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Alan Hung Lun Au, a bus driver employed by Tranzit Coachlines (Central) Limited, raised personal grievances relating to his suspension, a warning, and changes to his terms and conditions of employment following a passenger complaint in July 2025. The sole preliminary issue was whether Mr Au had raised those personal grievances within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found that all three grievances were raised in time, allowing the substantive proceeding to proceed.

Applicant: Alan Hung Lun Au (employee, bus driver)
Respondent: Tranzit Coachlines (Central) Limited (employer)

Applicant: Tyler Hobbs and Fred Hills, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Michael Gould, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Au has been employed by Tranzit as a bus driver based in Te Awamutu. In July 2025, Tranzit received a passenger complaint about Mr Au and suspended him while it investigated. Following the investigation, Tranzit decided Mr Au would not return to the Te Awamutu service, issued him a warning on 14 August 2025, and proposed changes to his working arrangements including a transfer to Cambridge on a 60-hour fortnight. Mr Au, through himself, his sister-in-law (Dona Hobbs), his wife (Tracy Au), and an employment representative, communicated objections to the suspension at a meeting on 4 July 2025, during a telephone call on 4 August 2025, and at a meeting on 6 August 2025; objections to the warning via his representative's email of 15 August 2025; and objections to the changed terms via correspondence and meetings in early-to-mid August 2025. Tranzit denied any personal grievance had been raised in time, arguing that the communications used the language of an "employment relationship problem" rather than a personal grievance, and that Mr Au's dissatisfaction was directed primarily at the Waikato Regional Council rather than Tranzit. A case management conference on 17 March 2026 directed that the 90-day notification issue be dealt with as a preliminary matter, and the investigation proceeded on the papers.

1. Whether Mr Au raised a personal grievance about his suspension within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [32]-[37]).

Section 114(1) requires a personal grievance to be raised within 90 days of the act complained of or when it came to the employee's notice. Under section 114(2), a grievance is raised as soon as the employee has made, or taken reasonable steps to make, the employer aware that the employee alleges a personal grievance and wants it addressed. The Authority applied the principles from Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132 — that the process is informal and accessible, grievances may be raised orally or in writing, no formula of words is required, and a series of communications may be considered together. At the 4 July 2025 meeting, Mr Au's sister-in-law challenged the suspension process as unfair and unjust and sought correction; the August communications reinforced that Mr Au objected to his continued removal from work and wanted to return to Te Awamutu. Even accepting that the WRC's position formed part of the background, Mr Au's complaints were sufficiently directed at Tranzit's employment decisions to communicate a personal grievance. The Authority found the grievance about suspension was raised in time.

2. Whether Mr Au raised a personal grievance about the warning within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [38]-[42]).

The warning was issued on 14 August 2025, so any grievance about it could only crystallise from that date. Applying the same section 114(2) test and the Zivaljevic principles, the Authority focused on the representative's email of 15 August 2025, which identified the warning, stated Mr Au considered it unjustified (as he had not refused to lower the ramp and had not breached any known policy), identified that an employment relationship problem existed, and indicated Mr Au wished to attend mediation. The Authority rejected Tranzit's argument that a represented employee's failure to use the words "personal grievance" should be treated as significant — the Act imposes no higher formal threshold because an employee has representation; the question remains one of substance. The Authority found the grievance about the warning was raised in time.

3. Whether Mr Au raised a personal grievance about changes to his terms and conditions of employment within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [43]-[45]).

Again applying section 114(2) and the Zivaljevic principles, the Authority considered the communications of 7 August 2025, 12 August 2025, and 15 August 2025 together. Those communications identified the proposed transfer to Cambridge and the 60-hour fortnight as disadvantageous (in terms of additional travel, financial cost, and loss of time), sought specific remedies (reimbursement, meal allowance, guaranteed hours, and recognition of existing contractual terms), and indicated Mr Au wanted Tranzit to address the matter. The Authority rejected Tranzit's argument that framing the matter as an "employment relationship problem" rather than a "personal grievance" was determinative. The grievance about changed terms and conditions was found to be raised in time.

4. Whether Tranzit's agreement to attend mediation was itself sufficient to establish that a personal grievance had been raised — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[47]).

The Authority accepted Tranzit's submission that agreement to mediate does not, by itself, prove a personal grievance was raised, because mediation can address employment relationship problems more broadly. However, the agreement to mediate was treated as relevant context confirming that Tranzit was aware the matters at issue were concrete disputes about employment decisions that Mr Au said had disadvantaged him and which he wanted resolved.

5. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [50]).

Costs were reserved to be determined following the substantive proceeding. No costs award was made at this stage.

6. Merits of the substantive personal grievance claims (unjustified disadvantage, breach of employment agreement, breach of good faith, breach of implied duty of trust and confidence) — Status: Not reached (paras [5], [49]).

This determination was explicitly a preliminary determination only. The Authority expressly stated that it does not deal with the substance of any grievances or Mr Au's other claims, and that nothing in the determination should be construed as forming views on the merits. Those matters are to be determined in the substantive proceeding.

The preliminary issue was resolved entirely in Mr Au's favour: all three personal grievances (suspension, warning, and changes to terms and conditions) were found to have been raised within the 90-day statutory period, and the matter will proceed to a substantive investigation.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination only. The substantive grievances and all remedies will be determined in the subsequent substantive proceeding. Costs are reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Lyon Kawhaaru (employee) successfully pursued an unjustified dismissal claim against The Deck Tahuna Limited (employer) in an earlier determination dated 8 May 2026. The parties were unable to agree on costs, leading to this costs-only determination. The Authority applied the standard daily tariff and ordered the respondent to pay $4,500 plus the filing fee.

Applicant: Lyon Kawhaaru (employee)
Respondent: The Deck Tahuna Limited (employer)

Applicant: Miranda Anderson, advocate
Respondent: Debbie Wilkes

Mr Kawhaaru was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed by The Deck Tahuna Limited in a substantive determination dated 8 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 288). Following that determination, the Authority encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves, referencing its usual daily tariff approach. The parties were unable to reach agreement on costs, and Mr Kawhaaru's representative filed submissions seeking the full daily tariff of $4,500 plus the $71.55 filing fee, with no uplift sought. The respondent opposed any costs award. The Authority then determined costs on the basis of written submissions received on 2 June 2026 (applicant) and 23 June 2026 (respondent).

1. Whether costs should be awarded to the successful applicant, and if so, at what level — Status: Established (paras [6]-[11]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, guided by its Practice Direction and principles set out in JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175. The key principles are that costs are discretionary, generally follow the event, and are assessed by reference to the notional daily tariff, which may be adjusted upward or downward based on factors such as complexity, unnecessary or unreasonable conduct, and the overarching objective of modest, access-to-justice-focused awards. The investigation meeting was held in Nelson and occupied a full day, making the starting-point tariff $4,500; the Authority found no reason to adjust that figure upward or downward. Accordingly, the respondent was ordered to pay $4,500 as a contribution toward the applicant's costs, together with reimbursement of the $71.55 filing fee, within 28 days.

The costs claim was upheld in full at the standard daily tariff rate.

Costs: $4,500 (full daily tariff, no uplift or reduction applied), payable within 28 days of the date of this determination; Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55. No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were dealt with in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 288).

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from an unsuccessful employment grievance brought by Luboslava Kecer against her former employer Spectrum Care Limited. Ms Kecer's substantive claims — relating to dismissal, unjustifiable disadvantage, breach of employment agreement, and good faith breaches — were all dismissed. The key questions were whether costs should be stayed pending a challenge to the Employment Court, and what level of costs contribution Spectrum should receive. Spectrum was awarded $5,500 in costs.

Applicant: Luboslava Kecer (employee)
Respondent: Spectrum Care Limited (employer)

Applicant: Erika Whittome and Liz Lambert, advocates
Respondent: Saadi Radcliffe and Paul McBride, counsel

Ms Kecer was employed by Spectrum Care Limited as a Community Support Worker – Residential for intellectually disabled people from September 2018 until 23 December 2021, when her employment ended because she declined mandatory COVID-19 vaccination, had no valid exemption, and no redeployment opportunities were available. She brought multiple substantive claims against Spectrum, including unjustifiable dismissal, unjustifiable disadvantage, breach of employment agreement clauses, unilateral variation of terms, failure to provide a safe workplace, and breach of good faith. All substantive claims were unsuccessful. Several claims were withdrawn or abandoned by Ms Kecer on 12 November 2025, including common law damages claims, foreseeable damages, and claims under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015. Following the unsuccessful substantive determination, Spectrum sought a costs award of $10,500; Ms Kecer opposed this and sought a stay of costs pending her challenge to the Employment Court.

1. Whether costs should be stayed pending the Employment Court challenge — Status: Dismissed (paras [14]-[16]).

The Authority applied the general principle that an Employment Court challenge does not operate as a stay of Authority proceedings or orders. No other ground for a stay was advanced by Ms Kecer. The Authority held that the principle "costs follow the event" applies and that the investigation process needed to be finally concluded, given the claims dated back to December 2021. Ms Kecer's argument that she should not be "further financially penalised for exercising her right to seek justice" was not accepted as a basis for a stay. The stay application was dismissed.

2. What is the appropriate starting point (notional daily tariff) for costs — Status: Established at $4,500 (paras [17]-[19]).

The Authority applied its standard tariff-based approach under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, referencing the principles in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co. Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. A one-day in-person investigation meeting was held in January 2026, setting the notional starting point at $4,500. Spectrum's argument that the tariff should be increased to $6,750 because post-hearing written submissions were lodged was rejected, as the tariff is designed to include costs associated with submissions whether oral or written. Neither party submitted the tariff should be decreased, and no reason was identified to do so.

3. Whether the notional starting tariff should be increased due to the conduct of Ms Kecer's case — Status: Established (paras [20]-[22]).

The Authority considered whether Ms Kecer's conduct had unreasonably increased Spectrum's actual legal costs, consistent with the principles in PBO v Da Cruz. Six factors were identified as warranting an upward adjustment: (a) claims were unclear from the outset and required significant Authority resources to clarify; (b) disputed jurisdiction issues were flagged at the outset; (c) Ms Kecer's position on what personal grievance was raised and when materially changed across multiple stages of proceedings; (d) new claims were raised and previously withdrawn claims were reactivated in post-hearing submissions; (e) problems with the applicant's advocate regarding production of an Agreed Statement of Facts and chronology; and (f) Ms Kecer pursued novel claims with no prospect of success. The Authority increased the notional tariff by $1,000, resulting in a costs award of $5,500.

The claim for a stay of costs was dismissed and Spectrum's costs application was partially upheld, with Ms Kecer ordered to pay $5,500 (below the $10,500 sought).

