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Applicant: PJX (role not stated — document body not provided)
Respondent: V Ltd (role not stated — document body not provided)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

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Shay Braden, a traffic management officer employed by TK Logistics Limited, resigned on 2 March 2025 after repeated failures by her employer to pay wages on time or in full. She claimed constructive dismissal, lost wages, hurt and humiliation compensation, and penalties for wage protection breaches. The Authority upheld her constructive dismissal claim and awarded compensation, lost wages, and costs, but declined to impose penalties.

Applicant: Shay Braden (employee)
Respondent: TK Logistics Limited (employer)

Applicant: William Lynch, advocate
Respondent: Tara Royce, advocate

Ms Braden was employed by TK Logistics Limited as a traffic management officer from 21 November 2023 until 16 March 2025, working out of the Alexandra depot on various Central Otago sites. Her hourly rate had increased to $28.50 by late August 2024. From November 2024 onward, TK Logistics — a small family-run business experiencing significant financial difficulties — repeatedly failed to pay Ms Braden's wages on time or in full, leaving her without income over the Christmas period and requiring her to borrow money to meet living costs. On 2 March 2025, Ms Braden resigned by emailed letter giving notice until 16 March 2025, and her final pay was not made until 21 March 2025. TK Logistics acknowledged financial difficulties but argued it had consulted employees and taken active steps to remedy the situation, and disputed that the dismissal was unjustified. A grievance was raised and the matter proceeded to an investigation meeting on 17 July 2026.

1. Whether TK Logistics breached duties owed to Ms Braden by failing to pay wages in full and on time — Status: Established (paras [10]-[21]).

Section 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 requires an employer to pay the entire amount of wages without deduction. The Authority found that TK Logistics repeatedly failed to pay Ms Braden's wages in full and on time across multiple pay periods from November 2024 through to her final pay on 21 March 2025. Despite TK Logistics' arguments that the delays arose from genuine financial hardship and were the subject of consultation with employees, the Authority found the statutory provision was clearly breached.

2. Whether Ms Braden was constructively dismissed — Status: Established (paras [8], [22]-[24]).

The three-part constructive dismissal test from established case law (including Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA)) requires that: (i) there was a breach of duty; (ii) the breach was sufficiently serious that resignation was a reasonably foreseeable response; and (iii) the employee resigned in response to the breach. The Authority found all three elements satisfied, relying on the principle (confirmed in Ling v Super Cuisine Group Ltd [2023] NZEmpC 106) that underpayment or delayed payment of wages is a sufficiently serious breach. Ms Braden's resignation in the context of ongoing non-payment — including during the Christmas break and again during her notice period — clearly established constructive dismissal.

3. Whether the constructive dismissal was justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [25]-[26]).

Once constructive dismissal was established, the onus shifted to TK Logistics to prove the dismissal was justified under the s 103A justification test, including substantive and procedural elements. The Authority found TK Logistics had not discharged this onus. The dismissal was found to be both substantively and procedurally unjustified; while TK Logistics had communicated its difficulties at times, the repeated failures to pay wages meant their actions could not be justified.

4. Whether TK Logistics breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Addressed but subsumed within the constructive dismissal finding (paras [25]-[26]).

The Authority considered good faith obligations in the context of the justification assessment under s 103A. No separate penalty finding for good faith breach was made; the conduct was addressed as part of the overall justification analysis.

5. Compensation for hurt, humiliation, and loss of dignity under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [28]-[31]).

The Authority assessed the extent of humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings caused by TK Logistics' failure to resolve wage payment concerns. The Authority found that Ms Braden suffered unnecessary anxiety and felt she had no agency over her work situation. Having regard to comparable cases cited in submissions, the Authority awarded $4,000 in compensation.

6. Lost wages under s 123(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Partially established (paras [32]-[33]).

Ms Braden sought thirteen weeks of lost wages (until she found alternative employment on 5 May 2025). TK Logistics argued the award should be limited given the company's financial position and likelihood it could not have continued employing her. The Authority awarded four weeks' lost wages calculated at 50 hours per week at $28.50 per hour ($5,700), plus 8% holiday pay ($456), reflecting the company's difficult financial circumstances as a limiting factor.

7. Whether penalties should be imposed for breach of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Dismissed (para [34]).

Ms Braden sought penalties for TK Logistics' wage payment failures. The Authority declined to impose penalties, finding that the breaches were not deliberate or sustained, and that countervailing factors (including the company's genuine financial difficulty) made a penalty award disproportionate in the circumstances.

8. Whether Ms Braden's contributory conduct should reduce any remedy under s 124 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [35]-[36]).

The Authority applied the factors summarised in Maddigan v Director General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190 at [71]–[76] to assess whether Ms Braden's own conduct contributed to the circumstances giving rise to her grievance. The Authority found no contributory conduct on Ms Braden's part and made no reduction to the remedies awarded.

9. Costs — Status: Established (paras [38]-[39]).

The Authority exercised its discretion under s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. As Ms Braden was successful, costs were awarded in her favour. The hearing occupied a half-day investigation meeting, and a costs contribution of $2,250 was fixed, together with the Authority filing fee of $71.55.

The claim was substantially upheld: constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage were established, with compensation and lost wages awarded, but penalties were not imposed.

- Compensation (hurt and humiliation): $4,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000
- Lost wages: $5,700 gross (four weeks at 50 hours/week at $28.50/hour) under s 123(1)(b)
- Holiday pay on lost wages: $456.00 (8% of lost wages)
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs contribution: $2,250 plus Authority filing fee of $71.55
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination

[CONSENT]

This is a consent determination arising from an employment dispute between a pseudonymised applicant (UOP) and respondent (SJO). The parties resolved their dispute during the Investigation Meeting and requested the Authority make consent orders based on a signed Record of Settlement. The Authority made those orders, which are full, final, and binding, and also issued a non-publication order covering the parties' identities and settlement terms.

Applicant: UOP (employee — identity suppressed)
Respondent: SJO (employer — identity suppressed)

Applicant: Russell Drake and Marisa Boshoff-Terblanche, advocates
Respondent: Shane Killian, counsel

The parties are identified only by randomly generated letter strings due to a confidentiality order. The nature and duration of the employment relationship are not disclosed in the determination. The dispute was brought by the applicant before the Employment Relations Authority. During the Investigation Meeting, the parties reached a negotiated resolution and signed a Record of Settlement. They jointly requested that the Authority make consent orders giving effect to that settlement and that the parties' names and settlement terms remain confidential. No substantive findings on the merits of any claim were made.

1. Whether the Authority should make consent orders giving effect to the parties' Record of Settlement — Status: Established (paras [1]-[3]).

The parties jointly requested consent orders following resolution of their dispute during the Investigation Meeting. The Authority, acting under its power to make consent orders, determined that the terms of the Record of Settlement should be made an order of the Authority, rendering them enforceable as such. The terms are described as full, final, and binding in respect of all employment-related matters between the parties, including any question of costs in the ERA proceedings.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made suppressing the parties' names and the terms of settlement — Status: Established (paras [4]-[6]).

The parties agreed that their identities and settlement terms should remain confidential. Under Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority has power to prohibit publication of party names and restrict access to relevant documents. The Authority was satisfied on the information before it that such an order was appropriate, and accordingly prohibited publication of the parties' names and the Record of Settlement, with registry file access restricted except where necessary for enforcement purposes. Pseudonymous letter strings with no resemblance to actual names were used in the determination.

The matter was resolved by consent; the Authority made consent orders giving effect to the Record of Settlement and issued a non-publication order suppressing the parties' identities and settlement terms.

The specific terms of the settlement (including any monetary or other remedies) are confidential and not disclosed in the determination. The settlement covers all employment-related matters between the parties, including costs. No further remedy was ordered by the Authority beyond making the agreed terms enforceable as an order of the Authority.

Jing Niu, a migrant caregiver employed by New Windsor 2017 Limited (trading as New Windsor Care), brought claims for unjustified disadvantage, unjustified dismissal, wage arrears, holiday and leave pay, and penalties for good faith breaches. The key legal questions concerned whether NW complied with its employment obligations regarding pay and hours, whether the dismissal was justified, and whether penalties were warranted for good faith breaches. The Authority upheld all claims, ordering NW to pay substantial wage arrears, leave entitlements, lost wages, compensation, and a penalty.

Applicant: Jing Niu (employee)
Respondent: New Windsor 2017 Limited (employer, trading as New Windsor Care)

Applicant: Lawrence Blackaby (representative — firm not stated)
Respondent: Nancy Wang (manager of New Windsor Care — no legal counsel appearing)

Jing Niu commenced employment with New Windsor 2017 Limited at its Auckland residential aged care facility for Chinese residents in late May 2023, initially without a written employment agreement. She subsequently signed three individual employment agreements (IEAs), with the third (IEA 3) specifying 40 hours per week at $29.66 per hour, prepared in connection with her Accredited Employer Work Visa (AEWV) application, which was approved in July 2024. NW disputed the validity of IEA 2, claiming it was signed by a family member without authority and that its terms were inserted by Ms Niu and her immigration adviser without NW's knowledge. From around November 2023, Ms Niu was paid in cash at only $20 per hour and her hours were reduced below contracted minimums; NW also presented a purported volunteer agreement signed in December 2023, which Ms Niu said she did not understand. On 4 August 2024, after Ms Niu asked about aligning her wages with the AEWV requirements, NW's manager told her she was no longer required to work. Ms Niu raised a personal grievance on 26 August 2024 and thereafter NW declined to engage with mediation on multiple occasions and failed to provide witness statements or attend the reconvened investigation meeting.

1. Whether Ms Niu is owed arrears of wages — Status: Established (paras [41]-[42]).

Under s 132 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and s 83 of the Holidays Act 2003, where an employer fails to keep or produce wage records, the burden shifts to the employer to disprove the employee's calculations. NW failed to maintain records and did not rebut Ms Niu's evidence. The Authority accepted Ms Niu's calculations covering three employment periods, including shortfalls due to cash payments at $20 per hour and failure to provide minimum contracted hours. Wage arrears of $26,291.86 were established.

2. Whether Ms Niu is owed annual holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [43]).

Applying s 83 of the Holidays Act 2003 and the burden-shifting principle, the Authority found Ms Niu received no genuine annual holiday payments. A payment recorded as holiday pay on 21 January 2024 was found to be wages for work performed. Annual holiday pay of $3,677.84 was accepted as owing.

3. Whether Ms Niu is owed sick leave pay — Status: Established (paras [44]).

Ms Niu's evidence that she took approximately nine days of sick leave from 29 December 2023 to about 7 January 2024 and was not paid was accepted. Sick leave pay of $2,001.05 was found owing.

4. Whether Ms Niu is owed public holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [45]).

Ms Niu worked five public holidays without receiving time and a half or an alternative paid day off. The Authority accepted her calculations of a shortfall of $1,668.38 in public holiday pay.

5. Whether Ms Niu raised a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage within time and whether such a grievance was established — Status: Established (paras [56]-[58]).

