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Liam Ryan claimed that his engagement with Orbit Marketing Limited since November 2020 constituted an employment relationship, entitling him to unpaid wages, holiday pay, and remedies for alleged unjustifiable disadvantage. The threshold legal question was whether Mr Ryan was an employee or an independent contractor/business partner, as the Authority's jurisdiction over all substantive claims depended on resolving this issue. The Authority found that Mr Ryan was not an employee and dismissed his application, leaving the substantive claims outside the Authority's jurisdiction.

Applicant: Liam Ryan (alleged employee/applicant)
Respondent: Orbit Marketing Limited (employer/respondent)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Grant Edmundson, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Ryan, a Wellington-based sales and marketing professional, entered into discussions with Orbit Marketing Limited (a startup nationwide marketing company) in 2020 following his redundancy. On 29 May 2020, Mr Ryan and Orbit signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing him as a prospective co-owner and partner, with remuneration structured around hourly charge-out rates and profit share; no employment relationship was contemplated. In December 2021, Mr Ryan became a director and 12.5% shareholder pursuant to a Shareholders Agreement, which also did not provide for an employment relationship. From February 2023, Mr Ryan also signed an independent contractor agreement (and an Independent Contractor Handbook) for a separate Brand Ambassador role with Orbit. In October 2023, Orbit offered Mr Ryan an individual employment agreement backdated to 1 November 2020, but the parties never concluded the agreement due to unresolved disputes over its terms; Mr Ryan continued working with Orbit until May 2026, when he ceased involvement but retained his 12.5% shareholding. Mr Ryan claimed he had been an employee throughout, was owed unpaid wages and holiday pay, and had suffered unjustifiable disadvantage, while Orbit maintained he was at all times an independent contractor and co-owner.

1. Whether Mr Ryan was an employee of Orbit Marketing Limited (the threshold jurisdictional issue) — Status: Dismissed (paras [1]-[72]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA), which requires determination of the "real nature" of the relationship by considering all relevant matters including intention, without treating any single statement as determinative. Following the Supreme Court's approach in Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 34 and Rasier Operations BV v E Inc [2025] NZSC 162, the Authority assessed: (a) the parties' common intention from written and oral terms; (b) how the relationship operated in practice; and (c) the control, integration, and fundamental (economic reality) tests. The Authority found no clear common intention of employment — the MOU and Shareholders Agreement established a partnership/co-ownership structure, and the 2023 employment agreement was never signed or its terms agreed. Applying all three common law tests, none was conclusive of an employment relationship: control was not exercised beyond reasonable business direction; integration reflected Mr Ryan's role as a director/co-owner rather than as an employee; and the economic reality (including profit share payments, withholding tax treatment, ACC responsibility, ability to perform other work, and the absence of invoicing) was more consistent with an owner-operator or contractor arrangement. On the balance of probabilities, Mr Ryan was not an employee at any time.

2. Whether the February 2026 "specified contractor" amendments to s 6 of the ERA applied to Mr Ryan's status determination — Status: Not reached (paras [25]).

The Authority noted that s 6 was amended in February 2026 to introduce a definition of "specified contractor." However, because Mr Ryan lodged his Statement of Problem on 17 December 2025 (before 21 February 2026), the transitional provisions in Schedule 1AA cl 27 of the ERA meant the pre-amendment law applied to his claim, and the specified contractor provisions did not need to be considered further.

3. Whether the October 2023 employment agreement (unsigned) could establish an employment relationship — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[41]).

The Authority applied s 64(6) of the ERA, which provides that an intended agreement must not be treated as an employee's employment agreement unless the employee has signed it or agreed to its terms. While Orbit offered an employment agreement in October 2023 and Mr Ryan did not sign it, the parties engaged in extensive and ongoing negotiations about its terms without ever concluding an agreement. The Authority found that the agreement could not be taken as establishing an employment relationship, and that Mr Ryan's failure to sign — combined with prolonged unresolved discussions — confirmed no concluded employment agreement ever came into existence.

4. Substantive claims (unpaid wages, holiday pay, and unjustifiable disadvantage) — Status: Not reached (paras [3]-[4], [72]).

Because Mr Ryan could not establish that he was ever an employee, the Authority found it had no jurisdiction to investigate or determine the substantive claims for unpaid wages, holiday pay, or unjustifiable disadvantage. These claims were accordingly not considered on their merits.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [73]-[75]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If costs cannot be agreed, Orbit (as the successful party) may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, and Mr Ryan has 14 days from service to file a reply. The Authority indicated it would determine costs on the usual daily tariff basis if required.

The claim was dismissed in full; Mr Ryan failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that he was ever an employee of Orbit Marketing Limited, and the Authority therefore had no jurisdiction to consider his substantive claims.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending agreement between the parties or further application by Orbit within 28 days.

The Association of Professionals and Executive Employees (APEX) applied urgently for referral to facilitated bargaining under section 50B of the Employment Relations Act 2000 in the context of collective bargaining with Canterbury SCL Ltd and associated employer companies providing medical laboratory services. APEX alleged both a serious and sustained breach of good faith by the Respondent and that a proposed strike would likely substantially affect the public interest. The Authority granted the application for urgent facilitation on the public interest ground alone, finding the good faith breach argument premature, and ordered the parties to proceed to facilitation.

Applicant: Association of Professionals and Executive Employees (APEX) (union)
Respondent: Canterbury SCL Ltd and Others (employers providing medical laboratory services)

Applicant: Omar Hamed, advocate
Respondent: Diana Hudson, counsel

APEX and the Respondent group of companies (covering multiple entities across several New Zealand regions) are parties to collective agreements due to expire on 30 October 2026, with bargaining for a Multi-Employer Collective Agreement initiated by APEX on 4 September 2026. Prior to formal bargaining, the parties had been in dispute since late June 2026 about the Bargaining Process Agreement (BPA) and Life Preserving Services (LPS) arrangements, with the Respondent taking the position that these matters needed to be resolved before substantive bargaining could commence. APEX alleged this amounted to a refusal to bargain and a breach of the duty of good faith under section 4 of the Act. The parties attended mediation on 1 October 2026, which was unsuccessful, and APEX subsequently issued a 24-hour strike notice for 2 November 2026, with balloting underway for a further 72-hour strike. The Respondent consented to facilitation but only on the ground that the proposed strike would likely substantially affect the public interest, not on the good faith ground, and the parties agreed that approximately 620 union members were covered and that a strike would likely substantially affect public interest.

1. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(d) of the Act (proposed strike likely to substantially affect the public interest) is made out — Status: Established (paras [7]-[8], [10]).

Section 50C(1)(d) requires that parties have proposed a strike which, if it occurred, would be likely to affect the public interest substantially. The Authority found this ground was satisfied, noting that APEX had issued a strike notice for a 24-hour withdrawal of labour and was balloting for a further 72-hour strike, both parties agreed on the significance of the public interest impact given coverage of around 620 members performing urgent laboratory services for public health, and the nature of the Respondent's services (including urgent laboratory work under long-term contracts with Health New Zealand) reinforced the likelihood of substantial public impact. No authority cited beyond the statutory provision itself.

2. Whether the ground under s 50C(1)(a) of the Act (serious and sustained failure to comply with the duty of good faith under s 4 that has undermined bargaining) is made out — Status: Dismissed (para [9]).

Section 50C(1)(a) requires that a party has failed to comply with the duty of good faith in section 4 of the Act, that the failure was serious and sustained, and that it undermined bargaining. The Authority declined to make any finding on this ground, stating that any argument that the Respondent's conduct constituted a breach of good faith or that such a breach was serious and sustained was premature at this stage. As facilitation was already granted on the s 50C(1)(d) ground, no further analysis of the good faith allegation was required.

3. Whether urgency should be granted for the facilitation application — Status: Established (para [8]).

The Authority granted urgency on the basis that the proposed strike, if it occurred, would be likely to substantially affect the public interest, having regard to the nature of the laboratory services provided and the proximity of industrial action. The imminent expiry of collective agreements and the issued strike notice for 2 November 2026 supported urgency.

4. Whether costs should be ordered — Status: Dismissed (para [13]).

The Authority made no order for costs, noting that all parties were willing to attend facilitation and the application was cooperative in nature.

The application for urgent facilitation was upheld on the public interest ground under s 50C(1)(d), with the good faith ground dismissed as premature and no costs ordered.

Facilitation ordered: The Authority ordered the parties to engage in facilitation to assist them toward settlement of new collective agreement(s). A case management conference is to be convened as soon as possible to arrange urgent facilitation, to be conducted by a different Authority Member. No monetary remedy ordered. No costs ordered.

[COSTS ONLY]

Janet Ashe (applicant) had her employment-related claims dismissed by the Authority in a prior determination ([2026] NZERA 690) on the basis that she had elected to have those claims heard by the Human Rights Review Tribunal, leaving the Authority without jurisdiction. This determination deals solely with the costs arising from that earlier jurisdictional ruling. The Board sought full indemnity costs of $5,610.00, but the Authority applied a standard tariff-based approach with a modest uplift and ordered Ms Ashe to pay $3,280.00.

Applicant: Janet Ashe (employee/claimant)
Respondent: The Tomarata School Board of Trustees (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in Person)
Respondent: Jess Keating, counsel for the Respondent

In a prior determination dated 22 September 2026 ([2026] NZERA 690), the Authority found that Ms Ashe had elected to have her claims heard by the Human Rights Review Tribunal, and accordingly the Authority had no jurisdiction to continue. Costs were reserved in that determination and the parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, but were unable to do so. The Board sought its full actual costs of $5,610.00, arguing that indemnity costs were warranted because Ms Ashe had filed meritless complaints, lacked understanding of cross-jurisdictional filing, and had caused the Board to defend multiple proceedings. The Board also relied on the fact that it had made a settlement offer on costs (with instalment options) on 29 September 2026, which Ms Ashe declined. Ms Ashe argued either that costs should be reserved pending any challenge to the earlier determination, or that costs should lie where they fell; she also disputed that her conduct unnecessarily increased costs, noting she had received some advocate advice and paid a filing fee.

1. Whether costs should be reserved pending a potential challenge to the prior jurisdictional determination — Status: Dismissed (paras [18]).

The Authority declined to reserve costs pending any challenge, finding that the Authority is best placed to determine costs as sought and that a court could revisit the position if a challenge succeeds. No authority was cited for this proposition; it was treated as a matter of case management discretion.

2. Whether indemnity (full actual) costs of $5,610.00 should be awarded against Ms Ashe — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]-[10], [15]-[22]).

The Board argued for full indemnity costs on the basis that Ms Ashe repeatedly filed meritless claims, misunderstood cross-jurisdictional rules, and declined a reasonable settlement offer. The Authority applied the settled principles from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, which hold that costs awards in the Authority are discretionary, consistent with equity and good conscience, and generally modest and reasonable. The Authority declined to award full indemnity costs, instead applying the standard daily tariff framework.

3. Whether a contribution to costs should be awarded in favour of the Board, and at what level — Status: Established (paras [15]-[22]).

Costs ordinarily follow the event, and Ms Ashe was wholly unsuccessful in the preliminary determination. The Authority used the normal daily tariff ($4,500 for a full day's investigation) and took a half-day investigation as the appropriate starting point for a matter determined on the papers, consistent with the approach illustrated in Gate Gourmet New Zealand Ltd v Aviation Workers United Inc [2024] NZERA 642. A small uplift was applied to reflect the Board's attempt to resolve costs by way of a settlement offer before seeking an Authority determination. The resulting award was $3,280.00.

The claim for full indemnity costs was partially upheld; Ms Ashe was ordered to pay a contribution to costs of $3,280.00 in favour of the Board.

Costs: $3,280.00 ordered to be paid by Ms Ashe (Janet Ashe) to The Tomarata School Board of Trustees, pursuant to clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. No other remedies ordered. This is a final costs determination (not interim or provisional), though the Authority acknowledged a court could revisit it if a challenge to the underlying determination succeeds.