Costs: $5,500.00 ordered against the applicant (Ms Kecer) in favour of Spectrum Care Limited, payable within 28 days of the date of determination (1 July 2026). No other remedy ordered.

Brendan David Powell-Sykes, a former CCTV Off-Sider employed by Hydrotech Limited trading as TDG Environmental, brought a personal grievance claim for unjustified disadvantage arising from a workplace injury. The central preliminary question was whether Mr Powell-Sykes had raised a personal grievance against TDG within the statutory 90-day notification period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found that his formal written complaint letter of 30 October 2023 did constitute the raising of a personal grievance within the required period, and the matter will proceed to a full investigation.

Applicant: Brendan David Powell-Sykes (employee, former CCTV Off-Sider)
Respondent: Hydrotech Limited t/a TDG Environmental (employer)

Applicant: Paul Matthews, advocate
Respondent: Rachel Skavantzos

Mr Powell-Sykes commenced employment with TDG Environmental on 26 June 2023 as a CCTV Off-Sider under an Individual Employment Agreement. On 2 October 2023, he suffered injuries to both forearms while performing cesspit truck offsider work — a role he says was outside the scope of his employment contract. He alleges that after the injury his manager reprimanded him for late filing of an incident report, failed to provide him with duty of care, did not take him to a work-appointed doctor, and placed him under unreasonable pressure to return to work before he was medically fit. On 30 October 2023, Mr Powell-Sykes wrote a formal written complaint to his branch manager raising concerns of breach of contract, lack of duty of care, causing unnecessary distress, and lack of communication. The preliminary issue before the Authority was whether that letter constituted the raising of a personal grievance within the 90-day notification period. TDG acknowledged receipt of the letter and accepted that no particular formula of words is required to raise a personal grievance, but the matter was put before the Authority for determination on the papers following a case management teleconference on 28 January 2026.

1. Whether Mr Powell-Sykes raised a personal grievance against TDG within the 90-day notification period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [7]–[17]).

Section 114 of the Act requires an employee to raise a personal grievance within 90 days from the date the action alleged to amount to the grievance occurred, or from when it came to the employee's notice, whichever is later. The Authority applied the principles from Creedy v Commissioner of Police [2006] ERNZ 517 and Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132, which hold that no particular formula of words is required, the grievance may be raised orally or in writing, and the key question is whether the employer was made sufficiently aware of the nature of the complaint to be able to respond to it on its merits. Objectively considered, Mr Powell-Sykes's letter of 30 October 2023 — sent just 28 days after the incident on 2 October 2023 — conveyed the substance of a complaint of unjustified disadvantage, raising issues of breach of contract, failure of duty of care, causing distress, and inadequate communication following his workplace injury. The Authority found that the letter constituted the raising of a personal grievance within the 90-day period, and also noted that the claim was filed in the Authority on 13 April 2025, well within the three-year limitation period under s 114(6).

2. Whether the substance of Mr Powell-Sykes's complaint amounts to an established personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage — Status: Not reached (para [16]).

The Authority noted that the complaint is in the nature of an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance but expressly reserved this question for the substantive investigation, stating that "whether he is correct about this remains to be seen" and that TDG will have the opportunity to defend itself. This issue was not determined at the preliminary stage.

3. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [19]).

The Authority reserved costs without making any finding or order at this stage, leaving costs to be addressed following the substantive investigation.

The preliminary claim was upheld: Mr Powell-Sykes raised a personal grievance within the 90-day statutory notification period, and the matter will proceed to a full investigation on the merits.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination only. Costs are reserved. The parties may contact the Authority Officer if they wish to be directed to mediation; otherwise the investigation will continue.

BDN applied under s 71ZB of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 (PLEPA) to review a decision by IRD (acting on behalf of MBIE) refusing to allow a second transfer of parental leave payments (PLP) back to her after her husband returned to work. The central legal question was whether IRD correctly applied PLEPA's restriction limiting PLP to one transfer between partners, and whether IRD's failure to advise BDN of that limitation provided grounds to reverse the decision. The application was dismissed and IRD's decision was confirmed.

Applicant: BDN (employee/PLP recipient — anonymised)
Respondent: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (government agency administering PLP through IRD delegates)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Jessica Ellison, counsel for the Respondent

BDN was approved for parental leave payments commencing 22 September 2025, and IRD simultaneously approved a transfer of PLP to her husband. On 20 October 2025 BDN returned to work and PLP was transferred to her husband under s 71E PLEPA. On 29 October 2025 BDN's husband accepted a new job commencing 2 February 2026, and on 30 January 2026 BDN requested a second transfer of PLP back to herself. IRD refused on 30 January 2026, advising that only one transfer of PLP is permitted under PLEPA. On 2 February 2026 BDN's husband returned to work and PLP ceased, leaving seven weeks of entitlement unused. BDN argued that IRD failed to inform her at the time of the first transfer — and again when her husband notified IRD of his intention to return to work — that only one transfer was permitted, and that this lack of advice caused her and her husband to make decisions that were detrimental to them. MBIE contended that IRD's decision correctly reflected the express statutory provisions and that ignorance of the limitation was not a basis for reversal.

1. Whether IRD correctly declined BDN's application for a second transfer of PLP — Status: Established (paras [16]-[20]).

Section 71J PLEPA provides that PLP is payable for one continuous period not exceeding 26 weeks, or where a transfer has been made under s 71E, for one continuous period per person, provided the two periods together do not exceed 26 weeks. The Authority interpreted this as permitting only one transfer of PLP across the duration of the entitlement. The Authority cited Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment v Duan [2023] NZEmpC 332 in support of BDN's initial eligibility and confirmed the statutory framework. It concluded that because a first transfer had already occurred from BDN to her husband, a second transfer back to BDN was not permitted, and IRD's refusal was correct.

2. Whether BDN's circumstances — specifically IRD's failure to advise her of the transfer limitation — provided grounds for the Authority to modify or reverse IRD's decision — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[27]).

The Authority acknowledged that PLEPA grants it a review jurisdiction under s 71ZB but noted that prior ERA determinations have consistently declined to override decisions that correctly apply the statute: Hood v MBIE [2021] NZERA 215; Anaru v MBIE [2022] NZERA 375; Liu v MBIE [2022] NZERA 512; Faulkner v MBIE [2023] NZERA 748; and Tennent v MBIE [2025] NZERA 649. The Authority found that IRD was not legally obliged to advise BDN of the limitation on transfers, and that her lack of awareness of the statutory restriction, together with IRD's silence on the point, did not constitute a legal basis for reversing a decision that was correct in law. The Authority expressed sympathy for BDN's situation but held that the statutory provisions are clear and must be applied.

3. Costs — Status: Dismissed (para [29]).

The Authority applied the Practice Direction of the Employment Relations Authority, under which parties are presumed to bear their own costs in PLP review proceedings. No order for costs was made.

The application was dismissed in full; IRD's decision declining the second transfer of PLP was confirmed.

None ordered. No costs awarded; parties bear their own costs in accordance with the applicable Practice Direction.

Lita Beattie, a qualified chef, claimed she was employed by Matthew Roberts at his food business (Matt's Kitchen/The Food Project) from March to August 2024 and was not properly paid wages during that time. The key legal questions were whether Ms Beattie was an employee or independent contractor, whether her resignation amounted to constructive dismissal, and what remedies were appropriate. The Authority found Ms Beattie was an employee, that her resignation was a constructive dismissal, and ordered Mr Roberts to pay wage arrears, lost wages, holiday pay, and compensation totalling over $56,000.

Applicant: Lita Beattie (employee/former head chef)
Respondent: Matthew Roberts (employer/business owner)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate
Respondent: Matthew Roberts in person

Ms Beattie, a qualified chef, began working for Mr Roberts at his food business (Matt's Kitchen) on Easter Saturday, 30 March 2024, as Head Chef/Kitchen Manager, following a phone call in January 2024 in which they agreed she would be paid $27 per hour. Mr Roberts admitted Ms Beattie did work for him but maintained they had a contracting arrangement — under a "living contract" that went missing — and claimed payments were capped at $200 per week partly to offset a debt she owed him; he also characterised the arrangement as business mentoring. Ms Beattie said she was paid sporadically, rarely at the agreed rate, and worked very long hours (50–60 hours per week), receiving only occasional cash payments and some bank transfers. Both parties had discussed a WINZ Flexi Wage subsidy scheme, which contemplated a formal employment relationship with Ms Beattie receiving wages of $27 per hour. On 12 August 2024, Mr Roberts told Ms Beattie he would only ever pay her $20 per hour (below the then minimum wage of $23.15) and only if money was left after his own bills, prompting her to resign on 14 August 2024. A personal grievance was raised on 2 September 2024, mediation did not resolve the matter, and the case proceeded to investigation.

1. Whether Ms Beattie was an employee or independent contractor under s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [21]–[43]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which requires determination of the "real nature of the relationship" having regard to all relevant matters, including the parties' intentions, but not treating any statement describing the relationship as determinative. The Authority found strong indicators of employment: both parties had applied for a WINZ Flexi Wage subsidy contemplating formal employment; Ms Beattie was integrated into the business as the sole head chef; she worked exclusively for Mr Roberts during the period; she did not invoice him or work for others; and Mr Roberts directed her hours. The absence of payroll, PAYE, and KiwiSaver was attributed to Mr Roberts' failure to comply with minimum employment standards rather than evidence of contracting. The Authority accepted Ms Beattie's evidence as credible and consistent, and rejected Mr Roberts' business mentoring narrative as unsupported by text communications. Ms Beattie was found to be an employee.

2. Whether Ms Beattie's resignation on 14 August 2024 constituted constructive dismissal — Status: Established (paras [44]–[54]).

The Authority applied the tests from Auckland Shop Employees v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA) and Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUW [1994] 1 ERNZ 168 (CA), requiring either deliberate coercion to resign or a sufficiently serious breach of duty that foreseeably compelled resignation. The Authority found that the sustained failure to pay wages from the outset of employment, combined with Mr Roberts' statement in August 2024 that he would only pay $20 per hour (below minimum wage) and only if funds permitted, constituted a serious and ongoing breach of the obligation to pay remuneration. It was reasonably foreseeable that Ms Beattie would resign in those circumstances, and her resignation was found to be a constructive dismissal.

3. Whether penalty should be awarded for breaches of minimum employment standards under s 133A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [62]–[65]).

The Authority considered the factors in s 133A, including the nature of the breaches, the existence of one prior Authority determination involving Mr Roberts (which related to compliance with a settlement rather than the same underlying breaches), Mr Roberts' apparent financial difficulties, health issues of close family members, and the fact the business had wound up. The Authority declined to impose penalties, treating this as an isolated example and noting that a public determination was itself a form of accountability. No penalties were ordered on top of the other remedies.

