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Deborah Coley, a caregiver employed by Bupa Care Services NZ Limited at the Liston Heights Care Home in Taupo, brought multiple personal grievance claims and a statutory breach claim arising from Bupa's attempt to vary her guaranteed minimum hours of work, a subsequent disciplinary investigation, and a written warning. The key legal questions concerned whether Bupa breached her employment agreement, whether Bupa unjustifiably disadvantaged her through unfair bargaining and an unfair investigation/warning process, whether she was discriminated against on grounds of family status or national origin, and whether Bupa breached s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The claims relating to the employment agreement breach, unjustified disadvantage through unfair bargaining, unjustified disadvantage through the investigative process (in part), unjustified disadvantage through the warning, and the s 4 breach were upheld; the discrimination claim and one aspect of the investigative process complaint were dismissed.

Applicant: Deborah Coley (employee/caregiver)
Respondent: Bupa Care Services NZ Limited (employer)

Applicant: Emily Blunt, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Shelley Eden, counsel for the Respondent

Deborah Coley was employed by Bupa initially on a casual basis and signed a permanent individual employment agreement on 14 July 2024 guaranteeing her a minimum of 32 hours of work per week. While a roster change consultation process was occurring at the time, Ms Coley was not a permanent employee during that process and did not engage with it; her offer letter and employment agreement expressly guaranteed 32 hours per week. From August 2024 Bupa sought Ms Coley's agreement to vary this term to an average of 32 hours over a six-week roster cycle, but Ms Coley declined. In November 2024 Bupa commenced a redundancy process directed specifically at Ms Coley because she refused to sign the variation, and she ultimately accepted the varied terms on 17 December 2024 under what she described as duress. Separately, in September 2025 Bupa investigated complaints from a resident's family member and three registered nurses about Ms Coley's conduct with residents; following a process that Ms Coley says was procedurally unfair (including failure to provide the abuse and neglect policy at the outset), Bupa issued Ms Coley a written warning on 4 December 2025. Ms Coley raised personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage (unfair bargaining, investigative process, and warning), discrimination on grounds of family status and national origin, a breach of contract claim (resolved as to wage arrears), and a claim under s 4 of the Act; she sought compensation and penalties.

1. Whether Bupa breached clause 6.1 of the individual employment agreement by failing to provide Ms Coley a guaranteed minimum of 32 hours of work per week — Status: Established (paras [23]-[75]).

The Authority applied standard contract interpretation principles, focusing on the express terms of the employment agreement and offer letter, both of which unambiguously guaranteed 32 hours per week. Bupa argued Ms Coley understood (through the roster consultation, a handwritten work pattern document, and her acceptance of the new roster) that the guarantee was to be averaged over six weeks, and further argued estoppel by convention, promissory estoppel, and mistake. The Authority rejected all these arguments: the consultation occurred while Ms Coley was a casual employee, the work pattern document and handwritten note post-dated the signed agreement, and Bupa's own August 2024 letter seeking a variation confirmed there had been no prior shared understanding. On mistake, the Authority found Bupa had not established a mistake existed at the time of the offer (citing Foai v Air New Zealand Ltd [2012] NZEmpC 57). The Authority found Bupa breached clause 6.1 by failing to provide the guaranteed 32 hours per week after 14 July 2024.

2. Whether estoppel by convention applied to qualify the express 32-hours-per-week guarantee — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]-[66]).

The Authority applied the test from NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc v Amcor Packaging (New Zealand) Limited [2011] NZEmpC 135, requiring a shared assumption between the parties. The Authority found no shared understanding existed: Bupa's own letter of 16 August 2024 stated it wished to "adjust" Ms Coley's hours from 32 per week to an average of 32 over six weeks, confirming the parties had not previously agreed to this interpretation. The claim that Ms Coley had accepted the roster pattern consistent with averaging was also rejected.

3. Whether promissory estoppel applied — Status: Dismissed (paras [61]-[65]).

Citing Harris v TSNZ Pulp and Paper Maintenance Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 43, the Authority found promissory estoppel was not made out because Ms Coley had not agreed to the work roster in the work pattern document prior to signing her employment agreement. The Authority's finding that the document post-dated the agreement undermined Bupa's reliance argument.

