Stay informed about NZ Employment law

Harrison Murray, a plumbing and drainage worker, was dismissed by In Ch-It Plumbing and Drainage Limited (ICIPDL) on 10 January 2025 after approximately two months of employment. ICIPDL sought to rely on a 90-day trial period clause to justify the dismissal, but the Authority found the trial period was invalid because the employment agreement was signed after Mr Murray had already started work. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified, established several statutory breaches, and ordered compensation for lost wages, hurt and humiliation, arrears of notice pay, interest, and a penalty.

Applicant: Harrison Murray (employee)
Respondent: In Ch-It Plumbing and Drainage Limited (employer)

Applicant: William Lynch, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

Harrison Murray was employed by ICIPDL in earthworks, concrete and drainage works from 11 November 2024. The parties signed a written individual employment agreement (IEA) on 18 November 2024 — after Mr Murray had already commenced employment — which contained a 90-day trial period clause. On 10 January 2025, following a meeting with ICIPDL director David Anderson, Mr Murray was dismissed. Mr Murray was given short notice of the meeting, was not told dismissal was a possible outcome, and one of the grounds cited in his dismissal letter (unauthorised use of a work vehicle) was not raised with him at the meeting. ICIPDL did not attend the investigation meeting, despite receiving notice; attempts to contact ICIPDL by telephone were unsuccessful. ICIPDL contended the dismissal was lawful under the trial period, and in the alternative argued Mr Murray's conduct (absences, lateness, vehicle misuse) contributed to his dismissal in a blameworthy way.

1. Whether the 90-day trial period clause was valid and binding on the parties — Status: Dismissed (paras [10]-[11], [18]).

The Authority applied the strict compliance requirement from s 67A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, as confirmed in Smith v Stokes Valley Pharmacy (2009) Ltd and Blackmore v Honick Properties Limited, which requires the trial period to be agreed in writing before the employee commences work. The IEA was signed on 18 November 2024, after Mr Murray began employment on 11 November 2024, making the trial period invalid. The Authority also noted that ICIPDL's failure to pay one week's notice as contractually required would independently have vitiated reliance on the trial period, citing Ioan v Scott Technology NZ Limited [2019] NZCA 386.

2. Whether Mr Murray was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [12]-[13], [15]-[19]).

With the trial period invalid, the Authority applied the s 103A justification test — whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as ICIPDL did. Mr Murray was called to a meeting without fair notice of the matters to be discussed or that dismissal was a possible outcome, and at least one ground of dismissal (vehicle use) was not raised with him at the meeting. These procedural defects were not minor. The dismissal was unjustified.

3. Whether Mr Murray was entitled to reimbursement of lost wages under s 123(1)(b) — Status: Established (paras [20]-[21]).

The Authority considered evidence of Mr Murray's loss and his efforts to find alternative employment. It awarded $15,080 (gross), representing 13 weeks (three months) of lost remuneration calculated at his rate of pay and minimum guaranteed hours.

4. Whether Mr Murray was entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [22]-[23]).

Mr Murray gave evidence of significant personal harm: stress, financial strain, relationship breakdown, housing upheaval, difficulty sleeping, and needing to care for his son. The Authority assessed the harm against the spectrum of similar awards and awarded $16,000.

5. Whether Mr Murray's conduct contributed to the circumstances of dismissal under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [24]-[27]).

The Authority is required to consider contributory conduct and reduce remedies if warranted. The Authority found Mr Murray did not contribute in a blameworthy way. His absences were attributed to extraordinary personal circumstances (child falling ill and coming into his full-time care), his work hours in the preceding weeks were substantial, and ICIPDL had not raised its concerns with sufficient clarity during employment. The vehicle use ground was not raised at the disciplinary meeting. No deductions were made.

6. Whether arrears of wages (notice pay) were due — Status: Established (para [28]).

Mr Murray was not paid one week's contractual notice on termination as required by the IEA. He was awarded $1,160 (gross), calculated at $29 per hour for a minimum of 40 hours per week.

7. Whether holiday pay arrears were owing — Status: Not reached (footnote 1).

Mr Murray withdrew this claim at the investigation meeting, having acknowledged he received termination holiday pay in his final pay.

8. Whether interest should be ordered on arrears — Status: Established (paras [29]-[30]).

The Authority has power to award interest under the second schedule of the Act. Interest was ordered on the $1,160 arrears from 10 January 2025 until the date of full payment, to be calculated using the civil debt interest calculator.

9. Whether ICIPDL breached good faith obligations under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established but folded into grievance remedy (paras [31]-[32]).

The Authority found ICIPDL was not open and communicative with Mr Murray about its concerns, inconsistent with the duty of good faith. However, a separate penalty for this breach was not ordered, as it was subsumed within the personal grievance for which remedies were already awarded.

10. Whether ICIPDL breached the Wages Protection Act 1983 by failing to pay wages in lieu of notice on termination — Status: Established (paras [31], [33], [36]).

ICIPDL failed to pay the contractual week's notice on termination and had not remedied this despite being on notice of the claim. The Authority found this constituted an unlawful deduction and a breach of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983. This breach was globalised with the wage records breach for penalty purposes.

11. Whether ICIPDL breached s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to provide wage and time records on request — Status: Established (paras [31], [33], [36]).

Mr Murray requested wage and time records by letter dated 21 January 2025, but they were not provided until the statement in reply was filed on 14 October 2025 — a delay of approximately nine months. This was found to be non-compliant with the statutory obligation to provide immediate access to records on request.

12. Whether penalties should be ordered for statutory breaches — Status: Partially established (paras [31]-[39]).

The maximum penalty per breach for a company is $20,000 under s 135 of the Act. The Authority considered factors under s 133A, and authorities including Nicholson v Ford and Labour Inspector v Daleson Investment Ltd. The good faith breach was not separately penalised. The wage records breach and failure to pay notice were globalised and a total penalty of $500 was ordered: half ($250) to Mr Murray and half to the Crown.

13. Whether either party was entitled to costs — Status: Reserved (para [41]).

Costs were reserved. Parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a memorandum process prescribed if agreement could not be reached.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, statutory breaches established, arrears and penalty ordered; contribution dismissed; costs reserved.

- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b)): $15,080 (gross) — payable within 28 days
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $16,000 — payable within 28 days
- Arrears of notice pay: $1,160 (gross) — payable within 28 days
- Interest on arrears of $1,160 from 10 January 2025 until date of full payment (calculated using the civil debt interest calculator) — payable within 14 days of determination
- Penalty: $500 total — $250 to Mr Murray, $250 to the Crown — payable within 21 days of determination
- Contribution reduction: None applied
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved

QHE, a former employee of Robert Walters New Zealand Limited (RW), pursued a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage and sought to join Samsung Electronics New Zealand Limited (SENZ) as either a controlling third party (CTP) or joint employer. The key legal questions were whether SENZ met the statutory threshold for joinder as a CTP under s 103B of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether SENZ could be considered QHE's joint employer. The Authority granted the application to join SENZ as a CTP and directed all three parties to mediation before the substantive investigation continues.

Applicant: QHE (employee — name suppressed)
Respondent: Robert Walters New Zealand Limited (employer); Samsung Electronics New Zealand Limited (proposed second respondent)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in person)
Respondent (RW): Anne Wilson, counsel for the respondent
Proposed Respondent (SENZ): Emma Peterson, counsel for the proposed respondent

QHE was employed by RW under a fixed-term individual employment agreement from 21 June 2021, and was seconded to SENZ under a Master Services Agreement between RW and SENZ to work as a Graduate RF/Drive Test Engineer in SENZ's Graduate Programme. His role involved overnight mobility testing in a moving vehicle provided by SENZ. In December 2021 QHE was subject to a disciplinary process related to his unauthorised use of his own vehicle for testing; he responded by raising a personal grievance with both RW and SENZ on or around 17 December 2021, alleging unjustified disadvantage due to working conditions — specifically that the SENZ vehicle was unsuitable and causing him motion sickness and equipment malfunctions. RW investigated the grievance (with SENZ representatives participating), issued QHE a letter of expectations in January 2022, and on 25 March 2022 QHE entered a second fixed-term agreement with RW in an office-based role. In a prior preliminary determination dated 28 January 2026, the Authority found it lacked jurisdiction over QHE's unjustified dismissal claim and made an interim non-publication order suppressing QHE's name. The current application concerns joinder of SENZ as a CTP or joint employer to the remaining unjustified disadvantage claim.

1. Whether the notification requirement under s 115A of the Act was satisfied so as to permit joinder of SENZ as a CTP — Status: Established (paras [22]-[23]).

Section 103B(3)(a) requires compliance with the notification requirements in s 115A, meaning the employee must have notified the CTP that its actions caused or contributed to the personal grievance within the applicable notification period. SENZ argued it was not properly notified because the grievance focused entirely on the vehicle and its health consequences rather than on SENZ's conduct specifically. The Authority found that QHE's joint notification to both RW and SENZ on or around 17 December 2021 was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement; the threshold was met.

2. Whether SENZ met the definition of a controlling third party under s 5 of the Act — Status: Established (para [25]).

The two-stage s 5 test requires: (a) a contract or arrangement with the employer under which the employee performs work for the person's benefit; and (b) the person exercises, or is entitled to exercise, control or direction over the employee similar to that of an employer. SENZ itself accepted it was a CTP, and the MSA between RW and SENZ confirmed this status. The Authority was satisfied s 103B(3)(b)(i) was met without material dispute.

3. Whether an arguable case was made out that SENZ's actions caused or contributed to the personal grievance under s 103B(3)(b)(ii) — Status: Established (paras [24]-[26]).

The "arguable case" threshold is a relatively low one, analogous to the standard applied in interim reinstatement settings (citing X v Y Ltd v New Zealand Stock Exchange [1992] 1 ERNZ 863), requiring serious or arguable but not certain prospects of success. SENZ argued its actions did not cause or contribute to the grievance because the complaint was about the vehicle itself. The Authority rejected this, finding that the vehicle and work method QHE was required to use were provided by and under the control of SENZ, and there was at least an arguable case that SENZ's actions caused or contributed to the grievance. Section 103B(3)(b)(ii) was satisfied.

4. Whether SENZ's submission that there was no unresolved personal grievance defeated the joinder application — Status: Dismissed (para [27]).

SENZ argued that RW had already suitably addressed and resolved the grievance, and QHE had subsequently moved to an office-based role, meaning there was no unresolved grievance and therefore no jurisdictional foundation to join SENZ. The Authority declined to accept this at the joinder stage, finding that the evidence on this point had not been properly tested and it was premature to make a finding at this preliminary stage.

5. Whether SENZ was QHE's joint employer — Status: Not reached (paras [28]-[29]).

QHE contended SENZ was his joint employer alongside RW; both RW and SENZ denied this. Because the Authority granted joinder as a CTP, it found it unnecessary to determine the joint employer question. For completeness, however, the Authority observed that the starting point under s 6 of the Act would be the real nature of the relationship, and that on the available evidence (RW recruited QHE, held the written employment agreement, paid wages, and managed the employment relationship), an objective assessment would have found QHE employed by RW alone — not SENZ.

6. Whether the parties should be directed to mediation before the substantive investigation continues — Status: Established (paras [31]-[33]).

Section 103B(5) of the Act empowers the Authority to direct parties to use mediation services following joinder of a CTP. Having granted joinder, the Authority considered it appropriate to direct all three parties to attend mediation. The Authority warned QHE that his litigation approach — including a 102-page draft amended statement of problem — was exposing him to a significant costs risk if unsuccessful. Mediation was ordered to be attended by no later than 20 October 2026, and the Authority proceedings were suspended pending mediation or further direction.

7. Whether the interim non-publication order suppressing QHE's name should be made permanent — Status: Not reached (para [4]).

An interim non-publication order was made in the preliminary determination of 28 January 2026. The Authority noted the order remains in place for now but that parties should be prepared to make further submissions on permanent suppression in the substantive proceedings; no final determination was made at this stage.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [34]).

Costs were expressly reserved pending the investigation of QHE's personal grievance. No costs order was made at this stage. The Authority separately warned QHE about his exposure to a costs award should he be unsuccessful.

The application to join SENZ as a controlling third party was upheld; the parties were directed to mediation; all other issues were reserved or not reached.

None ordered at this stage. The Authority directed the three parties to attend mediation by no later than 20 October 2026, with proceedings suspended in the interim. Costs reserved pending the substantive investigation. Non-publication order remains in interim form; permanency to be addressed in substantive proceedings.

[CONSENT]

Steven David Mitchell (employee) brought an employment relationship problem against Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated (employer), which had resulted in an earlier interim reinstatement order dated 2 July 2026. The parties subsequently reached a private settlement resolving all matters between them and jointly applied to the Authority to record consent orders discontinuing proceedings, discharging the applicant from his undertaking as to damages, and confirming no costs liability. The determination gives effect entirely to that agreed resolution.

Applicant: Steven David Mitchell (employee)
Respondent: Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated (employer)

Applicant: William Rasburn and Callum Osborne (counsel — firm not stated)
Respondent: Brian Nathan and Sari Robb (counsel — firm not stated)

Steven David Mitchell was employed by Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated in circumstances not described in this determination. A prior determination dated 2 July 2026 (Mitchell v Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated [2006] 435, as cited) granted interim reinstatement pending full investigation of an employment relationship problem. At the time of that interim reinstatement application, the applicant gave an undertaking as to damages, as is standard in interim relief proceedings. Before the investigation proceeded to a substantive hearing, the parties reached a private settlement of all matters in dispute. Both parties jointly approached the Authority to record the settlement as consent orders and to close the Authority file.

1. Whether the Authority should record the parties' private settlement as consent orders discontinuing proceedings — Status: Established (paras [2]–[3]).

The Employment Relations Act 2000 permits the Authority to make orders by consent of the parties. Both parties jointly confirmed they had resolved their employment relationship problem and no further proceedings were required. The Authority accepted this joint application and made the requested orders, including discontinuance of proceedings, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

2. Whether the applicant should be discharged from his undertaking as to damages given in connection with the interim reinstatement application — Status: Established (paras [2]–[3]).

When interim reinstatement is granted, an applicant typically provides an undertaking as to damages to protect the respondent should the interim relief prove to have been wrongly granted. As the matter has been fully settled, continuation of that undertaking was no longer appropriate. At the joint request of both parties, the Authority discharged Steven David Mitchell from that undertaking as a term of the consent orders.

