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Regina Rasheed, a principal of 14 years at Zayed College for Girls (an Islamic special character secondary school), was dismissed on 17 June 2025 following a lengthy disciplinary process. She claimed unjustified disadvantage (arising from an unresolved 2022 disciplinary investigation and two suspensions) and unjustified dismissal, and sought reinstatement, lost wages, compensation, sick leave reimbursement, and penalties against both the employer and the proprietor Trust. The Authority found all personal grievances established, upheld reinstatement, awarded $40,000 compensation, reimbursement of lost wages and sick leave, and imposed a $6,000 penalty against the Trust for aiding and abetting breaches of the employment agreement.

Applicant: Regina Rasheed (employee/principal)
Respondent: Commissioner of Zayed College for Girls (First Respondent/employer); Aotearoa Charitable Foundation Trust (Second Respondent/proprietor)

Applicant: Richard Harrison, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Joseph Williams, counsel for the First Respondent; Tim Clarke, counsel for the Second Respondent

Mrs Rasheed was employed as principal of Zayed College for Girls from June 2011 until her summary dismissal on 17 June 2025 — a tenure of approximately 14 years. In August 2022, the Board of Trustees (BoT) commenced a disciplinary investigation into alleged misconduct by Mrs Rasheed via a subcommittee; however, the process was never formally concluded, partly due to the Trust withdrawing its BoT representatives and the BoT's subsequent dissolution. On 28 March 2023, Lynley Myers was appointed Commissioner, who initiated a Personal Assistance and Guidance (PAG) programme and eventually closed the 2022 disciplinary matter in December 2023. In June 2024, during Mrs Rasheed's sabbatical, acting principal Mrs Shea wrote to the Commissioner raising concerns about Mrs Rasheed's leadership; this triggered a workplace investigation, two suspensions (1 July 2024 and 15 September 2024), and ultimately dismissal on 17 June 2025 after the investigator found 30 of 47 allegations proven. Mrs Rasheed contended the entire process breached the collective agreement's disciplinary provisions, that the two suspensions were unjustified, and that her dismissal was unjustified; the Commissioner maintained all actions were those of a fair and reasonable employer, and the Trust denied liability and opposed reinstatement on grounds of irretrievable breakdown.

1. Whether Mrs Rasheed suffered unjustified disadvantage through the employer's failure to investigate and conclude the 2022 disciplinary process in a fair and timely manner — Status: Established (paras [79]-[84]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test and the collective agreement's requirements (clauses 6.1.1, 6.3) that disciplinary processes protect the principal's mana and dignity and be concluded as soon as reasonably practicable. The Authority rejected the Commissioner's submission that Mrs Rasheed knew by November 2022 the investigation posed no threat; it found the prolonged delay — compounded by the Commissioner's initial non-engagement and subsequent re-surfacing of closed complaints through the workplace investigation — caused Mrs Rasheed quantifiable disadvantage including harm to her health. The duty to be open and constructive under s 4(1A)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was also breached. A personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage was established.

2. Whether the first suspension (1 July 2024) constituted unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [85]-[88]).

The Authority applied clause 6.1.1(a) of the collective agreement (requiring informal discussion before formal action unless inappropriate) and clause 6.4 (suspension only available once a disciplinary process under clause 6.3 is underway). The Authority found no practical impediment to an informal discussion occurring; the themes in Mrs Shea's letter mirrored matters already addressed in the PAG programme; the Commissioner had not yet formed a view on whether the allegations were competence or discipline matters and was appointing the investigator to "ascertain the precise nature of what is alleged." These deficiencies were not minor or technical, and Mrs Rasheed's refusal of paid special leave did not constitute blameworthy conduct. A personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage was established.

3. Whether the second suspension (15 September 2024) constituted unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [89]-[92]).

Applying the same collective agreement provisions, the Authority found that on receipt of the workplace investigator's 171-allegation table, the Commissioner's obligation under clause 6.1.1(a) was again triggered. The Commissioner was equipped, given her prior knowledge of the PAG programme and earlier engagement, to assess which matters were stale, closed, or performance-related before resorting to suspension. The broad characterisation of "health and safety risk" and "culture of fear" without specific notified incidents under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 did not justify bypassing the collective agreement process. A personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage was established.

4. Whether Mrs Rasheed was unjustifiably dismissed on 17 June 2025 — Status: Established (paras [93]-[105]).

The Authority applied s 103A and the collective agreement (clauses 6.1.1, 6.3.3) and cited FMV v TZB [2021] NZSC 102, Simpsons Farms Ltd v Aberhart [2006] ERNZ 825, Edwards v Board of Trustees of Bay of Islands College [2015] NZEmpC 6, and Campbell v Commissioner of Salford School [2015] NZEmpC 122. The dismissal process was flawed from the outset by the failure to apply informal discussion mechanisms. The Commissioner had not reviewed any underlying interview evidence compiled by the investigator, in breach of clause 6.3.3's requirement to be satisfied as to the facts. Specific upheld findings were each found unjustified: four "yelling" allegations lacked specificity or were contradicted by available evidence; the management units finding contained a significant mathematical error; the warrant of fitness allegation was unsupported by failure to interview the affected staff member (who in Authority proceedings denied the allegation); and PAG programme matters had "leaked" into the disciplinary process without disclosure to Mrs Rasheed. Dismissal based on an accumulation of findings, several of which were unjustified, could not itself be justified.

5. Whether reinstatement should be ordered — Status: Established/Ordered (paras [107]-[117]).

Reinstatement is the primary remedy under s 123(1)(a) and must be ordered where practicable and reasonable (s 125(2)), and availability of a vacancy is not a requirement (Walker v Firth Industries [2014] NZEmpC 60). The Authority found no professional body barrier, the Teaching Council had not proceeded further on mandatory reporting, and conflicting staff evidence weighed in favour of reinstatement, particularly evidence from community members including an expert in Islamic dispute resolution. The Authority acknowledged the appointment of a new principal was made with full notice of reinstatement proceedings. Reinstatement was granted conditionally: immediate reinstatement to payroll and, within 21 days, the parties to agree a process for Mrs Rasheed to return to the position of principal.

6. Whether lost wages from 17 June 2025 to reinstatement should be reimbursed under s 123(1)(b) — Status: Established (para [118]).

Mrs Rasheed had not sought other work and had been pursuing reinstatement while undertaking professional development, which the Authority found appropriate in the circumstances. The order was granted as sought, with leave for parties to return on calculation.

7. Whether compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [119]-[124]).

The Authority considered the evidence of Dr Aamina Ali (a clinical psychologist and family member who observed Mrs Rasheed's deterioration over three years), Mrs Rasheed's own account of humiliation from the suspensions and dismissal, and the broader damage to her standing in the Islamic community. Given the ongoing and overlapping nature of multiple personal grievances, a global award was considered appropriate. A sum of $40,000 was awarded, having regard to the particular circumstances and comparable cases.

8. Whether 23 days of sick leave taken should be reimbursed — Status: Established (para [125]).

The Authority was satisfied the sick leave was taken due to workplace stress arising from the established personal grievances. The remedy was granted as sought, with leave for parties to return on calculation.

9. Whether any remedy should be reduced for Mrs Rasheed's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [126]-[132]).

The Authority considered each grievance separately. On the delay grievance, Mrs Rasheed could not be held responsible for delays in a process wholly in the employer's control. On the suspensions, her refusal of paid special leave was not blameworthy as she was under no contractual obligation to accept. On dismissal, the deficiencies arose from the employer's own failures; Mrs Rasheed had repeatedly sought to assist the process and comply with the collective agreement. The Authority acknowledged Mrs Rasheed accepted some performance matters needed addressing, but in the absence of a fair process these could not be characterised as blameworthy. No reduction was applied.

10. Whether the employer (Commissioner) breached good faith obligations (s 4 of the Act) and the employment agreement — Status: Established (para [133]).

Breaches of the collective agreement and the statutory obligation of good faith (s 4) were found to be established through the findings on unjustified disadvantage and dismissal. However, the Authority determined that a penalty award against the employer would not be appropriate in this matter, and declined to order one.

11. Whether a penalty should be ordered against the employer — Status: Dismissed (para [133]).

Although breaches were established, the Authority exercised its discretion against ordering a penalty against the Commissioner/employer, finding it not appropriate in the circumstances.

12. Whether the Trust aided and abetted breaches of Mrs Rasheed's employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [134]-[138]).

The Authority found the Trust's application was not time-barred, as the cause of action for penalty arose on 1 April 2024 (date of application) and the claim was lodged within 8 months. On the merits, the Trust's representatives (including Mr Elidrissi as BoT chair) were the majority on the disciplinary subcommittee and, before that process was complete, acted in ways that instigated and aided the employer's breach — specifically, participating in a meeting where Mrs Rasheed's resignation was sought in exchange for payment, raising concerns with the Ministry threatening to withdraw from the integration agreement, and not reporting these actions to the BoT. The Trust was found to have been aware of, or likely aware of, its obligations under the collective agreement and that its actions would impede compliance.

13. Whether a penalty should be ordered against the Trust — Status: Established (para [139]).

Having regard to s 133A factors and comparable cases, a penalty of $6,000 was ordered against the Trust, with half payable to Mrs Rasheed as compensation for inconvenience and resources expended in pursuing statutory entitlements (i.e., $3,000 to Mrs Rasheed). The penalty is to be paid within 21 days.

14. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to hear the personal grievances raised — Status: Established (preliminary matter, para [4]).

In a preliminary determination issued on 16 April 2025 ([2025] NZERA 213), jurisdictional matters raised by the Commissioner regarding the scope of Mrs Rasheed's personal grievances were resolved in Mrs Rasheed's favour. This issue was not re-litigated in the substantive determination.

15. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Reserved (paras [142]-[144]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if unable to do so, Mrs Rasheed may file a memorandum within 14 days of the determination, with replies due within 14 days of service.

The claims were upheld substantially in full: unjustified disadvantage (three separate heads) and unjustified dismissal were all established; reinstatement, lost wages, compensation and sick leave reimbursement were ordered; the Trust was penalised; no contributory reduction was applied; and the employer penalty claim was dismissed.

- Reinstatement: Yes — immediate reinstatement to payroll; parties to agree a process for return to the position of principal within 21 days of determination.
- Lost wages: Reimbursement of lost wages from 17 June 2025 to date of reinstatement to payroll under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 (quantum to be calculated; parties have leave to return).
- Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $40,000 global award for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings across all established personal grievances, payable within 21 days.
- Sick leave reimbursement: 23 days sick leave reimbursed under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 (quantum to be calculated; parties have leave to return).
- Penalty against the Trust: $6,000 total penalty under s 133A, with $3,000 payable to Mrs Rasheed (half the penalty), payable within 21 days.
- Penalty against employer: None ordered.
- Costs: Reserved.

Regina Rasheed, principal of Zayed College for Girls for 14 years, applied for interim reinstatement after being suspended on 1 July 2024 pending an investigation into staff concerns about her leadership. The key legal questions were whether she had an arguable case for unjustified disadvantage, an arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and where the balance of convenience and overall justice lay. The Authority granted interim reinstatement, finding all three criteria satisfied and ordering the suspension lifted with immediate effect.

Applicant: Regina Rasheed (employee — principal)
Respondent: Commissioner of Zayed College for Girls (employer)

Applicant: Richard Harrison, counsel
Respondent: Joseph Williams and Rosie Davison, counsel

Mrs Rasheed has been principal of Zayed College for Girls, a state integrated special character Islamic secondary school, since 2011 — a tenure of 14 years. In 2022–2023 there was disharmony in management and governance; a disciplinary investigation was commenced by the Board of Trustees but left unresolved, and in mid-2023 a Commissioner (Ms Myers) was appointed. The Commissioner initiated a competency programme under the collective agreement which was concluded satisfactorily in April 2024, and Ms Rasheed went on approved sabbatical leave from 29 April to 5 July 2024. While she was on sabbatical, the acting principal Ms Shea wrote to the Commissioner on 19 June 2024 raising staff concerns about Ms Rasheed's leadership, health and safety, and professional standards. Following receipt of that letter and Mrs Rasheed's opposition to suspension, the Commissioner suspended her on 1 July 2024 under clause 6.4 of the Secondary Principals' Collective Agreement (the collective agreement). Mrs Rasheed argued the suspension was unlawful because the Commissioner had not first initiated informal discussions under clause 6.1.1(a) or commenced a formal disciplinary process under clause 6.3, a pre-condition she argued was required before clause 6.4 suspension could be accessed. The Commissioner argued the suspension was fair and reasonable given the seriousness of the health and safety concerns and the need to protect the integrity of the investigation.

1. Whether Mrs Rasheed has an arguable case for unjustified disadvantage by way of suspension — Status: Established (paras [10]-[32]).

The test for an arguable case requires only that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious, i.e., has some serious but not necessarily certain prospects of success (Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36). The substantive test is the s 103A objective justification test — whether the College's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could do in all the circumstances. Mrs Rasheed argued, relying on Campbell v The Commissioner of Salford School [2015] ERNZ 844, that clause 6.4 suspension was only accessible after initiating informal discussions (clause 6.1.1(a)) and a disciplinary process under clause 6.3, neither of which occurred. The Commissioner conceded the low threshold was met but argued the suspension was substantively justified, relying on XYZ v ABC [2017] NZEmpC 40. The Authority found it was seriously arguable that the Commissioner failed to comply with the collective agreement requirements, particularly given the broad and unformulated nature of the concerns and the absence of any prior inquiry or attempt to raise matters with Ms Rasheed informally, and held the arguable case threshold was met.