Igreta Sinanaj, a Compliance Officer employed by Consilium NZ Limited, resigned after receiving a written warning concerning her workplace conduct and collaboration, and raised personal grievances for unjustified dismissal (constructive), unjustified disadvantage, discrimination, and breach of good faith. The key legal questions were whether Consilium's disciplinary process and resulting written warning were justified, whether the resignation amounted to constructive dismissal, and whether discrimination or good faith breaches occurred. The Authority found entirely in favour of Consilium, dismissing all claims.

Applicant: Igreta Sinanaj (employee)
Respondent: Consilium NZ Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Lucy Jenkins and Isabella Peacock-Price, counsel for the Respondent

Igreta Sinanaj was employed by Consilium NZ Limited as a Compliance Officer from approximately February/March 2022. From late 2023 Consilium developed concerns about Ms Sinanaj's workplace conduct, particularly regarding her collaboration with colleagues and working style, and by early 2024 considered these concerns showed a continuing pattern. Consilium delayed formal action during 2024 to allow Ms Sinanaj time to grieve the death of her partner. Concerns re-emerged in late 2024, culminating in a failed team meeting on 31 March 2025, after which Consilium commenced a formal disciplinary process. A disciplinary meeting was held on 14 April 2025, followed by further correspondence and meetings; on 6 May 2025 Consilium issued Ms Sinanaj with a written warning. Ms Sinanaj went on sick leave the following day and resigned on 28 May 2025, claiming her resignation was a constructive dismissal caused by the unjustified warning, an unsafe work environment, discrimination based on her cultural background, and breaches of good faith. Consilium denied all allegations, maintaining its process and the warning were justified.

1. Whether Consilium's disciplinary process was justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [43]-[47]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, asking whether Consilium acted as a fair and reasonable employer could in all the circumstances, informed by the good faith obligations in s 4(1A) of the Act. The Authority required Consilium to show it properly investigated concerns, clearly communicated those concerns and their possible implications, gave Ms Sinanaj a genuine opportunity to respond, and considered her responses before deciding. The Authority found Consilium satisfied each element: concerns were thoroughly investigated over an extended period, clearly communicated with relevant information, responded to through an unusually comprehensive process (including multiple meetings and written exchanges), and Ms Sinanaj's responses were carefully considered before the decision was made. The process was found to be justified and consistent with good faith obligations.

2. Whether the written warning issued on 6 May 2025 was substantively justified — Status: Established (paras [48]-[50]).

The Authority reviewed all evidence of the disciplinary history, meeting transcripts, and subsequent correspondence and concluded without doubt that the written warning fell within the range of sanctions a fair and reasonable employer could impose. The Authority found the warning was based on clear and evidenced concerns about Ms Sinanaj's workplace interactions, not on misrepresentations, bias, or subjective opinion. No specific external authorities were cited; the s 103A standard was applied. The warning was found to be substantively justified.

3. Whether the expectations imposed on Ms Sinanaj as part of the written warning were justified — Status: Established (para [51]).

The Authority found that the expectations imposed on Ms Sinanaj alongside the written warning were appropriate, clear, and achievable, and that Consilium had provided adequate guidance on how they could be met. No detailed separate analysis was provided; the finding followed from the overall justification assessment. The expectations were upheld as reasonable.

4. Whether Ms Sinanaj's resignation constituted a constructive (unjustified) dismissal — Status: Dismissed (para [54](a)).

The Authority noted that Ms Sinanaj had not been dismissed but had resigned, and her claim of constructive dismissal required her to show that Consilium had breached duties owed to her such that resignation was a justified response. Because the Authority found Consilium had not breached any duty — its process, warning, and expectations were all justified — there was no underlying breach to ground a constructive dismissal claim. The grievance for unjustified dismissal was therefore dismissed.

5. Whether Consilium's actions gave rise to an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance — Status: Dismissed (para [54](b)).

The Authority found no basis for an unjustified disadvantage grievance because all of Consilium's actions — the disciplinary process, the warning, and the expectations — were justified under the s 103A standard. No separate analysis was required beyond the justification findings already made.

6. Whether Consilium discriminated against or harassed Ms Sinanaj (including on the basis of her cultural background, personal circumstances, and communication preferences) — Status: Dismissed (paras [52](d), [54](c)).

Ms Sinanaj alleged Consilium unfairly judged her based on her tone, communication style, and demeanour, which she said were products of her cultural background, grief, and personal communication preferences. The Authority found that Consilium appropriately recognised and discussed these personal characteristics in its assessment, and there was no unfair judging or discrimination. The discrimination and harassment grievance was dismissed.

7. Whether Consilium breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [52](c), [54](d)).

Ms Sinanaj alleged repeated biased and subjective judgements and a lack of clarity, support, and fairness, amounting to a breach of good faith. The Authority found the process met the obligations under s 4(1A) and that Consilium acted as a fair and reasonable employer throughout. No breach of good faith was established.

8. Whether Consilium failed to provide a safe work environment — Status: Dismissed (paras [52](b), [54](e)).

Ms Sinanaj claimed the disciplinary process and warning created an unsafe workplace making resignation her only option, and alleged the conduct amounted to workplace mobbing. The Authority found the opposite: the process was conducted safely, providing Ms Sinanaj an open forum to discuss team behaviour, assessed her conduct objectively in the context of the whole team's dynamics, and any allegation of mobbing was unfounded.

9. Whether Consilium breached its own policies and Code of Conduct in relation to the disciplinary process — Status: Dismissed (paras [52](e), [54]).

Ms Sinanaj alleged Consilium failed to follow its own internal policies and Code of Conduct in conducting the disciplinary process. The Authority found no evidence to support this allegation.

10. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [59]-[61]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, Consilium may file a costs memorandum within 28 days; Ms Sinanaj then has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its standard daily tariff basis unless circumstances warrant adjustment.

All of Ms Sinanaj's claims were dismissed; the employment relationship problem was resolved entirely in favour of Consilium NZ Limited.

None ordered. Costs are reserved pending the parties' attempts to resolve the issue between themselves, with a process set out for filing memoranda if agreement cannot be reached.

This is a supplementary determination dealing solely with an interim non-publication application made by WZZ (the Respondent in the underlying employment dispute) in relation to a previously published ERA determination ([2026] NZERA 700). The Respondent sought interim and permanent non-publication orders on the basis that the published determination identifies a law firm and its principals and contains serious allegations of unethical practice. The Authority granted an interim non-publication order, temporarily removing the determination from the ERA website, while reserving the question of permanent non-publication for further submissions from both parties.

Applicant: YXZ (identity suppressed; role in underlying dispute not further specified in this determination)
Respondent: WZZ (identity suppressed; described as legal professionals/principals of a law firm)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

WZZ applied for both an interim and a permanent non-publication order in respect of an ERA determination ([2026] NZERA 700) already published on the Authority's website. The basis for the application was that the published determination named a law firm and its principals and included serious allegations of unethical practice, including reference to a regulatory complaint. WZZ argued that publication caused damage to the professional reputation of those principals and had cultural and family impacts. YXZ opposed the making of any non-publication orders. No application for non-publication had been made prior to the investigation of the underlying matter, despite WZZ's principals being legal professionals with legal representation. This supplementary determination addresses only the interim application, with the permanent non-publication question to be determined after both parties provide submissions.

1. Whether an interim non-publication order should be granted in respect of determination [2026] NZERA 700 — Status: Established (paras [5]-[13]).

The Authority applied the open justice principle as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135, which requires a high standard to be met before departing from open justice, with specific adverse consequences or other sound reasons needed to justify non-publication. The Authority noted that parties are on notice that ERA determinations are public, and that no application was made before the investigation despite the Respondent having legal representation. Nonetheless, recognising that submissions from both parties had not yet been considered on the permanent order question, the Authority granted an interim order: parties are to be identified only by initials with no correlation to their actual names (under Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000), and determination [2026] NZERA 700 is to be temporarily removed from the ERA website until further order.

2. Whether a permanent non-publication order should be granted — Status: Not reached (paras [10]-[11]).

The Authority expressly reserved this question for further consideration after both parties have filed submissions. The high standard for permanent non-publication (Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135) has not yet been assessed on the merits; the interim order is purely protective pending that full consideration.

3. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [14]).

Costs were reserved pending determination of the substantive (permanent non-publication) matter and no costs order was made at this stage.

The interim non-publication application was upheld; the permanent non-publication application and costs were reserved for further determination.

Interim non-publication order granted: parties identified by initials only (with no correlation to actual names) pursuant to Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000; determination [2026] NZERA 700 removed from the ERA website until further order. No monetary remedy ordered. Costs reserved. This determination is interim and conditional, with permanent non-publication to be determined after further submissions.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from earlier substantive proceedings in which Stefan Vujcich (employee) succeeded in his personal grievance claim against his former employer Apricity NZ Management Limited (in liquidation), but failed in his personal claims against directors Andrew Meakin and Linden Toll. Mr Meakin, as the successful party in the substantive hearing, sought an uplifted costs award, while Mr Vujcich argued costs should lie where they fall given the mixed outcome and his financial hardship. The Authority awarded Mr Meakin $6,500 in costs, declining the requested uplift but applying modest reductions to the standard daily tariff.

Applicant: Stefan Vujcich (employee)
Respondent: Apricity NZ Management Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent/employer); Andrew Meakin (Second Respondent/director); Linden Toll (Third Respondent/director)

Applicant: Greg Burt, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Alexandria Till, counsel for the second respondent; No appearance for first and third respondents

Stefan Vujcich brought personal grievance proceedings against his former employer Apricity NZ Management Limited and personal claims against two directors, Andrew Meakin and Linden Toll. In the substantive determination ([2024] NZERA 623), the Authority found Mr Vujcich had been unjustifiably dismissed and awarded him $18,000 against Apricity NZ, which was by then in liquidation. The claims against Mr Meakin and Mr Toll personally were not established. Earlier in the proceedings, Mr Meakin's application to be struck out as a party was unsuccessful ([2024] NZERA 148), with costs on that application reserved. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves. Mr Meakin sought costs at or above the daily tariff rate, while Mr Vujcich argued for costs to lie where they fall, citing mixed success, financial hardship, and the practical reality that he would not recover the $18,000 awarded against the insolvent company.

1. Whether Mr Meakin is entitled to a costs award as the successful party in the substantive proceedings — Status: Established (paras [20], [22]-[23]).

Under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority has a discretionary power to award costs, guided by principles including that costs generally follow the event, awards should be modest, and conduct may be a factor in adjusting awards. The Authority found that Mr Meakin successfully defended the substantive personal claims against him and was properly regarded as the successful party, warranting a costs order in his favour. The Authority rejected Mr Vujcich's argument that the insolvency of Apricity NZ and his non-recovery of the $18,000 award should displace this outcome, noting Mr Vujcich should have factored the risk of non-recovery into his decision to continue against a company in liquidation.

2. Whether an uplift above the standard daily tariff was warranted — Status: Dismissed (para [21]).

Mr Meakin sought an uplift on the basis of several factors said to have increased his costs, including Apricity NZ being unrepresented, late amendments to pleadings, witness non-attendance, extended meeting time, and travel/accommodation disbursements. The Authority declined each ground: the claim was not without foundation (as shown by the failed strike-out); the employer's unrepresented status was outside Mr Vujcich's control; pleading amendments did not justify uplift in the circumstances; witness non-attendance did not demonstrably increase costs; additional meeting time from self-representation (compounded by late withdrawal of Mr Vujcich's counsel) should not attract a higher award; document bundle preparation is not ordinarily a basis for uplift; and disbursements for travel, food and accommodation are not the normal practice of the Authority, with no basis for departure here.

3. Whether costs on the costs submissions themselves should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [21(h)]).

Mr Meakin sought $1,500 plus GST for preparation of the costs submissions. The Authority noted it does not ordinarily award costs on costs applications and was not persuaded to make an exception in this case.

4. Whether a reduction from the daily tariff should be made to reflect Mr Vujcich's success in defending the strike-out application — Status: Established (para [24]).

Mr Vujcich successfully defended Mr Meakin's strike-out application, and the costs on that application had been reserved. The Authority applied a $1,000 reduction from the tariff starting point of $8,000 to reflect that success.