3. Whether there should be any order as to costs — Status: Dismissed (para [2]).

Both parties jointly confirmed there was no issue as to costs. The Authority recorded this agreement as part of the consent orders, and no costs were ordered.

4. Whether the Authority investigation timetable and scheduled hearing dates should be vacated — Status: Established (para [4]).

As the matter was fully resolved, there was no basis to continue the investigation. The Authority, at the joint request of the parties, vacated the investigation timetable and all scheduled investigation meeting dates, and closed the Authority file.

The matter was resolved by consent; all proceedings were discontinued, the applicant was discharged from his undertaking as to damages, no costs were ordered, and the Authority file was closed.

None ordered on the merits. By consent: (a) Proceedings discontinued; (b) Applicant discharged from undertaking as to damages given at the interim reinstatement stage; (c) No order as to costs; (d) Authority file closed and investigation timetable vacated.

[COSTS ONLY]

Four applicant employees brought employment relationship problems against Fiji Food Distributors NZ Limited (in liquidation) and its director Ameer Ali. Following two substantive determinations in which the applicants succeeded on unjustified disadvantage, unjustified dismissal, wage arrears, and penalties, this determination resolves the outstanding costs question. The Authority declined to award full indemnity costs but applied a significantly uplifted daily tariff, resulting in a total costs award of $60,000 jointly and severally against both respondents.

Applicants: Siddanth Prasad, Nishalnikesh Lal, Amit Verma, and Mukeshwar Prasad (employees)
Respondents: Fiji Food Distributors NZ Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent/employer) and Ameer Ali (Second Respondent)

Applicants: Rupert Ward, counsel
Respondents (First Respondent): No appearance (Liquidators consented to abide by decision)
Respondents (Second Respondent): No appearance

The four applicants were employed by Fiji Food Distributors NZ Limited (FFDL) and pursued employment relationship problems beginning in March 2022. In a substantive determination dated 20 October 2025, the Authority found that FFDL had unjustifiably disadvantaged and dismissed the applicants and owed them wage arrears. In a second determination dated 21 April 2026, the Authority ordered FFDL to pay a penalty of $50,000, deemed Ameer Ali to be a person involved in employment standards breaches, and granted the applicants leave to recover wage arrears. Costs were reserved in the second determination to allow the parties to attempt to agree; no agreement was reached. The applicants then applied for costs against both FFDL (in liquidation) and Mr Ali. FFDL's liquidators consented to the process and agreed to abide by any decision; Mr Ali did not respond despite being directed to do so.

1. Whether costs should follow the event in favour of the successful applicants — Status: Established (paras [12]-[13]).

The starting principle under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and the Authority's costs practice note is that costs follow the event, meaning a successful party is entitled to an award of costs from the other side. The applicants succeeded against both FFDL and Mr Ali in the substantive determinations, and the Authority confirmed they were entitled to a costs award on that basis without further elaboration being required.

2. Whether indemnity costs should be awarded based on the respondents' conduct and rejection of Calderbank settlement offers — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[19]).

The Authority acknowledged that indemnity costs may be appropriate where a party's conduct of the claim was particularly bad or where a Calderbank offer was unreasonably rejected, citing Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [2009] NZCA 234 and Prins v Tirohanga Group Limited (EmpC AC 27/07). The applicants submitted that two Calderbank offers (April 2025 and July 2025) were rejected at values lower than the amounts ultimately awarded, and that FFDL and Mr Ali engaged in obstructive behaviour, produced questionable evidence, refused mediation, and caused significant delays over approximately three and a half years. While the Authority largely accepted these submissions and characterised the matter as exceptional, it held that the bar for indemnity costs is very high and was not met on these facts; costs would instead be assessed on the daily tariff basis with significant upward adjustments.

3. Whether the daily tariff should be applied and at what base rate — Status: Established (paras [14], [20]-[21]).

The Authority applied the standard daily tariff of $4,500 for the first day and $3,500 for each subsequent day of an investigation meeting. It allocated seven equivalent "days" across the components of the proceedings: five days for the investigation meeting ($18,000), one day for post-meeting submissions ($3,500), and one day for penalty/s 142W submissions ($4,500), producing a starting point of $25,000.

4. Whether the daily tariff should be increased to reflect rejection of Calderbank offers — Status: Established (para [23]).

The Authority was satisfied that the two rejected Calderbank offers (both below the amounts ultimately awarded) justified an upward adjustment to the daily rate of $1,500 per day.

5. Whether the daily tariff should be increased to reflect the evidential complexity of the problem — Status: Established (para [24]).

The problem required in-depth evidential analysis to establish FFDL's employment standards breaches, significantly compounded by FFDL's failure to keep accurate records and its production of questionable evidence. The Authority accepted this created considerably more work than the daily tariff contemplates and awarded an additional increase of $2,500 per day.

6. Whether the daily tariff should be increased to reflect the respondents' conduct in the proceedings — Status: Established (para [25]).

The Authority accepted that FFDL and Mr Ali's obstructive conduct — including delays, failure to comply with directions, prevarication, and bad faith behaviour throughout — caused significant additional work and costs for the applicants, warranting a further increase of $1,000 per day.

7. Whether FFDL and Mr Ali should be jointly and severally liable for the costs award — Status: Established (paras [29]-[30]).

Given that the applicants succeeded against both respondents and having regard to the circumstances of the proceedings, the Authority held both FFDL (in liquidation) and Mr Ali jointly and severally liable for the total costs award.

The costs application was upheld; indemnity costs were declined but a substantially uplifted daily tariff award of $60,000 was ordered jointly and severally against both respondents.

Costs: $60,000 payable by FFDL (in liquidation) and Ameer Ali jointly and severally to the applicants as a contribution to their costs (comprising a $25,000 base daily tariff amount plus a $5,000-per-day uplift across seven days = $35,000 uplift).
No other remedy ordered in this determination (substantive remedies and penalties were ordered in prior determinations).

Jack Richards, a Front Desk Administrator, claimed he was a permanent employee of Max & Beresford Orthodontists and Associates Limited (M&B) and was unjustifiably dismissed when his role was disestablished. M&B contended the employment was genuinely casual and it had simply stopped offering him further casual work, meaning no dismissal had occurred. The Authority found the real nature of the relationship was permanent employment, granting the Authority jurisdiction to investigate Mr Richards' substantive personal grievance claims.

Applicant: Jack Richards (employee)
Respondent: Max & Beresford Orthodontists and Associates Limited (employer)

Applicant: William Lynch, advocate
Respondent: Lewis Turner, counsel

Mr Richards applied for a full-time salaried Front Desk Administrator role advertised by M&B on Seek in May 2024, and began employment on 22 May 2024. His employment agreement contained contradictory provisions: Schedule A specified normal hours of 40 hours per week Monday to Friday with a pathway to permanent employment after three months, while a separate clause described the employment as "casual in nature on an 'as and when required' basis." M&B terminated the employment on 16 October 2024 by letter citing disestablishment of Mr Richards' role due to excess reception capacity, giving two weeks' notice and describing a consultation process. Mr Richards claimed he was a permanent employee who was unjustifiably dismissed, and also alleged M&B breached its record-keeping obligations under s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA). M&B maintained the employment was always casual and that ceasing to offer work to a casual employee did not constitute a dismissal. This preliminary determination addressed only the threshold jurisdictional question of whether the employment was genuinely casual or permanent.

1. Whether Mr Richards was in a genuinely casual or permanent employment relationship with M&B (jurisdictional threshold) — Status: Established as permanent employment (paras [13], [35]–[64]).

The Authority applied the test from Jinkinson v Oceana Gold (NZ) Limited [2009] ERNZ 255, which identifies multiple factors relevant to determining the real nature of an employment relationship: hours worked each week, whether work is allocated by roster, whether there is a regular pattern of work, mutual expectation of continuity, whether notice is required before absence, and consistency of start/finish times. The Authority noted that the parties' contractual description is not determinative and all relevant circumstances must be weighed. Applying those factors, the Authority found: the employment agreement itself specified 40 hours per week as "normal hours"; holiday pay accrued (inconsistent with casual employment); Dr Li required two weeks' notice before any change to Mr Richards' hours and consulted him before disestablishing his role; M&B gave notice of termination for redundancy rather than simply ceasing to offer work; and there was no evidence of discrete casual engagements being offered and accepted. The Authority concluded the real nature of the relationship was permanent employment, giving Mr Richards standing to pursue his personal grievance claims.

2. Whether Mr Richards is entitled to have his substantive personal grievance claims (unjustifiable dismissal) investigated and determined by the Authority — Status: Established (paras [65]).

Having found that Mr Richards was a permanent employee, the Authority held it has jurisdiction to investigate and determine his substantive personal grievance claims. No merits assessment of the unjustifiable dismissal claim was conducted in this preliminary determination; that remains for a subsequent investigation.

3. Whether M&B breached its record-keeping obligations under s 130 of the ERA, and whether a penalty should be awarded — Status: Not reached (paras [1], [6]).

This determination expressly dealt only with the preliminary jurisdictional issue of employment status. The s 130 record-keeping breach and associated penalty claim were identified as live claims but were not investigated or determined at this stage; they will be addressed in the substantive investigation.

4. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [67]).

The Authority reserved costs pending the outcome of the substantive investigation and determination.

The preliminary claim was upheld: Mr Richards was found to be in a permanent (not casual) employment relationship with M&B, giving the Authority jurisdiction to investigate his substantive personal grievance and record-keeping penalty claims.

None ordered at this stage. The determination is preliminary and confined to the jurisdictional question of employment status. The parties were directed to advise within 14 days whether they wished to attend further mediation before the substantive investigation. Costs were reserved pending the substantive determination.

PNB Limited (employer) brought an application against two current employees (WJN and YIM) alleging they had, without authorisation, downloaded large volumes of confidential client data onto personal devices between April and June 2026. The key legal question in this preliminary determination was whether interim injunctive relief should be granted requiring the respondents to submit all personal electronic devices to forensic examination, and on what conditions. The Authority granted the interim relief in full, subject to conditions including agreement on an independent forensic examiner, a privacy-protection protocol, and cost-sharing between the parties.

Applicant: PNB Limited (employer)
Respondent: WJN and YIM (employees / First and Second Respondents)

Applicant: Stephanie Dyhrberg and June Hardacre, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Michael O'Flaherty, counsel for the Respondents

PNB Limited is a business that recently underwent a sale and purchase, after which both WJN and YIM remained employed under 12-month fixed-term transitional employment agreements containing confidentiality and non-disclosure obligations. On 24 June 2026, PNB's engineering manager discovered that WJN had downloaded a large volume of PNB data — including sensitive client files — onto local file storage and an external hard drive on at least five separate occasions between April and June 2026, and had emailed some of this data to YIM's personal email addresses; YIM had also logged onto PNB's VPN from two unmanaged devices. The respondents admitted the downloading occurred but denied any wrongful intent, stated they had not further disclosed any of PNB's information, and provided written undertakings to that effect. Both parties agreed in principle that a forensic examination of certain devices should occur, but disputed the scope (PNB sought examination of all personal devices and accounts; respondents sought to limit examination to specific work-connected devices) and the terms of a privacy-protection protocol. PNB also applied for removal of the substantive matter to the Employment Court, but that issue was deferred pending resolution of the interim relief application.

1. Whether interim non-publication orders should be granted for the parties — Status: Established (paras [8]-[12]).

The Authority applied clause 10 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA). It was satisfied that interim non-publication was appropriate because adverse consequences (including reputational harm) could reasonably be expected to flow from identification of the parties at a stage when the evidence had not yet been fully tested. The interim order prohibits publication of the names and any identifying details of PNB and each respondent until a substantive determination is issued or a further order is made. The question of permanent non-publication was expressly left for the substantive investigation.

2. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to grant interim injunctive relief requiring forensic examination of electronic devices — Status: Established (paras [27]-[28]).

The Authority relied on s 162 of the ERA, which confers power to make any order that the High Court or District Court may make under any enactment or rule of law relating to contracts. It also noted established ERA precedent — citing KXS Ltd v NXJ [2023] NZERA 486, Electropar Ltd v Smith [2019] NZERA 703, and Tex Onsite Ltd v Hill [2015] NZERA 161 — confirming the Authority's jurisdiction to issue interim orders for the protection of confidential information and to require employees to provide personal electronic devices for forensic examination where there is evidence or admission of confidential information being stored on those devices.

3. Whether PNB has an arguable case (serious question to be tried) justifying interim relief — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31], [37]).

The respondents conceded there was an arguable case and that a serious question to be tried existed as to whether they had breached their employment agreements and other duties. The Authority independently confirmed this on the untested evidence, noting that WJN admitted downloading a volume of confidential data, emailing some to YIM, and that YIM had accessed PNB's VPN from unmanaged devices, creating a real risk of harm to PNB's commercial interests and client relationships.

4. Whether the balance of convenience favours granting interim relief — Status: Established (paras [29], [35], [37]).

The respondents explicitly conceded that the balance of convenience favoured PNB. The Authority agreed, noting PNB had provided an undertaking as to damages (protecting the respondents if the application ultimately failed), and that the extent of the information and actions involved warranted a full forensic examination.

5. Whether the scope of the forensic examination should extend to all of the respondents' personal electronic devices and accounts (as sought by PNB), or be limited to specific work-connected devices (as proposed by the respondents) — Status: Established in favour of PNB (paras [34]-[38], [41]).

The Authority accepted PNB's position that the extent of the downloading and related actions warranted a full examination of all electronic devices. However, the Authority also accepted the respondents' submissions that protection of their personal (non-work-related) information must be addressed, and directed that a mutually agreed privacy-protection protocol be put in place as a condition of the orders. The Authority declined to determine which specific forensic examiner should be appointed or the precise examination protocol, leaving those matters for the parties to agree.

6. Whether costs of the interim relief proceedings should be determined — Status: Reserved (paras [44]-[45]).

Costs were reserved for determination following the substantive investigation outcome, or until the matter otherwise ceases to be before the Authority. The Authority noted that if the matter does not proceed further, parties should attempt to resolve costs between themselves, with the standard daily tariff applicable if the Authority is called upon to determine costs.

7. Whether the substantive matter should be removed to the Employment Court under s 178(2)(b) of the ERA — Status: Not reached (paras [4], [43]).