4. Whether compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) was warranted and at what level — Status: Established (paras [55]–[59]).

The Authority accepted both Ms Beattie's evidence about her significant emotional and mental health deterioration and the evidence of her health practitioner, Ms Lane, who observed worsening distress, increased support needs, and an urgent referral to the Mental Health Team. The Authority acknowledged Ms Beattie's pre-existing vulnerabilities (financial hardship from Covid-19, prior health challenges) and noted Mr Roberts was responsible only for harm caused by his own failings during the employment period. A compensation award of $18,000 was ordered.

5. Whether a globalised compensation award was appropriate across the constructive dismissal claim and separate disadvantage claims (failure to pay wages, failure to make KiwiSaver contributions, paying below minimum wage, failure to provide a written employment agreement) — Status: Established (paras [59]).

The Authority determined that all disadvantage claims were factually connected to the same course of conduct (non-payment of wages and associated failures) as the constructive dismissal, and that a single globalised compensation figure of $18,000 was appropriate rather than separate awards for each.

6. Whether wage arrears were owing and at what amount — Status: Established (paras [60]–[62]).

The Authority invoked s 132 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which allows the Authority to accept an employee's claim for unpaid wages as proven where the employer has failed to keep wage and time records and that failure has prejudiced the employee's ability to bring an accurate claim. No payroll records were kept by Mr Roberts. Ms Beattie's estimated hours table, deducting payments received, produced a figure of $23,050.00 gross in wage arrears. The Authority accepted this figure and ordered payment under s 131 of the Act.

7. Whether lost wages were payable following constructive dismissal and at what amount — Status: Established (paras [63]–[64]).

The Authority noted that the Act limits lost wages to the lesser of actual lost remuneration or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Ms Beattie did not find new employment until 15 October 2025 and gave evidence that her ability to find local work was hindered by the breakdown with Mr Roberts. The Authority awarded lost wages equivalent to three months' remuneration, calculated at $27 per hour, amounting to $14,040.00.

8. Whether annual holiday pay arrears were owed — Status: Established (para [65]).

Following from the finding that Ms Beattie was an employee, she was entitled to holiday pay under the Holidays Act at 8% of gross earnings. Ms Beattie calculated this at $1,844.00, and the Authority ordered payment of that amount under s 131 of the Act.

9. Whether PAYE deductions and KiwiSaver employer contributions were owing — Status: Established (para [65]).

The Authority held that PAYE deductions and KiwiSaver employer contributions must be accounted for and paid as a consequence of the employment relationship finding, but did not specify dollar amounts in the determination.

10. Whether interest on wage and holiday arrears should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [66]–[67]).

The Authority exercised its discretion under Schedule 2, clause 11 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, finding it appropriate to award interest to compensate Ms Beattie for being deprived of the use of money to which she was entitled. Interest was ordered using the civil debt interest calculator on the wage and holiday arrears from the date of this determination until full payment.

11. Whether Ms Beattie's conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance under s 124 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (para [68]).

The Authority considered s 124, which requires it to assess whether any remedy should be reduced due to the employee's own contribution to the situation. The Authority found that Mr Roberts had justified his conduct on the basis that Ms Beattie was a contractor, which was rejected. Ms Beattie had not contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance and no reduction was applied.

12. Whether certain late evidence submitted by Mr Roberts should be admitted and considered — Status: Partially established (paras [4]–[7]).

Mr Roberts submitted six additional documents the day before the investigation meeting. Only the text messages with Ms Beattie were found relevant and admitted. A late witness statement was excluded because that witness did not attend to give in-person evidence and Ms Beattie had no opportunity to cross-examine. An undated and unsigned repayment schedule was rejected as unreliable and also immaterial given the employment finding. Other documents (Himatangi Beach invoice, Kitchen totals email chain, settlement discussions, and equipment references) were found irrelevant to the employment period in question.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved.

The Authority reserved the question of costs and encouraged the parties to resolve it between themselves. A process was set out: Ms Beattie may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; Mr Roberts has 14 days from service to file a reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if asked to determine costs.

The claim was substantially upheld: Ms Beattie was found to be an employee, her resignation was a constructive dismissal, and she was awarded wage arrears, lost wages, holiday pay, and compensation for humiliation and distress; penalties were declined and costs were reserved.

- Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings) under s 123(1)(c)(i): $18,000.00
- Lost wages under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 (three months): $14,040.00
- Wage arrears under s 131: $23,050.00 (gross)
- Annual holiday arrears under s 131: $1,844.00
- PAYE deductions and KiwiSaver employer contributions: to be accounted for and paid (amounts not specified)
- Interest on wage and holiday arrears: from date of determination until paid in full (calculated using civil debt interest calculator)
- Penalties: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; process set out for determination by the Authority if required
- All monetary amounts payable within 28 days of the determination

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive remedies determination issued on 9 March 2026 in favour of employees Duane Farrell and the Corrections Association of New Zealand (CANZ) against the Department of Corrections. The parties were unable to agree on costs and filed memoranda. The Authority awarded $4,500 in costs to the applicants, applying the standard daily tariff with an uplift for factual complexity.

Applicant: Duane Farrell (employee) and Corrections Association of New Zealand (union, second applicant)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: Jim Roberts and Kirby Kleingeld, counsel for Applicants
Respondent: John Rooney and Pema Gyeltshen, counsel for the Respondent

The Authority had previously issued a substantive remedies determination on 9 March 2026 ([2026] NZERA 143), finding that Corrections had failed to keep Mr Farrell safe at work and had breached the relevant collective agreement, with six established personal grievances. Costs were reserved at that stage, with a timetable set for memoranda if the parties could not agree. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed submissions. The applicants sought $12,000 as a contribution toward actual costs of $16,494.57 (or $19,064.70 including related correspondence), citing factual complexity, multiple grievances, complex payroll calculations, and the fact that they were wholly successful. Corrections submitted that costs should be $2,250 (half the notional daily tariff), arguing the claimed amount was excessive and that factual complexity in submissions was not a basis for departure from the tariff.

1. Whether costs should follow the event in favour of the successful applicants — Status: Established (paras [2], [5]).

The Authority confirmed the general principle that costs follow the event under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act, consistent with its equity and good conscience jurisdiction. As Mr Farrell and CANZ were wholly successful in the underlying proceeding, Corrections was required to contribute to their costs. The Authority noted that costs awards are discretionary, must be principled, are not punitive, and are generally modest.

2. Whether the appropriate starting point for costs is the standard daily tariff of $2,250 — Status: Established (para [5]).

The Authority applied the standard daily tariff approach as the notional starting point, arriving at $2,250 for the remedies investigation conducted on the papers. This was consistent with the approach signalled in the substantive determination and accepted as the baseline by both parties.

3. Whether the factual complexity of the matter warranted an uplift above the standard daily tariff — Status: Established (para [6]).

The Authority accepted that factual complexity in determining remedies — given the number and discrete nature of the matters, including six personal grievances, complex payroll calculations involving allowances, KiwiSaver, overtime, call-out payments, and ACC interactions — justified increasing the starting point. The Authority doubled the tariff to $4,500, rejecting the applicants' submission for $12,000 (equivalent to three notional days) as too high, while rejecting Corrections' submission that no uplift was warranted.

The costs claim was partially upheld; the applicants were awarded $4,500 in costs, being the standard daily tariff doubled to reflect factual complexity, rather than the $12,000 sought.

Costs: $4,500 ordered to be paid by the Respondent (Corrections) to the Applicants within 21 days of the date of this determination (6 July 2026). No other remedy ordered (this determination addresses costs only; substantive remedies were dealt with in [2026] NZERA 143).

Jiancheng Zhang, an interior installer employed by Homelovers Group Limited (HGL), brought a claim for unpaid overtime wages. HGL's director admitted that Mr Zhang had not been paid for all overtime hours worked. The Authority found that HGL owed Mr Zhang wage arrears of $5,984.37 for unpaid overtime, plus additional annual holiday pay, and ordered payment within 28 days.

Applicant: Jiancheng Zhang (employee, interior installer)
Respondent: Homelovers Group Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Lixin Gu (director of HGL, appearing for the respondent)

Mr Zhang was employed by HGL as an interior installer from 1 April 2024 to 3 November 2024. His individual employment agreement provided that if he worked more than 30 hours per week, he would be paid for overtime at his usual hourly rate of $29.66. Mr Zhang received wages by direct credit and cash payments for overtime worked. HGL's director conceded that Mr Zhang had not been paid for all overtime hours he worked. Over the employment period, Mr Zhang worked 619.5 overtime hours, entitling him to $18,374.37 in overtime pay, but he received only $12,390 in cash, leaving a shortfall of $5,984.37 according to HGL's own records. Both parties attended the investigation meeting and gave evidence under oath.

1. Whether HGL owed Mr Zhang wage arrears for unpaid overtime — Status: Established (paras [9]-[14]).

The relevant test was straightforward contractual entitlement: clause 5.2(e) of the individual employment agreement required HGL to pay Mr Zhang for all overtime at his usual hourly rate of $29.66. The Authority reviewed records provided by both parties and calculated that Mr Zhang worked 619.5 overtime hours, generating an entitlement of $18,374.37. Against cash payments of $12,390 already made, HGL's own records confirmed a shortfall of $5,984.37, which the Authority accepted and ordered to be paid.

2. Whether additional annual holiday pay was owing as a consequence of the wage arrears — Status: Established (paras [14]-[15]).

Under section 25(2) of the Holidays Act 2003, annual holiday pay must be recalculated to reflect any wage arrears owing to the employee. The Authority applied this provision and calculated that $478.75 in additional annual holiday pay was owed to Mr Zhang as a direct consequence of the unpaid overtime wages. HGL was ordered to pay this amount.

3. Whether either party was entitled to costs — Status: Dismissed (para [16]).

Neither party was legally represented, and the Authority applied the standard approach that costs lie where they fall in such circumstances. No costs award was made to either party.

The claim was upheld, with HGL ordered to pay wage arrears, annual holiday pay, and reimbursement of the filing fee.

- Wage arrears (unpaid overtime): $5,984.37
- Annual holiday pay (consequential, per s 25(2) Holidays Act 2003): $478.75
- Reimbursement of filing fee: $71.55
- Total ordered: $6,534.67
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination (3 July 2026).
- No costs awarded to either party.

Alexander Semenoff (applicant/employee) claimed he was unjustifiably dismissed by Stan Semenoff Transport Limited (SSTL), a company wholly owned by his father Stanley Semenoff, in February 2025, and sought interim reinstatement. The threshold legal question was whether Alexander Semenoff was employed by SSTL at all at the relevant time, given that from June 2021 payments had been made to his company Lacomi Limited rather than to him personally via payroll. The Authority found he was not an employee of SSTL in February 2025, meaning it lacked jurisdiction to hear his claims, and dismissed the application.

