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Applicant: Kelvin Lewis Taylor (worker/claimant)
Respondent: Destro Limited (marketing agency)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Matthew Hutcheson and Grace Guy (counsel for Respondent)

Mr Taylor claimed he was a casual employee of Destro, a marketing agency that engaged Brand Ambassadors for experiential marketing campaigns, and brought claims including breach of contract, defamation, breach of the Worker Protection (Migrant and Other Employees) Act 2023, and breach of the Human Rights Act 1993. The Authority determined, on the papers, that Mr Taylor was an independent contractor and not an employee, applying the tests from Bryson v Three Foot Six and the Supreme Court's decision in Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc. As there was no employment relationship, the Authority had no jurisdiction over any of Mr Taylor's claims, and costs were reserved pending agreement or further submissions.

Mr Taylor signed a Brand Ambassador Services Agreement with Destro on 17 November 2024, described explicitly as an independent contractor arrangement. He worked on six campaigns totalling 30.25 hours between November 2024 and April 2025, choosing which campaigns to accept, invoicing Destro for completed work, and paying his own ACC levies and additional tax. The dispute arose when Mr Taylor sought to be put forward as host of a YouTube dating show (The Dating Void) run by Destro's pro bono client, The Attention Seeker, which declined him based on feedback from his earlier unpaid appearance on that show. Mr Taylor alleged Destro mishandled and unlawfully communicated that negative feedback, leading him to raise claims of breach of contract, defamation, breach of worker protection legislation, and racial and gender discrimination. Destro denied any employment relationship existed and challenged the Authority's jurisdiction. The parties agreed the threshold jurisdiction issue — whether an employment relationship existed — should be determined on the papers before any substantive claims were progressed.

1. Employment Relationship: Whether the parties were in an employment relationship under s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, applying the real nature of the relationship test from Bryson v Three Foot Six and Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc — (Dismissed)
2. Defamation Jurisdiction: Whether the Authority had jurisdiction over Mr Taylor's defamation claim, contingent on finding an employment relationship — (Not reached)
3. Worker Protection Act Jurisdiction: Whether the Authority had jurisdiction over Mr Taylor's claim under the Worker Protection (Migrant and Other Employees) Act 2023, contingent on finding an employment relationship — (Not reached)
4. Human Rights Act Jurisdiction: Whether the Authority had jurisdiction over Mr Taylor's racial and gender discrimination claims under the Human Rights Act 1993, contingent on finding an employment relationship — (Not reached)
5. Costs: What costs and disbursements should be awarded to the successful party — (Conditional/deferred)

1. Employment Relationship: The Authority applied the two-step inquiry confirmed in Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc — first examining the contractual terms, then applying the common law control, integration, and fundamental/economic reality tests. The Agreement expressly and repeatedly described the arrangement as independent contracting, there was no guaranteed work, no minimum hours, and Mr Taylor was free to work for competitors. In practice, the parties operated consistently with those terms: Mr Taylor chose which campaigns to accept, used his own clothing, invoiced Destro, bore his own tax obligations beyond withholding tax, and was never subject to discipline or performance management. All three common law tests indicated an independent contractor arrangement. An administrative error by Destro in labelling tax deductions as "PAYE" on payslips was noted but did not override the overwhelming weight of evidence. The Authority concluded Mr Taylor had not established on the balance of probabilities that he was employed by Destro, and therefore had no jurisdiction over his claims.
2. Defamation Jurisdiction: Not reached, because no employment relationship was found to exist, removing the jurisdictional foundation for this claim.
3. Worker Protection Act Jurisdiction: Not reached, for the same reason — the absence of an employment relationship deprived the Authority of jurisdiction.
4. Human Rights Act Jurisdiction: Not reached, again because the employment relationship threshold was not met.
5. Costs: Destro, as the successful party, is entitled to a contribution toward its legal costs. The matter was treated as a half-day investigation, setting a notional tariff of $2,250. The parties were encouraged to agree costs; if not resolved, Destro has 28 days to file costs submissions and Mr Taylor has 14 days to reply.

The claim was dismissed in full — no employment relationship was established and the Authority had no jurisdiction over any of Mr Taylor's claims.

None ordered on the merits. Costs: notional starting tariff set at $2,250 (half-day rate), with the final costs award reserved pending agreement between the parties or further submissions from both parties.

Applicant: Dongyan Lin aka Chloe Lin (employee)
Respondent: Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent/employer); Yook Insulation Limited (Second Respondent/employer); Yanfen Wang (Third Respondent/director)

Applicant: John Wood, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: First Respondent not represented; Yanfen Wang for Second Respondent and appearing in person

Dongyan Lin, an office administrator, worked for two closely associated insulation companies — Yoke and then Yook — from March 2023 to May 2024. Neither company remitted PAYE deductions from her wages to Inland Revenue, and Yook later misclassified her as a self-employed contractor, causing her significant personal and financial harm. The Authority upheld her unjustified disadvantage personal grievance and ordered repayment of unremitted PAYE amounts totalling $6,724.70 plus $8,000 compensation, with personal liability attaching to director Yanfen Wang if the companies cannot pay.

Ms Lin was employed by Yoke Insulation Limited from 20 March 2023, initially performing office administration including calculating her own wages and PAYE. From 24 October 2023, Yook Insulation Limited (a closely associated company controlled by Ms Wang and her domestic partner Mr Zhang) began paying her wages and, the Authority found, became her employer. Neither company remitted PAYE to Inland Revenue throughout her employment. In January 2024, Ms Lin discovered the problem when checking her IR account in connection with a property purchase and raised it with Ms Wang, who did not resolve it. Near the end of her employment, an arrangement was made involving an accountant that resulted in Ms Lin being misclassified by IR as a contractor. Ms Lin resigned on 27 April 2024 (last day 24 May 2024), and her advocate raised a personal grievance in June 2024 requesting records, which were not provided. A preliminary determination had already established that Ms Lin's relationship with the respondent companies was one of employment.

1. Identity of Employer: Whether Ms Lin's employer changed from Yoke to Yook from October 2023, or remained Yoke throughout — [Established]
2. WPA s 12A Breach (Premium): Whether the companies breached s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 by retaining PAYE deductions instead of remitting them to IR — [Established]
3. WPA s 4 Breach (Unlawful Deduction): Whether the companies breached s 4 of the WPA by deducting wages without lawful purpose — [Established]
4. Monies Owed: What PAYE amounts are owed to Ms Lin by Yoke and Yook respectively — [Established]
5. Wang — Person Involved / Leave to Recover: Whether Yanfen Wang was a person involved in the employment standards breaches under s 142W of the Act, such that leave should be granted to recover amounts from her personally — [Established]
6. Employment Agreement Breach: Whether the companies breached Ms Lin's employment agreement (and whether Ms Wang aided or abetted such breaches) — [Dismissed]
7. Failure to Provide Records: Whether the companies failed to supply wages, time, and holiday and leave records upon request — [Established (factual finding only; no separate penalty pursued)]
8. Penalties on Companies: Whether penalties should be imposed on the respondent companies under s 133A of the Act for employment standards breaches — [Dismissed]
9. Unjustified Disadvantage Grievance: Whether Ms Lin has a personal grievance under s 103(1)(b) of the Act arising from the failure to remit PAYE and misclassification as a contractor — [Established]
10. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Whether Ms Lin should receive compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings, and whether contribution applies under s 124 — [Established; contribution not applied]

1. Identity of Employer: The Authority noted that while the written employment agreement named Yoke, and payment of wages alone is not conclusive of employment, the close association of the two companies, Yook taking on Yoke's responsibilities before its liquidation, and the fact that Yook paid Ms Lin's wages from 24 October 2023, together indicated a change of employer. The Authority preferred Ms Lin's evidence on this point. Finding: Yoke was employer from 20 March 2023 to 23 October 2023; Yook from 24 October 2023 to 24 May 2024.
2. WPA s 12A Breach (Premium): Section 12A(2) of the WPA provides that where an employer receives money by way of deduction from wages (including PAYE) and does not remit it, the employee may recover it as a debt. The Authority found both companies received money by way of deduction from Ms Lin's wages that should have been paid to IR, constituting a clear breach of s 12A.
3. WPA s 4 Breach (Unlawful Deduction): Section 4 requires employers to pay the full amount of wages without deduction unless for a lawful purpose such as PAYE. The Authority found deductions were made but not remitted to IR and thus were not made for a lawful purpose. Both companies breached s 4.
4. Monies Owed: Ms Lin provided a detailed breakdown of wages paid and PAYE not remitted. Bank records corroborated the figures. The Authority accepted her calculations: Yoke owed $4,414.96 and Yook owed $2,309.74, both recoverable as debts.
5. Wang — Person Involved / Leave to Recover: The Authority was satisfied that Ms Wang exercised significant influence over the management and administration of Yoke and was a director of Yook. She was aware that PAYE was not being paid (Ms Lin had raised it directly with her) and had knowledge of the essential facts establishing the WPA contraventions. Under s 142W of the Act, Ms Wang was found to be a person directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in the breaches. Given Yoke's liquidation, leave was granted to recover the PAYE debt amounts directly from Ms Wang to the extent the companies could not pay.
6. Employment Agreement Breach: The Authority had not seen the written employment agreement and was not satisfied it could make a separate finding of breach under s 134 of the Act without sight of that document. The claim was therefore not established.
7. Failure to Provide Records: The Authority accepted that the absence of wages, time, and holiday and leave records when requested had made recovery of wages more difficult. No penalty was separately assessed for this issue as no penalty submissions were advanced specifically on it; the finding remained a factual one supporting other conclusions.
8. Penalties on Companies: The Authority declined to assess penalties under s 133A because Ms Lin's representative made no submissions addressing the relevant statutory factors. Without those submissions, the Authority was unwilling to embark on a penalty assessment.
9. Unjustified Disadvantage Grievance: Applying s 103(1)(b) and the s 103A justification test, the Authority asked whether the companies acted as alleged, whether that caused disadvantage, and whether it was unjustified. The Authority found the companies failed to remit PAYE throughout employment and caused Ms Lin to be misclassified as a contractor. This caused financial difficulty, contributed to her resignation, and breached employers' statutory duty. These actions clearly failed the fair-and-reasonable-employer standard. The grievance was established.
10. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Applying Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, the Authority assessed emotional harm including stress over a tax liability, inability to secure a home loan, ongoing IR correspondence, and inability to obtain visas for her parents. An award of $8,000 was appropriate, shared equally ($4,000 each) between Yoke and Yook. No contributory reduction applied under s 124: Ms Lin calculated wages and PAYE as required by her employers but was not responsible for ensuring the deductions were actually remitted to IR.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified disadvantage personal grievance and WPA breaches (ss 4 and 12A) were established; the employment agreement breach claim and penalty claims were dismissed; leave to recover from Ms Wang was granted.

- PAYE debt (Yoke): $4,414.96 payable to Ms Lin within 21 days (recoverable as a premium/unlawful deduction under WPA s 12A/s 11)
- Compensation (Yoke): $4,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 within 21 days
- PAYE debt (Yook): $2,309.74 payable to Ms Lin within 21 days
- Compensation (Yook): $4,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) within 21 days
- Total ordered: $14,724.70
- Contributory reduction: None applied (s 124 not engaged)
- Penalties: None ordered
- Personal liability (Ms Wang): Leave granted to recover the PAYE debt amounts ($4,414.96 from Yoke and $2,309.74 from Yook) directly from Yanfen Wang to the extent the companies are unable to pay
- Reinstatement: No
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; applicant may lodge memorandum within 28 days if not resolved

Applicant: Peter Saunders (employee)
Respondent: Service Foods Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (advocate previously withdrew; no submissions filed)
Respondent: Kirsty McDonald and Bridget Craig, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Saunders brought a series of claims against his former employer arising from an alleged assault by a co-worker in December 2022, including claims under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, the Crimes Act 1961, and in tort (battery and intentional infliction of emotional harm). A preliminary determination in March 2025 had already found that Mr Saunders had not raised any personal grievances within the 90-day statutory timeframe. This determination finds that the Authority has no jurisdiction to investigate any of the remaining claims, as they fall either outside the Authority's statutory powers or are attempts to re-litigate matters already determined.