5. Whether financial hardship to Mr Vujcich justified a further reduction or a "costs lie where they fall" order — Status: Partially established (para [25]).

Mr Vujcich submitted affidavit evidence of significant financial hardship, arguing this warranted either no costs order or a reduced one. The Authority gave only limited weight to the affidavit because it was not recent, but nonetheless applied a small further reduction, resulting in a total costs award of $6,500 (no GST). The primary position — that costs should lie where they fall — was rejected.

6. Whether Mr Vujcich was entitled to a cross-award of $1,434 in costs for successfully defending the strike-out application — Status: Dismissed (paras [12], [24]).

Mr Vujcich argued he should receive $1,434 for successfully defending the strike-out application, calculated by reference to High Court Rules Guideline Scale. The Authority instead treated that success as a factor reducing Mr Meakin's costs award (a $1,000 reduction), rather than making a separate cross-award to Mr Vujcich.

The claim for costs was partially upheld: Mr Meakin's application for costs succeeded at the standard tariff level (with reductions), but the requested uplift and disbursements were declined.

Costs: Mr Vujcich is ordered to pay $6,500 (no GST) to Andrew Meakin within 28 days of the date of the determination (12 October 2026). No uplift, disbursements, or costs-on-costs awarded. No remedy ordered in favour of Mr Vujcich.

Amrit Pal Singh, a migrant cook employed by Bluemoonskynzz Limited (trading as Titirangi Indian Kitchen and Ambrosia Bar and Restaurant), brought claims for unjustified dismissal, wage arrears, unpaid public and annual holidays, rest and meal break breaches, and various statutory penalty claims against his employer and its sole director, Dil Barala. The key legal questions concerned whether the personal grievance was raised in time, whether Mr Singh was unjustifiably dismissed by abandonment of rostering, and whether BMSL had systematically underpaid and mistreated Mr Singh over more than two years. The Authority upheld all substantive claims and ordered total monetary awards exceeding $230,000 against BMSL, plus penalties against both BMSL and Mr Barala.

Applicant: Amrit Pal Singh (employee/cook)
Respondent: Bluemoonskynzz Limited (first respondent/employer) and Dil Barala (second respondent/sole director)

Applicant: Dr Rekha Arya, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

Amrit Pal Singh, a migrant worker, commenced employment as a cook with Bluemoonskynzz Limited (BMSL) on 25 September 2023 under an accredited employer work visa. BMSL is operated by its sole director, Dil Barala, and runs two restaurants: Titirangi Indian Kitchen and Ambrosia Bar and Restaurant in Beachlands. Mr Singh alleges he was required to work over 70 hours per week, was not provided with a signed individual employment agreement, was paid inconsistently and far below what he was owed, and was given no rest or meal breaks. From November 2025, Mr Singh raised concerns about unpaid wages, after which BMSL abruptly ceased all communication, stopped rostering him, and paid his final wages on 30 November 2025. Mr Singh lodged a statement of problem on 17 March 2026, outside the 90-day grievance notification period; he sought leave to raise his grievance out of time on the basis of exceptional circumstances, including that he never received a signed employment agreement containing the required dispute resolution explanation. BMSL and Mr Barala failed to appear, file evidence, or provide requested wage and time records, leaving Mr Singh's evidence largely uncontested.

1. Whether the personal grievance for unjustified dismissal was raised within the 90-day statutory period, and if not, whether exceptional circumstances apply — Status: Established (paras [26]-[45]).

Under s 114(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA), a personal grievance must be raised with the employer within 90 days. The Authority may grant leave under s 114(3) if exceptional circumstances caused the delay and it is just to do so; s 115(c) identifies the absence of the required dispute resolution explanation in the employment agreement as an exceptional circumstance. Mr Singh's final wage was paid on 30 November 2025, making the 90-day deadline 28 February 2026; his grievance was not lodged until 17 March 2026. The Authority found that BMSL provided only an unsigned intended agreement (which did not constitute a valid employment agreement under s 64(6) ERA), that Mr Singh did not have the required dispute resolution explanation, that the precise end-date of employment was uncertain, and that no prejudice would flow to BMSL from granting leave. Leave was granted.

2. Whether Mr Singh was unjustifiably dismissed by BMSL — Status: Established (paras [46]-[50]).

Under s 103A(2) ERA, the Authority assesses whether the employer's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done. Citing 123 Casino Limited v Zuo [2020] NZEmpC 88, the Authority found that BMSL's failure or refusal to restore Mr Singh to the roster from December 2025 amounted to dismissal. BMSL gave no explanation, ceased all communication, and followed no process. The Authority was satisfied Mr Singh was unjustifiably dismissed.

3. Whether Mr Singh was owed wage arrears pursuant to s 131 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [51]-[70]).

Section 131 ERA provides for recovery of unpaid wages, and s 132(1) requires employers to maintain wages and time records; s 132(2) allows the Authority to draw adverse inferences from the absence of such records. BMSL failed to produce any records. The Authority accepted Mr Singh's evidence in full — including his IRD income summary, bank statements, and a detailed spreadsheet recording 72.5 hours worked per week (adjusted for one day off per week after approximately two months) — and found his total entitlement to be $229,390 gross, of which $40,442.20 was paid, leaving arrears of $188,947.80 (gross).

4. Whether BMSL complied with rest and meal break provisions under s 69ZD(5) of the Act, and what remedies are available — Status: Established (paras [71]-[72], [89]-[93]).

Section 69ZD(5) ERA prescribes mandatory rest and meal breaks for work periods beyond eight hours. The Authority found Mr Singh worked more than eight hours daily and that there was no evidence BMSL ever provided rest or meal breaks. The breaches were found to be intentional. Applying a global approach and considering deterrence, citing Hunter v Medina Trading Ltd [2023] NZERA 374, the Authority ordered a penalty of $2,000 to be paid by BMSL to Mr Singh. The Court of Appeal's guidance in Jetstar Airways Ltd v Greenslade [2015] NZCA 432 was cited regarding the importance of these provisions.

5. Whether BMSL breached s 4 of the Act (good faith) — Status: Established (paras [73]-[74], [94]-[97]).

Section 4(1A)(b) ERA requires employers to be active and constructive, responsive and communicative in maintaining productive employment relationships. The Authority found BMSL's abrupt cessation of all communication with Mr Singh from December 2025 — without explanation or process — constituted an intentional breach of good faith. Citing Pan v L&S Earthmoving Ltd [2024] NZERA 645, and noting Mr Singh was a vulnerable migrant employee, the Authority ordered BMSL to pay a penalty of $4,000 to Mr Singh.

6. Whether BMSL failed to provide Mr Singh with an individual employment agreement, and whether a penalty should be issued — Status: Established (paras [75], [98]-[100]).

Section 65(1) ERA requires employers to provide employees with an individual employment agreement. The Authority found BMSL provided only an unsigned intended employment agreement to INZ; Mr Singh never signed it and it did not constitute a valid employment agreement. Given the importance of deterrence and the absence of any mitigating factors, the Authority ordered BMSL to pay a penalty of $1,000 to the Crown.

7. Whether BMSL failed to pay Mr Singh for public holidays, and what is owed — Status: Established (paras [76]-[78]).

The Authority found Mr Singh's employment ran from 25 September 2023 to 30 November 2025, during which 23 public holidays fell. On the balance of probabilities, Mr Singh worked on the public holidays he identified as unpaid, given the restaurants' seven-day operating schedules. BMSL was ordered to pay $17,250 (gross) for unpaid public holidays.

8. Whether BMSL failed to pay Mr Singh for annual holidays, and what is owed — Status: Established (paras [79]-[81]).

Aside from a trip to Punjab (25 May–1 July 2025) treated as a period of leave, the Authority found Mr Singh had not taken or been paid for any other annual leave. BMSL was ordered to pay $16,240 (gross) in outstanding annual leave.

9. Whether Mr Barala incited, instigated, aided, or abetted breaches of Mr Singh's employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [82]-[86], [101]-[105]).

Under s 134(2) ERA, a person who aids and abets a breach of an employment agreement may be personally liable for a penalty. As sole director, Mr Barala organised Mr Singh's accommodation and was his primary contact for all employment matters. The Authority found Mr Barala knew or ought to have known that BMSL was not paying Mr Singh correctly or on time, and that he had the ability and control to ensure compliance. The Authority ordered Mr Barala to pay a penalty of $4,000 (half to the Crown, half to Mr Singh), citing Williams v Slavering Tusk Ltd (in liq) [2022] NZERA 76 and other comparable cases.

10. Whether Mr Singh is entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings — Status: Established (paras [106]-[111]).

Section 123(1)(c)(i) ERA provides for compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings arising from a personal grievance. The Authority applied the test in Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited [2023] NZEmpC 179 and Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield [1993] 1 ERNZ 344: the assessment focuses on the nature and extent of harm to the employee, not punishment. The Authority accepted that Mr Singh was upset by the abrupt ending of his employment and his inability to establish why, and awarded $9,000.

11. Whether Mr Singh is entitled to reimbursement of lost wages following dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [112]-[113]).

Section 123(1)(b) ERA provides for reimbursement of lost remuneration. However, the Authority was not satisfied, based on the evidence before it, that Mr Singh took reasonable steps to mitigate his loss in the three months following dismissal, relying on Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190. Despite the Authority seeking additional evidence, Mr Singh provided none. No award was made for lost wages.

12. Whether Mr Singh's conduct contributed to the dismissal and whether remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [114]-[115]).

Section 124 ERA requires the Authority to consider whether an employee's own conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to dismissal, applying the test from Yang v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand [2025] NZEmpC. The Authority found no factual basis to conclude that Mr Singh contributed to his dismissal and made no reduction.

13. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Not reached (paras [118]-[120]).

Costs were reserved. The Authority encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Singh was directed to file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with BMSL and Mr Barala having 14 days to reply. The Authority noted it would apply its usual daily tariff if required to determine costs.

The claims were substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, all wage, holiday, and leave claims allowed, all penalty claims upheld, and personal liability of Mr Barala established; only the lost wages (mitigation) claim and contribution reduction were dismissed.

- Wage arrears: $188,947.80 (gross) — BMSL to pay Mr Singh within 28 days
- Public holiday pay: $17,250 (gross) — BMSL to pay Mr Singh within 28 days
- Annual leave: $16,240 (gross) — BMSL to pay Mr Singh within 28 days
- Compensation (hurt/humiliation/injury to feelings, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $9,000 — BMSL to pay Mr Singh within 28 days
- Penalty (s 69ZD(5) — rest and meal breaks): $2,000 — BMSL to pay Mr Singh within 28 days
- Penalty (s 4(1A)(b) — good faith): $4,000 — BMSL to pay Mr Singh within 28 days
- Penalty (s 65(1) — failure to provide individual employment agreement): $1,000 — BMSL to pay to the Crown within 28 days
- Penalty (s 134(2) — Mr Barala aiding and abetting): $4,000 total — $2,000 to the Crown, $2,000 to Mr Singh, within 28 days
- Interest: On wage arrears ($188,947.80), public holidays ($17,250), and annual leave ($16,240), calculated using the civil debt calculator
- Reimbursement of lost wages: None ordered (mitigation not established)
- Reinstatement: Not ordered/not sought
- Costs: Reserved

Julia Faye Cunard, a delivery truck driver employed by Bidfood Limited from February 2023 until January 2025, brought claims of unjustified dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage following her termination for serious misconduct arising from 13 at-fault vehicle incidents during her employment. The key legal questions were whether Bidfood followed a fair process and was substantively justified in dismissing Ms Cunard, and whether she had raised valid disadvantage grievances within time. The Authority dismissed all claims, finding the dismissal justified in both process and substance, and the disadvantage claims unproven and out of time.

