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Sean Logan sought recovery of a $3,500 deduction made from his final pay by his former employer Spacetech Limited (in liquidation), claiming breaches of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA). Because Spacetech is in liquidation, Logan pursued Daniel Billings — its director and shareholder — as a person involved in those breaches, and also sought a penalty against Billings for alleged breach of the individual employment agreement. The Authority found Spacetech breached the WPA, granted conditional leave to recover $3,500 from Billings (only to the extent Spacetech cannot pay), awarded interest, but dismissed the penalty claim.

Applicant: Sean Logan (employee)
Respondent: Daniel Billings (director and shareholder of former employer Spacetech Limited, in liquidation)

Applicant: Hamish Burdon, advocate for the applicant
Respondent: Daniel Billings, in person

Sean Logan was employed as a Cabinet Maker, initially with Aubrey Capital Limited and then with Spacetech Limited from 2024 under an individual employment agreement (IEA) containing a general deductions clause (clause 8.2) that purported to satisfy the written consent requirement of s 5 of the WPA. Logan resigned on 18 June 2025, citing workplace treatment concerns. Billings responded the same day asserting Logan's immediate departure was a breach of the four-week notice period and reserved the right to deduct damages from final pay. On 1 July 2025, Billings emailed Logan informing him of an intended $3,500 deduction for rework costs, referencing clause 8.2, and inviting a written dispute by close of business 2 July 2025. Logan emailed on 2 July 2025 expressly withdrawing consent and disputing the deduction, but on 3 July 2025 Billings processed the pay run including the deduction. Both Spacetech and Aubrey were placed in liquidation and struck out as parties (with liquidators not consenting to the claims continuing against those entities), leaving Billings as the sole respondent. Billings acknowledged holding a "person involved" position under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act) but denied a substantive WPA breach and argued that any order against him personally was premature pending liquidation outcomes.

1. Whether Spacetech breached ss 4 and 5 of the WPA by failing to adequately consult before making the deduction — Status: Established (paras [24]-[28]).

Section 5(1A) of the WPA requires an employer to consult an employee before making a specific deduction pursuant to a general deductions clause. The Authority found that while Billings' email of 1 July 2025 provided an itemised account and identified the contractual clause, it gave no meaningful detail about how the $3,500 figure was calculated from losses attributable to Logan's conduct. The Authority therefore held that Spacetech had not adequately consulted Logan as required by s 5(1A), establishing a breach of ss 4 and 5 of the WPA.

2. Whether Spacetech breached s 5(2) of the WPA by proceeding with the deduction after Logan withdrew consent — Status: Established (para [26]).

Section 5(2) of the WPA provides that an employee may withdraw consent to a deduction by giving written notice to the employer. The Authority found that Logan's 2 July 2025 email constituted effective written withdrawal of consent, and that although it may have arrived after nominal "close of business," Billings confirmed it was received and considered before the pay run was processed on 3 July 2025. Spacetech had sufficient time to adjust the pay run but did not do so, thereby breaching s 5(2).

3. Whether the deduction was unreasonable under s 5A of the WPA — Status: Partially established/conditional (para [27]).

Section 5A prohibits an employer from making a deduction from wages if it is unreasonable. The Authority stated it "would not have been satisfied" the deduction was reasonable given the uncertainty around what losses were attributable to Logan and noting Spacetech itself had acknowledged alternative remedies (such as an application to the Authority once losses were quantified). This finding was made in addition to the primary ss 4 and 5 findings, with the Authority noting the likely breach of s 5A.

4. Whether Daniel Billings was a "person involved" in Spacetech's WPA breaches under s 142W of the Act — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31]).

Under s 142W of the Act, a "person involved" includes someone directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or a party to a breach of an employment standard. Billings conceded he met this definition. The Authority confirmed the finding and rejected Billings' reliance on the s 142ZD defence, finding he had not proved either limb of that defence under s 142ZD(2)(a) or (b).

5. Whether leave should be granted to recover the deduction amount from Billings personally — Status: Established (conditional) (paras [29]-[32], [35]).

Under s 142Y(2)(b) of the Act, the Authority may grant leave to recover from a person involved to the extent the employer cannot pay. The Authority acknowledged the unknown prospects of recovery from Spacetech in liquidation and granted conditional leave, limiting Billings' personal liability to the amount Spacetech is unable to pay. Billings' argument that any order was premature was effectively resolved by structuring the order as conditional rather than dismissing the claim.

6. Whether interest should be awarded on the deducted amount — Status: Established (para [33]).

The Authority confirmed it is appropriate to award interest where a person has been unlawfully deprived of money to which they are entitled. Interest is to be calculated using the Civil Debt Interest Calculator from 4 July 2025 (inclusive) and continues to accrue until the full amount is paid.

7. Whether Billings incited, instigated, aided, or abetted a breach of the IEA under s 134(2) of the Act, and whether a penalty should be imposed — Status: Dismissed (para [34]).

Section 134(2) of the Act imposes liability to a penalty on a person who incites, instigates, aids or abets a breach of an employment agreement. The Authority noted Logan's submissions did not identify which specific term of the IEA had been breached, and that if clause 8.2 was relied upon it was not clear how that clause had itself been breached (as distinct from the statutory WPA obligations). Absent a clearly articulated contractual breach, the Authority declined to impose a penalty, and the claim was dismissed.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [36]-[38]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter between themselves. If unresolved, Logan may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Billings having 14 days to reply. The Authority noted any costs award would be adjusted downward from the standard daily tariff given no investigation meeting was held.

The claim was partially upheld: the WPA breach claims were established, conditional leave to recover $3,500 from Billings was granted with interest, but the penalty claim for breach of the IEA was dismissed.

Recovery of deduction: $3,500 (less any applicable tax), recoverable from Daniel Billings conditionally — only to the extent Spacetech Limited (in liquidation) is unable to pay that amount (s 142Y(2)(b) of the Act).
Interest: Awarded, calculated using the Civil Debt Interest Calculator from 4 July 2025 (inclusive) until the sum is fully paid; exact dollar amount not specified.
Reinstatement: Not ordered and not sought.
Penalty: None ordered (claim dismissed).
Costs: Reserved.

Jacqueline Evans, a Head Chef employed by Glasshouse Investments (2015) Limited (GIL) at Glasines Café Bar, raised personal grievances for unjustified action causing disadvantage and unjustifiable constructive dismissal, along with claims for unlawful wage deduction and penalties. The key legal questions were whether GIL's conduct — including the absence of a written employment agreement, an unlawful wage deduction, a flawed disciplinary process, and a failure to maintain a safe workplace — constituted constructive dismissal and/or unjustified action causing disadvantage, and whether penalties were warranted. The Authority upheld the disadvantage grievance and the wages claim and imposed a partial penalty, but dismissed the constructive dismissal grievance and the good faith penalty claim.

Applicant: Jacqueline Evans (employee — Head Chef)
Respondent: Glasshouse Investments (2015) Limited (employer, operator of Glasines Café Bar)

Applicant: Angela McKenzie, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Matthew Smellie for the Respondent

Ms Evans was employed by GIL as Head Chef at Glasines Café Bar from May 2022, resigned in March 2023, then recommenced employment shortly afterwards in a second term. GIL conceded it did not have a written employment agreement for the second term, and also conceded it deducted $350 from Ms Evans's pay without a lawful basis. In December 2023, GIL initiated a disciplinary process concerning alleged theft, but the process was never properly concluded: a written warning was placed on Ms Evans's file without her being informed. Workplace relationships deteriorated, with the manager Mr Eade swearing directly at Ms Evans and one employee refusing to work with her; Ms Evans had raised these concerns with Mr Smellie but no effective steps were taken. Ms Evans resigned in May 2024, claiming constructive dismissal, but GIL denied all liability. The matter was investigated at a hearing in Invercargill on 16 December 2025.

1. Whether GIL failed to have a written employment agreement for Ms Evans — Status: Established (paras [24]-[25], [44], [65]).

GIL conceded that it did not have a written employment agreement for Ms Evans's second term of employment commencing shortly after March 2023. This was an admitted breach. The Authority accepted the concession and found the failure established, which formed the basis for a penalty under the Employment Relations Act 2000.

2. Whether GIL made an unlawful deduction of $350 from Ms Evans's pay — Status: Established (paras [26]-[27], [62]).

GIL conceded the deduction of $350. The Authority applied the Wages Protection Act 1983 and found that, in the absence of a written employment agreement authorising the deduction, the deduction was unlawful. Ms Evans's claim for repayment of $350 was upheld.

3. Whether GIL conducted an unjustified and flawed disciplinary process with Ms Evans — Status: Established (paras [28]-[36], [44]).

The Authority applied the justification test under s 103A of the Act (whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as GIL did) informed by s 4 (good faith). GIL failed to properly investigate, inform Ms Evans of the implications, give her a genuine opportunity to respond, or consider her response before making a decision; a written warning was placed on her file without notice to her. The Authority concluded the disciplinary process was clearly flawed and unjustified.

4. Whether GIL failed to provide Ms Evans with a safe workplace — Status: Partially established (paras [37]-[43]).

The Authority divided this issue into two categories. As to excessive hours and being required to act as temporary Bar Manager without certification, the Authority was not satisfied these constituted a failure to provide a safe workplace, finding GIL had provided relevant training and that Ms Evans willingly accepted the additional hours and duties (paras [38]-[39]). As to negative workplace interactions and strained working relationships (including Mr Eade swearing at Ms Evans), the Authority was satisfied GIL knew of the issues, did not do enough to defuse tensions despite assurances from Mr Smellie, and that this amounted to an unjustified failure to provide a safe work environment (paras [40]-[43]).

5. Whether GIL's unjustified actions gave rise to a personal grievance for unjustified constructive dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[50]).

The Authority applied the constructive dismissal test from Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA), Wellington etc Clerical Workers etc IUOW v Greenwich [1983] ACJ 965, and Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUOW Inc [1994] 2 NZLR 415 (CA), requiring a sufficiently serious breach of duty such that resignation in response was foreseeable, and that the employee did resign in response to that breach. The Authority was not satisfied those criteria were met: the earlier breaches had passed with little complaint, Ms Evans appeared robust and likely to tolerate rather than resign due to workplace issues, the course-of-conduct/last-straw argument (referencing Sonny Ooi & Associates Ltd v Fainitski [1998] 1 ERNZ 1 and Preston v Comtec Communications Ltd) was not supported on the facts, and there were concerns her decision to resign was also influenced by her own failure to follow cash-advance protocols and anxiety about potential further action by GIL.

6. Whether GIL's unjustified actions gave rise to a personal grievance for unjustified action causing disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [51]-[52]).

Under s 103(1)(b) of the Act, the Authority found that GIL's unjustified actions — particularly the flawed disciplinary process and failure to address difficult working relationships — did cause disadvantage to Ms Evans's employment. The personal grievance was upheld on this basis.

7. Whether Ms Evans is entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings — Status: Established (paras [54]-[57]).

The Authority assessed compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act, applying the framework from Stormont v Peddle Thorp Aitken Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 71, Waikato District Health Board v Archibald [2017] NZEmpC 132, and Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113. The harm included loss of confidence and self-worth from the unjustified disciplinary process, breakdown in working relationships causing loss of dignity, and anxiety and frustration. The Authority assessed this as lower-level harm and awarded $18,000 in compensation.

8. Whether Ms Evans is entitled to reimbursement of lost remuneration — Status: Dismissed (para [59]).

Under ss 123 and 128 of the Act, lost remuneration is tied to a dismissal grievance. Because the constructive dismissal grievance was not established, there was no relevant dismissal and therefore no entitlement to reimbursement of lost wages.

9. Whether Ms Evans contributed to the situation giving rise to her grievances, warranting reduction of remedy under s 124 — Status: Dismissed (paras [60]-[61]).

The Authority applied s 124 of the Act and the test from Xtreme Dining Ltd v Dewar [2016] NZEmpC 136, requiring culpable or blameworthy conduct that contributed to the grievances. The Authority found no such conduct and declined to reduce the remedy.

10. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of the duty of good faith — Status: Dismissed (para [64]).

The Authority found it was not satisfied that GIL breached the duty of good faith in a manner that would justify imposition of a penalty, and declined to award one on this ground.

11. Whether a penalty should be imposed for failure to have a written employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [65]-[67]).

The Authority found a penalty appropriate under the Act for the failure to have an employment agreement, having regard to the factors in s 133A and comparable cases. A penalty of $1,500 was imposed, of which $1,000 was directed to be paid to Ms Evans and $500 to a Crown bank account.

12. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [72]-[74]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to negotiate costs between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Evans may file a costs memorandum within 28 days, with GIL having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff unless adjustment is warranted.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified action causing disadvantage grievance, the unlawful wage deduction claim, and the penalty for failure to have an employment agreement were all established; the constructive dismissal grievance, the lost remuneration claim, and the good faith penalty claim were dismissed.

Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i) — humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $18,000
Reimbursement of lost wages: None ordered (no dismissal established)
Unlawful wage deduction repayment: $350
Penalty for failure to have employment agreement: $1,500 total — $1,000 payable to Ms Evans; $500 payable to a Crown bank account (within 28 days of determination)
Reinstatement: Not ordered
Costs: Reserved

ZKY, a former Corrections Officer employed by the Department of Corrections from January 2024 until his dismissal in April 2025, applied for interim reinstatement pending substantive determination of his unjustified dismissal personal grievance. His dismissal arose from his use of excessive force against two prisoners following a serious assault on him at work in October 2024. The Authority found that while ZKY had a weakly arguable case for unjustified dismissal, he had no arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and the balance of convenience and overall justice strongly weighed against interim reinstatement, so the application was dismissed.

Applicant: ZKY (employee — Corrections Officer)
Respondent: Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: Rani Amaranathan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: David Traylor, counsel for Corrections

ZKY, a Fijian immigrant, was employed as a Corrections Officer at Auckland Prison from 6 January 2024. On 2 October 2024, he and a colleague were assaulted by two prisoners; ZKY suffered concussion and a laceration requiring stitches. Following the assault, ZKY subjected the prisoners to repeated and severe physical force (kicking, punching, and stomping on their heads while they were on the ground and being restrained), and made threatening remarks toward prisoners while being removed from the scene. Corrections dismissed ZKY on 2 April 2025 for serious misconduct. ZKY faced criminal charges, pleading guilty to assault with intent to injure in relation to one prisoner and was discharged without conviction in November 2025. He raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal in April 2025 but delayed his interim reinstatement application until May 2026, citing focus on criminal and immigration matters. ZKY argued his conduct was caused or mitigated by his concussion and extreme stress response, and that Corrections failed to adequately investigate those factors; Corrections maintained the dismissal was substantively and procedurally justified and that reinstatement was untenable.

1. Whether ZKY had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (weakly) (paras [43]–[53]).

The threshold for an arguable case is low: the claim must not be merely frivolous or vexatious and must show a possible (but not necessarily certain) prospect of success. ZKY did not dispute the physical acts themselves but argued that his conduct stemmed from concussion and an extreme fight-or-flight response, and that Corrections failed to properly investigate his mental state at the time. The Authority noted the Employment Court's decision in Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Tawhiwhirangi [2007] ERNZ 610, which held that the mere application of force on a prisoner does not establish serious misconduct and that Corrections must inquire into a CO's state of mind. While the Authority identified significant weaknesses in ZKY's automatism argument (he had not raised it during the disciplinary process, the criminal proceedings, or in his interim reinstatement application), it found ZKY's arguments could not be said at this stage to be completely frivolous or vexatious, and so a weakly arguable case for unjustified dismissal was established.