2. Whether Mrs Rasheed has an arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [33]-[41]).

The Authority considered whether reinstatement was practically and reasonably achievable, noting s 125(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 makes reinstatement the primary remedy where practical and reasonable. The Commissioner argued reinstatement was impracticable given Ms Rasheed's senior role, the risk to third parties, and the need to preserve the integrity of the investigation. The Authority found that the Commissioner's concerns were partly the product of the arguably deficient suspension process itself, that the Commissioner had previously managed similar concerns about Ms Rasheed's leadership successfully, that the complaints did not involve protected disclosures or serious misconduct of the kind in XYZ v ABC, and that given the conflicting untested evidence it could not be concluded reinstatement was impractical or unreasonable. The arguable case for permanent reinstatement was established.

3. Where the balance of convenience lies — Status: Resolved in favour of the applicant (paras [42]-[47]).

The balance of convenience requires weighing the detriment or injury each party will suffer if the interim order is granted or not, including whether damages can adequately compensate harm. The Commissioner argued that compensation was adequate, that Ms Rasheed was on full pay, that she had arguably breached her direction not to communicate with staff, and that the investigation's integrity would be undermined. The Authority found that damages would not adequately compensate Ms Rasheed for reputational harm given her central role in a small, faith-based school and her deep cultural and community ties. It also found that the Commissioner — with access to Ministry of Education resources, having previously managed the relationship successfully, and with existing College structures — could craft a managed return-to-work arrangement minimising any risk to third parties or the investigation. The balance of convenience favoured granting interim reinstatement.

4. Where the overall justice of the case lies — Status: Resolved in favour of the applicant (paras [48]-[52]).

The overall justice assessment is a check on the earlier analysis, as described in NZ Tax Refunds Limited v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90. Mrs Rasheed submitted that upholding the lawfulness of the collective agreement framework and preventing ongoing harm was critical, and also raised potential mandatory Teaching Council reporting obligations if the suspension continued. The Commissioner submitted overall justice favoured declining reinstatement to protect the investigation, and that mandatory reporting was irrelevant at this early stage. The Authority found that the overall justice supported upholding the legal framework and obligations under the collective agreement, and declined to accept that the risk to the investigation outweighed this consideration.

5. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [55]).

The Authority reserved costs without deciding the matter, as the substantive employment relationship problem remains to be heard.

The application for interim reinstatement was upheld in full; the suspension is lifted immediately and the parties are directed to resume mediation to agree the terms of Mrs Rasheed's return to work.

Interim reinstatement: Granted — the suspension is lifted with immediate effect.
Conditions: (i) The parties are to resume mediation forthwith to seek agreement on how Mrs Rasheed can be reinstated to her position or one no less advantageous than that held at the date of suspension; (ii) if agreement is not reached by Thursday 5 September 2024, further directions may be sought from the Authority.
A case management conference to be convened to timetable the substantive investigation meeting.
Compensation: None ordered at this stage (interim determination only).
Costs: Reserved.

FEC, a school principal at a small rural school operated by HES (the School), claimed constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage arising from a series of events culminating in her resignation in August 2023. The key legal questions were whether the School's conduct amounted to constructive dismissal and whether FEC was unjustifiably disadvantaged in her employment. The claim for constructive dismissal was dismissed, but a limited disadvantage grievance was established in relation to the presiding member of the Board of Trustees making two unannounced visits to FEC's home after work hours, resulting in an award of $10,000 compensation.

Applicant: FEC (employee, school principal)
Respondent: HES (employer, school/Board of Trustees)

Applicant: Fiona McMillan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: John Unsworth & Jack Unsworth, counsel for the Respondent

FEC was employed as a beginning principal at a small rural school operated by HES, acting in the role from March 2022 through to January 2024. She alleged that from late 2022 the Board of Trustees was dysfunctional, failed to support her, and increased her workload, causing high stress levels. The key trigger for her resignation was an incident on 11 August 2023 when a parent was confrontational at a school speech competition; FEC called an urgent Board meeting that day and sought a trespass notice against the parent, which the Board declined to issue, instead agreeing the presiding member would speak to the parent first. On 12 and 14 August 2023 the presiding member made unannounced visits to FEC's home to deliver a written list of parent complaints and to discuss school matters, conduct that FEC found confrontational and distressing. FEC resigned by email on 15 August 2023, citing her partner's health as the reason; she later argued at investigation that her true reason was the Board's failure to provide a safe work environment. The School denied any breach of duty and relied on the stated reason in the resignation letter. No personal grievances (other than the constructive dismissal claim) had been formally raised by FEC with the School during employment.

1. Whether the constructive dismissal claim was established — Status: Dismissed (paras [28], [37]–[50], [51]–[55]).

The Authority applied the three-limb test from Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Limited [1985] 2 NZLR 372, focussing on whether a breach of duty by the employer caused FEC's resignation. The Authority found FEC's written resignation letter stated her partner's health as the reason, and that evidence from the Police Constable (who was present at the 11 August incident) directly contradicted FEC's account that the Police had directed the Board to trespass the parent. The Authority preferred the Constable's evidence as more reliable, found no breach of duty by the School in respect of the health and safety complaint, and held the Board was entitled to rely on the written reason for resignation. Accordingly, the constructive dismissal grievance was not made out.

2. Whether the disadvantage grievances relating to lack of Board support, workload, and general health and safety concerns were established — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]–[28], [38]).

The Authority applied s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and s 103A's objective test of what a fair and reasonable employer would do. The evidence showed FEC had not formally raised health and safety issues or personal grievances with the School; her communications to the Board were characterised as keeping the Board informed rather than raising grievances. There was no compelling evidence the School was made aware of these matters in a way requiring a formal response, and no Board-initiated issues (other than the parent incident) were raised as complaints. These disadvantage claims were not made out.

3. Whether the presiding member's unannounced home visits on 12 and 14 August 2023 constituted an unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [44]–[50], [53]–[54]).

Applying s 103A's objective fair and reasonable employer standard, and relying on the secretly recorded comments made by the presiding member immediately before the visits (which revealed a hostile frame of mind towards FEC), the Authority preferred FEC's account of those interactions. It found the visits were entirely inappropriate: the presiding member should not have attended FEC's home without prior consent to discuss the parent complaint matters, particularly when FEC had raised concerns about an abusive parent. The Authority accepted these visits caused FEC to feel unsupported, unsafe at home, and had a detrimental effect on her, and held the School's actions in this respect unjustifiably disadvantaged FEC.

4. Whether the Authority should re-characterise the personal grievance under s 122 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [39]–[40]).

Section 122 of the Act permits the Authority to find a personal grievance is of a different type from that alleged. The Authority used this provision to find that, while the constructive dismissal claim failed, the circumstances surrounding the presiding member's home visits gave rise to an unjustified disadvantage grievance, and awarded remedy on that basis.

5. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for blameworthy contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (para [7](d)).

The issue was identified for investigation but the Authority made no explicit finding of contributory conduct by FEC and no reduction was applied, though FEC's own conduct in not formally raising grievances and giving a different reason for resignation was noted factually. No s 124 reduction was applied to the remedy awarded.

6. Whether penalties should be imposed for breaches of the Employment Relations Act 2000, including s 4 (good faith), and/or damages for breach of the Employment Agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [55]).

FEC sought penalties and/or damages for alleged breaches of her employment agreement and s 4 of the Act. The Authority concluded the circumstances of the case did not warrant the imposition of a penalty and made no penalty order. No reasoning beyond that conclusion was provided on this issue.

7. Whether lost remuneration and loss of superannuation contributions were payable — Status: Not reached / Dismissed (para [7](c)).

These remedies were sought but the Authority made no award of lost wages or superannuation, and did not address them in the remedies discussion, consistent with the constructive dismissal claim being dismissed and the disadvantage finding being limited to the home visit incidents.

8. Whether non-publication orders should be made — Status: Established (paras [3]–[4]).

The Authority granted permanent non-publication orders under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, prohibiting publication of names or identifying information about FEC, staff, the school, pupils, parents, and others involved. The application was unopposed, and FEC gave evidence of potential harm from publication; the small rural community context meant witness identification would likely lead to her identification. No public interest in the information was identified.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (final paras).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, FEC may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination; HES then has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be determined on its usual daily tariff basis absent special circumstances.

The claim was partially upheld: the constructive dismissal and most disadvantage claims were dismissed, but a limited unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to the presiding member's unannounced home visits was established, resulting in compensation of $10,000.

Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i) — humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $10,000, to be paid within 28 days of the determination date.
Lost wages: None ordered.
Superannuation contributions: None ordered.
Penalties: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought / not ordered.
Costs: Reserved.

OAS, a chef employed by JIK Limited (a small Auckland hospitality business), claimed unjustified dismissal after he was removed from the roster following absences related to a family violence situation involving his ex-partner and children. The key legal questions were whether OAS resigned/abandoned his employment or was unjustifiably dismissed, and whether JIK breached its good faith obligations. The Authority found OAS was unjustifiably dismissed, that JIK breached its good faith duty (though without penalty), and awarded him reduced compensation for lost wages and distress.

Applicant: OAS (employee, chef)
Respondent: JIK Limited (employer, hospitality business)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: Arvind Nair, counsel

OAS was employed by JIK Limited as a chef from approximately July 2023 under an employment agreement that included family violence leave provisions. In early February 2024, OAS had an unauthorised absence after his dog died (despite his leave request being declined), and on 10 February 2024 a family violence incident occurred involving his ex-partner, his current partner, and his children. From 12 February 2024, OAS notified JIK he needed time away to keep his children safe, obtain a protection order, and deal with court proceedings; he offered to return the following week and to provide supporting evidence. JIK's owner, PVK, construed OAS's messages as a resignation, citing his recent pattern of unauthorised absences, and on 16 February 2024 the next roster was circulated without OAS being allocated any shifts. OAS maintained he had not resigned and that his employment ended when JIK stopped rostering him. A property-return dispute between the parties was resolved at the investigation meeting. JIK argued OAS had either resigned, abandoned his employment, or that any dismissal was justified.

1. Whether OAS resigned, abandoned his employment, or was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (unjustified dismissal) (paras [43]-[53]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test of whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as JIK did in all the circumstances. It found OAS's communications, read as a whole, could not properly be construed as a resignation; references to potentially resigning were conditional and he consistently said he was willing to return. JIK's decision not to roster OAS was a dismissal at JIK's initiative, driven by frustration at his absences. Because OAS was entitled to family violence leave under both the Employment Agreement and Subpart 5 of the Holidays Act 2003 (which incorporates the Family Violence Act 2018 definition), JIK's failure to engage with his situation and dismissal of him for absences covered by that entitlement were not actions a fair and reasonable employer could have taken. The unjustified dismissal claim was established.

2. Whether OAS was entitled to family violence leave in the week of 12 February 2024 — Status: Established (paras [44]-[48]).

The Authority referred to Subpart 5 of the Holidays Act 2003 and s 9 of the Family Violence Act 2018 (which covers physical and psychological abuse by a former partner) and s 72B HA 2003 (covering an employee who lives with a child against whom family violence is being inflicted). OAS had communicated to JIK that he needed time to protect his children and obtain a protection order; JIK did not ask any questions or seek supporting documents and so was taken to have accepted his account at face value. The Authority found OAS was entitled to family violence leave for that week.

3. Whether JIK breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [54]-[58]).

Under s 4 of the Act, parties must be active and constructive in maintaining a productive employment relationship. The Authority found JIK failed to properly engage with OAS about his family violence situation, took an unfavourable interpretation of his messages, and concluded he had resigned despite him saying he would return. These failures were inconsistent with the duty of good faith.

4. Whether a penalty should be imposed on JIK for its breach of good faith under s 4A of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [55], [59]-[60]).

Under s 4A of the Act, a penalty may be imposed where a good faith breach was serious, sustained and deliberate, or intended to undermine the employment relationship. The Authority found that while JIK breached good faith, its behaviour was driven by genuine frustration at OAS's non-attendance and pressure on its small team; it was not deliberate, serious and sustained, nor intended to undermine the employment relationship. A penalty was not warranted.

5. Whether the Employment Relations Act 2000 amendments (ss 123B, 123C and amended s 124), which came into force on 21 February 2026, applied to the remedies assessment — Status: Dismissed (paras [62]-[63]).

JIK's counsel submitted the new provisions should apply. The Authority rejected this, relying on s 33 of the Legislation Act 2019, which provides that amendment of legislation does not affect proceedings that commenced before the amendment. OAS lodged his claim before 21 February 2026, so the law at the time of filing applied. This was confirmed by The Board of Trustees v LGY [2026] NZEmpC 46.