Applicant: Alexander Semenoff (alleged employee)
Respondent: Stan Semenoff Transport Limited (employer)

Applicant: David Luttig, advocate
Respondent: Stanley Semenoff and Carlo Lang

Alexander Semenoff was employed by SSTL from around 2001 and remained on its payroll until May/June 2021. In May/June 2021, following negotiations between Alexander and his father Stanley Semenoff (SSTL's sole owner), Alexander was removed from the SSTL payroll and payments were redirected fortnightly to Lacomi Limited, a company he partly owned, via GST invoice. The parties disputed whether this change was initiated by Alexander (SSTL's position) or was a purely administrative change that did not alter his employment status (Alexander's position). After June 2021, Alexander was also a director and shareholder of Kings Quarry Limited and Pebblebrook Properties Limited alongside Stanley Semenoff, and claimed he performed work across the Semenoff Group as an employee of SSTL. On 10 February 2025, Stanley Semenoff wrote to Alexander stating payments to Lacomi would cease immediately, citing cashflow pressure and asserting Alexander had not performed work for SSTL for at least 12 months. Alexander raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal on 16 February 2025; SSTL denied any employment relationship existed.

1. Whether Alexander Semenoff was employed by SSTL in February 2025 — Status: Dismissed (paras [32]-[45]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which requires determination of the "real nature" of the relationship between the parties, having regard to all relevant matters including the parties' intentions but without treating any label as determinative, informed by the Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 34 control and fundamental tests. The Authority found that after June 2021, Alexander Semenoff requested payment be made to Lacomi, was absent from SSTL for extended periods pursuing his own businesses, was not subject to SSTL's control, operated as an economically independent actor with directorships and shareholdings in related companies, and did not perform a specific role for SSTL. The payments to Lacomi were characterised as serving the dual purpose of compensating him as an independent contractor across the Semenoff Group and providing family financial support, partly because of Alexander's status as Stanley's son. Although Alexander represented himself to others as "Operations Manager" within the group, the Authority found this was adequately explained by his independent contractor/Kings Quarry role and did not overcome the weight of evidence against employment status. The Authority concluded he was not an employee of SSTL in February 2025.

2. Whether interim reinstatement should be ordered — Status: Not reached (para [46]).

Because the Authority found Alexander Semenoff was not employed by SSTL, it had no jurisdiction to consider the interim reinstatement application or any other substantive claims. This issue was therefore not reached.

3. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [47]-[49]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, SSTL may lodge and serve a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the written determination, with Alexander Semenoff having 14 days thereafter to reply. Costs would ordinarily be assessed on the Authority's standard notional daily rate, subject to any factors warranting adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in full — the Authority found Alexander Semenoff was not employed by SSTL in February 2025 and accordingly had no jurisdiction to hear the interim reinstatement application or any other matter.

None ordered. Costs are reserved pending agreement between the parties or a separate costs memorandum process.

Brent Colyer, an electrician employed by New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) since October 2005, raised personal grievances for unjustified action causing disadvantage and constructive dismissal following a disciplinary process arising from a crane isolation breach in August 2024 that resulted in a written warning. The key legal questions were whether NZAS's disciplinary process was unjustified, whether Mr Colyer's subsequent resignation constituted a constructive dismissal, and what remedies were available. The unjustified disadvantage grievance succeeded and $18,000 compensation was awarded, but the constructive dismissal grievance was dismissed.

Applicant: Brent Colyer (employee)
Respondent: New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (employer)

Applicant: Mary-Jane Thomas, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Gillian Service and Nicola Whiteman, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Colyer had been employed by NZAS as an electrician since October 2005 — nearly 20 years at the time of the events. On 28 August 2024, while inspecting a gantry crane, he failed to isolate a nearby 35-tonne crane as required by signage at the site, and also did not wear required PPE when he subsequently isolated the 35-tonne crane. An incident report was produced the following day, triggering an internal investigation led by Superintendent Tony Dixon, which Mr Colyer later alleged was conflated with a disciplinary investigation without adequate notice to him. The disciplinary process that followed was disputed: Mr Colyer received a letter on 30 September 2024 headed as an "investigatory" meeting despite the investigation being complete, was not provided the Investigation Report in advance, and was inadvertently given a draft report containing a pre-determined sanction. NZAS ultimately issued a written warning on 4 October 2024; after further discussions and agreed amendments to the warning, Mr Colyer resigned on 21 October 2024, claiming the events constituted a constructive dismissal and unjustified action causing disadvantage. NZAS maintained its process was fair and that the isolation breach was a genuine safety matter warranting disciplinary action.

1. Whether NZAS's disciplinary process was unjustified and constituted a breach of the duty of good faith — Status: Established (paras [53]–[55]).

The Authority assessed whether NZAS's conduct was unjustified under s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, applying the standard of whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as NZAS did. The Authority found multiple failings: (a) the investigation into the isolation incident was covertly transformed into a disciplinary conduct investigation without informing Mr Colyer; (b) the investigation was inadequate — no written statements were obtained from witnesses and PPE requirements were not properly verified despite Mr Colyer's disagreement; (c) a concern about Mr Colyer's working relationship with a colleague was introduced by HR without being properly investigated or clearly articulated in the disciplinary letter; (d) the letter of 30 September 2024 mislabelled the meeting as investigatory when it was disciplinary and omitted the Investigation Report; and (e) the accidental provision of the draft report containing a pre-determined sanction caused Mr Colyer reasonable distress. The Authority concluded these failings rendered NZAS's disciplinary process unjustified and in breach of the duty of good faith.

2. Whether Mr Colyer's resignation amounted to a constructive dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]–[60]).

The Authority applied the three-part test from the established constructive dismissal case law (Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths [1985]; Wellington etc Clerical Workers v Greenwich [1983]; Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District [1994]): the breach must be sufficiently serious to warrant resignation, resignation must be reasonably foreseeable in response to the breach, and the employee must in fact have resigned in response to the breach. While the Authority accepted the first limb was satisfied — the procedural breaches were sufficiently serious — it was not satisfied that resignation was reasonably foreseeable, given that Mr Colyer had accepted the written warning, negotiated its terms, and then raised no further concerns for eleven days before resigning. Additionally, Mr Colyer's resignation letter cited broader grievances (hostile work environment, lack of respect for his expertise, deteriorating conditions over two years), indicating his resignation was not solely caused by the disciplinary process. The constructive dismissal grievance therefore failed.

3. Whether NZAS's unjustified actions caused disadvantage to Mr Colyer's employment, establishing an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance under s 103(1)(b) — Status: Established (paras [61]–[63]).

Having found NZAS's actions unjustified, the Authority assessed whether a disadvantage to Mr Colyer's employment resulted. The Authority found that the unjustified disciplinary process resulted in a written warning that made Mr Colyer's employment less secure, constituting a clear disadvantage. The personal grievance for unjustified action causing disadvantage was accordingly established.

4. Whether Mr Colyer was entitled to lost remuneration as a remedy — Status: Dismissed (para [65]).

The Authority considered the remedies available under s 123 of the Act. Since Mr Colyer had not lost any remuneration as a direct result of NZAS's unjustified actions (he remained employed until his own resignation), he was not entitled to a lost wages award under s 123(1)(b). This aspect of his claim was not pursued further.

5. Whether Mr Colyer was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [66]–[69]).

The Authority applied the framework from Stormont v Peddle Thorp Aitken Ltd [2017], Waikato District Health Board v Archibald [2017], and Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] — identifying the impact and effects of the unjustified actions, assessing the harm caused, and quantifying that harm. Evidence from Mr Colyer and his partner established he suffered humiliation, felt physically ill, lost trust, became withdrawn, experienced sleep and appetite disruption, and felt distressed during the process. The Authority quantified the harm at $18,000, consistent with comparable cases.

6. Whether Mr Colyer's conduct contributed to the situation warranting a reduction in remedies under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [70]–[71]).

The Authority was required under s 124 to consider whether Mr Colyer behaved in a culpable or blameworthy manner that contributed to his grievances, applying Xtreme Dining Ltd v Dewar [2016]. The Authority found no contributory behaviour by Mr Colyer and therefore made no reduction to the compensation award.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [74]–[77]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Colyer may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with NZAS having 14 days to respond. Costs, if determined, will be assessed on the Authority's standard daily tariff basis subject to any adjustment factors.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified action causing disadvantage grievance succeeded and $18,000 compensation was awarded; the constructive dismissal grievance was dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $18,000 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, with no deductions.
Lost wages: None ordered (not applicable — no lost remuneration resulted from the unjustified actions).
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Costs: Reserved — parties to attempt resolution; failing agreement, Mr Colyer to file memorandum within 28 days.

E Tū Incorporated (a union) applied to the Employment Relations Authority for facilitated bargaining with Resene Paints Limited under s 50B of the Employment Relations Act, following serious difficulties concluding a new Collective Agreement. The key legal question was whether one or more statutory grounds under s 50C(1) justified a reference to facilitation. The Authority accepted the application, finding the ground of unduly protracted bargaining under s 50C(1)(b) was made out.

Applicant: E Tū Incorporated (union)
Respondent: Resene Paints Limited (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney and Finn O'Dwyer-Cunliffe, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Paul McBride, counsel for the Respondent

E Tū initiated bargaining with Resene for a new Collective Agreement on 20 May 2025, with a bargaining process agreement entered into on 28 August 2025. The parties held seven in-person bargaining meetings between August and November 2025, and attended two mediation sessions in December 2025 and March 2026. Between 15 October 2025 and 10 April 2026, union members took strike action on 13 occasions. An impasse arose, particularly regarding E Tū's position that wages be set at a "living wage" and the fact that coverage had not yet been agreed. E Tū alleged multiple good faith breaches by Resene, including failure to provide requested information under s 34, unlawful deduction of monthly incentive payments from striking workers, discriminatory provision of sports tickets to non-members only, and revocation of pre-approved leave coinciding with planned strike action. Resene denied all good faith breaches, characterised the bargaining as limited given this was a new (not rolled-over) collective, and maintained that its pay proposals were reasonable. The matter was determined on the papers by consent.

1. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(a) — serious, sustained failure to comply with the duty of good faith that undermined bargaining — was established — Status: Not reached (paras [3], [20], [23]-[24]).

The Authority noted that the evidence regarding alleged good faith breaches (including withholding information under s 34, MIP deductions, sports ticket discrimination, and revocation of pre-approved leave) was in dispute between the parties and could not be resolved on the papers at this stage. The Authority found it unnecessary to determine this ground because only one statutory ground needed to be made out, and s 50C(1)(b) was established instead.

2. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(b) — bargaining being unduly protracted and extensive efforts (including mediation) having failed to resolve difficulties — was established — Status: Established (paras [18]-[24]).