4. Whether a mistake was made in the offer letter such that the 32-hours guarantee should be read differently — Status: Dismissed (paras [67]-[72]).

The Authority examined contemporaneous evidence and found Bupa never described the term as a mistake at the time of the offer or in its August and August 2024 correspondence; the first time Bupa characterised it as a mistake was after Ms Coley refused to agree to the variation. Applying Foai v Air New Zealand Ltd, the Authority concluded Bupa had not established a mistake was made at the time the offer was presented.

5. Whether Ms Coley was unjustifiably disadvantaged by Bupa's approach to bargaining for new terms of employment — Status: Established (paras [76]-[94]).

The Authority applied the personal grievance test under s 103(1)(b) and the fair and reasonable employer standard under s 103A(3) of the Act. Bupa threatened Ms Coley's ongoing employment during a meeting on 7 October 2024, proceeded with a redundancy process when she declined the variation, and sent letters in November and December 2024 making clear redundancy was the only alternative. The Authority found the redundancy proposal was not genuine, particularly as other caregivers on identical 32-hours guarantees were not subjected to the same process. Bupa's conduct was found to breach its obligation of good faith under clause 4.1(b) of the employment agreement. Cases cited by Bupa (Davis v Commissioner of Police [2014] NZEmpC 152; Alkazaz v Asparona Limited [2019] NZERA 215) were distinguished on their facts.

6. Whether Ms Coley was unjustifiably disadvantaged by Bupa's investigative process regarding complaints about her care of residents — Status: Partially established (paras [95]-[122]).

The Authority considered two sub-issues. First, on failure to provide relevant information: the Authority found Bupa breached its statutory obligation under s 4 of the Act and its own misconduct policy by failing to provide the abuse and neglect policy at the outset of the investigation, despite ultimately making findings of breach of that policy. This deprived Ms Coley of the ability to properly respond to the concerns investigated. Second, on whether the allegation relating to 21 August 2025 (talking loudly) had already been addressed informally and therefore could not be the subject of a formal investigation: the Authority found Bupa's misconduct policy expressly allowed informal discussions to lead to formal investigations, and Ms Coley had an opportunity to respond to this allegation; this sub-claim was dismissed.

7. Whether Ms Coley was unjustifiably disadvantaged by the warning she received from Bupa following the investigation — Status: Established (paras [123]-[150]).

Applying s 103A(3)(d) and the fair and reasonable employer standard, the Authority found Bupa failed to genuinely consider Ms Coley's explanations: the outcome letter did not engage with her responses to each allegation; Bupa did not address why the complaints were not reported at the time of the alleged incidents (some nearly six weeks later); one complaint was investigated by Ms Jordan, who was a witness to one of the incidents; the abuse and neglect policy was not provided until after findings were made; and the historic and procedurally non-compliant nature of the complaints was not considered. The Authority found the findings could not have been made by a fair and reasonable employer.

8. Whether Ms Coley was discriminated against on the grounds of family status — Status: Dismissed (para [158]).

Under s 103(1)(c) and s 105(l) of the Act, applying the "material ingredient" test from McAlister v Air NZ Ltd [2009] NZSC 78, the Authority found insufficient evidence that Bupa's decision to vary Ms Coley's hours was due to her not having children. Ms Coley's understanding that other caregivers with child care responsibilities had rosters adjusted was not supported by sufficient evidence to establish the claim.

9. Whether Ms Coley was discriminated against on the grounds of ethnic or national origin — Status: Dismissed (paras [159]-[163]).

Applying the same statutory framework (s 105(g)) and the McAlister "material ingredient" test, the Authority accepted Bupa offered 32 hours per week to caregivers on work visas to comply with visa conditions, but found Ms Coley's national origin (New Zealand citizenship) was not a material ingredient in Bupa's decision to vary her hours. The discrimination claim on this ground was not established.