Applicant: Julia Faye Cunard (employee, delivery truck driver)
Respondent: Bidfood Limited (employer, wholesale food and beverage distributor)

Applicant: Keshila Fayen
Respondent: Daniel Erickson

Ms Cunard was employed by Bidfood Limited as a delivery truck driver (Class 1 and 2 licences) from 27 February 2023, based in Christchurch. During her employment she was involved in 13 at-fault vehicle incidents, including collisions with parked cars, signs, barriers, building structures, and mirrors, occurring across multiple periods of active driving. Following an early cluster of four incidents in 2023, Bidfood issued a written warning and arranged external driving assessment and coaching. Further incidents continued through 2024. After a drug test following a November 2024 incident returned a positive result, Bidfood investigated both the pattern of incidents and whether Ms Cunard had failed to disclose medication with driving-impairing side effects. The second allegation (non-disclosure of medication side effects) was not established. Following a disciplinary meeting on 24 December 2024 and written feedback from Ms Cunard, Bidfood dismissed her on 16 January 2025 for serious misconduct, citing its lost trust and confidence in her ability to drive safely. Ms Cunard raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and disadvantage (relating to long hours and being placed on an unfamiliar route), which was not resolved at mediation, leading to these proceedings.

1. Whether Bidfood was justified in dismissing Ms Cunard for serious misconduct under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[57]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test: whether a fair and reasonable employer could have made the same decision to dismiss in all the circumstances, including whether a fair process was followed. The Authority found Bidfood investigated the allegations, put them clearly to Ms Cunard, gave her opportunities to respond (including written and in-person feedback), and genuinely considered her explanations — evidenced by its rejection of the medication non-disclosure allegation. Substantively, the Authority found it was within scope for Bidfood to treat 13 at-fault incidents over approximately 22 months (net of leave periods) as negligent serious misconduct, particularly given Ms Cunard's explanation that she counted carparks rather than using mirrors when reversing and her inability to recognise the ongoing safety risk her driving pattern posed. The dismissal claim was dismissed.

2. Whether the process leading to dismissal was procedurally fair — Status: Established in favour of the respondent (paras [47]-[56]).

The Authority considered the requirements of s 103A: adequate investigation, allegations put to the employee, opportunity to respond, and genuine consideration of the employee's explanations. Submitted procedural flaws included: (a) initial discrepancy in the number of incidents cited (10 vs 13); (b) allegations said to be unclear; (c) dismissed responses at the meeting; (d) reference to Bidfood contacting her medical practitioner directly; and (e) inclusion of allegedly expired or irrelevant warnings. The Authority found none of these flaws caused unfairness to Ms Cunard: the number discrepancy was an obvious error, she understood the cumulative concern, her responses were genuinely considered, and the relevant driving warning was properly taken into account. The procedural challenge was dismissed.

3. Whether Bidfood erred by including in the dismissal process earlier warnings (including those said to be expired or unrelated) — Status: Dismissed (paras [53]-[56]).

Ms Cunard argued that the four incidents addressed by the May 2023 written warning had been "dealt with" and should not be revisited, and that additional warnings (for verbal abuse to a customer and harassment of a colleague) were irrelevant or expired. The Authority accepted that the verbal abuse and harassment warnings arguably should not have been included, but held this did not render the dismissal unjustified because the driving-related warning remained relevant context for the outcome. The Authority found the cumulative pattern of at-fault driving incidents was the central substantive basis for dismissal, and Bidfood was entitled to consider the earlier driving warning when determining the appropriate response.

4. Whether Ms Cunard's disadvantage grievances (working long hours and being placed on an unfamiliar route) were raised within time and were substantiated — Status: Dismissed (paras [58]-[59]).

The Authority found Ms Cunard had not raised the long hours or unfamiliar route concerns as standalone grievances at any point prior to responding to Bidfood's disciplinary allegations. There was no evidence she had been made to work hours exceeding legal limits, and no contractual entitlement to a permanent route. She accepted she received a week's familiarisation with the new route. The Authority further found these matters were not advanced in detail in submissions and, to the extent they were pursued, they effectively formed part of her explanation for the driving incidents rather than independent disadvantage claims. Both disadvantage claims were dismissed.

5. Whether any remedies (lost wages and compensation) should be ordered — Status: Not reached (para [60]).

As all substantive claims were dismissed, no question of remedy arose.

6. Whether Ms Cunard's conduct contributed to any grievance under s 124 of the Act, warranting reduction of any remedy — Status: Not reached (para [5](d), footnote 1).

The contribution question was identified as an issue but was not reached because the substantive claims were all dismissed. The Authority noted that the pre-2026 amendment version of s 124 applied given the timing of the dismissal and lodging of proceedings.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [61]-[62]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Bidfood may lodge a memorandum on costs within 14 days of issue of the determination, with Ms Cunard having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily rate absent particular circumstances.

All claims brought by Ms Cunard were dismissed in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved — parties encouraged to agree; if not, Bidfood to file a costs memorandum within 14 days, with Ms Cunard having 14 days to respond.

Rangiterewaka Hira, a long-serving employee of Institut de Selection Animale (New Zealand) Limited (ISA), raised personal grievances for unjustifiable disadvantage relating to an alleged demotion/role reclassification, workplace investigation processes, and health and safety/workplace injury complaints. The central legal question was whether Ms Hira raised these grievances within the statutory 90-day time limit under s 114(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority determined on a preliminary basis that the demotion/reclassification and health and safety grievances were raised out of time, while grievances potentially arising from the investigation process (beyond role change) remain open pending further particulars from Ms Hira.

Applicant: Rangiterewaka Hira (employee)
Respondent: Institut de Selection Animale (New Zealand) Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in Person)
Respondent: Simmi Singh, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Hira has been employed since 1983 by a predecessor of ISA, originally as Farm Manager, and is currently employed as Lead Poultry Technician. On 11 November 2024, ISA wrote to Ms Hira offering continued employment following a business acquisition, and provided her with an Individual Employment Agreement and Position Description designating her role as Lead Poultry Technician reporting to a Farm Supervisor. Ms Hira signed both the Employment Agreement and the Position Description on 15 November 2024, acknowledging she had been advised of her right to seek independent legal advice and had been given a reasonable opportunity to do so. On 16 November 2025 — approximately one year later — Ms Hira formally raised a written personal grievance for unjustifiable disadvantage, including alleged demotion, reclassification, lack of consultation, concerns arising from two workplace investigations in September–November 2025, and allegations of workplace chemical exposure and health and safety complaints. ISA denied the grievances and contended that most or all of the claims had been raised outside the statutory 90-day limitation period under s 114 of the Act, without ISA's consent to late raising. The parties agreed to have the preliminary time-limit issue determined on the papers without testing evidence.

1. Whether the unjustifiable disadvantage grievance arising from demotion, reclassification, or role change from Farm Manager to Lead Poultry Technician was raised within the 90-day statutory time limit — Status: Dismissed (paras [12]-[26]).

Section 114(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 requires that a personal grievance be raised with the employer within 90 days of the act or omission occurring or coming to the employee's notice, whichever is later, unless the employer consents to late raising. The Authority found that the role change, reclassification, and lack of consultation had all materialised in November 2024 when Ms Hira was presented with and signed the Employment Agreement and Position Description — documents that clearly set out her changed title and responsibilities and acknowledged her right to seek independent advice. Ms Hira's later appreciation of the practical implications of the role change during 2025 could not extend the limitation period given her signed acknowledgement at the time. The 90-day period expired in March 2025, but the grievance was not raised until approximately 15–16 November 2025; no exceptional circumstances were established and ISA did not consent to late raising.

2. Whether associated allegations arising from the role change events (inadequate consultation, unilateral variation, breach of good faith, misrepresentation, concealment, duress, lack of opportunity to obtain advice, and validity of the Employment Agreement) were raised within the 90-day statutory time limit — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[26]).

The Authority treated these associated allegations as intrinsically connected to the November 2024 role change events. Because the core facts underpinning all these claims were apparent from the documents Ms Hira signed on 15 November 2024, the same 90-day analysis applied. The Authority found no exceptional circumstances and ISA did not consent to late raising; accordingly, these claims also fell outside the statutory time limit.

3. Whether unjustifiable disadvantage grievances arising from the September–November 2025 workplace investigation processes were raised within the 90-day statutory time limit — Status: Partially established/Conditional (paras [27]-[34]).

The Authority found that to the extent Ms Hira relied on the investigations as the point at which she became aware of the practical implications of her role change and altered responsibilities, those claims were raised outside the statutory time limit (as they still traced back to the November 2024 role change). However, the Authority left open the possibility that distinct acts or omissions during the investigations (separate from the role change) might constitute timely grievances. The Authority directed Ms Hira to provide further particulars — specifically the act or omission relied on in each investigation, the relevant dates, and the date and manner in which each was raised with ISA — before any determination can be made on those remaining potential grievances.

4. Whether unjustifiable disadvantage grievances arising from alleged workplace chemical exposure and health and safety complaints were raised within the 90-day statutory time limit — Status: Dismissed (paras [35]-[41]).

Ms Hira alleged a chemical exposure on or about 15 October 2025 and made complaints to external agencies including WorkSafe New Zealand. The Authority held that raising concerns with external agencies does not constitute raising a personal grievance with the employer. There was no evidence that these matters were raised as personal grievances with ISA until they appeared in Ms Hira's Further Amended Statement of Problem dated 11 June 2026 — well outside 90 days. No exceptional circumstances were established and ISA did not consent to the late raising.

5. Whether costs should be determined at this preliminary stage — Status: Not reached (para [44]).

The Authority reserved costs pending the outcome of the substantive matter; no costs determination was made at this stage.

The preliminary claims were partially upheld for the respondent: the demotion/reclassification grievance and health and safety/workplace injury grievances were dismissed as out of time; the investigation-related grievances remain open in part, subject to Ms Hira providing further particulars as directed.

None ordered at this stage. Costs reserved pending outcome of the substantive matter. The determination is preliminary and conditional — certain investigation-related grievances may proceed once Ms Hira provides the required further particulars (para [34]).

James Wilson, a former national permanent recruitment services manager, brought personal grievances against his former employer Advanced Personnel Services Limited (APSL), alleging unjustified disadvantage, unjustified dismissal, and breach of his notice period provision under his individual employment agreement. APSL relied on a 90-day trial period to justify the dismissal. The Authority dismissed all claims, finding the trial period was valid, the dismissal was lawful, and no unjustified disadvantage had been established.

Applicant: James Alexander Wilson (employee)
Respondent: Advanced Personnel Services Limited (employer)

Applicant: Ben Anderson, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Mary-Jane Thomas, counsel for the Respondent

James Wilson was employed by APSL as national permanent recruitment services manager from 12 August 2024, on a salary of $100,000 per annum plus commission, subject to a 90-day trial period with a one-week trial notice period. APSL is a nationwide recruitment agency with a permanent placement division. Wilson was terminated on 9 September 2024, with notice given on 6 September 2024, and paid out in lieu of notice, with employment ending 13 September 2024. The reasons given for dismissal were poor judgment, wrong fit with the business, and lack of leadership of his team, particularly following the submission of a very low sales forecast. Wilson disputed: the reasonableness of his sales targets; whether he was disadvantaged by an inadequate induction; whether Mr Densem's conduct at a meeting on 30 August 2024 was intimidating and aggressive; whether his team's capability was misrepresented to him; whether APSL's handling of his work-from-home (WFH) requests was appropriate; and whether the 90-day trial period was valid and properly relied upon. APSL maintained that its targets were reasonable, the trial period was validly drafted and exercised, and Wilson was simply not the right fit for the role.

1. Whether APSL's sales expectations for Mr Wilson were reasonable — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[34]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test: whether the employer's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority found that Wilson's targets (zero for August, $10,000 for September, $25,000 for October) were reasonable given his claimed 14 years of recruitment experience, and that he had not communicated any different progressive approach in writing. The white-collar vs blue-collar focus argument was rejected as there was no express wording in the IEA or job description supporting a white-collar focus, and APSL had a separate entity for that work. This aspect of the unjustified disadvantage claim was not established.

2. Whether Mr Wilson was unjustifiably disadvantaged by a failed induction and onboarding process — Status: Dismissed (paras [35]-[36]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test. The pre-onboarding link was emailed on 20 August 2024, and Mr Densem explained it was not necessary for revenue-generating work. Crucially, when Wilson met with Mr Densem on 2 September 2024 and said he felt "ambushed," he raised no concern about a lack of training. The Authority found this unjustified disadvantage claim was not established.