The applicable test under s 103(1)(b) of the Act requires the employee to show that their employment or a condition thereof was affected to their disadvantage by an unjustified action of the employer. The Authority found Ms Niu's grievance was raised within time in respect of ongoing conduct. On the balance of probabilities, NW acted as alleged by reducing hours and wages below agreed terms, breaching the Minimum Wages Act 1983, Wages Protection Act 1983, and Holidays Act 2003, causing clear disadvantage, and those actions were unjustified.

6. Whether Ms Niu has a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [59]-[61]).

The justification test under s 103A of the Act asks whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as NW did in all the circumstances. The Authority found NW's communication on 4 August 2024 that Ms Niu was "no longer required to work" constituted a "sending away" (dismissal). NW failed to investigate any alleged concerns, raise them with Ms Niu, give her a reasonable opportunity to respond, or genuinely consider any explanation. The dismissal was substantively and procedurally unjustified.

7. Whether a separate remedy for the unjustified disadvantage grievance should be awarded — Status: Not reached/declined (para [62]).

The Authority determined it was not necessary to make a separate remedy award in relation to the disadvantage grievances, as adequate remedies were being awarded under the dismissal grievance.

8. Whether lost wages should be awarded as a remedy for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [63]-[64]).

Under s 123(1)(b) and s 128(2) of the Act, lost wages are ordinarily capped at three months' ordinary time remuneration, but the Authority may exercise discretion to award a greater sum. Ms Niu was without income for over 18 weeks despite actively seeking work. The Authority exercised its discretion to award a greater sum calculated on 40 hours per week at $29.66 per hour, totalling $21,355.20.

9. Whether compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [65]-[70]).

The Authority considered Ms Niu's particular vulnerability as a migrant worker with limited English, her prior exploitation by a previous employer, her fear of deportation following Ms Wang's threat to contact Immigration New Zealand, her financial stress, and her resulting psychological harm. Having regard to the evidence and comparable cases, compensation of $25,000 was awarded.

10. Whether Ms Niu's contributory conduct warranted a reduction in remedies under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [71]).

The Authority found no basis on which a reduction in remedies was warranted for any contribution on Ms Niu's part.

11. Whether NW breached good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act and whether a penalty should be imposed under s 4A — Status: Established (paras [46]-[53]).

Section 4A of the Act permits the Authority to impose a penalty (maximum $20,000 for a company) for breaches of good faith under s 4. The Authority applied the factors in s 133A and cited Nicholson v Ford [2018] NZEmpC 132 and Labour Inspector v Daleson Investment Ltd [2019] NZEmpC 12. NW's breaches — failing to pay agreed wages, hours, and leave entitlements — were found intentional, serious, and ongoing, with high culpability. Ms Niu's vulnerability as an AEWV holder was an aggravating factor. NW had previously been penalised $3,000 by the Authority for similar conduct (Zhang v New Windsor 2017 Limited [2024] NZERA 778) and failed to pay even that award, resulting in a compliance order (Zhang v New Windsor 2017 Limited [2026] NZERA 449). A penalty of $8,000 was imposed, split equally between Ms Niu ($4,000) and the Crown ($4,000).

12. Costs — Status: Not ordered (para [74]).

Ms Niu did not seek costs of representation. No costs order was made.

The claims were upheld in full: unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal grievances established, all wage and leave arrears accepted, compensation and lost wages awarded, and a penalty imposed against NW.

- Wage arrears: $26,291.86
- Annual holiday pay: $3,677.84
- Sick leave pay: $2,001.05
- Public holiday pay: $1,668.38
- Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $25,000
- Lost wages (unjustified dismissal): $21,355.20
- Penalty (s 4A): $8,000 total — $4,000 payable to Ms Niu, $4,000 payable to the Crown
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination date
- Costs: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered

Colin Wood, a long-serving Senior Quarantine Officer with over 45 years of service, brought personal grievance claims against his employer, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI), after his employment was terminated on medical grounds on 8 October 2024. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal was substantively and procedurally justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, whether Mr Wood suffered unjustified disadvantage, and whether MPI breached its good faith obligations. The dismissal was found justified, but a narrow unjustified disadvantage claim succeeded for the period in September–October 2023 when Mr Wood was medically cleared but not rostered or informed of the delay; he was awarded 17 days' wage arrears.

Applicant: Colin Wood (employee — Senior Quarantine Officer)
Respondent: Chief Executive of the Ministry for Primary Industries / Manatū Ahu Matua (employer)

Applicant: Jason Tuck, advocate
Respondent: Stephen Wakem

Colin Wood commenced employment in border biosecurity in 1977, accumulating over 45 years of service, most recently as a Senior Quarantine Officer employed under a collective employment agreement. From December 2022, Mr Wood experienced extended and patchy absences due to multiple health conditions, with inconsistent communication to MPI about his situation. In September 2023 MPI initiated a formal process; Mr Wood's GP cleared him to return to work, but MPI sought a second opinion from Dr Adams, who also cleared him from 20 November 2023 and recommended a graduated return to work (RTW). A new and serious health condition diagnosed in December 2023 necessitated critical surgery in January 2024, delaying any RTW. After surgery, further medical and occupational therapist (OT) assessments produced a graduated RTW plan of 11–16 weeks that MPI concluded it could not practically accommodate given operational and health and safety considerations; MPI terminated Mr Wood's employment by medical retirement on 8 October 2024. Mr Wood argued the dismissal was unjustified, that he suffered unjustified disadvantage at several points in the process, and that MPI breached good faith obligations; MPI denied all claims, asserting it was entitled to "cry halt" after prolonged absence and given its inability to support the RTW plan.

1. Whether the dismissal was substantively justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [24]-[49], [55]).

The Authority applied the s 103A objective reasonableness test and the three-step framework from Lal v The Warehouse Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 66, expanded in Lyttelton Port Company Ltd v Arthurs [2018] NZEmpC 9: (a) reasonable opportunity to recover; (b) fair and reasonable inquiry into prognosis balancing fairness to employee against practical business needs; and (c) genuine consultation with the employee. The Authority found MPI satisfied all three steps: it gave Mr Wood ample recovery time, conducted thorough medical inquiry including two OT reports and two opinions from Dr Adams, and engaged Mr Wood in consultation throughout. MPI's decision that it could not practically accommodate the RTW plan — given shift complexity, health and safety risks, financial cost of over 18 months of overtime cover, and the incomplete nature of the plan — was objectively reasonable. The dismissal was therefore substantively justified and Mr Wood's unjustified dismissal claim failed.

2. Whether the dismissal was procedurally justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [41]-[44], [47]).

The Authority assessed whether MPI gave prior notice of intention to dismiss, explained its reasoning, and gave Mr Wood a genuine opportunity for input before finalising the decision. MPI proposed termination in January 2024 (noted as ill-timed relative to surgery), did not proceed until meeting Mr Wood nearly three months post-surgery, sought his feedback, and considered (though ultimately preferred the primary OT report over) his independently commissioned second OT report. All procedural requirements were met, and the dismissal was procedurally justified.

3. Whether Mr Wood was unjustifiably disadvantaged by MPI's failure to roster him in a timely manner after his GP cleared him in September 2023 — Status: Established (paras [51]-[52], [55]).

The Authority applied the unjustified disadvantage test under s 103A and relied on Scott v The Vice-Chancellor of the University of Canterbury [2021] NZERA 311. Between 25 September and 18 October 2023, Mr Wood was medically cleared by his own GP and ready, willing and able to work, but was not rostered and was not told MPI was seeking a second opinion or why his GP clearance was insufficient. MPI also raised a new concern with his doctor about physical presentation without informing Mr Wood or giving him an opportunity to respond. Placing him on involuntary unpaid leave in those circumstances constituted an unjustified disadvantage. This claim succeeded for that specific period only.

4. Whether Mr Wood was unjustifiably disadvantaged by MPI's failure to roster him in a timely manner after his GP cleared him in April 2024 — Status: Dismissed (para [53]).

The Authority found no similar lack of timeliness occurred in the April to June 2024 period following Mr Wood's post-surgery clearance, and this aspect of the disadvantage claim was not established.

5. Whether Mr Wood was unjustifiably disadvantaged by MPI taking an unreasonable position on health and safety risks and the proposed RTW plan — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[45]).

The Authority found MPI's concerns about the RTW plan were genuine and reasonable, supported by evidence from Mr Rawnsley about the operational constraints, health and safety risks, managerial burden, and financial cost. Although MPI adopted a worst-case-scenario approach to OT timeframes, this was found to be reasonable given the estimations were subject to change. This aspect of the disadvantage claim was not established.

6. Whether Mr Wood was unjustifiably disadvantaged by being notified of the final termination decision by email rather than in person — Status: Dismissed (para [54]).

The Authority acknowledged that notification in person would have been more respectful, but under s 103A(5) of the Act found this disadvantage to be minor and that it did not result in Mr Wood being treated unfairly. This aspect of the claim failed.

7. Whether MPI breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [56]-[57]).

The duty of good faith requires both parties to be active and constructive in the employment relationship. The Authority found insufficient evidence to support a breach by MPI, noting that MPI had communicated early and clearly about the consequences of continued absence and had kept Mr Wood informed of the termination proposal. The good faith claim was unsuccessful.

8. Whether a penalty should be awarded for any breach of good faith — Status: Not reached (para [57]).

Because the good faith breach claim was dismissed, the question of whether a penalty should be ordered did not arise.

9. Whether remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (contributory conduct) — Status: Not reached (para [5]).

Because the only successful claim was the unjustified disadvantage in September–October 2023, and that disadvantage arose from MPI's conduct rather than any blameworthy conduct by Mr Wood, the Authority made no findings under s 124 and no reduction was applied.

10. Whether compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) should be awarded for the unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (para [59]).

The Authority found that Mr Wood had not demonstrated any sufficiently significant detrimental impact during the September–October 2023 period to warrant a compensation award for hurt, humiliation or injury to feelings. No such award was made.

11. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Conditional (paras [61]-[64]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to reach agreement. If they cannot, either party may file a costs memorandum within 28 days and the other party has 14 days to reply. If determined by the Authority, costs will be assessed on its usual daily tariff basis.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal claim was dismissed, the good faith breach claim was dismissed, and only the narrow unjustified disadvantage claim relating to MPI's failure to roster Mr Wood and inform him of the delay between 25 September and 18 October 2023 succeeded.

Lost wages: Payment of 17 days' wages at Mr Wood's ordinary hourly rate for the period 25 September 2023 to 17 October 2023, to be paid within 28 days of the determination (exact dollar amount not stated — dependent on ordinary hourly rate).
Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i): None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Costs: Reserved — parties to negotiate; failing agreement, memoranda to be filed within prescribed timeframes; tariff basis to apply.

Eddie Edmonds, a Team Manager employed by Hutt City Council (HCC) for approximately five years, resigned in April 2025 following a lengthy audit and disciplinary process that proposed his dismissal for serious misconduct. He filed claims of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal with the Authority. The sole preliminary issue determined was whether Mr Edmonds had raised his constructive dismissal personal grievance within the 90-day notification period — the Authority found that he had, and the substantive claims will proceed.