6. Whether OAS should be awarded compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [64]-[67]).

The Authority applied the test from Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, requiring quantification of harm caused by the unjustified actions. OAS gave evidence of feeling humiliated by JIK's indifference, suffering depression and sleep difficulties, and losing purpose and independence after dismissal. The Authority acknowledged other personal factors (family situation) would also have affected his mental health and were not attributable to JIK. An award of $15,000 was assessed as appropriate before any contribution reduction.

7. Whether OAS should be awarded lost wages — Status: Partially established (paras [68]-[74]).

OAS claimed $14,300 gross (13 weeks at $27.50/hr × 40hrs/week). The Authority, applying the discretionary and individualised approach confirmed in Sam's Fukuyama Food Services Ltd v Zhang [2011] NZCA 608, considered OAS's limited mitigation efforts, his poor pre-dismissal attendance record, the short tenure of just over six months, and the likelihood that his pattern of unreliable attendance would have continued. The Authority awarded 8 weeks' lost wages ($8,800 gross) as the amount reflecting actual loss, before contribution reduction.

8. Whether OAS's own conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to his grievance under s 124 of the Act, and if so what reduction should apply — Status: Established (paras [75]-[80]).

Under s 124, the Authority must consider the extent to which the employee's blameworthy or wrong conduct contributed to the grievance situation and may reduce remedies accordingly. OAS's unauthorised absence the week before (after his dog's death, despite the leave request being declined) was found to be blameworthy conduct that coloured JIK's response to his subsequent family violence leave request. However, this contribution was not significant given JIK's own failure to observe its contractual and statutory family violence leave obligations. A 10% reduction was applied to all remedies.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [82]-[84]).

Costs were not determined. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If not resolved, OAS may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination; JIK then has 14 days to reply. The Authority noted it would apply its standard notional daily rate absent special circumstances.

The claim of unjustified dismissal was upheld; the good faith breach was established but no penalty was imposed; remedies were awarded subject to a 10% contribution reduction.

- Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) (hurt/humiliation/distress): $13,500.00 (being $15,000 reduced by 10% for contribution)
- Lost wages under s 128: $7,920.00 gross (being $8,800 reduced by 10% for contribution)
- Both amounts payable within 28 days of the determination date
- Penalty: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; timetabling directions given if Authority determination required

DGZ (an employee) applied to the Employment Relations Authority for orders to anonymise her name and prohibit publication of her identifying details in two earlier publicly available determinations — one dismissing her personal grievance for unjustified dismissal by redundancy, and one ordering her to pay costs. The key legal question was whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected from continued publication, sufficient to justify departing from the principle of open justice. The Authority declined the application, finding DGZ's evidence fell short of the required standard.

Applicant: DGZ (employee/former employee)
Respondent: WXU (employer, a company)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in person)
Respondent: Kelly Rowell, counsel for the Respondent

DGZ was formerly employed by WXU and was made redundant. A first determination issued on 24 September 2025 declined her personal grievance claim for unjustified dismissal, and a second determination issued on 13 November 2025 ordered her to pay costs to WXU. Both determinations were published on the Authority's publicly accessible online database. DGZ filed a challenge to the first determination in the Employment Court on 21 October 2025 but discontinued those proceedings on 23 March 2026 after a confidential judicial settlement conference resolved the costs issue; the substantive findings of the Authority were unchanged. On 12 May 2026 DGZ applied for orders anonymising her name and prohibiting publication of her identifying details in both earlier determinations, asserting that the public availability of the determinations had caused disproportionate prejudice to her employment opportunities (including an alleged withdrawn job offer), that a confidential settlement justified privacy protection, and that her status as a refugee heightened her privacy needs. WXU opposed the application, disputing the extent of the alleged prejudice and the characterisation of any settlement agreement.

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction/power to make anonymisation and non-publication orders in respect of determinations already published — Status: Established (paras [9]-[10]).

Under clause 10 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act), the Authority may order that names, evidence, or pleadings not be published. The Authority confirmed, following JKL v Stirling Anderson Limited [2022] NZEmpC 107, that there is no temporal limit on this power and it may be exercised even after proceedings have concluded and determinations have been published. The Authority therefore accepted it had jurisdiction to consider the application.

2. Whether DGZ established specific adverse consequences reasonably expected to result from publication of her name, sufficient to justify departure from the open justice principle — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[13], [23]-[41]).

The applicable test, drawn from the Supreme Court in Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135 and applied by the Employment Court in MW v Spiga Limited [2024] NZEmpC 147, requires an applicant to establish, by evidence and reasonable inference, that specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected to occur, and that those consequences justify departing from the fundamental rule of open justice. The Authority assessed DGZ's four grounds — harm to employment prospects, outweighing of public interest, confidential settlement, and refugee status — against the seven Spiga factors (circumstances of the case, interests of the applicant, interests of the respondent, interests of third parties, public interest, equity and good conscience, and tikanga). The Authority found DGZ's evidence was too limited and speculative: the alleged job withdrawal was unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, DGZ had obtained two other jobs since publication, there was no confidential settlement covering the substantive findings, and no evidence supported heightened vulnerability from her refugee background. The application was accordingly declined.

3. Whether the alleged confidential settlement of DGZ's employment relationship problem justified a non-publication order — Status: Dismissed (paras [21], [26]).

DGZ argued that her withdrawal from the Employment Court proceedings was on confidential terms that should protect her identity. WXU denied any confidential settlement of the substantive personal grievance; it said only the costs issue was resolved at a confidential judicial settlement conference. The notice of discontinuance expressly recorded no costs issues between the parties but contained nothing indicating the substantive findings were resolved confidentially or that the earlier determinations had lost their status as public documents. The Authority accepted WXU's account and rejected this basis for the order.

4. Whether DGZ's status as a refugee heightened her need for privacy and constituted a relevant factor justifying a non-publication order — Status: Dismissed (paras [22], [27]-[28]).

DGZ submitted her background as a refugee made privacy and personal security particularly important. The Authority acknowledged that refugee or migrant status could in some circumstances create increased vulnerability, but found no evidence that this was a relevant factor here. DGZ had lived in New Zealand for more than 20 years, had New Zealand-born children, owned property in New Zealand, and had worked in her professional field for more than 15 years. The ground was not made out.

5. Whether costs should be ordered in relation to the determination of this application — Status: Dismissed (para [43]).

No costs were sought by either party. The Authority made no order as to costs.

The application was dismissed in full; DGZ's request for anonymisation and non-publication orders in respect of the two earlier determinations was declined, and no costs were ordered.

None ordered. No anonymisation or non-publication orders were made in respect of the earlier determinations. No costs were ordered in relation to the determination of this application. The parties' names were anonymised in this third determination only (for procedural reasons relating to DGZ's potential challenge rights), but the two earlier determinations remain publicly accessible and unchanged.

Anthea Andrew, a long-serving Medical Laboratory Technician and Quality Co-ordinator employed by Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (HNZ) since 1996, challenged HNZ's 2024 decision to regrade her position and cease her higher duties allowance, arguing this constituted an unjustified unilateral variation of her employment terms and an unlawful wage deduction. The key legal questions were whether HNZ breached her collective agreement and/or the Wages Protection Act 1983, and whether HNZ unjustifiably disadvantaged her by implementing the regrading without adequate prior consultation. The Authority dismissed all substantive claims, finding HNZ's regrading was legitimate under the collective agreement and not unjustified, though it recommended a further formal grading review and reserved costs.

Applicant: Anthea Andrew (employee)
Respondent: Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (employer)

Applicant: Bradley McDonald, counsel
Respondent: Jack Brown and Ashley-Jayne Lodge, counsel

Anthea Andrew has been employed by HNZ and its predecessors since December 1996 as a Medical Laboratory Technician, latterly also holding a Quality Co-ordinator and Point of Care Testing Co-ordinator role. From 2015 onwards, she was paid an additional allowance (described variously as a higher duties allowance or, from 2017, as a split salary across two pay scales) to recognise the additional responsibilities she undertook. Following a collective agreement restructure in late 2023 arising from a pay equity settlement, HNZ conducted a grading review at Ms Andrew's own request and in September–October 2024 determined she should be placed on Designated 2 of the new Designated Position Salary Scale, ceasing the previous allowance arrangement. Ms Andrew declined this outcome, contending HNZ had acted unilaterally without her consent and had failed to properly consult her, particularly by implementing the change on 31 October 2024 before a scheduled further meeting had occurred. HNZ maintained the regrading was conducted pursuant to the collective agreement, after extensive consultation over nine months, and resulted in a single consolidated salary covering her full responsibilities.

1. Whether HNZ unilaterally breached Ms Andrew's employment agreement by varying her remuneration without consent — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[38]).

The Authority framed the test as whether the solution implemented was one a fair and reasonable employer could have taken. It found the regrading was not a unilateral variation but a response to Ms Andrew's own request for a grading review, conducted pursuant to clause 5.1.2(b) and (c) of the collective agreement, which expressly authorised the employer to review roles not in designated positions and to determine the appropriate band. Because the collective agreement authorised the process and the outcome, no breach of the employment agreement was established.

2. Whether cessation of the higher duties allowance constituted an unauthorised deduction in breach of s 5 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]).

The Authority held that because the collective agreement terms had not been breached, and because s 16 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 preserves the primacy of a collective employment agreement, no breach of s 5 of the Act arose. The finding that the regrading was legitimately effected under the collective agreement was determinative of this issue.

3. Whether HNZ unjustifiably disadvantaged Ms Andrew by implementing the regrading on 31 October 2024 without first hearing further from her about her job description and responsibilities — Status: Partially established (paras [39]-[42]).

The Authority applied the good faith obligations under the Employment Relations Act 2000 (including Schedule 1B, Code of good faith for the public health sector). It found that while the overall process was extensive and Ms Andrew had ample opportunity to engage, HNZ committed an omission at the final stage by failing to make further efforts to arrange a meeting after Ms Andrew explained she could not attend on 1 November 2024. However, the Authority found this omission did not cause Ms Andrew any detriment to her rights, because a formal internal salary review process was available and remained open to her, which she inexplicably chose not to utilise. Accordingly, no compensatory remedy was awarded for this element.

4. Whether the Authority could fix or correct Ms Andrew's salary or grading — Status: Not reached/dismissed as outside jurisdiction (paras [37]).

The Authority noted it cannot independently review or alter a grading decision, as this would constitute wage fixing, which is expressly prohibited under s 161(2)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Wage fixing is also not among the remedies available for personal grievance under s 123 of the Act. No interpretation dispute under s 129(1) of the Act was raised in the alternative.

5. Whether remedies (including compensation for hurt, humiliation and distress and/or lost wages) should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (paras [41]-[43]).

Because no unjustified disadvantage personal grievance or breach was established, no compensatory remedy under s 123 of the Act was available. The Authority acknowledged Ms Andrew's understandable frustration but found HNZ had acted with patience and tolerance in unwinding a complex remuneration history of its own making.

6. Whether any remedy should be reduced for contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (paras [32](d)).

This issue was listed as a question to be determined but was not reached because no remedy was awarded.

7. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of good faith obligations — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]).

The Authority noted that Ms Andrew had not sought a penalty for good faith breaches in a timely manner, effectively declining to impose one. Although a good faith omission was found at the final consultation stage, no penalty was considered appropriate.

8. Whether the Authority should make a recommendation for a further grading review — Status: Established (paras [43]).

Pursuant to s 123(1)(cc) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority recommended (not ordered) that HNZ formally review Ms Andrew's grading again to allow further input from her, noting the lengthy employment relationship, her significant commitment and skills, and the fact that the regrading appeared to have reduced her base salary from approximately $94,218.80 to $91,749 per annum (though overall remuneration did not decrease when the higher overtime base rate was accounted for).

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [44]-[46]).

Costs were reserved. If unresolved, HNZ's counsel may lodge a memorandum within 28 days and Ms Andrew may reply within 14 days of service. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff, with possible adjustment, and flagged the question of whether costs should lie where they fall given the lengthy and unblemished employment relationship.

The claims were dismissed in their entirety; no remedies or penalties were ordered, though the Authority made a non-binding recommendation that HNZ undertake a further grading review.

None ordered. A non-binding recommendation was made pursuant to s 123(1)(cc) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 that HNZ formally review Ms Andrew's grading with further input from her. Costs reserved pending further memoranda from the parties.

Ali Gencer, a Turkish migrant chef, brought claims against his employer Turquoise DKZ Limited (trading as Turquoise Café) following the end of his employment in June 2024. The key disputes concerned whether he was dismissed or resigned, whether he was disadvantaged by substandard accommodation and tasks outside his role, whether wages and statutory entitlements were properly paid, and whether money was deducted for visa costs. The Authority found Mr Gencer resigned, dismissed his disadvantage claims, but upheld a wage arrears claim for underpayment below the minimum wage rate during his first six weeks of employment.