This issue was deferred by agreement at the case management conference on 14 August 2026, with the parties agreeing that the interim relief application would be determined first. The Authority indicated it would progress the removal application separately, with an Authority Officer to contact the parties regarding a submissions timetable.

The application for interim injunctive relief was upheld in full, subject to conditions; the non-publication order was granted on an interim basis; costs were reserved; and the removal application was deferred.

Interim Injunctive Relief: Granted — the respondents must provide all electronic devices (both PNB-issued and personal) to an agreed independent forensic examiner for examination, recovery, and irretrievable deletion of any PNB confidential information.
Conditions of the order:
(a) The parties must agree on the independent third-party forensic examiner.
(b) The parties must agree on a privacy-protection protocol for the respondents' personal information.
(c) Examination to occur as soon as practicably possible.
(d) The examiner must prepare a written report; PNB's representative must advise the Authority when examination is complete and provide a copy of the report.
(e) Costs of the forensic examination to be shared equally between the parties.
Directed Mediation: The parties are directed to urgent mediation no later than 25 September 2026 once the forensic examination report is available.
Legal costs: Reserved pending substantive investigation outcome.
Non-publication: Interim non-publication order granted prohibiting publication of names and identifying details of all parties.
No monetary remedy ordered at this stage.
This is a preliminary/interim determination only; the substantive claims and removal application remain to be determined.

[COSTS ONLY]

Duane April (employee) successfully brought personal grievance claims against Coatrite Fire Limited (employer) in an earlier determination. Costs were reserved, and this determination deals solely with the quantum of costs payable to Mr April as the successful party. The Authority awarded $8,000 plus the filing fee of $71.55 as a costs contribution.

Applicant: Duane April (employee)
Respondent: Coatrite Fire Limited (employer)

Applicant: Dave Cain, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Heidi Bohlmann, advocate for the Respondent

In a prior determination dated 14 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 466), the Authority found that Mr April had established personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal, and awarded compensatory remedies, arrears of wages, holiday pay, unlawful deductions, interest, and a penalty. Costs were reserved at that time, with a timetable set for the parties to resolve the issue or file memoranda. Mr April filed a costs memorandum within the timetable, supported by an invoice showing total representation costs of $16,999.55 (including GST). Coatrite did not file any memorandum or otherwise engage with the Authority on the costs issue. Mr April sought a costs award of $8,000 plus the filing fee as a disbursement, without seeking any uplift.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to Mr April as the successful party, and if so, at what level — Status: Established (paras [3]–[9]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act, exercised on a principled, discretionary basis consistent with its equity and good conscience jurisdiction. The applicable principles include that costs generally follow the event, awards are modest, and conduct that unnecessarily increases costs may be taken into account. Applying the notional daily tariff of $4,500 for the first day and $3,500 for each subsequent day, and noting the matter involved two hearing days, the starting point was $8,000. No reduction was warranted given the reasonable level of actual costs incurred and the range and complexity of issues (including personal grievances, strike-out and set-off applications, deductions analysis, and contributory conduct). No uplift was sought or found warranted. The Authority awarded $8,000 plus the filing fee disbursement of $71.55.

The costs claim was upheld, with Mr April awarded $8,071.55 in costs and disbursements.

Costs: $8,000 (based on notional two-day tariff).
Disbursements: $71.55 (filing fee reimbursement).
Total: $8,071.55 payable by Coatrite Fire Limited to Mr April.
Note: This determination deals with costs only; all substantive remedies were ordered in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 466.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive decision in which OAS (employee) successfully established a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal against JIK Limited (employer) and was awarded compensatory remedies, wage arrears, holiday pay, and interest. The sole issue is the quantum of costs to be awarded to OAS as the successful party. The Authority awarded OAS $5,500 in costs plus reimbursement of the $71.55 filing fee, applying an uplift above the daily tariff in recognition of valid Calderbank/without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs settlement offers made by OAS that JIK Limited declined.

Applicant: OAS (employee)
Respondent: JIK Limited (employer)

Applicant: Dave Cain, advocate
Respondent: Arvind Nair, counsel

The Authority had previously issued a substantive determination on 16 July 2026 (OAS v JIK Limited [2026] NZERA 474) finding that OAS had established a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and awarding compensatory remedies, arrears of wages, holiday pay, unlawful deductions, and interest. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed costs memoranda within the timetable set by the Authority. OAS claimed total representation costs of $14,055.55 (including GST) and sought a costs award of $6,750 plus the filing fee, including an uplift based on three Calderbank offers made on 17 July 2024, 2 September 2025, and 5 September 2025. JIK Limited argued that the standard notional daily tariff of $4,500 was appropriate and that no uplift was warranted because the dispute involved genuine disagreement and the parties had engaged in genuine attempts to settle.

1. Whether OAS was entitled to a costs award as the successful party — Status: Established (paras [6]-[7]).

The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event, meaning the unsuccessful party ordinarily contributes to the successful party's costs. As OAS succeeded in the substantive determination, the starting point for costs was the notional daily tariff of $4,500 for one full hearing day, consistent with clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority confirmed costs awards are discretionary, must be principled, and are generally modest.

2. Whether a decrease from the daily tariff was warranted — Status: Dismissed (para [8]).

The Authority considered whether any factors justified reducing the tariff below $4,500, such as unreasonable conduct by OAS or unnecessary cost inflation. No such factors were identified, and accordingly no reduction was applied.

3. Whether an uplift above the daily tariff was warranted due to OAS's Calderbank/without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs settlement offers — Status: Established (paras [9]-[10]).

The Authority identified two relevant offers made after the application was lodged and before preparation for the investigation was complete (2 September 2025 and 5 September 2025). Both offers were on a without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs basis, made on clear terms, and each was for a sum less than the total ultimately awarded to OAS. The Authority confirmed a "steely approach" is required when valid settlement offers have been made and declined, and that JIK Limited would have been better off had it accepted either offer. An uplift of $1,000 above the tariff was warranted, resulting in a costs award of $5,500.

4. Whether OAS was entitled to reimbursement of the filing fee as a disbursement — Status: Established (para [10]).

The Authority accepted the filing fee of $71.55 as a disbursement to be reimbursed by JIK Limited, in addition to the costs award.

The costs claim was partially upheld: OAS was awarded $5,500 in costs (less than the $6,750 sought but more than the $4,500 proposed by JIK Limited), plus reimbursement of the $71.55 filing fee.

Costs: $5,500 payable by JIK Limited to OAS within 21 days of the date of the determination (7 September 2026).
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55 payable by JIK Limited to OAS within 21 days.
No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were ordered in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 474).

Kevin Newlands, a former school caretaking manager, claimed breach of contract and statutory breaches against The Ōtūmoetai College Board after his employment was terminated on 30 November 2021 when he declined to be vaccinated against COVID-19, as required by the COVID-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Order 2021. The key legal questions were whether the Board breached his Employment Agreement, breached health and safety legislation, and whether s 113 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 barred his claims. The Authority dismissed all of Mr Newlands' claims, finding the Board lawfully complied with the Order and did not breach any contractual or statutory obligations.

Applicant: Kevin Newlands (employee)
Respondent: The Ōtūmoetai College Board (employer)

Applicant: Karen Glass and Erika Whittome, advocates
Respondent: Paul Robertson and Joy Walpole-Williams, counsel

Mr Newlands was employed by the Board from January 2018 as a facilities/caretaking manager overseeing a team of four caretakers and a cleaner at a school of over 2,000 students. On 6 November 2021, the government amended the COVID-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Order 2021 to require that employees in affected education services be vaccinated by specified dates. The Board assessed that Mr Newlands' role was covered by the Order, as it required on-site presence and contact with students, and it engaged with him in a series of meetings in November 2021 discussing the Order, redeployment options, and alternatives such as remote working or leave. Mr Newlands declined vaccination and could not identify any suitable alternative role; the Board terminated his employment on 30 November 2021. Mr Newlands originally filed personal grievance claims (disadvantage and unjustified dismissal) but removed these in an amended statement of problem, leaving only breach of contract and statutory claims. The Board denied all breaches, arguing the termination flowed from a mandatory legislative instrument, not any independent act on its part.

1. Whether the Board appropriately assessed that Mr Newlands' work was "certain work" covered by the COVID-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Order 2021 — Status: Established (i.

e., the Board's assessment was correct and upheld).
The Authority applied the terms of the Order and noted the Court of Appeal has ruled on its lawfulness, and that the Authority has no jurisdiction to question the validity of the Order. The evidence showed Mr Newlands managed facilities upkeep, coordinated maintenance, responded to emergencies, and unavoidably came into contact with students on-site; his role plainly fell within the Order. The Authority found the Board correctly assessed that Mr Newlands' work was "certain work" under the Order, and that Mr Newlands himself accepted this at the 23 November 2021 meeting. The Authority relied on Pretorius v Board of Trustees of Taupō Intermediate School [2022] NZERA 664 for the principle that the vaccination requirement arose from the legislative instrument, not from any act or omission of the employer.

2. Whether the Board breached the Order in its consultation process or in dismissing Mr Newlands — Status: Dismissed.

The Authority found the Board followed an appropriate process: it met with Mr Newlands, consulted him about redeployment, offered various alternatives, sought his submissions before finalising its decision, and stood him down on pay pending the decision. The requirement to terminate arose from the Order itself, not from any independent or unlawful decision of the Board. No breach of the Order was established.

3. Whether the Board unilaterally varied Mr Newlands' Employment Agreement by requiring him to be vaccinated — Status: Dismissed.

Mr Newlands argued that because his Employment Agreement contained no vaccination requirement, the Board's insistence on vaccination amounted to a unilateral variation. The Authority rejected this reasoning, finding that the vaccination requirement derived from the Order (a legislative instrument), not from any contractual variation. No variation of his Employment Agreement occurred.

4. Whether the Board engaged in unfair bargaining — Status: Dismissed.

The unfair bargaining claim was inextricably linked to the unilateral variation claim; because the Authority found no unilateral variation, the unfair bargaining allegation equally failed. There was no evidential or legal basis for an unfair bargaining finding.

5. Whether the Board breached s 61 of the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) by failing to maintain a safe and healthy workplace ($75,000 claimed) — Status: Dismissed.

The Authority noted it has jurisdiction over HSWA matters only to the extent they are employment relationship problems. The situation arose from the Order, not from any failure by the Board to identify hazards or maintain controls. The Board was attempting to comply with its legal obligations under the Order, making it illogical that compliance could simultaneously constitute a HSWA breach. The Authority found no failure by the Board to comply with obligations owed to Mr Newlands regarding safety, health, and welfare.

6. Whether common law damages for breach of good faith under ss 4 and 142 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (or s 61(3)(g) HSWA) were available — Status: Dismissed.

The Authority found the situation had nothing to do with the HSWA matters invoked by Mr Newlands. To the extent the claim was for damages for breach of statutory good faith duties, the Authority relied on Hirte v Midwifery Employee Representation and Advisory Service Inc. [2025] NZEmpC 5 to find that such damages are not available in the Employment Relations Authority.

7. Whether the Board breached its obligations by threatening to deprive Mr Newlands of his job if he did not submit to vaccination, causing damage to his mental wellbeing — Status: Dismissed.

The Authority found Mr Newlands was not "threatened" with losing his job; rather, he was advised of the legal effect of the Order. The Board had no ability to allow him to continue working unless he was vaccinated under the Order. The HSWA did not override the Order. This claim could not succeed.

8. Whether the Board failed to follow redundancy consultation clauses in the collective agreement, entitling Mr Newlands to $10,000 damages and a redundancy payment of $37,635.58 — Status: Dismissed.

The Authority found that Mr Newlands' employment ended due to his refusal to be vaccinated under the Order, not as a result of redundancy, reorganisation, or a surplus staffing situation. The redundancy provisions in clause 6.9 of the collective agreement were therefore not triggered. Because no redundancy arose, there was no entitlement to either a redundancy payment or damages for failure to consult on redundancy.

9. Whether Mr Newlands' claims were barred by s 113 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (which requires dismissal challenges to be brought through the personal grievance process) — Status: Not reached (determinative finding made on other grounds).

The Authority found it unnecessary to conclusively determine the s 113 bar given it had found no contractual breach and no causation of loss. However, the Authority observed it would likely have applied, as Mr Newlands' claims were essentially a challenge to aspects of his dismissal. Mr Newlands had in any event removed his personal grievance claims from his amended statement of problem.

10. Claim for actual/consequential damages relating to inability to meet mortgage payments, forced house sale, real estate agent fees, legal fees, and break fees ($43,137.18) — Status: Dismissed.

These damages were consequential on the termination of employment. Because no breach of contract or other actionable wrong was established, there was no causation basis for this claim.

11. Claim for unpaid wages for work completed after termination — Status: Dismissed.

No separate analysis was provided beyond the finding that all claims were dismissed following the determination that no contractual breach or unlawful act by the Board occurred.

12. Claim for a written reference from the Board — Status: Dismissed.

Dismissed as part of the general dismissal of all Mr Newlands' claims; no separate analysis provided.

13. Claim for a direction requiring the Board to engage an independent investigator into workplace health and safety processes — Status: Dismissed.

Dismissed as part of the general dismissal of all claims; no HSWA breach was established to support such a direction.

14. Claim for costs of preparation and filing of amended statement of problem ($2,871.55) — Status: Reserved.

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, the Board may file a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Mr Newlands having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff basis.

All of Mr Newlands' claims were dismissed in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved; parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a process set out for the Authority to determine costs on the daily tariff basis if agreement is not reached.

OJX, a retail sales assistant employed by AVJ, brought personal grievance claims for unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal after being dismissed on medical incapacity grounds following her breast cancer diagnosis. The key legal questions were whether AVJ's handling of OJX's requests to transfer away from the lingerie department constituted unjustifiable action, and whether her dismissal for medical incapacity was unjustified. The Authority found OJX was disadvantaged by AVJ's failure to adequately explore and communicate the difficulties of redeploying her away from the lingerie department, but that her dismissal was not unjustified; she was awarded $8,000 compensation for the disadvantage grievance.

