocars did. Eurocars breached all four procedural fairness obligations in s 103A(3) — it failed to investigate, failed to raise concerns, failed to give Mr Horsefield an opportunity to respond, and failed to consider any response before dismissing him. Substantively, Mr Horsefield had only worked six days, had disclosed his appointments beforehand, had always received approval to attend them, and had no warnings or prior concerns raised with him. Dismissal for attendance without any graduated warning process was not substantively justified. The Authority noted s 103A(5) did not apply because the procedural failures were significant, not minor.
10. Remedies: Lost remuneration was calculated under s 128(2) based on three working days per week at 7.5 hours per day (per Mr Durgesh's own evidence), at $23.50 per hour = $528.75 per week × 12 weeks = $6,345.00 gross, reduced by one week of temporary work actually obtained. Hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) was assessed at $6,000.00, having regard to the shock, hurt, and distress evidenced by Mr Horsefield and supported by his mother's affidavit. Eurocars' argument that ACC payments negated lost remuneration was rejected — these are separate matters.
11. Contributory Conduct: Under s 124, the Authority assessed whether Mr Horsefield's conduct contributed to the situation. It found no blameworthy conduct: he had disclosed his appointments before employment began, received approval each time, was never warned, and was unaware Eurocars viewed his attendance as a problem. No reduction was applied.
12. Costs: The Authority noted Mr Horsefield as the successful party is entitled to a contribution toward legal costs. The notional starting point for a half-day hearing is $2,250.00. Parties were encouraged to resolve costs by agreement; if not, submissions are to be filed within specified timeframes.

The claim was substantially upheld: Mr Horsefield's unjustified dismissal grievance succeeded, the employment agreement breach was established, the penalty claim was dismissed, and no contributory reduction was applied.

- Lost wages: $6,345.00 gross (12 weeks × $528.75/week under s 128(2))
- Hurt/humiliation/distress: $6,000.00 (under s 123(1)(c)(i), no deductions)
- Total ordered: $12,345.00, payable within 28 days
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Penalties: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved (parties to resolve by agreement based on $2,250.00 notional starting point; failing agreement, submissions to be filed)

Applicant: Layth Abu-Laban (employee)
Respondent: Everest Corporation Limited (employer, trading as Direct Tyres & Auto)

Applicant: Danny Gelb, advocate
Respondent: Abdullah Khan (director, self-represented)

Layth Abu-Laban, an apprentice automotive technician employed by Everest Corporation Limited for approximately one year, was dismissed at a meeting on 11 June 2025 without any prior notice of the allegations against him or opportunity to respond. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified and rejected all of ECL's counter-allegations (misuse of property, poor workmanship, solicitation). Mr Abu-Laban was awarded $15,000 in compensation for hurt and humiliation and $13,258 in lost wages, with no reduction for contributory conduct.

Mr Abu-Laban commenced permanent employment as an automotive technician with ECL on 10 June 2024. ECL is a small business operated by director Abdullah Khan. On 11 June 2025, Mr Khan called Mr Abu-Laban to a meeting and informed him his employment was ending that same day, having allegedly given informal verbal notice approximately five weeks earlier that his "contract would not be renewed." Mr Abu-Laban was not informed of the meeting's purpose in advance, was not told of any allegations against him, and was not given any opportunity to respond. ECL's stated reasons for dismissal were loss of trust and confidence arising from alleged solicitation of customers, promotion of a personal business on Facebook, and poor workmanship. Mr Abu-Laban denied all allegations and filed a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal. ECL cross-filed its own application alleging Mr Abu-Laban breached good faith obligations and employment agreement clauses.

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether ECL's decision to dismiss Mr Abu-Laban and the manner in which it did so met the standard of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances, per s 103A of the Act — [Established]
2. S 130(2) Wages/Time Record Breach: Whether ECL failed to comply with s 130(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by not providing wages and time records upon request, and whether a penalty should be imposed — [Dismissed]
3. S 82(2) Holidays Act Record Breach: Whether ECL failed to comply with s 82(2) of the Holidays Act 2003 by not providing holiday and leave records upon request, and whether a penalty should be imposed — [Dismissed]
4. S 4 Good Faith Breach (employee): Whether Mr Abu-Laban breached s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to act in good faith toward ECL, and whether a penalty should be imposed — [Dismissed]
5. Employment Agreement Breaches: Whether Mr Abu-Laban breached clauses in his individual employment agreement relating to misuse of company property, poor workmanship, and solicitation of customers — [Dismissed]
6. Penalties/Damages Against Employee: Whether penalties and/or damages should be awarded in favour of ECL arising from Mr Abu-Laban's alleged employment agreement breaches — [Dismissed]
7. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Whether Mr Abu-Laban is entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings — [Established]
8. Lost Remuneration (s 128(2)): Whether Mr Abu-Laban is entitled to reimbursement of lost wages — [Established]
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction (s 124): Whether any remedy should be reduced due to Mr Abu-Laban's contribution to the circumstances giving rise to the grievance — [Dismissed]
10. Costs: Whether either party is entitled to an award of costs — [Not reached]

1. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A test — whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as ECL did. The Authority found ECL failed on all four s 103A(3) limbs: it did not investigate allegations, did not raise concerns with Mr Abu-Laban, did not give him a reasonable opportunity to respond, and did not genuinely consider any explanation. Mr Abu-Laban's employment was permanent (not fixed-term as ECL appeared to believe), and ECL provided no evidence in support of its allegations. Relying on Angus v Ports of Auckland Limited [2011] NZEmpC 160, the Authority found the dismissal unjustified.
2. S 130(2) Wages/Time Record Breach: Mr Abu-Laban sent a text message to Mr Khan about payment of wages. The Authority was not satisfied Mr Khan understood this to be a formal request for his wages and time record under s 130(2). ECL had also provided a pay item transaction report. The claim was not established.
3. S 82(2) Holidays Act Record Breach: The Authority found there was insufficient evidence that Mr Abu-Laban had actually requested his holiday and leave record from ECL. The claim was not established.
4. S 4 Good Faith Breach (employee): The Authority found there was no evidence before it to support ECL's claim that Mr Abu-Laban breached his good faith obligations under s 4. ECL's penalty application was declined.
5. Employment Agreement Breaches: The Authority examined each allegation in turn. ECL's allegations of poor workmanship were not substantiated — where damage occurred (e.g., the steering wheel), ECL's own modified tools were a contributing cause. The tyre blowout was caused by ECL-fitted tyres. No evidence supported the solicitation allegation; Mr Abu-Laban was an apprentice also studying at Unitec and did not operate his own business. The allegation of theft (removing brake parts) was found to be Mr Abu-Laban demonstrating worn brakes to Mr Khan. None of ECL's allegations were substantiated.
6. Penalties/Damages Against Employee: Having found no breaches of the employment agreement or s 4, the Authority declined all penalty and damages claims by ECL.
7. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Applying the principle from Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield and Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited [2023] NZEmpC 179, the Authority assessed the nature and extent of harm to Mr Abu-Laban. The dismissal caused him significant shock, embarrassment, stress, and mental harm, and prevented him from continuing his Unitec apprenticeship study. Considering comparable cases (Macfarlane v Lavros Lodge Ltd), the Authority awarded $15,000.
8. Lost Remuneration (s 128(2)): The Authority noted the obligation to award the lesser of actual lost remuneration or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Mr Abu-Laban had taken reasonable mitigation steps and earned $2,888 from casual electrical work in the three months following dismissal. Three months' remuneration was calculated at $16,146 (implied), less $2,888 earned, resulting in an award of $13,258.
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction (s 124): The Authority found Mr Abu-Laban did not contribute to the circumstances giving rise to the personal grievance, having rejected all of ECL's allegations. No reduction was applied.
10. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Abu-Laban may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with ECL having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The personal grievance claim was upheld in full; all of ECL's counter-claims were dismissed.

- Compensation (hurt/humiliation/injury to feelings, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $15,000
- Lost wages (s 128(2)): $13,258 (gross) (being three months' ordinary time remuneration less $2,888 earned in mitigation)
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Penalties against ECL: None ordered
- Penalties/damages against Mr Abu-Laban: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved
- All payments to be made within 28 days of the determination date (12 May 2026)

Applicant: Macfarlane Seymour (employee)
Respondent: Hilton Haulage Limited (employer)

Applicant: Itania Nikolai, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: David Traylor, counsel (firm not stated)

Macfarlane Seymour, a milk tanker driver employed by Hilton Haulage Limited, claimed unjustified disadvantage and breach of good faith arising from a failed annual refresher driving assessment in July 2025 and Hilton's subsequent handling of the matter, including a proposed performance improvement plan and requirement to drive accompanied. The Authority found that Hilton was contractually entitled to conduct the assessment and require retraining, that the assessment outcome was supported by evidence, and that the process steps taken were reasonable. On the evidence available (noting the determination was truncated), the claims appear to have been dismissed.

Mr Seymour was employed by Hilton Haulage Limited as a milk tanker driver based at Tokoroa from 15 July 2025 (employment agreement issued 17 June 2024), with Hilton operating a large fleet across 17 North Island locations. From around Christmas 2024, supervisors noted a marked decline in Mr Seymour's driving speed, with informal conversations between him and Operations Manager Hayden Gardiner failing to resolve concerns. On 11 July 2025, Lead Driver Nick Adams conducted Mr Seymour's annual refresher driving assessment and assessed him as not meeting the required standard due to consistently low and inconsistent speeds. Following the failed assessment, Hilton required Mr Seymour to drive accompanied until retraining and reassessment were completed, proposed a draft performance improvement plan, and repeatedly sought to meet with Mr Seymour, but those efforts were frustrated by Mr Seymour's refusal to meet without prior information disclosure and his subsequent sick leave from 7 August 2025. Mr Seymour raised a personal grievance (Statement of Problem lodged 14 October 2025), issued a provisional improvement notice under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (cancelled by WorkSafe), and declined mediation until directed by the Authority.

1. Unjustified Disadvantage – Annual Assessment: Whether Hilton's conduct of the annual refresher driving assessment on 11 July 2025 constituted an unjustifiable action under s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
2. Unjustified Disadvantage – Drive-Accompanied Requirement: Whether requiring Mr Seymour to drive accompanied following the failed assessment unjustifiably disadvantaged him — [Dismissed]
3. Unjustified Disadvantage – Assessment Validity: Whether alleged procedural deficiencies in the assessment (Adams not observing pre-start check, not completing the drive) invalidated the assessment and constituted unjustifiable disadvantage — [Dismissed]
4. Unjustified Disadvantage – Lack of Camera Footage: Whether the unavailability of ERoad camera footage from the assessment day unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Seymour — [Dismissed]
5. Unjustified Disadvantage – PIP Process: Whether Hilton's proposal and handling of the draft performance improvement plan constituted unjustifiable disadvantage — [Dismissed]
6. Unjustified Disadvantage – Effect on Terms and Conditions: Whether any of Hilton's actions adversely affected Mr Seymour's terms and conditions of employment to his disadvantage — [Dismissed]
7. Breach of Good Faith: Whether Hilton breached the duty of good faith owed to Mr Seymour under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Status not determinable from truncated text; likely dismissed based on trajectory of reasoning]