3. Whether Mr Wilson was unjustifiably disadvantaged by Mr Densem's tone and demeanour at the 30 August 2024 meeting — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[39]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test and considered the credibility of witnesses. While Wilson may have felt deflated after the meeting, the Authority found this was not due to bullying or intimidation. The Authority observed Mr Densem as softly spoken but firm, and his supportive text messages to Wilson during illness were inconsistent with the image Wilson portrayed. Ms Macquet's comment to "light a fire" under his team was found to be motivational rather than inherently negative. This claim was not established.

4. Whether Mr Wilson was unjustifiably disadvantaged by misrepresentation of his team's capability — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[42]).

The Authority found no misrepresentation. Before signing his IEA, Wilson had been informed by Mr Densem that one team member was on pre-planned leave and the other had not reached required sales levels. Wilson's concern about his team's ability was only raised after Mr Densem expressed disappointment about the low sales forecast, not during the preceding three weeks of working with them. The Authority accepted APSL's submission that it would not benefit from setting Wilson up to fail, making the claim unsustainable on the facts.

5. Whether APSL's handling of Mr Wilson's work-from-home (WFH) requests amounted to unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (para [43]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test and found Mr Densem's handling of WFH requests — clarifying APSL had no formal WFH policy and treating requests as requests rather than advisories — fell within the acceptable range of conduct for a notional fair and reasonable employer. No formal disciplinary or performance process was required in these circumstances.

6. Whether the 90-day trial period provision was invalid due to unfair bargaining — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[47]).

The Authority considered Wilson's extensive background: 14 years of recruitment industry experience, maturity, confidence, and familiarity with his own industry. The Authority found it implausible that Wilson was unfamiliar with how 90-day trial periods operate. He had two to three working days to seek independent legal advice, could have requested an extension, and his enthusiastic response upon signing the IEA indicated no concern. The unfair bargaining challenge was rejected.

7. Whether the 90-day trial period provision was invalid due to unfair or internally inconsistent wording about the period — Status: Dismissed (para [48]).

The Authority considered the IEA as a whole and found it was "abundantly clear" that the 90 days ran from the first day Wilson commenced employment (12 August 2024). Cases cited by Mr Anderson (Blackmore v Honick Properties Ltd [2011] NZEmpC 152; Parkshit v James Richardson (NZ) Ltd [2015] NZERA Auckland 77; Pact Group v Sheridan [2023] NZEmpC 235) were found to be distinguishable on their facts or not helpful. The wording challenge was rejected.

8. Whether APSL breached the one-week notice period provision in the trial period — Status: Dismissed (paras [49]-[50]).

The Authority found that the letter of 6 September 2024 inviting Wilson to a meeting at 4:45 pm constituted notice. Wilson would have understood the purpose of the meeting given Mr Densem's prior expressed disappointment. Because Wilson went home sick before the meeting could proceed, it was rescheduled to 7:45 am on 9 September 2024 — before the normal 8 am start — so that APSL could provide a full working week's notice. The Authority found no breach of the trial period notice provision.

9. Whether Mr Wilson was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (para [51]).

Having found the 90-day trial period was validly drafted and properly exercised, and having found no unfair bargaining or procedural defects, the Authority concluded Wilson was not unjustifiably dismissed. The dismissal on grounds of wrong fit and lack of leadership was a lawful exercise of the trial period by APSL.

10. Whether remedies of lost wages and compensation for hurt and humiliation under s 123(1)(c)(i) should be awarded — Status: Not reached (para [51]).

Because all substantive grievance claims were dismissed, the Authority did not need to consider remedies.

11. Whether any remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for blameworthy contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (para [51]).

As no remedies were awarded, the question of reduction under s 124 did not arise.

12. Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs of representation — Status: Reserved (paras [52]-[54]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If unable to do so, APSL may file a memorandum on costs within 21 days; Wilson then has 14 days to reply. Costs, if determined, would be assessed on the Authority's usual daily tariff basis subject to any adjusting factors.

The application was dismissed in its entirety; all personal grievance claims (unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal) were unsuccessful.

None ordered. Costs reserved — parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if not resolved, APSL may file a costs memorandum within 21 days of the determination date.

Jonathan Lovatt, a café assistant employed by The Helicopter Line Limited (HL) for approximately eight months at a remote South Island location, claims he was unjustifiably dismissed when HL purported to make his role redundant. The Authority found the dismissal was not a genuine redundancy but rather a fault-based dismissal conducted without any fair process, and awarded compensation for hurt and humiliation together with notice arrears and interest. Claims for lost wages and penalties were declined.

Applicant: Jonathan Lovatt (employee, café assistant)
Respondent: The Helicopter Line Limited (employer)

Applicant: Dave Cain, advocate
Respondent: Mark Quickfall (also sole director of HL — appeared as representative)

Mr Lovatt was employed as a café assistant at a small café operated by HL at Glentanner in the South Island, primarily a tourist-flight business, from approximately April 2024 until December 2024 (approximately eight months). He was paid $29.00 gross per hour for a minimum of 60 hours per fortnight. On 2 December 2024, HL's sole director Mark Quickfall wrote to Mr Lovatt advising the café would close on 5 December 2024, citing Mr Lovatt's alleged refusal to assist with changing to a cabinet/self-service food model, ordering food, and training incoming staff. HL characterised this as a redundancy (attracting two weeks' notice), whereas Mr Lovatt's individual employment agreement required four weeks' notice except in genuine redundancy. Mr Lovatt raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and also claimed breach of contract for the two-week notice shortfall, a penalty for that breach, and a penalty for HL's failure to provide employment records. HL denied the claims, maintaining the redundancy was genuine and the process fair.

1. Whether HL ended Mr Lovatt's employment based on a genuine redundancy — Status: Dismissed (paras [13]-[19]).

The Authority applied the principle from Grace Team Accounting Ltd v Brake [2014] NZCA 541 that redundancy must be genuine and based on actual business requirements, i.e., the role must be surplus to requirements. The Authority found that the 2 December 2024 termination letter did not mention redundancy and instead attributed closure of the café to Mr Lovatt's alleged refusal to carry out certain tasks and change the food service model — a fault-based reason. Critically, after Mr Lovatt's employment ended the café reopened briefly under a new model with a replacement employee, demonstrating his role was not surplus to requirements. The Authority concluded the dismissal was not a genuine redundancy.

2. Whether the dismissal was justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (i.

e., dismissal found unjustified) (paras [20]-[25]).
The statutory test under s 103A is whether the employer acted as a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances at the time. The Authority found that HL's real reasons — Mr Lovatt's alleged refusal to change service models and alleged conduct issues — were never raised with him through any performance management or disciplinary process; his August 2024 performance review showed top ratings across all indicators. HL gave him no meaningful opportunity to respond to the decision before it was made, and the letter's invitation to discuss came after the decision had already been communicated. The Authority found HL fell well short of fair and reasonable conduct and the dismissal was unjustified.

3. Whether compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act should be awarded for hurt, humiliation, and distress — Status: Established (paras [26]-[28]).

The Authority assessed the impact on Mr Lovatt, including being required to vacate staff accommodation at short notice (near Christmas), sleeping in his car temporarily, and the loss of dignity. Aggravating factors included that HL's sole director also controlled the associated landlord entity that required him to vacate the accommodation tied to employment. Mitigating factors included that Mr Lovatt had planned leave to the North Island for Christmas. The Authority awarded $16,000.00 compensation.

4. Whether lost wages under s 123(1)(b) of the Act should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (paras [29]-[30]).

The Authority calculated three months of lost wages from the effective end of employment (2 January 2025) at $870.00 gross per week = $10,440.00 gross. Mr Lovatt's IRD records showed he earned $10,708.99 gross from alternative employment within that period, exceeding his lost HL earnings. As his actual post-employment earnings exceeded his lost HL earnings, no award for lost wages was made.

5. Whether remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the Act due to Mr Lovatt's contributory conduct — Status: Dismissed (para [31]).

The Authority applied the law as it stood before the 21 February 2026 amendments. It found that the conduct now alleged against Mr Lovatt (behaviour and refusal to change service models) was never raised with him during his employment through any conduct or performance process, and even information communicated to managers could have been addressed beforehand. Relying on Ark Aviation Ltd v Newton [2001] ERNZ 133 regarding post-employment discoveries, the Authority found the alleged conduct lacked the necessary detail and process to justify a reduction, and declined to reduce remedies under s 124.

6. Whether HL breached the employment agreement by paying only two weeks' notice instead of four weeks — Status: Established (paras [32]-[33]).

Under Mr Lovatt's individual employment agreement, four weeks' notice was required unless the termination was a genuine redundancy (which attracted two weeks). Having found the dismissal was not a genuine redundancy, the Authority held HL was obliged to pay four weeks' notice. HL paid only two weeks (approximately 64 hours of "special paid leave"). The Authority ordered $1,740.00 gross (2 × $870.00) in arrears for the shortfall.

7. Whether interest should be awarded on the notice arrears — Status: Established (para [33]).

The Authority found the request for interest on the notice arrears was reasonable and ordered interest on $1,740.00 gross from 2 January 2025 until the date of payment in full, to be calculated using the civil debt interest calculator.

8. Whether a penalty should be imposed under s 134 of the Act for breach of the notice term in the employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (paras [34]-[36]).

Section 134 allows a penalty of up to $20,000.00 for a corporate employer breaching an employment agreement term. Applying the factors under s 133A (nature and extent of breach, intentionality, loss suffered, deterrence, vulnerability, prior breaches), the Authority found the breach was not deliberate, related to a poorly conducted process rather than deliberate non-payment, and the arrears and interest award already addressed the loss. There was no evidence of prior similar breaches and the Authority considered the determination itself would serve a deterrent purpose. No penalty was ordered.

9. Whether HL breached s 130 of the Act by failing to provide employment records, and whether a penalty should be imposed — Status: Breach established but penalty declined (para [37]).

The Authority found HL did breach its duty to provide employment records when asked by Mr Lovatt's representative at the time the personal grievance was raised, and the delay continued even after the Authority directed production — records were only provided after the investigation meeting. HL attributed this to "administrative oversight." The Authority found this surprising given HL's in-house HR resources. However, because the records were eventually produced and the delay caused no significant adverse effect on Mr Lovatt, the Authority declined to impose a penalty.

10. Whether any portion of a penalty should be paid to Mr Lovatt — Status: Not reached (para [2], issues list at para [12](g)).

As all penalty applications were declined, this question did not need to be determined.

11. Whether costs should be awarded and, if so, in what amount — Status: Reserved (paras [40]-[42]).

The Authority reserved costs, encouraging the parties to self-resolve the issue. If not resolved, Mr Lovatt may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with HL having 14 days to reply. The Authority confirmed it would apply the standard daily tariff approach, with costs generally following success.

The claim was partially upheld: the dismissal was found unjustified (not a genuine redundancy), compensation of $16,000.00 was awarded, notice arrears of $1,740.00 gross plus interest were ordered, but claims for lost wages, penalties, and contribution reduction were all unsuccessful.

- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, distress under s 123(1)(c)(i)): $16,000.00
- Notice arrears (breach of employment agreement — two weeks short notice): $1,740.00 gross
- Interest: On $1,740.00 gross from 2 January 2025 until date of payment in full (civil debt calculator rate)
- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b)): None ordered (post-dismissal earnings exceeded calculated loss)
- Penalties (s 134 — notice breach; s 130 — failure to provide records): None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to self-resolve; if not, memorandum process to follow within 28 days
- All amounts to be paid within 28 days of the determination date (9 October 2026)

[CONSENT]

Darren Sargeant (employee) brought proceedings against Metlifecare Limited (employer) in the Employment Relations Authority. The parties reached a full settlement of all matters arising from their employment relationship, with Sargeant withdrawing his proceedings and no payments being made by either party. The Authority issued a consent determination recording the agreed settlement terms as binding orders, with a non-publication order protecting the confidentiality of those terms.