The test requires satisfaction that bargaining has been unduly protracted and that extensive efforts, including mediation, have failed to resolve difficulties preventing conclusion of a collective agreement. The Authority applied a common sense assessment of the factual situation, drawing on Service & Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc v Sanford Limited [2012] NZEmpC 168 at [42], which cautions against finding reasons to refuse facilitation where the overall position makes it desirable. The Authority found that seven bargaining meetings, two mediations, 13 days of strike action, multiple unresolved disputes, and an entrenched impasse on the living wage issue — with no sign of the parties converging — collectively satisfied this ground.

3. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(c) — one or more protracted or acrimonious strikes or lockouts — was established — Status: Not reached (paras [3], [23]-[24]).

E Tū raised this ground, pointing to 13 days of strike action and alleging acrimony. Resene characterised the strikes as limited and low-key. As with s 50C(1)(a), the Authority did not need to resolve this ground having already found s 50C(1)(b) made out.

4. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [26]).

The Authority made no order as to costs, without elaborating on reasons.

The application for facilitated bargaining was upheld; the reference to facilitation under s 50C(1)(b) was accepted.

No monetary remedy ordered. The Authority accepted the reference to facilitation and directed that a case management conference be convened to arrange facilitation proceedings. In accordance with s 50D of the Act, the facilitating member will be a different member of the Authority from the one who accepted the reference. No costs order was made.

Sidney Yu and Jing Tham, two working holiday visa holders, were employed as casual nursery assistants by Queenstown Nursery Limited (QNL). The central dispute concerned whether their employment was truly day-to-day casual with no guaranteed future work, or whether a specific assignment of at least three further weeks had been agreed, giving them a right to work until 23 April 2025. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified, awarded each applicant lost wages for four unworked days (including a public holiday) and $2,000 compensation for humiliation.

Applicant: Sidney Yu and Jing Tham (employees/nursery assistants)
Respondent: Queenstown Nursery Limited (employer)

Applicants: Self-represented (applicants in person)
Respondent: Matthew Jones (sole director of QNL, appearing for the respondent)

Ms Tham and Mr Yu applied online in late March 2025 for casual nursery assistant roles with QNL and commenced work on 31 March 2025 on an agreed paid trial day, after which they were invited to continue. No written individual employment agreements were provided. On 6 April 2025, in response to Ms Tham's query, the sole director Mr Jones emailed confirming there was "at least the next three weeks" of Monday–Wednesday work, which the applicants say they relied upon and turned down other work opportunities. After working through to 15 April 2025, the applicants were told by email that evening that work was ending due to dropping temperatures; the applicants disputed this, having evidence that other casual workers continued beyond that date. Mr Jones later acknowledged (first to the Authority, then at the investigation meeting) that the real reason the applicants were selected for termination was inefficiency, though no performance concerns had ever been raised with them. The applicants raised a personal grievance, attempted mediation (which did not proceed as the respondent failed to attend), and lodged their claim in the Authority on 15 July 2025.

1. Whether the casual employment was based on a day-by-day assignment of work or whether an agreed assignment extended four working days beyond 15 April 2025 — Status: Established in favour of applicants (paras [27]-[28]).

The Authority examined the nature of the arrangement, including the absence of written employment agreements, the on-site communication practice about daily work prospects, and crucially the 6 April 2025 email from Mr Jones confirming "at least three more weeks" of work. The Authority found that while day-to-day communication did occur, the 6 April 2025 email constituted a clear offer of work extending to at least 23 April 2025. The Authority further noted that the respondent's own stated reason for termination (weather) was inconsistent with other casual workers continuing to work, and that the true reason (inefficiency) had not been disclosed at the time. The Authority concluded the applicants were entitled to be paid for the four remaining days they ought to have worked.

2. Whether the dismissal on 15 April 2025 was unjustified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31]).

Section 103A requires the Authority to assess whether a fair and reasonable employer could have dismissed in all the circumstances, considering both substantive reasons and procedural fairness. The Authority found the substantive reason given at the time (weather) was not genuine, as others continued working, and the real reason (inefficiency) was never raised with the applicants at any stage, including after the paid trial day which they had passed. Mr Jones's evidence about performance problems was vague and second-hand. No process was followed to raise or address any efficiency concerns. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified on both substantive and procedural grounds.

3. Whether the respondent breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (para [31]).

The Authority found that the employer's failure to disclose the real reason for terminating the applicants (inefficiency) at the time of dismissal, instead citing weather, breached the duty of good faith owed to employees under s 4 of the Act. This finding reinforced the overall conclusion of unjustified dismissal but did not result in a separate remedy.

4. Whether the applicants were entitled to lost wages for four unworked days under s 128 of the Act, including one day as a public holiday under s 12 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [32]-[36]).

The Authority accepted that other workers continued in employment until at least May 2025 (per Mr Jones's own evidence), confirming the applicants would have worked the four remaining days. For the public holiday (Easter Monday 21 April 2025), the Authority found this was an "otherwise working day" under s 12 of the Holidays Act 2003 because the employment terms specified Monday–Wednesday work, no exclusion for public holidays was ever communicated or documented, and but for the unjustified dismissal the applicants would have been entitled to work that day or receive payment for it. Lost wages were calculated at $26.50 per hour × 8 hours × 4 days = $848.00 gross each.

5. Whether the applicants were entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [37]-[40]).

The applicants claimed humiliation including from allegedly being exploited as migrant workers and from losing other job opportunities. The Authority did not accept the claim that real job opportunities were actually lost, nor that the exploitation narrative was established to the required level. However, the Authority accepted genuine humiliation arose from discovering they had been singled out and given a false reason at the time, which was later confirmed by Mr Jones's acknowledgment of the inefficiency basis. The dismissive response to their grievance also added to their humiliation. An award of $2,000 per applicant was made, taking into account the limited duration of the employment and the absence of evidence of ongoing financial stress.

6. Whether the applicants contributed to the grievance such that remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [41]).

The Authority found no evidence that either applicant had contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance, and no reduction in remedies was warranted.

7. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [42]).

Both applicants were self-represented. The Authority declined to make any order for costs in those circumstances.

The claim was upheld: both applicants succeeded in establishing unjustified dismissal and were awarded lost wages and compensation for humiliation; the contribution and costs issues were resolved in favour of no reduction and no costs order respectively.

For Sidney Yu:
- Lost wages (s 128 ERA 2000 / s 12 Holidays Act 2003): $848.00 gross (4 days × 8 hours × $26.50)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i) ERA 2000): $2,000.00 (non-taxable)

For Jing Tham:
- Lost wages (s 128 ERA 2000 / s 12 Holidays Act 2003): $848.00 gross (4 days × 8 hours × $26.50)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i) ERA 2000): $2,000.00 (non-taxable)

All payments to be made within 28 days of the determination date.
Costs: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.

Amanda Bradley, a Manager Region Training employed by Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ), brought a personal grievance alleging unjustified disadvantage arising from FENZ's failure to facilitate her access to the FireSuper occupational superannuation scheme. The key legal questions were whether the collective agreement conferred automatic eligibility to join FireSuper, whether the grievance was raised in time, and whether FENZ's conduct in handling her application amounted to an unjustified disadvantage. The Authority found no automatic entitlement under the collective agreement but upheld a narrow disadvantage grievance based on FENZ's poor and inconsistent communication, awarding $5,000 compensation.

Applicant: Amanda Bradley (employee — Manager Region Training, Te Kei Region)
Respondent: Fire and Emergency New Zealand (employer)

Applicant: Tim Cleary, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Tayna Kennedy, counsel for the Respondent

Amanda Bradley commenced employment with FENZ as a Manager Region Training (MRT) for the Te Kei Region on 6 November 2023, covered by the FENZ/FECA Collective Employment Agreement. Her employment offer made no mention of eligibility for the FireSuper occupational superannuation scheme, and KiwiSaver was the only superannuation option referenced. In February 2024, Ms Bradley applied to join FireSuper, triggering a prolonged and at times inconsistent exchange with FENZ and the scheme's trustees (FireSuper Trustee Limited), during which FENZ gave conflicting and unclear information about eligibility criteria. The FireSuper trustees declined Ms Bradley's application in September 2024, having sought (after the fact) confirmation from FENZ about whether her role qualified. Ms Bradley and FECA raised the matter first as a dispute and later as a personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage, which FENZ resisted on jurisdiction and timeliness grounds. FENZ's core position was that eligibility was governed solely by the FireSuper Trust Deed and the trustees' discretion, not by the collective agreement, and that FENZ had not improperly influenced or blocked her application.

1. Whether the terms and conditions of Ms Bradley's employment included automatic eligibility to access the FireSuper scheme (interpretation of cl 8(a) of the collective agreement) — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]–[62]).

The Authority applied the objective approach to contractual interpretation summarised in Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2014] NZSC 147, focusing on the plain and natural meaning of the text. Clause 8(a) of the collective agreement expressly made entitlement to participate in FireSuper "subject to meeting the eligibility criteria for the Fund or being otherwise approved for participation by the Trustees." The Authority found this language unambiguously links eligibility to external Trust Deed criteria or trustee discretion, not to collective agreement membership alone. The contextual history — that the prior (2018–2021) collective agreement had provided a bare, all-encompassing entitlement — confirmed the parties had deliberately moved to a more restrictive, externally governed entry point. The Authority therefore found no breach of contract and no automatic eligibility.

2. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to determine the employment relationship problem (threshold jurisdiction issue) — Status: Established (paras [3], [55], [68], [73], [79]).

FENZ argued the Authority lacked jurisdiction because the eligibility question was governed by the FireSuper Trust Deed, an external document, not the employment agreement. The Authority accepted it could not interpret the Trust Deed or direct the trustees, but held it had jurisdiction to examine FENZ's own conduct — including how FENZ communicated with Ms Bradley and whether FENZ exercised its acknowledged influence over the trustees in a justified manner. The Authority relied on s 160(3) of the Act (allowing it to address the employment relationship problem without being confined to the category the parties gave it) and Clarkson v Department of Child Youth and Family Services (EmpC, 2004) to take a broad perspective.

3. Whether Ms Bradley raised her personal grievance within the statutory 90-day timeframe under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [63]–[69]).

The Authority applied the principles from Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132 on the informal and accessible nature of raising a grievance, holding that no particular formula of words is required and that the totality of communications may constitute raising a grievance. The Authority found that Ms Bradley and FECA's communications from 28 February 2024 onwards were sufficient to put FENZ on notice of a personal grievance relating to her FireSuper access. The later formal categorisation as an unjustified disadvantage grievance (November 2024) was held irrelevant to the timing question. As an alternative finding, the Authority noted FENZ may have consented to the grievance by agreeing to attend mediation in September 2024.