1. Unjustified Disadvantage – Annual Assessment: The Authority applied the two-part test under s 103(1)(b): an unjustifiable employer action that affects the employee's terms and conditions to their disadvantage. It found that Hilton was contractually entitled to conduct annual refresher assessments under the Dairy Introduction Procedures Manual and the Employment Agreement. The assessment was conducted by an experienced and qualified Lead Driver and the outcome was supported by GPS data showing consistently below-limit speeds. The assessment was not an unjustifiable action.
2. Unjustified Disadvantage – Drive-Accompanied Requirement: The Authority found that the requirement to drive accompanied was expressly provided for in the Dairy Introduction Procedures Manual as a consequence of failing an assessment. Drive-alongs were not unusual at Hilton, especially in quieter seasons, and Mr Seymour had not objected on previous occasions. There was no change to his pay or duties, and no disciplinary process was initiated.
3. Unjustified Disadvantage – Assessment Validity: Mr Seymour argued that Adams not observing the pre-start check and leaving before the drive concluded invalidated the assessment. The Authority rejected this, finding those matters did not invalidate the driving component of the assessment, which had proceeded sufficiently for Adams to form a view.
4. Unjustified Disadvantage – Lack of Camera Footage: The Authority found that the ERoad footage was automatically overwritten within 72 hours due to the delay between the assessment (11 July) and it being entered into Zambion and acted upon (14 July). However, GPS data was made available to Mr Seymour, and Hilton offered a fresh assessment with footage. The Authority was not persuaded Mr Seymour was unjustifiably disadvantaged; if any defect existed, it was minor and did not result in unfair treatment, per s 103A(5).
5. Unjustified Disadvantage – PIP Process: The Authority found the draft PIP was a reasonable response to a genuine safety concern. It was circulated as a draft only, with Mr Seymour invited to provide feedback before finalisation. Hilton made repeated efforts to meet with Mr Seymour to discuss it, which were frustrated by Mr Seymour's refusal to meet. The process was not unjustifiable.
6. Unjustified Disadvantage – Effect on Terms and Conditions: The Authority found the failed assessment had no impact on Mr Seymour's rate of pay or duties. The accompanied driving requirement was not unusual and carried no adverse connotation. Mr Conway denied publicly announcing Mr Seymour was "stood down," and the Authority noted Mr Seymour was never suspended. No disadvantage to terms and conditions was established.
7. Breach of Good Faith: The determination was truncated before the Authority's full analysis and conclusion on the good faith claim under s 4 of the Act. Based on the factual findings and trajectory of the reasoning — including that Hilton responded to information requests, sought meetings, proposed mediation, and acted consistently with its contractual rights — the claim appears to have been dismissed, but this cannot be confirmed from the available text.

The claim of unjustified disadvantage was dismissed in full on the evidence available; the good faith claim's final resolution could not be confirmed due to truncation of the determination, though the reasoning strongly pointed to dismissal.

None ordered (on the basis of the available text; the determination was truncated and any remedy section or costs orders were not visible).

Applicant: Kelvin Lewis Taylor (worker/claimant)
Respondent: Destro Limited (marketing agency)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Matthew Hutcheson and Grace Guy (counsel for Respondent)

Mr Taylor claimed he was a casual employee of Destro, a marketing agency that engaged Brand Ambassadors for experiential marketing campaigns, and brought claims including breach of contract, defamation, breach of the Worker Protection (Migrant and Other Employees) Act 2023, and breach of the Human Rights Act 1993. The Authority determined, on the papers, that Mr Taylor was an independent contractor and not an employee, applying the tests from Bryson v Three Foot Six and the Supreme Court's decision in Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc. As there was no employment relationship, the Authority had no jurisdiction over any of Mr Taylor's claims, and costs were reserved pending agreement or further submissions.

Mr Taylor signed a Brand Ambassador Services Agreement with Destro on 17 November 2024, described explicitly as an independent contractor arrangement. He worked on six campaigns totalling 30.25 hours between November 2024 and April 2025, choosing which campaigns to accept, invoicing Destro for completed work, and paying his own ACC levies and additional tax. The dispute arose when Mr Taylor sought to be put forward as host of a YouTube dating show (The Dating Void) run by Destro's pro bono client, The Attention Seeker, which declined him based on feedback from his earlier unpaid appearance on that show. Mr Taylor alleged Destro mishandled and unlawfully communicated that negative feedback, leading him to raise claims of breach of contract, defamation, breach of worker protection legislation, and racial and gender discrimination. Destro denied any employment relationship existed and challenged the Authority's jurisdiction. The parties agreed the threshold jurisdiction issue — whether an employment relationship existed — should be determined on the papers before any substantive claims were progressed.

1. Employment Relationship: Whether the parties were in an employment relationship under s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, applying the real nature of the relationship test from Bryson v Three Foot Six and Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc — (Dismissed)
2. Defamation Jurisdiction: Whether the Authority had jurisdiction over Mr Taylor's defamation claim, contingent on finding an employment relationship — (Not reached)
3. Worker Protection Act Jurisdiction: Whether the Authority had jurisdiction over Mr Taylor's claim under the Worker Protection (Migrant and Other Employees) Act 2023, contingent on finding an employment relationship — (Not reached)
4. Human Rights Act Jurisdiction: Whether the Authority had jurisdiction over Mr Taylor's racial and gender discrimination claims under the Human Rights Act 1993, contingent on finding an employment relationship — (Not reached)
5. Costs: What costs and disbursements should be awarded to the successful party — (Conditional/deferred)

1. Employment Relationship: The Authority applied the two-step inquiry confirmed in Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc — first examining the contractual terms, then applying the common law control, integration, and fundamental/economic reality tests. The Agreement expressly and repeatedly described the arrangement as independent contracting, there was no guaranteed work, no minimum hours, and Mr Taylor was free to work for competitors. In practice, the parties operated consistently with those terms: Mr Taylor chose which campaigns to accept, used his own clothing, invoiced Destro, bore his own tax obligations beyond withholding tax, and was never subject to discipline or performance management. All three common law tests indicated an independent contractor arrangement. An administrative error by Destro in labelling tax deductions as "PAYE" on payslips was noted but did not override the overwhelming weight of evidence. The Authority concluded Mr Taylor had not established on the balance of probabilities that he was employed by Destro, and therefore had no jurisdiction over his claims.
2. Defamation Jurisdiction: Not reached, because no employment relationship was found to exist, removing the jurisdictional foundation for this claim.
3. Worker Protection Act Jurisdiction: Not reached, for the same reason — the absence of an employment relationship deprived the Authority of jurisdiction.
4. Human Rights Act Jurisdiction: Not reached, again because the employment relationship threshold was not met.
5. Costs: Destro, as the successful party, is entitled to a contribution toward its legal costs. The matter was treated as a half-day investigation, setting a notional tariff of $2,250. The parties were encouraged to agree costs; if not resolved, Destro has 28 days to file costs submissions and Mr Taylor has 14 days to reply.