2. Whether ZKY had an arguable case that permanent reinstatement would be available if his dismissal grievance succeeded — Status: Dismissed (paras [54]–[63]).

Under s 125 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA), reinstatement is the primary remedy where practicable and reasonable. The Authority applied the two-part test from Christienson v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Limited [2021] NZEmpC 142: reinstatement must be both feasible and reasonable in its effects on the employer, employee, and third parties. The Authority found the severity and repetitive nature of ZKY's assaults on vulnerable, restrained prisoners — graphically captured on CCTV and body cameras — was fundamentally inconsistent with reinstatement. Mr Parr's evidence described ZKY's conduct as among the most distressing he had witnessed in 39 years. ZKY's guilty plea to assault with intent to injure also disqualified him from working as a CO. Concerns about potential PTSD and risk of recurrence further undermined any case for reinstatement. The Authority concluded ZKY had no arguable case for permanent reinstatement, limiting him to financial remedies if his grievance succeeded.

3. Where the balance of convenience lay during the interim period — Status: Strongly against ZKY (paras [64]–[87]).

The Authority assessed relative hardships to each party and relevant third parties, following Savage v Wai Shing Ltd [2019] NZEmpC 141 and Angus v Ports of Auckland Limited [2011] NZEmpC 125. ZKY demonstrated severe financial hardship: his family was in rent arrears, at risk of car repossession, had borrowed $25,000 from a family member, and had only $4,000 in savings. However, these hardships were weighed against significant countervailing factors: Corrections' need for high trust in COs, the practical difficulties of returning ZKY to a prison environment (he would need 12 weeks' retraining; no suitable administrative role without prisoner contact existed; vacant roles were either unsuitable or closed), the over-one-year delay in lodging the interim reinstatement application, the preliminary weakness of ZKY's case (particularly the absence of medical evidence supporting automatism), and the possibility that new medical evidence actually suggested deliberate deterrent intent rather than absence of mens rea. The Authority also noted that if ZKY ultimately succeeded, financial damages would likely be an adequate remedy. The balance of convenience strongly weighed against interim reinstatement.

4. What the overall justice of the case required during the interim period — Status: Strongly against ZKY (paras [88]–[91]).

Standing back from the earlier analysis, the Authority found that interim reinstatement would send the wrong message to other staff, could potentially put staff and others at risk if ZKY's possible PTSD was triggered, and was inappropriate given the absence of medical evidence indicating ZKY could safely handle a similar situation. There were no suitable roles to reinstate him into. The overall justice strongly weighed against interim reinstatement.

5. Whether the non-publication interim order regarding recordings of the 2 October 2024 incident should be maintained — Status: Established (paras [1]–[2]).

The Authority had issued an interim non-publication order on 24 August 2026 regarding all recordings of the incident, subject to the condition it did not apply to the employment institutions, and directed that recordings be shared counsel-to-counsel only. The parties were given leave to apply for variation of the order as required.

6. Whether ss 123B and 123C of the ERA (inserted 21 February 2026) applied to ZKY's dismissal — Status: Dismissed/Not applicable (para [38]).

The Authority noted these amendments to the ERA did not apply to ZKY because his dismissal predated their commencement and the amendments were not retrospective.

7. Whether s 124 of the ERA (contribution to the situation) would apply to reduce remedies if ZKY succeeded — Status: Not reached (para [39]).

The Authority noted this provision would be relevant if ZKY's grievance succeeded at the substantive hearing, but made no findings on it at the interim stage.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [93]–[94]).

Corrections, as the successful party, was identified as entitled to a contribution towards actual legal costs. The matter was treated as involving a half-day investigation (determined on the papers), giving a notional starting point of $2,250. However, given ZKY's severe financial hardship, costs were reserved sine die.

The application for interim reinstatement was dismissed in its entirety.

None ordered at this stage. Costs reserved sine die (notional starting point of $2,250 identified but not yet ordered). The interim non-publication order regarding recordings of the incident remains in force, with parties having leave to apply for variation.

[CONSENT]

A Labour Inspector brought enforcement proceedings against two related healthcare businesses — SS Health Limited and LW Health Limited — and their associated individuals, Yinan Wang and Xiao Lin, for widespread breaches of minimum employment standards. The parties reached a partial settlement, with the Authority asked to record agreed orders on arrears by consent while leaving penalties and costs for a later determination. The consent determination records multiple statutory breaches and orders repayment of arrears totalling approximately $147,861.75 across both companies, with personal liability for the individual respondents if the companies cannot pay.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Respondents: SS Health Limited (First Respondent, matter 3388044); LW Health Limited (First Respondent, matter 3388084); Yinan Wang (Second Respondent, both matters); Xiao Lin (Third Respondent, both matters)

Applicant: Amy Webster, counsel for the Applicant
Respondents: Chris Eggleston, counsel for the Respondents

The Labour Inspector investigated SS Health Limited and LW Health Limited for compliance with minimum employment entitlements and standards, finding breaches across both companies. Employees worked across both stores, and the two companies were closely related. The individuals Yinan Wang and Xiao Lin were identified as persons involved in the breaches, giving rise to personal liability under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act). The parties reached a partial settlement, documented in a joint memorandum dated 2 July 2026, and jointly requested the Authority to record their agreement in a consent determination. The matters of penalty quantum and costs relating to the penalty determination remain outstanding, with an agreed timetable for submissions on those issues.

1. Whether the two matters (3388044 and 3388084) should be joined — Status: Established (para [4](a)).

The parties agreed to joinder of the two matters given the close relationship between SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd, the similarities of the breaches found, and the fact that employees worked across both stores. The Authority accepted this agreement and the matters were joined.

2. Whether SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd breached s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to keep adequate wages and time records — Status: Established (para [4](b)(i)).

The parties agreed by consent that both companies failed to maintain adequate wages and time records as required by s 130 of the Act. No contested factual or legal analysis was required given the agreed basis.

3. Whether SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd breached s 81 of the Holidays Act 2003 by failing to keep adequate holidays and leave records — Status: Established (para [4](b)(ii)).

The parties agreed by consent that both companies failed to keep adequate holidays and leave records as required by s 81 of the Holidays Act 2003.

4. Whether SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd breached s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 by failing to pay the minimum wage for all hours worked — Status: Established (para [4](b)(iii)).

The parties agreed by consent that both companies failed to pay the minimum wage for all hours worked, in breach of s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983.

5. Whether SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd breached s 23 of the Holidays Act 2003 by failing to calculate and pay annual holidays correctly at the end of employment — Status: Established (para [4](b)(iv)).

The parties agreed by consent that both companies breached s 23 of the Holidays Act 2003 in relation to the calculation and payment of annual holidays at the end of employment.

6. Whether SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd breached ss 49, 50, 56 and 60 of the Holidays Act 2003 by failing to correctly pay public holiday entitlements — Status: Established (para [4](b)(v)).

The parties agreed by consent that both companies failed to correctly pay public holiday entitlements in breach of multiple provisions of the Holidays Act 2003.

7. Whether SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd breached s 71 of the Holidays Act 2003 by failing to pay sick leave entitlements — Status: Established (para [4](b)(vi)).

The parties agreed by consent that both companies failed to pay sick leave entitlements as required by s 71 of the Holidays Act 2003.

8. Whether SS Health Ltd and LW Health Ltd breached s 4 of the Wages Protection Act by failing to pay all wages without deduction — Status: Established (para [4](b)(vii)).

The parties agreed by consent that both companies made unlawful deductions from wages in breach of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act.

9. Whether SS Health Ltd additionally breached ss 24–25 of the Holidays Act 2003 by failing to calculate and pay annual holidays correctly — Status: Established (para [4](c)).

The parties agreed by consent that SS Health Ltd specifically breached ss 24–25 of the Holidays Act 2003 regarding calculation and payment of annual holidays at the end of employment, in addition to the breach already acknowledged under s 23.

10. Whether Yinan Wang and Xiao Lin were persons involved in the breaches of LW Health Ltd and are jointly and severally liable for arrears under s 142Y of the Act — Status: Established (paras [4](d), [5](g)).

The parties agreed by consent that both individuals were persons involved in the breaches relating to LW Health Ltd and are jointly and severally liable to pay arrears owed by LW Health Ltd to the extent that company is unable to pay, pursuant to s 142Y of the Act.

11. Whether Yinan Wang was a person involved in the breaches of SS Health Ltd and is personally liable for its arrears under s 142Y of the Act — Status: Established (paras [4](e), [5](h)).

The parties agreed by consent that Ms Wang was a person involved in the breaches of SS Health Ltd and is liable to pay arrears owed by SS Health Ltd to the extent that company is unable to pay, pursuant to s 142Y of the Act.

12. Quantum of penalties relating to the statutory breaches — Status: Not reached (para [3]).

The issue of penalty quantum was expressly left outside the partial settlement. An agreed timetable for submissions on penalties is in place, and this issue will be determined by the Authority separately.

13. Costs relating to the penalty determination — Status: Not reached (paras [3], [6]).

Costs in relation to the penalty proceedings are also reserved for later determination. No issue as to costs arose in relation to the consent arrears orders.

The claim was partially upheld by consent: all statutory breach allegations were established by agreement, arrears orders were made against both companies and the individual respondents, and the issues of penalty quantum and associated costs remain for a future determination.

Arrears — LW Health Ltd: $33,382.61 payable to the Labour Inspector (for distribution to employees) via payment to the Crown account.
Arrears — SS Health Ltd: $114,479.14 payable to the Labour Inspector via payment to the Crown account.
Payment schedule: A lump sum of $42,000.00 due by 27 August 2026; thereafter minimum monthly payments of $3,000 by the 20th of each month until all amounts are paid in full.
Interest: Payable on any amounts still outstanding as at 1 June 2028, backdated to 25 September 2023 (Sally) and 2 April 2024 (Fiona and Yomi), calculated using the Ministry of Justice Civil Debt Interest Calculator.
Default: If any payment is more than five working days late, the entire remaining balance becomes immediately payable.
Personal liability (LW Health Ltd): To the extent LW Health Ltd cannot pay, Yinan Wang and Xiao Lin are jointly and severally liable under s 142Y of the Act.
Personal liability (SS Health Ltd): To the extent SS Health Ltd cannot pay, Yinan Wang is personally liable under s 142Y of the Act.
Tax: The Labour Inspector will attend to distribution and deduction/payment of tax as appropriate.
Penalties: Reserved — subject to further submissions and a separate determination.
Costs: None ordered in relation to the consent determination; reserved in relation to the penalty proceedings.

Nell Fisher, a nanny employed by Rachael Todd from July 2023 to February 2024, claimed she was not paid for all hours worked, including overnight stays and travel periods. The key legal question was whether overnight periods constituted "work" under the sleepover case principles, and whether the employment agreement's availability provisions were compliant with the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found in Ms Fisher's favour on unpaid overnight hours, awarding $9,720 in wage arrears, but declined to award compensation for humiliation/distress or additional lost wages for underpayment of core guaranteed hours.

Applicant: Nell Fisher (employee/nanny)
Respondent: Rachael Todd (employer)

Applicant: Paul Mathews, advocate
Respondent: Self-represented

Nell Fisher was employed as a nanny by Rachael Todd under a fixed-term individual employment agreement (IEA) signed in June 2023, commencing 17 July 2023 and expiring 17 April 2024, though Ms Fisher resigned on 28 February 2024. The IEA provided for 60 guaranteed hours per fortnight (maximum 80), an hourly rate of $27 for all hours worked, and an overnight allowance of $60 per night (7pm–7am). Ms Fisher's role involved caring for a child at Ms Todd's home, accompanying Ms Todd on domestic and overseas work travel, and staying overnight when Ms Todd was absent. Ms Fisher claimed she was required to be the primary carer overnight, was not paid for those hours (only receiving the $60 allowance), and was not always paid the guaranteed minimum fortnightly hours; she also claimed unjustifiable disadvantage causing humiliation and distress. Ms Todd disputed that Ms Fisher was ever left in sole charge overnight (pointing to the grandfather's presence), asserted that Ms Fisher was afforded significant flexibility, and maintained that overnight stays were for Ms Fisher's personal convenience and that she had never raised concerns about underpayment during employment. A non-publication order was also sought in relation to the child's and grandfather's identities.

1. Whether overnight periods (and travel periods) constituted "work" for which Ms Fisher was entitled to be paid at the hourly rate — Status: Established (paras [23]–[31]).

The Authority applied the three-factor test from Idea Services v Dickinson (CA), as adopted from the Employment Court: (a) constraints on the employee's freedom; (b) nature and extent of responsibilities; and (c) benefit to the employer. The Authority found that Ms Fisher faced significant constraints on her freedom during overnights (semi-rural location, responsibility for the child, limited ability to leave or socialise), bore very significant and continuous responsibilities akin to a loco parentis relationship, and that Ms Todd derived a clear benefit from this arrangement. Applying these factors, the Authority found Ms Fisher was working during overnight periods when in sole charge of the child and when travelling with Ms Todd, and accordingly was entitled to the $27 hourly rate for those hours.

2. Whether the employment agreement contained an availability provision compliant with s 67D of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [32]–[34]).

The Authority considered s 67D(1) of the Act, which defines availability provisions, and relied on Postal Workers Union of Aotearoa Inc v New Zealand Post Ltd [2019] NZEmpC 47, which extended the concept beyond zero-hours situations to require reasonable compensation for availability. The Authority found that the IEA effectively contained an availability provision — requiring Ms Fisher to make herself available for overnight childcare — and that this provision was on genuine grounds given the unique nature of the employment and was reasonable. The $60 overnight allowance was found to be a reasonable compensatory provision for availability under s 67D(3)(b), but it did not wholly compensate Ms Fisher for the hours actually worked overnight.

3. Whether Ms Fisher was unjustifiably disadvantaged during her employment and entitled to compensation for humiliation and distress under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Dismissed (para [36]).

The Authority declined to award compensation for humiliation and distress, finding that Ms Fisher's disadvantage claim was sufficiently addressed by the wage arrears award and that she had not made out a claim that she was treated in a humiliating fashion. Evidence from text message exchanges suggested Ms Todd was appreciative of Ms Fisher's work and that the employment ended on good terms, which undermined the distress and humiliation claim.

4. Whether Ms Fisher was entitled to additional lost wages for failure to pay the guaranteed minimum of 60 hours per fortnight — Status: Dismissed (para [36]).

The Authority declined to award additional compensation for underpayment of the core guaranteed hours. The Authority preferred Ms Todd's evidence that Ms Fisher was afforded significant flexibility in hours and had not raised concerns about underpayment of core hours during the employment relationship.

5. Whether Ms Fisher's contributory conduct should reduce any remedy — Status: Dismissed (para [37]).

The Authority found no issue of contributory conduct on Ms Fisher's part. The entitlement to payment arose from the terms of the IEA and the application of case law, and no reduction under s 114 was warranted.