Mr Saunders was employed by Service Foods Limited and in February 2023 alleged, during an unrelated disciplinary meeting, that he had been assaulted by a colleague in December 2022. Service Foods requested a written statement and CCTV review but Mr Saunders declined to provide the necessary information. The Authority's preliminary determination of 31 March 2025 ([2025] NZERA 184) found that no personal grievances had been raised within the statutory 90-day timeframe, a finding Mr Saunders did not challenge. Following a protracted procedural history — including multiple case management conferences, the withdrawal of his advocate on two occasions due to inability to contact Mr Saunders, and a sine die adjournment — the Authority ultimately directed an on-the-papers investigation into its jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Mr Saunders failed to file any evidence or submissions in response to the timetabled directions despite being given reasonable opportunity to do so.

1. Jurisdiction — Assault Claim: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Mr Saunders was assaulted by a co-worker, in the absence of a valid personal grievance — [Dismissed]
2. Jurisdiction — HSWA Adverse Conduct: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods engaged in adverse conduct under ss 88–90 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 — [Dismissed]
3. Jurisdiction — HSWA Notification Duty: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods breached its duty to notify WorkSafe under s 56 of the HSWA — [Dismissed]
4. Jurisdiction — Tort of Battery: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods is liable in tort for battery against Mr Saunders — [Dismissed]
5. Jurisdiction — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm: Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate whether Service Foods is liable in tort for intentionally inflicting emotional harm on Mr Saunders — [Dismissed]
6. Costs: Whether any party is entitled to an award of costs — [Reserved]

1. Jurisdiction — Assault Claim: The Authority can make findings of assault when investigating a valid personal grievance (e.g. John Wright v Otira Stagecoach Hotel Limited [2024] NZERA 29), but it has no criminal jurisdiction to make orders under the Crimes Act 1961. Because the preliminary determination found that no personal grievance relating to the assault was raised within the 90-day timeframe under s 114 of the Act, and that finding was not challenged, there is no live personal grievance before the Authority. The Authority therefore has no jurisdiction to investigate this claim on a substantive basis, and makes no finding on the alleged assault.
2. Jurisdiction — HSWA Adverse Conduct: Sections 88 and 89 of the HSWA together create the elements for liability under s 90, which provides for conviction and a fine. The Authority has no jurisdiction to investigate or determine such a claim; it is a matter for the courts or WorkSafe under the HSWA's own enforcement regime. The claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
3. Jurisdiction — HSWA Notification Duty: Section 56 of the HSWA imposes a duty to notify WorkSafe of notifiable events, with a fine of up to $50,000 for breach. Enforcement of this provision lies outside the Authority's jurisdiction. The claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
4. Jurisdiction — Tort of Battery: Under s 161(1)(r) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority has exclusive jurisdiction over employment relationship problems generally but expressly excludes tort actions. The Supreme Court in FMV v TZB [2021] NZSC 102 held that where an employment relationship problem can be framed as a personal grievance or other claim under s 161(1)(a)–(qd), it must be brought that way and cannot be recast as a tort. Mr Saunders' battery claim was already brought as an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance and determined to be out of time; the tort exception in s 161(1)(r) cannot be used to circumvent the s 114 timeframe requirements. The Authority has no jurisdiction.
5. Jurisdiction — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm: This tort claim also arose from the alleged assault and could have been (and was) brought as a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage. Applying the same FMV v TZB principles, a claim capable of being brought as a personal grievance must be brought that way, and the tort exception does not permit circumvention of the s 114 timeframe. The Authority has no jurisdiction to investigate this claim.
6. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Service Foods may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Saunders having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff basis if required to determine costs.

All remaining claims were dismissed for want of jurisdiction, with costs reserved.

None ordered. Costs reserved — to be determined on the standard daily tariff basis if the parties cannot agree, with Service Foods able to file a costs memorandum within 28 days.

Applicant: ZZP (employee)
Respondent: The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (employer)

Applicant: Denis Asher, advocate
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel

ZZP, a long-serving IRD team leader, was dismissed on medical grounds in December 2024 following an extended absence due to major depression, burnout, and a late fibromyalgia diagnosis. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified on procedural grounds — specifically, that the decision-maker raised several concerns in the final dismissal letter that had never been put to ZZP for comment. Reinstatement was declined but compensation for hurt and humiliation of $18,750 (after a 25% contributory reduction) was ordered.

ZZP had been employed by IRD since March 2013 in a leadership role managing direct reports in a busy call centre environment. From March 2024, ZZP provided a series of medical certificates — ultimately ten — covering absences due to major depression, burnout, and a subsequently diagnosed fibromyalgia condition. A psychiatrist-recommended graduated return to work in October 2024 failed, partly attributed to side effects of changing antidepressant medication. By late November 2024, the psychiatrist and subsequently a psychotherapist both recommended a fresh return-to-work plan from January 2025, with the psychotherapist suggesting an even earlier start date of 6 January 2025. IRD proposed medical retirement on 29 November 2024 and, following a meeting on 4 December where ZZP had an opportunity to respond, issued its final dismissal letter on 16 December 2024. ZZP raised a personal grievance in February 2025, arguing the dismissal ignored recent positive medical evidence and that the decision-maker introduced new concerns in the final letter without giving ZZP an opportunity to respond.

1. Non-Publication Order: Whether ZZP's name and identifying details should be suppressed to protect psychological wellbeing and future employment prospects — [Established]
2. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether IRD's decision to dismiss ZZP on medical grounds satisfied the s 103A test of justification, assessed through the Lal v The Warehouse Ltd framework for medical incapacity dismissals — [Established]
3. Reasonable Opportunity to Recover: Whether IRD gave ZZP a reasonable opportunity to recover before dismissing — [Established (in IRD's favour)]
4. Fair and Reasonable Inquiry: Whether IRD undertook a fair and reasonable inquiry into ZZP's prognosis for return to work — [Partially established]
5. Fair Consideration Before Dismissal: Whether IRD fairly considered ZZP's position before terminating, specifically whether undisclosed concerns were raised and ZZP given an opportunity to respond — [Established (breach found)]
6. Reinstatement: Whether reinstatement to ZZP's previous role was practicable and reasonable under s 125(2) of the Act — [Dismissed]
7. Compensation (Hurt and Humiliation): Whether ZZP was entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) for hurt, humiliation, and loss of dignity — [Established]
8. Lost Wages: Whether ZZP was entitled to reimbursement of lost remuneration under s 128 of the Act — [Dismissed]
9. Contributory Conduct: Whether ZZP's own actions contributed to the grievance under s 124, warranting a reduction in remedies — [Established]
10. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded — [Reserved]

1. Non-Publication Order: Applying the two-step test from MW v Spiga [2024] NZEmpC 147, the Authority found: first, a real risk of specific adverse consequences (psychiatric relapse) if ZZP's identity were published; and second, that ZZP's mental health history was sufficiently serious to justify departing from the open justice principle. A permanent non-publication order was granted, including depersonalisation of witness names.
2. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A test through the Lal v The Warehouse Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 66 framework, recently reaffirmed in Sheridan v Pact Group [2026] NZEmpC 51. While IRD satisfied some elements of the framework, the Authority found that undisclosed concerns introduced in the final dismissal letter, without opportunity for ZZP to respond, rendered the overall process procedurally unfair and the dismissal unjustified.
3. Reasonable Opportunity to Recover: The Authority found IRD did give ZZP a reasonable opportunity to recover. ZZP was absent for 29 weeks, IRD followed medical advice, allowed flexible and part-time work arrangements, accommodated the graduated return-to-work plan, and acted consistently with its own Injury or Illness Rehabilitation Guidelines. The allegation that IRD pressured ZZP to return early was unsupported by independent evidence.
4. Fair and Reasonable Inquiry: IRD broadly satisfied this element by accepting ZZP's medical evidence at face value and following the psychiatrist's recommendations. However, the Authority noted that IRD was correct to treat the November and December medical certificates with caution — since they projected a future return-to-work date rather than confirming current fitness — given the failed October return. This element was therefore substantially met by IRD.
5. Fair Consideration Before Dismissal: The Authority found a significant procedural defect. The group lead's final dismissal letter introduced four new concerns — suspicion about the psychiatrist's sudden unavailability, ZZP's alleged alternative explanation for absence involving an unhappy home life, the discrepancy in proposed return dates between the psychiatrist and psychotherapist, and the group lead's perception that ZZP and supporters were telling him what he wanted to hear — none of which had been raised with ZZP for comment. The group lead himself acknowledged "there can always be learnings." The Authority held that a fair and reasonable employer would have raised these concerns before deciding, and the defect was significant rather than minor under s 103A(5).
6. Reinstatement: Although reinstatement is the primary remedy under s 125(2), the Authority declined it. The Authority was concerned that ZZP would be returning to a high-pressure call centre leadership role that would regularly test their mental resilience. No current independent medical evidence from a psychiatrist or psychotherapist was adduced to the Authority, leaving an evidential gap. Observations during the investigation meeting also raised concerns. The risks to ZZP's mental health were considered too great for reinstatement to be practicable and reasonable.
7. Compensation (Hurt and Humiliation): Applying s 123(1)(c)(i) and the revised compensation bands from GF v Comptroller of the New Zealand Customs Service [2023] NZEmpC 101, the Authority assessed ZZP's loss as warranting $25,000 — in the mid-range (band 2: $12K–$50K). The finding was supported by ZZP's lengthy service, the importance of the role to their identity, and the particular harm caused by offensive and unsubstantiated comments about their family life in the dismissal letter, made to a mentally and emotionally vulnerable employee. The award was then reduced for contribution (see below) to $18,750.
8. Lost Wages: No award was made under s 128. ZZP had already received one month's pay in lieu of notice plus 65 days' pay for medical retirement — exceeding a standard three-month award. ZZP found alternative employment in April 2025 but voluntarily left after four months, which the Authority characterised as a failure to mitigate loss for which IRD should not be liable.
9. Contributory Conduct: Under s 124, the Authority found ZZP contributed to the situation that gave rise to the grievance by choosing to return to work in October 2024 contrary to the earlier psychiatric advice recommending absence until 30 November. This decision led directly to the relapse that triggered the final dismissal process. A 25% reduction to all remedies was applied.
10. Costs: Reserved. Parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a timetable set for memoranda if agreement cannot be reached. The Authority signalled it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if required to determine costs.

The claim of unjustified dismissal was upheld on procedural grounds, with reinstatement declined and compensation awarded subject to a 25% contributory reduction; the lost wages claim was dismissed.

- Reinstatement: No
- Compensation (hurt and humiliation, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $25,000 gross, reduced by 25% contributory reduction to $18,750, payable within 28 days
- Lost wages: None ordered (failure to mitigate; payments already received exceeded standard award)
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs: Reserved

Applicant: HTV (employee)
Respondent: BSN (employer, first respondent) and CXV (director/shareholder, second respondent)

Applicant: Alison Bendall, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Blair Edwards, counsel for the Respondents

This is a preliminary determination addressing a discrete evidential dispute arising in an unjustified dismissal claim brought by HTV (an employee) against her employer BSN and its sole director CXV, who is also her estranged husband. The respondents sought to place before the Authority documents filed in related Family Court proceedings, including a lawyer-for-child report, an affidavit, and a temporary protection order. The Authority held that, absent leave from the Family Court, placing those documents before the Authority would constitute a prohibited publication under s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980, and refused to admit them.