The claim was dismissed in full — no employment relationship was established and the Authority had no jurisdiction over any of Mr Taylor's claims.

None ordered on the merits. Costs: notional starting tariff set at $2,250 (half-day rate), with the final costs award reserved pending agreement between the parties or further submissions from both parties.

Applicant: Dongyan Lin aka Chloe Lin (employee)
Respondent: Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent/employer); Yook Insulation Limited (Second Respondent/employer); Yanfen Wang (Third Respondent/director)

Applicant: John Wood, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: First Respondent not represented; Yanfen Wang for Second Respondent and appearing in person

Dongyan Lin, an office administrator, worked for two closely associated insulation companies — Yoke and then Yook — from March 2023 to May 2024. Neither company remitted PAYE deductions from her wages to Inland Revenue, and Yook later misclassified her as a self-employed contractor, causing her significant personal and financial harm. The Authority upheld her unjustified disadvantage personal grievance and ordered repayment of unremitted PAYE amounts totalling $6,724.70 plus $8,000 compensation, with personal liability attaching to director Yanfen Wang if the companies cannot pay.

Ms Lin was employed by Yoke Insulation Limited from 20 March 2023, initially performing office administration including calculating her own wages and PAYE. From 24 October 2023, Yook Insulation Limited (a closely associated company controlled by Ms Wang and her domestic partner Mr Zhang) began paying her wages and, the Authority found, became her employer. Neither company remitted PAYE to Inland Revenue throughout her employment. In January 2024, Ms Lin discovered the problem when checking her IR account in connection with a property purchase and raised it with Ms Wang, who did not resolve it. Near the end of her employment, an arrangement was made involving an accountant that resulted in Ms Lin being misclassified by IR as a contractor. Ms Lin resigned on 27 April 2024 (last day 24 May 2024), and her advocate raised a personal grievance in June 2024 requesting records, which were not provided. A preliminary determination had already established that Ms Lin's relationship with the respondent companies was one of employment.

1. Identity of Employer: Whether Ms Lin's employer changed from Yoke to Yook from October 2023, or remained Yoke throughout — [Established]
2. WPA s 12A Breach (Premium): Whether the companies breached s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 by retaining PAYE deductions instead of remitting them to IR — [Established]
3. WPA s 4 Breach (Unlawful Deduction): Whether the companies breached s 4 of the WPA by deducting wages without lawful purpose — [Established]
4. Monies Owed: What PAYE amounts are owed to Ms Lin by Yoke and Yook respectively — [Established]
5. Wang — Person Involved / Leave to Recover: Whether Yanfen Wang was a person involved in the employment standards breaches under s 142W of the Act, such that leave should be granted to recover amounts from her personally — [Established]
6. Employment Agreement Breach: Whether the companies breached Ms Lin's employment agreement (and whether Ms Wang aided or abetted such breaches) — [Dismissed]
7. Failure to Provide Records: Whether the companies failed to supply wages, time, and holiday and leave records upon request — [Established (factual finding only; no separate penalty pursued)]
8. Penalties on Companies: Whether penalties should be imposed on the respondent companies under s 133A of the Act for employment standards breaches — [Dismissed]
9. Unjustified Disadvantage Grievance: Whether Ms Lin has a personal grievance under s 103(1)(b) of the Act arising from the failure to remit PAYE and misclassification as a contractor — [Established]
10. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Whether Ms Lin should receive compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings, and whether contribution applies under s 124 — [Established; contribution not applied]

1. Identity of Employer: The Authority noted that while the written employment agreement named Yoke, and payment of wages alone is not conclusive of employment, the close association of the two companies, Yook taking on Yoke's responsibilities before its liquidation, and the fact that Yook paid Ms Lin's wages from 24 October 2023, together indicated a change of employer. The Authority preferred Ms Lin's evidence on this point. Finding: Yoke was employer from 20 March 2023 to 23 October 2023; Yook from 24 October 2023 to 24 May 2024.
2. WPA s 12A Breach (Premium): Section 12A(2) of the WPA provides that where an employer receives money by way of deduction from wages (including PAYE) and does not remit it, the employee may recover it as a debt. The Authority found both companies received money by way of deduction from Ms Lin's wages that should have been paid to IR, constituting a clear breach of s 12A.
3. WPA s 4 Breach (Unlawful Deduction): Section 4 requires employers to pay the full amount of wages without deduction unless for a lawful purpose such as PAYE. The Authority found deductions were made but not remitted to IR and thus were not made for a lawful purpose. Both companies breached s 4.
4. Monies Owed: Ms Lin provided a detailed breakdown of wages paid and PAYE not remitted. Bank records corroborated the figures. The Authority accepted her calculations: Yoke owed $4,414.96 and Yook owed $2,309.74, both recoverable as debts.
5. Wang — Person Involved / Leave to Recover: The Authority was satisfied that Ms Wang exercised significant influence over the management and administration of Yoke and was a director of Yook. She was aware that PAYE was not being paid (Ms Lin had raised it directly with her) and had knowledge of the essential facts establishing the WPA contraventions. Under s 142W of the Act, Ms Wang was found to be a person directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in the breaches. Given Yoke's liquidation, leave was granted to recover the PAYE debt amounts directly from Ms Wang to the extent the companies could not pay.
6. Employment Agreement Breach: The Authority had not seen the written employment agreement and was not satisfied it could make a separate finding of breach under s 134 of the Act without sight of that document. The claim was therefore not established.
7. Failure to Provide Records: The Authority accepted that the absence of wages, time, and holiday and leave records when requested had made recovery of wages more difficult. No penalty was separately assessed for this issue as no penalty submissions were advanced specifically on it; the finding remained a factual one supporting other conclusions.
8. Penalties on Companies: The Authority declined to assess penalties under s 133A because Ms Lin's representative made no submissions addressing the relevant statutory factors. Without those submissions, the Authority was unwilling to embark on a penalty assessment.
9. Unjustified Disadvantage Grievance: Applying s 103(1)(b) and the s 103A justification test, the Authority asked whether the companies acted as alleged, whether that caused disadvantage, and whether it was unjustified. The Authority found the companies failed to remit PAYE throughout employment and caused Ms Lin to be misclassified as a contractor. This caused financial difficulty, contributed to her resignation, and breached employers' statutory duty. These actions clearly failed the fair-and-reasonable-employer standard. The grievance was established.
10. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Applying Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, the Authority assessed emotional harm including stress over a tax liability, inability to secure a home loan, ongoing IR correspondence, and inability to obtain visas for her parents. An award of $8,000 was appropriate, shared equally ($4,000 each) between Yoke and Yook. No contributory reduction applied under s 124: Ms Lin calculated wages and PAYE as required by her employers but was not responsible for ensuring the deductions were actually remitted to IR.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified disadvantage personal grievance and WPA breaches (ss 4 and 12A) were established; the employment agreement breach claim and penalty claims were dismissed; leave to recover from Ms Wang was granted.