Applicant: OJX (employee)
Respondent: AVJ (employer, retail business)

Applicant: Russell Nye-Wood, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Matthew McGoldrick, counsel for the respondent

OJX commenced employment with AVJ in early 2021 as a sales assistant, working part-time including one day per week in the lingerie department. In August 2023 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and began requesting a transfer away from the lingerie area, feeling deeply uncomfortable there given her diagnosis. She postponed recommended surgery and, from April 2024, provided a three-month medical certificate citing unfitness for work, but declined to provide further detail about her diagnosis or prognosis despite multiple requests from AVJ. AVJ persistently sought medical information and meetings, and after OJX failed to attend two scheduled meetings and provided only a brief hospital letter in early July 2024, AVJ terminated her employment on 8 July 2024 on medical incapacity grounds. OJX raised a grievance, alleging unjustified disadvantage in connection with AVJ's failure to transfer her away from the lingerie department and unjustified dismissal; the parties agreed on the chronology and legal framework, but disputed whether AVJ's actions were justified and whether it had done enough to accommodate her needs.

1. Non-publication order — Status: Established (paras [9]-[16]).

The Authority applied its statutory power under Schedule 2, clause 10 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, weighing the risk of harm to OJX's health privacy against the open justice principle, following MW v Spiga Limited [2024] NZEmpC 147. Given OJX's sensitive health information (breast cancer) and the intrinsic links between her name, medical condition, and working circumstances, the Authority granted a permanent non-publication order covering OJX's name and identifying details, and AVJ's and its witnesses' names and identifying details.

2. Whether OJX was disadvantaged by unjustifiable actions of AVJ regarding information requests — Status: Dismissed (paras [70]-[79]).

The Authority considered whether AVJ's repeated requests for medical information constituted unjustifiable action under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000. It found that AVJ's requests were reasonable from health and safety and staffing perspectives, noting OJX appeared to have a higher expectation of privacy than was warranted, and that her discomfort with the requests was not clearly communicated to AVJ. No unjustified action was established in relation to the information requests.

3. Whether OJX was disadvantaged by unjustifiable actions of AVJ regarding requests to transfer or change duties away from the lingerie department — Status: Established (paras [80]-[88]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification standard and found that while it was reasonable to expect OJX to work in the lingerie department before her diagnosis, AVJ had an obligation from at least September 2023 to take reasonable steps to accommodate her discomfort after her breast cancer diagnosis. AVJ made an assurance in January 2024 that it would move her out of lingerie as soon as possible, but failed to sufficiently explore her concerns, adequately investigate alternatives, or communicate the difficulties and outcomes of its efforts in the weeks following the February 2024 meeting. The Authority concluded OJX was disadvantaged by AVJ's failure to fully explore her concerns and explain why redeployment could not be achieved.

4. Whether OJX was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [89]-[127]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test and the established medical incapacity framework from Canterbury Clerical Workers IUOW v Andrews & Beaven Ltd [1983], Lal v The Warehouse Group Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 66, and Hoskin v Coastal Fish Supplies Ltd [1985], assessing factors including: contract terms, nature of position, length of service, nature and duration of illness, and prospects for recovery. AVJ had persistently sought information and meetings, offered EAP, made efforts to assist OJX in obtaining medical appointments, and gave multiple warnings. OJX provided only a bare three-month medical certificate and a brief hospital letter, refused to attend meetings, stopped responding to communications, and gave no clear indication she would return to work. The Authority found AVJ was not required to wait indefinitely and that its actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done; the dismissal was not unjustified.

5. Whether OJX's contractual medical examination clause required AVJ to commission an independent medical examination before dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [95]-[99], [116]-[117]).

OJX argued, relying on Honamombe v Tegel Foods Ltd [2023] NZERA 721, that clause 7.8.10 of the collective agreement (allowing AVJ to require an independent medical examination) effectively created a rehabilitation policy mandating a full inquiry before dismissal. The Authority found that AVJ's choice instead to seek information from OJX's own treating practitioners was quite appropriate and that requiring her to attend an unknown doctor would have been more distressing. The failure to exercise the contractual right to order an independent examination did not render the dismissal unjustified.

6. Remedy — lost wages — Status: Dismissed (paras [129]).

As only a disadvantage grievance (not a dismissal grievance) was established, lost wages were not available as a remedy. The Authority also noted that even if dismissal had been established, OJX could not easily be said to have been medically cleared and ready for work in the period following her dismissal.

7. Remedy — compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings — Status: Established (paras [130]-[132]).

The Authority assessed the impact of the disadvantage grievance on OJX, noting her ongoing sense that a substantial company had failed to adequately recognise and act upon her understandable discomfort at working in the lingerie area while suffering from breast cancer. An award of $8,000 was considered appropriate. No contribution reduction was applied because OJX's conduct in withholding medical information was unrelated to AVJ's failure to accommodate her lingerie department concerns.

8. Whether OJX's conduct warranted a reduction (contribution) to the remedy — Status: Dismissed (para [131]).

The Authority considered whether OJX's failure to provide medical information reasonably sought by AVJ warranted a deduction under s 114 of the Act. It held that although her conduct in withholding information could be considered blameworthy, this did not relate to AVJ's separate failure to adequately communicate and explore the lingerie redeployment issue, and so no contribution deduction was warranted.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [133]-[135]).

Costs were reserved. The Authority noted OJX had assistance through a community law centre under legal aid and costs were not sought on her behalf. If AVJ sought costs, it was directed to file a memorandum within 28 days, with OJX having 14 days to reply. The usual notional daily tariff would be applied with any adjustment factors.

The claim was partially upheld: the disadvantage grievance regarding AVJ's failure to adequately accommodate OJX's request to be transferred from the lingerie department was established, but the unjustified dismissal grievance was dismissed.

Compensation (hurt/humiliation/distress for disadvantage grievance): $8,000.00, payable within 28 days of the determination.
Lost wages: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; process prescribed for any costs application by AVJ.

Sarah Rudman, a registered nurse employed by The Ultimate Care Group Limited at a residential aged care facility, raised personal grievance claims of unjustified constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage following her resignation in June 2024. The key legal questions were whether Ultimate's conduct amounted to a constructive dismissal and whether any of nine alleged disadvantages were established. The claim of constructive dismissal was dismissed, but one ground of unjustified disadvantage — Ultimate's failure to constructively address a serious workplace communication breakdown — was established, resulting in a compensation award of $13,000 for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings.

Applicant: Sarah Rudman (employee, registered nurse)
Respondent: The Ultimate Care Group Limited (employer)

Applicant: Greg Lloyd, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Mark Hammond, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Rudman began working for Ultimate in 2022 as a caregiver, later qualifying as a registered nurse and continuing with Ultimate in that new role with increased duties and pay. From 2024, following a change in management, Ms Rudman experienced increased workload pressures and a deteriorating relationship with Facility Manager Ms O'Hara and Clinical Services Manager Ms Yeats. A significant incident occurred when Ms Yeats publicly criticised Ms Rudman over a medication delay during a patient fall, leading Ms Rudman to yell back, throw her badge, and briefly resign before being persuaded to return; she was then required to apologise to Ms Yeats without any reciprocal resolution of the underlying issues. On 11 June 2024, Ms Rudman discovered she had been underpaid by 25.6 hours (promptly rectified) and also disputed whether Ms O'Hara had promised an extra day's pay in lieu of a missed study leave day — a promise Ms O'Hara denied making — and Ms Rudman then formally resigned. Ms Rudman raised nine separate grounds of unjustified disadvantage and a constructive dismissal claim; Ultimate denied all claims and alleged contributory conduct on Ms Rudman's part.

1. Whether Ms Rudman was unjustifiably constructively dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[43]).

The Authority applied the established test that constructive dismissal requires a breach of duty by the employer of sufficient seriousness that it is reasonably foreseeable that the employee would resign, citing Weston v Advkit Para Legal Services Ltd [2010] NZEmpC 140 and NZ Woollen Workers IUOW v Distinctive Knitwear NZ Ltd (1990). The Authority found it was more likely than not that Ms Rudman misunderstood or was mistaken about Ms O'Hara's alleged promise to pay an extra day's wages in lieu of study leave; no such obligation existed, and the prompt correction of the separate underpayment showed Ultimate's willingness to meet its obligations. The failure to pay an extra study-day sum — which was never clearly agreed — did not constitute a breach serious enough to make resignation reasonably foreseeable, and the claim was not made out.

2. Unjustified disadvantage — chronic understaffing — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[49]).

An unjustified disadvantage requires both an unjustified employer action and a consequent change to a condition of employment to the employee's disadvantage. The Authority found Ultimate took active steps to address staffing issues and maintained safe staffing levels throughout; Ms Rudman's duties did not change, she was generally paid for hours worked, and temporary staffing pressures in aged care do not ordinarily constitute a breach of duty. The claim was not made out.

3. Unjustified disadvantage — stopping overtime payments — Status: Dismissed (paras [50]-[52]).

The Authority found that Ultimate's policy limited unapproved overtime but approved and emergency overtime continued to be paid, which Ms Rudman accepted. Ms Rudman was unable to provide sufficient particulars (dates, duration) of alleged unpaid time, and there was no documentary record to support the claim. On balance, the claim was not established.

4. Unjustified disadvantage — removal of on-call duties — Status: Dismissed (paras [53]-[55]).

The Authority held that working on-call shifts was not a contractual condition of Ms Rudman's employment, so no disadvantageous change to her employment conditions was made out. Additionally, Ultimate's reason for allocating on-call duties to more experienced nurses was not unjustifiable, particularly given Ms Rudman's own difficulties completing her core duties during shifts. The claim failed on both elements.

5. Unjustified disadvantage — paying Ms Rudman less than others — Status: Dismissed (paras [56]-[58]).

Ms Rudman relied solely on an unverified report from an unnamed person who did not give evidence; no comparator evidence or contractual basis for a higher rate was established. Ms Rudman was paid the rate agreed in her employment agreement. The Authority declined to find unjustified disadvantage.

6. Unjustified disadvantage — failure to provide adequate care when Ms Rudman was distressed — Status: Dismissed (paras [59]-[62]).

The Authority had sympathy for Ms Rudman's experience of grief following the death of a resident but found she had not established any contractual entitlement to specific support (such as EAP or counselling), nor had she requested help that was unreasonably refused. The disputed conduct of Ms Yeats (alleged laughter at the resident's death) was denied and unresolved on the evidence, but the absence of a demonstrated entitlement was determinative. The claim was not made out.

7. Unjustified disadvantage — blaming Ms Rudman for medication errors not hers — Status: Dismissed (paras [63]-[71]).

The Authority found that Ms Rudman had herself publicly acknowledged responsibility for multiple medication errors at a staff meeting, and the consequent requirement to undertake further training and observations was neither an unjustifiable action nor a disadvantageous change to any condition of employment. The subsequent report to the Nursing Council occurred after Ms Rudman's employment ended and was stated to be a statutory obligation, so it could not ground a personal grievance. The claim was not made out.

8. Unjustified disadvantage — blaming Ms Rudman for improper storage of restricted medication — Status: Dismissed (paras [72]-[73]).

The Authority could not discern any specific consequence suffered by Ms Rudman from this incident that changed any condition of her employment to her disadvantage; post-audit safety education delivered to all staff did not constitute an unjustifiable action or a disadvantageous change to employment conditions. To the extent this contributed to the further training requirement, that had already been found not to be a breach. The claim was not made out.

9. Unjustified disadvantage — reneging on agreement to pay for study day — Status: Dismissed (para [74]).

The Authority had already found under the constructive dismissal analysis that no breach of obligation occurred regarding the alleged study-day payment agreement, and the related unjustified disadvantage claim therefore also failed for the same reasons.

10. Unjustified disadvantage — criticising and verbally abusing Ms Rudman / failure to resolve communication breakdown — Status: Established (paras [75]-[81]).

The Authority found that the confrontation between Ms Rudman and Ms Yeats — whatever its precise form — was a significant breakdown in the employment relationship that negatively affected trust and confidence. Critically, while Ms O'Hara persuaded Ms Rudman to return to work, Ultimate took no steps to understand the underlying issues, resolve them, or clarify the confusion around apologies, nor was any action taken regarding Ms Yeats's conduct towards Ms Rudman. This amounted to a failure to be constructive, responsive, and communicative in maintaining a productive employment relationship — a breach of Ultimate's obligations under the Employment Relations Act 2000 — and was an unjustified action that negatively impacted Ms Rudman's terms and conditions. The claim was established.

11. Whether lost wages should be awarded as a remedy for the established unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (para [83]).

Section 123 of the Act allows reimbursement of wages or money lost as a result of the grievance. The Authority found that the incident occurred over one day, Ms Rudman returned to work the next day with no interruption to her earnings, and her hours of work continued at the same level until her resignation. No wages or other money were lost as a result of the established grievance, so no award under this head was made.

12. Whether compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [84]-[85]).

Under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act the Authority may award compensation for hurt and humiliation. The Authority accepted that the incident with Ms Yeats and the subsequent failure by Ultimate to address the situation had a real and ongoing negative impact on Ms Rudman — affecting her self-confidence, her joy in her work, and causing her to feel undermined and belittled in front of colleagues. A sum of $13,000 was awarded, reflecting the seriousness of the breach while acknowledging the employment relationship was capable of continuing.

13. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [86]-[87]).

The Authority considered whether Ms Rudman's own volatile behaviour was causative of and blameworthy in relation to the situation giving rise to her grievance. It found that Ms Rudman's conduct was not the proximate cause of the communication failures and that the failure lay with Ultimate's lack of responsiveness after the breakdown occurred. No reduction in remedies was warranted.

14. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [90]-[93]).

Costs were reserved, with parties encouraged to resolve them between themselves. The Authority's preliminary view was that the daily tariff for a one-and-a-half day hearing would be appropriate. A memorandum process was set out for any unresolved costs dispute. The Authority noted Ms Rudman is legally aided.

The claim was partially upheld: the constructive dismissal claim and eight of nine unjustified disadvantage grounds were dismissed, but one ground of unjustified disadvantage (failure to address the communication breakdown following the workplace confrontation) was established, with compensation awarded.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i)): $13,000, payable within 28 days, without deduction.
Lost wages: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not ordered (not sought).
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to agree; Authority's indicative view is the daily tariff for a one-and-a-half day hearing; memorandum process prescribed if unresolved.

Andrew McFarlane, a Senior Account Director employed by Stuff Limited from May 2011, was made redundant on 7 July 2025 following a restructure of Stuff's Christchurch agency sales team. Mr McFarlane claimed unjustified dismissal, arguing his role was not genuinely surplus and that the selection process pitting him against a colleague for a substantially similar role was unfair, with no meaningful redeployment efforts made. The Authority upheld the claim, finding Stuff failed to properly assess whether Mr McFarlane's role was actually surplus, ran a flawed contestable selection process, and breached good faith obligations by not actively exploring redeployment, resulting in awards of $25,000 compensation and $30,840.98 in lost remuneration plus interest.