10. Whether Bupa breached s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [164]-[178]).

Section 4(1A) and s 4(4)(ba) require good faith in bargaining for variations to individual employment agreements. The Authority found Bupa's proposal to make Ms Coley redundant solely because she refused to sign the variation, when the terms of her employment agreement were clear, was a deliberate breach of good faith intended to undermine bargaining. Bupa's letter of 22 November 2024 acknowledging it "was unable to fulfil those terms" and proceeding with redundancy was found to be a bad faith position. The Authority referenced Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited [2023] NZEmpC 179 and A Labour Inspector v Daleson Investment Limited [2019] NZEmpC 12.

11. Whether a penalty should be imposed for the s 4 breach — Status: Established (paras [166]-[178]).

The Authority applied the penalty factors in s 133A of the Act and the Borsboom v Preet PVT Ltd [2016] NZEmpC 143 framework. Noting the maximum penalty of $20,000 and a comparable case involving redundancy with mixed motives (where $6,000 was awarded, but where the employee was actually dismissed, distinguishing the present case), the Authority imposed a penalty of $3,000 split equally between the Crown ($1,500) and Ms Coley ($1,500).

12. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breaching clause 6.1 of the individual employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [179]-[186]).

The Authority found a penalty was appropriate because Bupa had not made a mistake when offering the 32-hour guarantee and had proceeded to breach its contractual obligation. The Authority set a penalty of $1,000 payable to the Crown, considering the statutory factors and comparable cases.

13. Whether Ms Coley is entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act in respect of the unjustified disadvantage grievances — Status: Partially established (paras [187]-[200]).

Applying the principles from Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield [1993] 1 ERNZ 344 and Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited, the Authority awarded $7,000 for the disadvantage grievance arising from unfair bargaining (finding Ms Coley experienced significant stress, sleep impacts, and mental health effects, and felt bullied). For the investigative process grievance, no compensation was awarded because Ms Coley did not provide sufficient evidence of personal impact. For the warning grievance, $8,000 was awarded, reflecting Ms Coley's humiliation, distress at not being heard, and the impact on her mental health including continued use of antidepressants.

14. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for employee contribution — Status: Dismissed (paras [201]-[206]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from Minhinnick v New Zealand Steel Limited [2010] NZEmpC 30 and Salt v Fell [2008] NZCA 128, requiring first that the employee's actions contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance, and second that a reduction was warranted. The Authority found none of Ms Coley's actions contributed to the situations giving rise to any of her personal grievance claims; no reduction was applied.

15. Whether a wages arrears claim should be determined — Status: Not reached (para [22]).

The parties resolved the wage arrears claim between themselves prior to the determination, so the Authority did not address it.

16. Whether either party is entitled to legal costs — Status: Not reached (paras [208]-[210]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Coley may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with Bupa having 14 days to reply.

The claim was partially upheld: the employment agreement breach, unjustified disadvantage through unfair bargaining, unjustified disadvantage through the warning, and the s 4 breach were established; one aspect of the investigative process grievance was established (failure to provide relevant information) but attracted no compensation; the discrimination claims on both grounds and the allegation that the 21 August 2025 incident could not be investigated were dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, injury to feelings — s 123(1)(c)(i)):
- $7,000 to Ms Coley for the unjustified disadvantage grievance arising from unfair bargaining for new terms of employment.
- $8,000 to Ms Coley for the unjustified disadvantage grievance arising from receipt of the warning.
- Nil for the unjustified disadvantage grievance arising from the investigative process (insufficient evidence of personal impact).

Penalties:
- $3,000 penalty for breach of s 4 of the Act: $1,500 to the Crown; $1,500 to Ms Coley.
- $1,000 penalty for breach of clause 6.1 of the individual employment agreement: $1,000 to the Crown.

All payments due within 28 days of the determination date (7 August 2026).

Reinstatement: Not sought/not ordered.
Contribution reduction: None applied.
Costs: Reserved; process set out for parties to resolve or apply to the Authority.

