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Gina Thompson, a Customer Services Officer employed by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD), was dismissed on 23 December 2025 for serious misconduct after accessing a taxpayer's account without a valid business reason, in contravention of an explicit instruction not to do so. Ms Thompson sought interim reinstatement under s 127 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, claiming unjustifiable dismissal. The Authority found she had a weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured declining the interim reinstatement application.

Applicant: Gina Thompson (employee, Customer Services Officer)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Inland Revenue Department (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney and Duncan Allan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Thompson had six years' service with IRD as a Customer Services Officer in the Customer and Compliance Services – Families segment, with no prior disciplinary or performance issues. On 24 October 2025, IRD's Domain Specialist sent an email to team leads instructing staff not to access the account of a specific taxpayer (Taxpayer A); this was forwarded to Ms Thompson at 2.44 p.m., and she accessed Taxpayer A's account two minutes later at 2.46 p.m. Ms Thompson's explanation was that she had not fully read the email before accessing the account, that she wanted to check whether she had previously worked on the account, and that she was preparing herself in case Taxpayer A called. IRD found her explanation not credible, noting that she would have had to scroll past the explicit instruction to find Taxpayer A's details, and that she also failed to report her access to a leader even after a further reminder email on 28 October 2025. Following an investigation process that included a meeting on 27 November 2025, written submissions from Ms Thompson and her union (the PSA), and a preliminary decision letter, IRD dismissed Ms Thompson on 23 December 2025 for serious misconduct. Ms Thompson brought a personal grievance for unjustifiable dismissal seeking both interim and permanent reinstatement; mediation did not resolve the matter.

1. Whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 affects the availability of reinstatement as a remedy in this case — Status: Not reached (paras [15]-[17]).

IRD raised as a preliminary issue whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 precluded reinstatement as a remedy for Ms Thompson. The Authority declined to address this question in the interim determination on two grounds: first, the urgency of the interim reinstatement application precluded a carefully considered determination; and second, counsel for IRD conceded it was best addressed at the substantive hearing (or by the Employment Court on challenge). The issue was expressly reserved for the substantive determination.

2. Whether Ms Thompson has established a serious question (arguable case) of unjustifiable dismissal — Status: Established (paras [48]-[58]).

The applicable test, drawn from Brooks Homes Ltd v NZ Tax Refunds Ltd [2013] NZSC 60 and Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36, requires the applicant to show the claim is not frivolous or vexatious — a deliberately low threshold. The Authority applied this threshold to the untested affidavit evidence, noting Ms Thompson's argument that the access was minimal, she lacked bad motive, had six years' service and no prior issues, and that dismissal was disproportionate. The Authority found that, despite IRD's contrary submissions about her credibility and the seriousness of the breach, Ms Thompson met the low threshold and had an arguable case for unjustifiable dismissal.

3. Whether Ms Thompson has established a serious question (arguable case) for permanent reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [59]-[68]).

Under s 125(2) of the Act, reinstatement is the primary remedy and must be both practicable and reasonable, as explained in Hong v Auckland Transport [2019] NZEmpC 54. The Authority applied Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, which confirmed that establishing an arguable case for unjustifiable dismissal and for permanent reinstatement are two separate sub-issues. On the untested evidence, the Authority found that Ms Thompson had only a "weak arguable case" for permanent reinstatement, citing IRD's concerns about destroyed trust and confidence, her ongoing access to sensitive taxpayer information with limited monitoring, the statutory obligations under the Tax Administration Act 1994, her failure to report her access, and her continued assertion that her conduct was legitimate. Accordingly, the Authority found she did not have a strongly arguable case for interim reinstatement.

4. Whether the balance of convenience favours granting interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [69]-[77]).

The Authority applied the principle from X v Y Limited [1992] 1 ERNZ 863, requiring it to weigh the detriment to each party. Ms Thompson argued severe financial hardship, emotional stress, difficulty finding new employment, and the constraint of Workforce Assurance Standards for three years. IRD argued that garden leave or return to payroll would be inappropriate given the risk Ms Thompson might be unable to repay if the substantive claim failed, and that government cost-saving obligations made such an order irresponsible. The Authority, balancing these considerations, found the balance of convenience favoured not reinstating Ms Thompson on an interim basis.

5. Whether the overall justice of the case favours granting interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [78]-[83]).

The overall justice assessment operates as a global check following analysis of the serious question and balance of convenience, as described by the Court of Appeal in NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90 at [47]. Ms Thompson submitted there was no improper motive and consequences were severe for her. IRD submitted that trust and confidence had been fundamentally destroyed given her access to vast amounts of sensitive taxpayer information with limited monitoring. The Authority concluded that overall justice subsisted in declining the application for interim reinstatement.

6. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [86]).

Costs were reserved pending the outcome of the substantive investigation meeting or until the matter otherwise ceased to be before the Authority.

The application for interim reinstatement was dismissed; the substantive claim of unjustifiable dismissal remains to be determined at a hearing scheduled for October.

None ordered at this stage. Interim reinstatement was declined. Costs reserved pending the substantive investigation. A case management conference is to be held to progress the matter to a substantive investigation scheduled for October.

John Keogh, an employee of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) whose Principal Advisor Investigations role was disestablished effective 1 June 2026, applied for interim reinstatement while his substantive personal grievance claims (unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, and breach of good faith) are investigated. The key legal questions were whether there was an arguable case for unjustified dismissal or disadvantage, whether there was an arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and whether the balance of convenience and overall justice supported interim reinstatement. The application for interim reinstatement was declined on all grounds.

Applicant: John Keogh (employee)
Respondent: Civil Aviation Authority (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Bronwyn Heenan and Matthew Maitland, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Keogh commenced employment with the CAA in 2018 and held the role of Principal Advisor Investigations until it was disestablished effective 1 June 2026 following a restructure driven by a new organisational strategy requiring cost efficiencies and changes to the investigations team's operating context. On 11 March 2026, Mr Keogh was issued a consultation letter outlining a proposal to disestablish his role; he provided written feedback raising concerns about the absence of a formal workload assessment, the short feedback period, and the lack of proper justification, but on 1 April 2026 CAA confirmed the disestablishment. Mr Keogh raised a personal grievance on 1 April 2026, alleging unjustifiable action and breach of good faith, and filed a Statement of Problem on 8 April 2026 seeking interim and permanent reinstatement. Following the disestablishment decision, CAA offered two redeployment options; Mr Keogh accepted the permanent Queenstown Investigator role on 25 May 2026 at the same salary, with a three-month transition period. CAA argued that Mr Keogh's acceptance of permanent redeployment into an equivalent role rendered any reinstatement claim nugatory, while Mr Keogh maintained his acceptance of redeployment did not extinguish his grievance or his right to reinstatement.

1. Whether there is an arguable case for unjustified dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[40]).

The applicable test for interim reinstatement requires the applicant to establish a serious (arguable) question to be tried. The Authority assessed the untested affidavit evidence and noted that CAA had undertaken an external review, adopted a new organisational strategy, carried out a consultation process, and offered redeployment options. Critically, Mr Keogh's acceptance of permanent redeployment into what appeared on the untested evidence to be a suitable alternative role at the same pay significantly weakened the unjustified dismissal claim, as his employment was ongoing. The Authority was not persuaded that a strongly arguable case of unjustified dismissal existed at this interim stage.

2. Whether there is an arguable case for unjustified disadvantage — Status: Dismissed (paras [41]-[45]).

Mr Keogh argued there was a serious question about whether CAA sufficiently evidenced its business reasons, conducted genuine consultation, and whether there was predetermination, relying in part on outstanding Official Information Act and Privacy Act requests. The Authority acknowledged the information requests could proceed independently and be raised at the substantive hearing but found that, on the untested evidence, Mr Keogh had not suffered a disadvantage for interim purposes given he retained the same salary, status, and ongoing employment through redeployment. The Authority was not persuaded that an arguable case of unjustified disadvantage existed for the purposes of the interim application.

3. Whether there is an arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[50]).

Even if an arguable case for dismissal or disadvantage existed, the applicant must also demonstrate an arguable case for permanent reinstatement. CAA argued there was no basis for reinstatement because the role was disestablished for genuine operational reasons and Mr Keogh had voluntarily accepted a suitable alternative role, rendering reinstatement nugatory. The Authority found that Mr Keogh's redeployment into what appeared to be an equivalent role in pay, expertise, and standing — absent any dismissal — counted against interim reinstatement, and held there was no arguable case for permanent reinstatement on the untested evidence.

4. Whether the balance of convenience supports interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [51]-[59]).

This required weighing the impact on each party of granting or refusing interim reinstatement, and whether adequate alternative remedies existed. Mr Keogh argued he faced loss of a senior permanent role, erosion of reinstatement remedies, and pressure to relocate to Queenstown, while CAA argued reinstating him would require re-establishing a cost-ineffective structure and disrupting other staff, and that monetary remedies would be adequate if he succeeded substantively. The Authority found no significant detriment to Mr Keogh if interim reinstatement was refused given his ongoing equivalent employment, accepted that reinstating him would burden CAA's operations, and concluded that monetary remedies would be more appropriate if Mr Keogh ultimately succeeded. The balance of convenience favoured CAA.

5. Whether the overall justice of the case supports interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [60]-[63]).

The overall justice assessment functions as a final check requiring the Authority to step back and consider the strengths of each party's case, citing NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90. CAA submitted that the factual matrix had materially changed since the application was filed (Mr Keogh having accepted permanent redeployment), that he would suffer no prejudice at the substantive hearing, and that reinstating him to a disestablished role in a flawed structure served no useful purpose. The Authority agreed, finding that the overall justice favoured CAA and that interim reinstatement should not be granted.

6. Whether the substantive claims (unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, breach of good faith, and other remedies) should proceed — Status: Established (para [65]).

The Authority expressly confirmed that Mr Keogh retains the right to have his substantive claims heard and determined, including all other remedies sought. The Authority directed that the substantive matters would be progressed toward an investigation meeting as soon as practicable. No findings on the merits of the substantive claims were made in this determination.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [66]-[67]).

The Authority reserved costs for determination following the substantive investigation meeting or until the matter otherwise ceases to be before the Authority. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with the Authority indicating it would apply the standard daily tariff basis if required to determine costs, subject to any upward or downward adjustment.

Mr Keogh's application for interim reinstatement was dismissed in its entirety; the substantive claims are to proceed to a future investigation meeting.

None ordered at this stage. Interim reinstatement declined. Substantive claims (unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, breach of good faith, and associated remedies including permanent reinstatement) remain live and will proceed to a substantive investigation meeting. Costs reserved pending the outcome of the substantive hearing or further order.

Nisha Thakkar, a fixed-term full-time team member employed by LS Travel Retail New Zealand Limited at Auckland Airport, pursued personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal, alleging LS Travel unilaterally varied her work hours and failed to provide guaranteed minimum hours under her individual employment agreement. The key legal questions were whether the s 103(3) jurisdictional bar applied, how the hours of work provisions in the IEA should be interpreted, whether the employer's actions were justified, and whether a penalty claim for breach of good faith was brought within time. The unjustified disadvantage grievances were upheld and compensation and lost wages ordered, but the constructive dismissal claim and the penalty claim were both dismissed.

Applicant: Nisha Thakkar (employee)
Respondent: LS Travel Retail New Zealand Limited (employer)

Applicant: Ruth Katsui, representative for the applicant
Respondent: Anne Wilson, counsel for the respondent

Ms Thakkar was employed as a fixed-term full-time team member in LS Travel's Relay stores at Auckland Airport from 27 November 2023, with her fixed term linked to her work visa expiring 21 September 2024. Her individual employment agreement (IEA) specified guaranteed hours of 40 hours per week and set out "Times and Days of Work" in Appendix A as Tuesday to Saturday from 12:30pm to 20:30pm, along with availability hours of 45. Shortly before Ms Thakkar commenced, LS Travel's arrivals store moved to 24/7 operations on direction from Auckland Airport, resulting in management rostering Ms Thakkar onto early morning and late-night shifts outside her stated availability. Ms Thakkar repeatedly objected to those shifts, LS Travel offered her a part-time contract as an alternative, and from March 2024 undertook a consultation process culminating in a proposed roster change to a 4am–12:30pm shift from 8 April 2024. Ms Thakkar stopped attending work after 6 April 2024, raised an unjustified disadvantage grievance in May 2024, attended unsuccessful mediation in May 2024, and on 20 June 2024 gave four weeks' notice of resignation after LS Travel proposed interim arrangements. LS Travel argued its rostering was contractually permitted, that the disadvantage claims were barred by s 103(3) as deriving solely from contractual interpretation, that Ms Thakkar resigned prematurely, and that her penalty claim was out of time.