6. Non-publication of the identities of the child and grandfather — Status: Established (partial) (para [5]).

The Authority exercised its discretion under Schedule 2, s 10(1) of the Act to suppress the names of Ms Todd's child and father (grandfather), who must not be named in any public forum. However, the Authority declined to make a non-publication order in respect of Ms Todd's own identity, as she had not advanced any reasons for that application and had not made out any ground under the factors in MW v Spiga [2024] NZEmpC 147.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [39]–[41]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unable to do so, the party seeking costs may lodge a memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with the other party having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would ordinarily be assessed on its usual daily tariff basis.

The claim was partially upheld: Ms Fisher succeeded on unpaid overnight wages but her claims for humiliation/distress compensation, underpayment of guaranteed core hours, and contributory conduct reduction were all dismissed.

Unpaid wages: $9,720.00 (gross) — representing 360 overnight hours (30 occasions × 12 hours) at $27/hour, not reduced by the $60 allowance previously paid per night.
Holiday pay: 8% calculated and paid on the $9,720.00 amount.
KiwiSaver contributions: to be calculated and paid on the $9,720.00 amount.
Compensation for humiliation/distress (s 123(1)(c)(i)): None ordered.
Additional lost wages for underpayment of guaranteed hours: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
Costs: Reserved.
Payment due within 28 days of the determination being issued.

James Honotapu, a long-serving employee of Atlas Fibrous Plaster Company Limited, brought a personal grievance claim for unjustified dismissal after being terminated on 16 July 2024 following a period of significant absenteeism. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal was justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, whether Atlas breached s 65 by failing to provide a written employment agreement, and the extent to which Mr Honotapu's own conduct contributed to the grievance. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified due to a flawed process, but applied a 50% contribution reduction to all remedies.

Applicant: James Honotapu (employee)
Respondent: Atlas Fibrous Plaster Company Limited (employer)

Applicant: Kara Orviss, Advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Doug Graham, Advocate for the Respondent

James Honotapu had a long employment relationship with Atlas Fibrous Plaster Company Limited, having worked there on and off for approximately 25 years, with his most recent period of employment commencing in 2011. When the Employment Relations Act 2000 came into force, Atlas offered Mr Honotapu a written employment agreement, which he declined to sign after older colleagues advised him to disregard it; Atlas told him the same terms and conditions would apply regardless. From 2022 onwards, Mr Honotapu's attendance deteriorated significantly — over a 19-month period from February 2023 to July 2024 he had 163 days absent, mostly for personal reasons and often without advance notice, leading to at least one verbal warning (reduced to writing) in June 2023. On 15 July 2024 Mr Honotapu was asked to attend a meeting the following day and invited to bring a support person, but was not told the meeting concerned possible dismissal; at the meeting on 16 July 2024, after Mr Honotapu indicated he would not change his conduct, Atlas decided to terminate his employment on the spot. Mr Honotapu argued the dismissal was procedurally unjustified because he was not forewarned that his job was at risk, while Atlas maintained the process was fair given the extensive prior warnings about absenteeism.

1. Whether Mr Honotapu's dismissal was unjustified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established.

The test under s 103A is whether the employer's actions were those a fair and reasonable employer could have taken in all the circumstances. The Authority found a significant procedural flaw: Mr Honotapu was not told before or during the meeting that dismissal was a possible outcome, and Mr Clifford himself confirmed he had not intended to dismiss Mr Honotapu at the outset of the meeting. The Authority held that once dismissal was being contemplated mid-meeting, the meeting should have been adjourned to allow Mr Honotapu to properly respond, potentially with a representative and medical evidence. Accordingly, the dismissal was unjustified despite the substantive grounds (persistent absenteeism) being potentially available to Atlas.

2. Whether Atlas breached s 65 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to provide a written employment agreement — Status: Dismissed.

Section 65 requires employers to provide written employment agreements. However, Mr Honotapu's own evidence at the hearing confirmed that Atlas had provided him with a written employment agreement; he chose to discard it on the advice of colleagues and refused to sign it. Atlas had also advised him that the terms in the agreement would apply regardless. On this evidence the s 65 breach claim could not be sustained.

3. Whether Mr Honotapu contributed to the circumstances giving rise to his personal grievance under s 124 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (50% reduction applied).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's conduct contributed blameworthy to the grievance. The Authority found Mr Honotapu's persistent absenteeism — largely for personal reasons, frequently without advance notice, and continuing after at least one formal warning — constituted significant blameworthy contribution. Balanced against this, Atlas bore responsibility for the procedural failure in not warning Mr Honotapu that dismissal was at stake before or during the meeting. The Authority determined a 50% reduction to all remedies was appropriate.

4. Quantum of lost wages remedy under s 128 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Partially established.

Mr Honotapu claimed lost wages based on 30 hours per week at $33 per hour (totalling $23,760 gross). The Authority rejected this basis, finding that in the period leading up to dismissal Mr Honotapu was working only approximately two days per week (six hours per day), equating to $396 per week. Applying 13 weeks' ordinary pay under s 128 produced a gross figure of $5,148, which was then reduced by 50% contribution to $2,574.

5. Quantum of compensation for hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings and loss of dignity — Status: Partially established.

The Authority considered evidence from both Mr Honotapu and his wife about the emotional impact of the dismissal, including embarrassment at the framing of the termination as being "fired." Taking into account all circumstances, the Authority assessed a gross award of $12,000, reduced by 50% contribution to $6,000.

6. Penalties — Status: Not reached.

Mr Honotapu's claim included a request for penalties. The Authority made no findings or orders in respect of penalties; the determination does not address this claim in the analysis or orders section, and no explanation for its omission is provided.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved.

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Honotapu may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Atlas having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would ordinarily be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis subject to any adjustment factors.

The claim was partially upheld: unjustified dismissal was established, but all remedies were reduced by 50% for contribution; the s 65 breach claim was dismissed; the penalties claim was not addressed; and costs were reserved.

Lost wages: $2,574 (representing 13 weeks at $396 per week, less 50% contribution), payable within 28 days.
Compensation for hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings and loss of dignity: $6,000 ($12,000 gross, less 50% contribution), payable within 28 days.
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Penalties: None ordered (not addressed).
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to settle; if not resolved, memorandum process to follow.

Congcong Guo, a former bus operator for Transportation Auckland Corporation Limited (NZ Bus), raised personal grievances of unjustified disadvantage across six grounds, unjustified constructive dismissal, a breach of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and a claim for holiday pay arrears, all arising from events following an assault he suffered at work in May 2025. The key legal questions were whether NZ Bus's actions during Mr Guo's rehabilitation and subsequent disciplinary process amounted to unjustified disadvantage or constructive dismissal. All of Mr Guo's claims were dismissed, and his application was unsuccessful.

Applicant: Congcong Guo (employee/former bus operator)
Respondent: Transportation Auckland Corporation Limited t/a NZ Bus (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Graham Emery, advocate for the Respondent

Mr Guo was employed as a bus operator for NZ Bus and was assaulted by a passenger on 17 May 2025 while driving his route in Royal Oak. Following the assault, Mr Guo was on ACC-managed rehabilitation administered by Howden Care, NZ Bus's accredited employer partner under the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (ACA). Disputes arose during the rehabilitation process over the venue for return-to-work assessments, the temporary suspension of Mr Guo's weekly ACC payments, the selection of medical providers, an alleged privacy breach, and whether his rostering breached his medical certificate restrictions. Mr Guo subsequently resigned on 22 November 2025 before a disciplinary process (concerning alleged red-light violations discovered during an unrelated complaint) could conclude, and he claimed this amounted to constructive dismissal. Mr Guo filed an amended statement of problem with the Authority on 24 September 2025 setting out eight claims; two were resolved before the hearing (one by an ex gratia payment of $461.50 for medical invoices, and one alleging psychologist bias which was dismissed on the evidence). Six claims proceeded to determination.

1. Whether Mr Guo was unjustifiably disadvantaged by being required to attend return-to-work assessments at a bus depot — Status: Dismissed (paras [8]-[13]).

The applicable test is s 103A(2) of the Act: whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as NZ Bus did in all the circumstances, assessed against the Wilson Grange Investments v Guerra target metaphor. Mr Guo's medical certificates did not explicitly state that a depot venue would trigger his PTSD, and NZ Bus offered him three alternative depot locations, a support person, transport, and an invitation to discuss security measures. Although a fully neutral venue would have been ideal, the Authority was satisfied that NZ Bus's actions fell within the range of justifiable outcomes and this claim was declined.

2. Whether Mr Guo was unjustifiably disadvantaged by the suspension of his weekly ACC compensation — Status: Dismissed (paras [14]-[18]).

Section 72 of the ACA obliges a claimant to undergo assessments when reasonably required by ACC. Mr Guo's ACC payments were suspended only after he was warned and then failed to attend his 2 July 2025 assessment; they were reinstated once he attended on 16 July. The Authority found the suspension resulted from Mr Guo's own non-compliance with s 72 obligations rather than any employer action under s 103(1)(b) of the Act, and accordingly no unjustified disadvantage was established.

3. Whether Mr Guo was unjustifiably disadvantaged by a lack of medical autonomy and informed consent in the selection of medical providers — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]-[20]).

While ACC independently found Mr Guo had not been consulted about his first psychologist, the procedural error lay with Howden Care (not NZ Bus directly). NZ Bus retained overall responsibility but did not itself select the providers. Further, Mr Guo was consulted about his subsequent psychologist and given a choice between two health professionals. The Authority found no unjustified action by NZ Bus disadvantaging Mr Guo in his employment.

4. Whether Mr Guo was unjustifiably disadvantaged by an alleged breach of privacy — Status: Dismissed (para [21]).

The Authority noted it has no jurisdiction to determine standalone Privacy Act 2020 claims, but a privacy breach in an employment context can constitute unjustified disadvantage under s 103(1)(b). The alleged breach was the case manager copying NZ Bus staff into an email. However, as NZ Bus was an accredited employer with overall responsibility for Mr Guo's rehabilitation, copying its representatives into communications was justified in all the circumstances, and no unjustified disadvantage was made out.

5. Whether Mr Guo was unjustifiably disadvantaged by a breach of his medical certificate restrictions in his rostering — Status: Dismissed (paras [22]-[25]).

Mr Guo's 22 August 2025 medical certificate restricted him to four hours per day; his rostered shifts ran until 7:10 pm in August, meaning he finished after twilight. The Authority accepted this was a breach of the medical restrictions by NZ Bus, and that a fair and reasonable employer should have ensured he would not be working after twilight. However, Mr Guo raised no concerns with his employer, completed the shifts without incident, and made no complaint until filing his ASOF on 24 September 2025. The Authority was not compelled to find an established personal grievance because no actual disadvantage to Mr Guo was demonstrated.

6. Whether Mr Guo was unjustifiably constructively dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [26]-[32]).

The constructive dismissal test follows Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Limited, identifying three non-exhaustive categories: forced resignation, deliberate course of conduct to coerce resignation, or employer breach leading to a reasonably foreseeable resignation. Mr Guo claimed NZ Bus's disciplinary investigation (for running red lights) was retaliatory. The Authority found the preliminary disciplinary outcome would have seen the relationship continue (a first written warning), and Mr Guo resigned before the process concluded. The threshold for constructive dismissal is high; the Authority found Mr Guo's resignation was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of NZ Bus's conduct and no retaliatory intent was established.

7. Whether Mr Guo was owed annual leave and wage arrears — Status: Dismissed (para [33]).

Mr Guo believed his final pay understated his annual leave entitlements but provided no evidence or calculations showing NZ Bus's figures were incorrect. The claim was not established and was declined.

8. Whether NZ Bus breached the duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (para [34]).

Given all of the above findings against Mr Guo on the substantive personal grievance claims, the Authority concluded there was no breach of the good faith duty by NZ Bus. No separate analysis was conducted; the conclusion followed from the dismissal of the other claims.

9. Claim of bias and harassment by the Howden Care psychologist — Status: Dismissed (para [5]).

The Authority expressed reservations about jurisdiction and, after reviewing a full recording of the interview, found no evidence of bias or harassment by the psychologist. The matter was not taken further.

10. Claim for reimbursement of GP medical invoices ($461.50) — Status: Not reached (para [4]).

NZ Bus agreed to make an ex gratia payment of $461.50 to cover Mr Guo's outstanding medical invoices. The Authority characterised this as a goodwill payment, not an admission of liability, and removed the issue from further investigation. No determination was made on whether there was a legal obligation to pay.

11. Costs — Status: Dismissed/lie where they fall (para [35]).

The general rule that costs follow the event would ordinarily favour NZ Bus as the successful party. However, NZ Bus was represented by a member of its own staff (an advocate, not external counsel) and accordingly costs were ordered to lie where they fall.

The application was dismissed in its entirety; all claims of unjustified disadvantage, unjustified constructive dismissal, annual leave arrears, and breach of good faith were declined.

None ordered. NZ Bus agreed to make an ex gratia payment of $461.50 to Mr Guo for outstanding medical invoices (not ordered by the Authority; characterised as a voluntary payment). Costs lie where they fall.

Fatima Fahmy, a registered early childhood education teacher, brought a personal grievance claim against her employer Minimarc Childcare Centre Inc (trading as Marc Early Learning Centre) alleging unjustifiable dismissal following termination on 3 July 2025 after a prolonged performance management process. The key legal questions were whether her dismissal was justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether her disadvantage grievances were raised within the 90-day statutory time limit. The Authority found the dismissal unjustifiable due to a lack of objectivity in the performance management process, and ordered reinstatement, lost wages, and $25,000 compensation for hurt and humiliation; the disadvantage claims were dismissed.

Applicant: Fatima Fahmy (employee, registered ECE teacher)
Respondent: Minimarc Childcare Centre Inc t/a Marc Early Learning Centre (employer)

Applicant: David Fleming, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Kirsty Wallace, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Fahmy commenced employment as a registered ECE teacher at MARC on 9 April 2021. From 2022, performance concerns arose and were addressed informally, including a written warning in March 2022. The employment relationship deteriorated from 2023 when Ms Fahmy began raising concerns about bullying and unfair treatment by Centre Manager Margaret Moss; two formal bullying complaints (May 2024 and April 2025) were both investigated and found unsubstantiated. MARC conducted three successive Performance Management Plans (PMPs) between August 2024 and June 2025, each concluded with insufficient improvement found, culminating in a first and final written warning in January 2025 and ultimately dismissal on 3 July 2025. Ms Fahmy disputed both the validity of the performance concerns and the impartiality of the process, noting that Ms Moss — against whom bullying complaints had been made — remained the primary evaluator throughout all three PMPs. MARC maintained the dismissal was warranted and the process was procedurally and substantively fair.

1. Whether Ms Fahmy was unjustifiably dismissed by MARC under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [76]-[104]).