Applicant: Ali Gencer (employee, chef)
Respondent: Turquoise DKZ Limited (t/a Turquoise Café) (employer)

Applicant: Mr Gencer in person (self-represented)
Respondent: Todd Western for the Respondent

Mr Gencer was employed as a chef by Turquoise DKZ Limited, a café in New Plymouth operated by director Erdinc Erol, from approximately 10 April 2024 until 22 June 2024. The employment was agreed verbally (no written employment agreement was provided) at $1,000.00 per week after tax, and Mr Erol also agreed to sponsor Mr Gencer's visa application. Mr Gencer had arrived in New Plymouth around 25 March 2024 and spent the first few weeks working on accommodation above the café rather than in the kitchen, living at an employee's home. On 21–22 June 2024, Mr Gencer requested a 50% pay rise, which Mr Erol declined; the dispute centres on whether Mr Gencer was then dismissed or resigned. Mr Gencer argued he was unjustifiably dismissed, was exploited as a vulnerable migrant, worked unpaid for the first three weeks, suffered substandard accommodation, and had money demanded of him for visa costs; Mr Erol maintained Mr Gencer resigned, all entitlements were paid, and he had acted in good faith. The matter proceeded to an investigation meeting on 31 March 2026, with four witnesses for the respondent and Mr Gencer giving evidence by AVL.

1. Whether Mr Gencer was dismissed or resigned — Status: Dismissed (unjustified dismissal claim not established) (paras [18]–[26]).

The Authority applied the classic test from Wellington, Taranaki & Marlborough Clerical v Greenwich (1983), requiring that termination be at the employer's initiative, and noted that resignation is a unilateral act assessed on an objective standard (citing Mike Transport Warehouse v Vermuelen [2021] NZEmpC 197 at [40]). Applying these principles to the evidence, the Authority found that Mr Gencer's own words ("if you do not want me I will not stay") and his conduct — dropping his key on the table and walking out, then not returning to work or taking any steps with his employer — objectively constituted a resignation. Although Mr Gencer sent an email stating he "can't believe you fired me," the Authority found that in the context of an angry response to a declined pay rise, Mr Erol was reasonably entitled to conclude Mr Gencer had resigned.

2. Whether Mr Gencer was disadvantaged by the failure to provide adequate accommodation and by being asked to carry out tasks outside his role as chef — Status: Dismissed (paras [27]–[30]).

The Authority considered whether the accommodation arrangement was an employment relationship problem and whether Mr Gencer suffered disadvantage. The Authority found that although the original plan to use the space above the café was not realised, accommodation was in fact provided at Mr Yildirim's house. Mr Gencer had not raised complaints about the adequacy of that accommodation with Mr Erol or Mr Yildirim at the time, and evidence from Mr Yildirim contradicted Mr Gencer's account that the accommodation was inadequate. In the circumstances, Mr Gencer was not disadvantaged by the failure to provide accommodation.

3. Whether a written employment agreement was provided — Status: Established (breach) (addressed in background facts and issues).

Mr Erol accepted that no written employment agreement was provided to Mr Gencer, though a draft had been prepared for immigration purposes. The Authority noted this breach but did not separately address remedies for it beyond its findings on wages; it appears the finding was made as context rather than as a basis for a discrete remedy.

4. Whether Mr Gencer received the minimum wage and was paid all wages and statutory entitlements — Status: Partially established (paras [33]–[38]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1993. Mr Erol accepted Mr Gencer worked 10.5-hour days, six days a week for the first six weeks. At the agreed salary of $1,000 per week after tax, Mr Gencer's implied hourly rate was $3.05 below the applicable minimum wage rate for that period. Once he moved to five-day weeks in the final four weeks, his rate exceeded the minimum wage. Wage and time records confirmed he was paid for a 10-week period from 10 April 2024. The Authority ordered wage arrears of $1,152.90 for the six-week underpayment period.

5. Whether Mr Gencer worked unpaid for the first three weeks (prior to 10 April 2024) — Status: Dismissed (paras [31]–[32]).

Mr Gencer claimed he began working in the café from 25 March 2024 and received cash payments for those first three weeks. The Authority found, on the basis of photographic evidence and Mr Gencer's own concession that he worked on the accommodation above the café upon arrival, that kitchen employment did not commence until 10 April 2024 as Mr Erol asserted. The Authority was satisfied the work done before that date was on the accommodation renovation, not as a chef in the café.

6. Whether there was a deduction from Mr Gencer's wages to pay for visa application fees — Status: Dismissed (paras [31] area and visa payment paragraphs).

Mr Gencer alleged Mr Erol asked him for money towards the visa application. Mr Erol produced documentary evidence showing he had personally paid approximately $2,000 to a licensed immigration adviser. The Authority found Mr Gencer could not provide any corroborating information to support his claim that he was coercively asked to contribute to or did pay the visa costs, and this claim was not established.

7. Whether any remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 for contributory conduct by Mr Gencer — Status: Not reached (listed as issue (h)).

Because Mr Gencer's unjustified dismissal and disadvantage claims were not established, no remedy for those claims arose. The only remedy awarded was the minimum wage shortfall (a statutory entitlement), to which s 124 contribution reduction does not apply. The issue was therefore not reached on the merits.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal and disadvantage claims were dismissed, but the wage arrears claim (underpayment below minimum wage) was upheld.

Wage arrears: $1,152.90 ordered to be paid by Turquoise DKZ Limited to Ali Gencer within 28 days of the determination (under s 131 of the Employment Relations Act 2000).
Compensation for unjustified dismissal (s 123(1)(c)(i)): None ordered (claim dismissed).
Lost wages (unjustified dismissal): None ordered (claim dismissed).
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
Costs: Reserved. Parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if unresolved, memoranda to be filed within 28 days. Authority will apply its usual daily tariff if asked to determine costs.

[CONSENT]

CZA (applicant/employee) brought employment relationship claims against GLE Limited (first respondent), QVT (second respondent), and TPF (third respondent). The parties resolved all issues by agreement and jointly asked the Authority to issue a consent determination reflecting their settlement. The determination records those agreed terms as final, binding, and enforceable orders of the Authority, with a non-publication order protecting the confidential settlement terms.

Applicant: CZA (employee)
Respondent: GLE Limited (first respondent/employer), QVT (second respondent), TPF (third respondent)

Applicant: Alexander Brown, Advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Jo Baguley, Counsel for the Respondents

CZA brought employment relationship claims against GLE Limited and two other respondents arising from their employment relationship and/or the ending of it. The nature of the specific claims and underlying facts are not described in the determination. The parties reached a negotiated settlement, documented in a Record of Settlement signed by the first respondent's director (on behalf of all three respondents) and by the applicant on 6 July 2026. They jointly applied to the Authority to have those agreed terms recorded as consent orders. The matter was dealt with on the papers (no hearing). The settlement was stated to fully and finally resolve all issues between the parties up to and including the date of the determination.

1. Whether the Authority should issue a consent determination recording the parties' agreed settlement terms as binding orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [2]-[5]).

The Authority may issue a consent determination under the Employment Relations Act 2000 where parties have resolved their employment relationship problems by agreement and request that their terms of settlement be recorded as orders of the Authority. The Authority was satisfied the parties had agreed on terms that fully and finally settled all issues between them. Accordingly, the agreed terms in the Record of Settlement were converted into final, binding, and enforceable orders. The determination notes that failure to comply may be addressed by a compliance order application, but no further action may be taken regarding any connected matters.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made protecting the confidential terms of settlement — Status: Established (paras [6]-[7]).

The Authority has power under clause 10 of the Second Schedule to the Employment Relations Act 2000 to prohibit publication of information where confidentiality is warranted. The parties agreed the terms of the Settlement were to remain confidential to them and their professional advisors. The Authority was satisfied there was no countervailing public interest requiring publication of the settlement terms, and accordingly made a non-publication order prohibiting publication of those terms, subject to the condition that the order does not apply to the employment institutions.

The claim was resolved by consent; the settlement terms were recorded as final and binding orders of the Authority, and a non-publication order was made protecting the confidential settlement terms.

The specific terms of the settlement (including any financial or other remedies agreed between the parties) are subject to a non-publication order and are not disclosed in the determination. The agreed terms of the Record of Settlement have been made final, binding, and enforceable orders of the Authority. No remedy details are publicly available.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from two earlier substantive determinations in which Dongyan Lin (employee) successfully established she was an employee who had been unjustifiably disadvantaged by Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation) and Yook Insulation Limited, with Yanfen Wang also involved. The Authority exercised its discretionary costs jurisdiction under Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, applying the daily tariff approach. Ms Lin was awarded $4,500 in costs plus the $71.55 application fee, payable jointly and severally by all three respondents.

Applicant: Dongyan Lin (aka Chloe Lin) (employee)
Respondent: Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent); Yook Insulation Limited (Second Respondent); Yanfen Wang (Third Respondent)

Applicant: John Wood, advocate
Respondent (First): Not represented
Respondents (Second and Third): Yanfen Wang, self-represented

This determination addresses costs only, following two substantive determinations issued on 3 October 2025 and 15 May 2026. In those earlier decisions, the Authority found Ms Lin was an employee, had been unjustifiably disadvantaged by both respondent companies, and ordered compensation and repayment of PAYE deductions wrongly withheld, with leave granted to recover PAYE amounts from Ms Wang if the companies could not pay. The investigation meeting was held in two sessions (half a day on 30 September 2025 and approximately two-thirds of a day on 19 March 2026), with written submissions lodged shortly after. Costs were reserved in the substantive determinations and the parties were given the opportunity to resolve costs between themselves, which they could not. Ms Lin applied for costs; the respondents did not respond to the application. The liquidators of Yoke Insulation Limited advised they would abide by the Authority's costs determination, which the Authority treated as agreement to proceed.

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to determine costs notwithstanding the pending Employment Court challenge — Status: Established (paras [3]–[4]).

The Authority noted that Ms Wang and Yook Insulation Limited had filed a challenge in the Employment Court regarding the second substantive determination. The Authority found no reason why costs could not nonetheless be determined at the Authority level concurrently. The liquidators' indication that they would abide by the costs outcome was treated as sufficient agreement to proceed under s 248(1)(c) of the Companies Act 1993. No jurisdictional impediment was found.

2. Whether Ms Lin is entitled to a costs award as the successful party — Status: Established (paras [9], [12]).

The Authority applied the principle that costs generally follow the event under its equitable and good conscience jurisdiction in clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, consistent with the principles in PBO Limited v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Faggotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. Although Ms Lin did not succeed on all claims (her breach of employment agreement claim and penalty claims were declined), she was the overall successful party and thus entitled to costs, subject to adjustment for partial success.

3. Quantum of costs using the daily tariff — Status: Established (paras [6], [10], [12]–[13]).

The Authority's daily tariff provides $4,500 for the first day and $3,500 for each subsequent day. The investigation meeting totalled more than a full day across two sessions. Ms Lin's representative submitted a starting point of $5,060 (based on one and a half sessions), but sought no uplift. The Authority rounded the starting point to $5,000 but, taking into account that Ms Lin did not succeed on all claims and the time taken to investigate those unsuccessful claims, reduced the award to the full-day tariff of $4,500. No uplift was warranted.

4. Whether the application fee should be recovered — Status: Established (para [13]).

The Authority found it appropriate to include the Authority application fee of $71.55 in the costs award, in addition to the daily tariff contribution.

5. Whether costs should be inflated or uplifted due to any party's conduct — Status: Dismissed (para [11]).

No uplift was sought by Ms Lin and the Authority independently confirmed none was warranted on the facts.

The costs application was partially upheld: Ms Lin was awarded $4,500 (daily tariff, reduced from the starting point to reflect partial success) plus $71.55 (application fee), payable jointly and severally by all three respondents within 14 days.

Costs: $4,500 (daily tariff contribution) plus $71.55 (application fee) = $4,571.55 total, ordered against Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation), Yook Insulation Limited, and Yanfen Wang jointly and severally, payable to Ms Lin via her representative within 14 days of 15 July 2026.
No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were addressed in the two prior determinations).

Qi Sun, an apprentice builder employed by Keene Construction Limited (KCL) from June 2023 to October 2024, claims he was unjustifiably dismissed by text message from KCL's director, Jeremy Smith, on 3 October 2024. The key legal questions were whether the text message exchange constituted a dismissal and, if so, what remedies Mr Sun was entitled to. The Authority found the dismissal both substantively and procedurally unjustified, and awarded lost wages, compensation for humiliation, wage arrears, and costs.

Applicant: Qi Sun (employee/apprentice builder)
Respondent: Keene Construction Limited (employer)

Applicant: Greg Lloyd, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

Mr Sun was employed by KCL as an apprentice builder from June 2023, working 32 hours per week under a written employment agreement. KCL had agreed to pay Mr Sun's apprenticeship costs, but in September 2024 failed to pay $300 in training costs. On 3 October 2024, a text exchange between Mr Sun and KCL director Jeremy Smith, arising from Mr Sun's query about the unpaid training costs, culminated in Mr Smith telling Mr Sun "don't bother coming into work," which Mr Sun reasonably interpreted as dismissal. Mr Smith later claimed he had only stood Mr Sun down for one day and that Mr Sun had chosen not to return, but no evidence was presented to support this. Mr Sun's representative raised a personal grievance on 15 October 2024; KCL disputed the claims and indicated a representative would engage, but no further contact was made and mediation did not occur. KCL did not participate in the Authority's investigation at any stage, and the investigation meeting proceeded as formal proof in KCL's absence.

1. Whether KCL's text message exchange on 3 October 2024 constituted a dismissal — Status: Established (paras [24]-[34]).