- PAYE debt (Yoke): $4,414.96 payable to Ms Lin within 21 days (recoverable as a premium/unlawful deduction under WPA s 12A/s 11)
- Compensation (Yoke): $4,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 within 21 days
- PAYE debt (Yook): $2,309.74 payable to Ms Lin within 21 days
- Compensation (Yook): $4,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) within 21 days
- Total ordered: $14,724.70
- Contributory reduction: None applied (s 124 not engaged)
- Penalties: None ordered
- Personal liability (Ms Wang): Leave granted to recover the PAYE debt amounts ($4,414.96 from Yoke and $2,309.74 from Yook) directly from Yanfen Wang to the extent the companies are unable to pay
- Reinstatement: No
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; applicant may lodge memorandum within 28 days if not resolved

Applicant: Peter Saunders (employee)
Respondent: Service Foods Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (advocate previously withdrew; no submissions filed)
Respondent: Kirsty McDonald and Bridget Craig, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Saunders brought a series of claims against his former employer arising from an alleged assault by a co-worker in December 2022, including claims under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, the Crimes Act 1961, and in tort (battery and intentional infliction of emotional harm). A preliminary determination in March 2025 had already found that Mr Saunders had not raised any personal grievances within the 90-day statutory timeframe. This determination finds that the Authority has no jurisdiction to investigate any of the remaining claims, as they fall either outside the Authority's statutory powers or are attempts to re-litigate matters already determined.

Mr Saunders was employed by Service Foods Limited and in February 2023 alleged, during an unrelated disciplinary meeting, that he had been assaulted by a colleague in December 2022. Service Foods requested a written statement and CCTV review but Mr Saunders declined to provide the necessary information. The Authority's preliminary determination of 31 March 2025 ([2025] NZERA 184) found that no personal grievances had been raised within the statutory 90-day timeframe, a finding Mr Saunders did not challenge. Following a protracted procedural history — including multiple case management conferences, the withdrawal of his advocate on two occasions due to inability to contact Mr Saunders, and a sine die adjournment — the Authority ultimately directed an on-the-papers investigation into its jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Mr Saunders failed to file any evidence or submissions in response to the timetabled directions despite being given reasonable opportunity to do so.

1. Jurisdiction — Assault Claim: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Mr Saunders was assaulted by a co-worker, in the absence of a valid personal grievance — [Dismissed]
2. Jurisdiction — HSWA Adverse Conduct: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods engaged in adverse conduct under ss 88–90 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 — [Dismissed]
3. Jurisdiction — HSWA Notification Duty: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods breached its duty to notify WorkSafe under s 56 of the HSWA — [Dismissed]
4. Jurisdiction — Tort of Battery: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods is liable in tort for battery against Mr Saunders — [Dismissed]
5. Jurisdiction — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods is liable in tort for intentionally inflicting emotional harm on Mr Saunders — [Dismissed]
6. Costs: Whether any party is entitled to an award of costs — [Reserved]

1. Jurisdiction — Assault Claim: The Authority can make findings of assault when investigating a valid personal grievance (e.g. John Wright v Otira Stagecoach Hotel Limited [2024] NZERA 29), but it has no criminal jurisdiction to make orders under the Crimes Act 1961. Because the preliminary determination found that no personal grievance relating to the assault was raised within the 90-day timeframe under s 114 of the Act, and that finding was not challenged, there is no live personal grievance before the Authority. The Authority therefore has no jurisdiction to investigate this claim on a substantive basis, and makes no finding on the alleged assault.
2. Jurisdiction — HSWA Adverse Conduct: Sections 88 and 89 of the HSWA together create the elements for liability under s 90, which provides for conviction and a fine. The Authority has no jurisdiction to investigate or determine such a claim; it is a matter for the courts or WorkSafe under the HSWA's own enforcement regime. The claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
3. Jurisdiction — HSWA Notification Duty: Section 56 of the HSWA imposes a duty to notify WorkSafe of notifiable events, with a fine of up to $50,000 for breach. Enforcement of this provision lies outside the Authority's jurisdiction. The claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
4. Jurisdiction — Tort of Battery: Under s 161(1)(r) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority has exclusive jurisdiction over employment relationship problems generally but expressly excludes tort actions. The Supreme Court in FMV v TZB [2021] NZSC 102 held that where an employment relationship problem can be framed as a personal grievance or other claim under s 161(1)(a)–(qd), it must be brought that way and cannot be recast as a tort. Mr Saunders' battery claim was already brought as an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance and determined to be out of time; the tort exception in s 161(1)(r) cannot be used to circumvent the s 114 timeframe requirements. The Authority has no jurisdiction.
5. Jurisdiction — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm: This tort claim also arose from the alleged assault and could have been (and was) brought as a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage. Applying the same FMV v TZB principles, a claim capable of being brought as a personal grievance must be brought that way, and the tort exception does not permit circumvention of the s 114 timeframe. The Authority has no jurisdiction to investigate this claim.
6. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Service Foods may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Saunders having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff basis if required to determine costs.