1. Whether the unjustified disadvantage claims are precluded by the s 103(3) jurisdictional bar — Status: Dismissed (paras [34]-[37]).

Section 103(3) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 bars unjustified disadvantage claims that derive solely from the interpretation, application, or operation of an employment agreement. Applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Breen v Prime Resources Company Limited [2026] NZCA 33, the Authority held the bar is not triggered where there is "something more" than just contractual interpretation. The Authority identified multiple additional actions going beyond mere interpretation, including LS Travel's rostering decisions, alleged preferential allocation of shifts to other staff, pre-employment representations, attempts to vary the IEA by offering part-time employment, and the consultation process. Accordingly, the jurisdictional bar did not apply and the claims proceeded as personal grievances.

2. Correct interpretation of the hours of work provisions in the IEA — Status: Established (paras [38]-[45]).

The Authority examined clauses 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.5 of the IEA and Appendix A, which specified Times and Days of Work as Tuesday to Saturday 12:30pm–20:30pm (40 hours) and Availability Hours of 45. LS Travel argued clause 7.5 (requiring Ms Thakkar to work rostered shifts) gave it full flexibility to roster any hours, but the Authority found this reading was inconsistent with the existence of the Availability Hours provision and the Times and Days of Work. Applying the contra proferentem principle (the drafter's ambiguity construed against LS Travel) and contextual background including pre-employment emails and the recruitment process, the Authority found the Times and Days of Work indicated when guaranteed hours would be provided, and the 45 availability hours related to additional shifts only. Ms Thakkar's interpretation was accepted as the correct one.

3. Whether Ms Thakkar established a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage — unilateral variation of work hours — Status: Established (paras [48]-[55]).

Under s 103(1)(b), an unjustified disadvantage grievance requires the employer to have taken an unjustified action that disadvantaged the employee's employment or a condition of it. The Authority found Ms Thakkar was clearly disadvantaged by being rostered outside her Times and Days of Work, causing loss of wages and financial and mental stress. LS Travel could not justify its actions on the basis of a genuinely held contractual interpretation (as its own conduct — including offering a part-time contract and conducting a formal consultation process — was inconsistent with that interpretation being genuinely held). The Authority also found undisclosed performance concerns were shared with Duty-Free managers to block a transfer, and that other casual/part-time staff received afternoon shifts, further undermining LS Travel's justification. This grievance was established.

4. Whether Ms Thakkar established a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage — failure to provide guaranteed minimum hours — Status: Established (paras [48]-[55]).

This was addressed as part of the same unjustified disadvantage assessment as Issue 3 above. The Authority was satisfied Ms Thakkar was not provided her guaranteed 40 hours during her Times and Days of Work, and LS Travel did not comply with its consultation obligations under clause 7.3 of the IEA prior to March 2024 (e.g. changing her shifts without her feedback or consent and then offering only a part-time alternative). The grievance was established on this ground also.

5. Whether Ms Thakkar was unjustifiably constructively dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [56]-[61]).

Constructive dismissal requires the employer's actions or inaction to have left the employee with no option but to resign, assessed against three non-exhaustive categories from Auckland Shop Employees v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372. The Authority was satisfied that LS Travel's actions following the March 2024 consultation process were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done: clause 7.3 permitted a roster change on two weeks' written notice after consultation, the consultation was not found to be predetermined, and LS Travel's letter of 17 June 2024 offered to explore interim arrangements. The Authority held Ms Thakkar's resignation was premature — she resigned before engaging with the interim proposal — and she was not constructively dismissed.

6. Whether the penalty claim was brought within time under s 135(5) of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [66]-[68]).

Section 135(5) requires a penalty action to be commenced within 12 months of when the cause of action first became known or ought reasonably to have been known. The original statement of problem (filed 19 August 2024) raised a disadvantage grievance mentioning good faith but did not seek penalties; the penalty claim was not added until 15 August 2025, more than 12 months after the alleged breaches occurred during Ms Thakkar's employment (which ended 18 July 2024). The penalty claim was therefore out of time and declined.

7. Whether LS Travel breached good faith obligations under s 4A of the Act warranting a penalty — Status: Not reached/Dismissed (para [68]).

Having found the penalty claim was out of time, the Authority did not need to reach the merits. However, it stated in any event it would not have been satisfied on the evidence that the employer's conduct warranted a penalty under s 4A of the Act.

8. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (para [62] and context).

LS Travel raised contribution as an issue if remedies were awarded. The Authority did not apply any reduction for contribution; no explicit finding on contribution was made and no reduction was applied to the awards.

9. Quantum of compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings — Status: Established (para [64]).

Under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act, the Authority awarded a global sum of $8,000 for humiliation and injury to feelings caused by the unjustified disadvantage grievances. The Authority noted that while Ms Thakkar described mental and emotional distress towards the end of and after employment, that distress was not wholly attributable to the established grievances and was taken into account in setting the global figure.

10. Quantum of lost wages — Status: Established (para [65]).

Under s 123(1)(b) of the Act, the Authority held Ms Thakkar was entitled to payment for any shortfall between 40 guaranteed hours and actual hours paid, for the period she was not rostered her guaranteed hours during her Times and Days of Work prior to 6 April 2024 (when consultation had been completed and notice given). Annual holiday pay of 8% was to be calculated on top of that amount. The precise dollar amount was not calculated in the determination and was left for the parties to calculate.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [70]-[72]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Thakkar may file a costs memorandum within 28 days; LS Travel has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would ordinarily be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified disadvantage grievances (unilateral variation and failure to provide guaranteed hours) were established and remedies ordered, but the unjustified constructive dismissal grievance was dismissed and the penalty claim was dismissed as out of time.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings): $8,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i), payable within 21 days.
Lost wages: Amount not specified in the determination — to be calculated as the shortfall between guaranteed 40 hours and hours actually paid up to and including 5 April 2024, plus 8% annual holiday pay on that amount, under s 123(1)(b).
Reinstatement: No.
Penalties: None ordered (claim dismissed as out of time).
Costs: Reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Volha Daniliuk (employee)
Respondent: For The Boys Limited (employer, First Respondent) and Big Black Sacks New Zealand Limited (Second Respondent)

Applicant: Aliaksandra Andreyuk, Advocate
Respondent: Jeremy Ansell and Nicole Meech, Counsel for First Respondent; No appearance for Second Respondent

This is a costs determination following an unsuccessful personal grievance claim by Ms Daniliuk against her former employers. Her unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, and good faith claims were all dismissed, with only a $2,000 Wages Protection Act penalty awarded against For The Boys Limited. The Authority ordered Ms Daniliuk to pay FTB $7,250 in costs, structured in two instalments to accommodate her financial circumstances.

Ms Daniliuk brought personal grievance and other employment claims against For The Boys Limited (FTB) and Big Black Sacks New Zealand Limited (BBS). In the substantive determination of 1 April 2026, all of her main claims (unjustified dismissal, unjustified disadvantage, and breach of good faith) were unsuccessful; only a $2,000 penalty for breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (for late payment of final accrued leave) was awarded. Costs were reserved in both the preliminary and substantive determinations. FTB made a Calderbank offer of over $40,000 on 18 December 2024 — well before the investigation meeting — which Ms Daniliuk declined. Ms Daniliuk filed a challenge to the Employment Court and sought a stay of the costs determination; she also submitted that costs should lie where they fall, citing hardship, FTB's inconsistent conduct, and the pending challenge. FTB sought the notional tariff plus uplifts totalling $11,500.

1. Costs — Stay or Deferral: Whether costs determination should be stayed pending Ms Daniliuk's challenge to the Employment Court — [Dismissed]
2. Costs Against BBS: Whether any costs order should be made in favour of BBS — [Dismissed]
3. Costs Following the Event: Whether costs should follow the event in favour of FTB as the substantially successful party — [Established]
4. Calderbank Offer Uplift: Whether FTB's Calderbank offer justifies an uplift above the notional daily tariff — [Partially established]
5. Uplift for Costs Submissions: Whether an additional uplift is warranted because Ms Daniliuk refused to agree to the tariff rate, requiring FTB to prepare costs submissions — [Dismissed]
6. Reduction for FTB's Conduct/Penalty: Whether FTB's shifting positions and the penalty finding justify a reduction in costs — [Dismissed]
7. Financial Hardship — Payment Terms: Whether Ms Daniliuk's financial circumstances should affect the quantum or payment terms of any costs order — [Partially established]

1. Costs — Stay or Deferral: Ms Daniliuk argued that proceeding with costs risked duplication and prejudice while her challenge was pending. The Authority rejected this, noting its usual practice is to determine costs so the Court has the determination before it. No risk of duplication or prejudice to Ms Daniliuk was identified, and the Authority proceeded to determine costs.
2. Costs Against BBS: BBS filed no costs submissions and had minimal engagement with the proceedings. The Authority agreed with Ms Daniliuk that no costs award against her in favour of BBS would sit comfortably with principle, and declined to make any such order.
3. Costs Following the Event: Applying the principles in PBO Limited v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, the Authority confirmed that costs generally follow the event. As FTB successfully defended the substantive claims (aside from the penalty), costs should be awarded in its favour. The starting point was the notional daily tariff: a half-day for the preliminary matter and a full day for the substantive hearing, yielding a base of $6,250.
4. Calderbank Offer Uplift: FTB's Calderbank offer, made over a year before the investigation meeting and at a value substantially exceeding the penalty awarded, was found to be valid and reasonable. Ms Daniliuk's stated reasons for declining it (non-monetary concessions) were unsupported by evidence, and her counteroffer raised no non-financial concerns. Applying the approach in Thing v South Pole IP Holding [2025] NZERA and Knight v AsureQuality Ltd [2025] NZERA 833, the Authority awarded an uplift of $1,000 for non-acceptance of the Calderbank offer. The full $5,000 uplift sought by FTB was not granted.
5. Uplift for Costs Submissions: FTB sought a $2,000 uplift because Ms Daniliuk refused to agree to tariff costs, requiring preparation of submissions. The Authority did not award this uplift separately, treating it as absorbed within the overall modest costs award consistent with the principle that costs should not be punitive.
6. Reduction for FTB's Conduct/Penalty: Ms Daniliuk argued FTB's shifting positions and the penalty finding should reduce any costs award. Consistent with the approach in Thing v South Pole IP Holding, the Authority found the penalty was addressed through its imposition and was not a reason to reduce costs. Insufficient evidence was placed before the Authority to justify a reduction based on FTB's alleged conduct.
7. Financial Hardship — Payment Terms: While hardship did not reduce the quantum of the costs award, the Authority accepted Ms Daniliuk's affidavit evidence of her financial circumstances and structured payment in two equal instalments of $3,625 each, due within 28 and 60 days of the determination respectively.

The costs application was partially upheld: Ms Daniliuk was ordered to pay FTB $7,250 in costs (base tariff plus a $1,000 Calderbank uplift); no costs order was made in favour of BBS.

Costs ordered against Applicant (Ms Daniliuk) in favour of First Respondent (FTB): $7,250, payable in two equal instalments of $3,625 — first instalment within 28 days, second within 60 days of the determination.
No costs order made in favour of Second Respondent (BBS).

Applicant: Phil Jacklin (employee)
Respondent: Planit Software Testing Limited (employer)

Applicant: Rachel Burt, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Peter Kiely & Anthony Kamphorst, counsel for the Respondent

Phil Jacklin resigned from his role as General Manager Central with Planit Software Testing Limited in September 2024, claiming constructive dismissal arising from Planit's failure to set KPIs and pay a short-term incentive (STI) bonus under clause 6.2 of his Employment Agreement. The Authority found that Mr Jacklin had misread the contractual provisions — the bonus was discretionary, annual (not quarterly), and up to 25% (not guaranteed) — and therefore his constructive dismissal claim failed. However, the Authority found Planit did breach an express contractual term by failing to provide KPIs and eligible amounts at the beginning of the financial year, constituting an unjustified disadvantage, and awarded $10,000 compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings.