Applicant: Eddie Edmonds (employee)
Respondent: Hutt City Council (employer)

Applicant: Pamela Greenlee, advocate
Respondent: David Traylor, counsel

Mr Edmonds was employed by HCC as a Team Manager for approximately five years. In September 2024, HCC commenced an audit into his team's use of purchasing cards (PCards), which led to an investigation and disciplinary process. On 2 April 2025, HCC issued a preliminary decision proposing dismissal on the basis of serious misconduct. Mr Edmonds raised a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage on 12 March 2025, and on 8 April 2025 his representative sent a detailed letter challenging HCC's preliminary decision and raising issues of unfairness, breach of good faith, and erosion of trust and confidence. Receiving no substantive response, Mr Edmonds resigned on 24 April 2025 stating he felt "forced to resign," with his employment ending on 28 April 2025. HCC accepted the unjustified disadvantage grievance was raised in time but disputed that a constructive dismissal grievance had been raised prior to Mr Edmonds filing his statement of problem with the Authority on 7 October 2025.

1. Whether Mr Edmonds raised a personal grievance for unjustified constructive dismissal within the applicable employee notification period — Status: Established (paras [6], [22]-[43]).

The applicable legal framework requires an employee to raise a personal grievance with the employer within 90 days of the action, event, or situation giving rise to the grievance (s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000). The Authority applied the purposive approach endorsed in Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132, which asks whether the employer was made aware of the substance of the complaint and what it was responding to, and noted that a series of communications taken in totality can amount to raising a grievance. Applying Teddy and Friends Ltd v Page [2022] NZEmpC 129, the Authority found that Mr Edmonds' detailed 8 April 2025 response letter — which challenged the proposed dismissal, identified procedural unfairness, alleged breach of good faith, and stated that trust and confidence had been destroyed — combined with his resignation letter of 24 April 2025 stating he was "forced to resign" due to "systemic issues," collectively amounted to raising a constructive dismissal grievance. The Authority concluded HCC had sufficient information to know what it was responding to, and that all relevant correspondence occurred well within the 90-day notification period before employment ended on 28 April 2025.

2. Whether HCC's argument that a constructive dismissal grievance cannot logically be raised before the resignation occurs should be accepted — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[41]).

HCC argued that because Mr Edmonds was never actually dismissed and his employment ended only by resignation, he could not have raised a constructive dismissal grievance prior to that resignation occurring. The Authority acknowledged an initial logical attraction to this argument but rejected it as simplistic and unfair in the specific circumstances, where HCC was actively proposing dismissal, Mr Edmonds had substantively contested that proposal on almost every point, and HCC had not engaged in response. The Authority found that Mr Edmonds had also made clear what HCC needed to do to remedy the situation — namely, revise its preliminary decision and engage in constructive dialogue — which further satisfied the notification requirement.

3. The substantive claims of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal — Status: Not reached (para [43]).

These substantive merits were not addressed in this determination, which was limited to resolving the preliminary notification issue. The Authority indicated the parties would be contacted to discuss progression of the substantive matter.

The preliminary claim was upheld: the Authority found that Mr Edmonds raised his personal grievance for unjustified constructive dismissal within the applicable employee notification period, and the substantive claims will proceed.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination only; the substantive claims of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal are yet to be heard and determined.

I cannot produce a meaningful summary of this determination because the document provided does not contain the actual text of the ERA determination. The content visible is metadata/system information (timestamps, privilege markers, UUIDs, and classification tags) rather than the body of the decision itself.

To produce an accurate structured summary in the required format, I would need the full text of the determination, including:
- The background and facts section
- The legal issues discussed
- The Authority's reasoning and conclusions
- Any remedies ordered

Please provide the full determination text and I will produce a complete structured summary. I will not speculate or invent content about a case I cannot read, as doing so would risk serious inaccuracies.

Golden Bay Cement (GBC), a division of Fletcher Concrete and Infrastructure Limited, sought a declaration that under clause 4.3 of its collective agreement with the Amalgamated Workers Union of New Zealand (AWUNZ), production shift workers are required to be available for and cannot refuse overtime during planned shutdowns. AWUNZ argued that longstanding practice exempted shift workers from compulsory shutdown overtime, and that the CA's relational context precluded GBC's strict contractual interpretation. The Authority declined GBC's application, finding that the interpretation sought was not available on a proper construction of the CA read in its relational context.

Applicant: Golden Bay Cement, a division of Fletcher Concrete and Infrastructure Limited (employer)
Respondent: The Amalgamated Workers Union of New Zealand Incorporated (union)

Applicant: Megan Vant, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Gary Pollak, counsel for the Respondent

GBC operates a cement manufacturing plant in Whangarei (Portland Plant) and is party to an expired collective agreement with AWUNZ covering a highly unionised workforce. Since 1996, employees have been paid under a Stable Income Plan (SIP) that includes an annualised overtime component; also since 1996, shift workers have not been required to work overtime during planned shutdowns (approximately twice yearly), with shutdown overtime instead being sought on a voluntary basis. In 2019–2020, during discussions to ensure CA compliance with s 67D of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a proposed variation acknowledged GBC was "comfortable with the current practice" on overtime timing, though this variation was not formally ratified due to COVID-19 disruption. In April 2024, GBC sought to change this practice by directing shift workers to work overtime during shutdowns, leading to unresolved discussions, two mediations, and the matter being included in current bargaining for a new CA. GBC argued clause 4.3 of the CA entitled it to require shift workers to be available for and work overtime during shutdowns, while AWUNZ contended the longstanding practice formed part of how the CA operated and that GBC was estopped from departing from it.

1. Whether, under clause 4.3 of the CA, employees (including shift workers) are required to remain available and work overtime as directed by GBC up to the specified overtime hours — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[34]).

The Authority applied the principles of objective contractual interpretation, starting with the natural and ordinary meaning of the CA's words in their whole-document context, informed by the relational context of employment agreements (citing NZ Air Line Pilots' Association Inc v Air New Zealand Ltd [2017] NZSC 111 and Le Gros v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2023] NZEmpC 193). The Authority found that clauses 3.1, 4.3, and 4.4, read together, do not provide a mechanism specifying how overtime is to be "shared equally" or what "certain circumstances" trigger compulsory overtime; these concepts are deliberately open-textured. The parties had over many years developed practices to fill that gap, including shift workers volunteering (rather than being compelled) for shutdown overtime. GBC's strict interpretation of clause 4.3 was unavailable because it did not engage with the broader overtime guidelines in the CA or the parties' relational context.

2. Whether it is a breach of clause 4.3 of the CA for employees to refuse overtime directed by GBC, including during shutdown periods — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[35]).

Following from the finding on issue 1, the Authority concluded that because GBC's interpretation of clause 4.3 was not available on a proper construction of the CA, employees cannot be found in breach of clause 4.3 for refusing compulsory shutdown overtime. The longstanding practice of voluntary shutdown overtime for shift workers was part of how the parties had operationalised the CA's ambiguous overtime-sharing obligation, and this remained the proper interpretive framework absent agreement to change it through bargaining or the CA's own mechanisms.

3. Whether estoppel (by convention or equity) prevented GBC from insisting on a strict interpretation of the CA to compel shift workers to work shutdown overtime — Status: Not reached (paras [33]-[34]).

The Authority resolved the dispute on the basis of the proper construction of the CA, incorporating its relational context, without needing to reach a formal determination on AWUNZ's estoppel argument. The Authority's reasoning effectively adopted the substance of AWUNZ's position — that the longstanding practice informed the meaning of the CA — rendering a separate estoppel analysis unnecessary.

4. Costs — Status: No order made (para [36]).

The Authority applied its usual approach to collective agreement interpretation disputes, directing that costs lie where they fall. No costs order was made against either party.

The application was dismissed in full; GBC's interpretation of clause 4.3 was not available on a proper construction of the collective agreement.

None ordered. Costs lie where they fall (no costs order made against either party).

Moses Day, a new law graduate, brought personal grievance claims against Shabani Law Limited after a troubled start to what he understood was an accepted job offer, culminating in his departure on 10 April 2025 after just four days at the firm's offices. The key legal questions were whether an employment relationship was established (including whether Day was a "person intending to work"), whether the 10 April letter signed at departure barred his claims, and whether he was unjustifiably dismissed. The Authority found in Day's favour on all substantive issues, awarding $5,509.74 in lost wages and $15,000 in compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings.

Applicant: Moses Day (employee/new graduate law clerk)
Respondent: Shabani Law Limited (employer, law firm)

Applicant: Paul Mathews, advocate for the applicant
Respondent: Mohammad Shabani, counsel for the respondent (also sole director/partner of respondent)

Moses Day, a BA/LLB graduate completing his professional legal studies course in Hamilton, applied for a law clerk/lawyer role advertised by Shabani Law Limited (SLL) on Student Job Search at $24 per hour for 30–40 hours per week. Following multiple interviews and communications from March 2025, Day understood he had accepted a job offer by 17 March 2025 at the latest, and by 1 April 2025 SLL emailed him a formal offer stating employment would commence 7 April 2025, followed by a request from the office manager for his bank account and tax details. Day relocated from Hamilton to Auckland, declined another job offer, and began attending SLL's offices on 7 April 2025. Over the following four days, SLL failed to provide an employment agreement as repeatedly promised, disclosed it was abandoning criminal law and could offer only 30 hours per week, and presented a draft agreement with terms materially worse than those discussed (including a later start date, no guaranteed hours, and an unlawful effective pay rate). On 10 April 2025, Mr Shabani initiated a discussion that resulted in Day signing a letter (drafted by Shabani) accepting $1,200 and agreeing not to pursue the matter; Day signed and left. SLL's primary defence was that no employment relationship had been established — that negotiations were ongoing and any employment was conditional on flexi-wage approval — and that the 10 April letter barred Day's claims.

1. Whether an employment relationship was established between Day and SLL — Status: Established (paras [74]–[90]).

The Authority applied ss 5 and 6(1)(b)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, under which "employee" includes a "person intending to work", defined as a person who has been offered and accepted work as an employee. The Authority also applied the principle from Baker v Armourguard Security Ltd [1998] 1 ERNZ 42 that an employment relationship can be formed before all its terms are articulated. The Authority found there was likely an oral offer and acceptance by 17 March 2025 with sufficient articulation of core terms; if not, the 1 April email offer, the request for bank and tax details, and Day's acceptance of those communications certainly established the relationship by that date. Mr Shabani himself conceded under cross-examination that he offered and Day accepted a role. Events from 7 April (access to office systems, involvement in firm discussions, attendance at training) further supported the conclusion that Day was at least a person intending to work. The Authority rejected SLL's argument that employment was conditional on flexi-wage approval, noting that condition was never communicated to Day.

2. Whether the 10 April 2025 letter signed by Day barred him from pursuing claims before the Authority — Status: Dismissed (paras [91]–[95]).