Applicant: Andrew McFarlane (employee — former Senior Account Director)
Respondent: Stuff Limited (employer)

Applicant: Ashley Jayne Lodge and Jack Brown, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Rosemary Wooders and Olivia Faulds, counsel for the Respondent

Andrew McFarlane commenced employment with Stuff Limited in May 2011 and was promoted to Senior Account Director on 1 July 2022. In August 2024, some of his responsibilities (programmatic advertising) were informally removed to create a new role for another employee (X), with no formal variation document recorded. In April 2025, Stuff proposed a restructure that disestablished both Mr McFarlane's Senior Account Director role and X's Programmatic Account Director role, creating a new "Senior Account Director – Agency" role to be filled via a closed contestable selection process between Mr McFarlane and X. Mr McFarlane participated in the process, raised concerns about the weighting of incumbent experience, but was ultimately unsuccessful; X was selected and Mr McFarlane's employment ended on 7 July 2025. Mr McFarlane argued his role was not genuinely surplus, the new role was substantially the same as his existing role, and Stuff failed to redeploy him; Stuff maintained the redundancy was genuine, consultation was adequate, and the selection process was fair.

1. Whether Mr McFarlane was unjustifiably dismissed under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [41]-[53]).

The Authority applied the s 103A objective test of whether Stuff's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could do in all the circumstances, following the Court of Appeal's guidance in Grace Team Accounting v Brake [2015] 2 NZLR 494, which requires a genuine redundancy based on business requirements and procedurally fair implementation. The Authority found that while the commercial rationale for restructuring was ostensibly genuine and not pretextual, Stuff critically failed to first assess whether Mr McFarlane's own role was surplus before subjecting him to a contestable selection process — an analysis the Authority found would more likely than not have led to his reconfirmation in the role. Compounded by inadequate redeployment efforts and a flawed selection process that returned programmatic responsibilities to the "new" role, the Authority concluded the process fell outside what a fair and reasonable employer could do, establishing unjustified dismissal.

2. Whether the redundancy was genuine — Status: Partially established (paras [46]-[48], [52]).

The Authority applied the Grace Team Accounting v Brake framework requiring valid and demonstrable commercial reasons free from ulterior motive. It found the restructuring was driven by legitimate commercial imperatives (declining revenue, inefficiency of maintaining two roles targeting the same market) and was not predetermined or ill-motivated. However, the Authority found Stuff's execution was "flawed and muddled," as it treated Mr McFarlane's role as surplus without conducting any comparative analysis of the old and new roles, meaning the surface genuineness of the restructure was undermined by procedural defects.

3. Whether Stuff breached good faith obligations under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, including whether consultation was adequate — Status: Established (paras [44]-[48], [52]).

The Authority applied s 4 of the Act, which requires employers to be active and constructive in maintaining the employment relationship, and the consultation principles from Stormont v Peddle Thorp Aitken Ltd [2017] ERNZ 352, including providing sufficiently precise information and maintaining an open mind. While Stuff provided a consultation pack and held meetings, the Authority found the consultation was only "surface" level: Stuff failed to properly analyse whether Mr McFarlane's role was actually surplus (as required by Jinkinson v Oceania Gold (NZ) Ltd (No2) [2010] NZEMPC 102 regarding fair selection processes), did not respond meaningfully to Mr McFarlane's feedback about incumbent weighting, and the consultation process did not include any consideration of reassignment as an alternative to a contestable process.

4. Whether Stuff met its redeployment obligations — Status: Dismissed (as to Stuff's compliance) / Established (as to breach) (paras [44]-[45], [49], [51]-[52]).

The Authority applied the good faith obligation under s 4(1A)(b) of the Act to be active and constructive in maintaining the employment relationship, citing New Zealand Steel v Haddad [2023] NZEmpC 57 and a 2018 article noting that paying lip service to redeployment is inconsistent with good faith. The Authority found Stuff took no active steps to redeploy Mr McFarlane: the termination letter merely directed him to Stuff's careers website, vacant roles (Account Manager, Head of Group Sales – Christchurch, and ultimately the Senior Account Director role itself) were not actively explored with him, and the more prudent course would have been to reassign Mr McFarlane without a contestable process. This failure constituted a breach of good faith obligations.

5. Whether there was unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (para [63]).

The Authority found in the orders that Mr McFarlane was unjustifiably disadvantaged as well as unjustifiably dismissed, reflecting the procedurally unfair manner in which the disestablishment of his position was handled. No separate detailed analysis was provided for disadvantage distinct from the dismissal finding; it was treated as part of the overall finding at the remedies stage.

6. Whether the selection process was fair and whether there was disparity in treatment compared to X — Status: Established (breach found) (paras [28], [50]-[51]).

Applying s 103A(4) of the Act, the Authority found evident disparity between the treatment of Mr McFarlane and X: when X's earlier role was disestablished in 2024, Stuff informally created a new role to retain X, then allowed X to compete against Mr McFarlane for a role substantially encompassing Mr McFarlane's existing duties. The selection criteria were subjectively weighted toward presentation performance, and Stuff failed to adjust them in response to Mr McFarlane's legitimate feedback about incumbent knowledge. The Authority found creating a contestable process in these circumstances was not the action of a fair and reasonable employer.

7. Whether remedies should be reduced due to Mr McFarlane's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [62]).

The Authority considered s 124 of the Act, which requires assessment of whether an employee's own actions contributed to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance. The Authority found no basis to reduce remedies: Mr McFarlane did not engage in any wrongful, blameworthy or culpable conduct, and the situation was characterised as a "no-fault" termination. No reduction was applied.

8. How costs are to be resolved — Status: Reserved (paras [64]-[67]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr McFarlane may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Stuff having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be assessed on the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was upheld: Mr McFarlane was found to have been unjustifiably disadvantaged and unjustifiably dismissed, with remedies ordered; the contributory reduction issue was dismissed; and costs were reserved.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, distress — s 123(1)(c)(i)): $25,000 (without deductions), payable within 28 days.
Lost remuneration (s 123(1)(b)): 13 weeks' lost pay at $55.29333/hour = $28,540.78, plus holiday pay at 8% = $2,300.20, totalling $30,840.98 (gross).
Interest: Payable on the lost remuneration amount in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016, from 20 July 2025 until payment.
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Contributory reduction: None.
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to agree; if not resolved, memoranda process to follow within specified timeframes.

Peter Calvert, a former employee of CVI Management Services LP (now in liquidation), brought claims against Bernard Whimp (director/manager) and Securities Management Limited (general partner of the limited partnership) for unpaid wages, holiday pay, notified additional leave, and payment in lieu of notice of termination. The key legal questions concerned whether the respondents were liable for the employer's obligations as general partner and as "persons involved" in breaches of employment standards under Part 9A of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The claims for wage arrears, holiday pay, and notice pay were substantially upheld against Securities Management Limited (as general partner and person involved), and conditionally against Mr Whimp (as person involved in employment standards breaches), while the notified additional leave claim was dismissed.

Applicant: Peter Calvert (employee)
Respondent: Bernard Whimp (First Respondent — director/manager of CVI Management Services LP) and Securities Management Limited (Second Respondent — general partner of CVI Management Services LP)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Bernard Whimp for the Respondents

Peter Calvert was employed by CVI Management Services LP until 12 December 2025, when he received an undated letter signed by Mr Whimp stating his employment had ceased as of 3 December 2025. Mr Calvert raised a personal grievance on 18 December 2025 and, along with other employees, commenced proceedings on 22 December 2025 against CVI Management Services LP, Securities Management Limited, and Bernard Whimp. CVI Management Services LP was placed in liquidation on 2 July 2026, which by operation of statute required proceedings against it to be treated as discontinued; the other applicants withdrew, but Mr Calvert elected to continue his revised claim against Mr Whimp and Securities Management Limited only, ultimately abandoning his personal grievance and pursuing only arrears of wages, holiday pay, notified additional leave, and payment in lieu of notice. The matter proceeded to mediation without success and then to an investigation meeting on 31 August 2026, at which Mr Calvert gave evidence and Mr Whimp also attended and gave evidence. The respondents had not participated in the case management conference or complied with timetabling directions, but Mr Whimp appeared at the investigation meeting and raised defences including alleged resignation by Mr Calvert and a business interruption/force majeure clause in the employment agreement.

1. Whether proceedings against CVI Management Services LP could continue after its liquidation — Status: Established (paras [5]-[6]).

Under s 92 of the Limited Partnership Act 2008, Part 16 of the Companies Act 1993 (including s 248) applies to limited partnerships in liquidation, meaning proceedings cannot continue without liquidator consent or a court order. As neither was obtained, proceedings against CVI Management Services LP were treated as discontinued by operation of law. Proceedings against Mr Whimp and Securities Management Limited were unaffected, relying on Lawton v Steel Pencil Holdings Ltd (In Liq) [2021] NZEmpC 199.

2. Whether Mr Calvert resigned from employment (terminating his entitlements at an earlier date) — Status: Dismissed (para [18]).

Mr Whimp submitted that Mr Calvert had resigned, relying on certain material. The Authority found it unnecessary to resolve the factual dispute because the employment agreement required notice of resignation to be given in writing, and Mr Calvert had not done so; therefore his employment continued until terminated by the employer on receipt of the letter on 12 December 2025.

3. Whether the business interruption/force majeure clause in the employment agreement relieved the respondents of liability for wage arrears and holiday pay — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]-[20], [32]).

The Authority held that the business interruption clause (clause 11) might have been relevant to a personal grievance claim (no longer pursued), but it did not affect statutory arrears claims under the Wages Protection Act 1983 or the Holidays Act 2023. Further, even if the clause could have applied, the employer did not purport to rely on it at the relevant time, and it provided no defence on the notice claim either.

4. Whether Mr Calvert was owed arrears of wages under the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [21]-[23]).

Mr Calvert remained employed, ready, willing, and available to work until 12 December 2025. The employer failed to pay his weekly salary of $2,596.15 for the week ending 10 December and a further $1,038.46 for 11–12 December, totalling $3,634.61 in unpaid wages. This failure breached s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983, engaging employment standards provisions.

5. Whether Mr Calvert was owed unpaid holiday pay under the Holidays Act 2023 — Status: Established (paras [24]-[27]).

Upon termination after less than a year's service, the employer was required under ss 23 and 27 of the Holidays Act 2023 to pay 8% of gross earnings since commencement. Based on year-to-date gross earnings of $75,115.40 plus the unpaid wage arrears, the Authority calculated unpaid holiday pay of $6,300.00 (slightly more than Mr Calvert's own calculation, but the correct statutory amount). This breach engaged employment standards provisions.

6. Whether Mr Calvert was entitled to payment for "notified additional leave" (32 hours) — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[30]).

Mr Calvert's claim for 32 hours of additional paid leave, based on manager messages on 10–11 December directing him not to come in, failed because that notified leave period ended when his employment was terminated on 12 December 2025. He had no contractual or statutory right to be paid for time falling after the end of employment. The claim also appeared to overlap with the period already covered by the wage arrears finding.

7. Whether Mr Calvert was entitled to payment in lieu of notice of termination — Status: Established (paras [31]-[33]).

The employment agreement required four weeks' written notice to terminate; there was no right to summarily dismiss Mr Calvert. The business interruption clause was not invoked at the time of dismissal and provided no defence. Mr Calvert was therefore entitled to four weeks' damages for breach of contract, calculated at $10,082.12 (note: breach of contract damages for failure to give notice are not an employment standard and thus not recoverable from persons involved under Part 9A — see below).

8. Whether Securities Management Limited, as general partner, was jointly and severally liable for the employer's debts and liabilities to Mr Calvert — Status: Established (paras [34]-[45], [60]-[61]).

Under s 26 of the Limited Partnerships Act 2008, a general partner is jointly and severally liable for the limited partnership's debts, but only to the extent the limited partnership cannot pay (s 28). The Authority found, based on Mr Whimp's own statements about inability to pay wages, the entity's liquidation, transfer of assets to a related entity, and the liquidators' first report, that CVI Management Services LP could not pay its debts to Mr Calvert. Accordingly, Securities Management Limited was liable for all proven claims — wage arrears ($3,634.61), holiday pay ($6,300.00), and notice damages ($10,082.12).

9. Whether Securities Management Limited was a "person involved" in breaches of employment standards under Part 9A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [46]-[55]).

Part 9A allows recovery of employment standards arrears from persons involved in breaches, to the extent the employer cannot pay. Wage and holiday pay breaches fall within the definition of employment standards; notice damages do not. Securities Management Limited, as general partner, was treated as an officer of the limited partnership under s 142W of the ERA 2000, and was directly and knowingly concerned in the breaches through its management responsibility under s 19 of the Limited Partnerships Act 2008 and through Mr Whimp's day-to-day conduct. Mr Calvert has leave to recover arrears of wages and holiday pay from Securities Management Limited on this basis (though orders under general partner liability make repetition unnecessary).

10. Whether Mr Whimp was a "person involved" in breaches of employment standards under Part 9A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [56]-[59], [62], [64]-[65]).

Mr Whimp managed the limited partnership's operations, was in a position to exercise significant influence, and knew that Mr Calvert had worked, been placed on paid leave, and then dismissed without payment of wages or holiday pay. The purported retrospective termination reinforced his involvement. The Authority found Mr Whimp was a person involved in the employment standards breaches. Orders against Mr Whimp for wage arrears and holiday pay were deferred to allow Securities Management Limited the opportunity to comply first; they take effect 28 days after the determination if Securities Management Limited fails to pay. Note: the notice damages claim is not recoverable from Mr Whimp under Part 9A (not an employment standard).

11. Whether breach of contract damages (payment in lieu of notice) are recoverable from persons involved under Part 9A — Status: Dismissed (paras [48]-[49]).

The Authority explicitly held that Part 9A does not permit recovery of damages for breach of an employment agreement (such as failure to give notice) from a person involved — it is limited to arrears of wages and holiday pay that constitute employment standards breaches. Notice damages were therefore only ordered against Securities Management Limited in its capacity as general partner.

12. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [66]).

Costs were reserved. Mr Calvert may lodge a memorandum regarding legal costs within 28 days; the respondents have a further 14 days to reply. Costs will be determined on the basis of submissions and the Authority's standard approach.