The test under s 103A requires an objective assessment of whether the employer's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. For performance-based dismissal, the Authority applied principles requiring the employer to: (i) disclose specific reasons for dissatisfaction; (ii) provide a reasonable period for improvement; and (iii) give objective consideration to whether sufficient improvement occurred. The Authority found MARC satisfied the first two elements — Ms Fahmy was clearly informed of concerns and given extended opportunity (August 2024–July 2025) with training and support — but failed the third. Despite MARC being aware of serious relationship difficulties between Ms Fahmy and Ms Moss, including two formal bullying complaints and Ms Moss's refusal to endorse Ms Fahmy's Teaching Council renewal, MARC allowed Ms Moss to remain the primary PMP evaluator throughout all three PMPs. The Authority held this seriously undermined the objectivity of the process and that a fair and reasonable employer would have implemented adequate safeguards; dismissal was therefore unjustifiable.

2. Whether the disadvantage claim arising from the March 2023 roster and role changes was raised within the 90-day statutory time limit under s 114 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [108]-[114]).

Section 114(1) requires a personal grievance to be raised within 90 days of the action or the employee's knowledge of it, whichever is later. The Authority found the roster and role changes crystallised in March 2023 and were therefore well outside the 90-day period by the time any grievance was formally raised. Additionally, the Authority found no unjustifiable action on MARC's part, as the changes did not affect Ms Fahmy's contractual terms and conditions, and were partly motivated by health and safety considerations related to Ms Fahmy's own back strain.

3. Whether the disadvantage claim arising from the first bullying complaint and its investigation (May–August 2024) was raised within the 90-day statutory time limit — Status: Dismissed (paras [115]-[120]).

Applying the same 90-day requirement under s 114(1), the Authority noted Ms Fahmy became aware of the investigation outcome in August 2024 but did not raise a grievance in relation to it within 90 days. Furthermore, the Authority found MARC's engagement of an external investigator was a reasonable response to a complaint involving the Centre Manager, and there was no evidence the investigation was hasty or superficial. No unjustifiable action was found.

4. Whether reinstatement was an appropriate remedy — Status: Established (paras [122]-[131]).

Under the Employment Relations Act 2000, reinstatement is the primary remedy. The Authority applied the principles from Vegepond NZ Ltd v Lowe [2025] NZEmpC 76, noting that the challenge of "walking back" a dismissal decision is not in itself sufficient to render reinstatement impractical. The Authority took into account that key personnel (Ms Moss, Ms Duncan, and the former Board Chair Ms Jordan) had left MARC since the dismissal, creating the opportunity for the employment relationship to be successfully re-established. Reinstatement was ordered, subject to a managed transition process via urgent mediation.

5. Whether Ms Fahmy was entitled to lost wages compensation — Status: Established (paras [132]-[138]).

The Authority accepted Ms Fahmy had made efforts to mitigate her loss by seeking alternative employment, though it found the evidence of mitigation steps was not fully specific. Lost remuneration was limited to the period from dismissal until 30 April 2026 (when casual employment at an alternative ECE centre ended), with the amount for any period of concurrent employment to be calculated as the difference between MARC earnings and actual casual earnings. The parties were directed to calculate the figure themselves, with leave to revert to the Authority if unable to agree.

6. Whether Ms Fahmy was entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [139]-[147]).

The Authority accepted that the dismissal affected Ms Fahmy's confidence and self-respect, noting she had contemplated retirement and experienced distress at losing relationships with parents and colleagues. The Authority took a measured approach, noting that the mandatory Teaching Council report did not appear to have caused additional harm to her employment prospects and that the two bullying complaints were not upheld, limiting the weight given to those matters. An award of $25,000 was determined appropriate having regard to the range of awards in comparable cases.

7. Whether Ms Fahmy contributed to the circumstances of her dismissal under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [148]-[149]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether an employee's conduct contributed to the situation resulting in dismissal, and if so to reduce remedies accordingly. The Authority found that because the dismissal arose from a performance management process, Ms Fahmy did not contribute to the situation leading to her dismissal. No reduction in remedies was applied.

8. Whether an application for interim reinstatement should be granted (prior hearing) — Status: Dismissed (paras [3]).

A prior determination dated 26 September 2025 declined interim reinstatement. This determination does not revisit the reasoning for that earlier decision.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [151]-[154]).

Costs were not determined in this proceeding. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If needed, a memorandum on costs from Ms Fahmy is to be lodged within 14 days of the written determination, with MARC having a further 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual notional daily rate as the starting point, per PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135.

The claim of unjustifiable dismissal was upheld; the disadvantage grievances were dismissed; remedies of reinstatement, lost wages, and $25,000 compensation were ordered.

Reinstatement: Yes — Ms Fahmy reinstated to her role at MARC; parties directed to attend urgent mediation to facilitate a managed and integrated return to the workplace.
Lost wages: Amount not fixed — ordered for the period from dismissal (3 July 2025) to 30 April 2026; the period of concurrent casual employment to be calculated as the difference between MARC earnings and actual casual earnings. Parties to agree the figure; leave reserved to return to the Authority if unable to do so.
Compensation (hurt/humiliation/injury to feelings): $25,000 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act.
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.56.
All monetary orders payable within 28 days of the determination date.
Costs: Reserved.

Etuati Mulinuu Vaasaoasaoa (also known as Eddie Mulinuu), a Health and Safety Advisor employed by Civic Waste Limited (a wholly owned subsidiary of WasteCo NZ Limited), was summarily dismissed for serious misconduct on 3 July 2026 following his failure to respond to a manager's email seeking health and safety guidance. Mr Mulinuu applied for interim reinstatement, which WasteCo opposed on the grounds that his dismissal was justified, that he had contributed to his grievance, and that he had disentitled himself to reinstatement. The Authority found in Mr Mulinuu's favour on all three stages of the interim injunction test and ordered his interim reinstatement subject to conditions.

Applicant: Etuati Mulinuu Vaasaoasaoa (employee — Health and Safety Advisor)
Respondents: Civic Waste Limited (First Respondent) and WasteCo NZ Limited (Second Respondent) (employers, treated collectively as "WasteCo")

Applicant: Rebecca White, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Janet Copeland, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Mulinuu commenced employment with Civic Waste Limited on or about 25 August 2025 as a Health and Safety Advisor; WasteCo NZ Limited purchased and amalgamated with Civic in October 2025, becoming his effective employer. On 7 January 2026, while Mr Mulinuu was on directed annual leave, a branch manager emailed him seeking guidance about crane work and whether safety documentation existed for chainsaw and mini-saw work; upon returning from leave, he recorded the email intending to action it but overlooked doing so amid a heavy workload. On 1 May 2026, a WasteCo worker was seriously injured during vegetation work involving a chainsaw, and the unanswered January email was later identified during the subsequent investigation as a possible contributing factor. WasteCo commenced a disciplinary process on 25 May 2026, ultimately characterising Mr Mulinuu's omission as a serious dereliction of duty and dismissing him summarily on 3 July 2026. Mr Mulinuu disputed that his admitted oversight amounted to serious misconduct, pointing to the email's non-urgent nature, his workload, the absence of follow-up, and wider operational responsibilities; he applied for interim reinstatement, which WasteCo opposed on justification, contribution, and trust-and-confidence grounds.

1. Whether Mr Mulinuu had an arguable case that his dismissal was unjustified — Status: Established (paras [36]-[49]).

The threshold for an arguable case is low: the applicant must show a possible (but not necessarily certain) prospect of success — the claim must not be merely frivolous or vexatious. The Authority found that Mr Mulinuu's admitted conduct — a single inadvertent failure to respond to an email sent while he was on leave, which was not marked urgent, had no deadline, was copied to others, and was never followed up — was arguably a performance issue or inadvertent oversight rather than serious misconduct. Concerns about procedural fairness (including the potentially shifting allegation, the role of a privileged investigation report, failure to discipline the email's sender, and questions of proportionality and disparity of treatment) further supported arguability. WasteCo itself accepted Mr Mulinuu had at least a weakly arguable case.

2. Whether Mr Mulinuu had an arguable case that permanent reinstatement would be available as a remedy if his unjustified dismissal claim succeeded — Status: Established (paras [50]-[59]).

Under s 125 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, reinstatement is the primary remedy where it is reasonable and practicable. The Authority noted that WasteCo's trust-and-confidence evidence had not been tested, and that claims about destruction of trust must be treated cautiously at the interim stage, citing C3 Limited v O'Brien [2024] NZEmpC 6. The Authority also considered the impact of the February 2026 amendments (ss 123B and 123C of the Act), which bar reinstatement and compensation where an employee's conduct amounts to serious misconduct or where they contributed to the grievance, but declined to make definitive findings on untested evidence, citing its own recent interim reinstatement determinations and Mitchell v Tasman Rugby Union Inc [2026] ERNZ 435. It concluded that Mr Mulinuu had an arguable case that his oversight was neither serious misconduct nor sufficiently blameworthy conduct to preclude reinstatement.

3. Whether the February 2026 amendments (ss 123B and 123C of the Employment Relations Act 2000) applied to bar remedies including reinstatement — Status: Not reached (paras [54]-[58]).

WasteCo submitted that the amendments applied because the dismissal occurred after they came into force (21 February 2026) even though the underlying email pre-dated them, arguing the failure persisted after the amendments. The Authority acknowledged this as a live issue but declined to resolve it on untested affidavit evidence, noting that the factual and legal questions as to whether the conduct amounted to serious misconduct (s 123B) and whether the employee contributed in the relevant sense (s 123C) required full testing at the substantive investigation hearing.

4. Whether the balance of convenience lay in favour of granting interim reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [61]-[84]).

The Authority weighed the detriment to each party if interim reinstatement were granted or refused. Factors favouring reinstatement included: Mr Mulinuu's role as main breadwinner with financial dependants; his age (66) and the reduced prospects of finding comparable work; the risk that delay would erode the practical availability of permanent reinstatement over time (citing Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] ERNZ 153); the fact that monetary compensation would not fully restore professional standing or skills; and the likely timing of the substantive hearing (not before December 2026, with a determination potentially not until early 2027). WasteCo's new systems, external quality-assurance arrangements, and organisational resources were found to make the prejudice to it manageable. WasteCo's "unclean hands" argument and its claim that trust and confidence had been destroyed were rejected on the current evidence. The balance of convenience favoured interim reinstatement.

5. What the overall justice of the case required — Status: Established in favour of interim reinstatement (paras [85]-[90]).

Standing back from the detailed analysis, the Authority concluded that overall justice required preservation of the employment relationship pending substantive determination. It noted that Mr Mulinuu's admission was narrow and candid, that multiple issues (the shifting allegation, information and investigation concerns, distributed operational responsibility, and proportionality of summary dismissal) required testing, and that the primary remedy of reinstatement should be kept practically available. The Authority relied again on Mitchell v Tasman Rugby Union Inc [2026] ERNZ 435 in declining to make definitive misconduct or contribution findings on untested evidence.

6. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [96]).

Costs were reserved sine die, meaning they were not determined at this stage and will be addressed at a later point.

The application for interim reinstatement was upheld in full; WasteCo was ordered to reinstate Mr Mulinuu subject to conditions, with costs reserved.

Interim reinstatement ordered: WasteCo is directed to reinstate Mr Mulinuu to the payroll within seven days of the determination date (24 August 2026), and to reinstate him to his Health and Safety Advisor role within 21 days of that date.
Conditions on reinstatement: WasteCo may require Mr Mulinuu to undergo induction and/or refresher training before recommencing work; his role is to be provided in accordance with his employment agreement, job description, and WasteCo's current health and safety strategy; he must cooperate with WasteCo's new systems; WasteCo retains management prerogative over reporting lines, supervision, work allocation, and may engage external oversight (e.g., by Findex).
Mediation: The parties are directed to attend mediation within ten working days to discuss the practicalities of effecting the interim reinstatement order.
Undertaking: Mr Mulinuu provided an undertaking to abide by any order regarding damages WasteCo might sustain as a result of the interim reinstatement.
Costs: Reserved sine die.
Note: This is a preliminary/interim determination only; the substantive dismissal grievance remains to be determined.

Lucky Daryll Haitana, a former employee of Carters Tyre Service Limited, brought a personal grievance claim for unjustified dismissal after being summarily dismissed on 24 July 2024. The key legal questions were whether Mr Haitana had raised his personal grievance within the 90-day statutory timeframe, and if not, whether exceptional circumstances justified granting him leave to raise it out of time. The Authority found against Mr Haitana on both questions and dismissed the application without reaching the merits of the dismissal.

Applicant: Lucky Daryll Haitana (employee)
Respondent: Carters Tyre Service Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Alex MacDonald

Mr Haitana was employed by Carters Tyre Service Limited and was summarily dismissed on 24 July 2024 following disciplinary proceedings concerning one allegation of misconduct and one of serious misconduct. At the dismissal meeting, Mr Haitana indicated he had no substantive response and said words to the effect of "see you in court." He lodged a statement of problem with the Authority in September 2025 — more than a year after dismissal — which was the first notification Carters received of any grievance. Carters opposed the application on the basis that it was out of time under s 114(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act) and opposed leave being granted; it also maintained its actions were justified. After failed mediation, the Authority treated the application as one for leave to raise the grievance out of time on the basis of exceptional circumstances. Mr Haitana gave evidence that after dismissal he had contacted an advocacy firm that ultimately declined to act for him, and that he had experienced depression and financial hardship during the period of delay.

1. Whether Mr Haitana raised his personal grievance within the 90-day statutory period — Status: Dismissed (paras [9]-[17]).

Under s 114(1) of the Act, an employee must raise a personal grievance with their employer within 90 days of the action giving rise to the grievance. The Authority applied Melville v Air New Zealand Ltd [2010] NZEmpC 87, which held that telling an employer "see you in court" immediately after dismissal is not sufficient to constitute raising a grievance, as the employer must be able to understand what it is responding to on the merits with a view to resolution. Mr Haitana's words at the dismissal meeting were indistinguishable from those in Melville, and the next communication Carters received was the statement of problem in September 2025 — over a year later. The Authority found that Mr Haitana did not raise a personal grievance within time.

2. Whether the delay was occasioned by exceptional circumstances under s 115(a) of the Act (inability to consider raising grievance due to trauma) — Status: Dismissed (paras [25]-[29]).

Section 115(a) of the Act provides that exceptional circumstances exist where the employee was so affected or traumatised by the matter that they were unable to properly consider raising the grievance within time. Applying Telecom New Zealand Ltd v Morgan [2004] 2 ERNZ 9, the Employment Court required that the consequences of dismissal be severe, connoting substantial injury. Mr Haitana described depression, financial hardship, and being "not mentally in a good place," but provided no medical or professional evidence to support this, and the description fell within the range of effects typically experienced following dismissal. The Authority found this fell well short of the threshold in Morgan and exceptional circumstances under s 115(a) were not established.

3. Whether the delay was occasioned by exceptional circumstances under s 115(b) of the Act (agent's unreasonable failure to raise grievance) — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[24]).

Section 115(b) of the Act provides exceptional circumstances where the employee made reasonable arrangements for an agent to raise the grievance but the agent unreasonably failed to do so. Mr Haitana had contacted an advocacy firm shortly after dismissal, but the firm declined to take his case within a matter of weeks, leaving time for him to raise the grievance himself. The Authority found there was never a completed arrangement for the firm to raise the grievance on his behalf — merely a request for the firm to consider acting — which fell short of the statutory requirement. Mr Haitana could not rely on s 115(b).