Phil Jacklin was engaged as General Manager Central by Planit Software Testing Limited in November 2023, commencing employment on 22 January 2024, at a base salary of $306,000. His Employment Agreement (clause 6.2) included eligibility for an annual short-term incentive bonus of up to 25% of annual salary, with KPIs and eligible amounts to be set at the beginning of each financial year, and all bonuses expressly at the absolute discretion of the COO or CEO. Planit was undergoing a significant global restructure at the time Mr Jacklin commenced, which delayed the setting of KPIs and eligible amounts. Mr Jacklin repeatedly raised concerns from April 2024 onward about the non-provision of KPIs and the non-payment of a bonus he believed was payable quarterly; Planit's representatives acknowledged his requests but attributed delays to the restructure. On 26 September 2024, after returning from a preplanned holiday to find no resolution, Mr Jacklin resigned by email with immediate effect, citing material breach of contract; Planit responded the following day expressing a desire for him to remain, which Mr Jacklin declined. The parties disputed the interpretation of clause 6.2 — Mr Jacklin maintained it obligated Planit to pay a quarterly bonus of 25% if targets were met, while Planit maintained the bonus was discretionary, annual, and not guaranteed.

1. Meaning of Clause 6.2: What is the plain meaning of clause 6.2 of Mr Jacklin's Employment Agreement regarding the nature, amount, timing, and discretion of the STI bonus? — (Established: resolved in favour of Planit's interpretation)
2. Breach of Employment Agreement: Did Planit breach its contractual obligations to Mr Jacklin, and if so, how? — (Partially established: breach found only as to failure to provide KPIs and eligible amounts)
3. Constructive Dismissal: Was Planit's breach of duty sufficiently serious that it was reasonably foreseeable Mr Jacklin would resign, constituting unjustified constructive dismissal under the third category in Woolworths? — (Dismissed)
4. Unjustified Disadvantage: If Mr Jacklin was not constructively dismissed, was he disadvantaged in his employment by Planit's failure to provide KPIs and eligible amounts? — (Established)
5. Remedies: If Mr Jacklin was unjustifiably constructively dismissed or disadvantaged in his employment, is he entitled to the remedies sought (lost wages, humiliation/dignity/feelings compensation, bonus payment of $19,720)? — (Partially established: $10,000 awarded for disadvantage only; lost wages, bonus payment, and constructive dismissal-related compensation dismissed)
6. Penalties: Is there a basis to order penalties against Planit for breach of the Employment Agreement and/or breach of good faith? — (Dismissed)
7. Contributory Conduct: Should any remedy awarded be reduced under s 124 of the Act for blameworthy conduct by Mr Jacklin? — (Not reached)
8. Costs: Is either party entitled to an award of costs? — (Reserved)

1. Meaning of Clause 6.2: The Authority applied a plain reading of clause 6.2. It found that the bonus was expressly discretionary ("at the absolute discretion" of the COO or CEO), payable up to 25% (not guaranteed at 25%), and annual rather than quarterly. The Authority rejected Mr Jacklin's argument that pluralisation of "bonuses and incentives" in the clause implied quarterly payments, describing that interpretation as strained and inconsistent with the plain wording. Planit's interpretation was accepted.
2. Breach of Employment Agreement: The Authority found that clause 6.2 expressly required Planit to set KPIs and eligible amounts at the beginning of each financial year. Even on a liberal interpretation, Planit had not done so. While the restructure provided context for the delay, it did not excuse Planit from either providing the figures or clearly communicating to Mr Jacklin the reasons and likely effects of the delay. No breach was found in relation to non-payment of the bonus itself, given the discretionary nature of any payment.
3. Constructive Dismissal: The Authority applied the third Woolworths category — breach of duty leading to resignation — requiring the breach to be of sufficient seriousness that resignation was reasonably foreseeable. The Authority found that Mr Jacklin's belief about his entitlement to a quarterly mandatory bonus was based on a misreading of clause 6.2. Because his resignation was premised on an incorrect contractual interpretation, he failed to prove the resignation amounted to a dismissal. The claim of constructive dismissal was dismissed.
4. Unjustified Disadvantage: Applying the broad definition of "disadvantage" recognised in Wiles v Vice-Chancellor of the University of Auckland [2024] NZempC 123, the Authority found that Planit's failure to provide KPIs and eligible amounts at the beginning of the financial year, without adequately informing Mr Jacklin of the reasons, was a breach of an express contractual term that did disadvantage Mr Jacklin in his employment. The Authority accepted that this caused him genuine distress and uncertainty.
5. Remedies: Because constructive dismissal was not established, claims for lost wages, the Q1 bonus of $19,720, and the $50,000 humiliation award tied to unjustified dismissal were all dismissed. On the unjustified disadvantage finding, the Authority awarded $10,000 for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings. No award was made for lost wages or the bonus payment.
6. Penalties: Although the Authority accepted that Planit's failure to provide KPIs had a negative effect on Mr Jacklin, it found that this harm was already remedied by the $10,000 compensation award. Imposing penalties in addition was found not appropriate in the circumstances, and both penalty claims (including for breach of good faith) were dismissed.
7. Contributory Conduct: The Authority did not reach this issue, as it arose only if a personal grievance remedy was awarded on the constructive dismissal claim. Given that the only remedy awarded related to unjustified disadvantage, and no explicit s 124 reduction was applied, the issue was effectively not engaged.
8. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a process set out for lodging memoranda if agreement is not reached. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was partially upheld — the constructive dismissal claim and associated remedies were dismissed, but the unjustified disadvantage claim was established and Mr Jacklin was awarded $10,000 compensation.

Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings (unjustified disadvantage): $10,000
Lost wages: None ordered
Bonus payment ($19,720): None ordered
Constructive dismissal compensation ($25,000 + $50,000): None ordered
Penalties: None ordered
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
Costs: Reserved
Payment due within 28 days of the date of determination.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Melissa Bowen (employee)
Respondent: Bank of New Zealand (employer)

Applicant: Michael O'Brien, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Philip Skelton KC, counsel for the Respondent

This is a costs determination arising from two unsuccessful applications by Ms Bowen to admit evidence from a July 2019 without prejudice meeting during the course of a broader employment relationship problem. Member Cheyne, who had separately handled the admissibility applications, determined that BNZ was the successful party on these interlocutory matters and ordered Ms Bowen to pay BNZ costs of $6,750.00, calculated using the daily tariff model with a 50% uplift applied to each application.

Ms Bowen brought an employment relationship problem against BNZ, which was investigated by Member van Keulen. Member Cheyne separately handled two admissibility applications made by Ms Bowen seeking to admit evidence of discussions at a July 2019 without prejudice meeting. Both applications were declined: the first by directions dated 28 March 2025 (made shortly before a scheduled investigation meeting on remedies), and the second by directions dated 9 January 2026 (which sought admission of the evidence for the purpose of Member van Keulen's costs consideration). BNZ successfully resisted both applications. The substantive determination found BNZ liable and Ms Bowen was awarded remedies, but BNZ was treated as the successful party for the purposes of these costs proceedings. The parties could not agree on costs, and Ms Bowen contended that no costs should be ordered due to her inability to pay.

1. Applicable Costs Model: Whether the daily tariff model or an alternative approach should apply to narrow preliminary/interlocutory admissibility matters — [Established (daily tariff applied)]
2. Costs Uplift: Whether a percentage uplift on the daily tariff was warranted given the circumstances of Ms Bowen's applications — [Established (50% uplift applied to both applications)]
3. Ability to Pay: Whether Ms Bowen's alleged inability to pay should reduce or extinguish any costs award — [Dismissed]

1. Applicable Costs Model: The Authority applied established principles including that costs generally follow the event, awards are modest, and the daily tariff model is the standard approach. Member Cheyne noted that an earlier admissibility dispute between the same parties had been resolved using the daily tariff approach, providing no sufficient reason to depart from it here. The first application was assessed at half the daily rate (using the first-day investigation meeting rate) as the steps involved were more limited than in the earlier matter. The second application was also assessed using the daily tariff model.
2. Costs Uplift: A 50% uplift was applied to both applications, consistent with the uplift applied in an earlier costs determination involving the same parties ([2022] NZERA 55), where Ms Bowen's approach had similarly been found to warrant an uplift. For the first application, the urgency forced on BNZ (requiring submissions on short notice to preserve scheduled investigation dates) and the need to instruct counsel were noted as relevant factors, though the Authority was careful not to characterise the timing as blameworthy. For the second application, a higher uplift was considered warranted because the application was wholly unmeritorious and largely attempted to relitigate earlier directions at a very late stage; however, less was required of BNZ to oppose it, and balancing these factors, the same dollar figure of $3,375.00 was fixed for each application.
3. Ability to Pay: Ms Bowen argued that no costs should be ordered as she had not worked since her dismissal, was unable to work, and was on a sickness benefit, attributing her financial position to BNZ's wrongful conduct. Member Cheyne noted that no information about Ms Bowen's overall financial position was provided, and that BNZ had already paid sums to Ms Bowen and into court under a consent judgment with an agreed off-setting arrangement in place. The Authority held it was not appropriate to adjust the costs assessment based on ability to pay.

The costs claim was upheld in favour of BNZ; Ms Bowen was ordered to pay costs of $6,750.00.

Costs: $6,750.00 payable by Ms Bowen to BNZ within 28 days of the determination (comprising $3,375.00 for the first admissibility application and $3,375.00 for the second admissibility application, each calculated at half the daily tariff rate with a 50% uplift).

[CONSENT]

Applicant: Linda Hamilton (employee)
Respondent: Hollyer Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Luke Acland, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Jonny Sanders, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Hamilton brought a personal grievance claim of unjustified dismissal against Hollyer Holdings Limited. The employer admitted the dismissal was unjustified. The parties reached a confidential settlement and jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination, making the settlement terms orders of the Authority.

Ms Hamilton was employed by Hollyer Holdings Limited and was dismissed in circumstances she considered unjustified. Hollyer Holdings Limited admitted that the dismissal was unjustified. The parties negotiated a resolution and entered into a confidential settlement agreement. They then jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination to give the settlement terms the force of Authority orders. The contents of the settlement agreement are subject to a non-publication order pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Ms Hamilton was unjustifiably dismissed — [Established (by admission)]
2. Non-Publication Order: Whether the terms of the settlement agreement should be subject to a non-publication order under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Established]

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Hollyer Holdings Limited admitted that the dismissal was unjustified. No contested hearing was required. The Authority accepted the admission and the parties' agreed resolution.
2. Non-Publication Order: Pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority made a non-publication order covering the contents of the settlement agreement, consistent with the parties' request for confidentiality.

The claim was resolved by consent, with the employer admitting unjustified dismissal and the parties' confidential settlement agreement becoming orders of the Authority.

The specific terms of the remedy are confidential and subject to a non-publication order. The settlement agreement terms have been made orders of the Authority by consent. No publicly disclosed figures are available.

Applicant: Paul McMillan (employee/first applicant) and Dion Robin (employee/second applicant)
Respondent: Qube Ports NZ Limited (employer)

Applicant: Simon Mitchell KC and Angus Drumm, counsel for the applicants
Respondent: Alastair Espie and Bridget Craig, counsel for the respondent

Two Terminal Tractor operators at the Port of Gisborne were dismissed (or had future engagement refused) following a coordinated refusal to work with a particular loader operator on 8 January 2026, which Qube treated as serious misconduct. Both applicants sought interim reinstatement pending a substantive investigation of their unjustified dismissal grievances. The Authority granted interim reinstatement to the permanently employed applicant (McMillan) but declined it for the casual applicant (Robin), whose uncertain employment status undermined the balance of convenience in his favour.

Paul McMillan commenced permanent employment with Qube on 22 May 2023 and Dion Robin commenced on 6 July 2023 under a casual "as-and-when required" arrangement, though Robin disputes his true status. Both raised safety concerns about a particular loader operator on multiple occasions in 2024 and 2025, which Qube investigated but largely concluded were not substantiated by CCTV evidence. On 8 January 2026, all three TT operators on shift — including both applicants — refused to work with the loader operator before vessel loading commenced; Qube treated this as coordinated serious misconduct. Following fact-finding meetings and a disciplinary process, McMillan was dismissed on 27 February 2026 and Robin was told he would not be re-engaged; both raised personal grievances on 3 March 2026. The parties attended mediation without resolution and agreed to have the Authority determine the preliminary question of interim reinstatement based on affidavit evidence and submissions.