The Authority applied the objective test under s 103A(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act): whether KCL's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. Citing Cornish Truck & Van Limited v Gildenhuys [2019] NZEmpC 6, the Authority applied the objective test of whether it was reasonable for someone in Mr Sun's position to conclude that employment had been terminated. In the absence of any evidence from KCL rebutting Mr Sun's account, the Authority accepted Mr Sun's evidence and found the text messages constituted a sending away amounting to dismissal. The Authority further found that even if KCL had not intended permanent dismissal, Mr Smith had the opportunity to clarify this on 3 October 2024 but failed to do so.

2. Whether the dismissal was substantively and procedurally unjustified under s 103A(3) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [25]-[34]).

The Authority considered the four procedural requirements in s 103A(3): whether KCL sufficiently investigated any allegations, raised concerns with Mr Sun, gave him an opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered his explanation. KCL provided no evidence of compliance with any of these requirements. Mr Sun had received no prior warnings about performance or conduct, and the dismissal was carried out without any process. The Authority found the dismissal both procedurally and substantively unjustified.

3. Whether KCL breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act — Status: Established (para [27]).

Section 4(1A)(b) requires parties to be active, constructive, responsive, and communicative. The Authority noted this provision was relevant to its inquiry, and KCL's failure to engage with Mr Sun or the Authority's process was inconsistent with these obligations. No separate remedy was carved out specifically for this finding, but it informed the overall assessment.

4. Whether Mr Sun was entitled to compensation for lost wages under s 123(1)(b) of the Act, subject to his duty to mitigate — Status: Established (paras [36]-[40]).

Under ss 123(1)(b) and 128, the Authority must order payment of the lesser of actual lost remuneration or three months' ordinary time remuneration, subject to the employee's duty to mitigate. The Authority accepted Mr Sun's evidence of active efforts to find work (approaching approximately 10 building companies) and that the building industry was slow at the time. Mr Sun earned $2,834.13 gross after his employment ended before starting his own company in March 2025. The Authority ordered 11 weeks' lost wages at $48.00/hour for 32 hours per week, less the $2,834.13 earned, totalling $14,061.87 gross.

5. Whether Mr Sun was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [41]-[45]).

Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) is not punitive but is designed to quantify harm caused by humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings. The Authority referred to Employment Court guidance in Stormont v Peddle Thorp Aitken Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 71, Waikato District Health Board v Archibald [2017] NZEmpC 132, and Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113. The Authority accepted Mr Sun's evidence of significant distress, financial hardship, and having to borrow from family and friends. An award of $15,000 was considered appropriate.

6. Whether remedies should be reduced for Mr Sun's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [47]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's own conduct contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the grievance and reduce remedies accordingly. The Authority found no evidence of any contributory conduct by Mr Sun; in fact, Mr Sun had actively sought clarification from Mr Smith about his employment status. No reduction was applied.

7. Whether Mr Sun was entitled to wage arrears for his final week of work, unpaid annual holidays, and notice pay — Status: Established (paras [48]-[50]).

Mr Sun claimed 32 hours' unpaid wages for his final week, 1.79 weeks of unpaid annual holidays (evidenced by a final payslip), and two weeks' notice pay. The Authority rejected a claim for backdating of a wage increase to 1 April 2024, finding no persuasive evidence of such an agreement. The Authority calculated the total at 153.28 hours at $48.00/hour = $7,357.44 gross in wage arrears, plus $588.60 (8% holiday pay), totalling $7,946.04 gross.

8. Whether costs should be awarded and at what level — Status: Established (paras [52]-[55]).

The Authority applied its standard daily tariff methodology for costs. Taking into account the less-than-half-day hearing and the complexity of the matter, the Authority awarded $2,000 as a contribution to costs. Mr Sun was legally aided and KCL had not participated meaningfully in any proceedings.

The claim was upheld in full: unjustified dismissal was established, all remedies sought were awarded (with the exception of the backdated wage increase claim), no contributory reduction was applied, and costs were awarded.

- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b)): $14,061.87 gross (11 weeks at $48.00/hour × 32 hours, less $2,834.13 earned post-employment)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $15,000.00
- Wage and holiday pay arrears (final week + 2 weeks' notice + 1.79 weeks' annual holidays): $7,946.04 gross (inclusive of $588.60 holiday pay)
- Costs contribution: $2,000.00
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination date (14 July 2026)
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Claim for backdated wage increase: Not upheld

Blue Hunt, a farm assistant, brought claims against Lance Wakelin, his former employer and farm manager, following his dismissal on 2 September 2024 after approximately five months of employment. Mr Hunt alleged unjustified dismissal, failure to pay minimum wages, unlawful accommodation deductions, failure to maintain wage and time records, and absence of a written employment agreement. The Authority upheld all substantive claims, finding the dismissal unjustified due to a complete absence of fair process, and ordered compensation, lost wages, wage arrears, reimbursement of unlawful deductions, a penalty, and interest.

Applicant: Blue Hunt (employee/farm assistant)
Respondent: Lance Wakelin (employer/farm manager)

Applicant: Tim Vogel, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

Blue Hunt was employed as a farm assistant by Lance Wakelin from 2 April 2024, having previously worked on the same farm for the property owners (Damian and Anna Hopkins). The parties verbally agreed to 60 hours per week at a salary of $70,000 per annum, with a $300 per week accommodation deduction, but Mr Hunt says he never received or signed a written employment agreement. On 2 September 2024, after a heated exchange in the cow shed, Mr Wakelin sent Mr Hunt a text message stating "the ship has sailed, your employment is over and you have 2 weeks in which to move out." Mr Hunt claimed unjustified dismissal, unpaid minimum wages, unlawful accommodation deductions (amounting to approximately 22% of his weekly pay rather than the statutory maximum of 5%), failure to keep wage and time records, and no written employment agreement. Mr Wakelin contested several claims, asserting that a signed employment agreement existed (which Mr Hunt denied, saying the signature was not his), that the farm was operated by a partnership so he was not the sole employer, and that Mr Hunt's dismissal was justified by cumulative conduct issues — though he acknowledged the process could have been more formal. The investigation meeting proceeded on 12 January 2026 in Mr Wakelin's absence after multiple adjournment requests, including disputed medical certificates, were declined.

1. Whether Mr Wakelin was the employer (sole liability) — Status: Established (paras [36]-[37]).

Mr Wakelin argued the farm was operated by a partnership and he was therefore not the sole employer. The Authority found no evidence of a partnership had been provided, and noted that if a partnership existed, Mr Wakelin could seek contribution from other partners under joint and several liability principles. The Authority was satisfied that Mr Wakelin had employed Mr Hunt and dismissed him, and was accordingly the employer for the purposes of this claim.

2. Whether Mr Hunt was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [38]-[46]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test, which requires assessing whether the employer's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances, including whether concerns were investigated, raised with the employee, and whether the employee was given a reasonable opportunity to respond. Mr Wakelin followed no dismissal process whatsoever — he dismissed Mr Hunt by text after a heated confrontation, with no investigation, no formal raising of concerns, no opportunity to respond, and no consideration of whether dismissal was proportionate. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified.

3. Whether Mr Wakelin breached his good faith obligation — Status: Established (paras [2], [28](b), [47], [62]).

The Authority identified failure to comply with good faith obligations as a discrete issue and found that Mr Wakelin's conduct — including failure to follow any dismissal process and non-compliance with employment standards — was inconsistent with the good faith obligations under the Act, as discussed in the penalty and wage-records analysis. The determination did not separately elaborate on s 4 good faith beyond framing the standards breaches in those terms.

4. Whether Mr Wakelin failed to keep and/or provide wage and time records — Status: Established (paras [48]-[49]).

Mr Wakelin acknowledged no wage and time records were kept, attributing partial blame to Mr Hunt for refusing to fill in time sheets. Under s 132 of the Act, where an employer fails to keep wage and time records and that failure prejudices the employee's ability to bring an accurate claim, the Authority may accept the employee's claims as proven unless the employer proves otherwise. The Authority applied s 132 and accepted Mr Hunt's evidence that the agreement was for 120 hours per fortnight, calculating remedies on that basis.

5. Whether unlawful deductions were made from Mr Hunt's wages for accommodation — Status: Established (paras [58]-[59]).

Section 7 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 limits deductions for lodging to no more than five per cent of the employee's wages. The $300 per week deduction represented approximately 22% of Mr Hunt's weekly pay of $1,346, far exceeding the statutory cap. Additionally, no tenancy agreement or signed employment agreement authorising the deduction existed. The Authority found the deductions were unlawful and ordered reimbursement of amounts exceeding the 5% statutory maximum.

6. Whether Mr Hunt was paid below the minimum wage — Status: Established (para [56]).

The minimum wage at the relevant time was $23.15 per hour. At 60 hours per week on a $70,000 annual salary, Mr Hunt's effective hourly rate was $22.44, below the statutory minimum. Under s 131(1)(b) of the Act, the Authority ordered payment of the shortfall of $0.71 per hour for 1,320 hours worked, totalling $937.20 (gross), plus holiday pay.

7. Whether Mr Hunt is entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings — Status: Established (paras [50]-[52]).

The Authority assessed compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act. Mr Hunt had to live in his car for months after dismissal, suffered financial stress, and experienced shame and loss of dignity as the dismissal was known to others on the farm including the farm owners. Applying the banding approach used by the courts and comparable Authority cases, and noting Mr Hunt was able to return to employment in December 2024, the Authority awarded $20,000.

8. Whether Mr Hunt is entitled to lost wages — Status: Established (paras [53]-[55]).

The Act permits reimbursement of lost remuneration up to three months' ordinary time pay. Mr Hunt was out of work from 2 September until mid-December 2024 and had difficulty finding accommodation and employment. The Authority awarded the equivalent of three months' wages calculated at the applicable minimum wage rate, amounting to $18,057.

9. Whether penalties should be awarded against Mr Wakelin — Status: Established (paras [60]-[66]).

The Authority found multiple breaches warranting penalties: (a) failure to retain and provide a signed employment agreement (ss 64(1) and (3) of the Act); (b) failure to provide wage and time records on request (s 130(2)); (c) making deductions without written consent (s 5 of the Wages Protection Act 1983); (d) failure to pay minimum wage (s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983); and (e) lodging deductions exceeding 5% of wages (s 7 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983). Applying s 133A factors, and noting a prior finding against Mr Wakelin for unjustified dismissal, the Authority imposed a total penalty of $1,000. Under s 136 of the Act, the Authority exercised its discretion to direct $500 of that penalty to Mr Hunt, with the balance paid to the Crown.

10. Whether remedies should be reduced for Mr Hunt's contributory conduct (s 124 of the Act) — Status: Dismissed (para [67]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's actions contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance. The Authority found that Mr Wakelin had failed to follow any process remotely compliant with the s 103A fair and reasonable employer standard, meaning the deficiencies went well beyond minor procedural flaws. In these circumstances, Mr Hunt had not contributed to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance, and no reduction was made.

11. Whether interest should be awarded on wage and holiday arrears — Status: Established (paras [68]-[69]).

The Authority has discretion to award interest on money claims under Schedule 2, clause 11 of the Act. Interest was ordered on the wage and holiday arrears from the date of dismissal (2 September 2024) until the date of full payment, to be calculated using the civil debt interest calculator.

12. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Reserved (paras [71]-[72]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Hunt may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Wakelin having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be determined on its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, wage breaches and unlawful deductions established, penalties awarded, and all heads of remedy granted except contributory reduction (dismissed) and costs (reserved).

- Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $20,000.00 (s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act)
- Lost wages: $18,057.00 (s 123(1)(b) and s 128 of the Act; equivalent to three months at applicable minimum wage)
- Wage arrears: $937.20 (gross) under s 131 of the Act, plus 8% holiday pay to be calculated and paid
- Reimbursement of unlawful accommodation deductions: amounts deducted in excess of 5% of wages for lodging (quantum to be calculated)
- Interest: on wage and holiday arrears from 2 September 2024 until date of full payment (civil debt interest calculator)
- Penalty: $1,000.00 total — $500.00 paid to Mr Hunt; $500.00 paid to the Crown
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination
- Costs: Reserved

William James (employee) brought personal grievance claims against Christchurch Glass Limited (CGL), his employer, for unjustified constructive dismissal, disadvantage, and breach of good faith arising from an allegedly unfair investigation into his bullying complaint against his manager. This determination deals solely with a preliminary issue: whether leave should be granted to join DB & PA James Limited (DB&PA), the head franchisor entity, as a "controlling third party" (CTP) under s 103B of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The application was dismissed on the grounds that statutory notice to DB&PA under s 115A was not given within the required 90-day period, and additionally that DB&PA's actions did not arguably cause or contribute to Mr James's personal grievances.