Applicant: Darren Sargeant (employee)
Respondent: Metlifecare Limited (employer)

Applicant: Chloe Gliddon, advocate for Applicant
Respondent: Gillian Service and Isabella Denholm, counsel for the Respondent

Darren Sargeant brought employment relationship proceedings against Metlifecare Limited in the Employment Relations Authority. The nature of the underlying claims is not disclosed in this determination. The parties reached an agreement to settle all matters between them, as recorded in a Joint Memorandum of Counsel dated 8 October 2026. The settlement was resolved without any payments being made by either party, and Sargeant agreed to withdraw his proceedings entirely. The parties jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination recording the agreed settlement terms as enforceable orders, and agreed that the terms of the settlement remain confidential to themselves and their professional advisors.

1. Whether the parties' agreed settlement terms should be recorded as binding orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [3]-[5]).

The Authority accepted the parties' joint request to record the agreed settlement terms as orders pursuant to the Employment Relations Act 2000. Specific paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Settlement were made orders of the Authority, rendering them final, binding, and enforceable. The determination notes that failure to comply may be addressed by way of a compliance order application, but no further action may be taken regarding any matters connected to the employment relationship or its ending.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made protecting the confidentiality of the settlement terms — Status: Established (paras [6]-[7]).

The Authority made a non-publication order pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority was satisfied that there was no countervailing public interest requiring publication of the settlement terms, and the parties had agreed those terms should remain confidential to themselves and their professional advisors. The order does not apply to employment institutions.

The claim was resolved by consent, with the settlement terms recorded as binding orders of the Authority and a non-publication order made protecting the confidentiality of those terms.

No monetary remedy ordered. The matter was resolved without any payments being made by either party. Settlement terms made into binding orders of the Authority (specific terms confidential and subject to non-publication order). Non-publication order made pursuant to clause 10 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, with the condition that it does not apply to employment institutions.

Maria Linton, a registered nurse employed by Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (HNZ) at Waikato Hospital, was dismissed in December 2021 after refusing to receive a Covid-19 vaccination as required by the Covid-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Amendment Order (No 3) 2021. She claimed unjustified dismissal, breach of collective agreement change management and health and safety provisions, and breach of good faith obligations under Schedule 1B of the Employment Relations Act 2000. All claims were dismissed; the Authority found HNZ acted as a fair and reasonable employer in all the circumstances.

Applicant: Maria Linton (employee — registered nurse)
Respondent: Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (employer)

Applicant: Liz Lambert and Erika Whittome, advocates for the Applicant
Respondent: Rachael Judge and India Townsend, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Linton was employed by HNZ as a registered nurse at Waikato Hospital, with her employment governed by the Nursing and Midwifery Multi-Employer Collective Agreement (CA). The Covid-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Amendment Order (No 3) 2021 came into force on 25 October 2021, requiring health sector workers to receive their first vaccine dose by 15 November 2021 and second dose by 1 January 2022. Ms Linton declined to be vaccinated, stating she needed full information about vaccine risks before she could give informed consent. HNZ undertook a consultation process from late October 2021, provided information, held meetings, considered redeployment options (finding none available due to the breadth of the Amendment Order and HNZ's organisation-wide vaccination policy), and issued notice of termination on 26 November 2021; Ms Linton's employment ended on 24 December 2021. Ms Linton contended that HNZ failed to comply with collective agreement change management obligations (clause 25), health and safety obligations (clause 31), and good faith obligations under Schedule 1B of the Act, all of which HNZ denied.

1. Whether a staff surplus situation under clause 25.3 of the CA was triggered by the Amendment Order, requiring HNZ to explore reconfirmation and other options — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]-[29]).

The CA provides that staff surplus options, including reconfirmation in a position under clause 25.3.4, arise only "as a result of substantial restructuring." Ms Linton argued that because vaccinated nurses could perform her job, she was surplus to requirements. The Authority rejected this, finding that restructuring concerns positions rather than people and Ms Linton's position was not disestablished — she simply could not continue in it because of the Amendment Order, not because of any restructure. Accordingly, clause 25.3.4 and associated staff surplus options were not triggered.

2. Whether HNZ breached clauses 23 and 25.3.2 of the CA regarding union representation and notification — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[36]).

Clause 23 provides for paid time off to consult union officials, and clause 25.3.2 sets notification obligations in a staff surplus situation. The Authority found that HNZ advised Ms Linton of her right to engage with her union (via a letter dated 29 October 2021 and an FAQ factsheet), and that no staff surplus situation arose. Because the staff surplus threshold was not met, clause 25.3.2 notification obligations were not triggered.

3. Whether HNZ breached its consultation obligations under clause 25.2.8 of the CA — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[61]).

Clause 25.2.8 sets out consultation obligations in change management. The Authority found HNZ discharged these obligations by sending Ms Linton an Implementation Process document, holding a meeting on 5 November 2021, responding to her written correspondence, informing her about the medical exemption process, and considering her feedback. Ms Linton's further submission that HNZ breached the Bipartite Relationship Framework (Appendix 1(a), clause 3) by not informing her that all DHBs were implementing the same process was rejected; clause 3 does not establish a change management process but refers only to the possible establishment of a sub-committee.

4. Whether HNZ should have applied for a significant service disruption (SSD) exemption under clause 12A(4)(a)(ii)(B) of the Amendment Order — Status: Dismissed (paras [62]-[66]).

The SSD exemption was available where exemption was necessary to prevent significant disruption to essential health services, and applied to the first two vaccinations. HNZ's witness (Ms Coley) gave evidence that the 313 exemptions granted at Waikato Hospital were temporary booster-related exemptions, not SSD exemptions, and that no basis existed to apply for an SSD exemption for Ms Linton because her work could be performed by a vaccinated person. The Authority accepted this evidence.

5. Whether HNZ adequately explored redeployment options — Status: Dismissed (paras [67]-[71]).

As part of the consultation process HNZ considered redeployment but found no suitable roles, because the Amendment Order applied broadly across the health sector and HNZ's organisational policy required vaccination for all staff at Waikato Hospital sites — including those in non-patient-contact roles — due to the risk of contact with vulnerable patients. The Authority accepted this evidence and found HNZ was unable to identify suitable redeployment opportunities.

6. Whether Ms Linton was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [72]-[77], [91]).

The statutory test under s 103A(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 is whether the employer's actions and the manner of acting were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority must consider whether the employer sufficiently investigated, raised concerns, gave a reasonable opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered the employee's explanation (s 103A(3)), and may consider other factors (s 103A(4), citing Thorne v KiwiRail Limited [2015] NZEmpC 48). Applying this test, the Authority found HNZ acted fairly and reasonably across all aspects of the process and Ms Linton was not unjustifiably dismissed.

7. Whether HNZ breached health and safety provisions in clause 31 of the CA (incorporating HSWA obligations) by failing to conduct a risk assessment for unvaccinated workers — Status: Dismissed (paras [78]-[82]).

Ms Linton argued HNZ was required under the HSWA, as incorporated into the CA at clause 31, to conduct a workplace health and safety risk assessment to determine whether the work could safely be performed by an unvaccinated employee, and that the Amendment Order did not override collective agreement terms. The Authority rejected this, finding the Amendment Order specifically directed PCBUs not to allow affected persons to carry out certain work unless vaccinated. This direction itself constituted the relevant health and safety measure, making a separate risk assessment unnecessary. HNZ was found to have complied with clause 31.

8. Whether HNZ breached good faith obligations under Schedule 1B of the Act (Code of Good Faith for the public sector) and/or the CA — Status: Dismissed (paras [83]-[90], [93]).

Ms Linton argued HNZ breached clause 4 of the Code by failing to consult constructively about alternatives including redeployment, working from home, or alternative arrangements. The Authority found HNZ engaged constructively with Ms Linton throughout the consultation process and was unable to offer redeployment because of its organisation-wide vaccination requirement. The Authority concluded HNZ complied with its good faith obligations.

9. Whether Ms Linton is entitled to remedies under s 123(1)(c)(i) or s 128 of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [15](d)).

This issue was contingent on Ms Linton establishing a personal grievance. Because no personal grievance was established, remedies were not considered.

10. Whether an award of damages should be made — Status: Not reached (para [15](e)).

This issue depended on a relevant claim being established. As all claims were dismissed, this issue was not reached.

11. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (para [15](f)).

This issue only arises if a personal grievance remedy is awarded. As no remedy was awarded, this question was not reached.

12. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Reserved (paras [95]-[98]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, HNZ may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Ms Linton having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would determine costs on its usual daily tariff basis if required.

The application was dismissed in its entirety; Ms Linton was found not to have been unjustifiably dismissed and HNZ was found not to have breached collective agreement or good faith obligations.

None ordered. Costs reserved pending agreement between the parties or further memoranda.

Sarathkadayil Sasankan, a Kerala cook employed by Kodur Investment Limited (trading as Kodur's Kitchen), resigned on 1 April 2024 and brought claims of unjustified constructive dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, wage arrears, unpaid public holiday entitlements, and breach of health and safety obligations against his employer and its director Aneesh Kodur. The Authority found that while the constructive dismissal claim failed, Kodur did unjustifiably disadvantage Mr Sasankan by failing to pay him for all hours worked, and ordered wage arrears, compensation, and a penalty, with personal liability extended to Mr Kodur as director.

Applicant: Sarathkadayil Sasankan (employee, Kerala cook)
Respondent: Kodur Investment Limited trading as Kodur's Kitchen (employer, first respondent) and Aneesh Kodur (director, second respondent)

Applicant: Roland Samuels, advocate
Respondent: Aneesh Kodur (self-represented for the respondents)

Mr Sasankan was employed as a Kerala cook by Kodur Investment Limited from approximately 24 July 2023 (training) and permanently from 4 September 2023, under an employment agreement providing for a minimum of 33 hours per week with additional hours paid at the ordinary rate. He resigned on 1 April 2024, alleging he had not been paid for all overtime hours worked, was required to work while injured, and was required to obtain a driver's licence as a unilateral change to his employment conditions. Kodur denied all claims, asserting that all hours worked were properly paid as evidenced by payslips. Mr Sasankan raised his personal grievances in writing on 10 June 2024, having previously communicated wage concerns in writing on 4 April 2024. WhatsApp records showed hours posted daily by the restaurant team, and comparison of those records with payslips and bank statements revealed underpayments across multiple weeks, though Mr Sasankan's broader claims of approximately $27,972 in arrears were unsupported by sufficient verifiable evidence. The Authority was unable to accept approximated figures, limiting its findings to evidenced underpayments.

1. Whether personal grievance claims were raised in compliance with s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [8]-[11]).

Section 114 of the Act requires that personal grievances be raised within 90 days of the action giving rise to the grievance. Mr Sasankan's written grievance was raised on 10 June 2024, with wage concerns communicated on 4 April 2024. The Authority was satisfied that both the unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage grievances were raised in compliance with s 114.

2. Whether wage arrears were owed to Mr Sasankan — Status: Partially established (paras [12]-[21]).

The Act at s 132(2) allows the Authority to accept all claims as proved but the Authority declined to do so given insufficient verifiable evidence. By cross-referencing WhatsApp records, payslips, and bank statements, the Authority found at least 237.50 hours of underpayment, equating to $7,172.50 gross plus eight per cent holiday pay. Mr Sasankan's claimed total of $27,972.19 based on approximations was not accepted.

3. Whether Mr Sasankan was owed unpaid public holiday entitlements — Status: Dismissed (para [22]).

Mr Sasankan raised generalised concerns about public holiday payments but was unable, despite specific requests, to identify which days or how many days were unpaid. Kodur's payroll records showed five public holidays worked with five alternative days provided. The claim for further public holiday entitlements was unsuccessful for lack of specificity.

4. Whether Kodur breached its contractual health and safety obligations — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]-[27]).

The employment agreement included basic health and safety obligations. Mr Sasankan claimed he was required to carry heavy loads despite a back injury, but he acknowledged he was never instructed to carry rice bags and that doing so was seen as part of the job. His physiotherapist records dated the injury as 31 March 2024, the day before his resignation, and the medical certificate was issued a month after employment ended. Insufficient evidence showed that safety concerns were raised during employment, and the claim for breach of contract on health and safety grounds was declined.

5. Whether Mr Sasankan's resignation constituted unjustified constructive dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[35]).