1. Applicable Law / Transitional Provisions: Whether the new ss 123B and 123C of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (inserted 21 February 2026) apply to the applicants' grievances, given the dismissals occurred on 27 February 2026 but most disciplinary events preceded the amendments — [Established (amendments apply)]
2. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (McMillan): Whether McMillan has an arguable (non-frivolous) case for unjustified dismissal, including whether his refusal to work was protected under s 83 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 — [Established]
3. Arguable Case — Robin's Employment Status: Whether Robin has an arguable case that he was employed on an ongoing rather than truly casual basis, which is a prerequisite to any unjustified dismissal claim — [Partially established (weakly arguable only)]
4. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (Robin): Whether Robin has an arguable case for unjustified dismissal, contingent on his employment status — [Partially established (weakly arguable, contingent)]
5. Arguable Case — Permanent Reinstatement: Whether the applicants have an arguable case for permanent reinstatement, including whether ss 123B and 123C bar reinstatement as a remedy — [Established (for both, but Robin's case is contingent and weaker)]
6. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of convenience favours granting or refusing interim reinstatement for each applicant — [Established for McMillan; Not established for Robin]
7. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case supports granting interim reinstatement for each applicant — [Established for McMillan; Not established for Robin]
8. Costs: Whether costs should be determined at this interim stage — [Not reached (reserved)]

1. Applicable Law / Transitional Provisions: The Authority applied s 33 of the Legislation Act 2019, which preserves existing legal rights against the effect of legislative amendment, and held that an unjustified dismissal cause of action does not arise until termination occurs. Because termination happened on 27 February 2026 — after ss 123B and 123C came into force on 21 February 2026 — the amendments apply. The Authority also found no evidence to support the applicants' allegation that Qube deliberately delayed its decision until after the amendments came into force. This outcome is consistent with earlier Employment Court authorities (Allen v C3 Ltd; Ramkissoon v Commissioner of Police) interpreting equivalent provisions of the Interpretation Act 1999.
2. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (McMillan): The threshold for an arguable case is low — the claim must not be merely frivolous or vexatious. McMillan raised substantive arguments: that his refusal was protected by s 83 of the HSWA as a response to a genuine belief in serious health and safety risk, and that procedural defects (AI-generated transcripts with factual errors, non-disclosure that the loader operator had been spoken to) were relevant to justification. The Authority found these arguments were not frivolous and that McMillan met the threshold for an arguable case of unjustified dismissal.
3. Arguable Case — Robin's Employment Status: The Authority identified that Robin's dismissal claim depends entirely on whether he was in ongoing employment. Robin's written agreements described him as casual "as-and-when required," but he produced income summaries and payslips suggesting consistent full-time hours. The Authority noted this is a fact-specific assessment requiring examination of multiple factors and found the untested evidence provided a "weakly arguable" case that Robin was in ongoing employment — sufficient to proceed but not compelling.
4. Arguable Case — Unjustified Dismissal (Robin): Contingent on Robin's employment status, the Authority found he also had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal on the same substantive grounds as McMillan, but the strength of that case is tempered by the unresolved status question.
5. Arguable Case — Permanent Reinstatement: Under s 125 of the Act, reinstatement is preferred where practicable and reasonable. The Authority could not confidently conclude at this interim stage that ss 123B or 123C would bar reinstatement, as the conduct's characterisation as "serious misconduct" or "misconduct" remained untested. Qube's evidence about prior safety investigations was incomplete, and the finding of coordinated refusal was disputed. The Authority found the parties appeared capable of re-establishing a productive relationship, noting the loader operator was on day shifts; both applicants met the arguable case threshold, though Robin's case remained contingent on his status.
6. Balance of Convenience: For McMillan, the Authority weighed his significant personal hardship (age, family, financial circumstances), against Qube's operational concerns. It found Qube had previously accommodated rostering arrangements that kept McMillan away from the loader operator, and that the balance favoured McMillan. For Robin, the uncertainty around his casual status and his expectation of ongoing work meant the Authority was not satisfied the balance favoured him in the interim period.
7. Overall Justice: The Court of Appeal's formulation (NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd) treats overall justice as a global check on earlier conclusions. For McMillan, all prior factors supported interim reinstatement and overall justice confirmed that outcome. For Robin, the contingent and weak nature of his status argument, and the balance of convenience not favouring him, meant overall justice did not support interim reinstatement.
8. Costs: The Authority reserved costs for determination after the substantive investigation meeting or when the matter otherwise concludes.

The claim was partially upheld: McMillan's application for interim reinstatement succeeded; Robin's application for interim reinstatement was declined.

McMillan: Interim reinstatement ordered — to be restored to payroll within two days and rostered to work within seven days of 30 April 2026; reinstatement is subject to an undertaking by McMillan to abide by any order for damages Qube may sustain through the reinstatement. This is a provisional/interim remedy only; the substantive grievance remains to be determined.
Robin: No remedy ordered at this interim stage.
Costs: Reserved.

Applicant: Darin Jonker (employee)
Respondent: Wainuiomata High School Board (employer)

Applicant: Darin Jonker in person
Respondent: Paul Robertson and Dew James-Powys, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Jonker, a fixed-term teacher at Wainuiomata High School, was dismissed for serious misconduct on 16 January 2026 after an independent investigation found he had harassed his manager. He applied for interim reinstatement pending a substantive Authority investigation, claiming his fixed-term agreement was unlawful and that he was a permanent employee. The Authority declined interim reinstatement, finding neither a strongly arguable case of permanent employment nor a sufficiently compelling case to justify reinstating him into a role that had in any event expired.

Mr Jonker was employed as a fixed-term full-time teacher from 19 February 2025 to 27 January 2026, initially in Hard Materials and Hospitality, later also performing some PE classes on a temporary basis. He had applied for a permanent PE teaching role but was unsuccessful; WHS offered him the fixed-term role instead due to an ongoing school redevelopment project. In September 2025, Mr Jonker's manager raised a harassment complaint against him after he responded to her performance concerns with a high volume of aggressive emails; Mr Jonker simultaneously complained of bullying by the Principal and manager. An independent investigator found harassment by Mr Jonker was established and his bullying complaint unsubstantiated; WHS then commenced a disciplinary process. Mr Jonker was dismissed on 16 January 2026 for serious misconduct and filed an application in the Authority on 14 January 2026 seeking, among other things, interim reinstatement and a declaration that the fixed-term agreement was unlawful.

1. Arguable Permanent Employment: Whether there is a seriously arguable case that Mr Jonker was a permanent employee rather than a fixed-term employee, in particular whether the fixed-term agreement complied with s 66 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
2. Arguable Unjustified Dismissal: Whether there is a seriously arguable case that Mr Jonker was unjustifiably dismissed — [Partially established]
3. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of convenience supports granting interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
4. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case supports interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
5. Arguable Permanent Reinstatement: Whether there is a seriously arguable case that Mr Jonker would be permanently reinstated at a substantive hearing — [Dismissed]
6. Costs: Whether costs should be determined — [Reserved]

1. Arguable Permanent Employment: The Authority applied the two-stage serious-question-to-be-tried test from Hussain v Auckland Transport [2025] NZEmpC 274, requiring an arguable case for unjustified dismissal and for reinstatement. The Authority found that contemporaneous documents clearly showed Mr Jonker accepted a fixed-term offer on 18 February 2025, referred to his "year contract" in his own emails throughout employment, and only raised permanent employment status after receiving a standard reminder letter about the approaching end of his fixed term. The reason given in the letter of offer — an existing redevelopment project creating staffing and curriculum uncertainty — appeared on its face to be genuine and based on reasonable grounds under s 66. The Authority concluded it was not strongly arguable that Mr Jonker was a permanent employee.
2. Arguable Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority assessed whether there was a seriously arguable case of unjustified dismissal arising from the disciplinary process. Mr Jonker's objections focused on procedural matters (terms of reference, involvement of the then-Presiding Member, and concurrent investigation of complaints) rather than the substance of the conduct alleged. The Authority noted Mr Jonker had participated in and accepted the investigation process before withdrawing immediately upon receiving the draft report recommending findings against him, and did not appear to have engaged with the substance of the disciplinary process. The Authority found the unjustified dismissal claim was only weakly arguable but could not be entirely discounted.
3. Balance of Convenience: The Authority applied the principle from Savage v Wai Shing Ltd [2019] NZEmpC 141 that interim relief should maintain the last settled position between parties. Mr Jonker's fixed-term role had expired on 27 January 2026 in any event, meaning there was no existing role to return him to; reinstatement would require WHS to create a new unfunded position at the expense of existing staff, students, and projects. The Authority found the balance of convenience clearly favoured WHS.
4. Overall Justice: The Authority applied the principle from Port of Wellington Ltd v Longwith [1995] 1 ERNZ 87 (CA) that in some cases, particularly alleged unjustified dismissal, the state of the employment relationship may itself preclude reinstatement. With unresolved performance concerns, conduct concerns, and reciprocal complaints still in play, and with no indication from Mr Jonker as to how those matters could be managed in practice, the overall justice also pointed against interim reinstatement.
5. Arguable Permanent Reinstatement: The Authority noted that Mr Jonker expressly did not seek permanent reinstatement. This itself pointed away from interim reinstatement being appropriate. In any event, the Authority assessed that prospects of permanent reinstatement were weak given all the circumstances.
6. Costs: The Authority reserved costs, encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves, and indicated that if asked, costs would be assessed on the usual daily tariff basis absent circumstances justifying adjustment.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Kulwinder Singh (employee/claimant)
Respondent: Tauranga Mount Taxis Limited (employer/respondent)

Applicant: Ajay Sharma, advocate
Respondent: Ken Patterson, counsel

This is a costs determination following the Authority's January 2022 dismissal of Mr Singh's employment claims for want of jurisdiction. The respondent sought indemnity costs or an uplifted award, while the applicant argued costs should lie where they fall. The Authority awarded $5,500 in costs to the respondent, applying the standard daily tariff with a moderate uplift.

The Authority dismissed Mr Singh's claims against Tauranga Mount Taxis Limited on 14 January 2022 for lack of jurisdiction. The parties were unable to agree on costs and filed memoranda. The respondent incurred actual costs of $9,821.39 and sought either indemnity costs or an uplift to $9,000 (two days' tariff), citing the applicant's repeated failure to identify the correct respondent despite being told the named entity was incorrect, improper attempts to join individuals and other entities without grounds or leave, and failure to provide supporting evidence despite three case management conferences where this was directed. The applicant argued costs should lie where they fall, contending the matter was determined on the papers, the claimed costs were disproportionate, and that the invoices were not actually incurred by the respondent.

1. Costs Lie Where They Fall: Whether it was appropriate to make no costs order against the unsuccessful applicant — [Dismissed]
2. Appropriate Starting Point: What the correct tariff-based starting point for the costs award should be where the matter was determined on the papers — [Established]
3. Indemnity Costs: Whether the applicant's conduct warranted an award of indemnity costs — [Dismissed]
4. Uplift on Tariff: Whether the applicant's conduct justified a moderate uplift above the base daily tariff — [Established]
5. Costs Actually Incurred: Whether the invoices provided were actually incurred by the respondent — [Established]

1. Costs Lie Where They Fall: The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event. The applicant was unsuccessful and had actively pursued multiple claims against the respondent and associated persons over a considerable period without providing supporting evidence despite having opportunities to do so. There was no principled reason to depart from the usual costs approach.
2. Appropriate Starting Point: The Authority applied its established daily tariff approach (set out in PBO Limited v Da Cruz and confirmed in Fagotti v Acme and Co Limited), with the current rate being $4,500 for the first day. Although the matter was determined on the papers, the Authority selected a full day's tariff as the starting point because the respondent was required to file in-depth submissions and documentation to explain the legal relationships between multiple entities, much of which the applicant himself failed to provide.
3. Indemnity Costs: The Authority declined to award indemnity costs, affirming that costs in the Authority are intended to be modest and a contribution only, not a full indemnity, consistent with settled principles.
4. Uplift on Tariff: The Authority found a moderate uplift of $1,000 was appropriate. The applicant's conduct — including repeated failures to provide documents or grounds for his claimed relationship despite multiple case management conferences, and his improper mid-process attempt to add individual respondents without leave before abandoning that claim — materially increased the respondent's costs.
5. Costs Actually Incurred: The Authority rejected the applicant's submission that the invoices were not incurred by the respondent. Given the overlapping relationships between the respondent, its sole shareholder (a provident society), and the board members/directors named by the applicant, the invoiced costs were consistent with the evidence and properly attributed to the respondent.