4. Whether, if exceptional circumstances existed, it would be just to grant leave — Status: Not reached (para [31]).

Under s 114(4) of the Act, the Authority must also be satisfied it is just to grant leave, even where exceptional circumstances exist. Having found no exceptional circumstances, this question did not strictly arise. However, the Authority noted that the significant additional delay between the other employee's dismissal in 2024 (which apparently motivated Mr Haitana to apply) and September 2025, which remained unexplained, would have counted heavily against Mr Haitana even if exceptional circumstances had been established.

5. Whether the personal grievance claim of unjustified dismissal should be investigated and determined on its merits — Status: Not reached (para [33]).

Because the Authority found the grievance was not raised within time and no exceptional circumstances justified leave, the Authority had no jurisdiction to investigate and determine the personal grievance claim. The substantive merits of the dismissal were not considered.

6. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [34]).

Costs were reserved. Carters was noted as not legally represented but was given 28 days to lodge a memorandum seeking costs if it wished, with Mr Haitana given a further 14 days to respond. Costs are to be determined on the papers.

The application was dismissed in full; the Authority had no jurisdiction to investigate Mr Haitana's personal grievance claim as it was raised out of time and no exceptional circumstances justified granting leave.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending any memorandum from Carters within 28 days of the determination.

[COSTS ONLY]

This determination deals solely with the costs issue reserved from an earlier substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 537) in which Briar Kennedy (employee) was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed by Adulto HR Limited (employer). The parties agreed on a costs figure of $4,724.88 but the Authority determined that a hearing fee component of $153.33 was not payable, resulting in a costs order of $4,571.55.

Applicant: Briar Kennedy (employee)
Respondent: Adulto HR Limited (employer)

Applicant: Evie Hope, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Peter Cooper, for the Respondent

In a prior determination dated 7 August 2026 ([2026] NZERA 537), the Authority found that Briar Kennedy was unjustifiably dismissed by Adulto HR Limited and awarded remedies. The costs issue was reserved at that time, with the parties encouraged to resolve it between themselves. Both parties submitted on costs on 20 August 2026. Ms Kennedy sought $4,724.88 in total costs, comprising the daily tariff of $4,500 (for an Investigation Meeting spanning two half-days), a filing fee of $71.55, and a hearing fee of $153.33 for the second half-day. Adulto HR Limited agreed to the total sum sought by Ms Kennedy. The Authority partially accepted Ms Kennedy's calculation, disallowing the $153.33 hearing fee on the basis that the total time in the Investigation Meeting did not exceed one day.

1. Whether costs should be awarded and at what rate — Status: Established (paras [3]–[6]).

The Authority applied the standard daily tariff under the Employment Relations Authority's costs framework. The Investigation Meeting proceeded over two half-days, which the Authority treated as the equivalent of one full day, making the $4,500 daily tariff appropriate. Both parties agreed on this component, and the Authority confirmed it was appropriate to apply it.

2. Whether a hearing fee of $153.33 for the second half-day of the Investigation Meeting was payable — Status: Dismissed (para [5]).

The Authority found that a hearing fee for a second day is not payable where the total time spent in the Investigation Meeting did not exceed one day in duration. Accordingly, $153.33 was deducted from the amount sought by Ms Kennedy.

3. Whether disbursements (filing fee of $71.55) were recoverable — Status: Established (para [6]).

The Authority allowed the filing fee of $71.55 as a disbursement, which was uncontested by either party.

The costs claim was partially upheld; the Authority ordered costs of $4,571.55, disallowing the $153.33 hearing fee component.

Costs: $4,571.55 ordered against Adulto HR Limited, comprising $4,500 (daily tariff) and $71.55 (filing fee disbursement). The hearing fee component of $153.33 was disallowed. No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were dealt with in [2026] NZERA 537).

David Turner, a class 5 truck driver employed by Big B Cartage Limited (trading as Transflora), claims he was unjustifiably dismissed on 11 March 2025 following a seven-minute disciplinary meeting in which he was given no prior notice of the specific allegations against him. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal was unjustified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, whether a penalty was warranted for BBCL's failure to provide wage and time records under s 130(2), and what remedy (if any) should be awarded and whether it should be reduced for contributory conduct. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified, declined to impose a penalty for the s 130(2) breach, and ordered BBCL to pay $9,750 compensation after a 25% contributory reduction.

Applicant: David Turner (employee)
Respondent: Big B Cartage Limited (employer, trading as Transflora)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Andrew Sims for the Respondent

David Turner commenced employment with Big B Cartage Limited (BBCL) as a class 5 truck driver on 29 October 2024. On 29 January 2025, Mr Turner sent a text message to his colleague Adrian Harris using abusive and threatening language; Mr Sims (a director of BBCL) characterised this as workplace bullying. On 7 March 2025, Mr Sims invited Mr Turner to a disciplinary meeting, which took place on 11 March 2025 and lasted only seven minutes; Mr Turner was given no prior details of the allegations and was not shown the text message before the meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting Mr Turner was told termination was the likely outcome and was then dismissed by email that same day, with a notional 24-hour window to provide mitigating circumstances — though the dismissal had effectively already been communicated. Mr Turner's representative requested a copy of his wages and time record on 27 March 2025, which BBCL did not provide. Mr Turner claims unjustified dismissal and seeks compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act and a penalty against BBCL for breaching s 130(2); BBCL contends the dismissal was for serious misconduct (workplace bullying) and denies liability.

1. Whether Mr Turner was unjustifiably dismissed by BBCL — Status: Established (paras [10]-[25]).

The applicable test under s 103A(2) of the Act is whether the employer's actions and the manner in which it acted were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances at the time of dismissal, having regard to the s 103A(3) factors (investigation, raising concerns, opportunity to respond, genuine consideration of response). The Authority found BBCL failed all four limbs: it did not provide Mr Turner with any information about the allegations prior to the meeting; it did not advise him of the specific allegations beforehand; it did not disclose the key text message relied upon; the meeting was only seven minutes long; and Mr Turner had effectively been told his employment was terminated before he had any real opportunity to respond. Citing De Bruin v Canterbury District Health Board, Gorrie Fuel Limited v Marlow, Alatipi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, and Angus v Ports of Auckland Limited, the Authority concluded that BBCL did not comply with any of the s 103A(3) requirements and the dismissal was accordingly unjustified.

2. Whether BBCL breached s 130(2) of the Act by failing to provide wages and time records — Status: Established (paras [26]-[29]).

Section 130(2) obliges an employer to provide an employee with a copy of their wages and time record upon request. BBCL failed to provide the record after a request was made on 27 March 2025. The Authority found the statutory obligation was breached. However, applying s 133A of the Act and the Borsboom v Preet PVT factors for determining whether to impose a penalty, the Authority found the breach was inadvertent, and Mr Turner had not claimed any particular loss arising from it; accordingly, no penalty was imposed.

3. Whether a penalty should be imposed on BBCL for the s 130(2) breach — Status: Dismissed (paras [27]-[29]).

The Authority considered the s 133A factors and the Full Court's guidance in Borsboom v Preet PVT, including the nature and extent of the breach and the objects of the Act. Because the breach was inadvertent and no loss was demonstrated, the Authority declined to award a penalty despite the breach being established.

4. Whether Mr Turner is entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [30]-[35]).

The Authority applied the principle that compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) is assessed by reference to the nature and extent of the harm caused to the employee, not as a punitive measure (citing Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield and Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited). The Authority accepted Mr Turner's evidence about loss of confidence, significant financial stress in supporting his young family, and impact on his mental and physical well-being (including current ACC status). Having considered comparable cases including Tunnicliffe v Solly's Freight (1978) Ltd, the Authority assessed compensation at $13,000 before any reduction for contribution.

5. Whether any remedy should be reduced for the employee's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [36]-[41]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to dismissal and, if so, whether that conduct was culpable or blameworthy (citing Yang v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand). The Authority found the abusive text message Mr Turner sent to Mr Harris on 29 January 2025 was blameworthy and clearly contributed to the chain of events leading to his dismissal. However, citing Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation, it noted that Mr Turner could not be held responsible for the additional procedural deficiencies that worked significantly against him. Drawing on Goodger v Robert and Jane Goodger t/a Mainly Doors and Maddigan, the Authority assessed a 25% reduction, reducing the compensation from $13,000 to $9,750.

6. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Reserved (paras [44]-[47]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If they cannot agree, Mr Turner may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination date, with BBCL having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances require adjustment.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal grievance was established and compensation ordered (reduced for contribution); the application for a penalty for the s 130(2) breach was dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i)): $13,000 assessed, reduced by 25% for contributory conduct to $9,750, payable by BBCL to Mr Turner within 28 days of the determination date.
Penalty for s 130(2) breach: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought and not ordered.
Lost wages: None ordered.
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; failing that, memorandum to be filed within 28 days.

Yucen Xi, a part-time client advisor employed by Silvertime Trading Limited (STL) at a jewellery store in Auckland, was dismissed during a meeting on 19 July 2025 in which her area manager gave her the choice between resignation and immediate termination, called security to remove her from the store, and required return of her key. Ms Xi brought personal grievance claims for unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, holiday pay breaches, and a s 4 good faith penalty; STL counterclaimed for failure to return a company mobile phone. The Authority upheld Ms Xi's personal grievance claims, ordered compensation of $18,000 for hurt and humiliation, $6,240 in lost wages (capped at 13 weeks), penalties totalling $3,000, and $650 in unpaid annual holiday pay, while dismissing STL's counterclaim.

Applicant: Yucen Xi (employee)
Respondent: Silvertime Trading Limited (employer)

Applicant: Matthew Dearing, counsel
Respondent: Aimee Cai, advocate

Ms Xi was employed as a part-time permanent client advisor by Silvertime Trading Limited (STL) from 22 March 2024, working at the Qeelin store in Westfield Newmarket, Auckland, and reported to area manager Edwin Wu. On 19 July 2025, Mr Wu called a meeting with Ms Xi at short notice, without disclosing its purpose, and presented her with two choices: resign or be dismissed, while also calling security to remove her from the store and requiring immediate return of her key. Ms Xi recorded the meeting and was subsequently removed from the roster; STL processed her final pay on 13 August 2025 but deducted 26 hours of accrued annual leave covering the period after the dismissal date. Ms Xi raised a personal grievance on 22 July 2025, sought new employment, and secured a new role on 22 March 2026. STL counterclaimed that Ms Xi had not returned a company mobile phone provided for work purposes, alleging she still possessed it; Ms Xi maintained she had misplaced the phone on 15 July 2025, reported it to police that day, and provided contemporaneous evidence supporting her account. STL argued that after 19 July 2025 Ms Xi was obliged under good faith to engage with STL's communications, and also sought a s 4 penalty against Ms Xi.

1. Whether Ms Xi was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [10]-[22]).

The applicable test is objective: whether it was reasonable for someone in Ms Xi's position to consider her employment had been terminated (Cornish Truck & Van Limited v Gildenhuys [2019] NZEmpC 6 at [45]). The Authority found that, objectively viewed, the combination of Mr Wu's statements giving Ms Xi only the choice of resignation or termination, calling security, demanding immediate return of the key, and removing her from the roster, constituted a dismissal. STL failed to meet its s 103A(3) obligations: it did not notify Ms Xi of allegations, provide relevant information, investigate concerns, or give her an opportunity to respond. The dismissal was therefore unjustified.

2. Whether STL's good faith obligations continued after 19 July 2025 — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[22]).

STL argued Ms Xi owed it a continuing duty of good faith after the meeting. The Authority held that the s 4 duty of good faith under the Employment Relations Act 2000 applies only to parties in an employment relationship, which concluded on 19 July 2025. No ongoing obligation existed after that date.

3. Whether Ms Xi was unjustifiably disadvantaged by STL's failure to follow a fair disciplinary process — Status: Established (paras [23]-[26]).

A personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage arises where an employer's action or failure puts an employee at a disadvantage without justification. The Authority found that STL's failure to disclose the purpose of the meeting, warn Ms Xi her employment was at risk, or afford her an opportunity to prepare and respond, denied her the ability to participate fairly in a disciplinary process. This disadvantaged Ms Xi prior to and during the dismissal meeting. The grievance was established, though remedies were awarded only once to avoid double recovery.

4. Whether STL breached s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (good faith) and whether a penalty should be imposed — Status: Established (paras [27]-[32], [67]-[72]).

Section 4A of the Act provides that a party who fails to comply with the s 4(1) good faith duty is liable to a penalty if the failure was deliberate, serious, and sustained. The Authority applied the penalty factors in s 133A and principles from Borsboom v Preet PVT Ltd [2016] NZEmpC 143. STL's conduct — calling security, demanding the key, denying Ms Xi compensation, ignoring her requests for information, and refusing to let her complete her shift — was egregious and intentional. A penalty of $2,500 was imposed, payable to Ms Xi, reflecting the power imbalance, intentional nature of the breach, and the need for specific and general deterrence.

5. Whether STL breached s 27(2) of the Holidays Act 2003 (HA03) and whether a penalty should be imposed — Status: Established (paras [33]-[42]).

Section 27(2) of the HA03 requires payment of outstanding annual holiday pay upon termination of employment. The Authority found Ms Xi's employment ended on 19 July 2025 but STL deducted 26 hours of accrued annual leave from her final pay and did not process that pay until 13 August 2025. This constituted a breach of s 27(2). Under s 76A of the HA03, a penalty is appropriate where the breach was intentional; the Authority found it was intentional given STL's awareness of the dismissal date. STL was ordered to pay $650 (gross) in unpaid annual leave and a penalty of $500.

6. Whether STL breached the health and safety provision in Ms Xi's individual employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (paras [43]-[47]).

Ms Xi's employment agreement contained a provision obliging parties to comply with the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015. Ms Xi alleged STL breached this clause by its conduct on 19 July 2025. The Authority accepted Ms Xi was emotionally distressed but found insufficient evidence to establish a breach of the specific IEA clause. The claim was dismissed.

7. Whether Ms Xi failed to return company property (mobile phone) and thereby breached her employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (paras [48]-[55]).

Although there was no express term requiring return of company property, an implied term exists to that effect (Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd [2021] NZSC 85 at [116]). STL alleged Ms Xi still possessed the phone and had accessed a company WeChat account in August 2025. The Authority found STL did not provide sufficient evidence to establish this claim. Ms Xi provided contemporaneous evidence — a message to a colleague and a police report both dated 15 July 2025 — showing she had misplaced the phone that day. On the balance of probabilities Ms Xi had misplaced the phone; she did not breach the implied term.

8. Whether STL should pay a penalty against Ms Xi under s 4 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[22]).

STL sought a penalty against Ms Xi on the basis that she failed to engage in good faith after the dismissal. The Authority held there was no continuing good faith obligation after the employment relationship ended on 19 July 2025. The claim was therefore not available and was implicitly dismissed.

9. Entitlement to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) (hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings) — Status: Established (paras [56]-[66]).

The Authority assessed the nature and extent of harm applying the test from Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited [2023] NZEmpC 179, and the meaning of "humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings" from Lim v Meadow Mushrooms Limited [2015] NZEmpC 192. Ms Xi was publicly escorted out by security in view of employees from other stores, suffered acute mental health impacts requiring crisis support, counselling and medical assistance, and experienced disruption to her master's degree. Having regard to comparable awards (Rimple v NZ-Kebabs Limited [2026] NZERA 128) and no double recovery across the two grievances arising from the same facts (Faitala v The Pacific Island Business Development Trust [2026] NZEmpC 53), the Authority awarded $18,000.