The Authority considered whether the departure letter constituted a binding settlement preventing Day from proceeding. SLL itself did not assert the letter as a bar, characterising the $1,200 as a goodwill gesture and relying instead on there being no employment relationship. The Authority found the letter did not use conventional "full and final settlement" language, did not identify what claims were being settled, and was drafted by Shabani rather than Day. Taking all these factors into account, the Authority held the letter did not bar Day from proceeding.

3. Whether Day's time at SLL's offices from 7–9 April 2025 constituted him becoming a volunteer rather than an employee/person intending to work — Status: Dismissed (paras [87]–[90]).

The Authority considered whether Day had "morphed" into a volunteer status after attending the office. It found that, while Day likely did use the word "volunteering" (with air quotes), this was explicable in the context of the unresolved flexi-wage back-pay question and Shabani's failure to provide an employment agreement. Shabani himself denied even setting up a volunteer arrangement. The Authority concluded that even if there was some volunteering agreement, Day remained a person intending to work and retained the right to pursue a grievance.

4. Whether Day was dismissed (actually or constructively) by SLL — Status: Established (paras [96]–[103]).

The test for actual dismissal is objective: whether it was reasonable for someone in Day's position to consider their employment terminated (Cornish Truck & Van Ltd v Gildenhuys [2019] NZEmpC 6). Constructive dismissal was assessed by reference to Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Limited [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA), covering situations where the employer initiates termination. The Authority found it more likely that Shabani raised the exit arrangement first, giving Day a "choice" of two options (three more weeks' work or $1,200) — both of which involved ending his employment. While the situation stopped short of an unconditional direction to leave, the Authority found this was at minimum a constructive dismissal, as the termination was initiated by the employer and Day felt he had no genuine choice.

5. Whether the dismissal was unjustified — Status: Established (paras [104]–[114]).

The objective fair and reasonable employer standard under the Act was applied. The Authority found SLL failed to provide an employment agreement in a timely manner, changed the terms (hours, removal of criminal law work) after Day had relocated and started attending the office, presented a draft agreement with unlawful terms, and moved prematurely to end the relationship without any redundancy or hours-reduction process. SLL also breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act by failing to be active and constructive in maintaining a productive employment relationship. The dismissal was found to be unjustified.

6. Whether Day suffered a disadvantage grievance through SLL's failure to provide an employment agreement and/or failure to provide promised hours of work — Status: Not reached (para [96]).

Day pursued these as alternative disadvantage grievance heads. The Authority noted that because the unjustified dismissal claim was accepted, a second head of compensation was not sought and the disadvantage grievances did not need to be separately determined.

7. Whether Day made any blameworthy contributory contribution warranting a reduction in remedies under s 114 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [128]).

The Authority found no blameworthy and causative contribution by Day, so no reduction to any remedy was warranted.

8. Quantum of lost wages — Status: Established (paras [115]–[120]).

Under s 128(2) of the Act, the Authority considered the appropriate period of lost remuneration. Day sought $5,040 (7 weeks at $720 gross/week) plus further reduced earnings for an additional six weeks. The Authority found the three-month (13-week) cap under s 128(2) appropriate, accepted Day's evidence that the $1,200 already received was wage-related and should be deducted, and calculated lost wages as $5,509.74 gross (7 weeks' full wages + 6 weeks' reduced earnings differential, less $1,200 already received). SLL's submissions criticising Day's mitigation efforts were rejected.

9. Quantum of compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [121]–[127]).

The Authority considered the impact on Day, including: stress and anxiety caused by SLL's failure to provide an employment agreement; loss of another job offer; health issues exacerbating an existing condition; loss of confidence and trust in the legal profession; withdrawal from friends and family; episodes of weeping. SLL's argument that Day was less vulnerable because of prior overseas travel was rejected. The Authority awarded $15,000, reduced from Day's claimed $30,000.

10. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [130]–[131]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. A procedure was set out for filing cost memoranda if agreement is not reached.

The claim was substantially upheld: the employment relationship was established, the 10 April letter was not a bar to proceedings, the dismissal was found to be unjustified, no contributory reduction applied, and remedies of lost wages and compensation were awarded.

Lost wages: $5,509.74 gross (calculated as 7 weeks' full wages at $720 gross/week = $5,040, plus reduced earnings differential for 6 weeks = $1,669.74, less $1,200 already received).
Compensation (hurt/humiliation/distress): $15,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, with no deduction for contribution.
Both amounts payable within 28 days of the date of determination.
Reinstatement: Not ordered (not sought).
Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve costs themselves; procedure set for memoranda if required.

The determination in Allison v Gregg Builders Limited ([2026] NZERA 729) cannot be meaningfully summarised because the document provided contains only metadata and classification markings, with no substantive determination text. The full content of the Authority's reasoning, findings, and orders has not been supplied, making it impossible to identify the nature of the dispute, the legal issues addressed, or the outcome reached.

Applicant: Allison (role not determinable from document)
Respondent: Gregg Builders Limited (employer, assumed)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

The document provided contains no substantive facts. The text consists entirely of metadata fields (timestamps, classification labels, document identifiers, and a member name) extracted from what appears to be a document management system record. No background, chronology, arguments, or procedural history can be extracted from the supplied text.

1. All legal issues — Status: Not determinable (no paragraph references available).

The determination text supplied contains no substantive content. Only metadata is present (document identifiers, a date stamp of 2026-08-01, classification markings "Privileged" and "IN-CONFIDENCE", Member William Fussey's name, and numeric fields). No legal issues, findings, tests, authorities, or reasoning can be identified or summarised. It is not possible to confirm whether any issue was established, dismissed, or not reached.

The outcome cannot be determined from the document as provided — no substantive determination text was supplied.

None determinable from the document provided. No remedies, compensation amounts, or orders can be identified.

David O'Connell, former managing director of Geneva Finance Limited (GFL), sought a ruling that a Record of Settlement (RoS) executed at the end of his employment precluded GFL from continuing District Court proceedings against him for alleged breaches of his duties as a company director under the Companies Act 1993. The central legal question was whether the "full and final settlement" clause in the RoS extended to cover claims relating to directorial duties arising from a loan agreement between GFL and O'Connell's private company. The Authority found that the RoS resolved only O'Connell's redundancy-related employment relationship problem and did not bar GFL's District Court proceedings.

Applicant: David O'Connell (employee/former managing director)
Respondent: Geneva Finance Limited (employer)

Applicant: Anthony Drake, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: Sam Hiebendaal and Liz Coats, counsel (firm not stated)

David O'Connell was employed by GFL from August 2006 and became a company director on 19 June 2007, ultimately serving as managing director until August 2023. In 2007, GFL advanced $273,711 to O'Connell's private company, THL No 2 Investments Limited (THL), to fund THL's purchase of shares in GFL's holding company; the loan carried 8% interest. On 1 October 2007, while O'Connell was a GFL director, an amended loan agreement reduced the interest rate to zero, a change GFL now alleges constituted a breach of O'Connell's directorial duties. The loan was not repaid when it fell due in 2012, THL was removed from the Companies Register in 2013, and the $273,711 remains outstanding. O'Connell's employment ended by way of a negotiated Record of Settlement dated 7 July 2023, which settled an employment problem relating to his role change and contained a "full and final settlement" clause covering "all problems, claims or complaints…in relation to the employment relationship or its termination." GFL subsequently commenced District Court proceedings against O'Connell for breach of directors' duties under ss 131 and 133 of the Companies Act 1993, prompting O'Connell to file a Statement of Problem arguing the RoS barred those proceedings.

1. Whether the RoS's "full and final settlement" clause extends to cover GFL's District Court claim for breach of directors' duties under the Companies Act 1993 — Status: Dismissed (paras [24]-[40]).

The Authority applied the principles from Santamaria v TVNZ [2024] NZERA 681 and IT Live (Auckland) Ltd v Bramley [2026] NZERA 643, which establish that a full and final settlement clause can cover claims a party was unaware of, but only if the language clearly indicates that intention, and that courts will be slow to infer surrender of rights of which a party was unaware. The Authority found that the RoS made no express reference to the Amended Loan agreement or to directorial duties; the Background section framed the settlement as resolving an employment problem concerning O'Connell's role change only. Relying on FMV v TZB [2021] NZSC 102, the Authority noted that the ERA has no jurisdiction over directors' duties claims under the Companies Act, which further weighed against the proposition that the RoS was intended to sweep in such claims. No reasonable and properly informed third party could conclude the RoS was intended to cover the alleged breach of directors' duties, and accordingly the RoS does not bar GFL from continuing in the District Court.

2. Whether the Amended Loan agreement was part of O'Connell's remuneration package (and thus employment-related) — Status: Dismissed (paras [27]-[31], [39]-[40]).

O'Connell and witness Peter Francis contended that the Amended Loan agreement was part of O'Connell's remuneration, intended to retain him during GFL's financial difficulties. The Authority found there was no documentary support for this characterisation: neither O'Connell's individual employment agreement nor GFL's consolidated financial statements for the year ending 31 March 2009 reflected the circa $100,000 interest benefit as remuneration. The Shareholders Agreement was between GFHL, O'Connell personally, and THL — GFL was not a party — and bore the hallmarks of an arm's-length commercial transaction rather than an employment benefit. Given O'Connell's seniority and expertise, the Authority found he would have been fully aware that these were commercial transactions separate from his employment.

3. Whether GFL's duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 required it to raise the Amended Loan agreement during settlement negotiations — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[38]).

O'Connell argued in the alternative that GFL's good faith obligation under s 4 of the Act required it to disclose the Amended Loan agreement issue during settlement discussions, and that its failure to do so was for ulterior reasons. The Authority rejected this on the facts, finding that GFL's witness Malcolm Johnston, who joined the board in 2020, had insufficient knowledge of the 2007 loan history to have raised it during the 2023 settlement discussions. There was no finding of bad faith on GFL's part.

4. Admissibility of a without-prejudice email from Mr Drake dated 9 May 2023 — Status: Established (i.

e., ruled inadmissible) (paras [32]-[34]).
GFL's counsel sought to admit a without-prejudice pre-settlement email to show the scope of the parties' intended settlement, relying on Sheppard Industries Ltd v Avanti Bicycle Company Ltd [2011] NZCA 346. The Authority took a narrow interpretation of Sheppard, distinguishing it on the basis that in Sheppard there was uncertainty about whether a settlement had even been reached — not the case here. The Authority held that public policy considerations in the employment jurisdiction, where tens of thousands of settlements are reached each year, required protection of without-prejudice communications, and ruled the email inadmissible. The Authority noted, however, that the outcome was the same regardless of this ruling.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [41]-[44]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, GFL may lodge a costs memorandum within 21 days, with O'Connell having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was dismissed; the RoS does not bar GFL from continuing its District Court proceedings against O'Connell for alleged breaches of directors' duties under the Companies Act 1993.

None ordered. The Authority determined it lacked jurisdiction over the directors' duties dispute and that the RoS did not cover GFL's District Court claim. Costs reserved pending agreement between the parties or further memoranda.