Applicant: William Peter James (employee/Franchise Manager)
Respondent: Christchurch Glass Limited (employer, trading as Novus Glass – Christchurch West franchise)

Applicant: Anna Dao, representative for the Applicant
Respondent: Ashley-Jayne Lodge and Georgina Anderson Brooks, counsel for Respondent

Mr James was employed by CGL (trading as Novus Glass) from October 2017, most recently as Franchise Manager from June 2023. DB&PA James Limited (trading as Novus New Zealand) is the head franchisor entity, co-directed by Mr James's father and uncle (who are also CGL directors), and its managing director Mr Armstrong was appointed to investigate Mr James's bullying complaint against his manager, Mr Krammer, who was employed by DB&PA but worked on CGL's premises. Mr James resigned on 20 March 2025, alleging constructive dismissal, and claimed the investigation was not conducted fairly or independently. He lodged Authority proceedings before resigning and later amended his claims. Mr James sought to join DB&PA as a CTP, motivated in part by concerns that CGL had ceased operating the franchise and a new entity (Christchurch West Glass Limited) now operated it. DB&PA and CGL opposed the joinder application on two grounds: (1) that statutory notice under s 115A was not given within the 90-day period; and (2) that DB&PA was not a CTP and its actions did not cause or contribute to the grievances.

1. Whether Mr James had raised a personal grievance and applied to the Authority to resolve it, as a precondition to applying under s 103B — Status: Established (para [21]).

Section 103B(1) requires that the employee must have raised a personal grievance under s 114 and asked the Authority to resolve it before applying to join a CTP. The Authority was satisfied without detailed analysis that Mr James had met this precondition, given his existing proceedings and grievance notice. No further reasoning was required on this point.

2. Whether it is arguable that DB&PA was a "controlling third party" under s 5 of the Act — first limb (contract or arrangement under which employee performed work for DB&PA's benefit) — Status: Established (paras [25], [27]).

The Authority applied the two-part statutory definition of CTP in s 5 of the Act. On the first limb, the Authority found it arguable (though with some weakness) that there was a franchise arrangement under which Mr James performed work for the benefit of DB&PA as head franchisor. The Authority accepted that head franchise support arrangements — including HR and payroll administration — could satisfy this element, but noted Mr James was clearly aware CGL was his employer and that the "all one and the same" argument was unpersuasive.

3. Whether it is arguable that DB&PA exercised employer-like control or direction over Mr James — second limb of the CTP definition — Status: Partially established (paras [26]-[27]).

On the second limb, the Authority found this only "weakly arguable." Mr Krammer, DB&PA's employee, was recorded as Mr James's direct manager in his IEA and worked on the same premises; his conduct is the subject of Mr James's complaint. However, the Authority accepted that the arrangement was administrative and practical (avoiding family conflict in management) and did not amount to day-to-day employer-type control by DB&PA itself. The Authority concluded it was weakly arguable but not strongly so.

4. Whether it is arguable that DB&PA's actions caused or contributed to Mr James's personal grievances — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[34]).

Under s 103B(3)(b)(ii), the applicant must show an arguable case that the proposed CTP's actions caused or contributed to the grievance. The Authority found it could not conclude that DB&PA as an entity arguably contributed to or caused the grievances. The grievances centred on Mr Krammer's conduct and Mr Armstrong's alleged lack of independence as investigator — individuals connected to DB&PA but acting in capacities related to CGL's internal processes. The Authority found the application was more likely motivated by enforcement concerns (CGL no longer operating the franchise) than by genuine contribution by DB&PA to the grievances. No binding authorities were cited on this point beyond the statutory text.

5. Whether the statutory notice requirements under s 115A of the Act were satisfied — Status: Dismissed (paras [35]-[40]).

Section 115A requires the employee to notify the proposed CTP, within the 90-day employee notification period (as defined in s 114(7)), that the employee considers the CTP's actions caused or contributed to the personal grievance. The Authority held notice was a threshold requirement (not merely an "arguable case" matter) and that the 90-day period ran from the date of resignation (20 March 2025), giving a deadline of approximately 18 June 2025. The Authority reviewed nine separate communications between January and October 2025 and found none constituted valid notice to DB&PA under s 115A — none specifically stated that Mr James considered DB&PA to be a "controlling third party" whose actions contributed to his grievance; most focused on individuals (directors, Mr Armstrong) rather than the entity DB&PA. The first communication that could be characterised as seeking to join DB&PA occurred in October 2025, well outside the notice period. As notice was not given, the s 103B requirements were not met and leave could not be granted.

6. Whether the application to join DB&PA as a controlling third party should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[41]).

As the threshold notice requirement under s 115A was not met, and the arguable case on contribution was also not established, the Authority refused to grant leave to join DB&PA under s 103B. The Authority also noted the substantive grievances can be adequately resolved through proceedings against CGL alone.

7. Whether costs should be determined — Status: Not reached (para [43]).

Costs were reserved until resolution of the substantive matter. No costs determination was made at this stage.

The preliminary application to join DB&PA James Limited as a controlling third party under s 103B of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was dismissed; the substantive proceedings against CGL are to continue.

None ordered at this stage. The application to join DB&PA was refused. Costs are reserved until resolution of the substantive matter. An Authority Officer will contact the parties to schedule the hearing of the substantive claims.

Five seafarers employed by Holcim (New Zealand) Limited on the MV Buffalo sought interim reinstatement after being made redundant on 14 January 2026, following Holcim's decision to cease maritime cement transport and switch to road and rail. The key legal questions were whether the seafarers had a serious arguable case for unjustifiable dismissal and permanent reinstatement, and where the balance of convenience and overall justice lay. The Authority found a serious question to be tried on unjustifiable dismissal but declined interim reinstatement on the grounds that permanent reinstatement was not arguable and the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Holcim.

Applicants: Ezaiah Unasas, Hare Clark, Manoj Perera, Vincent Lee, and Eric Phillips (employees/seafarers)
Respondent: Holcim (New Zealand) Limited (employer)

Applicants: Simon Mitchell KC and Angus Drumm, counsel for the applicants
Respondent: Sherridan Cook and Sianatu Lotoaso, counsel for the respondent

The applicants were seafarers employed by Holcim on the MV Buffalo, a vessel that transported cement around the New Zealand coast. From late 2024, Holcim entered discussions to sell the Buffalo and explored various options including chartering back arrangements and a replacement pneumatic cement carrier. In late November 2025 the seafarers were given redundancy notices effective 28 December 2025, but were ultimately dismissed on 14 January 2026 (after a December 2025 interim injunction obtained by a related group of colleagues delayed matters). A Ministerial authorisation sought by Nova Marine/Alton Shipping to operate a foreign vessel with a foreign crew was declined in December 2025, collapsing the charter-back arrangement. A related determination ([2026] NZERA 452) had already found, in respect of a similar group of seafarers, that Holcim breached its good faith obligations, inadequately consulted, and breached clause 39 of the collective agreement (protection from disadvantage), making the redundancy unjustifiable. The applicants sought interim and permanent reinstatement; Holcim opposed on the grounds it no longer owned or operated any vessel and had no prospect of maritime operations in the foreseeable future.

1. Whether there is a serious question to be tried that the applicants were unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [29]-[30]).

The test for a serious question to be tried requires an arguable case on the merits. The Authority applied findings from the closely related determination [2026] NZERA 452, which concluded that Holcim had breached its good faith obligations, inadequately consulted, and breached clause 39 of the collective agreement (protection from disadvantage), rendering the redundancy unjustifiable. On the evidence available, the Authority found the same conclusion applicable to this group of applicants, and accordingly the serious question threshold was met without detailed re-analysis.

2. Whether there is a serious question to be tried that the applicants should be permanently reinstated — Status: Dismissed (paras [31]-[36]).

The arguable-case test for reinstatement requires that reinstatement be arguably reasonable and practicable. There were no concerns about the seafarers' capacity or workplace conduct. However, since the investigation meeting, commercial negotiations between Holcim and Nova Marine's New Zealand-related company had concluded without agreement, and enquiries with a local bulk shipping provider confirmed no vacancies existed for Holcim crew. With no evident prospect of Holcim or a contractor on its behalf employing additional maritime crew in the foreseeable future, the Authority concluded there was no arguable case that permanent reinstatement was reasonable or practicable.

3. Where does the balance of convenience lie — Status: Established in favour of the respondent (paras [37]-[45]).

The balance of convenience requires weighing the detriment to each party. The Authority acknowledged that loss of employment is itself disadvantageous (financially and otherwise), and noted the limited New Zealand seafarer job market. It cited Chief Judge Inglis's observations in Vegepod NZ Ltd v Lowe that reinstatement is the primary remedy and that routinely declining interim reinstatement monetises the employment relationship and incentivises unlawful conduct. However, the applicants had received redundancy and other payments covering at least three to four months' pay (in some cases more), and financial loss could potentially be covered by damages. On the other side, ordering interim reinstatement where Holcim had no maritime work to offer would impose a not insignificant financial burden of paying wages for crew who could not be assigned duties. The Authority concluded the balance of convenience somewhat favoured Holcim.

4. Where does the overall justice lie pending substantive determination — Status: Established in favour of the respondent/against interim reinstatement (paras [46]-[48]).

Drawing back to consider the overall picture, the Authority noted that circumstances had firmed up since the application was lodged: Holcim was now using road and rail transport with some external provider support, which the union did not dispute and which had no capacity to employ the applicant seafarers. The overall justice assessment did not alter the earlier conclusions, and the application for interim reinstatement was declined.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [49]).

The Authority reserved the question of costs to be addressed at a later stage.

6. Next steps regarding substantive investigation — Status: Conditional (para [50]).

The Authority noted that if any of the applicants wished to proceed with a substantive investigation meeting, they were required to notify the Authority, and that referral to mediation would likely be the next step.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full; the serious question on unjustifiable dismissal was established but permanent reinstatement was not arguable, and both the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Holcim.

None ordered. Costs reserved. Substantive proceedings may proceed if the applicants notify the Authority; mediation likely to be directed as the next step.

Rebecca Francis-Clothier applied for paid parental leave (PPL) after resigning from her employment and relocating to Australia for medical and family reasons, but Inland Revenue declined her application on the basis she had only completed 24–25 qualifying weeks of work, falling short of the 26-week statutory threshold. The key legal questions were whether she met the eligibility threshold under s 2BA(4) of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, and whether the Authority should exercise its discretion to grant PPL in any event. The Authority confirmed the Inland Revenue decision, finding she did not meet the statutory threshold and that no basis existed to exercise a discretion in her favour.

Applicant: Rebecca Francis-Clothier (employee/PPL applicant)
Respondent: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (government agency administering PPL)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Kate McKenzie-Bridle, counsel for the respondent

Ms Francis-Clothier had worked as a service delivery co-ordinator in New Zealand for approximately three years. Upon discovering she was pregnant with her third child, and following medical advice related to her pregnancy history, she decided to resign and relocate to Australia to join her partner. She gave notice of resignation on 29 October 2025, with her last day of work being 26 November 2025. On that date her employer paid out over seven weeks of accrued annual leave and holiday pay in her final pay, rather than her taking it as leave before termination. Her baby was due on 11 June 2026, making the relevant 52-week qualifying period run from 11 June 2025. Inland Revenue calculated she had worked only 24 qualifying weeks (or 25 at the most generous interpretation), rather than the required 26, and declined her PPL application on 11 March 2026. Ms Francis-Clothier argued the treatment of her accrued annual leave and the payment of four statutory public holidays over Christmas 2025/New Year 2026 should be counted toward her qualifying period, and alternatively that her exceptional medical and family circumstances warranted a discretionary grant of PPL.

1. Whether Ms Francis-Clothier met the 26-week qualifying work threshold under s 2BA(4) of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[47]).

The threshold test requires an employee to have been employed for an average of at least 10 hours per week for any 26 weeks of the 52-week period immediately preceding the expected date of delivery. The qualifying period ran from 11 June 2025 to 11 June 2026, and Ms Francis-Clothier worked full-time only until 26 November 2025 — giving her 24 weeks on Inland Revenue's count, or at best 25 weeks even under the most generous interpretation. The hours test was clearly met; the 26-week duration test was not. The Authority found no sound basis to treat either the paid-out annual leave or the statutory holiday payments as extending her employment or as weeks worked.

2. Whether accrued but paid-out annual leave should count as qualifying working weeks — Status: Dismissed (paras [32]-[35], [46]-[47]).

Ms Francis-Clothier believed her six-plus weeks of accrued annual leave would count toward her qualifying period, but it was paid out in her final pay on her last day of employment rather than taken as leave. The Authority found that paid-out leave does not extend the period of employment or constitute weeks worked for PPL qualifying purposes. The Authority noted that had she taken her annual leave (rather than having it paid out), her situation might have been different, but she did not make that arrangement with her employer.

3. Whether the "absent from work" provision in s 72A(2)(f) of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 applied to treat Ms Francis-Clothier as still employed — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[42]).

Section 72A(2)(f) can treat an employee as still employed during an absence if the absence does not disrupt the normal pattern of their employment. MBIE itself considered this provision but concluded it did not apply. The Authority agreed, finding it was difficult to regard Ms Francis-Clothier as having a "normal pattern of employment" after she had resigned and finished work; the accrued annual leave was not paid in respect of a period when she was normally at work.

4. Whether payment of statutory/public holidays under s 40 of the Holidays Act 2003 extended Ms Francis-Clothier's period of employment or qualifying weeks — Status: Dismissed (paras [43]-[46]).