HTV was employed by BSN, a limited liability company of which her husband CXV is the sole director. Both are shareholders in BSN. HTV and CXV are separated, and proceedings between them are ongoing in the Family Court. HTV has brought a personal grievance claim against BSN for unjustified dismissal and also seeks remedies against CXV personally. In the course of the employment proceedings, BSN and CXV sought to rely on three Family Court documents — a lawyer-for-child report, CXV's affidavit, and a temporary protection order — as evidence relevant to their defence. HTV opposed this on the basis that it would breach s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980, which restricts publication of Family Court proceedings without leave of that court. Neither respondent had obtained leave from the Family Court before seeking to rely on the documents. This preliminary matter was investigated on the papers by a separate Authority Member to preserve the integrity of the substantive investigation.

1. Admissibility of Family Court Documents: Whether documents filed in Family Court proceedings may be placed before the Authority without leave of the Family Court, or whether s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980 prohibits this — [Established (prohibition upheld)]
2. Scope of "Publication": Whether providing Family Court documents to the Authority (rather than a wide audience) constitutes "publication" within the meaning of s 11B — [Established (broad scope confirmed)]
3. Authority's Broad Evidence Power: Whether s 160(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (permitting the Authority to take into account evidence it thinks fit) overrides the prohibition in s 11B of the Family Court Act — [Dismissed]
4. Non-Publication Orders as Cure: Whether the Authority could receive the documents subject to a non-publication or confidentiality direction as an alternative to requiring Family Court leave — [Dismissed]
5. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded — [Reserved]

1. Admissibility of Family Court Documents: Section 11B(3) of the Family Court Act prohibits publication of reports of Family Court proceedings that include identifying information where a vulnerable person is a party, without leave of that court. A "vulnerable person" includes a person subject to a protection order under the Family Violence Act 2018. As both HTV and CXV are parties to a temporary protection order, a vulnerable person is plainly a party to the Family Court proceedings. No leave was sought or obtained. The Authority held that the Family Court documents were therefore not lawfully before it.
2. Scope of "Publication": The respondents argued that "publication" required dissemination to a broad audience. The Authority rejected this, relying on McNabb v Silver Fern Farms Ltd [2020] NZEmpC 101, where the Employment Court held that providing Family Court material to even one additional party (Silver Fern Farms, which was not a party to the Family Court proceedings) constituted prohibited publication. BSN, as a separate legal entity distinct from CXV, is not a party to the Family Court proceedings; providing the documents to it therefore amounts to publication. The Authority confirmed the same reasoning applies here.
3. Authority's Broad Evidence Power: The Authority acknowledged that s 160(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 permits it to consider a wide range of evidence. However, it held that this power cannot override a statutory prohibition in another Act of Parliament. To admit the documents without Family Court leave would constitute an offence under s 11B(6) of the Family Court Act, and relevance alone does not satisfy the leave requirement. Parliament has deliberately shielded Family Court proceedings and provided a specific mechanism — leave of the Family Court — for lifting that shield.
4. Non-Publication Orders as Cure: The respondents submitted that a non-publication order from the Authority could resolve any publication concern after the Authority had considered the material. The Authority dismissed this, reasoning that the Family Court is best placed to assess any leave application, and that an Authority non-publication order cannot retrospectively cure the offence of unauthorised publication that would occur upon receiving the documents.
5. Costs: No decision was made on costs; they were expressly reserved for later determination.

The preliminary claim was upheld in full in favour of HTV: the Family Court documents are not lawfully before the Authority, and costs are reserved.

None ordered at this stage (preliminary determination only). Costs reserved.

Applicant: Keenan Gonsalves (employee)
Respondent: Watercare Services Limited (employer)

Applicant: Jonathan Loh, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: John Rooney and Ngahuia Muru, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Gonsalves, a Water Supervisor with approximately eight years' service, was summarily dismissed after directing his relief crew to enter an excavation site following a power cable strike, without first confirming whether the power had been isolated by Vector. He raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal, seeking compensation for hurt and humiliation and lost remuneration. The Authority found the dismissal justified in both substance and process, and dismissed the grievance entirely.

Mr Gonsalves was employed by Watercare Services Limited as a Water Supervisor for approximately eight years. On 21–22 November 2024, Watercare crews were undertaking a hydrant replacement job at Gavin Street, Penrose, during which a power cable was accidentally struck at approximately 2.30am. Vector was notified and crew stood down pending Vector's repair. Mr Gonsalves arrived on site at approximately 7am, assessed the situation, obtained approval from a Water Operations Controller to cap the water main, and at approximately 7.45am directed the relief crew to enter the excavation and repair the water pipe — before Vector had confirmed the power was isolated. Watercare conducted a Human Factors Incident Investigation and a disciplinary process, during which Mr Gonsalves initially admitted making a "critical error in judgement" but later claimed at the final outcome meeting that he must have known the power had been isolated, a claim contradicted by crew member Andrew Fraser. Watercare dismissed Mr Gonsalves for summary dismissal on 20 December 2024 on grounds of gross negligence and serious misconduct; Mr Gonsalves raised a personal grievance on 22 January 2025.

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Watercare's decision to summarily dismiss Mr Gonsalves, and the process by which it did so, met the standard of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
2. Sufficiency of Investigation: Whether Watercare sufficiently investigated the allegations, in particular whether it adequately investigated the question of whether the power cable had been isolated before Mr Gonsalves directed the crew to re-enter the excavation — [Dismissed]
3. Procedural Defects — Timeframes: Whether the short timeframes imposed by Watercare during the disciplinary process prejudiced Mr Gonsalves' ability to respond meaningfully — [Dismissed]
4. Procedural Defects — Internal Policy Compliance: Whether Watercare complied with its own disciplinary policy requiring the Head of the department to be informed before any decision to dismiss was made — [Dismissed]
5. Serious Misconduct: Whether Mr Gonsalves' conduct was capable of amounting to serious misconduct justifying summary dismissal — [Established]
6. Consideration of Alternatives to Dismissal: Whether Watercare genuinely considered alternatives to dismissal — [Established]
7. Opportunity to Respond: Whether Watercare gave Mr Gonsalves a reasonable opportunity to respond to its concerns and genuinely considered his explanation — [Established]
8. Remedies (Compensation and Lost Remuneration): Whether Mr Gonsalves was entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) and/or lost remuneration under s 128 of the Act — [Not reached]
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction: Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act — [Not reached]
10. Costs: Whether either party was entitled to costs — [Reserved]

1. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A(2) test — whether the employer's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. Having considered all four statutory factors (investigation, raising concerns, opportunity to respond, and genuine consideration), the Authority found Watercare acted consistently with that standard in both substance and process. The dismissal was held to be justified and no personal grievance was established.
2. Sufficiency of Investigation: The Authority found that the key allegation was not whether the power had in fact been isolated, but whether Mr Gonsalves knew it had been isolated before directing the crew to enter the excavation. Watercare conducted a Human Factors Incident Investigation, gathered written statements, interviewed crew (including Mr Fraser), reviewed photographs, and followed up with Vector. Despite Mr Gonsalves' belated claim that he must have known the power was isolated, he could not identify who told him, and Mr Fraser directly contradicted him. The investigation was found to be sufficient.
3. Procedural Defects — Timeframes: The Authority found that Watercare put its concerns in writing, provided Mr Gonsalves with all relevant material (including the internal email he later relied on), allowed representation at each meeting, issued a preliminary outcome letter inviting further feedback, and adjourned the final outcome meeting to seek additional information. Adequate time was provided for preparation, and no procedural prejudice was established.
4. Procedural Defects — Internal Policy Compliance: The Authority accepted Ms Kingston's evidence that on 13 December 2024, Mr Richie Rameka (Head of Maintenance Service) was informed about the possibility of terminating Mr Gonsalves' employment. The Authority was satisfied the disciplinary policy requirement had been met, and found no breach.
5. Serious Misconduct: Applying the principles from Baillie v Oranga Tamariki, Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil and Hines v Eastland Port, the Authority confirmed that even a one-off act of negligence can constitute serious misconduct depending on circumstances. Mr Gonsalves was a supervisor in a safety-sensitive role who, with full knowledge of a cable strike and the standing instructions not to re-enter the excavation until Vector confirmed the all-clear, directed the crew to proceed without verifying that the power had been isolated. His own written admission acknowledged the severity of the conduct. The Authority found this amounted to serious misconduct that destroyed the trust and confidence essential to the employment relationship.
6. Consideration of Alternatives to Dismissal: Ms Kingston gave evidence that Watercare considered demotion, a final written warning, and a performance improvement process, but concluded that because a supervisor had exposed crew to the risk of significant harm through a serious safety breach, summary dismissal was the appropriate outcome. The Authority accepted this evidence without challenge.
7. Opportunity to Respond: Mr Gonsalves was given three written opportunities to explain his position, attended two meetings with representation, received a preliminary outcome letter, and had the final outcome meeting adjourned when he raised new information. Watercare took a flexible and open-minded approach including interviewing Mr Fraser and contacting Vector at Mr Gonsalves' request. The Authority found the requirements of s 103A(2)(b)–(d) were met.
8. Remedies: Not reached. The personal grievance was not established, so no remedies arose for consideration.
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction: Not reached. As no personal grievance was established, s 124 did not require consideration.
10. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Watercare may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days; Mr Gonsalves then has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in full; Mr Gonsalves failed to establish an unjustified dismissal personal grievance.

None ordered. Costs reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Rimple Rimple (employee)
Respondent: NZ-Kebabs Limited (In Liquidation) (First Respondent/employer); Rupinder Kaur Bal (Second Respondent); Gursahib Singh Dhillon (Third Respondent); Harpal Bal (Fourth Respondent)

Applicant: Susanne Lass, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: No appearance for First, Second and Fourth Respondents; Alex Davis, counsel for Third Respondent (firm not stated)

This is a costs-only determination following a substantive decision issued on 4 March 2026 in which NZ-Kebabs Limited was ordered to pay Ms Rimple significant remedies including lost wages, hurt and humiliation compensation, unpaid leave entitlements, and a penalty. The Authority reserved costs in the substantive determination and, the parties being unable to agree, Ms Rimple brought a costs application. The Authority awarded total costs of $12,500 (inclusive of GST), apportioned between NZ-Kebabs Limited, Mr Dhillon, and Mr Bal, plus disbursements.

Ms Rimple was employed by NZ-Kebabs Limited (NZKL), and in the substantive determination she succeeded on claims relating to unjustified dismissal, unpaid leave entitlements, and the payment of an unlawful premium in connection with her employment in New Zealand. The investigation meeting ran for three days. NZKL was placed into liquidation on 21 May 2026, after the substantive determination but before this costs determination. The parties were unable to resolve costs by agreement. Ms Rimple sought an uplift on the standard daily tariff on four grounds: NZKL's failure to provide witness statements in advance, NZKL's postponement application, introduction of a new narrative at the investigation meeting, and NZKL's failure to accept Ms Rimple's Calderbank offer. Ms Rimple also sought a costs order on a joint and several basis against Mr Dhillon and Mr Bal.