10. Entitlement to reimbursement of lost wages under s 128 of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [73]-[83]).

Section 128 ordinarily limits reimbursement to three months' ordinary time remuneration unless the Authority exercises its s 128(3) discretion to award more. Ms Xi sought wages for the full period from 19 July 2025 to 22 March 2026 (approximately 35 weeks). The Authority declined to exercise the s 128(3) discretion based on a counterfactual analysis, finding it was more likely than not that the fundamentally broken relationship between Ms Xi and Mr Wu meant employment would not have continued beyond three months in any event. Ms Xi was awarded 13 weeks' wages ($6,240).

11. Whether remedies should be reduced for Ms Xi's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [84]-[88]).

The Authority must consider whether the employee's conduct contributed to the dismissal and, if so, whether it was culpable or blameworthy (Yang v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand [2025] NZEmpC). Although Mr Wu referred obliquely to a grooming policy concern, there was no evidential basis to establish any culpable or blameworthy conduct by Ms Xi. No reduction was applied.

12. Whether Ms Xi is entitled to interest on any awards — Status: Not reached (para [9](i)).

This issue was listed in the issues schedule but was not addressed in the determination. No explanation was given for its omission; the Authority appears to have proceeded directly to summary orders without addressing interest.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [90]-[92]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Xi may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with STL having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis.

The claims were substantially upheld: Ms Xi's personal grievances for unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage were established, the holiday pay breach and s 4 good faith penalty were established, and STL's counterclaim regarding the mobile phone was dismissed.

- Hurt/humiliation/loss of dignity/injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $18,000
- Lost wages (s 128, capped at 13 weeks): $6,240 (gross)
- Unpaid annual holiday pay (s 27(2) HA03): $650 (gross)
- Penalty for breach of s 27(2) HA03: $500 (payable to Ms Xi)
- Penalty for breach of s 4 Employment Relations Act 2000: $2,500 (payable to Ms Xi)
- Contribution reduction: None
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Costs: Reserved
- Interest: Not addressed
- All payments due within 28 days of 21 August 2026

Juliet Hull, former CEO of Sleaktek Limited (a biodegradable coating start-up), brought claims of unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, breach of good faith, and wage/holiday arrears after her employment was terminated in June 2024, ostensibly by redundancy. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal and alleged disadvantages were justified, whether counterclaims of serious misconduct against Ms Hull had any foundation, and what remedies (including penalties against the company and its sole director, Robert Lawrence) were appropriate. The Authority upheld Ms Hull's claims in full, dismissed all counterclaims, and awarded substantial compensation, wage arrears, penalties, and a declaration under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 against Mr Lawrence personally.

Applicant: Juliet Hull (employee, former Chief Executive Officer)
Respondent: Sleaktek Limited (first respondent, employer) and Robert Lawrence (second respondent, sole director)

Applicant: Angela Evans and Tanya Preston
Respondent: Robert Lawrence (for the respondents)

Ms Hull was engaged by Sleaktek from October 2022, initially on a fixed fee, then as an employee and CEO from approximately early 2023 with a salary of $200,000 per annum. Sleaktek was a start-up developing a waterproof biodegradable coating, and Ms Hull was instrumental in raising funds and managing the business. By early April 2024, following positive product testing results and amid discussions about future investment and CAP tables, Mr Lawrence (sole director) stopped paying Ms Hull's salary without her agreement, citing insolvency risk, and began a process culminating in a letter dated 11 June 2024 purporting to terminate her employment by redundancy, while simultaneously raising unparticularised allegations of serious misconduct. Ms Hull raised personal grievances of unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage, and sought wage arrears, holiday pay, and penalties; Sleaktek and Mr Lawrence counterclaimed for damages, return of shares, and expenses on grounds including blackmail, hostile takeover, and failure to bring in funds. Mediation on 30 May 2024 did not resolve matters.

1. Was Ms Hull unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [60]-[71], [73]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test (what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances), assessing whether Sleaktek sufficiently investigated, raised concerns, gave Ms Hull a real opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered her explanations. While there was some factual basis for concern about the company's finances, Sleaktek failed on every other limb: it did not properly raise the restructure with Ms Hull, did not genuinely consider her proposed alternatives (salary reduction, deferred salary, further funding from Mr Kanji and the Craigs), and the meeting on 17 April 2024 was not adequate consultation. Critically, Mr Lawrence's own statements that he wanted Ms Hull "out" regardless of available funding showed the process was predetermined, undermining any claim of genuine business-driven redundancy. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified.

2. Was the termination date 11 June 2024 (as opposed to 20 March 2024 as later argued by respondents) — Status: Established (paras [72]-[73]).

Mr Lawrence submitted in post-hearing submissions that Ms Hull had ceased employment on 20 March 2024 and had been overpaid. The Authority rejected this, noting Sleaktek continued to engage with and direct Ms Hull through to June 2024 and conducted a redundancy process up to 11 June 2024; it was appropriate to hold Sleaktek to its own correspondence.

3. Was Ms Hull justifiably dismissed for serious misconduct (allowing unsecured loan rather than SAFE Note) — Status: Dismissed (paras [75]-[80]).

The SAFE Note issue was determined by Mr Lawrence himself and Mr Craig in direct discussions; any arrangement concluded was between them, not through Ms Hull. Contemporaneous correspondence confirmed Mr Lawrence congratulated everyone on the outcome at the time. The Authority found the allegation that Ms Hull should have compelled Mr Craig to invest via a SAFE Note fundamentally overstated her role and was not made out on the facts.

4. Was Ms Hull justifiably dismissed for serious misconduct (the "blackmail" text message to Mr Craig) — Status: Dismissed (paras [81]-[92]).

The Authority examined the text message from an employment law perspective (Ms Hull's obligations to her employer). It found: (a) Ms Hull reasonably believed Mr Lawrence had already resigned as director based on his own written statements; (b) the text was drafted, shown to, and approved by Mrs Lawrence before being sent; and (c) Ms Hull was thus carrying out a reasonable instruction from her employer's authorised representative. Mr Craig's reply contained no conditions tied to Mr Lawrence's departure. No breach of employment obligations occurred.

5. Was Ms Hull justifiably dismissed for serious misconduct (the "begging email" to a potential funder) — Status: Dismissed (paras [93]-[102]).

Mr Lawrence alleged Ms Hull's February 2023 email to a funder mentioning her own financial sacrifices caused the funder to decline investment. The Authority found the email was a truthful account of circumstances typical of a start-up CEO, that the funder declined for its own stated reasons (timeline to sales commencement) after full due diligence, and that Mr Lawrence had accepted those reasons at the time and raised no concern until over 12 months later, after he had already decided he wanted Ms Hull "out."

6. Was Ms Hull's sole duty to bring in funds, and did her failure to do so amount to serious misconduct — Status: Dismissed (paras [103]-[111]).

Ms Hull's employment agreement and attached position description listed seven broad categories of duties encompassing overall management, board collaboration, financial oversight, and ESG culture — not merely fundraising. Mr Lawrence acknowledged Ms Hull had brought in significant funds and performed other duties but claimed she had not done enough. The Authority found this allegation was not made out on the facts.

7. Did Ms Hull attempt a hostile takeover of Sleaktek via the CAP table discussions — Status: Dismissed (paras [112]-[117]).

Contemporaneous email correspondence, including Mr Lawrence's own positive email to Mr Craig after the meeting, confirmed these discussions were part of ongoing planning involving all parties (including Mr Lawrence himself), and no concluded agreement was reached or intended. The allegation was not made out.

8. Did Ms Hull conduct a secret pre-meeting with Mr Craig in breach of Mr Lawrence's instructions — Status: Dismissed (paras [118]-[119]).

The Authority preferred the evidence of Ms Hull and Mr Craig that Ms Hull arrived early and the brief period before others arrived was used for preparation rather than a separate secret meeting. No breach of instructions occurred.

9. Was the procedural and substantive test for serious misconduct dismissal met (s 103A, s 103) — Status: Not established (paras [120]-[121]).

As a completeness finding, the Authority noted that none of the alleged misconduct matters were put to Ms Hull before the dismissal decision, she was never invited to respond, and the correspondence did not identify what the allegations were. Even if any misconduct had been substantively arguable, the process was entirely absent, meaning s 103A was not satisfied in any event.

10. Did Ms Hull suffer unjustified disadvantage arising from a predetermined restructure process — Status: Established (paras [122]-[124]).

Under s 103 of the Act, an unjustified disadvantage arises where the employee's employment or any condition of it is affected to her disadvantage by an unjustifiable action of the employer. Mr Lawrence stated openly that the restructure was needed regardless of available funding to get Ms Hull "out," demonstrating predetermination. Ms Hull was deprived of any real opportunity to advocate for alternatives. The Authority found this disadvantage established.

11. Did Ms Hull suffer unjustified disadvantage from Mr Lawrence speaking negatively about her in front of third parties — Status: Established (paras [125]-[126]).

On at least two undisputed occasions (the meeting with Sleaktek's lawyer in late March 2024, and the 17 April 2024 meeting with the Craigs), Mr Lawrence publicly questioned Ms Hull's integrity and competence. Mrs Lawrence herself later apologised and maintained this view at the investigation meeting. The Authority found these public criticisms deprived Ms Hull of her right to fair treatment and damaged her professional relationships; the unjustified disadvantage was established.

12. Other alleged grounds of unjustified disadvantage (preventing Ms Hull from performing duties; threatening or unreasonable written/verbal statements; making misconduct findings without justification) — Status: Not reached (para [127]).

The Authority considered these matters were already addressed in its findings on unjustified dismissal and the dismissed misconduct allegations, and found it unnecessary to make further findings.

13. Did the respondents breach the statutory duty of good faith owed to Ms Hull — Status: Not reached (paras [128]-[129]).

The Authority noted that good faith submissions were addressed by the underlying findings on unjustified dismissal and disadvantage and the employment agreement breaches; it found no need for separate further findings on good faith.

14. Did contribution under s 124 of the Act apply to reduce remedies — Status: Dismissed (paras [130]-[135]).

The test (from Goodfellow v Building Connexion Ltd [2010] NZEmpC 82) requires that the employee's conduct be both causative of the outcome and blameworthy (a breach of duty). The Authority found Ms Hull's conduct was neither: her actions did not breach her obligations, the dismissal was ostensibly on a "no-fault" redundancy basis, and Sleaktek's later shift to alleged misconduct did not establish blameworthy contribution. No reduction was applied.

15. Was Ms Hull entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)) for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [139]-[140]).

The Authority accepted Ms Hull's evidence of personal and professional distress, reputational harm from repeated public misconduct allegations, need for medical treatment and medication, significant lifestyle changes, and having to seek employment in Australia. The contradictory and unresolved justifications for dismissal and the absence of any consultation process were also weighed. An award of $35,000 was made (against the $50,000 sought).

16. Was Ms Hull entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings for unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [141]).

Recognising the public nature of Mr Lawrence's comments (but that the audience was limited to Sleaktek's lawyer and investors), the degree of predetermination, and the need to avoid "double dipping," the Authority awarded $10,000 (against the $50,000 sought).

17. Was Ms Hull entitled to lost wages under s 123(1)(b) and s 128 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [142]-[144]).

Ms Hull lost remuneration as a result of the unjustified dismissal. The Authority awarded three months' ordinary time remuneration of $50,000 gross (at $200,000 p.a.), and declined to award more than the s 128 cap given the separate notice period award.

18. Was Ms Hull entitled to wage arrears for the period 1 April to 11 June 2024 and holiday pay on those arrears — Status: Established (paras [145]-[146]).

Ms Hull had a contractual entitlement to salary throughout her employment. Sleaktek's unilateral decision to stop paying her (as confirmed by contemporaneous correspondence from Mr Lawrence) was not excused by lack of funds in the absence of any agreement. The Authority awarded $38,717.93 gross in unpaid salary plus $3,097.43 in holiday pay (8%), totalling $41,815.36 gross.

19. Was Ms Hull entitled to a contractual notice period of 4 weeks — Status: Established (paras [147]-[149]).

Ms Hull's employment agreement provided for a 4-week notice period on redundancy. Sleaktek could not rely on its later (unestablished) serious misconduct allegations to avoid this contractual entitlement. The Authority also exercised discretion under s 128(3) given the length of time Ms Hull took to find new employment and her need to relocate to Australia. Awarded: $15,384.61 gross plus $1,230.77 holiday pay, totalling $16,615.38 gross.

20. Was Ms Hull entitled to unpaid annual holiday pay on termination under the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [150]-[156]).

Annual holiday pay is a statutory minimum entitlement under the Holidays Act 2003 (s 6) that cannot be contracted out of. Using payslip records (accrual of 16 hours/month, consistent with 5 weeks p.a. as per the employment agreement schedule), and a daily rate of $769.20, and deducting 14 days leave already taken from a 50-day entitlement over 2 years, the Authority awarded $27,692.28 gross (ss 27 and 83 Holidays Act 2003; s 132 ERA).

21. Should a penalty be awarded against Sleaktek for breach of the employment agreement (failure to pay wages) under s 134(1) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [157]-[163]).

The failure to pay wages was a breach of the employment agreement and of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983. Applying the Nicholson v Ford [2018] NZEmpC 132 penalty factors, the breach was intentional, specific, ongoing, and deliberate (confirmed by Mr Lawrence's correspondence). A starting point of $20,000 was discounted by 20% for the nature of the withholding and more significantly for the start-up's limited means, resulting in a total penalty of $7,000: $5,000 to Ms Hull and $2,000 to the Crown.

22. Should a penalty be awarded against Mr Lawrence personally under s 134(2) of the Act for aiding/abetting breach of the employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [164]-[167]).

Mr Lawrence, as managing director, made and confirmed in writing the decision to cease paying Ms Hull's salary and directed payment to others in preference to her. He had the requisite knowledge to be found to have incited, aided, or abetted the breach. Given the individual penalty cap of $10,000 under s 135, his government superannuation income, and the historically modest awards under this section, a penalty of $1,500 (all to Ms Hull) was imposed.

23. Should Mr Lawrence be declared a "person involved in a breach of employment standards" under s 142W of the Act — Status: Established (paras [168]-[172]).

The Authority found all elements of s 142W satisfied: the failure to pay wages was a breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (an employment standard under s 5); Mr Lawrence was an officer (sole director) of Sleaktek; and he was knowingly and directly concerned in the breach by virtue of his decision-making control over the company. The declaration was made.

24. Should leave be granted under s 142Y to recover monies from Mr Lawrence personally if Sleaktek cannot pay — Status: Established (paras [173]-[176]).

Having made the s 142W declaration and found a default in payment of wages constituting a breach of employment standards, the Authority granted leave for Ms Hull to recover any monies payable by Sleaktek from Mr Lawrence personally to the extent Sleaktek is unable to pay.

25. Should interest be awarded on unpaid wages, holiday pay, and notice payments — Status: Established (paras [177]-[178]).