Jarden Management Limited, a New Zealand investment and advisory group, applied to the Employment Relations Authority for urgent removal of proceedings to the Employment Court under s 178(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, following the resignation of two senior executives — Daniel Reynolds and Silvana Schenone — who allegedly factory-reset their work phones, destroying data Jarden was entitled to inspect. The key legal questions concerned whether important questions of law arose (including fiduciary duties of senior employees, jurisdiction over unlawful means conspiracy, and proprietary rights in copied data), whether the matter was of sufficient public interest and urgency, and whether the Employment Court already had related proceedings before it. The Authority granted the removal application on all grounds under s 178(2)(a)–(d), finding in particular that it lacked jurisdiction to make deliver-up orders and that time was of the essence given the respondents' continuing good faith obligations as employees on garden leave.

Applicant: Jarden Management Limited (employer)
Respondent: Daniel Reynolds (First Respondent, employee/former Co-Chief Executive Officer) and Silvana Schenone (Second Respondent, employee/former Managing Director)

Applicant: Brian Dickey KC, Lucy Jenkins and Ashleigh Inder, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Philip Skelton KC, Stephen Rankin and Stephen Langton, counsel for the Respondent

Jarden Management Limited is a New Zealand investment and advisory group. Daniel Reynolds was employed from 1 January 2021, most recently as Co-Chief Executive Officer, and Silvana Schenone was employed as Co-Head of Investment Banking (NZ) and more recently as Managing Director. On or about 27 July 2026, both respondents resigned and were placed on garden leave — Reynolds until 26 January 2027 and Schenone until 26 October 2026. Jarden alleged that on or about 5 August 2026, both respondents factory-reset their work mobile phones, destroying data Jarden claimed it was entitled to inspect, and that clones of that data held by the respondents' solicitors had been withheld from Jarden. Jarden contended it needed access to the cloned data urgently to determine whether confidential information had been disseminated to competitors, whether client relationships had been improperly solicited, and whether the coordinated departure of 14 employees to a competitor had been planned using Jarden's devices. The respondents opposed removal, arguing the matter fell within the Authority's ordinary jurisdiction, no important questions of law arose, the cloned data was preserved under court undertakings, and removal was premature given the matter was fact-heavy and uninvestigated.

1. Whether an important question of law — the scope of duties owed by a senior employee holding both fidelity and fiduciary obligations — arises other than incidentally (s 178(2)(a)) — Status: Established (paras [14], [33]).

Jarden argued that the precise delineation between the higher duties owed by directors and those owed by employees raises an important question of law with broad New Zealand-wide implications. The respondents contended this question did not arise on the immediate deliver-up application and could be the subject of a later removal application if it genuinely arose in the substantive matter. The Authority was satisfied, without detailed analysis, that the grounds under s 178(2)(a) were established, accepting the submission that this was a non-incidental question of law warranting court-level determination.

2. Whether an important question of law — whether the Authority or the Employment Court has jurisdiction to determine an unlawful means conspiracy claim in the context of an employment relationship — arises other than incidentally (s 178(2)(a)) — Status: Established (paras [14], [22]–[23], [33]).

Jarden submitted that the respondents had alleged in their Statement in Reply that Jarden's employees engaged in unlawful means conspiracy, raising a jurisdictional question. The respondents countered that no conspiracy counterclaim had been formally raised and that in any event such a claim fell outside the Authority's jurisdiction, meaning s 178 removal could not assist. The Authority found the s 178(2)(a) grounds established overall, without separately resolving each sub-question, treating the jurisdictional complexity itself as indicative of an important question of law.

3. Whether an important question of law — proprietary and equitable rights in information copied and retained in the context of an employment relationship — arises other than incidentally (s 178(2)(a)) — Status: Established (paras [14], [20]–[21], [33]).

Jarden argued that, if its IT Policy did not conclusively resolve data ownership, broader questions of proprietary and equitable rights in copied information arose. The respondents submitted that this was a routine question of contractual interpretation (applying the IT Policy and individual employment agreements) that the Authority handles daily and not a matter requiring removal. The Authority was satisfied the grounds under s 178(2)(a) were collectively met, treating these questions as sufficiently important to warrant Employment Court determination.

4. Whether the Authority lacked jurisdiction to make deliver-up orders, providing a jurisdictional basis supporting removal — Status: Established (paras [13], [30]).

Jarden submitted that deliver-up orders are creatures of the High Court Rules and are an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction the Authority, as a creature of statute, does not possess, whereas the Employment Court may apply the High Court Rules via Regulation 6 of the Employment Court Regulations 2000. The Authority expressly acknowledged it does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for deliver-up orders. This jurisdictional gap was a significant factor supporting removal and was distinguished from the Authority's power under s 160(a) to call for evidence.

5. Whether the matter was of such nature and urgency that it was in the public interest to be removed immediately to the Employment Court (s 178(2)(b)) — Status: Established (paras [15]–[16], [31], [33]).

Jarden submitted that the matter raised public interest issues concerning the obligations of senior executives and directors during a coordinated move to a competitor, and that clarifying lawful versus unlawful competitive conduct would have broader relevance across New Zealand employment relationships. The respondents argued there was no irreversible prejudice because the cloned data was preserved under court undertakings. The Authority accepted that time was of the essence given the duration of the respondents' good faith obligations during garden leave and was satisfied that the public interest and urgency ground was established.

6. Whether the Employment Court already had before it proceedings between the same parties involving the same or similar issues (s 178(2)(c)) — Status: Established (paras [17]–[18], [26], [33]).

Jarden submitted the Employment Court had already heard argument and evidence about the background to the resignations and the cloning/wiping of devices in related proceedings (Jarden Management Limited v Daniel Reynolds and Silvana Schenone [2026] NZEmpC 226), and had indicated it expected the matter to be returned to it urgently. The respondents countered that the Employment Court's judgment of 24 August 2026 meant the Court no longer had the matter before it, and that the Court's observations did not bind the Authority. The Authority was satisfied the s 178(2)(c) ground was established, evidently treating the prior related proceedings and the Court's expressed expectation as sufficient.

7. Whether the Authority should exercise its residual discretion to remove the matter in all the circumstances (s 178(2)(d)) — Status: Established (paras [17]–[18], [27], [32]–[33]).

Jarden relied on s 178(2)(d) on the basis that the Court had already engaged with the background facts and anticipated receiving the matter back. The respondents argued removal was premature in an uninvestigated, fact-heavy dispute and that the Authority had adequate powers (including compliance orders) to deal with what was essentially a disclosure application. The Authority, having considered the respondents' arguments, found that in all the circumstances the Employment Court should determine the matter, exercising its discretion in favour of removal under s 178(2)(d).

8. Costs of the removal application — Status: Reserved (paras [34]–[35]).

The Authority noted that once a matter is removed, it ceases to be before the Authority, but that the Authority retains the ability to set its own costs. The Applicant was directed to file costs submissions within 14 days of the determination, with the Respondent having a further 14 days to respond. No costs order was made at this stage.

The removal application was upheld in full — the proceedings were ordered to be removed to the Employment Court on all grounds under s 178(2)(a)–(d).

No substantive remedy was ordered by the Authority (the determination concerns removal of proceedings only, not the underlying merits). Costs: Reserved — the Applicant is to file costs submissions within 14 days, with the Respondent having 14 days thereafter to respond.

BMD, a Development Manager employed by Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities (KO), was made redundant in January 2025 following a major government-driven restructuring that cut KO's housing delivery targets by two-thirds. The key legal questions were whether KO's decision to adopt HDS as its sole delivery model, and the redeployment process that followed, met the standard required of a fair and reasonable employer under section 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether KO breached its good faith obligations. BMD's unjustified dismissal claim was upheld, with awards for lost wages, hurt and humiliation compensation, and a penalty against KO.

Applicant: BMD (employee — Development Manager/acting Senior Development Manager, anonymised by non-publication order)
Respondent: Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities (employer, Crown entity)

Applicant: Kylie Dunn and Owen Posthuma, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Mark Donovan, counsel for the respondent

BMD was recruited from overseas by KO and commenced employment in early 2022 as a Development Manager; from August 2023 they were seconded (with extensions) to a Senior Development Manager role within the Construction & Innovation (C&I) delivery team. In 2024, the Government reduced KO's housing delivery targets by 66%, prompting KO to restructure, disestablish all C&I roles (a net reduction of 310 FTE positions), and adopt the Housing Delivery System (HDS) as its sole delivery methodology. KO issued a consultation document in September 2024, received feedback consistently requesting comparative performance data on HDS versus C&I (which KO declined to provide), and issued a decision document in November 2024 confirming the restructuring. BMD applied for five roles through the expressions of interest (EOI) redeployment process; KO's assessment of four of those applications credited BMD with only four months' experience as Senior Development Manager when the actual period was approximately 15 months, and KO gave notice of dismissal on 13 December 2024 before providing full scoring information or responding to BMD's enquiry about further roles. BMD raised a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage in November 2024 and a further grievance for unjustified dismissal in March 2025; they also made a protected disclosure on 1 December 2024 alleging conflicts of interest in the HDS procurement and the composition of the restructuring team (KO's investigation found no wrongdoing). BMD secured new fixed-term employment on 29 May 2025 at a lower salary.

1. Whether further non-publication orders should be made — Status: Established (paras [5]-[7]).

A permanent non-publication order was made under clause 10(1) of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 prohibiting publication of BMD's name and identifying details. The Authority was satisfied publication would risk the confidentiality of the protected disclosure, BMD's future employment prospects, and their health. The order did not extend to KO. Witnesses and individuals named in the protected disclosure were anonymised as an additional protective measure consistent with the presumption of innocence.

2. Whether BMD was unjustifiably dismissed — substantive justification for choosing HDS over C&I — Status: Established (paras [41]-[53]).

The applicable test under section 103A(2) of the Act requires the Authority to assess whether both the decision and the process by which it was reached were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done. The Authority applied Stenhouse v Towman Towing Group Ltd [2021] NZEmpC 988 and UXK v Talent Propeller Ltd [2022] NZEmpC 101, finding that while the Authority may receive evidence in documentary form (not just oral testimony), some evidence explaining the employer's decision must exist. Here, no member of the Future State Team (which made the challenged decisions) gave evidence; KO's sole witness had no direct involvement and their evidence was document-derived. KO's own KPMG data (January 2024 quarterly report) contradicted the stated efficiency rationale for HDS, and KO could not adequately justify withholding that data during consultation. The tier structure in the decision document pre-determined BMD's fate before consultation began rather than through it. KO therefore failed to discharge the onus under section 103A(2), making the dismissal substantively unjustified.

3. Whether BMD was unjustifiably dismissed — procedural justification (redeployment process) — Status: Established (paras [54]-[60]).

The Authority found the EOI redeployment process fell short of the fair and reasonable employer standard on multiple grounds: the cap on applications and any exemption mechanism were neither clearly communicated nor fairly administered; KO's response to BMD's enquiry about further roles arrived after notice of dismissal had already been given (a 12-day delay analogous to the breach found in New Zealand Steel Ltd v Haddad [2023] NZEmpC 57); a material error credited BMD with only four months' Senior Development Manager experience rather than approximately 15 months across four of five EOI applications; KO failed to genuinely and actively consider alternatives before dismissal; and preliminary scores were withheld until after notice of dismissal had been given, denying BMD a meaningful opportunity to respond. Each failure alone was sufficient to render the dismissal procedurally unjustified; together they clearly fell short of the required standard.