1. Starting Point for Costs: Whether the notional daily tariff for a three-day investigation meeting provides the correct starting point — (Established)
2. Costs Against Company in Liquidation: Whether NZKL's subsequent liquidation affects its liability for costs arising from proceedings initiated before liquidation — (Established)
3. Uplift — Failure to File Witness Statements / Postponement: Whether NZKL's failure to provide witness statements and its postponement application justify an uplift on the tariff — (Dismissed)
4. Uplift — New Narrative at Hearing: Whether NZKL's introduction of new documents and a further witness at the investigation meeting justifies an uplift — (Dismissed)
5. Uplift — Calderbank Offer: Whether Ms Rimple's Calderbank offer of 20 January 2026 was valid and, if so, whether it justifies an uplift — (Established)
6. Validity of Mr Dhillon's Calderbank Offers: Whether Mr Dhillon's settlement correspondence constituted valid Calderbank offers — (Dismissed)
7. Joint and Several Liability for Costs: Whether costs should be ordered jointly and severally against Mr Dhillon and Mr Bal — (Dismissed)
8. Apportionment of Costs Among Respondents: Whether and how costs should be apportioned between NZKL, Mr Dhillon, and Mr Bal — (Established)

1. Starting Point for Costs: The Authority applied the standard notional daily tariff under the Authority's Practice Direction (following Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135). For a three-day investigation meeting, the starting point was $11,500.
2. Costs Against Company in Liquidation: The Authority held, applying Bradbury v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2015] NZSC 80 at [16], that costs liability properly rests with NZKL because the proceedings were initiated before it was placed into liquidation. Liquidation did not extinguish that liability.
3. Uplift — Failure to File Witness Statements / Postponement: The Authority accepted that both the failure to provide witness statements and the postponement application were outside NZKL's control because its legal counsel at the time became unwell. No uplift was warranted on these grounds.
4. Uplift — New Narrative at Hearing: Although the Authority accepted that new documents and a further witness introduced a new narrative at the investigation meeting, it declined to adjust the tariff because this did not substantially increase costs, did not cause the meeting to be adjourned part-heard, and reasonable preparation costs are already captured in the daily tariff.
5. Uplift — Calderbank Offer: The Authority confirmed Ms Rimple's 20 January 2026 offer was a valid Calderbank offer directed to all respondents. The substantive orders exceeded what Ms Rimple had offered. Applying Reid v Ngati Rangi Trust [2021] NZEmpC 110 and Stevens v Hapag-Lloyd (NZ) Limited [2015] NZEmpC 137, the Authority recognised the public interest in early resolution while maintaining the principle of modest costs awards, and granted an uplift of $1,000, bringing the total to $12,500.
6. Validity of Mr Dhillon's Calderbank Offers: Mr Dhillon's settlement correspondence did not include the requisite "without prejudice — save as to costs" notation. His offers were therefore not valid Calderbank offers and could not be taken into account.
7. Joint and Several Liability for Costs: The Authority held that a joint and several costs order against Mr Dhillon and Mr Bal would be inconsistent with the principle that costs in the Authority must remain modest. Apportionment was the appropriate approach instead.
8. Apportionment of Costs Among Respondents: The Authority considered the roles of Mr Dhillon (who managed NZKL's business and is referenced in WhatsApp communications regarding the premium) and Mr Bal (who primarily orchestrated the premium payments). Conducting a balancing exercise, the Authority apportioned the total $12,500 as: NZKL $6,500; Mr Bal $3,500; Mr Dhillon $2,500. Disbursements (document preparation $219.77 and filing fee $71.55) were ordered against NZKL.

The costs application was partially upheld: costs of $12,500 (inclusive of GST) were awarded and apportioned among three respondents, with an uplift for the Calderbank offer but uplifts for other grounds refused; joint and several liability was declined in favour of apportionment.

Costs — NZKL: $6,500 (inclusive of GST)
Costs — Mr Dhillon: $2,500 (inclusive of GST)
Costs — Mr Bal: $3,500 (inclusive of GST)
Total costs: $12,500 (inclusive of GST)
Disbursements (document preparation/bundles): $219.77 (inclusive of GST) — payable by NZKL
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55 (inclusive of GST) — payable by NZKL
All amounts payable within 28 days of this determination.

Applicant: Benjamin James Fuller (employee)
Respondent: Super Cheap Auto (New Zealand) PTY Limited (employer)

Applicant: Lawrence Anderson, advocate
Respondent: Emma Crowley, counsel

Benjamin Fuller, a part-time retail employee at Super Cheap Auto, brought multiple unjustified disadvantage claims including challenges to a final written warning issued in December 2023, exclusion from a bonus scheme, alleged bullying, and inadequate investigation of his workplace concerns. The Authority found that the personal grievance relating to the final written warning was raised out of time and SCA had not consented to it being raised late. All remaining disadvantage claims were dismissed on their merits, and the penalty claim also failed.

Mr Fuller has been employed by Super Cheap Auto (SCA) as a Part-Time Retail Team Member since October 2022. In October 2023, he was observed mixing paint without required PPE and vaping in a non-designated area, leading to a formal disciplinary process. On 4 December 2023, SCA issued him a final written warning. In August/September 2024, SCA determined Mr Fuller was ineligible for a bonus (the "FY25 Reward Campaign") because his warning, less than 12 months old, constituted a recorded breach of the Code of Conduct; however, SCA later paid him the bonus in good faith after he raised the issue through his representative in November 2024. In February 2025, Mr Fuller lodged a Statement of Problem with the Authority raising grievances around the warning, bonus exclusion, and related matters; he later filed an amended SOP in June 2025 adding claims of bullying and inadequate investigation following a June 2025 conversation with his manager and a May 2025 team meeting. Mediation in July 2025 was unsuccessful, after which SCA conducted a workplace investigation and issued findings in October 2025.

1. Timeliness of Warning Grievance: Whether Mr Fuller raised his personal grievance relating to the final written warning within the 90-day statutory timeframe under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and if not, whether SCA consented to it being raised out of time — [Dismissed]
2. Disadvantage Claim 1 – Issuing Warning: Whether the issuing of the final written warning constituted an unjustified action causing disadvantage — [Dismissed]
3. Disadvantage Claim 2 – Warning on Record: Whether SCA keeping the final written warning permanently on file unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Fuller — [Dismissed]
4. Disadvantage Claim 3 – Bonus Exclusion: Whether SCA's initial decision to exclude Mr Fuller from the bonus constituted unjustified action causing disadvantage — [Dismissed]
5. Disadvantage Claim 4 – Bullying and Unreasonable Treatment: Whether Ms Escandor's conduct towards Mr Fuller (including discussion of staff complaints, reading out customer feedback, allowing colleagues to speak another language, and asking him to go home early) constituted unjustified action causing disadvantage — [Dismissed]
6. Disadvantage Claim 5 – Failure to Investigate: Whether SCA's investigation into Mr Fuller's workplace concerns was inadequate, one-sided or dismissive, amounting to unjustified disadvantage — [Dismissed]
7. Disadvantage Claim 6 – Refusal to Provide Investigation Information: Whether SCA's initial refusal or delay in providing information relating to the investigation caused unjustified disadvantage — [Dismissed]
8. Disadvantage Claim 7 – Refusal to Correct File Information: Whether SCA's maintenance of file notes and refusal to correct records on Mr Fuller's file constituted unjustified disadvantage — [Dismissed]
9. Penalty – Good Faith Breach: Whether SCA breached good faith obligations under s 4A(b)(iii) of the Act in a deliberate, serious, and sustained manner or in a manner intended to undermine the employment relationship, justifying a penalty under s 134 — [Dismissed]
10. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded and to whom — [Reserved]

1. Timeliness of Warning Grievance: Under s 114 of the ERA 2000, a personal grievance must be raised within 90 days of the act or the employee becoming aware of it, with late filing requiring employer consent. The Authority found Mr Fuller's December 2023 emails did not constitute raising a personal grievance — at most they sought reconsideration of the sanction — and his subsequent conduct was inconsistent with having raised a grievance. The first clear articulation of an unjustified disadvantage claim came in the 15 November 2024 correspondence, which was out of time. SCA had not expressly or impliedly consented to the late grievance, including by its later payment of the bonus. Accordingly, the Authority had no jurisdiction over grievances relating to the warning process or the warning itself.
2. Disadvantage Claim 1 – Issuing Warning: Determined in the alternative, in case the Authority's timeliness finding was wrong. Applying the test of what a fair and reasonable employer would do, the Authority found SCA was entitled to bring disciplinary proceedings where an earlier informal response had been deemed inadequate, and the final written warning was proportionate given the health and safety issues involved, the clear policies in place, and Mr Fuller's own admissions.
3. Disadvantage Claim 2 – Warning on Record: Mr Fuller argued the warning's permanent retention on file caused anxiety about future employment. The Authority found he had been made aware by mid-2025 (and through SCA's updated July 2025 policy) that the warning would not be used for disciplinary escalation purposes after 12 months. Mr Fuller confirmed this understanding, and no actual disadvantage from the warning's continued existence on file was shown. SCA's retention of the record was justified.
4. Disadvantage Claim 3 – Bonus Exclusion: The Authority found that Mr Fuller's narrow interpretation of the bonus eligibility criteria was incorrect — his final written warning expressly recorded a Code of Conduct breach, which was the relevant disqualifying criterion. No evidence showed SCA disclosed Mr Fuller's bonus status to colleagues, and any embarrassment from discussions with colleagues was not shown to be caused by SCA's conduct. In any event, SCA's later payment of the bonus was sufficient to rectify the concern, and SCA's actions were justified.
5. Disadvantage Claim 4 – Bullying and Unreasonable Treatment: The Authority found it was appropriate for Ms Escandor to discuss staff complaints with Mr Fuller and noted Mr Fuller himself conceded some concerns may have been legitimate. No disciplinary outcome followed the conversation. The evidence did not establish Mr Fuller was named in the customer feedback meeting. The language issue had improved following management reminders. Mr Fuller acknowledged he had voluntarily gone home early on occasion. None of these matters were shown to constitute unjustified disadvantage.
6. Disadvantage Claim 5 – Failure to Investigate: Mr Poiner conducted a fair process: he invited Mr Fuller to provide information, commissioned a senior person to investigate, gathered witness evidence, gave Mr Fuller opportunities to clarify matters, and issued findings. While there was some inadvertent delay, Mr Fuller acknowledged at the investigation meeting that the issues had become less prevalent since the outcome was issued. The Authority accepted this was not the response of someone disadvantaged by an inadequate investigation, and SCA's actions were justified.
7. Disadvantage Claim 6 – Refusal to Provide Investigation Information: Mr Fuller provided no evidence of actual disadvantage from SCA's initial withholding of investigation information. Mr Poiner's initial hesitation was based on perceived confidentiality obligations, and the information was provided within the statutory Privacy Act 2020 timeframe once that framework was invoked. The claim was unsupported by evidence and no disadvantage was established.
8. Disadvantage Claim 7 – Refusal to Correct File Information: Raised only in closing submissions, the Authority noted Mr Fuller retained the right to request correction of his personal information if he wished. Mr Poiner had clarified that file notes are informal and non-disciplinary in nature; the escalation in this case was an exception that occurred promptly after the initial event. The Authority found the submission that file notes could be relied upon in future discipline causing emotional harm was not a reasonable inference from the evidence.
9. Penalty – Good Faith Breach: Under s 4A(b)(iii) of the Act, a penalty requires a deliberate, serious, and sustained breach of good faith, or conduct intended to undermine the employment relationship. Since no good faith breaches were established across any of Mr Fuller's claims, no basis for a penalty existed and the claim was declined.
10. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If not resolved, SCA may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with Mr Fuller having 14 days to respond.

All of Mr Fuller's personal grievance claims and penalty claims were dismissed in full; the determination was entirely in favour of SCA.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending further submissions.

Applicant: Timothy Osbaldiston (employee)
Respondent: Primehort Distributors Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Robert Thompson, advocate for the Respondent

Timothy Osbaldiston brought a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal following his redundancy from Primehort Distributors Limited (PDL) in March 2025. PDL argued the grievance was barred because the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction through email correspondence on 20 March 2025. The Authority rejected PDL's argument, finding no genuine dispute had arisen at the time of the email exchange and that Mr Osbaldiston had not accepted the subsequent full and final settlement offer.