The Authority applied the test in Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 and Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities IUOW Inc [1994] 1 ERNZ 168: constructive dismissal requires that the employer's conduct was the dominant cause of resignation or involved a serious breach making resignation reasonably foreseeable. Mr Sasankan never raised wage concerns during employment (his visa dependency made him hesitant), the safety/back injury claim was not raised prior to resignation, and the driver's licence allegation was unsubstantiated. The Authority found he was not left with no real choice but to resign, and the claim failed.

6. Whether Mr Sasankan was unjustifiably disadvantaged in his employment — Status: Established (para [36]).

Kodur's failure to pay Mr Sasankan for all hours worked was found to constitute unjustified disadvantage, following the principle cited from Morgan v JML Construction & Anor [2026] NZERA 547 that failure to pay contractual wages is a fundamental breach. The personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage succeeded.

7. Whether Mr Sasankan should receive compensation for hurt and humiliation under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Partially established (paras [37]-[39]).

Mr Sasankan was not entitled to compensation for distress relating to the termination of employment (as the constructive dismissal claim failed), but was entitled to compensation for distress caused by non-payment during employment. There was little evidence of significant impact; $3,000 was awarded as an appropriate recognition of the unjustified disadvantage.

8. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [40]).

The Authority found no contributing conduct by Mr Sasankan that would justify any reduction in remedies ordered.

9. Whether penalties should be imposed for failure to keep accurate wage and time records under s 130(g) of the Act and for breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [41]-[52]).

The Authority applied the penalty factors set out in Borsboom v Preet PVT [2016] NZEmpC 143. Kodur failed to provide accurate daily hours records despite additional time being given. The breach was not inadvertent — Kodur later implemented a new recording system suggesting awareness of the deficiency. Mr Sasankan was a vulnerable migrant worker whose visa was tied to his employment. A penalty of $1,000 was imposed, directed to the Crown bank account rather than Mr Sasankan (as the same breaches formed the basis of his successful disadvantage claim and remedy).

10. Whether Aneesh Kodur should be held personally liable as a person involved in a breach of employment standards under ss 142W and 142Y of the Act — Status: Established (paras [53]-[58]).

Under ss 142W and 142Y of the Act, a director can be personally liable where they have been directly involved in a breach of employment standards (defined in s 5 to include breaches of the WPA and s 130). Mr Kodur was the sole director and hands-on manager responsible for wages and records, with direct knowledge of hours paid; it was due to his actions that records were not kept and wages not paid in full. The Authority granted Mr Sasankan leave under s 142Y(2) to recover any unpaid amounts from Mr Kodur personally in the event Kodur Investment Ltd defaults.

11. Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs of representation — Status: Not reached (paras [62]-[64]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with the Authority indicating it would determine costs on its usual daily tariff basis if required and memoranda could be lodged within 28 days.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified disadvantage claim succeeded (wage arrears and compensation awarded), the constructive dismissal claim was dismissed, and a penalty was imposed for breach of employment record-keeping standards.

- Wage arrears: $7,172.50 gross plus 8% holiday pay on that amount (under s 131 of the Act), payable by Kodur Investment Limited within 28 days.
- Compensation (hurt/humiliation/distress for unjustified disadvantage): $3,000 (under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act), payable within 28 days.
- Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55, payable within 28 days.
- Penalty: $1,000 for breach of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 and s 130(g) of the Act, payable to the Crown bank account within 28 days.
- Personal liability: Aneesh Kodur ordered to be personally liable under s 142Y of the Act for any amounts Kodur Investment Limited is unwilling or unable to pay.
- Reinstatement: Not ordered.
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves.

[CONSENT]

PYL (applicant/employee) brought employment relationship claims against KZL Limited (respondent/employer). The parties resolved all matters by negotiating agreed terms of settlement, and jointly applied to the Authority to issue a consent determination recording those terms as binding orders. The Authority granted the consent determination, making the settlement terms final and enforceable, and issued a non-publication order to preserve the confidentiality of the settlement.

Applicant: PYL (employee)
Respondent: KZL Limited (employer)

Applicant: Abbey Kilkolly, advocate
Respondent: Melanie O'Neill, counsel

PYL was an employee of KZL Limited, and an employment relationship dispute arose between them. The nature of the underlying claims is not disclosed in the determination. The parties negotiated and signed an Agreed Terms of Settlement on 8 October 2026, resolving all issues arising out of their employment relationship, including any matters connected to the ending of that relationship. Both parties then jointly requested that the Authority issue a consent determination recording those agreed terms as orders of the Authority. The matter was dealt with on the papers (no in-person hearing). The parties also agreed that the terms of the settlement should remain confidential to them and their professional advisors, and the Authority was satisfied there was no countervailing public interest requiring publication.

1. Whether the Authority should issue a consent determination recording the parties' agreed terms of settlement as binding orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [2]–[5]).

The Authority has jurisdiction under the Employment Relations Act 2000 to issue consent determinations recording agreed settlement terms as enforceable orders. Both parties consented and presented their signed settlement agreement. The Authority accepted the parties' agreement and made the terms of the Settlement final, binding, and enforceable as orders of the Authority, with the consequence that no further challenges or actions regarding the employment relationship or its ending may be taken (other than a compliance order application for non-compliance with the settlement terms).

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made in respect of the terms of the settlement — Status: Established (paras [1], [6]–[7]).

Under clause 10 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority may make a non-publication order where there is justification and no countervailing public interest. The parties agreed that the settlement terms should remain confidential to them and their professional advisors. The Authority was satisfied there was no public interest requiring disclosure and accordingly made a non-publication order prohibiting publication of the terms of the Settlement, subject to the condition that the order does not apply to the employment institutions. The parties are also referred to by randomised letters (PYL and KZL Limited) rather than their actual names.

The consent determination was issued in full, recording the settlement as final, binding, and enforceable orders of the Authority, with a non-publication order over the terms of the settlement.

The specific terms of the settlement (including any financial or other remedies agreed between the parties) are subject to a non-publication order and are not disclosed in the determination. No remedy details are available on the public record. The settlement is enforceable as an order of the Authority; non-compliance may be addressed by a compliance order application.

RWP, an employee of VKS, brought personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal (by medical incapacity), along with a claim for penalties for breach of good faith, arising from a short-lived employment relationship that deteriorated during a probationary period. RWP alleged bullying, retaliatory conduct, and a flawed termination process; VKS denied all claims and argued it acted reasonably throughout. The Authority dismissed all three claims, finding VKS's conduct justified and RWP's own failure to engage constructively contributed to the difficulties that arose.

Applicant: RWP (employee)
Respondent: VKS (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Alexandria Till, counsel for the respondent

RWP commenced employment with VKS on 24 June 2025 as a Quality Control Coordinator (though her individual employment agreement incorrectly reflected a "Team Leader" title). Performance concerns emerged during her training period, with the Manager raising issues on multiple occasions from July 2025 onward. At a probationary review meeting on 9 September 2025, RWP raised workplace complaints against the Manager and a Co-worker, claiming bullying, retaliatory conduct, withdrawal of training, salary-related comments, and humiliating treatment; VKS disputed the characterisation of those events. VKS initiated a parallel investigation and probation process, but progress was complicated by RWP's changing positions on whether to engage in the investigation or pursue a negotiated exit via without prejudice discussions. RWP went on sick leave from approximately 23 September 2025, formally raised her personal grievance in writing on 8 October 2025, attended mediation unsuccessfully on 20 October 2025, and was ultimately dismissed on 12 December 2025 for medical incapacity after refusing to provide further medical information. RWP sought $200,000 in compensation; VKS maintained all its actions were justified.

1. Non-publication orders for both parties and witnesses — Status: Established (paras [4]-[7]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from MW v Spiga Limited [2024] NZEmpC 147: first, whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected if publication occurred; second, whether those consequences were significant enough to depart from the principle of open justice. The Authority was satisfied that adverse consequences to future employment prospects for RWP and two witnesses justified a departure from open justice, with no countervailing public interest in disclosure. A permanent non-publication order was made under clause 10(1) of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 covering both parties' and witnesses' names; VKS's name was included in the order to prevent identification by deduction.

2. Unjustified disadvantage personal grievance under s 103(1)(b) of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [67]-[82]).

The Authority applied the three-part test under s 103(1)(b): whether VKS acted as alleged, whether that caused disadvantage, and whether VKS's actions were unjustified, assessed against the s 103A "fair and reasonable employer" standard. The Authority found the evidence did not establish bullying, withdrawal of training, retaliatory nit-picking, or humiliating conduct. The Manager's performance feedback was found to be reasonable, training continued throughout, and the Co-worker's expressions of frustration did not amount to bullying. While the Authority accepted the HR investigation could have been formalised sooner, it noted that RWP's own shifting positions on WOP discussions and investigation participation contributed to delays, and VKS moved quickly once a formal approach was identified. The grievance was not established.

3. Unjustified dismissal personal grievance under s 103(1)(a) of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [83]-[96]).

The justification test under s 103A required the Authority to assess whether VKS's actions and process in terminating for medical incapacity were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done. The Authority applied principles from Dunn v Waitemata District Health Board [2014] NZEmpC 201 and Lal v The Warehouse Limited [2017] NZEmpC 66, requiring a reasonable opportunity to recover, reasonable inquiry into prognosis, and consideration of alternatives, balanced against the employer's needs. The Authority found VKS had engaged with RWP about return-to-work requirements, offered to fund a GP visit, warned RWP of the prospect of termination, and held a meeting at which RWP chose not to provide further medical information. Given RWP's significant absence (from 13 October 2025) relative to her short tenure, and her failure to engage constructively with the process, VKS was entitled to terminate. The dismissal was justified.

4. Whether remedies should be reduced for RWP's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [10](d)).

This issue was listed as a question for determination but was not reached because the Authority dismissed both personal grievances; no remedies were awarded to which a s 124 reduction could apply.

5. Penalty for breach of good faith duty under s 4 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [97]).

The Authority found, consistently with its findings on the substantive grievances, that VKS had not breached its good faith obligations towards RWP. No separate analysis was required beyond those findings; the penalty claim was declined on that basis.

6. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [99]-[101]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. VKS was given 28 days from the date of determination to lodge and serve a costs memorandum if needed, with RWP having 14 days to reply. The Authority noted its usual daily tariff would apply unless circumstances justified adjustment.

All claims — unjustified disadvantage, unjustified dismissal, and penalties for breach of good faith — were dismissed in full; the application was unsuccessful.

None ordered. Costs reserved, with a process set for VKS to file a costs memorandum within 28 days if agreement is not reached.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive Employment Relations Authority decision issued on 31 July 2026. The applicant, Suraj Goswami (employee), succeeded in the substantive matter against Moto Kare Limited (in liquidation) and its director/manager Jagmeet Singh personally. The Authority awarded Mr Goswami $3,881.25 in costs plus a $71.55 filing fee, both to be paid by Mr Singh personally, with an uplift applied to the standard tariff due to the respondents' failure to provide wage, time, and leave records.

Applicant: Suraj Goswami (employee)
Respondent: Moto Kare Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent / employer); Mansha Chopra (Second Respondent); Jagmeet Singh (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Susanne Lass, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

Mr Goswami was employed by Moto Kare Limited (MKL), which is now in liquidation. In the substantive determination dated 31 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 514), the Authority granted Mr Goswami leave to recover wage arrears, public holiday payments, annual holiday pay, and a penalty totalling approximately $55,392 from Jagmeet Singh personally, as Mr Singh was found to have directed Mr Goswami's work, managed the business, managed payroll, and was a person involved in a breach of employment standards. The Authority reserved costs in the substantive determination and invited the parties to resolve costs between themselves. No resolution was reached, and Mr Goswami brought a costs application. The respondents did not appear at the investigation meeting (held on the papers) and made no submissions.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to Mr Goswami, and if so, at what level — Status: Established (paras [4]-[12]).