The claim for costs lying where they fall and for indemnity costs were both dismissed; a costs award of $5,500 (base tariff of $4,500 plus $1,000 uplift) was ordered in favour of the respondent.

Costs: $5,500 (inclusive) payable by Kulwinder Singh to Tauranga Mount Taxis Limited within 28 days of the determination date. No other remedies ordered.

Applicant: Diana Zhao (employee)
Respondent: DSV Air & Sea Limited (employer)

Applicant: Martin Lyttleton, advocate
Respondent: Simon Martin, counsel

Diana Zhao was made redundant from her Customer Services Manager role at DSV Air & Sea Limited on 30 September 2025, following a brief restructuring process. She applied for interim reinstatement, arguing her dismissal was unjustified due to inadequate consultation, lack of genuine commercial reason, and failure to properly consider redeployment. The Authority granted interim reinstatement, finding a serious question to be tried on both unjustified dismissal and permanent reinstatement, and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Ms Zhao.

Diana Zhao commenced employment with DSV Air & Sea Limited on 23 March 2020 as Customer Services Manager. On 27 August 2025, DSV presented Ms Zhao with a workplace change proposal to merge three departments, disestablishing her position and that of another manager, and creating a new Customer Experience Manager role. Ms Zhao interviewed for the new position on 2 September 2025 but was told the following day that she was unsuccessful and there were no suitable redeployment options; her employment ended on 30 September 2025. She raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal on 24 October 2025, and DSV responded in December 2025. Ms Zhao applied for interim reinstatement on 6 March 2026, some six months after dismissal, arguing the process was rushed, consultation was inadequate, redeployment was not properly explored, and the new role was substantially the same as her former role. DSV conceded there was a serious question to be tried on unjustified dismissal but disputed that reinstatement was practicable or reasonable.

1. Serious Question – Unjustified Dismissal: Whether there is a serious question to be tried in relation to Ms Zhao's claim of unjustified dismissal by reason of redundancy — (Established)
2. Serious Question – Permanent Reinstatement: Whether there is a serious question to be tried in relation to Ms Zhao's claim for permanent reinstatement, having regard to delay, availability of the role, alleged relationship breakdown, and subsequently discovered misconduct — (Established)
3. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of convenience favours granting interim reinstatement, considering adequacy of damages, preservation of status quo, relative strength of parties' cases, and alleged post-employment misconduct — (Established, in Ms Zhao's favour)
4. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case favours the making of an interim reinstatement order — (Established, in Ms Zhao's favour)

1. Serious Question – Unjustified Dismissal: The test requires an arguable claim that the dismissal was unjustified. DSV conceded this threshold was met, and the Authority agreed, noting arguable issues around whether consultation was adequate, whether genuine commercial reasons were established, whether Ms Zhao should have been redeployed into the substantially similar Customer Experience Manager role, and whether DSV provided the selection matrix in advance of the interview. The issue was established.
2. Serious Question – Permanent Reinstatement: Following Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, a serious question must also be shown as to whether permanent reinstatement is practicable and reasonable. The Authority weighed delay (Ms Zhao applied six months after dismissal and three months after DSV's grievance response) against DSV's own delay in responding to the grievance. The Authority found the role's non-existence and relationship tensions were not conclusive barriers: citing Idea Services Limited v Wills [2025] NZEmpC 28 and Genesys Telecommunications Laboratories [2019] NZEmpC 113, it held that if DSV failed to properly consider redeployment, it could not credibly argue reinstatement was impracticable. DSV's size (155 NZ employees; ~11,800 Asia Pacific) also supported this. Alleged relationship breakdown and Ms Zhao's comments did not reach the threshold of a reinstatement barrier per Humphrey at [45]. The issue was established.
3. Balance of Convenience: The Authority applied the test from Stellar Elements New Zealand Limited v Amesbury [2024] NZEmpC 36, considering adequacy of damages, status quo, and relative strength of cases. Ms Zhao had a strong arguable case on unjustified dismissal given the speed of the process, the interview matrix question, the similarity of roles, and DSV's redeployment obligations. She had demonstrated efforts to find alternative employment and had means to satisfy the undertaking under s 127(2) of the Act. The only factor favouring DSV was unsubstantiated post-employment misconduct allegations that had not been put to Ms Zhao or investigated. Overall, the balance of convenience favoured Ms Zhao.
4. Overall Justice: Standing back and assessing the totality of the circumstances, the Authority found the overall justice favoured interim reinstatement. Ms Zhao lost her position through no fault of her own, the redundancy consultation was brief, DSV's redeployment process was arguably deficient, and any delay was partly attributable to DSV's own delayed grievance response. The interim reinstatement order was granted.

The application for interim reinstatement was upheld: all four issues were resolved in Ms Zhao's favour.

Reinstatement: Yes — DSV ordered to reinstate Ms Zhao to its payroll within 5 days of the determination date, and to place her in a position no less advantageous than her former position within 28 days.
Mediation: Directed within 21 days of the determination.
Case management conference: To be convened following mediation to progress to a substantive investigation meeting.
Costs: Reserved.
Note: This is an interim reinstatement order only; the substantive merits of the unjustified dismissal claim remain to be determined.

Applicant: Harish Kumar Anandan (employee)
Respondent: Baiju Rajan (director of Indigo Traders Limited, now in liquidation)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: No appearance

Mr Anandan sought recovery of unpaid final wages and holiday pay totalling $1,128.96 gross from his former employer Indigo Traders Limited (in liquidation), and sought leave to recover those amounts directly from Indigo's director, Baiju Rajan. The Authority found that Indigo had breached employment standards by failing to make the payments, and that Mr Rajan was sufficiently involved in those breaches to be personally liable. Mr Rajan was ordered to pay the full amount owed, plus interest, to the extent Indigo cannot pay.

Mr Anandan worked for Indigo Traders Limited, a furniture retailer, from July 2025 until January 2026, reporting directly to Mr Rajan, who was also responsible for payroll. In January 2026, Mr Anandan and other staff were told their employment was ending due to Indigo's financial difficulties and store closures. Two final payslips were issued — one dated 14 January 2026 for ordinary pay of $672.00, and one dated 28 January 2026 for holiday pay of $456.96 — but neither amount was deposited into Mr Anandan's bank account. Mr Anandan emailed Mr Rajan on 24 February 2026 requesting payment; Mr Rajan telephoned and promised payment within a day or two but none was made. After a follow-up email on 3 March 2026 went unanswered, Mr Anandan lodged his application with the Authority. Mr Rajan was served with all documents and given notice of the investigation meeting but did not engage at any stage.

1. Unpaid Final Pay and Holiday Pay: Whether Indigo failed to pay Mr Anandan his final ordinary pay and holiday pay, and the amount owing — [Established]
2. Employment Standards Breach: Whether Indigo's failure to pay constituted a breach of employment standards under s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 and relevant provisions of the Holidays Act 2003 — [Established]
3. Director Liability (s 142W ERA): Whether leave should be granted to recover the unpaid amounts directly from Mr Rajan as a person involved in the employment standards breaches, under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Established]
4. Interest: Whether Mr Anandan is entitled to interest on the amounts owing — [Established]
5. Experience Letter: Whether the Authority could order Indigo or Mr Rajan to provide Mr Anandan with an experience letter — [Dismissed]
6. Costs: Whether any costs order should be made — [Dismissed]

1. Unpaid Final Pay and Holiday Pay: The Authority accepted Mr Anandan's unchallenged oral evidence and documentary evidence, including the two payslips and his bank transaction history showing no wages received from Indigo after 1 January 2026. The Authority was satisfied that Indigo failed to make either of the two payments identified in the payslips, totalling $1,128.96 gross.
2. Employment Standards Breach: Applying s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (which requires wages to be paid) and the relevant provisions of the Holidays Act 2003 (which require holiday pay on termination), the Authority found that Indigo had breached both statutes. The failure to make the payments constituted breaches of employment standards.
3. Director Liability (s 142W ERA): Under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a person involved in an employer's breach of employment standards may be personally liable. The Authority found that Mr Rajan, as the director responsible for payroll, had knowledge of the essential facts establishing the breaches; he was also personally on notice of the defaults before Indigo went into liquidation, had acknowledged the obligation by promising payment, but failed to ensure it was made. Leave was accordingly granted to recover the monies from Mr Rajan to the extent Indigo cannot pay.
4. Interest: The Authority found Mr Anandan was entitled to interest on the unpaid amounts under the applicable interest provisions, calculated from 29 January 2026 (the day after his last pay day should have occurred) until full payment is made, using the Ministry of Justice civil debt interest calculator.
5. Experience Letter: Mr Anandan had requested an experience letter, but the Authority noted it does not have jurisdiction to order the provision of such a letter and so declined the request.
6. Costs: The Authority stated there was no issue as to costs and made no costs order.

The claim was upheld: Mr Rajan is personally liable to pay the outstanding wages and holiday pay to the extent Indigo Traders Limited (in liquidation) cannot pay them, plus interest.

- Ordinary time pay: $672.00 (gross)
- Holiday pay: $456.96 (gross)
- Total: $1,128.96 (gross), payable by Mr Rajan to the extent Indigo cannot pay, within 14 days of the determination
- Interest: Accruing on the above amounts from 29 January 2026 until full payment, calculated using the Ministry of Justice civil debt interest calculator
- Experience letter: Not ordered (no jurisdiction)
- Costs: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not applicable

Applicant: Smita Nalawade (employee)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Inland Revenue Department (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney and Duncan Allan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Nalawade, a Customer Services Officer at IRD, was dismissed on 19 December 2025 for serious misconduct after accessing a taxpayer's account without a valid business reason and failing to disclose that access after recognising it was an error. She applied for interim reinstatement pending a substantive hearing on her unjustified dismissal claim. The Authority declined the interim reinstatement application, finding that while Ms Nalawade had a low-threshold arguable case for unjustified dismissal, she had only a weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement, the balance of convenience favoured IRD, and overall justice supported declining the application.

Ms Nalawade was employed as a Customer Services Officer with IRD for approximately three years. On 24 October 2025, she received a forwarded email advising staff that a particular taxpayer (Taxpayer A) was being managed by Complaints and that staff should not access his account without a valid business reason. Within two minutes of receiving the email, Ms Nalawade accessed Taxpayer A's account, spending approximately four minutes reviewing various sections. She stated she believed Taxpayer A may have been a customer she had previously dealt with and wanted to check for any outstanding actions, but upon accessing the account she realised it was not the same person and exited without using or sharing the data. Subsequently, after receiving reminders and attending a team meeting where her Team Lead indicated no one should have accessed the account, Ms Nalawade recognised her error but did not disclose her access. IRD discovered the access through active monitoring, commenced a disciplinary investigation, and dismissed Ms Nalawade on 19 December 2025 (confirmed by letter dated 23 December 2025) for serious misconduct, citing the unauthorised access and her failure to proactively disclose it. Ms Nalawade raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and applied for interim reinstatement; mediation did not resolve the matter.

1. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Ms Nalawade has established an arguable case (not frivolous or vexatious) that her dismissal was unjustified — [Established]
2. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Whether Ms Nalawade has established an arguable case that she would be permanently reinstated if successful in her unjustified dismissal claim — [Dismissed]
3. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of inconvenience and detriment favours granting or declining interim reinstatement — [Dismissed (favours IRD)]
4. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the matter supports granting interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
5. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded at this stage — [Not reached]

1. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: The threshold is low — the claim must simply not be frivolous or vexatious, as established in Brooks Homes Ltd v NZ Tax Refunds Ltd [2013] NZSC 60 and affirmed in Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36. The Authority noted Ms Nalawade's explanation that she believed she had a legitimate business reason to access the account, that the access was brief, and that there was no finding of improper motive or misuse of data. On the basis of the untested affidavit evidence, the Authority found this threshold met, concluding Ms Nalawade has an arguable case that she was unjustifiably dismissed.
2. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Following Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, an applicant must separately establish an arguable case for permanent reinstatement. Applying Hong v Auckland Transport [2019] NZEmpC 54, reinstatement must be both practicable and reasonable. The Authority accepted IRD's submission that Ms Nalawade's role requires continuous, largely unmonitored access to sensitive taxpayer accounts, making trust and confidence essential, and that the circumstances — including her failure to disclose her error — significantly undermined that trust. On the untested evidence, the Authority found Ms Nalawade had only a weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement, insufficient to support an interim order.
3. Balance of Convenience: Applying X v Y Limited [1992] 1 ERNZ 863, the Authority weighed the prejudice to each party. Ms Nalawade argued financial hardship, personal difficulties, restricted future employment prospects due to Workforce Assurance Standards, and loss of income. However, the Authority noted the absence of evidence about her financial position or mitigation steps, and that garden leave or payroll reinstatement raised concerns about Ms Nalawade's ability to repay damages if unsuccessful. IRD also cited cost-saving obligations as a government agency. Balancing these considerations, the Authority found the balance of convenience favoured not reinstating Ms Nalawade on an interim basis.
4. Overall Justice: Described by the Court of Appeal in NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90 as a global check on the earlier analysis. The Authority found that, notwithstanding Ms Nalawade's lack of improper motive, the seriousness of the breach of fundamental obligations around taxpayer confidentiality and the failure to disclose her error meant the overall justice of the case supported declining interim reinstatement.
5. Costs: The Authority reserved costs for determination following the substantive investigation meeting and its outcome, or until the matter otherwise ceases to be before the Authority. No decision was made at this stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full; the substantive unjustified dismissal claim remains to be determined at a hearing scheduled for October.

None ordered at this stage (this is a preliminary determination on interim reinstatement only). Costs reserved pending outcome of the substantive investigation.

Applicant: Punipuao Fatu (employee)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Inland Revenue Department (employer)

Applicant: Peter Cranney and Duncan Allan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Susan Hornsby-Geluk, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Fatu, a Customer Services Officer with 36 years of service at IRD, was dismissed on 19 December 2025 for serious misconduct after accessing a taxpayer's account without a valid business reason, despite express instructions not to do so. She applied for interim reinstatement pending a substantive hearing on her unjustified dismissal personal grievance. The Authority found she had a low-threshold arguable case for unjustified dismissal but declined interim reinstatement, finding the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured the IRD.

Ms Fatu had been employed as a Customer Services Officer at IRD for 36 years when she was dismissed on 19 December 2025 for serious misconduct. On 24 October 2025, IRD's Complaints Management team instructed staff via email not to engage with a specific taxpayer (Taxpayer A), and Ms Fatu's Team Lead forwarded this message along with a separate reminder not to access accounts without a valid business reason. Despite these instructions, Ms Fatu accessed Taxpayer A's account at 3:45 p.m. that same day, conducting a comprehensive search and viewing significant confidential information. Ms Fatu explained she was checking whether Taxpayer A was a customer she had previously spoken to and transferred; she did not disclose her access to her Team Lead, saying she felt ashamed. IRD discovered the access through its internal monitoring system, conducted an investigation meeting on 3 December 2025, and after receiving written responses from Ms Fatu and her union (PSA), decided that her conduct amounted to serious misconduct warranting summary dismissal. Ms Fatu grieved her dismissal and sought both interim and permanent reinstatement; mediation did not resolve the dispute.

1. Applicability of New Legislation: Whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 affects the availability of reinstatement as a remedy for Ms Fatu — [Not reached]
2. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Ms Fatu has an arguable case (not frivolous or vexatious) that she was unjustifiably dismissed — [Established]
3. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Whether Ms Fatu has a more than weak arguable case that she would be permanently reinstated if her dismissal claim succeeded — [Dismissed]
4. Balance of Convenience: Whether the balance of prejudice between the parties favours granting or declining interim reinstatement — [Dismissed (favours IRD)]
5. Overall Justice: Whether the overall justice of the case supports granting interim reinstatement — [Dismissed]
6. Interim Reinstatement Order: Whether interim reinstatement under s 127 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 should be granted — [Dismissed]
7. Costs: Whether costs should be determined at this stage — [Not reached/Reserved]

1. Applicability of New Legislation: The IRD raised as a preliminary issue whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 precludes reinstatement as a remedy. The Authority declined to resolve this question in the interim determination, citing the urgency of the proceedings and the complexity of the legal question. The Authority noted that Ms Hornsby-Geluk conceded the issue was best addressed in a substantive determination, and potentially by the Employment Court if challenged.
2. Serious Question — Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the low threshold from Brooks Homes Ltd v NZ Tax Refunds Ltd [2013] NZSC 60 and Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36, requiring only that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious. Ms Fatu argued that her access of Taxpayer A's account was an error of judgement and that dismissal was a disproportionate outcome given her 36 years of unblemished service. The Authority found that, at this low threshold and on untested affidavit evidence, Ms Fatu had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal.
3. Serious Question — Permanent Reinstatement: Applying Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59 and Hong v Auckland Transport [2019] NZEmpC 54, the Authority noted reinstatement must be both practicable and reasonable. IRD argued it had lost confidence in Ms Fatu and that monitoring her continuous access to taxpayer accounts would be impractical. The Authority found Ms Fatu had only a weak arguable case for permanent reinstatement, insufficient to support an interim order.
4. Balance of Convenience: Applying X v Y Limited [1992] 1 ERNZ 863, the Authority weighed Ms Fatu's financial hardship and limited employment prospects (including being subject to Workforce Assurance Standards for three years) against IRD's concerns about cost, accountability, and the difficulty of recovering any interim salary payments if the substantive claim fails. The Authority found the balance of convenience favoured not reinstating Ms Fatu, noting the absence of evidence about her financial position or mitigation efforts, and IRD's cost-saving obligations as a government agency.
5. Overall Justice: Applying NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90, the Authority described overall justice as a global check on the analysis of the earlier issues. Ms Fatu argued there was no improper motive and IRD could manage reinstatement with no real risk. IRD argued the breach of a fundamental business rule justified dismissal and that overall justice favoured it. The Authority found overall justice supported declining the application.
6. Interim Reinstatement Order: Having found that Ms Fatu did not have a strongly arguable case for reinstatement and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured the IRD, the Authority declined to grant interim reinstatement under s 127 of the Act. The matter will proceed to a substantive investigation.
7. Costs: The Authority reserved costs for determination following the substantive investigation or until the matter otherwise concludes, making no costs order at this stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was dismissed in full; the matter will proceed to a substantive investigation of the unjustified dismissal personal grievance.

None ordered at this preliminary stage. Costs reserved pending the substantive investigation.

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: John Pio (employee)
Respondent: Strautmann Hopkins Limited (first respondent/employer) and Hopkins Farming Group Limited (second respondent)

Applicant: Erin Burke, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: Paul McBride, counsel for the First Respondent; Peter McCarthy, director of Hopkins Farming Group Limited (self-represented for Second Respondent)

This is a costs-only determination following a substantive decision issued on 19 March 2026 ([2026] NZERA 164) in which Mr Pio succeeded in his personal grievance for unjustified dismissal and was awarded $72,184 in compensatory remedies. Costs were reserved in both the substantive determination and an earlier preliminary determination ([2025] NZERA 261). The Authority awarded costs in favour of Mr Pio against both respondents: $8,179.55 from Strautmann Hopkins Limited and $1,000 from Hopkins Farming Group Limited.

Mr Pio brought a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal against Strautmann Hopkins Limited (SHL) and a separate penalty action against Hopkins Farming Group Limited (HFG). A preliminary determination in May 2025 maintained HFG's joinder to the proceedings and dismissed HFG's application to have the action struck out as frivolous and vexatious; costs were reserved at that stage. The substantive investigation meeting ran for two full days, and Mr Pio ultimately prevailed, receiving $72,184 in remedies. Mr Pio's total legal costs incurred across the proceedings were $42,936.56. He sought costs on a solicitor-client basis or significantly above tariff, relying in part on a without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs settlement offer made to SHL (which was not extended to HFG). HFG opposed any costs award against it and cross-sought costs of up to $20,000 on the basis that it had successfully defended the penalty action.

1. Costs against SHL: Whether SHL should pay a contribution to Mr Pio's costs following his success in the substantive proceeding — [Established]
2. Costs against HFG (penalty action): Whether HFG should pay a contribution to Mr Pio's costs in relation to the preliminary determination — [Established]
3. HFG's cross-claim for costs: Whether HFG was entitled to a costs award against Mr Pio on the basis that the penalty action against it was baseless or an abuse of process — [Dismissed]
4. Solicitor-client or elevated costs: Whether the circumstances warranted costs above the Authority's standard tariff scale — [Dismissed]
5. Effect of without-prejudice offer: Whether Mr Pio's settlement offer elevated his entitlement to costs — [Dismissed]

1. Costs against SHL: The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event. Using the daily tariff of $4,000 per hearing day, and noting the investigation meeting ran two full days, the notional starting point was $8,000. No factors were found to justify increasing or reducing that figure; matters such as file reconstruction, adjournments, and information provision did not unreasonably inflate costs. The Authority awarded $8,000 plus disbursements of $179.55.
2. Costs against HFG (penalty action): Although HFG ultimately succeeded in defending the penalty action in the substantive determination, it had failed in its earlier application to have itself removed from the proceedings (the cl 12A dismissal application). The Authority found that Mr Pio incurred real costs in the preliminary matter and that HFG's unsuccessful opposition to joinder warranted a contribution. Given the matter was resolved on the papers, a modest award of $1,000 was reasonable.
3. HFG's cross-claim for costs: HFG sought up to $20,000 in costs, arguing the penalty action was baseless and that Mr Pio had improperly conflated the two respondents. The Authority rejected this, noting no supporting evidence of qualifying professional costs or expenses was provided, that executive time of a director is not routinely compensable in costs, and that the preliminary determination had already upheld joinder of HFG. No costs award was made in HFG's favour.
4. Solicitor-client or elevated costs: Mr Pio sought costs on a full indemnity basis or significantly above tariff. The Authority declined, finding no exceptional circumstances that would justify departure from the standard tariff approach. Awards are generally modest and the Authority applied its usual daily rate.
5. Effect of without-prejudice offer: Mr Pio argued his settlement offer should elevate the costs award. The Authority found the offer was ineffective because it was approximately $10,000 higher than the total remedies ultimately awarded, meaning the outcome did not beat the offer. The offer was also directed only to SHL and did not extend to HFG as a separate legal entity.

The claim for costs was partially upheld: Mr Pio was awarded costs against both respondents; HFG's cross-application for costs was dismissed.

Costs awarded to Mr Pio:
- From Strautmann Hopkins Limited: $8,000 (contribution to professional representation costs for the substantive determination) plus disbursements of $179.55
- From Hopkins Farming Group Limited: $1,000 (contribution to professional representation costs for the preliminary determination)
- HFG's cross-application for costs: None ordered
- No costs ordered on a solicitor-client or elevated basis

Applicant: Jeanette Go (employee)
Respondent: Point Limited (employer)

Applicant: Pam Greenlee, advocate
Respondent: Danny Gelb, advocate

Jeanette Go, an Estimator employed by Point Limited, was made redundant in October 2024 following a restructuring of the Estimation Department. Point Limited conceded the redundancy process was flawed — principally in failing to disclose selection criteria, interviewing only Ms Go among the team, and issuing a dismissal letter prepared before the final consultation meeting had concluded. The Authority awarded $18,000 compensation for unjustifiable dismissal and disadvantage, plus four weeks' lost wages of $5,769.23, but declined to impose penalties given Point Limited's early acknowledgment of the process failures.