The Authority has power to award interest under clause 11 of Schedule Two of the Act, informed by the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016. Interest was awarded on the unpaid salary, unpaid annual holiday pay, and contractual notice payments (subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of the orders), running from 11 June 2024 to the date of payment in full, calculated via the Civil Debt Calculator.

26. Sleaktek's counterclaim for $150,000 damages for hurt and humiliation — Status: Dismissed (paras [180]-[183]).

Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) is only available to employees with an established personal grievance, not to employers and not to limited liability companies. The Authority found it had no power to make such an award in favour of Sleaktek.

27. Sleaktek's counterclaim for $100,000 in general damages — Status: Dismissed (paras [184]).

The claim was unparticularised. The Authority treated it as connected to the serious misconduct allegations (misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary obligations, defamation, conspiracy, blackmail), all of which were dismissed above. No award was made.

28. Sleaktek/Mr Lawrence's claim for reimbursement of power bills and lease fees — Status: Dismissed (paras [185]-[187]).

These were business expenses of Sleaktek incurred (partly after Ms Hull's dismissal) by Mr Lawrence and Mr Kanji in the course of ongoing product work. Ms Hull did not commit Sleaktek to these expenses and was not found in breach of any obligations. She was not personally liable for Sleaktek's business outgoings.

29. Sleaktek's claim for return of shares in Sleaktek Holdings Limited gifted to Hull Corporate Trustee Limited — Status: Dismissed (paras [188]-[192]).

The shares were gifted by Mrs Lawrence's company (Tisane Limited) to Hull Corporate Trustee Limited — a transaction between third parties not party to Ms Hull's employment agreement. There was no written agreement conditioning the gift on Ms Hull's continued employment or performance. The claim of acquisition under false pretences was unsupported by evidence. Additionally, the Authority questioned its jurisdiction over third parties not party to the employment relationship. No orders were made.

30. Sleaktek's claim for $30,000 costs against Ms Hull — Status: Not reached (paras [198]-[200]).

Costs were reserved for all parties. The Authority encouraged negotiation between the parties, with a process for lodging memoranda if needed.

31. Costs generally — Status: Reserved (paras [198]-[200]).

Costs were reserved for both parties, to be determined on the usual daily tariff basis if not resolved between the parties, with the applicant able to lodge a memorandum within 28 days.

32. Whether the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 should be taken into account (raised by respondents) — Status: Not reached.

The respondents raised this in their counterclaim statement. The Authority did not address this provision separately, having disposed of all misconduct and counterclaims on the facts and on employment law grounds.

Ms Hull's claims were upheld in full; all respondents' counterclaims were dismissed; remedies including compensation, wage arrears, holiday pay, penalties, and a s 142W declaration were awarded.

- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings — unjustified dismissal): $35,000 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings — unjustified disadvantage): $10,000 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Combined HHD order as stated in the orders: $45,000 without deduction (to Ms Hull)
- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b) / s 128 — 3 months at $200,000 p.a.): $50,000 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Unpaid wage arrears (1 April–11 June 2024) plus 8% holiday pay thereon: $41,815.36 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Contractual notice period (4 weeks) plus 8% holiday pay: $16,615.38 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Unpaid annual holiday pay on termination: $27,692.28 gross (to Ms Hull)
- Penalty against Sleaktek (s 134(1) — breach of employment agreement/Wages Protection Act): $7,000 total — $5,000 to Ms Hull; $2,000 to Crown account
- Penalty against Mr Lawrence personally (s 134(2) — aiding/abetting breach): $1,500 to Ms Hull
- Declaration: Mr Lawrence is a person involved in a breach of employment standards under s 142W ERA 2000
- Leave granted under s 142Y for Ms Hull to recover any monies payable by Sleaktek from Mr Lawrence personally to the extent Sleaktek is unable to pay
- Interest: On unpaid salary/holiday pay arrears, notice period, and annual holiday pay on termination — running from 11 June 2024 to date of payment in full, calculated via the Civil Debt Calculator
- Reinstatement: Not sought / not ordered
- Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve; applicant may lodge memorandum within 28 days if needed
- Remedies against Ms Hull: None ordered (all counterclaims dismissed)

Khajen S. Raj Kumar, a management accountant employed by Steel and Tube Holdings Limited from March 2022, brought a personal grievance alleging unjustifiable dismissal and disadvantage following the disestablishment of his role through redundancy in December 2024. The key legal questions were whether the redundancy was substantively genuine and procedurally fair under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether S&T breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act. All claims were dismissed; the Authority found the redundancy genuine and the process substantially fair.

Applicant: Khajen S. Raj Kumar (employee/management accountant)
Respondent: Steel and Tube Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Heather Stephens, advocate
Respondent: Joshua Kimpton, counsel

Mr Kumar was employed as a management accountant in S&T's distribution division from 7 March 2022, supporting financial reporting and business performance analysis. On 18 November 2024, he was invited to a meeting the following day at which S&T presented a workplace change proposal that identified his role as the only position proposed for disestablishment, as part of a broader cost-reduction exercise across multiple divisions. Mr Kumar was given an opportunity to provide feedback and did so, including a counterproposal to expand the scope of his role. A decision meeting on 28 November 2024 confirmed the redundancy; his employment ended on 13 December 2024. Mr Kumar raised a personal grievance on 28 February 2025, alleging the redundancy was not genuine (asserting his role was core and the decision predetermined), that S&T failed to provide all relevant information, failed to properly consider his feedback, and failed to adequately explore redeployment. S&T denied all claims, asserting genuine business reasons and a fair process.

1. Whether the redundancy was substantively justified (genuine business reason) — Status: Established (paras [22]-[30]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, asking whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as S&T did, and following Grace Team Accounting Ltd v Brake [2014] NZCA 541 that redundancy must rest on valid and demonstrable commercial reasons and cannot be a pretext. S&T provided evidence of publicly listed financial results, internal financial briefings, prior redundancies (including another management accountant in a different division), and seven simultaneous change proposals across the business. The Authority accepted that task redistribution—though it reallocated rather than eliminated duties—was a genuine cost-saving measure and that S&T was entitled to reorganise regardless of Mr Kumar's disagreement. The redundancy was found to be substantively justified.

2. Whether the restructure process was carried out in a fair and reasonable manner (procedural justification under s 103A) — Status: Established (paras [31]-[40]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test with reference to Simpson Farms v Aberhart [2006] ERNZ 825 on the obligation to genuinely consult and keep an open mind. S&T gave written notice of the meeting, invited a support person, allowed Mr Kumar to record the meeting, extended the consultation period on request, and expressly stated no final decision had been made. The claim of predetermination was rejected after detailed review of transcripts; the Authority accepted Mr Smyth saw disestablishment as a likely but not foregone conclusion, and was genuinely open to alternatives. While the process was somewhat rushed and feedback could have been discussed in more detail, no procedural defects were significant enough to render the dismissal unjustified.

3. Whether S&T provided all relevant information to Mr Kumar (good faith obligation under s 4) — Status: Dismissed (paras [41], [47]).

The Authority noted the obligation under s 4 to provide all relevant information so employees can meaningfully influence the decision, drawing on Grace Team Accounting Ltd v Brake. It found Mr Kumar had access to publicly available financial results, internal financial meeting information, and S&T commenced the first consultation meeting by referencing those financials openly. The assertion that no verifying data was provided was not supported by the evidence.

4. Whether S&T genuinely considered Mr Kumar's feedback — Status: Partially established as a deficiency but not sufficient to vitiate justification (paras [42], [47]-[48], [53]).

The Authority acknowledged that, given the effort Mr Kumar put into his feedback and the short timeframe, it would have been more respectful to discuss the feedback in more detail. However, the transcript of the 28 November 2024 meeting showed S&T had met and considered the feedback before making its decision. This procedural shortcoming was minor and would not have changed the outcome.

5. Whether redeployment opportunities were adequately considered — Status: Partially established as a deficiency but not resulting in unfairness (paras [43]-[46]).

S&T committed in its written proposal to actively explore redeployment opportunities but in practice relied on Mr Kumar to monitor the careers page himself without actively investigating alternatives. The Authority found S&T did not fully meet the obligation it set for itself. However, because there were no suitable alternative positions available at the relevant time, Mr Kumar was not treated unfairly in practice, and the deficiency did not affect the outcome.

6. Whether S&T breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [47]-[50]).

The Authority briefly addressed this, finding no evidence of any breach of good faith by either party. Both parties were professional, responsive, and communicative; Mr Kumar had access to all relevant information; meetings were conducted respectfully; and EAP and HR support was offered. The Authority declined to award a penalty because any procedural defects identified were not deliberate, serious, sustained, or intended to undermine the employment relationship.

7. Whether S&T breached Schedule 2 of the employment agreement (dispute resolution processes) — Status: Dismissed (para [51]).

The Authority found no evidence of a breach of the dispute resolution processes in the employment agreement; the parties had attended mediation.

8. Whether remedies (lost wages and s 123(1)(c)(i) compensation) should be awarded — Status: Not reached (para [56]).

As all personal grievance claims were unsuccessful, no remedies were considered.

9. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [56]).

This issue did not arise as no remedies were awarded.

10. Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs — Status: Reserved (paras [57]-[59]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, S&T may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Mr Kumar having 14 days to reply. Costs, if determined, would be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis.

All of Mr Kumar's claims were dismissed in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending potential memoranda from the parties.

Pawan Kumar, a Financial Adviser employed by Enva Financial Limited (EFL), brought a personal grievance claim of constructive dismissal after resigning with his last day being 31 January 2025. The sole preliminary issue before the Authority was whether Mr Kumar had established exceptional circumstances justifying leave to raise his personal grievance out of time under s 114(4) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, given the grievance was lodged 33 days after the 90-day statutory deadline. The Authority found that Mr Kumar had not established exceptional circumstances and declined to grant leave, effectively ending his personal grievance claims.

Applicant: Pawan Kumar (employee, former Financial Adviser)
Respondent: Enva Financial Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Michael Smythe, counsel for the Respondent

Pawan Kumar was employed as a Financial Adviser by Enva Financial Limited from 27 March 2024, with his last working day being 31 January 2025, when he resigned in disputed circumstances. Mr Kumar lodged an application with the Authority on 3 June 2025 asserting he had been constructively dismissed. EFL responded that Mr Kumar had not raised a personal grievance within the statutory 90-day timeframe (which would have expired approximately 1 May 2025) and did not consent to it being raised out of time. Separately, EFL made a counter-application on 17 June 2025 claiming Mr Kumar had breached post-employment obligations. The parties agreed to resolve the preliminary time-bar issue by written submissions, which were received on 22 May 2026. Mr Kumar argued that EFL's post-resignation conduct, including alleged bad faith negotiations and economic pressure, as well as his deteriorating mental health (supported by a GP consultation note of 31 May 2025), constituted exceptional circumstances; EFL denied this and argued the sole purpose of the late grievance was to hinder its recovery of money owed.

1. Whether Mr Kumar raised his personal grievance within the statutory 90-day timeframe under s 114(1) and (2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [3], [21]).

The 90-day timeframe is a statutory requirement under s 114(1) of the Act. The Authority found that Mr Kumar did not raise a personal grievance within 90 days of his last working day (31 January 2025), with his application being lodged 33 days late. There was no suggestion or documentation that Mr Kumar sufficiently identified a personal grievance while employed or within the statutory period.

2. Whether Mr Kumar established exceptional circumstances to justify leave to raise the personal grievance out of time under s 114(4) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]–[20]).

The Authority applied the Supreme Court's formulation in Creedy v Commissioner of Police [2008] 1 ERNZ 109, which defines "exceptional circumstances" as those that are unusual, outside the ordinary course, or uncommon — not requiring uniqueness or rarity. Mr Kumar advanced two grounds: (a) that EFL's alleged bad faith conduct and post-resignation economic pressure deterred him from pursuing a grievance; and (b) that his mental health deterioration prevented him from raising the grievance in time under s 115(b) of the Act. The Authority rejected both grounds: EFL's post-employment conduct could not engage the good faith duty (per Balfour v The Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2007] ERNZ 808), and the medical evidence (a GP note of 31 May 2025) post-dated the expiry of the limitation period and showed Mr Kumar was functioning normally — contrary to his claim of a "physiological collapse." The Authority found exceptional circumstances were not established.

3. Whether it would be just to grant leave under s 114(4)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [17]–[20]).

Even if exceptional circumstances had been found, the Authority considered whether it was just to grant leave, examining the length of the delay, prejudice to EFL, and the merits of the underlying claim. The 33-day delay was found not insignificant and inadequately explained. Granting leave would unduly prejudice EFL. Mr Kumar had not raised his concerns with EFL during employment, and there was controversy about potential post-employment breaches on his part that could severely restrict any remedy. The Authority found Mr Kumar's prospects of establishing constructive dismissal were too remote to allow the matter to proceed.

4. EFL's counter-claim for breach of post-employment obligations — Status: Not reached (para [4], [23]).

EFL filed a separate application on 17 June 2025 claiming Mr Kumar had breached post-employment obligations. This matter was not determined in the preliminary hearing and remains unresolved. The Authority encouraged the parties to resolve all outstanding issues, including EFL's counter-claims, on a mutually agreed basis.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [22]–[26]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to negotiate resolution of costs (and all outstanding matters) between themselves. If unresolved, EFL may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Kumar having 14 days to reply. The Authority will assess costs on its usual daily tariff basis if required.

The claim was dismissed: the Authority declined to grant leave for Mr Kumar's personal grievance to proceed out of time, finding he had not established exceptional circumstances under s 114(4) of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

None ordered. Costs are reserved, with a process outlined for the parties to resolve costs by agreement or by memoranda to the Authority within specified timeframes.

[COSTS ONLY]

Dilpreet Kaur and Amanda Gilbert (employees) brought employment claims against Summerset Group Holdings Limited (employer), which were dismissed in a substantive determination dated 7 May 2026. This determination deals solely with the question of costs following that dismissal. The Authority awarded the respondent $4,500 in total costs contribution, split equally between the two applicants at $2,250 each.

Applicant: Dilpreet Kaur and Amanda Gilbert (employees)
Respondent: Summerset Group Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate
Respondent: Greg Cain, counsel

Both applicants had their employment claims dismissed by the Authority in a substantive determination issued on 7 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 285). The investigation meeting was held over one day, concluding at approximately 3.30 pm, with written closing submissions filed afterwards. Following the dismissal of their claims, the parties were unable to agree on costs and filed memoranda for the Authority to determine the matter. The respondent sought costs at the standard daily tariff of $4,500 for one hearing day. The applicants opposed any costs award, arguing their claims were brought in good faith, were not frivolous, and that an award would cause them undue financial hardship following their redundancies; they provided no supporting financial evidence for that hardship claim.

1. Whether costs should follow the event in favour of the successful respondent — Status: Established (paras [8]-[10]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The applicable principles, drawn from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135 at [114], are that costs should be modest and represent a reasonable contribution to costs actually and reasonably incurred, not a punishment. The Authority held that costs follow the event and, as the respondent was the successful party, it was entitled to a contribution to its costs.

2. Whether the standard daily tariff of $4,500 was the appropriate starting point — Status: Established (paras [3]-[5], [11]-[12]).