The Authority applied the principles set out in clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority's Practice Direction, and the legal principles from Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135 and JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175. Costs follow the event as a general rule and are assessed against a notional daily tariff, with discretion to adjust upward or downward based on relevant factors including unnecessary costs caused by a party's conduct. The investigation meeting was half a day, giving a starting tariff of $2,250; the Authority uplifted this by $1,125 on the basis that MKL's failure to provide wage/time records and holiday/leave records required Mr Goswami to reconstruct those claims from available contemporaneous records, generating unnecessary additional work and cost. The Authority concluded a total costs award of $3,881.25 was appropriate and ordered it to be paid by Mr Singh personally, given his established personal liability in the substantive determination.

2. Whether Mr Singh personally (as opposed to MKL in liquidation) should bear the costs order — Status: Established (paras [11]-[12]).

The Authority noted that in the substantive determination Mr Singh was found to have directed Mr Goswami's work, managed the business and payroll, and was identified as a person involved in a breach of employment standards, providing the basis for personal liability. Because MKL is in liquidation, the Authority directed the costs award against Mr Singh personally, consistent with the approach taken in the substantive proceeding where leave was granted to recover remedies from Mr Singh in his personal capacity.

3. Whether the filing fee should be recoverable — Status: Established (para [15]).

The Authority ordered Mr Singh to pay Mr Goswami's filing fee of $71.55 in addition to the costs contribution, within 28 days of the determination.

The costs application was upheld; Mr Singh is ordered to pay Mr Goswami $3,881.25 in costs plus $71.55 in filing fees.

Costs contribution: $3,881.25 (payable by Jagmeet Singh to Mr Goswami within 28 days of the determination date).
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55 (payable by Jagmeet Singh to Mr Goswami within 28 days of the determination date).
Total payable: $3,952.80.
No other remedies ordered in this costs determination (substantive remedies were addressed in [2026] NZERA 514).

George Weston Foods (NZ) Limited (GWF), the employer, applied to the Employment Relations Authority to stay execution of an $8,000 compensation award previously made in favour of its employee, Arnold Putt, pending an Employment Court challenge. The key legal question was whether a stay of the compensation award should be granted, assessed against the well-established multi-factor test for stay applications. The Authority declined the stay, finding that the overall balance of convenience favoured Mr Putt receiving the compensation to which he was prima facie entitled.

Applicant: George Weston Foods (NZ) Limited (employer)
Respondent: Arnold Putt (employee)

Applicant: Charlotte Parkhill and Luke Ji, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Allan Halse, advocate for the respondent

In a prior determination dated 25 March 2026 ([2026] NZERA 179), the Authority found that GWF had unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Putt by acting inconsistently in its investigation process, and awarded him $8,000 compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000; other grievances were not established and costs were reserved. Mr Putt, who remained employed by GWF at that time, elected to challenge the determination to the Employment Court on a non-de novo basis, though GWF subsequently obtained an order for the matter to be heard de novo. GWF, which had not itself initially filed a challenge, applied to the Authority to stay execution of the compensation award, arguing that if the Court reduced the award it faced a serious risk of being unable to recover the $8,000 from Mr Putt given his financial circumstances. Mr Putt opposed the stay, citing significant financial hardship, ongoing work-related stress resulting in certified sick leave, and the emotional importance of the award as recognition of the harm he suffered. GWF also questioned the good faith of Mr Putt's challenge, suggesting it was driven by a separate and subsequent employment dispute rather than genuine pursuit of a legal remedy. The matter was determined on the papers.

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to hear a stay application — Status: Established (para [8]).

A question was raised on Mr Putt's behalf as to whether a stay application should have been lodged in the Employment Court rather than the Authority. The Authority accepted its jurisdiction to grant stay applications, referencing Employment Court Regulations 2000, reg 64. No further elaboration was required as the jurisdictional question was resolved in favour of proceeding.

2. Whether a stay of execution of the $8,000 compensation award should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]–[29]).

The Authority applied the well-established six-factor test for stay applications drawn from Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bilgola Enterprises Ltd (1999) 13 PRNZ 48 (HC), New Zealand Cards Ltd v Ramsey [2013] NZCA 582, and Chen v Wei [2026] NZEmpC 38: (1) whether the challenge would be rendered nugatory without a stay; (2) whether the challenge was brought in good faith; (3) whether the successful party would be injuriously affected by a stay; (4) impact on third parties; (5) novel or important public interest questions; and (6) the overall balance of convenience. The Authority found it could not safely conclude the challenge lacked good faith (para [23]); acknowledged GWF's risk of non-recovery but noted that Mr Putt is a current employee, the amount is modest ($8,000), and GWF is a large international company (para [28]); found no workable mechanism for GWF's proposed "payment into Court" through the Authority (para [26]); and found no relevant third-party impact or public interest factors (para [27]). Weighing all factors, the Authority held that Mr Putt's prima facie entitlement to his award and the financial and emotional benefit to him outweighed GWF's risk, and declined the stay (para [29]).

3. Costs of the stay application — Status: Not reached/reserved (paras [30]–[31]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. A process was set out: Mr Putt may lodge and serve a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with GWF having 14 days from service to file a reply, if the parties cannot agree. No costs determination was made at this stage.

GWF's application for a stay of execution of the $8,000 compensation award was dismissed in full; costs were reserved.

None ordered at this stage. The stay application was declined. Costs are reserved, with a timetable provided for costs memoranda if the parties cannot reach agreement.

Craig Brown (applicant/employee) applied to have his personal grievance claim removed from the Employment Relations Authority to the Employment Court under s 178(2)(d) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The application followed an earlier Employment Court finding that Mr Brown was an employee of The Clinician Holdings Limited, and Mr Brown argued removal would avoid inconsistent findings and duplicative litigation. The Authority declined the application, finding the case to be a conventional personal grievance matter appropriately dealt with by the Authority in the first instance.

Applicant: Craig Brown (employee)
Respondent: The Clinician Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Michael Kilkelly, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Matthew McGoldrick, counsel for the Respondent

Craig Brown was found by the Employment Court (Judge King) to have been an employee of The Clinician Holdings Limited (TCHL) between 1 June 2022 and 31 March 2023, following a three-day substantive hearing (Brown v The Clinician Holdings Ltd [2025] NZEmpC 48). Mr Brown now seeks to have his personal grievance claim removed to the Employment Court rather than investigated by the Authority. He argued that removal would reduce the risk of inconsistent findings, promote efficient use of judicial resources, avoid lengthy re-litigation of the same factual material already canvassed in the Court, and that TCHL's apparent willingness to challenge Authority determinations would increase his costs. TCHL opposed removal, contending the grievance claim is an ordinary matter, that any cost or time savings from removal are speculative, and that an Authority investigation meeting could be scheduled more quickly than a Court hearing. The matter was determined on the papers following a case management conference.

1. Whether the personal grievance claim should be removed to the Employment Court under s 178(2)(d) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (that in all the circumstances the Court should determine the matter) — Status: Dismissed (paras [7]-[16]).

Section 178 of the Act confers a discretion on the Authority to remove matters to the Employment Court, including under s 178(2)(d) where the Authority is of the opinion that in all the circumstances the Court should determine the matter. The Court of Appeal in A Labour Inspector v Gill Pizza Ltd [2020] NZCA 192 cautioned that removal is contemplated in relatively limited circumstances, particularly for matters not fully investigated by the Authority, though there is no express presumption either for or against removal (per Judge Corkill in Danske Mobler Limited v A Labour Inspector [2023] NZEmpC 233 and Chief Judge Inglis in Johnston v Fletcher Construction Co Ltd [2017] ERNZ 894). The Authority found Mr Brown's concerns about inconsistent findings to be misplaced, as the Employment Court's prior decision on employment status was a discrete issue that would be respected; his remaining concerns about cost, timeliness, and TCHL's financial capacity were characterised as ordinary litigation risks faced by all parties and insufficient to warrant removal. The Authority concluded this was a conventional personal grievance case with no unusual features requiring departure from the standard statutory scheme of first-instance investigation by the Authority, and declined the removal application.

2. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [17]).

The Authority reserved costs in relation to the on-the-papers preliminary determination, with no costs order made at this stage.

The application for removal to the Employment Court was dismissed in its entirety.

None ordered at this stage. Costs are reserved.

Taranjot Singh (employee) brought claims of unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, and recovery of an illegal premium payment against his employer, Sian Enterprises Limited, and its associated individual Satwant Singh. This particular determination deals solely with a penalty imposed by the Authority of its own motion against a third party, Jagdeep Singh, who failed without good cause to attend an investigation meeting after being formally summonsed. The Authority found that Jagdeep Singh's deliberate non-attendance obstructed its investigation and imposed a penalty of $5,000 payable to the Crown.

Applicant: Taranjot Singh (employee)
Respondent: Sian Enterprises Limited (First Respondent, employer) and Satwant Singh (Second Respondent)
Note: The penalty in this determination is directed at third party Jagdeep Singh, who is neither the named applicant nor a named respondent but was summonsed as a witness.

Applicant: John Wood, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Arunjeev Singh, counsel for the Respondent

Taranjot Singh commenced employment as a driver with Sian Enterprises Limited (SEL) in March 2024. He claims that prior to his employment being confirmed, Satwant Singh (Second Respondent) instructed him to pay premium amounts — alleged to be illegal under s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — into New Zealand bank accounts held in the name of Jagdeep Singh. Satwant Singh denied knowing any Jagdeep Singh, but during the investigation meeting on 11–12 August 2026, it emerged that Jagdeep Singh is the sole director and shareholder of a company (referred to as "ILV") where Satwant Singh's brother is employed, and that Satwant Singh himself had been a director of ILV until 19 March 2025. The Authority issued a summons to Jagdeep Singh on 27 August 2026 requiring his attendance on 4 September 2026 and production of bank statements for the period October–December 2023. Jagdeep Singh neither attended nor provided any explanation for his non-appearance, and did not respond to a subsequent Minute issued on 11 September 2026 warning of a potential penalty and giving him until 18 September 2026 to make submissions. This determination addresses only the penalty question arising from Jagdeep Singh's obstruction of the Authority's investigation; the substantive employment claims remain to be determined separately.

1. Whether Jagdeep Singh's failure to attend the Authority investigation meeting after being summonsed constituted obstruction of an Authority investigation under s 134A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, warranting a penalty — Status: Established (paras [12]–[18]).

Section 134A of the Act provides that every person who, without sufficient cause, obstructs or delays an Authority investigation — including failing to attend when required — is liable to a penalty. The power to impose this penalty may be exercised by the Authority of its own motion under s 134A(2)(a). Jagdeep Singh was formally summonsed, duly served at his registered Companies Office address, failed to attend, gave no explanation, and made no submissions despite being warned and given the opportunity to respond. The Authority was satisfied that the non-attendance was deliberate and intentional and constituted obstruction of the investigation, in particular the inquiry into the alleged illegal premium payment claims.

2. What penalty amount should be imposed on Jagdeep Singh under ss 133A and 135(2)(a) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [19]–[26]).

The maximum penalty for an individual under s 135(2)(a) of the Act is $10,000. In determining the appropriate amount, the Authority applied the factors in s 133A of the Act and followed the approach in Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited and Warrington Discount Tobacco Limited [2016] NZEmpC 143, which includes consideration of deterrence and degree of culpability as identified in Labour Inspector v Preet PVT Ltd [2016] ERNZ 514 at [68] and [80]. The Authority took into account that the obstruction was deliberate, that the context involved alleged illegal premium payments (which are serious offences under s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983), that the integrity of the investigation and administration of justice was undermined, and that there was no indication Jagdeep Singh could not pay. A penalty of $5,000 — half the maximum — was ordered, payable to a Crown bank account within 14 days.

3. Whether costs should be ordered — Status: Dismissed (para [27]).

The Authority made no order for costs without providing further reasons.

The claim was upheld in part: a penalty of $5,000 was imposed on Jagdeep Singh for obstructing the Authority's investigation; no costs were ordered. The substantive employment claims (unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, and illegal premium payment recovery) were not determined in this proceeding.

Penalty: $5,000 ordered against Jagdeep Singh (third party/summonsed witness), payable into a Crown bank account within 14 days of 7 October 2026.
Costs: None ordered.
Note: This determination is limited to the penalty issue only. The substantive employment claims remain outstanding and will be the subject of a separate determination.