Ms Go was employed as an Estimator from 2019, initially by Tamaki Building Supplies Limited, which was subsequently acquired and restructured so that Point Limited became her employer. She was based in East Tamaki while the rest of her team was based in Avondale. From late 2023 and through 2024, incoming plans for estimation declined significantly due to the economic climate, and various measures were taken to manage reduced workload. On 3 October 2024, management initiated a formal restructuring consultation, with Ms Go being the only team member to provide feedback; she proposed a reduced-hours arrangement across the team as an alternative to redundancy. Two consultation meetings were held (15 and 17 October 2024), but the dismissal letter dated 17 October had already been prepared and signed before the second meeting concluded, and the selection criteria applied had never been disclosed to any team member. Ms Go's employment ended on 17 October 2024. Point Limited conceded at an early stage that the process was flawed, so the investigation focused solely on the quantum of compensation and lost wages.

1. Quantum of Compensation: What amount of compensation is appropriate for unjustifiable dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage arising from the flawed redundancy process under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act? — (Established)
2. Quantum of Lost Wages: What amount of lost wages is appropriate under s 124 of the Act, given that the underlying redundancy was genuine but the process was flawed? — (Partially established)
3. Penalties: Whether penalties should be imposed on Point Limited for breaches of its duties under the Act? — (Dismissed)
4. Costs: Whether costs should be awarded and, if so, in what amount? — (Conditional/Reserved)

1. Quantum of Compensation: The Authority applied s 123(1)(c)(i), which permits compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings. The Authority accepted that the redundancy had a genuine business rationale (declining workload acknowledged even by Ms Go), but found significant process failures: non-disclosure of selection criteria, no interviews of other team members, failure to properly consider the reduced-hours proposal (partly because Mr Aro misunderstood it), failure to discuss redeployment, and a pre-prepared dismissal letter. The Authority accepted evidence from Ms Go and her sister that she suffered ongoing stress, sleep difficulties, social withdrawal, and required medication, while noting that the litigation process itself also contributed to her stress. Weighing those factors, the Authority awarded $18,000.
2. Quantum of Lost Wages: The Authority noted that lost wages are not typically awarded in a genuine redundancy situation. However, because the hasty process meant dismissal may have been delayed had a proper process been followed — though it would not have changed the ultimate outcome — a modest award was warranted. The Authority awarded four weeks' gross salary ($75,000 ÷ 52 × 4 = $5,769.23), declining Ms Go's claim for 19 months of lost wages.
3. Penalties: The Authority noted that penalties are punitive in nature and are not awarded to remedy the applicant's loss. Because Point Limited acknowledged the process failures at an early stage and Ms Go had been compensated, the Authority concluded it was not appropriate to impose penalties in these circumstances.
4. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unable to do so, Ms Go could file a costs memorandum within 14 days of the determination's issue, with Point Limited having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual notional daily rate unless particular circumstances required adjustment, citing PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135.

The claim was partially upheld: compensation and a modest lost wages award were granted, but penalties were declined and costs were reserved.

- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, distress): $18,000.00 (under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act)
- Lost wages: $5,769.23 gross (four weeks at $75,000 per annum, under s 124 of the Act)
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Penalties: None ordered
- Costs: Reserved
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered

[COSTS ONLY]

Applicant: Dianne Olive Kelso (employee)
Respondent: Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (employer)

Applicant: Elizabeth Lambert, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: Anne Wilson, counsel (firm not stated)

This is a costs determination following a preliminary finding on 3 March 2026 that Ms Kelso had failed to raise her personal grievance within the 90-day statutory timeframe and had not established exceptional grounds to extend it. Health New Zealand sought $3,000 in costs as the wholly successful party. The Authority awarded a modest contribution of $1,500, reflecting the straightforward nature of the proceeding and the fact that costs cannot be used as punishment.

In the preliminary determination ([2026] NZERA 124), the Authority found Ms Kelso had not raised her personal grievance within the 90-day period required by s 114(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and had not established exceptional grounds under s 114(4) to allow the matter to proceed out of time. The investigation was conducted entirely on the papers by way of written submissions, with no investigation meeting held. Health New Zealand, as the wholly successful party, applied for a costs contribution of $3,000. Ms Kelso's advocate opposed, arguing that novel Covid-era issues warranted costs lying where they fall, relying on GF v OO [2022] NZEmpC 292/2021.

1. Costs Award: Whether costs should be awarded to Health New Zealand as the successful party, and if so, in what amount — [Established]
2. Costs Lie Where They Fall: Whether the circumstances (including the Covid-era novel issues argument) justified departing from the default position that costs follow the event — [Dismissed]

1. Costs Award: The Authority confirmed its discretion to award costs under s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Act, guided by the principles in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, including that costs are not punitive and must be consistent with the Authority's equity and good conscience jurisdiction. Applying the notional daily rate framework (currently $4,500 for the first day), the Authority noted the matter was handled entirely on the papers and was relatively straightforward. The Authority acknowledged some additional costs were incurred by HNZ in defending the application, including responding to an element (breach of contract) that was well-settled as unfeasible, but found only a modest award of $1,500 was warranted in all the circumstances.
2. Costs Lie Where They Fall: Ms Kelso's advocate argued by analogy with GF v OO that novel Covid-era issues should cause costs to lie where they fall. The Authority rejected this argument, finding no parallel with that case, which concerned a substantive matter. Nothing novel arose in the Authority's consideration of whether the personal grievance should proceed out of time, so no basis existed to depart from the default position that costs follow the event.

The application for costs was partially upheld; Ms Kelso was ordered to pay $1,500 as a contribution to Health New Zealand's costs.

Costs: $1,500 payable by Ms Kelso to Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora within 28 days of the determination being issued. No other remedies ordered.

Applicant: Kyle Horsefield (employee)
Respondent: Eurocars Limited t/a Oceanic Cars and Car4Every1 (employer)

Applicant: Adrian Plunket, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: John Wood, advocate (firm not stated)

Kyle Horsefield was employed as a Sales Representative by Eurocars Limited for approximately nine days before being summarily dismissed by text message on 21 November 2024. The central dispute was whether he was a permanent or casual employee, and whether his dismissal was justified. The Authority found he was a permanent employee, his dismissal was both procedurally and substantively unjustified, and ordered Eurocars to pay $12,345 in combined lost remuneration and distress compensation.

Mr Horsefield commenced employment with Eurocars on 12 November 2024, having responded to a job advertisement and signed a casual individual employment agreement (IEA). He worked for approximately six days before being dismissed by text on 21 November 2024, which stated the company needed someone who came to work on time and that his "casual employment" was terminated. During his brief employment, Mr Horsefield attended pre-arranged physio appointments (recovering from a broken ankle), a family lawyer appointment about his grandmother's will, and had one day off to support his stepfather in hospital — all of which had been disclosed to and approved by Eurocars. Mr Horsefield contended he was a permanent employee who had been unjustifiably dismissed, while Eurocars argued he was a casual worker who had simply not been offered further work. No witness appeared for Eurocars at the investigation meeting as the sole director was overseas on the day, and his written statement was untested and unsworn. The Authority proceeded with the investigation meeting in Eurocars' absence, noting the respondent had known about the hearing date for nearly six months.

1. Signed Employment Agreement: Whether Mr Horsefield had a signed written IEA — [Partially established]
2. Terms and Conditions: What were the terms and conditions of Mr Horsefield's employment, in the absence of a signed IEA — [Established]
3. Permanent vs Casual Status: Whether Mr Horsefield was a permanent or casual employee — [Established (permanent)]
4. Good Faith Breach (pre-dismissal): Whether Eurocars breached its s 4 good faith obligations by failing to clearly communicate the nature and terms of the employment relationship — [Established]
5. Employment Agreement Breach: Whether Eurocars breached clause 18.1 of the IEA by failing to give one hour's notice or pay in lieu before ending employment — [Established]
6. Penalty for Good Faith Breach: Whether a penalty should be imposed for the good faith breach — [Dismissed (withdrawn by applicant)]
7. Penalty for Employment Agreement Breach: Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of the IEA — [Dismissed]
8. 90-Day Time Limit: Whether Mr Horsefield raised his unjustified dismissal grievance within the 90-day limit under s 114(1) of the Act — [Established]
9. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether Mr Horsefield's summary dismissal was justified under the s 103A(2) test — [Established (unjustified)]
10. Remedies: What remedies should be awarded for the unjustified dismissal — [Established]
11. Contributory Conduct: Whether remedies should be reduced under s 124 due to Mr Horsefield's contributory conduct — [Dismissed]
12. Costs: What costs and disbursements should be awarded — [Reserved]

1. Signed Employment Agreement: Despite specific requests, only an unsigned IEA was produced. The Authority could not confirm a signed version existed but proceeded on the basis the document recorded agreed terms.
2. Terms and Conditions: Mr Horsefield gave uncontested evidence that he printed, signed, and delivered the IEA before his first day of work on 12 November 2024. The Authority was satisfied the unsigned IEA lodged reflected the agreed terms and conditions of employment.
3. Permanent vs Casual Status: The Authority applied the principle that attaching a "casual" label does not determine the true nature of the relationship; the totality of the circumstances must be assessed. Eurocars' conduct — expecting Mr Horsefield to attend work at designated times, terminating because he was "unreliable," and Mr Durgesh's own statement about intending to employ him through November and December 2024 — demonstrated mutual ongoing obligations. The Authority found there was a permanent employment relationship with no fixed hours, on an "as required" basis.
4. Good Faith Breach (pre-dismissal): Under s 4 of the Act, employers must be responsive, communicative, and not mislead employees. Eurocars failed to clearly communicate that Mr Horsefield's role was limited to a specific time period, failed to specify working days and hours, and failed to inform him his pre-existing appointments would be problematic — all in breach of s 4 good faith obligations.
5. Employment Agreement Breach: Clause 18.1 of the IEA required one hour's notice or one hour's pay in lieu before termination. The text message dismissal on 21 November 2024 was an immediate, unilateral ending of employment without notice or payment, constituting a clear breach of clause 18.1.
6. Penalty for Good Faith Breach: Mr Horsefield withdrew this claim during the investigation meeting, so it was not pursued or determined.
7. Penalty for Employment Agreement Breach: The Authority noted that the breach of the IEA (failure to give notice) formed part of the dismissal grievance and was addressed within that claim. The specific facts did not warrant imposition of a penalty, so this claim was dismissed.
8. 90-Day Time Limit: Mr Horsefield raised his grievance within eight days of dismissal, well within the 90-day statutory requirement under s 114(1). No issue arose on this point.
9. Unjustified Dismissal: Applying the s 103A(2) objective test, the Authority assessed whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as Eurocars did. Eurocars breached all four procedural fairness obligations in s 103A(3) — it failed to investigate, failed to raise concerns, failed to give Mr Horsefield an opportunity to respond, and failed to consider any response before dismissing him. Substantively, Mr Horsefield had only worked six days, had disclosed his appointments beforehand, had always received approval to attend them, and had no warnings or prior concerns raised with him. Dismissal for attendance without any graduated warning process was not substantively justified. The Authority noted s 103A(5) did not apply because the procedural failures were significant, not minor.
10. Remedies: Lost remuneration was calculated under s 128(2) based on three working days per week at 7.5 hours per day (per Mr Durgesh's own evidence), at $23.50 per hour = $528.75 per week × 12 weeks = $6,345.00 gross, reduced by one week of temporary work actually obtained. Hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) was assessed at $6,000.00, having regard to the shock, hurt, and distress evidenced by Mr Horsefield and supported by his mother's affidavit. Eurocars' argument that ACC payments negated lost remuneration was rejected — these are separate matters.
11. Contributory Conduct: Under s 124, the Authority assessed whether Mr Horsefield's conduct contributed to the situation. It found no blameworthy conduct: he had disclosed his appointments before employment began, received approval each time, was never warned, and was unaware Eurocars viewed his attendance as a problem. No reduction was applied.
12. Costs: The Authority noted Mr Horsefield as the successful party is entitled to a contribution toward legal costs. The notional starting point for a half-day hearing is $2,250.00. Parties were encouraged to resolve costs by agreement; if not, submissions are to be filed within specified timeframes.

The claim was substantially upheld: Mr Horsefield's unjustified dismissal grievance succeeded, the employment agreement breach was established, the penalty claim was dismissed, and no contributory reduction was applied.