4. Whether BMD was unjustifiably disadvantaged in their employment — Status: Established but subsumed (para [62]).

The Authority found that the same conduct underpinning the unjustified dismissal finding (lack of disclosure, unfair EOI process, scoring error, and KO's lack of timeliness) also unjustifiably disadvantaged BMD before the dismissal took effect. However, no separate or additional finding beyond the dismissal arose, and no separate remedy was awarded, because the harm was inseverable from the unjustified dismissal.

5. Whether KO breached its obligations as a good employer — Status: Established but subsumed (para [63]).

KO's failures — not properly testing the HDS/C&I comparison, the unclear and unfairly administered EOI cap, and the material scoring error — also breached its statutory obligation to act as a good employer under section 118(1) of the Crown Entities Act 2004 (via section 9(1) of the Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities Act 2019). That obligation requires a fair, transparent, and properly consulted process with genuine impartiality in selection. This finding added no separate head of remedy, reinforcing the dismissal and disadvantage findings.

6. Whether KO breached its duty of good faith under section 4A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [79]-[82]).

Section 4A requires an employer to be active and constructive in maintaining the employment relationship, including by providing relevant information before decisions adversely affecting continued employment. The Authority found KO breached this duty through repeated failure to disclose comparative HDS/C&I performance data, unresponsive handling of BMD's redeployment cap enquiry, and late provision of scoring information — failures that were systemic, affecting a wider group of employees, and never remedied even after BMD raised a personal grievance in November 2024.

7. Whether a penalty should be imposed on KO under section 4A and section 134 of the Act, and whether any portion should be paid to BMD — Status: Partially established (paras [83]-[88]).

The Authority considered the factors under section 133A of the Act, including the deliberate, serious, sustained, and systemic nature of KO's breaches. A penalty of $5,000 was imposed. BMD's request that the penalty be paid to them under section 136(2) was declined: because BMD had already been compensated for their loss, payment to them was not appropriate. Guided by Gibson v Department of Justice (unreported, 1994) but not bound by it, the Authority ordered the penalty paid to the Crown, reasoning that the deterrent and normative function of a penalty does not depend on which account receives it.

8. Whether lost wages should be awarded, and the quantum — Status: Partially established (paras [67]-[70], [78]).

The Authority assessed the period for which KO should compensate BMD for lost wages. BMD sought six months; KO argued one to two weeks. The Authority found the appropriate period ran from dismissal on 13 January 2025 until BMD secured new employment on 29 May 2025 (approximately 19 weeks), calculated on the substantive base salary of $151,164 per annum (the higher duties allowance was due to expire on 30 January 2025), producing a gross figure of $55,225.00. After deducting redundancy compensation of $37,174.60, the net figure was $17,510.00. A 10% contribution reduction was applied (see issue 9), reducing the final award to $15,759.00. The Authority followed Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190 on mitigation obligations.

9. Whether BMD's contributory conduct should reduce any remedy under section 124 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [76]-[78]).

The Authority acknowledged BMD bore no responsibility for being made redundant, but found they bore some responsibility for failing to seek approval for more than five EOI applications and for not pursuing further roles after the EOI outcomes were known. A 10% reduction applied to the lost wages award only. No reduction was applied to the hurt and humiliation compensation, as that harm was substantially attributable to KO's conduct.

10. Whether compensation for hurt and humiliation should be awarded under section 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act, and the quantum — Status: Established (paras [72]-[75]).

BMD suffered genuine stress, anxiety, and a sense of powerlessness, corroborated by their partner's evidence of observable impact on BMD's behaviour and health. However, there was no medical or psychiatric evidence of profound, sustained, or severe harm justifying the $50,000 sought. Applying consistency with comparable determinations (Chesmar v Rooney Earthmoving Ltd [2026] NZERA 502), the Authority awarded $28,000, reflecting moderate but genuine harm — more than a nominal loss of dignity but short of the sustained and severe psychological injury warranting the highest awards.

11. Whether KiwiSaver contributions and annual leave entitlements should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [71], [78]).

KO was ordered to pay KiwiSaver contributions and annual leave entitlements calculated on the (10%-reduced) lost wages award at the rates that would have applied had employment continued to 29 May 2025.

12. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Reserved (paras [90]-[92]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. A timetable for memoranda was set, with the Authority noting it would apply its usual notional daily rate absent special circumstances.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, unjustified disadvantage established (subsumed), good faith and good employer obligations breached, and remedies awarded — with a 10% contribution reduction applied to lost wages only.

- Lost wages (reimbursement): $15,759.00 (gross 19-week period of $55,225.00, less redundancy compensation of $37,174.60 = $17,510.00, then reduced by 10% contribution = $15,759.00) — payable within 28 days.
- KiwiSaver contributions and annual leave entitlements: calculated on the $15,759.00 lost wages award at rates applicable had employment continued to 29 May 2025 — payable within 28 days.
- Compensation for hurt and humiliation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $28,000.00 (no contribution reduction applied) — payable within 28 days.
- Penalty: $5,000.00 payable to the Crown (not to BMD) under section 134 of the Act — payable within 28 days.
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
- Costs: Reserved.
- Non-publication: Permanent non-publication order of BMD's name and identifying details.

The determination text provided contains only document metadata and security/classification markings — no substantive content from the ERA determination is available for analysis. The actual body of the decision (parties, facts, legal issues, reasoning, and outcome) has not been disclosed in the document extract provided. As a result, no meaningful legal summary can be produced.

Applicant: Labour Inspector (enforcement authority)
Respondent: Arise Church and others (names of additional respondents not provided in document)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

The document provided contains no substantive factual content. Only metadata fields are visible, including a document date stamp (2026-09-21), classification markings ("Privileged", "IN-CONFIDENCE"), and internal document identifiers. No background, chronology, arguments, or procedural history can be extracted from the text supplied.

1. All legal issues — Status: Not reached (no paragraph references available).

No legal issues, tests, authorities, or reasoning can be identified because the body of the determination was not included in the document extract provided. The text contains only metadata and access-control markings and does not disclose any substantive content of the ERA determination.

No outcome can be stated — the determination body was not included in the document extract provided.

None ordered — no remedy information is available from the document extract provided. Note: this reflects the absence of document content, not a finding that no remedy was awarded.

Staged2Sell Limited (S2S), a residential house-staging business, brought claims against its former senior employee Ashleigh Turner and her husband's staging company, Stage It Collective Limited (SC), alleging multiple breaches of Ms Turner's individual employment agreement (IEA) and duties of good faith during her employment. The key legal questions concerned whether Ms Turner agreed to the second IEA, and whether she breached conflict-of-interest, non-solicitation, confidentiality, and fidelity obligations. The Authority found several breaches established and ordered penalties totalling $5,000 payable to S2S, while dismissing claims relating to confidentiality, property theft, financial compensation, and the penalty claim against SC.

Applicant: Staged2Sell Limited (employer)
Respondent 1: Ashleigh Turner (former employee)
Respondent 2: Stage It Collective Limited (competing staging business)

Applicant: Robert Thompson and Graeme Nelson, advocates for the Applicant
Respondents: Maryline Suchley, advocate for the Respondents

Ms Turner was employed by S2S, initially as a casual employee and then promoted to Home Staging Operations Assistant in January 2024, before a further promotion to Home Staging Customer Relations Manager under a second IEA signed around 27 May 2024. Her husband, Shayde Turner, had previously been employed by S2S but resigned on 28 March 2024. Shortly after Mr Turner's resignation, the Turners began establishing a competing house-staging business, advertised from late March 2024, with SC formally incorporated on 18 June 2024 — with Ms Turner as a minority shareholder. On 26 June 2024, S2S sent Ms Turner a letter alleging serious misconduct, proposing suspension, and attaching Companies Office records; Ms Turner agreed to the proposed suspension that afternoon and resigned that evening. S2S alleged that during her employment Ms Turner breached her IEA by failing to disclose her conflict of interest (shareholding in SC), soliciting S2S's clients for the competing business, misusing confidential information, removing S2S property, and working on the competing business during paid leave. Ms Turner and SC denied all substantive claims, arguing inter alia that she had not agreed to the second IEA, that Ms Christensen had given permission for the competing business, and that she had promptly taken mitigating steps after resignation. Mediation was unsuccessful and an investigation meeting was held on 25–26 March 2026.

1. Whether Ms Turner agreed to be bound by the second IEA (including its restrictive covenants) — Status: Established (paras [12]–[20]).

The Authority applied general contract principles of offer and acceptance. Although Ms Turner did not sign the main declaratory page of the second IEA, she initialled every page (including the declaratory page), signed the final appendix page, accepted a pay rise of $4.00/hour, and commenced performance in the more senior role described in that agreement. The Authority found these facts collectively demonstrated that S2S could reasonably rely on Ms Turner's conduct as acceptance, and that the second IEA superseded the first IEA in full.

2. Whether Ms Turner breached the conflict-of-interest clause (IEA clause 9.2) by failing to notify S2S of and obtain permission for her shareholding in SC — Status: Established (paras [21]–[26]).

Clause 9.2 of the IEA required prior permission before becoming a shareholder of any other organisation. The Authority accepted that Ms Turner became a shareholder of SC — a directly competing business — without notifying or seeking permission from S2S, and rejected the Turners' claim that Ms Christensen had given permission during a phone call on 8 June 2024. The breach was established, but no penalty was ordered because Ms Turner promptly resigned as shareholder after leaving S2S and SC ceased trading for three months post-employment (the restraint period), constituting meaningful mitigation.

3. Whether a penalty under s 134 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) should be ordered for the conflict-of-interest breach — Status: Dismissed (paras [25]–[26]).

Applying the s 133A factors (deterrence, extent of breach, harm, and vulnerability), the Authority declined to impose a penalty. The prompt post-resignation mitigation steps taken by Ms Turner — removing herself as shareholder and ceasing SC's trading for the full restraint period — satisfied the Authority that a penalty was not warranted for this particular breach.

4. Whether Ms Turner breached the non-solicitation clause (IEA clause 3.1) by soliciting S2S clients during her employment — Status: Established (paras [27]–[39]).

Clause 3.1 prohibited soliciting, diverting, or accepting business from S2S's clients or prospective clients during employment and for three months after. The Authority found it implausible that Ms Turner was unaware that her phone number had been placed on the competing business's website (set up two days after Mr Turner resigned), that advertising flyers were distributed to known S2S referral agents, and that at least two real estate agents who regularly referred vendors to S2S were solicited or diverted. The Authority found Ms Turner must have known who S2S's regular referral agents were given her senior role. A breach was established in respect of a small number of solicitations during employment.

5. Whether a penalty under s 134 ERA should be ordered for the non-solicitation breach — Status: Established (paras [34]–[39]).