The Authority's well-known daily tariff approach sets $4,500 for the first hearing day and $3,500 for subsequent days. Given the investigation meeting was concluded by approximately 3.30 pm and written submissions followed, the Authority determined that the standard one-day tariff of $4,500 properly applied. The respondent sought no adjustment upward or downward from that starting point.

3. Whether costs should lie where they fall (i.e., no award) because the applicants' claims were brought in good faith and were not frivolous — Status: Dismissed (paras [13]-[15]).

The applicants argued that their claims were legitimate, of sufficient complexity to warrant a formal hearing, and that a costs award would act as a punishment or deterrent to employees raising genuine concerns. The Authority rejected this, noting that the applicants themselves acknowledged the complexity of the issues, and that costs regimes are a well-established part of litigation. The Authority found no basis to decline an award that would otherwise properly be made.

4. Whether a downward adjustment to costs should be made on the ground of the applicants' financial hardship — Status: Dismissed (paras [16]-[18]).

The applicants submitted they were not in a financial position to meet a significant costs award without undue hardship following their redundancies. The Authority found this submission to be unsupported: no detail of the financial difficulties was provided, no definition of "undue hardship" was given, and no supporting financial evidence was filed. The Authority declined to make any downward adjustment on the basis of financial hardship where it was asserted but not evidenced.

5. How the costs award should be apportioned between the two applicants — Status: Established (para [19]).

Both applicants' claims were determined in a single investigation meeting and the Authority considered that time was evenly divided between them. Accordingly, the $4,500 award was split equally, with each applicant liable for $2,250.

The costs application was upheld in favour of the respondent; each applicant was ordered to pay $2,250 as a contribution to the respondent's costs.

Costs: $4,500 total awarded to the respondent — Dilpreet Kaur ordered to pay $2,250 and Amanda Gilbert ordered to pay $2,250, each within 28 days of the date of the determination.
No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination).

This determination concerns an application by employee MHT for a permanent non-publication order in proceedings against employer KAZ. Following the Authority's earlier refusal of interim reinstatement and a subsequent successful mediation resolving the substantive employment dispute, the only remaining issue was whether the interim non-publication order should be made permanent. The Authority granted the permanent non-publication order, finding that the ends of justice warranted departure from open justice given the sensitive health matters involved.

Applicant: MHT (employee)
Respondent: KAZ (employer)

Applicant: Fiona Dalziel, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Rachel Webster, counsel for the Respondent

MHT brought employment relationship claims against KAZ and sought interim reinstatement pending the Authority's substantive investigation. By a determination dated 24 June 2026, the Authority declined the application for interim reinstatement and made an interim non-publication order protecting the names and identifying details of both parties, pending further order. Following that interim determination, the parties attended mediation and resolved the substantive dispute. The only matter remaining for the Authority's determination was whether the interim non-publication order should be made permanent. MHT submitted in favour of a permanent order, citing sensitive health matters and the absence of any public interest in the parties' identities. KAZ did not oppose the making of a permanent non-publication order.

1. Whether a permanent non-publication order should be made in respect of the names and identifying details of the parties — Status: Established (paras [10]–[15]).

The Authority applied the test from MW v Spiga Ltd [2024] NZEmpC 147 at [87] and [92], affirming that open justice is of fundamental importance and may only be departed from to the extent necessary to serve the ends of justice or where the administration of justice may weigh against full openness. The test is not simply whether specific adverse consequences would follow from publication, but whether departure from open justice is necessary in all the circumstances. The Authority was satisfied that there was reason to believe specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected if the parties were identified, particularly given the involvement of sensitive health matters, and that there was no legitimate public interest in the identity of the parties (notwithstanding some possible public interest in the proceeding itself). The permanent non-publication order was granted under cl 10(1) of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

2. Whether costs should be awarded in respect of the non-publication application — Status: Dismissed (para [17]).

The Authority made no order as to costs on the non-publication application, directing that costs shall lie where they fall. No reasons beyond this direction were stated.

The application for a permanent non-publication order was upheld; costs were not awarded to either party.

Non-publication: A permanent order is made under cl 10(1) of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000 prohibiting publication of the names and/or any identifying details of the parties.
Costs: None ordered; costs lie where they fall.

Lyndal Midgley (applicant/employee) has a dispute against The Priory in New Zealand of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem (respondent/employer). This determination is solely a preliminary procedural ruling made at a case management conference, issuing non-publication orders in respect of a witness's identity and medical evidence, and the fact and content of a confidential Record of Settlement relating to another individual. No merits issues have been decided at this stage.

Applicant: Lyndal Midgley (employee)
Respondent: The Priory in New Zealand of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in Person)
Respondent: Chloe Luscumbe, counsel for the Respondent

Lyndal Midgley has filed an employment relationship problem against her employer, The Priory in New Zealand of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem. The underlying merits of the dispute have not yet been addressed. A case management conference was held on 7 August 2026 at which procedural matters were agreed between the parties. Two non-publication orders were consented to: one concerning the identity and medical evidence of a witness referred to as FSK, and one concerning the fact and content of a confidential Record of Settlement relating to another individual, Adam Craven. The rationale for both orders was agreed upon and accepted by the Authority Member.

1. Whether a non-publication order should be made in respect of the identity and medical evidence of witness FSK — Status: Established (paras [1], [3], [4]).

The Authority applied Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which grants power to make non-publication orders. The Member accepted that identifying the witness and disclosing her medical evidence would cause distress and harm to her. Accordingly, the witness is to be referred to only by the initials FSK (bearing no relationship to her actual name), and all identifying details and medical evidence about her are subject to a non-publication order.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made in respect of the fact and content of the Record of Settlement relating to Adam Craven — Status: Established (paras [2], [3], [4]).

Again applying Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Member accepted there is a recognised public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of mediated settlements. The fact and content of the Record of Settlement relating to Adam Craven, which is subject to confidentiality under its own terms, are not to be published.

The determination was upheld in full as a preliminary procedural ruling; both non-publication orders were granted by consent.

None ordered on the merits. Two non-publication orders were made under Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000: (1) prohibiting publication of the name, identifying details, and medical evidence of witness FSK; and (2) prohibiting publication of the fact and content of the Record of Settlement relating to Adam Craven. The substantive merits of the employment dispute remain to be determined.

Alaa Abdelmeguid Imbarak Abdelmeguid (Sheikh Alaa), an imam employed by North Shore Islamic Trust (NSIT), brought claims for unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, wage arrears, and penalties following NSIT's March 2022 communication that it would not pursue his return to New Zealand. NSIT counterclaimed for repayment of an air ticket advance and damages for alleged pre-employment misrepresentation. The Authority dismissed all of Sheikh Alaa's claims and NSIT's misrepresentation claim, but ordered Sheikh Alaa to repay the $6,510.80 air ticket advance to NSIT.

Applicant: Alaa Abdelmeguid Imbarak Abdelmeguid (employee/imam)
Respondent: North Shore Islamic Trust (employer/charitable trust operating a mosque)

Applicant: Arunjeev Singh, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: John Burley, counsel for the Respondent

Sheikh Alaa, an Al-Azhar-trained imam, was employed by NSIT from 24 July 2019 under a series of successive fixed-term individual employment agreements (IEAs), with a base salary of $33,000 per annum. He had previously been associated with NSIT since 2016 under an Al-Azhar envoy programme. On 29 May 2021 he departed New Zealand for Egypt on planned annual leave; due to COVID-19 border restrictions and the decline of his critical purpose visa (CPV) application, he was unable to return. NSIT actively supported his visa efforts but, with Ramadan approaching and no prospect of return, on 11 March 2022 wrote to Sheikh Alaa advising it would seek another imam, which Sheikh Alaa characterised as a dismissal. Sheikh Alaa claimed wage arrears for alleged excess hours worked (55 vs 40 per week), unpaid wages while overseas, holiday pay, public holiday pay, and notice pay, and alleged unjustified disadvantage through failures to keep wage/time records and to provide suitable accommodation. NSIT denied dismissal occurred, asserted the employment relationship had ended or was frustrated, and counterclaimed for repayment of an air ticket advance and damages for pre-employment misrepresentation about Sheikh Alaa's Al-Azhar stipend.

1. Whether wage arrears of $20,424.13 (gross) were due for the period 24 July 2019 – 29 May 2021 (claimed on basis of 55 hours/week worked vs 40 hours/week paid) — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[38]).

The applicable test required Sheikh Alaa to establish each hour worked beyond the agreed 40-hour week for which payment was sought. The only IEA specifying hours (12 March 2019) recorded 40 hours/week, and the parties' successive IEAs were drafted with Sheikh Alaa's active involvement. No contemporaneous records (diary, timesheets) supported the 55-hour claim; Sheikh Alaa's own expert witness (Imam Fouda) confirmed an ordinary imam workload was 32–40 hours/week; and Sheikh Alaa's claim was characterised as a retrospective reconstruction rather than based on verifiable facts. The claim was dismissed.

2. Whether wage arrears of $14,444.42 (gross) were due for the period 1 August 2021 to 10 December 2021 (while Sheikh Alaa was overseas) — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[43]).

The governing IEA (4 February 2021) required Sheikh Alaa to be physically present in New Zealand to discharge his duties, including leading prayers at the mosque and residing at the provided accommodation. There was no evidence he sought or was directed to perform duties from Egypt, and he had not applied for an extended leave of absence as permitted under the IEA. The Authority was satisfied the express terms of the IEA, read in context, made New Zealand presence a condition of employment, and Sheikh Alaa could not establish he had performed contractual duties from Egypt entitling him to wages.

3. Whether annual leave and holiday pay arrears of $7,189.47 were due for 2019–2021 — Status: Dismissed (para [44]).

This claim was contingent on the success of the wage arrears claim at issue 1. Because no additional hours beyond 40 per week were established, no additional holiday or leave pay entitlement arose. The claim was dismissed without separate analysis.

4. Whether public holiday pay of $5,581.88 was due — Status: Dismissed (paras [45]-[48]).

The IEAs provided that public holiday pay was triggered only when Sheikh Alaa was "called out to work" on a public holiday by NSIT. There was no direct evidence he was ever directed by NSIT to work on a public holiday. The Authority held the specific "called out to work" provision governed over the general duty to lead prayers, and in the absence of any such direction, the claim failed.

5. Whether notice pay of $14,300 was due — Status: Dismissed (addressed as part of unjustified dismissal analysis at paras [49]-[55]).

Notice pay was premised on a finding of dismissal. Because the Authority found there was no dismissal (and no extant employment agreement at the relevant time), this claim necessarily failed.

6. Whether Sheikh Alaa was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [49]-[55]).

The test requires an existing employment relationship at the time of the alleged dismissal. The Authority found the IEA signed 19 March 2020 expired on 30 June 2021, and the 4 February 2021 IEA could not come into effect on 1 July 2021 because Sheikh Alaa could not perform his obligations (he was in Egypt). The parties' conduct — Sheikh Alaa not being paid, not seeking payment, not being directed to work, and both parties focused on his immigration status — was consistent with no extant agreement. Alternatively, if the 4 February 2021 IEA did come into effect, the Authority found the doctrine of frustration (citing DQJ v Commissioner of Inland Revenue Department [2025] NZEmpC 10) applied, as it was impossible for Sheikh Alaa to perform his obligations and all reasonable options had been exhausted. Accordingly, there was no dismissal.

7. Whether Sheikh Alaa was unjustifiably disadvantaged by NSIT's failure to maintain wage and time records — Status: Dismissed (paras [56]-[60]).

Under s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, an employer must keep wage and time records. However, the personal grievance must arise during employment. There was no evidence Sheikh Alaa ever requested his wage and time record during his employment; a pay slip summary was provided when he requested one for immigration purposes in March 2021. Because the breach (if any) was never triggered by a request during employment, the personal grievance was not established.

8. Whether Sheikh Alaa was unjustifiably disadvantaged by NSIT's failure to provide suitable accommodation — Status: Dismissed (paras [61]-[67]).

Sheikh Alaa alleged the shared bathroom facilities posed a risk of embarrassment and that there were pest problems, but acknowledged he never raised these concerns with NSIT (for fear of jeopardising NSIT's support for his residency application). The Authority found NSIT was unaware of the concerns, that any tangible risk from the bathroom configuration had not been objectively established, and that pest eradication steps had been taken. The personal grievance was not established.

9. Whether remedies for unjustified disadvantage should be awarded ($20,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Not reached (para [7](ii)).

Because neither unjustified disadvantage claim was established, the question of compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) did not arise.

10. Whether remedies for unjustified dismissal should be awarded ($40,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Not reached (para [7](iv)).

Because no unjustified dismissal was established, the question of compensation did not arise.

11. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for Sheikh Alaa's contributory/blameworthy conduct — Status: Not reached (para [7](v)).

As no grievances were established, the question of reduction for contributory conduct was moot.

12. Whether penalties should be imposed for: (a) failure to keep wage/time records (s 130(1) ERA); (b) failure to maintain good faith obligations (s 4 ERA); (c) failure to pay minimum wage (s 6 Minimum Wage Act 1983); (d) failure to pay public holiday entitlements (s 46 Holidays Act 2003); (e) failure to pay wages under the employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [68]).

No breaches of statutory duty or employment agreement were established in respect of any of Sheikh Alaa's claims. Accordingly, no basis for imposing penalties existed and the claim was not taken further.

13. Whether Sheikh Alaa was required to repay NSIT $6,510.80 for the air ticket advance — Status: Established (para [69]).

There was no dispute that this sum had been advanced to Sheikh Alaa by NSIT for the purpose of purchasing a return air ticket to New Zealand. The Authority ordered repayment within 21 days of the determination, noting that whether Sheikh Alaa received a refund on the ticket was irrelevant to his obligation to repay the advance.

14. Whether Sheikh Alaa breached his good faith obligations towards NSIT by misrepresenting that his Al-Azhar stipend had ceased, thereby inducing NSIT to pay him a salary it would not otherwise have paid (claim for damages of up to $129,000) — Status: Dismissed (paras [70]-[72]).

NSIT claimed actionable misrepresentation, seeking recovery of $30,000 plus approximately $99,000 in salary paid. The Authority found the evidence of what was represented, to whom, and what was understood was too fragmented to establish an actionable misrepresentation. Even if misrepresentation were established, NSIT had received the benefit of Sheikh Alaa's services and failed to undertake due diligence or negotiate a repayment mechanism. The claim was dismissed. A preliminary issue also arose as to whether pre-employment representations fell within the scope of an employment relationship problem (noted in footnote 3), but was not separately resolved given the dismissal of the substantive claim.

15. Whether either party was entitled to costs — Status: Reserved (para [74]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, NSIT was to lodge a costs memorandum within 14 days, with Sheikh Alaa to reply within a further 14 days. The Authority indicated it would apply the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in its entirety; NSIT's counterclaim for air ticket repayment was upheld, but its misrepresentation/damages claim was dismissed.

Repayment by Sheikh Alaa to NSIT: $6,510.80 (air ticket advance), payable within 21 days of the date of determination.
All of Sheikh Alaa's claims (wage arrears, holiday pay, public holiday pay, notice, unjustified dismissal and disadvantage compensation, penalties): None ordered.
NSIT's misrepresentation/damages claim: None ordered.
Costs: Reserved; process set out for parties to resolve or seek determination.