- Lost wages: $6,345.00 gross (12 weeks × $528.75/week under s 128(2))
- Hurt/humiliation/distress: $6,000.00 (under s 123(1)(c)(i), no deductions)
- Total ordered: $12,345.00, payable within 28 days
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Penalties: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved (parties to resolve by agreement based on $2,250.00 notional starting point; failing agreement, submissions to be filed)

Applicant: Layth Abu-Laban (employee)
Respondent: Everest Corporation Limited (employer, trading as Direct Tyres & Auto)

Applicant: Danny Gelb, advocate
Respondent: Abdullah Khan (director, self-represented)

Layth Abu-Laban, an apprentice automotive technician employed by Everest Corporation Limited for approximately one year, was dismissed at a meeting on 11 June 2025 without any prior notice of the allegations against him or opportunity to respond. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified and rejected all of ECL's counter-allegations (misuse of property, poor workmanship, solicitation). Mr Abu-Laban was awarded $15,000 in compensation for hurt and humiliation and $13,258 in lost wages, with no reduction for contributory conduct.

Mr Abu-Laban commenced permanent employment as an automotive technician with ECL on 10 June 2024. ECL is a small business operated by director Abdullah Khan. On 11 June 2025, Mr Khan called Mr Abu-Laban to a meeting and informed him his employment was ending that same day, having allegedly given informal verbal notice approximately five weeks earlier that his "contract would not be renewed." Mr Abu-Laban was not informed of the meeting's purpose in advance, was not told of any allegations against him, and was not given any opportunity to respond. ECL's stated reasons for dismissal were loss of trust and confidence arising from alleged solicitation of customers, promotion of a personal business on Facebook, and poor workmanship. Mr Abu-Laban denied all allegations and filed a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal. ECL cross-filed its own application alleging Mr Abu-Laban breached good faith obligations and employment agreement clauses.

1. Unjustified Dismissal: Whether ECL's decision to dismiss Mr Abu-Laban and the manner in which it did so met the standard of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances, per s 103A of the Act — [Established]
2. S 130(2) Wages/Time Record Breach: Whether ECL failed to comply with s 130(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by not providing wages and time records upon request, and whether a penalty should be imposed — [Dismissed]
3. S 82(2) Holidays Act Record Breach: Whether ECL failed to comply with s 82(2) of the Holidays Act 2003 by not providing holiday and leave records upon request, and whether a penalty should be imposed — [Dismissed]
4. S 4 Good Faith Breach (employee): Whether Mr Abu-Laban breached s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to act in good faith toward ECL, and whether a penalty should be imposed — [Dismissed]
5. Employment Agreement Breaches: Whether Mr Abu-Laban breached clauses in his individual employment agreement relating to misuse of company property, poor workmanship, and solicitation of customers — [Dismissed]
6. Penalties/Damages Against Employee: Whether penalties and/or damages should be awarded in favour of ECL arising from Mr Abu-Laban's alleged employment agreement breaches — [Dismissed]
7. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Whether Mr Abu-Laban is entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings — [Established]
8. Lost Remuneration (s 128(2)): Whether Mr Abu-Laban is entitled to reimbursement of lost wages — [Established]
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction (s 124): Whether any remedy should be reduced due to Mr Abu-Laban's contribution to the circumstances giving rise to the grievance — [Dismissed]
10. Costs: Whether either party is entitled to an award of costs — [Not reached]

1. Unjustified Dismissal: The Authority applied the s 103A test — whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as ECL did. The Authority found ECL failed on all four s 103A(3) limbs: it did not investigate allegations, did not raise concerns with Mr Abu-Laban, did not give him a reasonable opportunity to respond, and did not genuinely consider any explanation. Mr Abu-Laban's employment was permanent (not fixed-term as ECL appeared to believe), and ECL provided no evidence in support of its allegations. Relying on Angus v Ports of Auckland Limited [2011] NZEmpC 160, the Authority found the dismissal unjustified.
2. S 130(2) Wages/Time Record Breach: Mr Abu-Laban sent a text message to Mr Khan about payment of wages. The Authority was not satisfied Mr Khan understood this to be a formal request for his wages and time record under s 130(2). ECL had also provided a pay item transaction report. The claim was not established.
3. S 82(2) Holidays Act Record Breach: The Authority found there was insufficient evidence that Mr Abu-Laban had actually requested his holiday and leave record from ECL. The claim was not established.
4. S 4 Good Faith Breach (employee): The Authority found there was no evidence before it to support ECL's claim that Mr Abu-Laban breached his good faith obligations under s 4. ECL's penalty application was declined.
5. Employment Agreement Breaches: The Authority examined each allegation in turn. ECL's allegations of poor workmanship were not substantiated — where damage occurred (e.g., the steering wheel), ECL's own modified tools were a contributing cause. The tyre blowout was caused by ECL-fitted tyres. No evidence supported the solicitation allegation; Mr Abu-Laban was an apprentice also studying at Unitec and did not operate his own business. The allegation of theft (removing brake parts) was found to be Mr Abu-Laban demonstrating worn brakes to Mr Khan. None of ECL's allegations were substantiated.
6. Penalties/Damages Against Employee: Having found no breaches of the employment agreement or s 4, the Authority declined all penalty and damages claims by ECL.
7. Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): Applying the principle from Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield and Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited [2023] NZEmpC 179, the Authority assessed the nature and extent of harm to Mr Abu-Laban. The dismissal caused him significant shock, embarrassment, stress, and mental harm, and prevented him from continuing his Unitec apprenticeship study. Considering comparable cases (Macfarlane v Lavros Lodge Ltd), the Authority awarded $15,000.
8. Lost Remuneration (s 128(2)): The Authority noted the obligation to award the lesser of actual lost remuneration or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Mr Abu-Laban had taken reasonable mitigation steps and earned $2,888 from casual electrical work in the three months following dismissal. Three months' remuneration was calculated at $16,146 (implied), less $2,888 earned, resulting in an award of $13,258.
9. Contributory Conduct Reduction (s 124): The Authority found Mr Abu-Laban did not contribute to the circumstances giving rise to the personal grievance, having rejected all of ECL's allegations. No reduction was applied.
10. Costs: Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Abu-Laban may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with ECL having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The personal grievance claim was upheld in full; all of ECL's counter-claims were dismissed.

- Compensation (hurt/humiliation/injury to feelings, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $15,000
- Lost wages (s 128(2)): $13,258 (gross) (being three months' ordinary time remuneration less $2,888 earned in mitigation)
- Contributory reduction: None applied
- Penalties against ECL: None ordered
- Penalties/damages against Mr Abu-Laban: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved
- All payments to be made within 28 days of the determination date (12 May 2026)

Applicant: Macfarlane Seymour (employee)
Respondent: Hilton Haulage Limited (employer)

Applicant: Itania Nikolai, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: David Traylor, counsel (firm not stated)

Macfarlane Seymour, a milk tanker driver employed by Hilton Haulage Limited, claimed unjustified disadvantage and breach of good faith arising from a failed annual refresher driving assessment in July 2025 and Hilton's subsequent handling of the matter, including a proposed performance improvement plan and requirement to drive accompanied. The Authority found that Hilton was contractually entitled to conduct the assessment and require retraining, that the assessment outcome was supported by evidence, and that the process steps taken were reasonable. On the evidence available (noting the determination was truncated), the claims appear to have been dismissed.

Mr Seymour was employed by Hilton Haulage Limited as a milk tanker driver based at Tokoroa from 15 July 2025 (employment agreement issued 17 June 2024), with Hilton operating a large fleet across 17 North Island locations. From around Christmas 2024, supervisors noted a marked decline in Mr Seymour's driving speed, with informal conversations between him and Operations Manager Hayden Gardiner failing to resolve concerns. On 11 July 2025, Lead Driver Nick Adams conducted Mr Seymour's annual refresher driving assessment and assessed him as not meeting the required standard due to consistently low and inconsistent speeds. Following the failed assessment, Hilton required Mr Seymour to drive accompanied until retraining and reassessment were completed, proposed a draft performance improvement plan, and repeatedly sought to meet with Mr Seymour, but those efforts were frustrated by Mr Seymour's refusal to meet without prior information disclosure and his subsequent sick leave from 7 August 2025. Mr Seymour raised a personal grievance (Statement of Problem lodged 14 October 2025), issued a provisional improvement notice under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (cancelled by WorkSafe), and declined mediation until directed by the Authority.

1. Unjustified Disadvantage – Annual Assessment: Whether Hilton's conduct of the annual refresher driving assessment on 11 July 2025 constituted an unjustifiable action under s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Dismissed]
2. Unjustified Disadvantage – Drive-Accompanied Requirement: Whether requiring Mr Seymour to drive accompanied following the failed assessment unjustifiably disadvantaged him — [Dismissed]
3. Unjustified Disadvantage – Assessment Validity: Whether alleged procedural deficiencies in the assessment (Adams not observing pre-start check, not completing the drive) invalidated the assessment and constituted unjustifiable disadvantage — [Dismissed]
4. Unjustified Disadvantage – Lack of Camera Footage: Whether the unavailability of ERoad camera footage from the assessment day unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Seymour — [Dismissed]
5. Unjustified Disadvantage – PIP Process: Whether Hilton's proposal and handling of the draft performance improvement plan constituted unjustifiable disadvantage — [Dismissed]
6. Unjustified Disadvantage – Effect on Terms and Conditions: Whether any of Hilton's actions adversely affected Mr Seymour's terms and conditions of employment to his disadvantage — [Dismissed]
7. Breach of Good Faith: Whether Hilton breached the duty of good faith owed to Mr Seymour under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — [Status not determinable from truncated text; likely dismissed based on trajectory of reasoning]

1. Unjustified Disadvantage – Annual Assessment: The Authority applied the two-part test under s 103(1)(b): an unjustifiable employer action that affects the employee's terms and conditions to their disadvantage. It found that Hilton was contractually entitled to conduct annual refresher assessments under the Dairy Introduction Procedures Manual and the Employment Agreement. The assessment was conducted by an experienced and qualified Lead Driver and the outcome was supported by GPS data showing consistently below-limit speeds. The assessment was not an unjustifiable action.
2. Unjustified Disadvantage – Drive-Accompanied Requirement: The Authority found that the requirement to drive accompanied was expressly provided for in the Dairy Introduction Procedures Manual as a consequence of failing an assessment. Drive-alongs were not unusual at Hilton, especially in quieter seasons, and Mr Seymour had not objected on previous occasions. There was no change to his pay or duties, and no disciplinary process was initiated.
3. Unjustified Disadvantage – Assessment Validity: Mr Seymour argued that Adams not observing the pre-start check and leaving before the drive concluded invalidated the assessment. The Authority rejected this, finding those matters did not invalidate the driving component of the assessment, which had proceeded sufficiently for Adams to form a view.
4. Unjustified Disadvantage – Lack of Camera Footage: The Authority found that the ERoad footage was automatically overwritten within 72 hours due to the delay between the assessment (11 July) and it being entered into Zambion and acted upon (14 July). However, GPS data was made available to Mr Seymour, and Hilton offered a fresh assessment with footage. The Authority was not persuaded Mr Seymour was unjustifiably disadvantaged; if any defect existed, it was minor and did not result in unfair treatment, per s 103A(5).
5. Unjustified Disadvantage – PIP Process: The Authority found the draft PIP was a reasonable response to a genuine safety concern. It was circulated as a draft only, with Mr Seymour invited to provide feedback before finalisation. Hilton made repeated efforts to meet with Mr Seymour to discuss it, which were frustrated by Mr Seymour's refusal to meet. The process was not unjustifiable.
6. Unjustified Disadvantage – Effect on Terms and Conditions: The Authority found the failed assessment had no impact on Mr Seymour's rate of pay or duties. The accompanied driving requirement was not unusual and carried no adverse connotation. Mr Conway denied publicly announcing Mr Seymour was "stood down," and the Authority noted Mr Seymour was never suspended. No disadvantage to terms and conditions was established.
7. Breach of Good Faith: The determination was truncated before the Authority's full analysis and conclusion on the good faith claim under s 4 of the Act. Based on the factual findings and trajectory of the reasoning — including that Hilton responded to information requests, sought meetings, proposed mediation, and acted consistently with its contractual rights — the claim appears to have been dismissed, but this cannot be confirmed from the available text.

The claim of unjustified disadvantage was dismissed in full on the evidence available; the good faith claim's final resolution could not be confirmed due to truncation of the determination, though the reasoning strongly pointed to dismissal.

None ordered (on the basis of the available text; the determination was truncated and any remedy section or costs orders were not visible).