The Authority found a penalty appropriate given the need for deterrence and the breach of trust, but moderated the amount. Mitigating factors included: the breach was not deliberate or ongoing; only a small number of agents were involved; no retainer contracts existed with those agents (a less secure proprietary interest); Ms Turner appeared to have been partly led by her husband; and she took genuine steps to make amends. A penalty of $4,000 payable to S2S was ordered.

6. Whether Ms Turner breached confidentiality provisions of her IEA (clauses 25.5–25.6) and whether a penalty should be ordered — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]–[42]).

S2S alleged Ms Turner accessed and downloaded confidential information (including pricing, client lists, and S2S's "unique" staging system) to give SC a commercial advantage. The Authority found Ms Christensen's description of the "unique system" insufficiently specific — it was a general efficiency system that others could discover, and pricing was accessible in the public domain. The allegation of unusual OneDrive access was speculative — the Authority declined to make a presumptive leap in the absence of specific evidence of what, if anything, was downloaded and used. The claim and any penalty were dismissed.

7. Whether Ms Turner breached her duty of fidelity by removing and retaining S2S property (staging furniture and accessories) — Status: Dismissed (paras [43]–[48]).

S2S alleged Ms Turner took items (worth a claimed $2,073.00 in total) from S2S during her employment and used them in the competing business. The Authority found Ms Christensen's identification of items from advertising photographs insufficient proof that Ms Turner had taken them without authority. As to items Ms Turner acknowledged taking (valued at ~$260.00 at purchase price, less in second-hand value), the Authority found it plausible she genuinely believed they were surplus items being given away, consistent with Ms Christensen's own uncertainty about stock levels. The claim was dismissed and no financial loss or penalty ordered.

8. Whether Ms Turner breached her duty of fidelity by working on the competing business during paid leave — Status: Established (paras [49]–[53]).

The Authority found that on a day of paid leave from S2S, Ms Turner helped Mr Turner complete a staging job for the competing business after he ran out of time. The Authority held this was a breach of the implied duty of fidelity — the obligation to act at all times in the employer's best interests — because she worked for a competing business during her employment without authorisation, regardless of the circumstances. Ms Turner had initialled the IEA pages covering competing employment obligations and was found to have been "willfully blind" to her duties.

9. Whether a penalty under s 134 ERA should be ordered for the fidelity breach during paid leave — Status: Established (paras [53]).

The Authority ordered a penalty at the lower end — $1,000 payable to S2S — applying similar reasoning to the non-solicitation penalty. Mitigation included that it appeared to be a one-off incident and Ms Turner was partly responding to her husband's situation rather than acting deliberately to undermine S2S.

10. Whether S2S was entitled to financial compensation for losses arising from the breaches — Status: Dismissed (paras [54]).

S2S claimed losses based on a spreadsheet totalling $15,870.00. The Authority found the spreadsheet linked staging revenue losses to properties where alleged stolen items appeared in photos, rather than to actual lost bookings from solicitation. Only three properties credibly related to solicitation losses, with gross revenues of $1,840, $1,840, and $1,610 respectively, but Ms Christensen could not quantify net profit lost. The Authority declined to make a financial compensation order in the absence of adequate evidence of actual profit loss.

11. Whether a penalty should be ordered against SC (second respondent) under s 134(2) ERA for aiding and abetting Ms Turner's IEA breaches — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]).

Section 134(2) allows a penalty against a third party who aids and abets a breach. The Authority found the connection to SC unclear: SC was only incorporated on 18 June 2024, most of the relevant conduct pre-dated incorporation, the window between incorporation and discovery was short, and SC ceased trading for three months post-employment as mitigation. The Authority could not establish a sufficient nexus to justify a penalty against SC.

12. Whether a penalty for breach of good faith (raised in post-hearing submissions) should be considered — Status: Not reached (para [6]).

S2S raised a penalty claim for breach of good faith only in written submissions after the investigation meeting. The Authority declined to consider this claim because it was not previously applied for and by the time of the submissions was outside the strict time frame for commencing penalty applications under s 135(5) ERA.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [58]–[60]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, S2S may file a costs memorandum within 28 days, with the respondents having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances require adjustment.

The claim was partially upheld: non-solicitation and fidelity breaches were established against Ms Turner with penalties ordered; the conflict-of-interest breach was established but attracted no penalty; and claims relating to confidentiality, theft of property, financial compensation, and penalties against SC were dismissed.

Penalties ordered under s 134 ERA, payable by Ashleigh Turner to Staged2Sell Limited within 28 days:
- $4,000.00 for breach of non-solicitation clause (IEA clause 3.1)
- $1,000.00 for breach of implied duty of fidelity (working for competing business during paid leave)
Total penalties: $5,000.00

Financial compensation: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not applicable / not sought.
Penalty against SC (second respondent): None ordered.
Costs: Reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from a prior substantive decision (GND v YKB [2026] NZERA 437) in which the employee GND's claims of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal were dismissed and GND was found to owe $4,008.58 in overpaid wages to the employer YKB. The key questions here are the quantum of costs payable by GND to YKB and enforcement of the overpayment repayment order. The Authority awarded costs of $5,500 (including a modest uplift for GND's rejection of a Calderbank offer) and ordered repayment of the $4,008.58 overpayment.

Applicant: GND (employee)
Respondent: YKB (employer)

Applicant: Nita Sadie, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: David France, counsel for the Respondent

In the substantive determination dated 2 July 2026, Member Fuiava dismissed GND's claims of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal and found that GND had been inadvertently overpaid $4,008.58 in salary and wages. No formal orders were made regarding the overpayment repayment in the original determination, as the Authority hoped the parties could resolve it themselves. The parties were unable to agree on either costs or repayment of the overpayment, necessitating this costs determination. Six days before the investigation meeting (held 21 May 2026), YKB made a Calderbank offer to forgo recovery of the overpayment if GND withdrew his proceedings; GND declined this offer on 18 May 2026. GND subsequently challenged the substantive determination to the Employment Court, and his advocate submitted that costs should be stayed pending that challenge and that the respondent's conduct was not wholly vindicated.

1. Whether costs should be stayed pending GND's challenge to the Employment Court — Status: Dismissed (paras [3], [6]).

The Authority noted that a challenge to the Employment Court does not operate as a stay on costs. The applicant's advocate sought a stay on this basis, but the Authority declined, finding no basis to defer the costs determination while the challenge is on foot.

2. Whether the non-publication order granted in favour of both parties should be treated as a factor reducing costs against GND — Status: Dismissed (para [6]).

The applicant submitted that the determination did not wholly vindicate the respondent's conduct (pointing in part to the non-publication order). The Authority found that the non-publication order was a neutral factor in assessing costs and that YKB had, by any measure, successfully defended itself against GND's personal grievances.

3. Whether costs should follow the event in favour of YKB — Status: Established (paras [9]–[10]).

Under sch 2 cl 15 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and the principles in PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, costs generally follow the event and awards are to be modest. The Authority started from the notional daily tariff of $4,500 for a one-day investigation meeting (which ran 10 am to 3 pm). Having successfully defended against all of GND's claims, YKB was found entitled to costs.

4. Whether an uplift to costs was warranted due to GND's rejection of YKB's Calderbank offer — Status: Partially established (paras [4]–[5], [10]).

The respondent sought an uplift from $4,500 to $8,000 on the basis that GND unreasonably rejected a valid Calderbank offer made six days before the investigation meeting, under which YKB offered to forgo recovery of the $4,008.58 overpayment in exchange for withdrawal of proceedings. The Authority accepted that the offer was valid, that GND had sufficient time to consider it, and that he would have been better off accepting it, warranting an uplift. However, the requested uplift of $3,500 (77.78%) was found to be punitive in nature and inconsistent with the principle of modest costs awards; the Authority instead allowed an uplift of $1,000, bringing total costs to $5,500.

5. Whether GND should be ordered to repay the overpayment of $4,008.58 — Status: Established (para [11]).

The overpayment had been identified in the substantive determination at para [63] and the Authority had previously hoped the parties would resolve it voluntarily. As no repayment had been made, the Authority found this unacceptable and declined to defer the matter as requested by GND's advocate. The Authority confirmed the repayment order to ensure no residual matters remained in the Authority while the challenge proceeds to the Employment Court.

The claim for a costs stay was dismissed; costs were awarded in favour of YKB in the amount of $5,500 (base tariff of $4,500 plus a $1,000 Calderbank uplift), and GND was also ordered to repay the $4,008.58 wage overpayment, both payable by 2 November 2026.

Costs: $5,500 payable by GND to YKB (contribution towards actual and reasonable costs), due no later than 2 November 2026.
Overpayment repayment: $4,008.58 payable by GND to YKB, due no later than 2 November 2026.
No other remedies ordered.

The determination text provided contains no substantive content — it appears to be a document metadata or classification header only, with no facts, legal issues, findings, or orders set out in the body. As a result, no meaningful legal summary can be produced from the material supplied.

Applicant: PNB Limited (employer)
Respondent: WJN and Anor (identities not determinable from document)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

The document provided does not contain any substantive text from the determination. The body of the determination appears not to have been included in the submission — only internal metadata fields (timestamps, classification labels, document identifiers, and version numbers) are present. No facts, background, chronology, arguments, or findings can be extracted.

1. All legal issues — Status: Not reached (no paragraph references available).

No substantive determination text was provided. The document supplied consists entirely of metadata and classification artifacts (e.g., "UNCLASSIFIED", "Privileged", UUID strings, and version numbers). It is not possible to identify, describe, or assess any legal issue from the material available. No test, authority, or reasoning can be reported.

No outcome can be determined — the substantive content of the determination was not included in the document provided.

None ordered — the determination text was not available for review. No remedies, compensation amounts, penalties, or other orders can be reported.

Honglu Shao, a wok chef employed by Imperial Palace Restaurant & Event Centre (IPREC), brings claims of unjustified dismissal by redundancy, unjustified disadvantage, holiday pay arrears, and statutory penalties against IPREC, its related entity Imperial Palace Limited (IPL), and directors Kam-Tim Tong and Sik Fun Wong. The key legal questions concern whether the redundancy was substantively and procedurally justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, whether minimum employment standards were breached, and whether the directors can be held personally liable. The Authority upheld all claims, ordering IPREC to pay holiday pay, lost remuneration, compensation for humiliation, a penalty, costs, and the filing fee, with the directors jointly and severally liable for minimum standards payments if IPREC cannot pay.