4. Whether Ms Bradley was unjustifiably disadvantaged by FENZ's failure to influence or facilitate her access to FireSuper, or by FENZ's categorisation of her role as non-operational/non-ranked — Status: Partially established (paras [70]–[84]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test (whether FENZ's actions were those a fair and reasonable employer could have taken in all the circumstances), noting that FENZ had demonstrable influence over the trustees' eligibility decisions through the Trust Deed mechanism allowing FENZ to submit lists of qualifying roles. On the substantive question of whether FENZ was unjustified in not categorising MRT as a Black Watch or ranked/operational role, the Authority found FENZ's operational decision had internal logic and was within its legitimate discretion, and declined to find unjustified disadvantage on that basis. However, the Authority found FENZ's handling of Ms Bradley's queries from the outset was characterised by very poor, slow, inconsistent, and at times inaccurate communication, which breached the good faith obligation to communicate actively and constructively (s 4 of the Act). This narrow aspect of the disadvantage grievance was upheld.

5. Whether FENZ breached any obligations (including good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act) owed to Ms Bradley — Status: Established (para [84]).

The Authority found FENZ breached its good faith obligation to communicate in a timely and accurate manner, causing Ms Bradley unnecessary distress and uncertainty about her place in the organisation, her retirement investment decisions, and her trust and confidence in her employer. The communication was described as "unaccountably inconsistent, confusing and inaccurate" on what should have been a straightforward matter.

6. Whether Ms Bradley contributed to the circumstances giving rise to her personal grievance under s 124 of the Act, justifying reduction of any remedy — Status: Dismissed (para [86]).

The Authority considered whether Ms Bradley's own conduct contributed to the circumstances and found no contributing factor that would reduce the award.

7. Remedy — quantum of compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (para [85]).

The Authority awarded $5,000 as compensation for hurt, humiliation, and distress resulting from FENZ's poor communication, described as an "unfortunate saga of muddled and poor employer-employee communication."

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [88]–[90]).

The Authority reserved costs. Ms Bradley's counsel may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; FENZ has 14 days to reply. Costs will be determined on the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances justify adjustment.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified disadvantage grievance was upheld on the narrow ground of FENZ's poor and inconsistent communication, while the substantive claims of automatic FireSuper eligibility under the collective agreement and unjustified failure to categorise the MRT role as Black Watch/operational were dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, distress): $5,000 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, to be paid without deductions.
Reinstatement: No.
Lost wages: None ordered.
Contribution reduction: None applied.
Costs: Reserved — subject to memoranda process as described.

[CONSENT]

ABT (applicant/employee) brought a claim against JJV (respondent/employer) before the Employment Relations Authority. During the investigation meeting on 1 July 2026, the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement, the terms of which were then recorded as orders of the Authority by consent. Non-publication orders were granted over the parties' identities and the terms of the settlement.

Applicant: ABT (employee — identity suppressed)
Respondent: JJV (employer — identity suppressed)

Applicant: Heather Stephens, advocate
Respondent: Andrew Foster, counsel

ABT filed an application with the Employment Relations Authority raising an employment relationship problem against JJV. The nature of the underlying dispute is not disclosed in the determination. An investigation meeting was held in Hamilton on 1 July 2026. During that meeting, the parties advised they had reached a full and final settlement on agreed terms. At the parties' joint request, the settlement terms were incorporated into a consent determination and became orders of the Authority. Both parties also sought confidentiality over the settlement terms and non-publication orders regarding their identities.

1. Whether the parties' settlement agreement should be recorded as orders of the Authority by consent — Status: Established (paras [1]-[3]).

The parties jointly requested that the terms of their signed settlement agreement be made orders of the Authority. The Authority accepted the settlement and, by consent, gave it the status of a formal determination and orders. No merits of the underlying claim were examined or determined.

2. Whether confidentiality should apply to the terms of the settlement — Status: Established (paras [4], [7]).

The parties requested that the settlement terms remain confidential. The Authority accepted this request; the original signed settlement is held on the Authority's file but is not attached to the published determination. An order prohibiting publication of the settlement's terms and content was made pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 to the Employment Relations Act 2000.

3. Whether non-publication orders should be made over the parties' names and identifying information — Status: Established (paras [5]-[7]).

The parties advanced grounds for non-publication of their identities. The Authority considered those grounds and, having regard to the parties' circumstances, found it appropriate to grant the orders sought. Pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 to the Employment Relations Act 2000, orders were made prohibiting publication of the parties' names, witness names, and any information likely to lead to their identification. Randomly generated three-letter strings were used in place of actual names.

The matter was resolved by consent; the settlement agreement was recorded as orders of the Authority, with confidentiality and non-publication orders granted.

The specific terms of the remedy are confidential and not disclosed in the determination. The settlement is recorded as full, final, and binding in respect of all employment-related matters between the parties. The settlement terms are held on the Authority's file and are not published.

Joyce Ungco (employee) brought personal grievance claims — including unjustified dismissal, sexual harassment, and unjustified disadvantage — against Stephen George Bennett (individual) and his now-deregistered company, Protect and Build Limited. The key preliminary questions were whether Mr Bennett should be joined personally to the proceedings under s 221 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether Ms Ungco should be granted leave under s 142Y(2) to pursue Mr Bennett personally for unpaid wages and entitlements given the company's insolvency. Both preliminary issues were resolved in Ms Ungco's favour, with the substantive merits reserved for a future investigation meeting.

Applicant: Joyce Ungco (employee)
Respondent: Stephen George Bennett (individual, sole director and shareholder of Protect and Build Limited)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: Respondent in person

Ms Ungco was engaged as a sponsored immigrant in January 2024, initially without an individual employment agreement, in circumstances complicated by a personal relationship and shared accommodation with Mr Bennett. It is alleged that Mr Bennett initially paid Ms Ungco from his personal bank account, and that once a formal individual employment agreement was in place naming his company Protect and Build Limited as employer, Mr Bennett continued to direct her work and personally administered pay and leave matters. Ms Ungco alleges she was unjustifiably dismissed, sexually harassed, and unjustifiably disadvantaged in her employment. Mr Bennett denies the grievance claims and asserts Ms Ungco was lawfully made redundant due to the company's insolvency, and that any harassment claims arise from a domestic relationship breakdown rather than an employment context. Protect and Build Limited has since been deregistered and is unable to meet any remedies. At a directions teleconference on 3 June 2026, the Authority identified two threshold questions — joinder of Mr Bennett and leave to pursue him for unpaid entitlements — to be resolved on the papers before a substantive hearing scheduled for 22–23 September 2026 in Christchurch.

1. Whether Mr Bennett should be joined as a party to the proceedings under s 221 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to enable the Authority to more effectively determine the merits of Ms Ungco's application — Status: Established (paras [4], [5], [6]).

Section 221 of the Act permits the Authority to join a person as a party where doing so would enable the Authority to more effectively determine the matters in dispute. Given the disputed identity of the employer (personal payments by Mr Bennett, his direction of Ms Ungco's work, and his administration of pay and leave matters alongside the company's nominal role), and the personal nature of the alleged harassment, the Authority found that joining Mr Bennett in his personal capacity was necessary to effectively determine the employment relationship issues and the personal grievance claims. No liability findings were made at this stage.

2. Whether the Authority should grant leave under s 142Y(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 for Ms Ungco to pursue Mr Bennett personally for any wages or other money owed, given the company's inability to pay — Status: Established (paras [4], [7], [8], [9], [10]).

Section 142Y of the Act allows an employee to seek to recover unpaid wages or other money from a person who is not the employer, where the default results from a breach of employment standards and that person was "involved in the breach" within the meaning of s 142W. The Employment Court in Lawton v Pencil Holdings Limited (in Liq) [2021] NZEmpC 199 confirmed that it is not a precondition to proceed against the primary violator — liability of an involved person is separate — but the breach and the person's involvement must still be proved. The Authority found that the circumstances disclosed a substantive issue as to Mr Bennett's personal involvement, particularly given his sole directorship and the company's failure to meet minimum employment obligations, and accordingly granted prior leave for Ms Ungco to pursue Mr Bennett for any entitlements that may be established at the substantive hearing.

3. Whether costs should be determined — Status: Not reached (para [13]).

Costs were reserved pending the conclusion of the substantive investigation meeting scheduled for 22–23 September 2026. No costs determination was made at this preliminary stage.

Both preliminary issues were resolved in the applicant's favour: Mr Bennett was joined as a party to the proceedings and prior leave was granted for Ms Ungco to pursue him personally for any unpaid entitlements, with all substantive merits and costs reserved for a future hearing.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination only. Substantive claims (unjustified dismissal, sexual harassment, unjustified disadvantage, and wage/entitlement recovery under s 142Y) will be determined at an investigation meeting on 22–23 September 2026 in Christchurch. Costs reserved until conclusion of the investigation meeting.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive Employment Relations Authority decision issued on 12 May 2026, in which Layth Abu-Laban (employee) succeeded against Everest Corporation Limited (employer) and ECL's counterclaims all failed. The key legal questions are whether a costs uplift above the daily tariff is warranted based on the weakness of ECL's counterclaims and the existence of a Calderbank offer that ECL failed to beat. The Authority awarded Mr Abu-Laban $6,200 (inclusive of GST) in costs plus the filing fee of $71.55.

Applicant: Layth Abu-Laban (employee)
Respondent: Everest Corporation Limited (employer)

Applicant: Danny Gelb, advocate
Respondent: Abdullah Khan

The substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 292, issued 12 May 2026) ordered ECL to pay Mr Abu-Laban $15,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and $13,258 (gross) under s 128(2) of the Act. ECL's counterclaims — including alleged poor workmanship and poor performance — were all dismissed, partly because the matters raised had not been addressed during the employment relationship and no documentary evidence was provided. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination and the parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, but were unable to do so. Mr Abu-Laban made a Calderbank offer on 7 July 2025 seeking $10,000 under s 123(c)(i) plus $3,500 (plus GST) towards legal costs; the substantive outcome was more favourable to Mr Abu-Laban than that offer. Mr Abu-Laban then applied to the Authority to determine costs.

1. Whether costs should be awarded and whether they should follow the event — Status: Established (paras [6]-[7]).

The Authority applied the standard principles under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and the Authority's Practice Direction, as articulated in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135. Costs are discretionary but generally follow the event. The starting point is the notional daily tariff, set at $4,500 for a one-day investigation meeting. Because Mr Abu-Laban was the successful party and ECL succeeded on none of its counterclaims, costs were awarded in Mr Abu-Laban's favour.

2. Whether an uplift on the daily tariff was warranted due to the weakness of ECL's counterclaims and the additional hearing time they caused — Status: Established (paras [8]-[9]).