All remaining claims were dismissed for want of jurisdiction, with costs reserved.

None ordered. Costs reserved — to be determined on the standard daily tariff basis if the parties cannot agree, with Service Foods able to file a costs memorandum within 28 days.

Applicant: ZZP (employee)
Respondent: The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (employer)

Applicant: Denis Asher, advocate
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel

ZZP, a long-serving IRD team leader, was dismissed on medical grounds in December 2024 following an extended absence due to major depression, burnout, and a late fibromyalgia diagnosis. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified on procedural grounds — specifically, that the decision-maker raised several concerns in the final dismissal letter that had never been put to ZZP for comment. Reinstatement was declined but compensation for hurt and humiliation of $18,750 (after a 25% contributory reduction) was ordered.

ZZP had been employed by IRD since March 2013 in a leadership role managing direct reports in a busy call centre environment. From March 2024, ZZP provided a series of medical certificates — ultimately ten — covering absences due to major depression, burnout, and a subsequently diagnosed fibromyalgia condition. A psychiatrist-recommended graduated return to work in October 2024 failed, partly attributed to side effects of changing antidepressant medication. By late November 2024, the psychiatrist and subsequently a psychotherapist both recommended a fresh return-to-work plan from January 2025, with the psychotherapist suggesting an even earlier start date of 6 January 2025. IRD proposed medical retirement on 29 November 2024 and, following a meeting on 4 December where ZZP had an opportunity to respond, issued its final dismissal letter on 16 December 2024. ZZP raised a personal grievance in February 2025, arguing the dismissal ignored recent positive medical evidence and that the decision-maker introduced new concerns in the final letter without giving ZZP an opportunity to respond.

1. Non-Publication Order: Whether ZZP's name and identifying details should be suppressed to protect psychological wellbeing and future employment prospects — [Established]
2. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether IRD's decision to dismiss ZZP on medical grounds satisfied the s 103A test of justification, assessed through the Lal v The Warehouse Ltd framework for medical incapacity dismissals — [Established]
3. Reasonable Opportunity to Recover: Whether IRD gave ZZP a reasonable opportunity to recover before dismissing — [Established (in IRD's favour)]
4. Fair and Reasonable Inquiry: Whether IRD undertook a fair and reasonable inquiry into ZZP's prognosis for return to work — [Partially established]
5. Fair Consideration Before Dismissal: Whether IRD fairly considered ZZP's position before terminating, specifically whether undisclosed concerns were raised and ZZP given an opportunity to respond — [Established (breach found)]
6. Reinstatement: Whether reinstatement to ZZP's previous role was practicable and reasonable under s 125(2) of the Act — [Dismissed]
7. Compensation (Hurt and Humiliation): Whether ZZP was entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) for hurt, humiliation, and loss of dignity — [Established]
8. Lost Wages: Whether ZZP was entitled to reimbursement of lost remuneration under s 128 of the Act — [Dismissed]
9. Contributory Conduct: Whether ZZP's own actions contributed to the grievance under s 124, warranting a reduction in remedies — [Established]
10. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded — [Reserved]

1. Non-Publication Order: Applying the two-step test from MW v Spiga [2024] NZEmpC 147, the Authority found: first, a real risk of specific adverse consequences (psychiatric relapse) if ZZP's identity were published; and second, that ZZP's mental health history was sufficiently serious to justify departing from the open justice principle. A permanent non-publication order was granted, including depersonalisation of witness names.
2. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A test through the Lal v The Warehouse Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 66 framework, recently reaffirmed in Sheridan v Pact Group [2026] NZEmpC 51. While IRD satisfied some elements of the framework, the Authority found that undisclosed concerns introduced in the final dismissal letter, without opportunity for ZZP to respond, rendered the overall process procedurally unfair and the dismissal unjustified.
3. Reasonable Opportunity to Recover: The Authority found IRD did give ZZP a reasonable opportunity to recover. ZZP was absent for 29 weeks, IRD followed medical advice, allowed flexible and part-time work arrangements, accommodated the graduated return-to-work plan, and acted consistently with its own Injury or Illness Rehabilitation Guidelines. The allegation that IRD pressured ZZP to return early was unsupported by independent evidence.
4. Fair and Reasonable Inquiry: IRD broadly satisfied this element by accepting ZZP's medical evidence at face value and following the psychiatrist's recommendations. However, the Authority noted that IRD was correct to treat the November and December medical certificates with caution — since they projected a future return-to-work date rather than confirming current fitness — given the failed October return. This element was therefore substantially met by IRD.
5. Fair Consideration Before Dismissal: The Authority found a significant procedural defect. The group lead's final dismissal letter introduced four new concerns — suspicion about the psychiatrist's sudden unavailability, ZZP's alleged alternative explanation for absence involving an unhappy home life, the discrepancy in proposed return dates between the psychiatrist and psychotherapist, and the group lead's perception that ZZP and supporters were telling him what he wanted to hear — none of which had been raised with ZZP for comment. The group lead himself acknowledged "there can always be learnings." The Authority held that a fair and reasonable employer would have raised these concerns before deciding, and the defect was significant rather than minor under s 103A(5).
6. Reinstatement: Although reinstatement is the primary remedy under s 125(2), the Authority declined it. The Authority was concerned that ZZP would be returning to a high-pressure call centre leadership role that would regularly test their mental resilience. No current independent medical evidence from a psychiatrist or psychotherapist was adduced to the Authority, leaving an evidential gap. Observations during the investigation meeting also raised concerns. The risks to ZZP's mental health were considered too great for reinstatement to be practicable and reasonable.
7. Compensation (Hurt and Humiliation): Applying s 123(1)(c)(i) and the revised compensation bands from GF v Comptroller of the New Zealand Customs Service [2023] NZEmpC 101, the Authority assessed ZZP's loss as warranting $25,000 — in the mid-range (band 2: $12K–$50K). The finding was supported by ZZP's lengthy service, the importance of the role to their identity, and the particular harm caused by offensive and unsubstantiated comments about their family life in the dismissal letter, made to a mentally and emotionally vulnerable employee. The award was then reduced for contribution (see below) to $18,750.
8. Lost Wages: No award was made under s 128. ZZP had already received one month's pay in lieu of notice plus 65 days' pay for medical retirement — exceeding a standard three-month award. ZZP found alternative employment in April 2025 but voluntarily left after four months, which the Authority characterised as a failure to mitigate loss for which IRD should not be liable.
9. Contributory Conduct: Under s 124, the Authority found ZZP contributed to the situation that gave rise to the grievance by choosing to return to work in October 2024 contrary to the earlier psychiatric advice recommending absence until 30 November. This decision led directly to the relapse that triggered the final dismissal process. A 25% reduction to all remedies was applied.
10. Costs: Reserved. Parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a timetable set for memoranda if agreement cannot be reached. The Authority signalled it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if required to determine costs.