Applicant: Honglu Shao (employee — wok chef)
Respondent: Imperial Palace Restaurant & Event Centre (First Respondent/employer); Imperial Palace Limited (Second Respondent); Kam-Tim Tong (Third Respondent/director); Sik Fun Wong (Fourth Respondent/director)

Applicant: Mins Chang, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

Honglu Shao, a wok chef, commenced employment at IPREC on 12 July 2021, working approximately 48 hours per week at $37.41 per hour (later increased to an effective rate of $38.46 per hour following a $50 per week cash pay rise in May 2023). On 30 March 2023, Mr Shao was told that Kam-Tim Tong would take over management of the business, with all existing terms and conditions to continue. From January 2025, wages were delayed, causing financial anxiety for Mr Shao and his colleagues. On 24 January 2025, Mr Tong presented Mr Shao with a redundancy notice in English, which Mr Shao — who does not read English — was told to sign to access government benefits; he only discovered the true nature of the letter when his wife had it translated after the meeting. Mr Shao's last working day was 1 February 2025, and he secured alternative employment on 26 February 2025. The respondents did not file a Statement in Reply, lodge witness statements, or attend the investigation meeting, despite Mr Tong having agreed to the hearing date at a case management conference.

1. Whether Mr Shao was unjustifiably dismissed by IPREC — Status: Established (paras [23]–[32]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test of justification, requiring the employer's actions to be what a fair and reasonable employer could have done, assessed on an objective basis encompassing both substantive and procedural fairness. Substantively, no financial information was provided to justify the redundancy decision, and the mere fact that Mr Shao was aware of business decline was insufficient. Procedurally, there was no prior consultation with Mr Shao before the 24 January 2025 meeting, in breach of the good faith duty under s 4 of the Act, as affirmed in Simpsons Farms Limited v Aberhart [2006] ERNZ 825. The Authority concluded that IPREC failed to follow a fair and proper process and that the dismissal was unjustified.

2. Whether Mr Shao was unjustifiably disadvantaged by IPREC — Status: Established (paras [33]–[36]).

Mr Shao claimed disadvantage arising from IPREC's failure to provide him with a copy of his signed employment agreement and its failure to pay outstanding holiday entitlement on termination. The Authority accepted these claims. A further claim relating to PAYE on cash payments was noted but referred to Inland Revenue as outside the Authority's scope. The Authority found that IPREC's failures in relation to the employment agreement and holiday pay constituted unjustified disadvantage.

3. Whether Mr Shao is owed holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [38]–[39]).

Mr Shao's accrued annual leave balance was 315.36 hours per his last payslip; the Authority ordered payment calculated on 620.05 total hours at $38.46 per hour pursuant to the Holidays Act 2003, s 81. The amount ordered was $23,847.12 gross. No contrary evidence was provided by the respondents.

4. Whether Mr Shao is entitled to lost remuneration — Status: Established (paras [40]–[42]).

Mr Shao was unemployed for three weeks between his last working day (1 February 2025) and securing alternative employment (26 February 2025). The Authority calculated lost remuneration at $38.46 per hour × 48 hours × 3 weeks = $5,538.24 gross, ordered pursuant to s 128(2) of the Act.

5. Whether Mr Shao is entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings — Status: Established (paras [43]–[44]).

Mr Shao gave evidence of significant anxiety arising from the abrupt termination, including concerns about his ability to provide for his family. The Authority ordered $12,000.00 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act, reflecting the distress caused by the manner of dismissal.

6. Whether Mr Shao's own conduct contributed to his dismissal or disadvantage, warranting reduction in remedies under s 124 — Status: Dismissed (paras [45]–[46]).

The Authority was required under s 124 of the Act to consider any contributory conduct by the employee. The Authority found no contributing conduct by Mr Shao and made no reduction to the remedies awarded.

7. Whether penalties should be awarded against IPREC for breaches of minimum employment standards — Status: Established (paras [47]–[67]).

The Authority found three statutory breaches: (a) s 81 of the Holidays Act 2003 (failure to pay annual leave entitlements on termination); (b) s 130 of the Act (failure to provide wages and time records); and (c) s 4 of the Act (failure to act in good faith). Applying the framework in Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited and Warrington Discount Tobacco Limited [2016] NZEmpC 143 and s 133A of the Act, the Authority consolidated the s 130 and Holidays Act breaches into one, reducing potential exposure to two breaches (maximum $40,000). After considering IPREC's financial difficulties (reducing from $10,000 to the final figure) and proportionality with comparable cases, a penalty of $3,000.00 was imposed.

8. Whether any part of the penalty should be paid to Mr Shao — Status: Established (paras [68]–[69]).

The Authority noted that while penalties are punitive rather than compensatory, Mr Shao had suffered financial difficulty from the deprivation of monies owed. It ordered that 20% of the $3,000.00 penalty ($600.00) be paid to Mr Shao, with the balance paid into a Crown Bank Account for remittance.

9. Whether Mr Tong and Mr Wong are personally liable for the minimum standards payments if IPREC cannot pay — Status: Established (paras [70]–[75]).

The Authority applied s 142W of the Act, which deems a person "involved in a breach" if they were knowingly concerned in it. The Authority found both Mr Tong (sole director and shareholder) and Mr Wong (director) were directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in the breaches of minimum employment standards. Under s 142Y(2)(b), they are jointly and severally liable with IPREC to pay the minimum standards remedies to the extent IPREC is unable to pay.

10. Whether IPREC is liable for the filing fee — Status: Established (para [76]).

The Authority ordered IPREC to reimburse Mr Shao the filing fee of $71.56.

11. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [77]–[78]).

The Authority assessed the matter as a half-day investigation and ordered IPREC to pay $2,250.00 as a contribution to Mr Shao's costs.

The claims were upheld in full — unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, holiday pay, lost remuneration, compensation, and penalties were all established; no contributory reduction was applied.

- Holiday pay: $23,847.12 gross (pursuant to s 81, Holidays Act 2003)
- Lost remuneration: $5,538.24 gross (3 weeks; pursuant to s 128(2) of the Act)
- Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $12,000.00 (pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act)
- Penalty: $3,000.00 payable by IPREC to the Authority for transfer to a Crown Bank Account; 20% ($600.00) to be remitted to Mr Shao
- Filing fee reimbursement: $71.56
- Costs: $2,250.00 (contribution to costs)
- Personal liability of directors: Mr Tong and Mr Wong are jointly and severally liable with IPREC for minimum standards payments if IPREC fails or is unable to pay
- All payments to be made within 28 days of the determination date

[COSTS ONLY]

Anna Murgatroyd (employee) brought personal grievance claims against Xero (NZ) Limited (employer) following her dismissal on grounds of redundancy. By an earlier determination dated 18 May 2026, the Authority found her dismissal unjustified on procedural and good faith grounds, though several other claims were unsuccessful. This determination concerns costs only, and following consideration of Calderbank offers and the applicant's mixed success, the Authority ordered Xero to pay Ms Murgatroyd $4,500 in costs.

Applicant: Anna Murgatroyd (employee)
Respondent: Xero (NZ) Limited (employer)

Applicant: Michelle Clark, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Emma Butcher, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Murgatroyd's employment with Xero was terminated on grounds of redundancy. By determination dated 18 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 305), the Authority found the dismissal unjustified because Xero had not complied with its good faith obligations regarding redeployment and the restructure process was not procedurally fair. However, Ms Murgatroyd's claims that her dismissal was predetermined, that she suffered an unjustified disadvantage, and that her redundancy was substantively unjustified were all unsuccessful. The investigation meeting was held over two days (3 and 17 December 2025). Ms Murgatroyd received two weeks' lost wages and $16,000 in hurt and humiliation compensation. Xero made two Calderbank settlement offers — one on 22 August 2025 ($20,000 compensation plus $4,500 costs contribution) and one on 11 December 2025 ($25,000 compensation, $11,000 for lost shares, and $8,000 plus GST towards costs) — both of which Ms Murgatroyd declined. The parties could not agree on costs, requiring this determination.

1. Whether Ms Murgatroyd, as the successful party, is entitled to a costs award — Status: Established (paras [2], [16]).

The Authority confirmed the general principle that costs follow the event, drawing on PBO v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808. Although Ms Murgatroyd did not succeed on all claims, mixed success is still success, and she was the successful party overall (citing Coomer v JA McCallum and Son Limited [2017] ERNZ 885 at [37]). The Authority confirmed she was entitled to a costs award as the successful party.

2. What starting point for the costs tariff should apply — Status: Established (paras [4]-[5], [14]-[15]).

The Authority applies a notional daily tariff under the ERA Schedule 2, clause 15 and the Authority's Practice Note and Practice Direction. The preliminary indication in the main determination was 1.25 of the first-day tariff ($4,500). Upon closer review, noting the first day began at 9 am (due to an AVL witness in the UK) and ended at 3:15 pm, and the second day ran 10 am to 3 pm, the Authority revised the starting point upward to 1.5 of the first-day notional tariff, equating to $6,750.

3. Whether the two Calderbank offers made by Xero warranted a downward adjustment in costs — Status: Established (paras [17]-[19]).

The Authority applied the principle from PBO v Da Cruz that without prejudice settlement offers can be taken into account in costs determinations. The first offer ($20,000 + $4,500 costs) was described as a fine call as to whether Ms Murgatroyd would have been better off accepting it. The second offer ($25,000 compensation, $11,000 for shares, $8,000 + GST costs) was found to be clearly a valid Calderbank offer — generous, unambiguous, and giving ample time for consideration — and one Ms Murgatroyd would have been significantly better off accepting. The Authority reduced the costs award to the base notional tariff of $4,500, finding that the second day of the investigation would not have been required had the second offer been accepted.

4. Whether an uplift for GST should be awarded based on Xero's litigation conduct — Status: Dismissed (para [20]).

The applicant sought a GST uplift on the basis that Xero's conduct (regarding disclosure, case management, witness management, and the Miro board evidence) had unnecessarily increased costs. The Authority found nothing out of the ordinary in Xero's approach to justify an uplift. Furthermore, the Authority confirmed that the daily tariff is now treated as an all-inclusive, GST-neutral figure, citing QN v FT Ltd [2025] NZERA 253 and Jin v Precision NZ Ltd & Zhang [2026] NZEmpC 234 at [41]. The GST uplift request was declined.

The costs application was partially upheld: Ms Murgatroyd is entitled to costs, but the award was reduced from the revised starting point of $6,750 to $4,500 due to the second Calderbank offer, with no GST uplift awarded.

Costs: $4,500 ordered, payable by Xero (NZ) Limited to Anna Murgatroyd no later than Wednesday 28 October 2026.
No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were dealt with in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 305).

The determination text provided is not readable — it contains only document metadata, classification markers, and identity placeholders, with no substantive content about the parties, facts, legal issues, or outcome. As a result, no meaningful legal summary can be produced from the material supplied.

Applicant: McIsaac (role not determinable from provided text)
Respondent: Manor Property Services Limited (employer)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

The determination text as provided contains no substantive facts. The document appears to be either a placeholder, a corrupted or failed PDF extraction, or a restricted/privileged file that has not been properly disclosed. No chronology, employment relationship details, grievance history, or party arguments can be identified from the text supplied.

1. All legal issues — Status: Not determinable (no paragraph references available).

No substantive content was extracted from the determination. The document body contains only metadata fields (timestamps, privilege markers, GUIDs, and "Identity" placeholders). It is not possible to identify, state, or resolve any legal issue from the material provided. No test, authority, evidence, or reasoning is available.

No outcome can be determined from the text provided.

None determinable from the text provided.