The claim was partially upheld: wage arrears and holiday pay were established against both Securities Management Limited (as general partner and person involved) and Mr Whimp (as person involved, conditionally); notice damages were established against Securities Management Limited as general partner only; the notified additional leave claim was dismissed; and costs were reserved.

- Wage arrears: $3,634.61 (gross) — ordered against Securities Management Limited, effective immediately; conditionally ordered against Bernard Whimp (payable within 28 days if Securities Management Limited fails to pay).
- Holiday pay arrears: $6,300.00 (gross) — ordered against Securities Management Limited, effective immediately; conditionally ordered against Bernard Whimp (payable within 28 days if Securities Management Limited fails to pay).
- Damages (payment in lieu of notice — breach of contract): $10,082.12 — ordered against Securities Management Limited only (general partner liability), effective immediately.
- Total ordered against Securities Management Limited: $20,016.73 (gross).
- Notified additional leave claim: No remedy ordered (dismissed).
- Personal grievance remedies: No remedy ordered (claim withdrawn).
- Costs: Reserved; subject to further memoranda from the parties.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs-only determination following a substantive decision in which Sebastian Taylor (employee) largely failed in his claims against Gokula Music Limited (employer). The applicant sought a $4,500 costs contribution, arguing the respondent's non-engagement after initial case management unjustifiably increased his costs. The Authority declined to make any costs order, finding the applicant's mixed/largely unsuccessful outcome and the absence of evidence of actual costs militated against any award.

Applicant: Sebastian Taylor (employee)
Respondent: Gokula Music Limited (employer)

Applicant: David Prisk, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

The substantive determination was issued on 7 August 2026 (Taylor v Gokula Music Limited [2026] NZERA 528), with costs reserved. In that proceeding, Taylor's constructive dismissal claim failed and only one of five disadvantage claims was substantiated, resulting in a modest remedy that was further reduced for his own contributory conduct. The applicant's advocate lodged a costs submission on 11 August 2026 seeking $4,500, noting in passing that the respondent's sole director had recently died. The respondent filed nothing in response to the costs application, with the Authority noting this was likely explicable given those circumstances. The investigation meeting in the substantive matter lasted approximately two hours (less than one day), making the applicable notional tariff $2,250 rather than the full $4,500 daily rate.

1. Whether the Authority should exercise its discretion to award costs in favour of the applicant — Status: Dismissed (paras [4]-[19]).

The Authority's discretion to award costs is found in clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and is governed by principles set out in PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 and affirmed in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] ERNZ 919: costs ordinarily follow the event; awards should be modest; the notional daily tariff is the usual reference point; and conduct unnecessarily increasing costs may be taken into account. Because the applicant was largely unsuccessful (constructive dismissal claim failed; only one of five disadvantage claims established; remedy reduced for his own contributory conduct), the Authority found this was a case of mixed success at best, making it difficult to identify who "won" (citing Health Waikato Ltd v Elmsly [2004] 1 ERNZ 172). The Authority declined to award costs, finding no reasonable basis to exercise the discretion in favour of a largely unsuccessful applicant in a procedurally straightforward investigation.

2. Whether the respondent's non-engagement after case management justified an uplift from the notional tariff — Status: Dismissed (paras [8]-[11], [16]-[18]).

The applicant argued that the respondent's failure to engage after initial case management effectively forced a fully contested hearing, amplifying costs without justification, and warranted an uplift. The Authority rejected this argument, clarifying that any reference in the substantive determination to evidential difficulties being compounded by the respondent's non-engagement was a statement of fact, not a criticism of the respondent, and that the burden of proof on the central claims always rested with the applicant. Moreover, the non-engagement argument did not address the corollary that most hearing time was spent on the applicant's unsuccessful claims.

3. Whether the absence of evidence of actual costs was a bar to any award — Status: Established (paras [12]-[13]).

The Authority noted that it can only award the lesser of actual costs or a contribution calculated by reference to the notional tariff, and that without evidence of actual costs this comparison cannot be made. The absence of actual cost evidence also required caution in the exercise of the discretion to ensure any award is fair and proportionate. This factor independently supported declining to make any order.

4. Whether the appropriate notional daily tariff starting point was $4,500 or $2,250 — Status: Established (para [7]).

Because the investigation meeting lasted approximately two hours (less than one day), the Authority determined the appropriate tariff starting point was $2,250, not the full daily rate of $4,500 sought by the applicant.

The application for costs was dismissed; no costs order was made.

None ordered.

A Labour Inspector brought claims against NZ Dream Contracting Limited (a horticultural labour supply company), its sole director Gurpreet Singh, and Harbant Singh (an employee) arising from the employment of two migrant workers, Kulvinder Singh and Jaskaran Singh, in 2023. The key legal questions concerned multiple breaches of minimum employment standards — including failure to pay minimum wages, holiday entitlements, and unlawful wage deductions — as well as an unlawful post-employment premium under the Wages Protection Act 1983, and Gurpreet Singh's personal liability as a person involved in those breaches. The Authority upheld all substantive claims against NZ Dream and Gurpreet Singh, ordering repayment of wage arrears and a premium, with penalties and costs to be determined separately.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector (Senior Labour Inspector Lin (Stella) Gong, Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment)
Respondent: NZ Dream Contracting Limited (First Respondent, horticultural labour supply employer); Gurpreet Singh (Second Respondent, sole director and shareholder of NZ Dream); Harbant Singh (Third Respondent, employee of NZ Dream)

Applicant: Rebecca Denmead and Rhys Boyd, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance by the Respondents (previously represented by Mr Arunjeev Singh, who withdrew on the eve of the second investigation meeting)

NZ Dream Contracting Limited, a kiwifruit orchard labour supply company operated by its sole director Gurpreet Singh, employed Kulvinder Singh from 19 June 2023 to 1 November 2023, and Jaskaran Singh from 7 September 2023 to 3 November 2023, both on Accredited Employer Work Visas. Both complainants alleged they worked excessive hours (six to seven days per week, up to 10.5 hours per day) but were paid only for 40 hours per week, were not paid for all public holidays worked, and did not receive correct annual holiday pay on termination. Jaskaran additionally alleged that Gurpreet required him to withdraw $1,500.00 cash from ATMs after being paid wages and return it as purported "tax" payments for NZ Dream. The complainants made complaints to the Labour Inspectorate in early November 2023, and the Labour Inspectorate conducted a thorough investigation, gathering bank records, timesheets, photographs, video evidence, and audio recordings. The respondents denied all claims but failed to provide credible or detailed counter-evidence, did not appear at the second investigation meeting in June 2026, and did not lodge submissions in response to the Labour Inspector's updated calculations.

1. Assessment of credibility — Status: Established (paras [84]-[97]).

The Authority assessed the credibility of the Labour Inspector's witnesses against the respondents' limited evidence. The complainants gave detailed, consistent, and corroborated accounts supported by documentary evidence (timesheets, bank records, photographs, audio recordings), which were unchallenged in cross-examination due to the respondents' non-attendance. The Authority preferred the complainants' evidence over the respondents' brief, undetailed, and uncorroborated statements, and rejected NZ Dream's weekly timesheets as demonstrably inaccurate. The respondents failed to present any effective counternarrative.

2. What dates did NZ Dream employ the complainants — Status: Established (paras [98]-[101]).

The Authority had to determine the start date of Jaskaran's employment, as the respondents claimed it was 2 or 4 October 2023, while Jaskaran and his brother said it was 7 September 2023. The Authority accepted the complainants' evidence, supported by contemporaneous WhatsApp messages and photographs, that Jaskaran commenced employment on 7 September 2023, with a break from 23 September to 5 October 2023 at NZ Dream's direction. Kulvinder's employment dates (19 June to 1 November 2023) were undisputed.

3. Failure to keep accurate wages and time records in breach of ss 4B, 130(g) and 130(1A) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [102]-[107]).

Section 130 of the Act requires employers to keep wages and time records showing hours worked each day and pay for those hours. NZ Dream's records systematically under-recorded hours actually worked, failing to capture long hours, weekend work, and public holiday work. This prejudiced the complainants' ability to bring accurate claims under s 131, engaging s 132 of the Act, which permits the Authority to accept the employees' account unless the employer proves it incorrect. The respondents failed to provide credible contradicting evidence, so the complainants' accounts were relied upon.

4. Failure to keep accurate holiday and leave records in breach of s 81 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [108]-[110]).

Section 81 of the HA03 requires employers to keep holiday and leave records showing hours worked per pay period, public holiday details, and alternative holiday entitlements. NZ Dream failed to record total hours worked (including weekends and public holidays), failed to correctly record Jaskaran's commencement date, and failed to record public holiday information as required by ss 81(2)(b), (i), (j), (k) and (l). Section 83 of the HA03 applied, enabling the Authority to rely on the complainants' evidence of their days and hours of work.

5. Failure to pay minimum wage for every hour worked in breach of s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [112]-[115], [136], [146]).

Section 6 of the MWA entitles workers to not less than the prescribed minimum wage for every hour worked. Using ss 132(2) of the Act and 83 of the HA03 to accept the complainants' accounts of hours worked, and applying conservative estimates, the Labour Inspector recalculated wage arrears after the investigation meeting. NZ Dream owed Kulvinder $7,956.35 and Jaskaran $6,072.25 in minimum wage arrears. The respondents did not contest the recalculations.

6. Failure to pay public holiday entitlements (time and a half and alternative holidays) in breach of ss 50, 56, and 60 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [116]-[118], [122]).

Sections 50 and 56 of the HA03 require payment at time and a half and the provision of an alternative holiday when an employee works on a public holiday. The uncontested evidence established that Kulvinder worked on Matariki (14 July 2023) and Labour Day (23 October 2023), and Jaskaran worked on Labour Day. Neither complainant received time-and-a-half pay nor alternative holidays. NZ Dream owed Kulvinder $875.29 and Jaskaran $551.71 in public holiday entitlement arrears.

7. Failure to pay correct annual holiday pay on termination in breach of s 23 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [119]-[122]).

Section 23 of the HA03 requires an employer to pay 8% of gross earnings as holiday pay when employment ends before 12 months. Both complainants received some holiday pay on termination, but it was calculated using NZ Dream's deficient records that under-recorded hours, so the amounts were insufficient. The Authority found NZ Dream failed to correctly calculate and pay annual holiday pay arrears: Kulvinder was owed $1,360.86 and Jaskaran $566.14.

8. Failure to pay full wages when due in breach of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [123]-[128]).

Section 4 of the WPA requires employers to pay the entire amount of wages without deduction when wages become payable. The complainants' IEAs specified $31.00/hour for Kulvinder and $30.00/hour for Jaskaran, but they were not paid for all hours worked. The Authority found this amounted to unlawful deductions from wages, consistent with Labour Inspector v Rural Practice Ltd [2024] NZERA 66. Avoiding double-counting with minimum wage arrears, NZ Dream made unlawful deductions of $2,909.15 from Kulvinder's wages and $1,427.75 from Jaskaran's wages.

9. Whether NZ Dream and/or Gurpreet sought and received an unlawful post-employment premium from Jaskaran in breach of s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [147]-[155]).

Section 12A of the WPA prohibits an employer from seeking or receiving any premium in respect of employment. Jaskaran gave clear and unequivocal evidence that Gurpreet required him to withdraw $1,000 and $500 from ATMs after receiving wages, and return the cash for NZ Dream to pay his "tax." This was corroborated by Jaskaran's bank statements and an audio recording where Harbant did not deny the arrangement. The Authority, citing A Labour Inspector v Tech 5 Recruitment Ltd [2016] NZEmpC 167, found that requiring an employee to reimburse an employer for the employee's own tax is a premium. The $1,500.00 was ordered to be repaid by NZ Dream to the Labour Inspector for Jaskaran's benefit.

10. Whether NZ Dream breached employment standards as defined by s 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [156]-[157]).

Section 5 of the Act defines employment standards to include obligations under the Act, HA03, MWA, and WPA. The Authority found NZ Dream had engaged in multiple breaches of employment standards across all relevant legislation.

11. Whether Gurpreet Singh was a "person involved" in NZ Dream's breaches of employment standards under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [158]-[165]).

Section 142W of the Act enables personal liability for individuals who are directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in, or party to, breaches of employment standards. The applicable test, per A Labour Inspector v Southern Taxis & Ors [2021] NZCA 705, requires knowledge of the essential facts establishing the employer's contravention. As NZ Dream's sole director, shareholder, and controlling mind, Gurpreet made all decisions about the complainants' hours, pay, working conditions, and record-keeping. The Authority found Gurpreet was a person involved in the breaches, making him personally liable to pay outstanding wage arrears if NZ Dream defaults under s 142Y of the Act.

12. Whether Harbant Singh was a "person involved" in the substantive breaches of employment standards — Status: Dismissed (para [15], [168]).

The Labour Inspector did not allege Harbant was a person involved in the substantive breaches addressed in this determination. Harbant was employed by NZ Dream but was not an officer of the company. No penalties were imposed on Harbant for the claims in this determination.

13. Whether penalties should be imposed on NZ Dream and Gurpreet Singh for breaches of the Act, MWA, HA03, and WPA — Status: Conditional/Not yet determined (paras [167]-[169]).

The Authority found that serious breaches of employment standards had occurred and that it is necessary and appropriate to impose penalties on NZ Dream and Gurpreet Singh. However, the quantum of penalties was not determined in this determination; penalties (and costs) are to be determined on the papers pursuant to timetable directions issued to the parties.

14. What costs and disbursements should be awarded — Status: Not yet determined (para [173]).

The Authority noted the Labour Inspector, as the successful party, is entitled to a contribution towards actual legal costs. Costs are to be determined on the papers along with penalties, in accordance with issued timetable directions.

The substantive claims were upheld in full against NZ Dream Contracting Limited and Gurpreet Singh; no liability was imposed on Harbant Singh for the substantive breaches; penalties and costs were deferred for separate determination on the papers.