The Authority applied the principle from JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175 that conduct which increases costs unnecessarily can justify an uplift. The counterclaims advanced by ECL — alleging poor workmanship and performance — had not been raised during the employment relationship and were unsupported by documentary evidence; three additional respondent witnesses were called, adding unnecessary hearing time. A modest uplift of $500 was granted on this basis.

3. Whether the Calderbank offer justified a further uplift on the daily tariff — Status: Established (paras [10]-[14]).

The Authority acknowledged, following Reid v Ngati Rangi Trust [2021] NZEmpC 110, that a Calderbank offer can be taken into account in costs decisions in the Authority, though costs should remain modest. Applying the public interest principle from Stevens v Hapag-Lloyd (NZ) Limited [2015] NZEmpC 137, the Authority noted that there is a public interest in encouraging parties to resolve disputes before a hearing. ECL failed to accept the Calderbank offer and the final outcome was more favourable to Mr Abu-Laban than the offer. Balancing the need for modesty against those factors, the Authority applied a further uplift of $1,200.

4. Whether the filing fee should be reimbursed — Status: Established (para [17]).

The Authority ordered ECL to reimburse Mr Abu-Laban the filing fee of $71.55 as a separate order alongside the costs award.

The costs application was upheld; ECL is ordered to pay Mr Abu-Laban $6,200 (inclusive of GST) in costs plus $71.55 in filing fees.

Costs: $6,200 (inclusive of GST), comprising the $4,500 daily tariff plus a $500 uplift for the unnecessary counterclaims and additional witnesses, plus a $1,200 uplift for the Calderbank offer. Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55. Both amounts payable within 28 days of the date of this determination (2 July 2026).

GND (employee, account manager) brought claims against YKB (employer, business materials supplier) for unjustified disadvantage, unjustified constructive dismissal, breach of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and breach of his individual employment agreement, following his suspension and subsequent resignation after allegations of indecent acts. The key legal questions were whether YKB's disciplinary process was procedurally fair and whether GND's resignation constituted a constructive dismissal. All of GND's claims were dismissed; however, YKB established that it had overpaid GND by $4,008.58, which he must repay.

Applicant: GND (employee, account manager)
Respondent: YKB (employer, business materials supplier)

Applicant: Nita Sadie, advocate
Respondent: David France, counsel

GND commenced full-time employment with YKB on or about 28 February 2022 as an account manager, having worked within YKB's group of companies since March 2019 — a total of approximately seven years with no prior disciplinary record. On 1 December 2025, YKB received a complaint from a German tourist that a man in a YKB-branded vehicle had performed an indecent act at a public carpark at Snells Beach; the vehicle was traced to GND. GND was called to a meeting that afternoon and suspended on full pay pending investigation; a second allegation of indecent conduct — involving the partner of a neighbouring customer — emerged at a further disciplinary meeting on 12 December 2025. At the conclusion of the 12 December meeting, GND penned a resignation letter stating it was effective immediately and that the parties mutually agreed to part ways; GND contends the resignation was coerced by the area manager, which YKB denies. GND raised personal grievances of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal on 22 December 2025, and the matter proceeded to investigation before Member Peter Fuiava on 21 May 2026. YKB also claimed it had inadvertently overpaid GND following his resignation due to payroll timing and a subsequent payroll error.

1. Non-publication order of applicant's name and associated identities — Status: Established (paras [1]-[5]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from MW v Spiga [2024] NZEmpC 147: first, whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected from publication; second, whether those consequences are significant enough to depart from open justice. The determination references two serious and salacious allegations of indecent conduct involving GND; the Authority took into account the best interests of GND's three school-aged children, the reputational interests of his wife (the sole income earner), and the privacy of the neighbouring customer and his partner. The Authority found cumulative adverse consequences outweighed the open justice principle and granted a permanent non-publication order of GND's name under Sch 2 cl 10 of the Act, also depersonalising the respondent's and all witnesses' names; access to the Authority file is otherwise prohibited without leave from the Chief of the Authority.

2. Unjustified disadvantage — whether GND was disadvantaged by the area manager's failure to disclose the meeting's purpose in the 1 December telephone call — Status: Dismissed (paras [32]-[35]).

The test for unjustified disadvantage under s 103(1)(b) requires that conditions of employment were affected to the employee's disadvantage by unjustifiable employer action. The Authority assessed credibility using a multi-factor framework (citing Teo v The Surrey Hotel [2025] NZERA 229), noting there were no other witnesses to the call and the contemporaneous letter did not resolve the dispute. The Authority found that GND, given the unusual nature of the call from a senior manager he rarely dealt with and the close proximity of a subsequent Police call, knew or reasonably ought to have known the 1 December meeting concerned a serious matter. This claim was dismissed.

3. Unjustified disadvantage — whether GND was disadvantaged by lack of disclosure of written statements and supporting documents prior to/at the 1 December meeting — Status: Dismissed (paras [36]-[37]).

The Authority applied the standard of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances, noting the complaint had been received only hours before the meeting. The Authority found it was unrealistic to expect YKB to produce written witness statements from complainants who were potential Police witnesses and not readily accessible. The claim for unjustified disadvantage due to want of disclosure failed.

4. Unjustified disadvantage — whether the suspension without prior consultation constituted unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[44]).

The Authority accepted that YKB failed to consult GND before suspending him, in breach of s 4(1A)(b) and s 4(1A)(c) of the Act (the duty to be active and constructive and to provide information and an opportunity to comment). However, the Authority found that the seriousness of the allegations warranted urgent action; GND himself accepted the seriousness warranted investigation, expressed no disapproval at the time, and said he did not want to hinder his employer's process. The Authority concluded GND had implicitly agreed to the suspension and that his employment had not in fact been disadvantaged as a result; accordingly the personal grievance claim of unjustified disadvantage arising from the suspension could not succeed.

5. Breach of good faith under s 4 of the Act (and associated penalty under s 4A) — Status: Dismissed (paras [42]-[43]).

Although the Authority found YKB technically breached s 4(1A)(b) and (c) by failing to consult before suspending GND, it held that the circumstances (gravity of the allegations, need for urgent action) meant the breach could not attract a penalty under s 4A, as the respondent did not act deliberately or with intent to undermine the employment agreement or relationship. No penalty was imposed.

6. Breach of individual employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [63]).

The Authority noted in its conclusion that the breach of contract claim had not been made out, without detailed separate analysis, given its findings on the other claims. No specific contractual breach was established.

7. Whether the area manager downplayed the seriousness of GND's situation, causing him unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[48]).

GND alleged the area manager's reassuring manner gave him a false sense of security, causing him not to obtain representation. The Authority found this assertion implausible given YKB's two written letters, which clearly stated the allegations were serious, that summary dismissal was possible, and which explicitly encouraged him to bring a support person or representative. The Authority gave no weight to GND's assertion about an unrecorded telephone call on 9 December that allegedly downplayed the situation.

8. Whether the Police not proceeding with charges affected the fairness of YKB's process — Status: Dismissed (paras [49]-[50]).

The Authority held that criminal and employment processes are separate; the Police's decision not to proceed was due to the tourists being unable to remain in New Zealand, not because of a "misunderstanding" as GND contended. YKB was entitled to continue its disciplinary process based on the complaint it had received and its own reputational and policy interests.

9. Whether the opinion of GND's former line manager (that GND was not the type to commit an indecent act) should be given weight — Status: Dismissed (para [45]).

The former line manager was not called as a witness and the evidence was therefore uncorroborated opinion evidence; the Authority gave it no weight.

10. Unjustified constructive dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [51]-[57]).

The Authority applied the three categories of constructive dismissal from Auckland Shop Employees Union IUOW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372: (i) resign or be dismissed, (ii) deliberate course of conduct to coerce resignation, (iii) employer breach causing resignation. The Authority preferred the evidence of the area manager and line manager, who said no decision had been made, that the investigation would have continued, and that GND did not have to resign. The two written letters had made clear no decision was yet made. The Authority also found that GND's secret audio recording of his line manager the following day did not support the forced resignation narrative. Applying Mikes Transport Warehouse v Vermuelen [2021] NZEmpC 197, the Authority found GND — an experienced seven-year employee — had voluntarily resigned and did not seek to retract the resignation. The constructive dismissal claim was dismissed.

11. Whether the without prejudice discussion at the 12 December meeting was procedurally improper — Status: Dismissed (paras [54]-[55]).

GND's advocate submitted there was no basis for a without prejudice discussion, citing s 57 of the Evidence Act 2006 (referenced in the determination as the Evidence Act 2026, likely a typographical error). The Authority held that s 57 does not require an existing dispute before a without prejudice discussion can occur; it governs privilege for settlement/mediation communications. The Authority rejected the submission that the without prejudice discussion demonstrated a predetermined outcome.

12. Post-employment interference claims (prospective employer references and alleged harassment at GND's home) — Status: Dismissed (paras [61]-[62]).

GND alleged YKB had interfered with his post-employment job search via personal connections to prospective employers, and that an unidentified male had approached his mother-in-law making reference to the indecency allegations. The Authority found GND conceded he had no proof; the allegations were speculative and could not be taken further.

13. YKB's counterclaim — overpayment of wages — Status: Established (paras [58]-[60], [63]).

YKB claimed it had inadvertently overpaid GND: once due to the timing of its monthly payroll run on the day of resignation (12 December 2025), and again due to a payroll error on 14 January 2026 that paid GND as if still employed. GND argued he had been promised two months' notice in lieu, but the Authority found no express provision for this in the resignation letter (which stated immediate effect) and that cl 15 of the employment agreement did not support the claim in the absence of express agreement. The Authority found YKB entitled to recover $4,008.58, leaving the repayment mechanism to be agreed between the parties, to be revisited in a costs determination if necessary.

14. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [64]-[65]).

The Authority reserved costs to allow the parties to negotiate a repayment plan for the overpayment. The Authority's preliminary view is that the notional tariff for a one-day fixture of $4,500 is likely to be adopted as a starting point, subject to adjustment. YKB may lodge a costs memorandum within 21 days if the parties cannot agree; GND has 14 days to reply from service of that memorandum.

All of GND's claims (unjustified disadvantage, unjustified constructive dismissal, breach of good faith, and breach of contract) were dismissed; YKB's counterclaim for overpayment of $4,008.58 was upheld.

None ordered in favour of the applicant.
Repayment to respondent: GND is required to repay YKB $4,008.58 representing inadvertent overpayment of wages following his resignation. The parties are directed to first discuss repayment arrangements between themselves; if no agreement is reached, the matter may be revisited in a costs determination.
Costs: Reserved. Preliminary view is that the $4,500 daily tariff (one-day fixture) will be the starting point. YKB may file a costs memorandum within 21 days if parties cannot agree; GND has 14 days to reply.