Mr Osbaldiston was employed by PDL from 20 September 2023 until 28 March 2025, initially as an operations/project assistant and then, from around 10 February 2025, in a telesales role. On 17 March 2025, PDL issued a redundancy notice effective 28 March 2025, which also offered Mr Osbaldiston the option to leave earlier (21 March 2025) in exchange for one month's pay in lieu of notice. On 20 March 2025, Mr Osbaldiston emailed PDL accepting the "1 month's pay in lieu" and confirmed he would not be physically present at work through to 28 March 2025. Later that same day, PDL sent a formal "redundancy package" letter offering five weeks' pay in lieu with a full and final release of all claims — Mr Osbaldiston did not sign or accept this letter. Mr Osbaldiston subsequently raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal, which PDL sought to block on the basis that accord and satisfaction had already been reached.

1. Accord and Satisfaction: Whether the parties settled Mr Osbaldiston's personal grievance for unjustified dismissal on the basis of accord and satisfaction, thereby barring him from pursuing his claim — [Dismissed]

1. Accord and Satisfaction: The Authority applied the established legal principles from Clearkin v Geneva Healthcare Limited [2019] NZEmpC 174, Harris v Birchwood Farm Holdings Limited [2002] NZEmpC 124, and Graham v Crestline Pty Limited [2006] NZEmpC 848, requiring (i) a genuine dispute to exist, and (ii) a meeting of minds — or conduct inducing the other party to believe a payment is taken in satisfaction of the claim. The Authority found that Mr Osbaldiston's email acceptance on 20 March 2025 related only to PDL's earlier offer of one month's pay in lieu of notice and early departure — not a settlement of any grievance — because no genuine dispute had yet arisen between the parties at that point. The subsequent redundancy package letter, which contained additional terms including a full and final release, constituted a new and separate offer that Mr Osbaldiston did not sign or accept. Accordingly, the Authority rejected PDL's accord and satisfaction argument and held that Mr Osbaldiston may proceed with his personal grievance.

The preliminary issue was determined in the applicant's favour: Mr Osbaldiston's personal grievance for unjustified dismissal was not settled by accord and satisfaction and may proceed to a substantive investigation meeting.

None ordered at this stage (preliminary determination only). A case management conference is to be convened to progress the substantive claim. Costs are reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited (employer) [Applicant in 3316900; Respondent in 3322300/3352600]
Respondent: Garth Cunningham (employee) [Respondent in 3316900; Applicant in 3322300/3352600]

Applicant: Richard Upton, counsel for HealthAlliance N.Z. Ltd
Respondent: Garth Cunningham (Self-represented)

This is a costs-only determination arising from earlier proceedings in which Mr Cunningham successfully obtained a reopening of a prior Authority determination. Mr Cunningham, who was self-represented, sought $400 in costs (including the $153.33 filing fee). The Authority declined to award the full amount but ordered reimbursement of the filing fee only, consistent with its usual practice not to award costs to unrepresented parties who incurred no representation fees.

Mr Cunningham was an employee of HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited, a company providing specialist IT services to northern district health boards (now subsumed under Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora). In earlier proceedings (Cunningham v HealthAlliance NZ Ltd [2026] NZERA 159), the Authority granted Mr Cunningham's application to reopen a prior determination and declined his removal application. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed submissions. Mr Cunningham, having represented himself throughout, sought $400 inclusive of the $153.33 filing fee, noting a without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs offer had been made but rejected without counteroffer by HealthAlliance. HealthAlliance submitted that $400 was not justified for a self-represented litigant but indicated it was not economic to contest the point.

1. Costs to Self-Represented Party: Whether Mr Cunningham, as a successful but self-represented litigant who incurred no representation fees, is entitled to a costs award beyond reimbursement of the filing fee — [Dismissed]
2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: Whether Mr Cunningham is entitled to reimbursement of the Authority's filing fee — [Established]

1. Costs to Self-Represented Party: The Authority applied the principles from PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 (confirmed in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135), which include that costs generally follow the event, awards are modest, and conduct unnecessarily increasing costs may be taken into account. While Mr Cunningham succeeded in the reopening application, the Authority noted it is not its usual practice to award costs to parties who have not incurred representation fees. The Authority found no basis to depart from that approach and declined to award the broader $400 sought.
2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Authority determined that Mr Cunningham was entitled to be reimbursed for the filing fee paid in the removal matter. HealthAlliance was ordered to pay $153.33 within 28 days of the determination date.

The claim for costs was partially upheld — the filing fee reimbursement of $153.33 was ordered, but the broader costs award sought was dismissed.

Filing fee reimbursement: $153.33 (to be paid by HealthAlliance to Mr Cunningham within 28 days). No further costs awarded.

Applicant: Fiona Scott (employee)
Respondent: Ritchies Transport Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: James Sawers, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: William Henriksen, for the respondent

Fiona Scott worked as a casual charter bus driver for Ritchies Transport Holdings Limited from December 2022, but the Authority found that her employment had evolved into permanent employment by the time shifts ceased in approximately March–April 2024. The Authority upheld her unjustified dismissal claim, finding that Ritchies deliberately stopped scheduling her shifts without justification or process, but dismissed her unjustified disadvantage claim in relation to a first written warning issued after a disciplinary incident. Scott was awarded $10,000 compensation for hurt and humiliation and $12,870 in lost wages (three months' ordinary time remuneration).

Fiona Scott signed a casual employment agreement with Ritchies on 13 December 2022 to work as a Charter Driver, though approximately 90% of her actual shifts were on urban bus routes. She worked consistently and extensively over approximately 15 months, averaging well over 80 hours per fortnight in the latter part of her employment, and rarely declined shifts. In December 2023, Scott declined an offer of permanent employment, stating she valued the flexibility of casual work, but from early 2024 her hours were reduced — a response Ritchies connected to her not accepting permanent employment. On 23 March 2024, Scott deviated from her bus route to use the toilet at home and check on pets, leading to a disciplinary process resulting in a first written warning on 5 April 2024. Around 30 March 2024, two scheduled shifts were removed from her roster and, from that point onwards, Scott received no further shifts; in July 2024 she was deactivated from the rostering app entirely. Scott raised a personal grievance alleging unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage regarding the warning.

1. Employment Status: Was Ms Scott a casual employee or had her employment evolved into permanent employment at the time shifts ceased? — (Established: permanent employment found)
2. Unjustified Dismissal: Did Ritchies' cessation of scheduling shifts constitute an unjustified dismissal under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000? — (Established)
3. Unjustified Disadvantage: Did the issuing of the first written warning constitute an unjustified action causing disadvantage? — (Dismissed)
4. Admissibility of Post-Hearing Evidence: Should the post-investigation-meeting email from Ritchies' HR Business Partner (Mr Henriksen) regarding shift acceptance be admitted and relied upon? — (Dismissed: disregarded)
5. Lost Wages Remedy: What three-months' ordinary time remuneration should be awarded under ss 123 and 128 of the Act? — (Established)
6. Compensation for Hurt and Humiliation: What compensation should be awarded under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act? — (Established)
7. Contribution: Did Ms Scott's own actions contribute to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance, warranting a reduction under s 124? — (Dismissed: no reduction)
8. Costs: What costs, if any, should be awarded? — (Reserved)

1. Employment Status: The Authority applied the test of the "real nature of the relationship" under s 6(2) of the Act, recognising that employment status can evolve over time (applying Jinkinson v Oceana Gold (NZ) Limited [2009]). The Authority examined multiple factors: the regularity, consistency and volume of Scott's hours (averaging over 80 hours per fortnight in the latter period); the rostering practice of issuing shifts two weeks in advance that were treated as automatically accepted unless declined; the high proportion of urban (not charter) shifts; and Ritchies' own internal acknowledgement (via the Director of People) that regular hours on a casual agreement were "illegal." The Authority concluded that Scott was a permanent employee in all but name, and that her declining the formal permanent employment offer did not undermine this objective assessment.
2. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A test (what would a fair and reasonable employer do in all the circumstances). The Authority found that from approximately 30 March 2024 Scott received no further shifts, and inferred from the timing — contemporaneous with the disciplinary process — that cessation was deliberate rather than the result of technical or operational issues. The dismissal lacked substantive justification (no valid reason such as serious misconduct or redundancy) and no process whatsoever was followed. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified on both substantive and procedural grounds.
3. Unjustified Disadvantage: The Authority considered whether the first written warning was procedurally and substantively fair. Procedurally, Ritchies was entitled to escalate from an investigation meeting to a disciplinary meeting (provided it notified Scott, which it did), and it gave Scott the opportunity to respond and genuinely considered her explanations. Substantively, the Authority found the warning reasonable: Scott should have understood from the Code of Conduct that using a company bus for personal reasons (driving home) could constitute misuse of company property, and she also bypassed the final two stops of her route. Disparity of treatment was not established due to lack of evidence. The disadvantage claim was dismissed.
4. Admissibility of Post-Hearing Evidence: The post-meeting email from Mr Henriksen (Ritchies' HR Business Partner) describing how shifts were made available via the App was disregarded entirely because Henriksen was not a sworn witness, his evidence could not be tested, and he was not employed by Ritchies during the relevant period.
5. Lost Wages Remedy: Sections 123 and 128 of the Act require the Authority to award the lesser of actual lost remuneration and three months' ordinary time remuneration. The Authority calculated Scott's average weekly hours across the full employment period as 33 hours, at a predominant ordinary time rate of $30.00/hour, yielding $12,870 gross (33 × $30 × 13 weeks). Though Scott sought less than this statutory minimum, the Authority was obliged by s 128(2) to award the statutory minimum. The Authority noted that reimbursement of any Work and Income benefit payments was a separate matter for Scott to resolve with MSD (Hutchison v Nelson City Council [2014]).
6. Compensation for Hurt and Humiliation: Under s 123(1)(c)(i), the Authority assessed the distress Scott visibly exhibited during the Investigation Meeting, loss of dignity, injury to feelings, and the shock caused by the abrupt cessation of shifts — acknowledged even by Mr Gordon. Scott sought $10,000, which the Authority found moderate and appropriate, and awarded the full amount claimed.
7. Contribution: The Authority considered s 124 and found that Scott's own conduct did not contribute to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance (i.e. the unjustified dismissal). No reduction was applied.
8. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unable to do so, Scott may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with Ritchies given 14 days to reply. Costs, if determined by the Authority, would be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal grievance was established and remedies awarded; the unjustified disadvantage grievance (first written warning) was dismissed.

- Lost wages (three months' ordinary time remuneration): $12,870 (gross) — calculated at 33 hours/week × $30.00/hour × 13 weeks
- Compensation (hurt, humiliation and injury to feelings, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $10,000
- Contributory reduction: None applied (no contribution found)
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs: Reserved (parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; memorandum process prescribed if not resolved)
- Payment deadline: Within 28 days of the determination date

[CONSENT]

Applicant: KZD (employee)
Respondent: SHX (employer)

Applicant: D Kim, advocate
Respondent: S Liu and A Meng, counsel

The parties resolved their employment relationship dispute on their own terms during the investigation meeting. By consent, the agreed terms have been incorporated as orders of the Authority. The names of the parties and the terms of the resolution are suppressed by order under the Employment Relations Act 2000.

The nature of the underlying employment relationship problem is not disclosed in the determination. The matter proceeded to an investigation meeting on 2 and 3 June 2026. During that investigation, the parties reached a private settlement on their own terms. The parties jointly requested that the settlement terms be given the force of an Authority order, and also sought confidentiality over the parties' identities and the terms of resolution. No costs issue arose between the parties.