- Wage arrears for Kulvinder Singh: $13,101.65 (comprising $7,956.35 minimum wage arrears; $2,909.15 unlawful wage deductions; $1,360.86 annual holiday pay arrears; $875.29 public holiday entitlement arrears) — ordered payable by NZ Dream to the Labour Inspector for Kulvinder's benefit within 28 days.
- Wage arrears for Jaskaran Singh: $8,617.85 (comprising $6,072.25 minimum wage arrears; $1,427.75 unlawful wage deductions; $566.14 annual holiday pay arrears; $551.71 public holiday entitlement arrears) — ordered payable by NZ Dream to the Labour Inspector for Jaskaran's benefit within 28 days.
- Post-employment premium repayment for Jaskaran Singh: $1,500.00 — ordered payable by NZ Dream to the Labour Inspector for Jaskaran's benefit within 28 days (in addition to the $52,000.00 pre-employment premium ordered in the 17 August 2026 determination).
- Total ordered in this determination for Jaskaran: $10,117.85; for Kulvinder: $13,101.65.
- Personal liability of Gurpreet Singh: If NZ Dream defaults on paying any of the above within 28 days, Gurpreet Singh is personally ordered to pay the outstanding amounts pursuant to s 142Y of the Act within 28 days of this determination.
- Penalties: Reserved — to be determined on the papers.
- Costs: Reserved — to be determined on the papers.
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
- Non-publication order: Finalised regarding witnesses' bank account numbers, bank records, and banking information (does not apply to employment institutions).

Mujahid Khan, a senior quarantine officer with 18 years' service at the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI), was summarily dismissed on 6 October 2025 following two workplace complaints. The key legal questions were whether his dismissal was unjustified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, what remedies were appropriate, and whether permanent reinstatement was practicable and reasonable. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified, ordered permanent reinstatement, awarded $22,000 compensation for hurt and humiliation, and ordered $55,080 in lost wages.

Applicant: Mujahid Khan (employee, senior quarantine officer)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Ministry for Primary Industries (employer)

Applicant: Tony Sung, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: Maria Austen and Stephen Wakem, counsel (firm not stated)

Mr Khan had been employed by MPI as a senior quarantine officer for approximately 18 years under a collective agreement with the PSA. Two complaints arose in June 2025: the first (Complaint 1) alleged that on 10 June 2025, Mr Khan pressured a colleague (AB) to visit his friend's house during work hours and made inappropriate comments, and breached MPI's fleet vehicle policy; the second (Complaint 2) alleged that on 12 June 2025 Mr Khan raised his voice aggressively at a colleague (UX). MPI conducted an investigation involving multiple interviews and meetings, ultimately finding serious misconduct in relation to Complaint 1 and misconduct in relation to Complaint 2, and dismissed Mr Khan summarily on 6 October 2025. Mr Khan raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and was granted interim reinstatement by the Authority in May 2026. MPI contested permanent reinstatement on grounds including loss of trust and confidence, revocation of Mr Khan's statutory warrant, and potential impact on complainants.

1. Whether MPI sufficiently investigated the allegations against Mr Khan (Complaint 1) — Status: Established (i.

e. failure to sufficiently investigate found) (paras [26]-[58]).
The applicable test under s 103A(3)(a) requires the employer, having regard to its resources, to have sufficiently investigated the allegations before dismissing. The Authority found MPI failed to adequately weigh evidence that AB had been "primed" by colleagues' comments before the incident, failed to reference or engage with the statement of Mr Khan's friend Mr Ceran, mischaracterised AB's complaint as showing she "repeatedly" refused when the complaint described a dialogue, and did not genuinely weigh the gravity of the charge against the quality of the evidence as required by Alatipi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections. The Authority concluded MPI did not have clear evidence or carry out reasonable inquiries sufficient to establish on the balance of probabilities that Mr Khan breached clause 8.7 of the collective agreement.

2. Whether MPI genuinely considered Mr Khan's explanation before dismissal (Complaint 1) — Status: Established (i.

e. failure found) (paras [59]-[77]).
Under s 103A(3)(d), the employer must genuinely consider the employee's explanation. The Authority found that MPI failed to objectively analyse misconduct allegations against its own policy categories, did not identify which category of serious misconduct applied to the clause 8.7 breach, relied on a "dysfunctional and broken working relationship" factor that had never been put to Mr Khan as an issue during the process, and did not genuinely consider his submission that he had received no training on fleet vehicle use and custom and practice. The Authority also found MPI failed to consider how other employees used fleet vehicles in similar circumstances, as required by Wikaira v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections.

3. Whether MPI's investigation and findings regarding Complaint 2 (verbal altercation) were sufficient — Status: Established (i.

e. investigation sufficient, misconduct finding justified, but dismissal disproportionate) (paras [78]-[92]).
The Authority found that MPI had sufficient evidence, including Mr Khan's partial admission, to conclude on the balance of probabilities that he raised his voice in an agitated and aggressive manner at UX. However, under MPI's own guidelines a finding of misconduct would generally warrant a warning, not dismissal. The Authority held that dismissal was not a proportionate response to this finding of misconduct, consistent with VXO v Health New Zealand.

4. Whether Mr Khan was unjustifiably dismissed overall — Status: Established (paras [90]-[93]).

Applying the s 103A(2) test — whether MPI's actions and how it acted were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances — the Authority found the dismissal unjustified. MPI failed to comply with obligations under s 103A(3)(a) and s 103A(3)(d), and dismissal was not a proportionate outcome even for the substantiated misconduct in Complaint 2, following Angus v Ports of Auckland Limited.

5. Application for non-publication orders regarding complainants and witnesses — Status: Established (paras [10]-[20]).

The Authority applied the two-step framework from MW v Spiga Ltd and FDE v UWV: first, assessing whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected from publication; second, weighing those consequences against the principle of open justice. The Authority accepted that the material traversed sensitive workplace matters and that non-parties (complainants and witnesses) had a legitimate privacy interest per Scott v Damar Industries Limited. Permanent non-publication orders were granted for the names and identifying details of all complainants and witnesses, with initials bearing no relationship to actual names to be used.

6. Compensation for hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Established (paras [94]-[101]).

The Authority assessed the nature and extent of harm under Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited and the meaning of "humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings" per Lim v Meadow Mushrooms Limited. Relevant factors included: significant financial hardship, responsibility for a young son, the amplifying effect of 18 years' service on emotional impact, loss of long-term workplace friendships, and loss of dignity. Mr Khan's comparator case (West v Kowhai Intermediate School Board of Trustees, $45,000 award) was distinguished on its facts. The Authority awarded $22,000.

7. Reimbursement of lost wages — Status: Established (paras [102]-[108]).

The Authority applied a counterfactual analysis (Sam's Fukuyama Food Services Ltd v Zhang; Telecom New Zealand v Nutter) and was satisfied that but for the dismissal Mr Khan would have remained employed throughout the claimed period (6 October 2025 to 29 May 2026, when interim reinstatement took effect). After deducting earnings of $14,577.98 from alternative employment during that period, lost remuneration was assessed at $55,080 (gross), with leave granted to parties to advise if the figure requires amendment.

8. Whether permanent reinstatement was practicable and reasonable — Status: Established (paras [109]-[132]).

Under s 125(2) of the Act the Authority must provide for reinstatement wherever practicable and reasonable, applying the test in Christieson v Fonterra. The Authority rejected MPI's arguments: it found MPI's claimed loss of trust and confidence not made out on the facts, noting Mr Khan had engaged constructively throughout; the rotational and mobile nature of his role reduced the risk of impact on complainants; Mr Khan had already regained his statutory warrant and been performing his role since interim reinstatement in May 2026; and the distinguishing features of Gumbeze v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki and Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation (pre-existing fragility and deep distrust of management) were absent here. Permanent reinstatement to Mr Khan's former position (or a no less advantageous position) was ordered.

9. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 — Status: Dismissed (paras [133]-[138]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from Yang v Te Whatu Ora requiring consideration of whether the employee's conduct was culpable or blameworthy (Sefo v Sealord Shellfish Ltd). While Mr Khan accepted an error of judgement and a warning for Complaint 2 would have been warranted, the Authority found his use of the fleet vehicle and his honestly held belief that AB was agreeable to the visit did not amount to blameworthy or culpable conduct. No reduction was applied.

10. Costs — Status: Not reached (paras [143]-[146]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Khan may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with MPI having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances require adjustment.

The claim was upheld in full: unjustified dismissal established, permanent reinstatement ordered, compensation and lost wages awarded, and no reduction for contribution.

- Permanent reinstatement: Yes — Mr Khan reinstated to his former position or a position no less advantageous (s 123(1)(a)), effective from the date of the determination (interim reinstatement already in place from 29 May 2026).
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $22,000, payable within 28 days.
- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b)): $55,080 (gross), payable within 28 days; leave granted to parties to advise if the figure requires amendment.
- Reduction under s 124: None.
- Costs: Reserved (parties to attempt agreement; memorandum process outlined if agreement not reached).

UJX, a long-serving IRD employee, was dismissed on medical incapacity grounds in August 2025 after a protracted dispute over reasonable accommodation of their PTSD diagnosis. UJX claimed unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage (including failure to follow the reasonable accommodation policy and unlawful discrimination), and post-reinstatement disadvantage, seeking permanent reinstatement and compensation. The Authority upheld the unjustified dismissal and one unjustified disadvantage claim (failure to follow the reasonable accommodation policy), ordered permanent reinstatement and $30,000 compensation, but dismissed the discrimination, post-reinstatement disadvantage, and several other claims.

Applicant: UJX (employee)
Respondent: Commissioner of the Inland Revenue Department (employer)

Applicant: Michael O'Brien and Ben Nicholson, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel for the Respondent

UJX was employed by IRD from September 2012 as a team lead in customer compliance services, covered by a collective agreement that included reasonable accommodation and medical incapacity provisions. In August 2024 UJX made a formal workplace bullying complaint (not upheld) and was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD attributed to workplace mistreatment, which they disclosed to IRD only in December 2024. From early 2025, the parties engaged in extended, largely lawyer-driven correspondence about reasonable accommodations for UJX's disability, with IRD repeatedly requesting medical information and confirmation that its proposed accommodations would keep UJX safe at work, and UJX and their lawyer raising procedural and substantive objections without providing direct answers to those questions. IRD dismissed UJX on 11 August 2025 for medical incapacity, concluding it could not ensure UJX's safety when UJX would not confirm whether IRD's offered accommodations were sufficient; UJX was paid in lieu of notice and received 65 days' pay under the collective agreement. UJX obtained interim reinstatement on 31 October 2025, returned to work on 24 November, and then raised further grievances about the reinstatement process; the investigation meeting was held in March 2026 with further submissions received through May 2026.

1. Whether the non-publication order protecting UJX's identity and medical information should be made permanent — Status: Established (paras [4]-[5]).

The Authority applied the open justice starting point but found it was reasonably displaced by the sensitive nature of UJX's medical information (PTSD) and their status as a reinstated employee still in the workplace, with no countervailing public interest. The interim order was made permanent by anonymisation under schedule 2, clause 10 of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

2. Whether s 123C of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (in force from 21 February 2026, removing reinstatement as a remedy where employee conduct contributed to the grievance) applies to UJX's pre-commencement application — Status: Established (paras [12]-[19]).

The Authority applied s 33 of the Legislation Act 2019, which preserves existing rights and proceedings from the effect of amendments. It found that UJX's application, lodged before s 123C came into force, constituted a step in completing a "matter relating to an existing right" under s 33(1)(a) — namely, the right to seek reinstatement as part of the personal grievance regime — so s 123C did not apply and reinstatement remained available. The Authority relied on the Form 1 application framework and the structure of the personal grievance regime as support for this interpretation.

3. Whether IRD unjustifiably disadvantaged UJX by failing to comply with the reasonable accommodation policy — Status: Established (paras [69]-[70]).

The Authority found the reasonable accommodation policy was triggered from at least 27 March 2025 when UJX's disability and need for accommodation were known to IRD. IRD was obliged to follow and centre the policy in discussions, but failed to do so transparently, including by not applying the one-up review process. This failure constituted a breach of duty that occasioned disadvantage to UJX. The Authority accepted UJX's approach created complexity but held that raising personal grievances was an exercise of statutory rights that had to be seen in context of the shock of the diagnosis.

4. Whether IRD unlawfully discriminated against UJX on the ground of disability causing unjustified disadvantage under ss 104–105 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and s 21(1)(h) of the Human Rights Act 1993 — Status: Dismissed (para [71]-[72]).

The Authority applied the test from McAlister v Air New Zealand requiring the prohibited ground (disability) to be a "material ingredient" in the decision to treat the employee in the relevant way. It found a factual difficulty: the accommodations were not implemented because the dismissal intervened before the reasonable accommodation process was completed, and the process was overtaken by the medical incapacity consideration. The Authority noted that if wrong on this, the factual matrix overlapped with the established first grievance. The claim was not established.

5. Whether IRD unjustifiably dismissed UJX on 12 August 2025 — Status: Established (paras [73]-[75]).

Applying the s 103A justification test, the Authority found IRD could not justify dismissal for medical incapacity for two principal reasons: (a) UJX remained able to carry out their duties, which the evidence clearly established and which the decision-maker could not fairly and reasonably disregard under the ending employment policy; and (b) other options had not been exhausted, including an independent medical assessment for reasonable accommodation purposes, implementing agreed accommodations with appropriate notice, or waiting a reasonable period for UJX to recover. The Authority also found IRD had conflated the reasonable accommodation process with the medical incapacity dismissal process. It accepted IRD acted sincerely and earnestly, and found no improper motive established against the decision-makers.

6. Whether IRD unjustifiably disadvantaged UJX post-reinstatement (including alleged unilateral change of reporting line, being treated as a new employee, denial of system access, deletion of records, and capping of hours) — Status: Dismissed (paras [76]-[77]).

The Authority accepted these matters were upsetting to UJX but found they did not establish breaches or unjustified disadvantage caused by IRD's actions. It noted that re-formation of the employment relationship by reinstatement could not reasonably be expected to be seamless, and that concerns about system access and records were unclear. The personal grievance was not established.

7. Whether UJX is entitled to permanent reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [79]-[86]).

The Authority applied the s 125(2) test — that reinstatement is the primary remedy where practical and reasonable. It found UJX to be a loyal, skilled, long-serving employee with co-worker support, capable of performing their role, and sincerely wishing to return. IRD's opposition on grounds of staff objection, UJX's negative views of managers, and intractability of the relationship was considered but not accepted as sufficient to displace the primary remedy, particularly given IRD's size, resources, collective agreement framework, and the fact the employment relationship had already partially reformed under interim reinstatement. Authorities cited include Angus v Ports of Auckland [2011] NZEmpC 122 and Smith v Fletcher Concrete & Infrastructure Ltd [2020] NZEmpC 125.