The employer paid out four statutory holidays over Christmas 2025/New Year 2026 under s 40 of the Holidays Act 2003, which entitles a departing employee to be paid for public holidays that would have fallen during untaken annual leave. The Authority applied the Employment Court's reasoning in Parker v Auckland Regional Council [1993] ERNZ 152, which held that the same payment obligation under the predecessor Holidays Act 1981 did not alter or extend the date of termination of employment. The Authority concluded that neither the annual holiday payout nor the statutory holiday payments extended Ms Francis-Clothier's employment or the period she was regarded as having worked.

5. Whether the Authority should exercise its discretion under s 71ZB of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 and s 157(3) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to confirm, modify or reverse the Inland Revenue decision — Status: Dismissed (paras [48]-[53]).

The Authority has power to act in equity and good conscience and to confirm, modify or reverse IR's decisions, and has previously reversed decisions where incorrect IR advice caused loss of entitlement (Murphy v MBIE [2022] NZERA 211) or where unlawful employer conduct affected eligibility (Fitzek v MBIE [2021] NZERA 28). However, the Authority has also declined to exercise discretion merely because an applicant worked slightly less than 26 weeks, holding it is not the Authority's role to rewrite legislation (Don v MBIE [2024] NZERA 163). Here, IR's decision was correctly based on the statutory criteria, no fault lay with any third party, and while Ms Francis-Clothier's medical and family circumstances were genuinely difficult, the Authority found they did not provide a sufficient basis to override the statutory eligibility requirements.

6. Costs — Status: Not awarded (para [55]).

In accordance with the Employment Relations Authority's Practice Direction applicable to parental leave applications, no costs order was made in favour of either party.

The application was dismissed in full; the Inland Revenue decision declining paid parental leave was confirmed.

None ordered. No costs awarded to either party, in accordance with the Authority's Practice Direction for parental leave applications.

Moshe Sheleg, an IT developer, brought claims against HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited (HA) relating to a first period of work from August 2017 to April 2018, in addition to claims already determined for a second period (2020–2022). The key legal questions were whether the Authority had jurisdiction to hear personal grievance claims and other employment claims relating to the first period, given the applicable time limits under the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found it lacked jurisdiction: no personal grievance had been raised within the 90-day limit, leave to extend time would not have been granted, and no non-personal-grievance claim had been brought within the six-year limitation period.

Applicant: Moshe Sheleg (aka Moses Sheleg) (employee/IT developer)
Respondent: HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited (employer/business support services provider)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Richard Upton, counsel for the respondent

HA provided business support services to four northern district health boards and is now part of Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand. Mr Sheleg worked as an IT developer for HA during two periods: August 2017 to April 2018 (first period) and August 2020 to approximately June 2022 (second period). In a prior determination dated 20 December 2024, the Authority found Mr Sheleg was an employee during the second period, and HA's subsequent challenge to that finding in the Employment Court was discontinued. Mr Sheleg then sought to bring claims relating to the first period, potentially including a personal grievance and arrears of wages or holiday pay. All of Mr Sheleg's prior filings — his May 2022 Statement of Problem, January 2023 District Court statement of claim, and May 2023 further Statement of Problem — focused exclusively on the second period; the first period was not mentioned in any substantive claim until a March 2024 witness statement. HA opposed jurisdiction on the basis that no claims relating to the first period had been raised within the required timeframes, and it did not consent to any out-of-time claims.

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to hear personal grievance claims relating to the first period (August 2017 – April 2018) — Status: Dismissed (paras [9], [16]-[25], [30]-[31]).

Under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, an employee must raise a personal grievance with their employer within 90 days of the action alleged to constitute the grievance (or when it came to the employee's notice). The Authority found no evidence that Mr Sheleg raised a personal grievance with HA relating to the first period within the 90-day limit at any relevant time. His March 2024 witness statement, even if treated as a grievance, was years out of time, and no application for leave to raise a grievance out of time under s 114(4) had been made. The Authority concluded Mr Sheleg had not raised a personal grievance relating to the first period at all.

2. Whether, if a personal grievance was raised (in March 2024), leave to raise it out of time under s 114(4) should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [18]-[25], [30]).

For leave to be granted under s 114(4), three matters must be established: exceptional circumstances, a causal link between the exceptional circumstances and the delay, and that it is just to allow the out-of-time claim. The Authority noted that s 115(c) might in principle have provided an exceptional circumstance (HA's contract documentation lacking the required s 65 explanation), but found the delay of approximately four years — during which Mr Sheleg had also received legal advice confirming employment status in relation to the second period — was inordinate and unexplained and could not reasonably have been caused by the missing explanation. It further found it would be unjust to grant leave given the entire course of litigation, settlement discussions, and mediation had focused solely on the second period, and allowing first-period claims would significantly prejudice HA by substantially expanding the scope of the dispute. Leave would not have been granted even if an application had been made.

3. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to hear non-personal-grievance claims (e.g. arrears of wages or holiday pay) relating to the first period under s 142 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [10], [26]-[29], [30]-[31]).

Section 142 of the Act provides that no action in relation to an employment relationship problem that is not a personal grievance may be commenced more than six years after the cause of action arose. The first period of work ended on or about 24 April 2018, meaning any such claim had to be brought by 24 April 2024. The Authority found Mr Sheleg could not point to any document within the six-year window in which a non-personal-grievance claim in relation to the first period was raised or brought. His various filings all focused on the second period, and his March 2024 witness statement merely mentioned the first period without constituting anything resembling a pleaded non-personal-grievance claim.

4. Whether Mr Sheleg's May 2022 rejected Statement of Problem or subsequent filings raised claims relating to the first period — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[14], [28]-[29]).

The Authority examined Mr Sheleg's May 2022 attempted Statement of Problem (rejected by an Authority Officer as appearing to be a contractor claim), his January 2023 District Court statement of claim, and his May 2023 further Statement of Problem. All three focused exclusively on the second period (2020–2022); no reference to the first period appeared in any of them. The Authority found that even if the May 2022 filing had been accepted, it contained no claim relating to the first period, and therefore could not assist Mr Sheleg in establishing jurisdiction for first-period claims.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [33]).

The Authority reserved costs without making any order at this stage, indicating the issue may be addressed in a future proceeding.

The claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds: the Authority found it has no jurisdiction to hear or determine any claims Mr Sheleg may have relating to the first period of work (August 2017 – April 2018), and his remaining claims and potential remedies are confined to the second period.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination on jurisdiction only. Costs are reserved. An Authority officer is to contact the parties regarding next steps in relation to the second period of work.

[CONSENT]

Albert Hoi Dun Tung (applicant/employee) brought a claim against Reach International Holdings Limited (respondent/employer). Following an investigation meeting on 7 July 2026, the Authority member proposed a settlement, which both parties accepted. The matter was resolved by consent determination, with the respondent ordered to pay $900 in full and final settlement.

Applicant: Albert Hoi Dun Tung (employee)
Respondent: Reach International Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Sean Zhang, company director

Albert Hoi Dun Tung filed an employment-related claim against Reach International Holdings Limited. The nature of the underlying dispute and the specific claims advanced are not detailed in the determination. An investigation meeting was held on 7 July 2026. At the conclusion of that meeting, Authority Member Peter Fuiava proposed an alternative resolution to the parties. Mr Zhang, as company director representing the respondent, indicated his assent to the proposal at the meeting, and Mr Tung confirmed his acceptance by email the following morning (8 July 2026). The parties requested that their terms of settlement be made orders of the Authority by consent determination.

1. Whether the parties' agreed terms of settlement should be recorded as orders of the Authority by consent determination — Status: Established (paras [1]-[2]).

The Authority member proposed a resolution at the conclusion of the investigation meeting. Both parties consented to the proposed terms, and at the parties' request, the Authority formalised those terms as a consent determination under its powers to make orders by consent. No contested legal issues were adjudicated; the matter was resolved entirely by agreement.

The claim was resolved in full by consent determination, with the respondent ordered to pay $900 to the applicant in full and final settlement.

Settlement payment: $900 (full and final settlement of all claims), to be paid by direct credit into the applicant's bank account within seven days of the determination (8 July 2026).
Additional condition: Both parties acknowledged that the opportunity remains for them to resume working together in the future should they both wish to do so.
Costs: None ordered.

GLM, a former Advisor Placement Rehousing employed by Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities, sought interim reinstatement after being dismissed in May 2026 following their arrest and bail conditions that prevented them from attending work. The key legal questions were whether GLM had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal, an arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and whether the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured interim reinstatement. The Authority found an arguable case for unjustified dismissal but declined interim reinstatement, finding GLM had not established an arguable case for permanent reinstatement and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Kāinga Ora.

Applicant: GLM (employee — name suppressed)
Respondent: Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities (employer)

Applicant: Mark Ryan, counsel
Respondent: Saadi Radcliffe and Frances Lear, counsel

GLM was employed as an Advisor, Placement Rehousing (APR) — a frontline, field-based role involving direct and largely unsupervised engagement with vulnerable community members — until their employment was terminated in May 2026. On 28 February 2026, GLM was arrested and charged with wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and unlawful possession of a firearm (a cut-down shotgun), and was placed on a 24-hour curfew as a bail condition. Kāinga Ora became aware of GLM's situation progressively from 1 March 2026 onwards, conducted a formal disciplinary process including a meeting on 17 March 2026 and a preliminary outcome letter on 27 March 2026, and granted multiple extensions of time for GLM to respond and to seek a bail variation. GLM's counsel proposed office-based alternative duties and sought paid suspension pending the criminal trial (expected mid-2027), but Kāinga Ora found no suitable alternative duties and determined there was no viable timeframe for GLM to resume the role. On 6 May 2026, Kāinga Ora dismissed GLM effective immediately with payment in lieu of notice; later that same day the District Court granted a bail variation allowing GLM to travel directly to and from work, but Kāinga Ora declined to withdraw the termination. GLM then applied for interim reinstatement, which Kāinga Ora opposed on the grounds that GLM could not perform the inherent requirements of the field-based role, that reputational and operational risks were significant, and that the recently enacted s 123C of the Employment Relations Act 2000 raised further complications around remedy.

1. Whether GLM is entitled to an interim non-publication order — Status: Established (paras [3]-[4]).

The Authority found there were grounds justifying a temporary non-publication order to preserve the status quo pending the substantive determination. Pursuant to cl 10(1) of the Second Schedule to the Employment Relations Act 2000, GLM's name and identifying details are suppressed on an interim basis until further order. The Authority noted this should not be taken as an automatic indication that a permanent non-publication order will follow.

2. Whether GLM has an arguable case for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [34]-[41]).

The threshold at the interim stage is low: GLM need only show arguments that are not frivolous or vexatious and have a possible (but not necessarily certain) prospect of success. GLM argued that Kāinga Ora acted prematurely by treating unproven allegations as established fact, that the presumption of innocence applied, that alternative measures such as paid suspension were available, and that the bail variation granted on the same day as dismissal had not been considered. Kāinga Ora argued dismissal was within the range open to a fair and reasonable employer given the nine-week absence, serious charges, field-based role, operational pressures, and trust and confidence concerns. The Authority found GLM's arguments, while undeveloped, were not frivolous or vexatious and raised questions of both procedural fairness and substantive justifiability sufficient to meet the arguable case threshold.

3. Whether GLM has an arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [42]-[54]).

Under s 125 of the Act, reinstatement must be ordered where practicable and reasonable. Practicability requires that reinstatement be feasible and capable of successful implementation (applying Christieson v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Limited [2021] NZEmpC 142). The Authority found GLM's bail conditions — even as varied — did not permit the travel across multiple community locations inherent in the frontline APR role; no suitable alternative duties existed; the role had already been converted to a fixed-term position; Kāinga Ora faced significant reputational risk given the serious charges and its public-sector obligations to maintain public trust and confidence; and the newly enacted s 123C of the Act (inserted 21 February 2026) meant that a later finding of employee contribution to the situation would bar reinstatement entirely. The Authority concluded the current evidence did not support an arguable case for permanent reinstatement.

4. Whether the balance of convenience favours interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]-[63]).

The Authority weighed GLM's economic hardship and loss of income against Kāinga Ora's operational, reputational, and third-party risks. GLM argued the balance fell decisively in their favour and that garden leave reinstatement to the payroll would cause Kāinga Ora no operational prejudice. The Authority found, however, that the prejudice to Kāinga Ora if interim reinstatement were ordered — including reputational harm, risk to vulnerable community members, and the compulsion to pay for a role GLM could not in fact perform — was immediate, substantial, and not capable of redress by damages. GLM's affidavit evidence was also noted as being inconsistent with an ability to pay on any undertaking as to damages. The balance of convenience was found to favour Kāinga Ora.

5. Whether the overall justice of the case favours interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [64]-[73]).

The overall justice assessment functions as a global check on the conclusions reached on the earlier issues (applying NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90 at [47]). GLM submitted that refusing reinstatement would force a long-serving employee with a good track record into severe financial destitution before the substantive case could be heard. The Authority accepted that GLM's delays in filing (employment ended 6 May, application lodged 20 May, affidavit not filed until 5 June 2026) were not in themselves significant. However, the Authority agreed with Kāinga Ora that the practical utility of any reinstatement order was weak given the bail conditions, that GLM's prejudice was essentially economic and remediable if successful, and that Kāinga Ora's reputational, operational, and third-party risks could not be repaired by damages. Overall justice was found to point against interim reinstatement.

6. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [76]).

Costs were reserved for determination following the substantive investigation meeting and its outcome, or until the matter otherwise ceased to be before the Authority.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full, though the substantive personal grievance proceeding remains on foot and will be scheduled for hearing.

None ordered at this stage. Interim reinstatement declined. Costs reserved pending the substantive investigation meeting and its outcome. Non-publication of GLM's name and identifying details ordered on an interim basis until further order. Parties to be contacted to schedule the substantive hearing.

Steven David Mitchell, CEO of Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated (TRU), was summarily dismissed for serious misconduct on 20 March 2026 after a disciplinary process that followed an organisational review. He applied for interim reinstatement pending substantive resolution of his unjustified dismissal claim. The Authority found a strongly arguable case for unjustified dismissal (including predetermination), and ordered interim reinstatement to the payroll only — not to active duties — given the breakdown in the working relationship, with costs reserved.

Applicant: Steven David Mitchell (employee/former CEO)
Respondent: Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated (employer)

Applicant: Callum Osborne and William Rasburn, counsel for Applicant
Respondent: Brian Nathan and Sari Robb, counsel for Respondent

Mr Mitchell was employed as CEO of TRU from June 2024. In late November 2025, TRU obtained an independent organisational review which identified concerns about leadership visibility and communication. On 17 December 2025, TRU wrote to Mr Mitchell raising performance concerns and other concerns about absences, travel expenses, and attendance. Further allegations of serious misconduct were raised on 19 December 2025 — including intimidatory behaviour toward a staff member, disclosing confidential information to staff and delegates about a potential replacement CEO, and failing to follow a Board instruction regarding fixed-term contracts. Mr Mitchell was placed on paid suspension and responded through counsel; a Privacy Act disclosure made after his dismissal revealed a series of internal Board communications that Mr Mitchell argues demonstrate predetermination. TRU confirmed its proposal to summarily dismiss without change on 20 March 2026. Mr Mitchell sought interim reinstatement, compensation, lost wages, permanent reinstatement, penalties for breach of good faith, and penalties for an unlawful wage deduction, with this determination addressing only the interim reinstatement application.

1. Whether the recent Employment Relations Act 2000 amendments (ss 123B and 123C restricting remedies where employee contribution is found) apply to this matter — Status: Established (paras [59]-[62]).

The new amendments commenced 21 February 2026. Both the dismissal (20 March 2026) and the lodging of proceedings (10 April 2026) occurred after that commencement date. Mr Mitchell submitted the amendments should not apply because the alleged predetermination predated the commencement date, but the Authority rejected this as inconsistent with the statutory transitional provisions (Schedule 1AA, clause 15). The Authority concluded the new amendments apply on their face to this matter, meaning any contribution finding could restrict reinstatement, and a finding of serious misconduct contribution could extinguish all remedies.

2. Whether it is seriously arguable and not frivolous or vexatious that Mr Mitchell was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [63]-[75]).

The threshold requires a serious or arguable prospect of success that is not frivolous or vexatious (X v Y Limited v New Zealand Stock Exchange [1992] 1 ERNZ 863). Both parties agreed this threshold was met. The Authority went further and assessed arguable strength, finding Mr Mitchell had a strongly arguable case of predetermination: the internal Board communications revealed derisive personal views of Mr Mitchell formed before findings were put to him, an incorrect paraphrase of the review ("leadership must be replaced" vs "must be addressed"), a misattribution of the "missing in action" phrase to Mr Mitchell personally, and language potentially conflating a single travel expense issue into a dishonesty finding without sufficient investigation. The Authority found TRU's disciplinary process arguably merged with the review in a way inconsistent with TRU's submission that they were separate.

3. Whether it is seriously arguable that permanent reinstatement is practicable and reasonable — Status: Established (arguable) (paras [76]-[77]).

Under s 125 of the Act, reinstatement is the starting point remedy where practicable and reasonable (Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, [41]). TRU submitted that uncontested evidence established serious misconduct by Mr Mitchell sufficient to exclude reinstatement under the new amendments, and that the relationship breakdown made reinstatement impracticable. The Authority declined to make definitive findings of serious misconduct at this interim stage across each allegation (travel expenses, delegate disclosure, failure to follow instruction, Marfell interaction), finding in each case that the evidence was insufficiently tested to reach the required level of comfort. The Authority also declined to find that the discomfort experienced by staff on 20 January 2026 — when they understood Mr Mitchell had been suspended — rendered permanent reinstatement impracticable, noting that situation was arguably created by TRU's own communications. The Authority found it arguable that permanent reinstatement remained available.

4. Whether the balance of benefit and detriment favours interim reinstatement — Status: Established in favour of applicant, subject to condition (paras [78]-[82]).

TRU argued the balance favoured refusal because: (a) contribution findings under the new amendments made permanent reinstatement very unlikely; and (b) loss of trust and the outward-facing nature of the CEO role made return untenable. The Authority rejected the first argument, having found reinstatement remains arguable; accepted that the working relationship breakdown and the pivotal nature of the CEO role meant return to actual duties was unworkable in the interim. However, the Authority found a more significant detriment weighing toward Mr Mitchell: loss of income to support a wife unable to work, and the reputational difficulty of obtaining comparable employment in senior sport administration during interim proceedings. The balance of convenience favoured interim reinstatement on condition that it be reinstatement to the payroll only, not to active duties.

5. What is the overall justice of the matter — Status: Established in favour of applicant (para [83]).

Taking together the strongly arguable case for unjustified dismissal (including predetermination), the arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and the balance of convenience favouring Mr Mitchell, the Authority found overall justice required immediate reinstatement to the payroll pending substantive determination.

6. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Not reached/Reserved (para [85]).

The Authority reserved costs to the conclusion of the substantive stage. No determination on costs was made in this interim decision.

7. Substantive claims (unjustified dismissal, compensation, lost wages, penalties under s 4 and s 133A of the Act, unlawful wage deduction under the Wages Protection Act 1983, permanent reinstatement) — Status: Not reached (paras [1]-[2], [58]).

This determination expressly dealt only with the interim reinstatement application. All substantive claims — including unjustified dismissal, disadvantage grievances (including the suspension grievance), penalty claims for breach of good faith, and the unlawful deduction claim — are to be determined at a substantive investigation meeting currently scheduled for the week of 12 October 2026 in Nelson.

The interim reinstatement application was upheld on condition; Mr Mitchell is reinstated to the TRU payroll only (not to active duties) pending substantive determination, with costs reserved.

Interim reinstatement to payroll only: Mr Mitchell is reinstated to the TRU payroll at his CEO salary rate as at 20 March 2026. Payment is backdated from 21 March 2026 to the current pay period end as a taxed lump sum, then continuing at the existing salary payment frequency until the matter is substantively determined. Return to active duties: Not ordered (found unworkable given relationship breakdown and nature of the role). Permanent reinstatement, compensation, lost wages, and penalties: Not determined — reserved for substantive hearing (week of 12 October 2026, Nelson). Costs: Reserved to conclusion of substantive stage.

MGJ, a Clinical Dental Technician employed by Denture Care Services Limited (DCSL), claimed unjustified constructive dismissal after resigning during a proposed restructure process that included the potential disestablishment of their role. MGJ also claimed unjustified disadvantage arising from an unpaid pay rise, miscalculated sick leave, and incorrect annual holiday payments. The Authority dismissed all claims, finding that MGJ resigned voluntarily before the restructure process concluded, DCSL did not breach its good faith obligations, and no disadvantage was established on any of the three grounds advanced.

Applicant: MGJ (employee, Clinical Dental Technician)
Respondent: Denture Care Services Limited (employer, denture clinic operator)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Craig Metcalfe for the Respondent

MGJ commenced employment with DCSL as a Dental Technician in March 2019 and was promoted to Clinical Dental Technician in December 2019, working 24 hours per week at the Paraparaumu clinic. On 18–19 November 2024, MGJ received notice of a proposed restructure, and at a group meeting on 26 November 2024 learned that their role was among those proposed for disestablishment. Following the meeting, MGJ worked on an alternative proposal with colleagues and communicated it to management, but early the next morning (27 November 2024) resigned by email effective 31 January 2025, citing the restructure proposals as financially unviable. DCSL responded on 4 December 2024, noting that the restructure was still a proposal, that feedback was still open until 6 December, and expressing disappointment that MGJ had removed themselves from the process. MGJ subsequently raised concerns about a promised pay rise not delivered, sick leave entitlement calculation, and annual holiday payments. DCSL denied any pay rise had been promised for 2024, maintained that sick leave was capped at 20 days under the employment agreement, and provided records showing all annual holidays were correctly paid out.

1. Whether a non-publication order should be granted in respect of MGJ's name and identity — Status: Established (paras [8]-[13]).

The Authority applied the test of identifying specific risks of harm and weighing the reasonable likelihood of that harm against the open justice principle, citing Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 1335 and MW v Spiga Limited [2024] NZEmpC 147. Substantial evidence of MGJ's health history and personal life was heard at the investigation, and there were reputational concerns. The Authority was satisfied that a non-publication order was appropriate for MGJ's name and identifying details, including health history, which was not necessary for determining the employment relationship problem. Accordingly, MGJ was referred to by randomly chosen letters with no bearing on their actual name or initials.

2. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably constructively dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[41]).

The Authority applied the established three-limb test for constructive dismissal from Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd (1985) and Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUOW Inc [1994] 2 NZLR 415 (CA), requiring a serious breach of duty where a substantial risk of resignation was reasonably foreseeable. While the Authority accepted that DCSL could have provided more detail to impacted employees prior to the 26 November 2024 meeting, it found this was not fatal. Mr Metcalfe actively engaged with MGJ individually, offered to consider MGJ's alternative proposal, and made clear the restructure was not finalised. The Authority concluded that MGJ voluntarily resigned before the process concluded and other avenues remained open, so no constructive dismissal was made out, citing DBM Medical Ltd v Gaarkeuken [2025] NZEmpC 209.

3. Whether DCSL breached its good faith obligations under s 4(1A)(c) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[41]).

Section 4(1A)(c) of the Act requires an employer proposing decisions likely to affect an employee's continued employment to provide relevant information and an opportunity to comment before a decision is made. The Authority found that DCSL enabled sufficient avenues to meet this obligation: employees were invited to submit feedback by 6 December, Mr Metcalfe met individually with MGJ, entertained MGJ's alternative proposal, and emphasised no final decision had been made. DCSL had not made any unilateral decisions regarding the disestablishment of MGJ's role, and MGJ acknowledged under questioning that they could have waited for the process to conclude. No breach of good faith was established.

4. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably disadvantaged by DCSL's failure to deliver a promised pay rise — Status: Dismissed (paras [44]-[47]).

The test for unjustified disadvantage under s 103A of the Act is whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as DCSL did in all the circumstances. MGJ claimed a pay increase was promised at an annual appraisal in March 2024 to take effect from 1 April 2024. DCSL's evidence was that no pay adjustments were made for anyone in 2024 due to the company's financial situation, and MGJ confirmed awareness that no other employees received adjustments. The Authority found DCSL's position more credible, noting no other witnesses were called to support MGJ's claim, and that MGJ took no formal action at the time. No disadvantage was established on this ground.

5. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably disadvantaged by DCSL's sick leave calculation and payments — Status: Dismissed (paras [48]-[53]).

MGJ contended that accrued sick leave of 32 days (referenced in a May 2024 email from Mr Brugh) should have been paid until 31 January 2025. The employment agreement capped sick leave accumulation at 20 days, and DCSL calculated MGJ's paid sick leave entitlement to 7 January 2025. The Authority found that while DCSL may have exercised a discretion to allow more than 20 days' sick leave during the employment, it was not obliged to provide paid sick leave beyond the statutory minimum once an employee has resigned. The extended notice period was at MGJ's election, and no obligation arose for DCSL to fund it through sick leave. No disadvantage was established on this ground.

6. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably disadvantaged by incorrect annual holiday calculations and payments — Status: Dismissed (paras [54]-[59]).

The Authority reviewed DCSL's complete wage, time, holiday, and leave records including MGJ's final payslip. The records showed 5 days of annual holidays were owing, which were paid out on 6 February 2025 as 40 hours at 8 hours per day. Payment for one public holiday was also made in accordance with s 40(3) of the Holidays Act 2003. MGJ was given an opportunity to comment specifically on the records but chose not to do so. The Authority was unable to identify any discrepancy and no disadvantage was established.

7. Whether MGJ was owed any unpaid wages or other entitlements — Status: Dismissed (para [63]).

Following the review of all records and the dismissal of all disadvantage claims, the Authority found that MGJ was not owed any wage or holiday arrears. No further analysis beyond the preceding findings was required.

8. Whether either party should be awarded costs of representation — Status: Dismissed (paras [64]-[65]).

Neither party was represented by a paid agent or lawyer at the investigation meeting. The Authority applied the principle (citing the ERA's own guidance) that the costs of personal representation and one's own time in preparing and attending an investigation are not costs the Authority can award. Accordingly, no costs order was made.

All claims were dismissed in full; MGJ's personal grievance claims for unjustified constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage were not made out, and no wages, entitlements, or costs were ordered.

None ordered.

TEST - will revert