1. Consent Order: Whether the agreed settlement terms should be made orders of the Authority — [Established]
2. Non-Publication Order: Whether publication of the parties' names and settlement terms should be prohibited under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Established]

1. Consent Order: At the parties' joint request, the Authority incorporated their privately agreed settlement terms as orders of the Authority. A signed record of those terms is held on the Authority file. No merits determination was made.
2. Non-Publication Order: The Authority was satisfied, on the information before it, that a non-publication order was appropriate. Under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Member prohibited publication of the parties' names and all or any part of the settlement terms, except where necessary for enforcement purposes.

The matter was resolved by consent, with the settlement terms made orders of the Authority and confidentiality suppressing the parties' identities and terms.

The specific terms of the remedy are suppressed by non-publication order and are not disclosed in the determination. No costs were ordered.

Applicant: Cameron Keen (employee)
Respondent: Prestige Paving NZ Limited (employer)

Applicant: Dee Peteerson and Hayley Johnson, advocates
Respondent: No appearance

Cameron Keen worked as a labourer for Prestige Paving NZ Limited from August 2024 until his employment ended in disputed circumstances in February 2025, after his employer effectively abandoned the business and ceased communicating with him. The Authority found that Prestige unjustifiably disadvantaged and constructively dismissed Mr Keen by failing to pay him, unilaterally placing him on leave without pay, and ceasing communication. Mr Keen was awarded a total of $36,016.82 in compensation, lost wages, holiday pay, and costs.

Cameron Keen was employed as a labourer by Prestige Paving NZ Limited from 5 August 2024, initially paid cash at $20/hour before a written employment agreement was signed providing for the minimum wage of $23.15/hour. The company closed for the Christmas period on 13 December 2024, with workers told to return on 6 January 2025. The sole active director, Jason Devine, went to Australia and was involved in a car accident on 5 January 2025, advising he would be absent for 6–8 weeks, but failed to respond to Mr Keen's questions about whether he and other workers would be stood down. Prestige then unilaterally imposed leave without pay on Mr Keen from 14 February 2025, without his request, and Mr Keen saw an advertisement suggesting Devine was pursuing work in Australia. Mr Keen raised a personal grievance on 17 March 2025 through an advocate, asserting unjustified dismissal or constructive dismissal from 14 February 2025; Prestige did not engage in the grievance process, mediation, or the Authority investigation. Prestige is no longer trading and its directors are believed to be residing in Australia.

1. Unjustified Disadvantage: Whether Prestige's actions and omissions — including non-payment of wages, unilateral imposition of leave without pay, and failure to communicate — constituted unjustified disadvantage under the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Established]
2. Unjustified (Constructive) Dismissal: Whether Prestige's failure to provide ongoing employment and effective communication from 6 January 2025 amounted to an unjustified dismissal — [Established]
3. Breach of s 67C (Employment Agreement): Whether the employment agreement breached s 67C of the Act by failing to specify guaranteed hours, days of work, and start/finish times — [Established]
4. Compensation (Hurt, Humiliation, Distress): Whether Mr Keen was entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act and, if so, in what amount — [Established]
5. Lost and Unpaid Wages: Whether Mr Keen was entitled to reimbursement of unpaid wages (6 January–14 February 2025) and lost wages (13 weeks post-dismissal) under s 123(1)(b) of the Act — [Established]
6. Holiday Pay: Whether holiday pay was owing on the lost and unpaid wages — [Established]
7. Penalties: Whether the Authority should impose penalties on Prestige for failure to keep/provide wage and time records, failure to pay wages when due, and failure to pay accrued annual leave — [Dismissed]
8. Contributory Conduct: Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act due to Mr Keen's contributory conduct — [Dismissed]
9. Costs: Whether Mr Keen was entitled to a costs contribution — [Established]

1. Unjustified Disadvantage: In the absence of any documentary evidence or engagement from Prestige, the Authority inferred that the employer's actions — non-payment during 6 January to 14 February 2025, unilateral imposition of leave without pay, and lack of ongoing communication — caused Mr Keen unjustified detriment. The Authority found Mr Keen was available for work and entitled to remuneration during this period. The grievance of unjustified disadvantage was established.
2. Unjustified (Constructive) Dismissal: The Authority found that Jason Devine's inaction as Prestige's director — ceasing remuneration and unilaterally imposing leave without pay — effectively brought the employment relationship to an end without valid reason or process. With no explanation from Prestige, the Authority concluded this constituted an unjustified dismissal effective from 14 February 2025.
3. Breach of s 67C (Employment Agreement): The Authority noted that the employment agreement contravened s 67C of the Act because it failed to specify any guaranteed number of hours, the days on which work was to be performed, and the start and finish times of work. The schedule simply described hours as "Monday to Sunday, 24 Hours" and left the weekly hours field blank. This was recorded as a breach, though no separate penalty was ordered in connection with it.
4. Compensation (Hurt, Humiliation, Distress): Applying s 123(1)(c)(i), the Authority assessed that the dismissal dented Mr Keen's confidence and caused real, though transitory, distress and humiliation. Having regard to comparable cases (including the approach summarised in Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] ERNZ 337), the Authority awarded $12,000 in compensation.
5. Lost and Unpaid Wages: Under s 123(1)(b), the Authority accepted Mr Keen's evidence, supported by payslips, that he averaged 44.93 hours per week at $23.15/hour. Unpaid wages for 6 January to 14 February 2025 were calculated at $5,939.14, and lost wages for 13 weeks post-dismissal at $13,521.68, totalling $19,460.82. The Authority accepted this combined figure as fair in all circumstances.
6. Holiday Pay: The Authority found holiday pay at 8% was payable on the total unpaid and lost wages amount of $19,460.82, amounting to $1,556.86.
7. Penalties: Despite Prestige's failures regarding wage and time records, timely wage payment, and annual leave payments, the Authority declined to impose penalties, without elaborating further reasons beyond noting the circumstances were not condoned.
8. Contributory Conduct: Applying the test in Maddigan v Director General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190, the Authority found no factors indicating Mr Keen contributed to the manner in which his employment ended, and no reduction was made to remedies.
9. Costs: Given Prestige's non-participation in the proceedings and Mr Keen's success in obtaining significant remedies, the Authority exercised its discretion under s 14, Schedule 2 of the Act and awarded a $3,000 costs contribution to reflect preparation and attendance at the investigation meeting and submission preparation.

The claim was upheld in full: Mr Keen succeeded on both the unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal grievances; the penalty claim was dismissed and no contributory reduction was applied.

- Compensation (hurt/humiliation/distress): $12,000 (s 123(1)(c)(i)), payable without deduction
- Unpaid and lost wages: $19,460.82 (s 123(1)(b)) (comprising $5,939.14 unpaid wages 6 Jan–14 Feb 2025 and $13,521.68 lost wages for 13 weeks post-dismissal)
- Holiday pay: $1,556.86 (8% on the wages amount)
- Costs contribution: $3,000
- Contributory reduction: None
- Penalties: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination

Applicant: Stephen Nunn (employee)
Respondent: Port Nicholson Fisheries LP (employer)

Applicant: Robert Morgan, advocate
Respondent: Jeremy Little

Stephen Nunn, a driver and process worker employed by Port Nicholson Fisheries LP (PNF) for approximately ten years, was dismissed without notice following two disciplinary investigations in quick succession concerning regulatory compliance failures. The Authority found both investigations were substantively and procedurally flawed, including a failure to genuinely consider Mr Nunn's explanations, failure to show him CCTV footage, an improperly initiated suspension, and no consideration of alternatives to dismissal. Mr Nunn's unjustified dismissal claim was upheld in full, with compensation of $20,000 for hurt and humiliation, three months' lost wages, four weeks' notice pay, and public holiday arrears ordered.

Mr Nunn commenced work in approximately June 2014 and signed a new individual employment agreement (IEA) with PNF after it took over the business in 2019; he was employed on a permanent basis with a minimum of 16 hours per week, working as a driver and process worker at the Tauranga Depot. On 26 March 2024, Mr Nunn — working alone due to the depot manager's resignation and another employee's absence — left an octopus in the depot freezer without completing the required electronic Tally data entry; PNF subsequently issued a final written warning on 4 June 2024 after an investigation meeting on 6 May 2024 at which Mr Nunn had not been forewarned of the nature of the meeting. On the same day as the final written warning, PNF notified Mr Nunn of a second investigation relating to a landing on 28 May 2024, suspended him without prior consultation, and on 12 June 2024 dismissed him summarily for serious misconduct. Mr Nunn argued he was not properly trained in the electronic Tally system, that local depot practice was for other staff to handle data entry, and that he was not shown the CCTV footage relied upon in the second investigation. PNF maintained that Mr Nunn held Licensed Fish Receiver (LFR) qualifications, was aware of relevant legal requirements, and that his failures exposed PNF to significant regulatory risk from the Ministry for Primary Industries. Mr Nunn separately claimed public holiday pay arrears for the period April 2022 to February 2023, which PNF disputed but partly acknowledged as an area of previous miscalculation.

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether PNF's decision to dismiss Mr Nunn and how it was carried out was what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Established]
2. First Investigation Procedural Fairness: Whether the first employment investigation (octopus incident) complied with natural justice requirements, including adequate notice, disclosure of allegations and evidence, and genuine consideration of Mr Nunn's explanations — [Established]
3. First Investigation Substantive Justification: Whether the finding of serious misconduct and issue of a final written warning arising from the first investigation was substantively justified — [Established (in favour of Mr Nunn — not justified)]
4. Second Investigation Procedural Fairness: Whether the second employment investigation (28 May 2024 landing) complied with natural justice requirements, including disclosure of CCTV footage, genuine consideration of explanations, and impartiality of decision-maker — [Established (in favour of Mr Nunn — not justified)]
5. Unlawful Suspension: Whether the suspension of Mr Nunn on 4 June 2024 without prior consultation complied with the IEA and general employment law principles — [Established (in favour of Mr Nunn — non-compliant)]
6. Failure to Consider Alternatives to Dismissal: Whether PNF considered alternatives to dismissal before terminating Mr Nunn's employment — [Established (in favour of Mr Nunn — not considered)]
7. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): What level of compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings is appropriate — [Established]
8. Lost Wages: Whether Mr Nunn is entitled to lost wages and the appropriate quantum — [Established]
9. Public Holiday Pay Arrears: Whether Mr Nunn is owed arrears for public holidays between April 2022 and February 2023 under the Holidays Act 2003 — [Established]
10. Notice Period Pay: Whether Mr Nunn is entitled to payment in lieu of his four-week notice period — [Established]
11. Contribution (s 124): Whether any remedies should be reduced due to Mr Nunn's contributory conduct — [Dismissed]
12. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded and, if so, in what amount — [Reserved]

1. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A objective test, asking whether PNF's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all circumstances. Having found multiple procedural and substantive failures in both investigations (detailed below), the Authority concluded PNF's decision to dismiss was not one a fair and reasonable employer could have reached, and upheld the personal grievance.
2. First Investigation Procedural Fairness: Mr Nunn was invited to a meeting described to him merely as a "catch up" when PNF's own records show it was an investigation meeting. No written allegations were provided before the meeting. Evidence gathered from the Auckland depot manager was not disclosed to Mr Nunn. The Authority found these failures were more than minor procedural defects and that Mr Nunn was not given a genuine opportunity to respond to the actual concerns, including what appear to have been underlying performance concerns.
3. First Investigation Substantive Justification: Mr Nunn's explanations — that local practice was for the depot manager and other staff to handle data entry in Tally, that he was not trained in the Tally system (corroborated by an email from Ms Swales), that Ms Swales had recently resigned, and that octopus was typically sold locally rather than transported to Auckland — were not genuinely engaged with. The Authority noted that PNF's own compliance advisor had allowed Mr Nunn to purchase the octopus for bait, which undermined the seriousness PNF attributed to his conduct. The Authority held that without addressing these explanations, the finding of serious misconduct and the final written warning were not conclusions a fair and reasonable employer could reach.
4. Second Investigation Procedural Fairness: Mr Nunn was not shown the CCTV footage that formed the basis of the second investigation's findings, depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to respond. PNF again failed to genuinely engage with Mr Nunn's explanations about local practice. The same decision-maker (Mr Phipps) who had just issued the final written warning conducted the second investigation, creating an appearance of pre-determination. The Authority found the second investigation appeared pre-determined and that the process was not one a fair and reasonable employer could have followed.
5. Unlawful Suspension: The IEA expressly required consultation with the employee before any suspension. PNF suspended Mr Nunn on 4 June 2024 without prior consultation, in breach of cl 19 of the IEA. The Authority, citing E tū v Singh [2024] NZEmpC 84, confirmed the general requirement to give notice of a proposed suspension and seek the employee's views. This breach was an additional factor supporting the finding that PNF had not acted as a fair and reasonable employer.
6. Failure to Consider Alternatives to Dismissal: The Authority found there was no evidence PNF turned its mind to alternatives such as coaching, training, or a formal performance management plan. The decision to send Mr Nunn to LFR refresher training showed awareness of a competency issue but was not accompanied by structured support. A fair and reasonable employer was required to consider such alternatives before proceeding to dismissal.
7. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Applying the band framework from GF v Comptroller of the New Zealand Customs Service [2023] NZEmpC 101, the Authority assessed the impact on Mr Nunn as falling within band two (mid-range). Mr Nunn had ten years' service, was 70 years old, felt humiliated and shocked by the sudden dismissal, suffered anxiety, and his ability to continue working was important to him both financially and for mental wellbeing. Taking into account the lack of alternatives considered and the manner of dismissal, the Authority awarded $20,000.
8. Lost Wages: Under s 123(1)(b) of the Act, lost wages are capped at three months' ordinary time remuneration. Mr Nunn had been unable to find alternative employment since his dismissal, which the Authority accepted on the basis of his age and the nature of the work he was willing to do. An award equivalent to three months' wages (inclusive of holiday pay and KiwiSaver) was ordered.
9. Public Holiday Pay Arrears: Under s 49 of the Holidays Act 2003, if a public holiday falls on an otherwise working day, the employee must receive not less than relevant daily pay or average daily pay. PNF had calculated public holiday pay inconsistently — using an 8-hour-day basis before April 2022 and after February 2023, but switching to a pro-rata basis in between. Since PNF had used an 8-hour day both before and after the disputed period, the Authority found Mr Nunn was entitled to the difference between the pro-rata amount paid and the 8-hour day rate for public holidays in the period April 2022 to February 2023.
10. Notice Period Pay: Mr Nunn was dismissed summarily and without notice. His IEA provided for four weeks' notice. Given the finding that the dismissal was unjustified and serious misconduct was not established, the summary dismissal was not warranted, and PNF was ordered to pay the equivalent of a four-week notice period.
11. Contribution (s 124): The Authority found that because PNF had not been in a position to substantively justify its findings of serious misconduct and its process was fundamentally flawed, Mr Nunn could not be said to have contributed to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance. No reduction was applied.
12. Costs: The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If agreement cannot be reached, Mr Nunn may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with PNF having 14 days to respond.

The claim was upheld in full: unjustified dismissal established, public holiday arrears claim established, and no contributory reduction applied.

- Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)): $20,000
- Lost wages: Amount equivalent to three months' wages (inclusive of holiday pay and KiwiSaver) — precise dollar figure not specified in the determination
- Notice period pay: Amount equivalent to four weeks' notice — precise dollar figure not specified
- Public holiday arrears: The difference between what Mr Nunn was paid on a pro-rata basis and what he would have been paid at an 8-hour-day rate for public holidays between April 2022 and February 2023 — precise dollar figure not specified
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs: Reserved

Applicant: Heather Howard (employee)
Respondent: Independent Timber Merchants Co-operative Limited (employer)

Applicant: Heather Howard (self-represented)
Respondent: Jin Park, Counsel for the Respondent

Heather Howard, a Data and Insights Analyst, brought claims of unjustified disadvantage (bullying and harassment), unjustified dismissal, and breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 and good faith obligations against her employer ITM, following a dispute over an overpayment of wages and the cessation of flexible working arrangements upon her return from parental leave. The Authority found that Ms Howard's prolonged refusal to agree to a repayment schedule, her unsubstantiated bullying allegations, and her refusal to return to full-time work as contractually required collectively justified ITM's decision to dismiss her. All of Ms Howard's claims were dismissed.

Ms Howard was employed as a full-time Data and Insights Analyst by ITM from 3 August 2020 until November 2024. She returned from parental leave on transitional part-time arrangements (reduced to 29 hours per week until 31 October 2024), after which her employment agreement required her to revert to 40 hours per week. An administrative payroll error resulted in Ms Howard being overpaid by $6,265.38 (gross) over six pay periods between June and August 2024. From August 2024, ITM made extensive efforts to agree a repayment schedule with Ms Howard, but she repeatedly declined to sign any agreement and conditioned repayment on ITM extending her part-time hours to January 2025 — a position ITM denied ever agreeing to. Ms Howard lodged a personal grievance on 22 October 2024 alleging bullying and harassment by senior managers, refused to return to work on 1 November 2024, and was subsequently dismissed following a disciplinary process in November 2024. The overpayment amount was deducted from her final pay.

1. Unjustified Disadvantage (Bullying): Whether ITM unjustifiably disadvantaged Ms Howard through bullying and harassment by two senior managers during the overpayment and disciplinary processes — [Dismissed]
2. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether ITM unjustifiably dismissed Ms Howard under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
3. Wages Protection Act Breach: Whether the deduction of the overpayment ($6,265.38 gross) from Ms Howard's final pay breached ss 4 and 5 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — [Dismissed]
4. Good Faith (s 4 ERA): Whether ITM breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
5. Remedies: Whether Ms Howard was entitled to lost wages and/or compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — [Not reached]
6. Contributory Conduct Reduction: Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for Ms Howard's blameworthy contributory conduct — [Not reached]
7. Costs: Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs of representation — [Reserved]

1. Unjustified Disadvantage (Bullying): The Authority applied ITM's own harassment and bullying policy and assessed whether the conduct of Ms Jourdain and Ms Gerrand amounted to unwanted, unwarranted, and repeated behaviour causing detriment to Ms Howard's dignity, safety, or wellbeing. The Authority found that the conduct attributed to Ms Jourdain — including pursuing repayment, requiring Ms Howard to return to full-time hours, and involvement in disciplinary processes — constituted the reasonable exercise of lawful management functions, not bullying. No evidence supported the bullying allegations against Ms Gerrand, who was not named in the original personal grievance. Although the Authority noted an error in ITM communicating the investigation outcome through Ms Jourdain (the subject of the complaint), this did not amount to unjustified disadvantage. The grievance claim was dismissed.
2. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A test — whether ITM's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. It assessed whether ITM sufficiently investigated, raised concerns with Ms Howard, gave her a reasonable opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered her response. The Authority found that Ms Howard's sustained refusal to agree to any repayment schedule while acknowledging the debt, her linking of repayment to an unsubstantiated claim of agreed part-time hours, her unsubstantiated bullying allegations, and her refusal to return to work as contractually required collectively established a pattern of conduct going to the core of the employment relationship. Relying on Orme v Eagle Technology Group Ltd and Emmanuel v Waikato District Health Board [2019] NZEmpC 81, the Authority was satisfied that the conduct amounted to serious misconduct capable of destroying the trust and confidence essential to the relationship. Procedurally, Ms Howard was given notice, attended meetings with a representative, and ITM genuinely considered her feedback before deciding to dismiss. The dismissal was justified.
3. Wages Protection Act Breach: The Authority considered whether the deduction from final pay complied with ss 4 and 5 of the Wages Protection Act 1983, which require either written consent or, where an employment agreement allows deductions, consultation about the specific deduction. The IEA contained a general deductions clause expressly covering overpayments. ITM had consulted extensively with Ms Howard over three months about repayment. While no express written consent to a final-pay deduction was obtained, Ms Howard's representative had acknowledged that any outstanding amount would be deducted from final pay, indicating awareness. The Authority was satisfied there was no breach of the WPA.
4. Good Faith (s 4 ERA): The Authority found no breach of ITM's good faith obligations. ITM responded promptly to the overpayment, offered multiple repayment options, corrected its error on gross versus net calculation, investigated the bullying allegations, and responded to the personal grievance. The Authority found ITM made genuine efforts to accommodate Ms Howard's hours during her return to work and to resolve the repayment issue collaboratively. By contrast, Ms Howard's conduct — conditioning repayment on part-time hours and refusing to make any payment once the gross/net issue was resolved — raised its own good faith concerns. The claim was unsuccessful.
5. Remedies: Not reached, as all substantive grievance and statutory breach claims were dismissed.
6. Contributory Conduct Reduction: Not reached, as no remedies were awarded.
7. Costs: Reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If not resolved, ITM may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; Ms Howard has 14 days from service to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be assessed on its standard daily tariff basis absent special circumstances.

All of Ms Howard's claims — unjustified disadvantage, unjustified dismissal, Wages Protection Act breach, and good faith breach — were dismissed in their entirety.

None ordered. All claims were unsuccessful. Costs are reserved pending agreement between the parties or further memoranda.

Applicant: Michael Kissin (employee)
Respondent: WiTricity New Zealand Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Joe Benz

Mr Kissin was employed as director of engineering by WiTricity New Zealand Limited from May 2021 until June 2025, when he resigned with four weeks' notice as the company was being wound up. He brought claims for unpaid wages and annual holiday pay. The Authority upheld both claims in full, ordering WNZL to pay a total of $49,420 (gross).

Mr Kissin commenced employment with WNZL on or about 1 May 2021 as director of engineering. In early 2025, he became aware of a reduction in funding from the US parent company, WiTricity Corporation. On 28 April 2025, all employees were locked out of WNZL's computer systems; Mr Kissin was told this was an error and that long-term funding was being pursued. He resigned on 10 May 2025 with four weeks' written notice, and his final day was 6 June 2025. During his notice period he assisted WNZL by placing assets into storage, though he remained locked out of computer systems. At a meeting on 15 May 2025 it became clear the company was being wound up. Mr Kissin claimed he was owed one week's unpaid salary prior to resignation, his four-week notice period wages, and outstanding annual holiday pay. WNZL did not file a statement in reply, provide an affidavit, or supply wages, time, or leave records as directed by the Authority.

1. Wage Arrears: Whether WNZL owed Mr Kissin unpaid wages, comprising one week's salary ($4,442 gross) and four weeks' notice period pay ($17,769 gross) — [Established]
2. Annual Holiday Pay: Whether WNZL owed Mr Kissin outstanding annual holiday pay at the conclusion of his employment — [Established]
3. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded to either party — [Dismissed]

1. Wage Arrears: Under s 131 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority has jurisdiction to order payment of wages owed. Mr Kissin supported his claim with payslips and additional documentation. WNZL failed to respond, file a reply, or provide any wage and time records as directed. The Authority accepted Mr Kissin's evidence and was satisfied that WNZL owed him $22,211 (gross) in wage arrears, comprising one week's unpaid salary and four weeks' notice period pay.
2. Annual Holiday Pay: Employees are entitled to annual holiday pay accrued during their employment under the Holidays Act 2003. Mr Kissin provided evidence of the outstanding balance of annual holiday pay at the end of his employment. Again, WNZL offered no records or rebuttal evidence. The Authority was satisfied WNZL owed Mr Kissin $27,209 (gross) as the outstanding balance of annual holiday pay at the conclusion of his employment.
3. Costs: The Authority exercised its discretion and directed that costs lie where they fall, with no reasons elaborated upon beyond that brief statement.