The claim of unjustified dismissal was upheld on procedural grounds, with reinstatement declined and compensation awarded subject to a 25% contributory reduction; the lost wages claim was dismissed.

- Reinstatement: No
- Compensation (hurt and humiliation, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $25,000 gross, reduced by 25% contributory reduction to $18,750, payable within 28 days
- Lost wages: None ordered (failure to mitigate; payments already received exceeded standard award)
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs: Reserved

Applicant: HTV (employee)
Respondent: BSN (employer, first respondent) and CXV (director/shareholder, second respondent)

Applicant: Alison Bendall, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Blair Edwards, counsel for the Respondents

This is a preliminary determination addressing a discrete evidential dispute arising in an unjustified dismissal claim brought by HTV (an employee) against her employer BSN and its sole director CXV, who is also her estranged husband. The respondents sought to place before the Authority documents filed in related Family Court proceedings, including a lawyer-for-child report, an affidavit, and a temporary protection order. The Authority held that, absent leave from the Family Court, placing those documents before the Authority would constitute a prohibited publication under s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980, and refused to admit them.

HTV was employed by BSN, a limited liability company of which her husband CXV is the sole director. Both are shareholders in BSN. HTV and CXV are separated, and proceedings between them are ongoing in the Family Court. HTV has brought a personal grievance claim against BSN for unjustified dismissal and also seeks remedies against CXV personally. In the course of the employment proceedings, BSN and CXV sought to rely on three Family Court documents — a lawyer-for-child report, CXV's affidavit, and a temporary protection order — as evidence relevant to their defence. HTV opposed this on the basis that it would breach s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980, which restricts publication of Family Court proceedings without leave of that court. Neither respondent had obtained leave from the Family Court before seeking to rely on the documents. This preliminary matter was investigated on the papers by a separate Authority Member to preserve the integrity of the substantive investigation.

1. Admissibility of Family Court Documents: Whether documents filed in Family Court proceedings may be placed before the Authority without leave of the Family Court, or whether s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980 prohibits this — [Established (prohibition upheld)]
2. Scope of "Publication": Whether providing Family Court documents to the Authority (rather than a wide audience) constitutes "publication" within the meaning of s 11B — [Established (broad scope confirmed)]
3. Authority's Broad Evidence Power: Whether s 160(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (permitting the Authority to take into account evidence it thinks fit) overrides the prohibition in s 11B of the Family Court Act — [Dismissed]
4. Non-Publication Orders as Cure: Whether the Authority could receive the documents subject to a non-publication or confidentiality direction as an alternative to requiring Family Court leave — [Dismissed]
5. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded — [Reserved]

1. Admissibility of Family Court Documents: Section 11B(3) of the Family Court Act prohibits publication of reports of Family Court proceedings that include identifying information where a vulnerable person is a party, without leave of that court. A "vulnerable person" includes a person subject to a protection order under the Family Violence Act 2018. As both HTV and CXV are parties to a temporary protection order, a vulnerable person is plainly a party to the Family Court proceedings. No leave was sought or obtained. The Authority held that the Family Court documents were therefore not lawfully before it.
2. Scope of "Publication": The respondents argued that "publication" required dissemination to a broad audience. The Authority rejected this, relying on McNabb v Silver Fern Farms Ltd [2020] NZEmpC 101, where the Employment Court held that providing Family Court material to even one additional party (Silver Fern Farms, which was not a party to the Family Court proceedings) constituted prohibited publication. BSN, as a separate legal entity distinct from CXV, is not a party to the Family Court proceedings; providing the documents to it therefore amounts to publication. The Authority confirmed the same reasoning applies here.
3. Authority's Broad Evidence Power: The Authority acknowledged that s 160(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 permits it to consider a wide range of evidence. However, it held that this power cannot override a statutory prohibition in another Act of Parliament. To admit the documents without Family Court leave would constitute an offence under s 11B(6) of the Family Court Act, and relevance alone does not satisfy the leave requirement. Parliament has deliberately shielded Family Court proceedings and provided a specific mechanism — leave of the Family Court — for lifting that shield.
4. Non-Publication Orders as Cure: The respondents submitted that a non-publication order from the Authority could resolve any publication concern after the Authority had considered the material. The Authority dismissed this, reasoning that the Family Court is best placed to assess any leave application, and that an Authority non-publication order cannot retrospectively cure the offence of unauthorised publication that would occur upon receiving the documents.
5. Costs: No decision was made on costs; they were expressly reserved for later determination.

The preliminary claim was upheld in full in favour of HTV: the Family Court documents are not lawfully before the Authority, and costs are reserved.

None ordered at this stage (preliminary determination only). Costs reserved.