Filisi Beswick, a sales officer employed by Friendly Loans Limited (FLL) for over nine years, was dismissed on 29 October 2024 on the ground of medical incapacity after approximately three weeks' absence following a hospital visit for blurred vision and migraines. The key legal questions were whether the dismissal was unjustified, whether a deduction of $2,439.09 from her final pay was unlawful, and what remedies were appropriate. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified, the deduction unlawful, and awarded compensation for hurt and humiliation, lost wages, and reimbursement of the deducted sum.

Applicant: Filisi Beswick (employee)
Respondent: Friendly Loans Limited (employer)

Applicant: Joseph Slade, advocate
Respondent: John Pritchard (director of FLL, self-represented)

Ms Beswick was employed as a sales officer by FLL from 17 August 2015 until 29 October 2024 — a period of over nine years. On 4 October 2024 she attended hospital with blurred vision and migraines and received medical certificates rendering her unfit for work, with a driving restriction of one month. From 14 October 2024 she was on annual leave, as her sick leave was exhausted. FLL required her to produce a medical clearance certificate, a negative Covid-19 test, and confirmation of a valid driver's licence before returning, which she had not fully provided by 22 October 2024. On 29 October 2024 Ms Beswick emailed FLL confirming she had a negative Covid-19 test, a valid licence, and an updated medical certificate, and requested a face-to-face meeting; FLL responded by terminating her employment that same day under the employment agreement's medical incapacity clause. FLL also deducted $2,439.09 from her final pay, representing the outstanding balance of a personal loan FLL had made to her in May 2024, which Ms Beswick contended was unlawful. The matter did not proceed to mediation and was heard by the Authority at an investigation meeting on 12 May 2026.

1. Whether Ms Beswick was unjustifiably dismissed by FLL — Status: Established (paras [9]-[41]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, asking whether FLL's actions and processes were those of a fair and reasonable employer in all the circumstances. Applying case law including Dunn v Waitemata District Health Board [2014] NZEmpC 201, Lal v The Warehouse Limited [2017] NZEmpC 66, and Sheridan v Pact Group [2026] NZEmpC 51, the Authority held that a fair and reasonable employer must give the employee reasonable time to recover, conduct a proper inquiry into prognosis, seek meaningful input from the employee, and consider alternatives to dismissal. The Authority found FLL failed on all four counts: it could not establish Ms Beswick was incapable of performing her duties on 29 October 2024 (given her email confirming medical clearance, a valid licence, and a negative Covid test); it did not seek input from her before dismissing her; it dismissed after only approximately three weeks' absence (largely on annual leave); and it did not consider alternatives such as working from home. The dismissal was therefore unjustified.

2. Whether FLL unlawfully deducted $2,439.09 from Ms Beswick's wages and/or annual holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [42]-[50]).

The Authority considered whether the deduction was authorised under clause 7.6 of the employment agreement (a general deductions clause) and whether s 5(1A) of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA) had been complied with. The Authority held that clause 7.6, being a general deductions clause, did not capture a distinct commercial loan arrangement between the parties; moreover, s 5(1A) WPA prohibits a specific deduction pursuant to a general deductions clause without prior consultation with the employee, which did not occur. A separate clause about settling "staff or credit accounts" was noted but not treated as a general deductions clause. The deduction was therefore unlawful under s 11 of the WPA.

3. Whether Ms Beswick should be reimbursed the $2,439.09 unlawfully deducted — Status: Established (para [50]).

Having found the deduction unlawful, the Authority ordered FLL to pay Ms Beswick $2,439.09 pursuant to s 11 of the WPA within 28 days, as the statutory consequence of a finding of unlawful deduction.

4. Whether Ms Beswick was entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [51]-[55]).

The Authority applied the principle that compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) is for emotional harm suffered as a result of the grievance, not a punitive measure (Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield [1993] 1 ERNZ 344). It accepted that the dismissal had a substantial negative impact on Ms Beswick's emotional health: she was dismissed within three weeks of a hospitalisation, was unable to meet with her employer to explain her condition (contrary to her Tongan cultural values), and felt denied a fair hearing. Having regard to comparable cases (Davey v Prime Range Meats Limited [2012] NZERA; Drylie v Mana Cruising Club Inc [2019] NZERA 469), the Authority awarded $12,000.

5. Whether Ms Beswick was entitled to reimbursement of lost wages under s 128 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [56]-[59]).

The Authority considered Ms Beswick's failure to secure new employment until May 2025. It noted she was medically unfit for work for the three months following dismissal (supported by medical certificates dated November 2024 and February 2025) and was also struggling emotionally with the circumstances of her dismissal. Applying Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190 and Nath v Advance International Cleaning Systems (NZ) Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 101, the Authority found it was reasonable for Ms Beswick not to seek alternative work in that period and that medical unfitness alone does not automatically preclude a three-month lost wages award. WINZ payments received were put to one side (Judea Tavern Limited v Jesson [2017] NZEmpC 82). The Authority awarded the equivalent of three months' salary: $9,997 (gross).

6. Whether remedies should be reduced due to Ms Beswick's contribution under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [60]-[72]).

The Authority identified Ms Beswick's delayed communication with FLL (a two-day gap from 27–28 October 2024) as the only potential basis for a contribution reduction, and asked whether that conduct was culpable or blameworthy (Yang v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand [2025] NZEmpC at [63]). Applying a balancing exercise, the Authority found the delay was short, Ms Beswick was on annual leave during the period, she was not warned her employment was at risk, FLL itself made no contact on those two days, and FLL had an obligation to seek meaningful input before dismissing. No reduction was applied.

7. Whether either party is entitled to an award of costs — Status: Not reached (paras [74]-[76]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Beswick may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with FLL having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its standard daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claims were upheld in full: unjustified dismissal was established, the wage deduction was found unlawful, no contribution reduction was applied, and remedies were awarded on all heads claimed.

- Reimbursement of unlawful deduction: $2,439.09 (under s 11 WPA), payable within 28 days.
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings: $12,000 (under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000), payable within 28 days.
- Lost wages: $9,997 (gross) (representing 3 months' salary, under s 128(2) of the Act), payable within 28 days.
- Total monetary orders: $24,436.09.
- Reinstatement: Not ordered.
- Costs: Reserved; parties to attempt resolution, with process for Authority determination if needed.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from a personal grievance claim by Jeanette Go (employee) against Point Limited (employer) following a flawed redundancy process. The substantive merits were resolved in a prior determination ([2026] NZERA 369), with costs reserved. The key question was the appropriate level of costs contribution, including whether any reduction was warranted due to Ms Go's unsuccessful preliminary determination on employer identity. The Authority ordered Point Limited to pay Ms Go $2,750.00 as a contribution to costs.

Applicant: Jeanette Go (employee)
Respondent: Point Limited (employer)

Applicant: Pamela Greenlee, advocate
Respondent: Danny Gelb, advocate

Ms Go brought a personal grievance claim against Point Limited arising from a flawed redundancy process, which was resolved in a substantive determination dated 11 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 369). In that determination, costs were reserved to allow the parties to negotiate the issue between themselves. The parties were unable to agree, and Ms Go filed submissions seeking a costs contribution of $6,000.00. The investigation meeting ran for slightly over half a day. A preliminary determination had previously found that Point Limited was Ms Go's employer, though Ms Go had been the unsuccessful party in that preliminary matter; the Authority noted in that earlier determination that Point's communications had been confusing. Point Limited argued for modest costs, citing its success in the preliminary matter, its early concession of substantial liability, the limited live issues, and the claimed amount being disproportionate.

1. Whether Ms Go, as the successful party in the substantive investigation, was entitled to a costs contribution — Status: Established (paras [11], [15]).

The Authority applied the well-settled principles from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, which confirm that costs are discretionary, consistent with the Authority's equity and good conscience jurisdiction, generally follow the event, and should be modest and reasonable. Ms Go succeeded in the substantive investigation and costs ordinarily follow that result. The Authority ordered Point Limited to pay a costs contribution accordingly.

2. Whether the quantum of costs should reflect one and a half days of advocate time (preparation, attendance, and post-hearing submissions), as claimed at $6,000.00 — Status: Dismissed (paras [4]–[5], [12], [14]).

Ms Greenlee sought $6,000.00 based on one and a half days of advocate time, exceeding the standard daily tariff of $4,500.00. The Authority noted it does not ordinarily award costs for preparation time or for costs submissions. Taking into account the length of the investigation (slightly over half a day) and the nature of the issues, the Authority found $6,000.00 disproportionate and awarded the lesser sum of $2,750.00.

3. Whether the costs award should be reduced due to Ms Go's lack of success in the preliminary determination regarding the identity of the employer — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]–[7], [13]).

Point Limited argued that Ms Go's failure in the preliminary employer-identity determination warranted a reduction in any costs award in her favour. The Authority acknowledged that Ms Go was the unsuccessful party in that preliminary stage but noted its earlier observation that Point's own communications had been confusing. Giving little weight to the preliminary determination outcome, the Authority declined to make a significant reduction on this basis, though the overall modest award implicitly reflects the totality of circumstances.

The costs application was partially upheld; Ms Go was awarded $2,750.00 as a contribution to costs, less than the $6,000.00 sought.

Costs contribution: $2,750.00 payable by Point Limited to Jeanette Go, pursuant to clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were determined in [2026] NZERA 369).

[COSTS ONLY]

Wiremu Caldwell (employee) brought claims against the Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki, which were dismissed in a prior determination dated 2 June 2026. This determination deals solely with costs following that dismissal. The parties resolved costs by consent, resulting in an order requiring Mr Caldwell to pay $8,875.00 to the respondent.

Applicant: Wiremu Caldwell (employee)
Respondent: The Chief Executive, Oranga Tamariki (employer)

Applicant: Andrew McKenzie, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Hamish Kynaston, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Caldwell brought employment claims against Oranga Tamariki, the details of which were addressed in an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 340) dated 2 June 2026, in which his claims were dismissed. Following that dismissal, the parties negotiated costs and reached agreement, confirmed by a joint memorandum of counsel dated 30 June 2026. No investigation meeting was held; the matter was dealt with on the papers. The agreed costs figure of $8,875.00 was submitted to the Authority for formalisation as a consent order.

1. Costs — Status: Established by consent (paras [2]-[3]).

The parties resolved costs by agreement and confirmed the terms in a joint memorandum of counsel dated 30 June 2026. No contested costs analysis was required. The Authority adopted the agreed figure and issued it as a formal order, making it a binding determination of the Authority. The order requires Mr Caldwell to pay $8,875.00 to the respondent.

The costs determination was made by consent, ordering Mr Caldwell to pay $8,875.00 to the respondent.

Costs: $8,875.00 payable by the applicant (Mr Caldwell) to the respondent, ordered by consent.