Both claims were upheld in full; the wage arrears and annual holiday pay claims were established, and no costs were awarded to either party.

- Wage arrears: $22,211 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Annual holiday pay: $27,209 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Total ordered: $49,420 (gross)
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs: None ordered (costs to lie where they fall)
- Reinstatement: No

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Devon Harris (employee)
Respondent: Astra Construction Group Limited (employer)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: Doreen Wu

This is a costs-only determination following a successful personal grievance claim by Devon Harris for unjustified dismissal against Astra Construction Group Limited. The parties agreed costs by consent and jointly sought a consent determination. The Authority ordered Astra Construction Group Limited to pay Mr Harris $4,500.00 as a contribution to his costs of representation.

On 29 April 2026, the Authority determined in [2026] NZERA 276 that Mr Harris had established a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal, with awards and a penalty made in his favour. Costs were reserved at that time and the parties were encouraged to resolve costs directly. By joint memorandum dated 12 May 2026, the parties informed the Authority they had agreed on costs and sought a consent determination.

1. Costs Award: Whether Mr Harris, as the successful party, is entitled to a costs contribution by consent — [Established]

1. Costs Award: The parties reached agreement on costs and jointly sought a consent determination. As the successful party, Mr Harris was entitled to a costs award. The Authority gave effect to the parties' agreement and ordered payment of $4,500.00.

The costs claim was resolved by consent, with the Authority ordering Astra Construction Group Limited to pay Mr Harris $4,500.00 as a contribution to his costs of representation.

Costs: $4,500.00 (contribution to costs of representation), payable by Astra Construction Group Limited to Mr Harris by no later than 19 June 2026.

Applicant: Weidong Zhou (worker/applicant)
Respondent: Lihe Construction Limited (alleged employer)

Applicant: Lennon Xi, advocate
Respondent: Tracey Hu, counsel

Weidong Zhou claimed he was an employee of Lihe Construction Limited (LCL) and was seriously injured while working at a construction site on 11 February 2025 moving heavy marble slabs. LCL denied an employment relationship existed, asserting Mr Zhou was an independent contractor engaged for a single specific job. The Authority found that Mr Zhou was not an employee of LCL and was therefore unable to assist him further with his claims of unjustified dismissal and disadvantage.

LCL is a sole-director company operated by Mr Luo, which performs renovation and gardening work using casual contract labour as needed. In early February 2025, a third-party contractor (XXD) engaged Mr Luo for a marble slab unloading job; Mr Luo in turn arranged additional workers via a WeChat chain initiated through an intermediary (SSP), advertising $24 per hour at a specific address. Mr Zhou, who had been unemployed, learned of the job from his friend Mr Chen and agreed to attend without any direct prior contact with Mr Luo. On 11 February 2025, Mr Zhou arrived slightly late to the site and was seriously injured when a marble slab slipped, requiring three months of hospitalisation and approximately a year of recovery. Mr Zhou claimed he was directed by Mr Luo on site, while Mr Luo maintained that XXD controlled the site and issued instructions in English, which he merely translated. The central dispute was whether the real nature of the relationship between Mr Zhou and LCL constituted employment.

1. Employment Status: Whether Mr Zhou was an employee or an independent contractor of LCL when working on 11 February 2025, applying s 6(1)–(3) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed (not an employee)]
2. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Mr Zhou was unjustifiably dismissed by LCL — [Not reached]
3. Unjustified Disadvantage: Whether Mr Zhou was unjustifiably disadvantaged by LCL — [Not reached]
4. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded — [Reserved]

1. Employment Status: The Authority applied s 6(1)–(3) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, noting first that no written agreement designating Mr Zhou as an independent contractor existed, so the "specified contractor" gateway in s 6(7) was unavailable. The Authority then applied the control, integration, and fundamental/economic reality tests, as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd (No 2) and affirmed in Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc [2025] NZSC 162. On control, the Authority found LCL did not control the site (XXD did), Mr Luo had no contact details for Mr Zhou, could not enforce his attendance, and Mr Zhou was free to accept other work. On integration, LCL had no payroll, no employees, and no organisational structure into which Mr Zhou could be integrated. On the fundamental test, Mr Zhou was paid a fixed hourly rate, was free to subcontract, provided no tools (though neither did LCL, rendering this factor neutral), and bore no risk of loss/opportunity for profit distinct from other workers. The Authority concluded Mr Zhou was not in an employment relationship with LCL.
2. Unjustified Dismissal: Not reached, as the threshold issue of employment status was resolved against Mr Zhou, making it unnecessary to consider any personal grievance claims.
3. Unjustified Disadvantage: Not reached for the same reason — the absence of an employment relationship meant the Authority had no jurisdiction to consider this claim.
4. Costs: Reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. LCL was directed to lodge a memorandum on costs within 14 days of the determination if resolution was not reached, with Mr Zhou having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would ordinarily be determined on the notional daily rate unless particular circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was dismissed; Mr Zhou was found not to be an employee of LCL, and no further relief could be granted.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending memoranda from the parties.

[CONSENT]

Applicant: Health New Zealand (employer)
Respondent: Association of Professionals and Executive Employees Inc / APEX (union)

Applicant: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel
Respondent: Sarah Barker, advocate

Health New Zealand applied to the Employment Relations Authority for urgent referral to facilitation under s 50B of the Employment Relations Act 2000, after collective bargaining with APEX for a new Medical Physicists' collective agreement stalled following ten days of bargaining and multiple rounds of strike notices. APEX did not oppose the application. The Authority found the ground of unduly protracted bargaining under s 50C(1)(b) was established, and ordered the parties into facilitation.

Health New Zealand and APEX are parties to an expired Medical Physicists' collective agreement, with APEX having initiated bargaining for a new agreement on 3 July 2025. Bargaining commenced on 30 July 2025 and spanned ten days across multiple sessions, plus a productivity workshop and mediated bargaining on 14 May 2026. APEX issued strike notices in May 2026 targeting multiple hospitals nationwide, though early notices were withdrawn following mediation; further notices were issued on 22 and 25 May 2026. Despite these efforts, the parties were unable to reach a new collective agreement. APEX accepted the factual chronology but disputed minor details, including whether Health New Zealand tabled an offer in August 2025 and whether APEX agreed to speak positively of a mediation offer. Notwithstanding these minor disputes, APEX did not oppose the application and agreed the matter could be resolved on the papers.

1. Unduly Protracted Bargaining (s 50C(1)(b)): Whether the bargaining has been unduly protracted and extensive efforts including mediation have failed to resolve the difficulties preventing settlement — [Established]
2. Public Interest Strike Ground (s 50C(1)(d)): Whether APEX's proposed strikes would, if they occurred, be likely to affect the public interest substantially — [Not reached]

1. Unduly Protracted Bargaining (s 50C(1)(b)): The Authority applied the test from McCain Foods (NZ) Limited v Service & Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc [2009], which defines undue protraction as "excessive or disproportionate protraction as opposed to reasonable or expected or common protraction." The Authority noted that bargaining had continued across ten days since July 2025 with a productivity workshop and mediation, yet the parties remained unable to settle. Applying the principle from Service & Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc v Sanford Limited [2012] that the Authority should not be astute to find reasons to refuse referral where a common sense assessment supports it, the Authority was satisfied this ground was made out.
2. Public Interest Strike Ground (s 50C(1)(d)): As the s 50C(1)(b) ground was established, it was unnecessary for the Authority to consider whether the proposed strikes would substantially affect the public interest under s 50C(1)(d).

The application for referral to facilitation was upheld on the basis that bargaining had been unduly protracted under s 50C(1)(b), and the parties are ordered into facilitation.

Facilitation ordered: The parties are directed to engage in facilitation to assist in reaching a new collective agreement. A case management conference will be convened promptly to arrange urgent facilitation, to be conducted by a different Authority Member. Costs: Each party bears their own costs, per the Authority's standard practice direction on facilitation referrals.

Applicant: Claudia Moreira and Laura Jimenez (workers claiming employee status)
Respondent: Renew Wellness Place Limited (engaging entity)

Applicant: Paul Pa'u, advocate for the First and Second Applicants
Respondent: Alastair Espie and Bridget Craig for the Respondent

Two workers — Claudia Moreira and Laura Jimenez — engaged by Renew Wellness Place Limited under written independent contractor agreements claimed they were in fact employees and sought a preliminary determination on that threshold question. The Authority applied the three Bryson v Three Foot Six tests (control, integration, and fundamental/economic reality) alongside analysis of the written agreements and how the relationships operated in practice. The Authority found both applicants were genuine independent contractors, dismissed their applications, and reserved costs.

Renew Wellness Place Limited operates a health and wellness clinic in Parnell, Auckland. Ms Jimenez began assisting with setting up the clinic in late 2023/early 2024, initially taking on a clinic manager role, while Ms Moreira commenced on 12 February 2024 as a customer service manager. Both signed written "Contractor Agreements" labelling them as independent contractors, with Ms Moreira negotiating some adjustments to her terms (public holiday pay at time and a half, and at least one day off per week). The working relationship operated largely as described in each contract, with the applicants managing their own rostering, rendering invoices fortnightly, and handling their own tax obligations. Tensions arose in mid-to-late 2024 when Renew sought to reduce contractor hours due to financial pressures, and both applicants terminated their agreements in December 2024. Each applicant claimed other personal grievances contingent on being found to be employees; both denied being independent contractors in reality.

1. Employment Status: Were Ms Moreira and Ms Jimenez employees of Renew Wellness Place Limited, applying the "real nature of the relationship" test under s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, including the control test, integration test, and fundamental/economic reality test as articulated in Bryson v Three Foot Six Limited? — (Dismissed)
2. Dependent Personal Grievances: Could the applicants pursue their other personal grievances (contingent on a finding of employment)? — (Not reached)
3. Costs: Should either party contribute to the costs of representation of the other party? — (Conditional/Reserved)

1. Employment Status: The Authority applied s 6 of the Act, which requires it to determine the "real nature of the relationship" without treating any label as determinative, and used the three Bryson v Three Foot Six tests. On the control test, the Authority found Mr Rissetto exercised minimal day-to-day control, especially after May 2024, with the applicants managing their own rostering and reporting only at a high level — consistent with independent contracting. On the integration test, while the applicants wore uniforms and appeared to clients as part of the business, the Authority treated this as a neutral factor reflecting the character of the services rather than the true nature of the relationship. On the fundamental/economic reality test, both applicants set their own hours, rendered invoices, managed their own tax, and brought pre-existing skills — indicating they worked on their own account. The Authority also noted neither was unsophisticated, the contracts were negotiated (not imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis), neither sought employee entitlements such as leave or KiwiSaver in negotiations, each managed their own tax affairs, and both applicants had themselves explained the contractor arrangement to other Renew workers. The written agreements were given weight as genuine expressions of the parties' mutual intent, with limited divergence in practice. The application was dismissed.
2. Dependent Personal Grievances: Not reached, as the finding that both applicants were independent contractors meant the Authority had no jurisdiction to consider grievances available only to employees.
3. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If not resolved, Renew may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with the applicants having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would ordinarily apply its notional daily rate of $2,250 for on-the-papers matters unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claims were dismissed in full — both applicants were found to be genuine independent contractors, not employees of Renew Wellness Place Limited.

None ordered. The applications for a finding of employment status were dismissed. Costs were reserved, with a process prescribed for future determination if not resolved between the parties.