8. Whether UJX is entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [87]-[88]).

The Authority found UJX was significantly negatively impacted by the incapacity process and dismissal. Given the overlapping and ongoing nature of the grievances, a global award was appropriate. The Authority awarded $30,000, having regard to the circumstances and comparable matters.

9. Whether UJX is entitled to reimbursement of annual leave — Status: Established (para [89]).

The Authority ordered reimbursement of 7 days' annual leave for the period between UJX's last day of employment (13 August) and their return to work following interim reinstatement (24 November 2025).

10. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for UJX's blameworthy contributory conduct — Status: Dismissed (paras [90]-[91]).

The Authority found UJX was not blameworthy: they were entitled to expect IRD to scrupulously follow relevant policies, delays in medical information were not UJX's fault, exercising personal grievance rights was not blameworthy, and apparent refusal to allow questions to UJX's medical advisor was not blameworthy because IRD had other available options it did not pursue. No reduction was made.

11. Whether IRD breached implied terms, express terms, and good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [8]-[11], [69]-[75]).

The Authority addressed good faith and contractual obligations as part of its broader justification analysis. It found IRD's failure to centre and apply the reasonable accommodation policy, and the conflation of that process with medical incapacity dismissal, were inconsistent with good faith obligations under s 4(1A)(b) and the relational approach required by the Act as discussed in FMV v TZB [2021] NZSC 102. The Authority also cited Simpsons Farms Ltd v Aberhart [2006] ERNZ 825 for the principle that failure to comply with statutory obligations undermines justification. Discrete findings on implied and express terms beyond these conclusions were not separately stated.

12. Whether penalties should be ordered for any found breach, with 50% paid to UJX — Status: Dismissed (para [92]).

The Authority declined to order penalties, finding the parties faced a genuinely complex situation which both sought in good faith to resolve, and that this was not a matter warranting a penalty award.

13. Whether special damages of $35,306.34 for legal fees related to an alleged retaliatory proposal should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [93]).

The Authority accepted it was reasonable for UJX to seek legal advice but declined the award because it was difficult to draw a clear line between the events before the Authority and other ongoing matters, and the legal costs appeared to have developed across a broader dispute extending back to 2024.

14. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Not reached (paras [96]-[98]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. A timetable was set: UJX may lodge a memorandum on costs within 14 days of the determination, with IRD having 14 days to reply. The costs issue remains outstanding and was not determined.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal and one unjustified disadvantage grievance (failure to follow the reasonable accommodation policy) were established; permanent reinstatement and compensation were ordered; the discrimination grievance, post-reinstatement disadvantage grievance, penalties, special damages, and costs reduction claims were dismissed.

Reinstatement: Yes — permanent reinstatement to UJX's position with IRD.
Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings): $30,000 (global award under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act, encompassing the unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal grievances).
Annual leave reimbursement: 7 days' annual leave reimbursed (period 13 August – 24 November 2025).
Lost wages: None separately ordered (UJX remained employed under interim reinstatement).
Penalties: None ordered.
Special damages: None ordered.
Payment timeframe: All monetary amounts to be paid within 21 days of the determination date.
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; timetable set for memoranda if needed.

[COSTS ONLY]

Brent Colyer (employee) succeeded in a disadvantage personal grievance claim against New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) in a substantive determination dated 3 July 2026, but was unsuccessful in a constructive dismissal claim. This costs determination resolves the question of whether Mr Colyer is entitled to a costs award given his partial success, and if so, whether any adjustment to the standard daily tariff is warranted. The Authority awarded Mr Colyer the full daily tariff amount of $6,250, finding that any success is sufficient to ground a costs award and that the two grievances were not sufficiently distinct to justify a tariff reduction.

Applicant: Brent Colyer (employee)
Respondent: New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (employer)

Applicant: Mary-Jane Thomas, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Gillian Service and Isabella Denholm, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Colyer brought two personal grievance claims against NZAS: one for unjustified action causing disadvantage and one for constructive dismissal. In the substantive determination dated 3 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 444), the Authority found that NZAS had acted unjustifiably toward Mr Colyer causing disadvantage, and awarded compensation, but found no constructive dismissal. Mr Colyer had also abandoned his claim for lost remuneration at the investigation meeting. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination to allow the parties to agree on costs, but no agreement was reached. Mr Colyer then applied for costs of $6,250 (reflecting the 1.5-day investigation meeting at the daily tariff rate), plus costs for the costs application itself. NZAS opposed any costs award, arguing that Mr Colyer's partial success (winning only one of two claims and recovering only 45% of claimed compensation) meant costs should lie where they fall, and that the late abandonment of the lost remuneration claim was an equitable factor weighing against a costs award.

1. Whether Mr Colyer was entitled to a costs award at all, given he succeeded on only one of two claims and recovered only 45% of the compensation sought — Status: Established (paras [6]-[10]).

The Authority applied the principle that costs follow the event, and relied on the Employment Court's decision in William Coomer v JA McCallum and Son Limited [2017] NZEmpC 156, which holds that any success by an applicant is sufficient to ground a costs award, regardless of whether a larger or more complex claim was lost. Because Mr Colyer succeeded on the unjustified action causing disadvantage grievance, he was entitled to costs. The late abandonment of the lost remuneration claim was noted as an equitable consideration but did not alter this conclusion.

2. Whether the daily tariff starting point ($6,250 for a 1.5-day investigation meeting) should be adjusted downward for partial success — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[19]).

The Authority's practice note allows for tariff adjustments where partial success is relevant, but only where the claims are distinct and separate. The Authority applied the principle that if both claims arise from the same facts or allegations, they form one employment relationship problem and failing on one element does not warrant a reduction. Here, both the constructive dismissal grievance and the unjustified action grievance arose from the same facts, so the claims were not separate, and partial success was not relevant to a tariff reduction.

3. Whether the daily tariff should be increased to reflect additional work undertaken in making the costs application — Status: Dismissed (para [20]).

Mr Colyer sought costs for the costs application itself, in addition to the base tariff. The Authority declined to increase the tariff amount to account for the work involved in applying for costs, finding no persuasive basis to do so.

The costs application was upheld in part: Mr Colyer was awarded costs at the full daily tariff rate of $6,250; the application for an uplift to cover the costs application itself was dismissed.

Costs: NZAS is ordered to pay Mr Colyer $6,250 as a contribution to his costs. No additional amount was awarded for the costs of the costs application itself.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from a substantive decision in which the Employment Relations Authority found The Godfather Private Limited (TGP) liable for wage arrears and breaches of employment standards, with two individual respondents also found liable as persons involved in those breaches. A Labour Inspector sought a costs contribution and disbursements following the parties' failure to agree on costs. The Authority awarded $19,208.65 in total costs and disbursements against TGP.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Respondents: The Godfather Private Limited (First Respondent); Navjot Singh Rattanpal (Second Respondent); Ajmer Singh (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Rebecca Denmead, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Danny Gelb, counsel for the Respondent

In the substantive determination dated 21 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 482), the Authority found TGP liable for wage arrears to two employees and for seeking and receiving a premium from one employee in breach of s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983. Navjot Singh Rattanpal and Ajmer Singh were found to be persons involved in TGP's breaches of employment standards under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination to allow the parties to settle the issue, but no agreement was reached. The respondents requested a three-week extension to seek advice but provided no further communication, and the Inspector filed a costs submission on 10 August 2026 claiming $19,000 based on the notional daily tariff for a five-day investigation meeting, plus $2,878.99 in disbursements including travel and translation costs.

1. Whether the Authority should award costs in favour of the Labour Inspector, and at what level — Status: Established (paras [4]-[9]).

The Authority's discretion to award costs is set out in s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, with key principles drawn from the Authority's Practice Direction and PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808. Costs generally follow the event, awards are modest, and the daily tariff provides the starting point: $4,500 for the first hearing day and $3,500 for each subsequent day. Applied to five hearing days (including just over a half day on 14 April 2026), the starting point was $16,750. No further upward or downward adjustment to the daily rate was warranted, as the Authority's costs approach prioritises access to justice and modest awards (citing Key Industries v Perrin [2023] NZERA 172 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135). The Inspector did not seek apportionment between the three respondents, and costs were ordered solely against TGP.

2. Whether a cost contribution should be awarded for the adjourned hearing day of 3 February 2026 — Status: Established (para [7]).

TGP requested an adjournment at the commencement of the 3 February 2026 hearing day, and the cost implications were explained before the decision to adjourn was made. The Inspector sought a nominal contribution of $500 for that day. The Authority accepted this was appropriate because the Inspector and its witnesses had already attended, thereby incurring costs, and awarded the $500 contribution, bringing the total costs contribution to $17,250.

3. Whether travel disbursements should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [10]).

The Authority's normal practice is not to award disbursements for travel costs (citing A Labour Inspector v JD Foods Ltd & Ors [2024] NZERA 455). As TGP and the investigation meeting were both based in Auckland and no further explanation for the travel costs was provided, the travel disbursements claimed were declined.

4. Whether translation cost disbursements should be awarded — Status: Established (para [11]).

The Authority accepted that translation costs of $1,688.20 were reasonably and properly incurred and awarded them in full.

5. Whether the Authority lodgement fee should be recoverable as a disbursement — Status: Established (para [12]).

Consistent with standard practice, the Authority filing fee of $71.55 paid by the successful applicant was included in the disbursements award.

6. Whether witness expenses for summonsed witnesses should be recoverable — Status: Established (para [13]).

Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 requires payment to summonsed witnesses at the Authority's prescribed rate. The Inspector had been obliged to make these payments, and the Authority accepted witness fees of $198.90 as necessary and properly recoverable disbursements. No amount above the Authority rate was awarded, as no supporting documentation was provided for additional costs, and one summonsed witness had appeared by AVL.

The costs application was upheld in part: costs were awarded at the daily tariff rate with an adjournment contribution included, and disbursements were awarded for translation costs, witness fees, and the filing fee, while travel disbursements were declined.

Costs contribution: $17,250 (based on the daily tariff for five hearing days plus $500 for the adjourned day).
Disbursements: $1,958.65, comprising translation costs of $1,688.20, witness fees of $198.90, and filing fee of $71.55.
Total ordered: $19,208.65, payable by The Godfather Private Limited to the Crown (the Inspector) within 90 days of the date of the determination.
Travel disbursements: Declined.
No remedy ordered against the Second or Third Respondents (costs not apportioned between respondents).

[COSTS ONLY]

Richard Wood (applicant/employee) had previously failed to establish that he was in an employment relationship with Three Sixty Capital Partners Limited and associated individual respondents, resulting in the Authority declining jurisdiction over his claims. The respondents sought a costs award following their successful defence. The key question was the appropriate quantum of costs, with the Authority settling on a modest uplift above the standard "on the papers" tariff.

Applicant: Richard Wood (claimant/alleged employee)
Respondent: Three Sixty Capital Partners Limited (First Respondent), Mark Smitheram (Second Respondent), Peter Jeffs (Third Respondent), Gregory Young (Fourth Respondent)

Applicant: Blair Edwards and William Buckley, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Carter Pearce, counsel for the Respondents

In a prior determination dated 22 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 490), the Authority found that Richard Wood had not established he was in an employment relationship with Three Sixty Capital Partners Limited, and accordingly declined jurisdiction to investigate his claims. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves following that decision. The respondents sought costs of either $15,000 (described as less than half their actual costs) or, alternatively, $8,000 representing the tariff for a two-day investigation meeting. Mr Wood submitted that costs should be limited to $2,250, being half the daily tariff applicable to matters resolved on the papers. This costs determination was itself conducted on the papers.

1. Whether the respondents are entitled to a costs award following their successful defence — Status: Established (paras [4]-[5]).

The Authority has a discretionary power to award costs under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, to be exercised in a principled manner consistent with the Authority's equity and good conscience jurisdiction. The general principle that costs follow the event applied, as the respondents successfully defended all claims. The Authority confirmed the respondents were entitled to a consideration of costs.

2. Whether the appropriate starting point for costs is the half-daily tariff of $2,250 given the matter was resolved on the papers — Status: Established (paras [6]-[7]).

Consistent with the Authority's usual approach to investigations conducted on the papers (by consent), the starting point is one half of the notional daily tariff, being $2,250. The Authority confirmed this as the appropriate base figure before any adjustments. Relevant practice directions and prior authority (PBO Limited v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808; Faggotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135) were cited as framing the costs principles.

3. Whether attempts (or lack thereof) to resolve the dispute warranted an adjustment to the tariff — Status: Dismissed (para [8]).

No information was provided indicating that any party had made attempts to resolve the substantive dispute. Accordingly, no adjustment to the tariff was made on this ground.

4. Whether Mr Wood's conduct unreasonably increased the respondents' costs, warranting an upward adjustment — Status: Dismissed (paras [9], [15]).

The Authority found no evidence that Mr Wood's conduct unreasonably increased costs. The respondents' submission that the claim "obviously lacked merit" and that Mr Wood drew unnecessary individuals into the proceedings was rejected; the Authority affirmed that Mr Wood was entitled to have his employment status determined.

5. Whether an uplift to the tariff was warranted due to the volume of evidence and submissions filed in this preliminary investigation — Status: Established (paras [16]-[18]).

The Authority accepted that, compared with other preliminary "on the papers" investigations into employment status, this matter required more time due to the not insignificant volume of evidence and submissions filed by both sides. A modest uplift above the half-daily tariff was found fair and appropriate. The Authority declined the respondents' request for a larger uplift by analogy with High Court Rules costs regimes, finding the High Court Rules had no bearing on the Authority's own costs regime (para [14]).

6. Whether the High Court Rules provided a useful analogy justifying an uplift to the level sought by respondents — Status: Dismissed (para [14]).

The Authority rejected the submission that High Court Rules are an appropriate analogy for costs in the Authority. The Authority has its own distinct costs regime, and the High Court Rules were found to have no bearing on the appropriate costs quantum in this matter.

The costs claim was partially upheld: the respondents were awarded costs of $3,500, representing the half-daily tariff with a modest uplift, significantly less than either amount sought by the respondents.

Costs: $3,500.00 ordered to be paid by Richard Wood to the respondents (Three Sixty Capital Partners Limited, Mark Smitheram, Peter Jeffs, and Gregory Young) within 28 days of the determination. Apportionment of costs between the respondents is left to the respondents themselves. No other remedy ordered.