Applicant: Keenan Gonsalves (employee)
Respondent: Watercare Services Limited (employer)

Applicant: Jonathan Loh, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: John Rooney and Ngahuia Muru, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Gonsalves, a Water Supervisor with approximately eight years' service, was summarily dismissed after directing his relief crew to enter an excavation site following a power cable strike, without first confirming whether the power had been isolated by Vector. He raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal, seeking compensation for hurt and humiliation and lost remuneration. The Authority found the dismissal justified in both substance and process, and dismissed the grievance entirely.

Mr Gonsalves was employed by Watercare Services Limited as a Water Supervisor for approximately eight years. On 21–22 November 2024, Watercare crews were undertaking a hydrant replacement job at Gavin Street, Penrose, during which a power cable was accidentally struck at approximately 2.30am. Vector was notified and crew stood down pending Vector's repair. Mr Gonsalves arrived on site at approximately 7am, assessed the situation, obtained approval from a Water Operations Controller to cap the water main, and at approximately 7.45am directed the relief crew to enter the excavation and repair the water pipe — before Vector had confirmed the power was isolated. Watercare conducted a Human Factors Incident Investigation and a disciplinary process, during which Mr Gonsalves initially admitted making a "critical error in judgement" but later claimed at the final outcome meeting that he must have known the power had been isolated, a claim contradicted by crew member Andrew Fraser. Watercare dismissed Mr Gonsalves for summary dismissal on 20 December 2024 on grounds of gross negligence and serious misconduct; Mr Gonsalves raised a personal grievance on 22 January 2025.

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Watercare's decision to summarily dismiss Mr Gonsalves, and the process by which it did so, met the standard of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
2. Sufficiency of Investigation: Whether Watercare sufficiently investigated the allegations, in particular whether it adequately investigated the question of whether the power cable had been isolated before Mr Gonsalves directed the crew to re-enter the excavation — [Dismissed]
3. Procedural Defects — Timeframes: Whether the short timeframes imposed by Watercare during the disciplinary process prejudiced Mr Gonsalves' ability to respond meaningfully — [Dismissed]
4. Procedural Defects — Internal Policy Compliance: Whether Watercare complied with its own disciplinary policy requiring the Head of the department to be informed before any decision to dismiss was made — [Dismissed]
5. Serious Misconduct: Whether Mr Gonsalves' conduct was capable of amounting to serious misconduct justifying summary dismissal — [Established]
6. Consideration of Alternatives to Dismissal: Whether Watercare genuinely considered alternatives to dismissal — [Established]
7. Opportunity to Respond: Whether Watercare gave Mr Gonsalves a reasonable opportunity to respond to its concerns and genuinely considered his explanation — [Established]
8. Remedies (Compensation and Lost Remuneration): Whether Mr Gonsalves was entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) and/or lost remuneration under s 128 of the Act — [Not reached]
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction: Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act — [Not reached]
10. Costs: Whether either party was entitled to costs — [Reserved]

1. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A(2) test — whether the employer's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. Having considered all four statutory factors (investigation, raising concerns, opportunity to respond, and genuine consideration), the Authority found Watercare acted consistently with that standard in both substance and process. The dismissal was held to be justified and no personal grievance was established.
2. Sufficiency of Investigation: The Authority found that the key allegation was not whether the power had in fact been isolated, but whether Mr Gonsalves knew it had been isolated before directing the crew to enter the excavation. Watercare conducted a Human Factors Incident Investigation, gathered written statements, interviewed crew (including Mr Fraser), reviewed photographs, and followed up with Vector. Despite Mr Gonsalves' belated claim that he must have known the power was isolated, he could not identify who told him, and Mr Fraser directly contradicted him. The investigation was found to be sufficient.
3. Procedural Defects — Timeframes: The Authority found that Watercare put its concerns in writing, provided Mr Gonsalves with all relevant material (including the internal email he later relied on), allowed representation at each meeting, issued a preliminary outcome letter inviting further feedback, and adjourned the final outcome meeting to seek additional information. Adequate time was provided for preparation, and no procedural prejudice was established.
4. Procedural Defects — Internal Policy Compliance: The Authority accepted Ms Kingston's evidence that on 13 December 2024, Mr Richie Rameka (Head of Maintenance Service) was informed about the possibility of terminating Mr Gonsalves' employment. The Authority was satisfied the disciplinary policy requirement had been met, and found no breach.
5. Serious Misconduct: Applying the principles from Baillie v Oranga Tamariki, Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil and Hines v Eastland Port, the Authority confirmed that even a one-off act of negligence can constitute serious misconduct depending on circumstances. Mr Gonsalves was a supervisor in a safety-sensitive role who, with full knowledge of a cable strike and the standing instructions not to re-enter the excavation until Vector confirmed the all-clear, directed the crew to proceed without verifying that the power had been isolated. His own written admission acknowledged the severity of the conduct. The Authority found this amounted to serious misconduct that destroyed the trust and confidence essential to the employment relationship.
6. Consideration of Alternatives to Dismissal: Ms Kingston gave evidence that Watercare considered demotion, a final written warning, and a performance improvement process, but concluded that because a supervisor had exposed crew to the risk of significant harm through a serious safety breach, summary dismissal was the appropriate outcome. The Authority accepted this evidence without challenge.
7. Opportunity to Respond: Mr Gonsalves was given three written opportunities to explain his position, attended two meetings with representation, received a preliminary outcome letter, and had the final outcome meeting adjourned when he raised new information. Watercare took a flexible and open-minded approach including interviewing Mr Fraser and contacting Vector at Mr Gonsalves' request. The Authority found the requirements of s 103A(2)(b)–(d) were met.
8. Remedies: Not reached. The personal grievance was not established, so no remedies arose for consideration.
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction: Not reached. As no personal grievance was established, s 124 did not require consideration.
10. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Watercare may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days; Mr Gonsalves then has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in full; Mr Gonsalves failed to establish an unjustified dismissal personal grievance.

None ordered. Costs reserved.