Sebastian Taylor, a guitar technician employed by Gokula Music Limited, claimed he was constructively dismissed and/or unjustifiably disadvantaged by his employer following a rapid deterioration in the employment relationship in February 2025. The key legal questions were whether his resignation constituted a constructive dismissal and whether five alleged employer actions amounted to unjustified disadvantage. The constructive dismissal claim and most disadvantage claims were dismissed, but one disadvantage grievance — relating to the manner of Gokula's communications with Mr Taylor during his sick leave — was established, resulting in a reduced compensation award of $4,000.

Applicant: Sebastian Taylor (employee/guitar technician)
Respondent: Gokula Music Limited (employer)

Applicant: David Prisk, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

Sebastian Taylor was employed by Gokula Music Limited as a guitar technician from 1 February 2024, working Wednesday to Sunday at $26 per hour for at least 30 hours per week. The employment relationship was broadly functional for approximately 12 months, but deteriorated sharply in February 2025 following an incident on 12 February 2025 where Mr Taylor alleged his employer, Gregory Masson (Gokula's sole director), made a derogatory remark connected to his disclosed medical condition. Mr Taylor complained, took sick leave supported by a medical certificate, and received a series of communications from Mr Masson demanding clinical details, suggesting Mr Taylor consider leaving, and foreshadowing closer management. On 25 February 2025 Mr Taylor warned he would resign if his hours were not restored; on 4 March 2025 he resigned giving two weeks' notice. Mr Taylor claimed constructive dismissal and five disadvantage grievances, while Gokula denied all claims, attributing the breakdown to Mr Taylor's personal relationship with a colleague (anonymised as TYQ) and his sensitivity to performance feedback. Gokula failed to attend the investigation meeting, leaving only Mr Taylor's evidence and the contemporaneous text/email record before the Authority.

1. Whether the Individual Employment Agreement (IEA) was validly entered into and recorded the terms of Mr Taylor's employment — Status: Established (paras [19]-[27]).

The IEA was signed by TYQ (Gokula's manager) after Mr Taylor raised the absence of a written agreement. Gokula argued Mr Masson only learned of it in February 2025 and that TYQ had no authority to sign. The Authority applied s 65(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (Act) requiring written employment agreements. It found it more likely than not that TYQ prepared and signed the IEA with Mr Masson's knowledge and consent, relying on the commercial reasonableness of the terms, a contemporaneous text referencing the notice period without challenge, and the implausibility of Mr Masson being unaware. The IEA was accepted as recording the terms and conditions of Mr Taylor's employment.

2. Whether Mr Taylor was unjustifiably constructively dismissed by Gokula — Status: Dismissed (paras [44]-[65]).

The Authority applied the three non-exhaustive categories from Auckland Shop Employees IUOW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA), focusing on: (a) a course of conduct with the dominant purpose of coercing resignation; and (b) a breach of duty causing resignation, with the test of whether a substantial risk of resignation was reasonably foreseeable (Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUOW Inc [1994] 2 NZLR 415 (CA)). The "final straw" doctrine (Pivott v Southern Adult Literacy Inc [2013] NZEmpC 236) was also considered. The Authority found the relationship was functional for 12 months and all difficulties arose within a 20-day period; Mr Taylor first raised resignation himself; Gokula's communications were ill-judged but reactive, not part of a deliberate scheme; no disciplinary or formal steps were taken; Mr Masson apologised; and resignation was reasonably foreseeable only if preceding conduct had been known, which it was not. Constructive dismissal was not established.

3. Whether Gokula unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Taylor by unilaterally reducing his days and hours of work — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[47], [67]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test (whether the action was what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in the circumstances). It found the instruction for Mr Taylor to remain away on 20 February 2025 was issued while he was certified unfit for work; Mr Masson was entitled to arrange cover. There was no evidence Gokula intended to make permanent changes to hours. No unilateral variation was established.

4. Whether Gokula unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Taylor by unwarrantedly disclosing his personal health information — Status: Dismissed (paras [68]-[72]).

Three strands were assessed: (a) repeated disclosures to colleagues — dismissed, as this allegation reached the Authority only through TYQ's hearsay and TYQ did not give evidence; it was also implausible given Mr Taylor's regular on-site presence; (b) the 14 February 2025 incident — dismissed, as neither witness present gave evidence and Mr Masson denied it; (c) the 12 February 2025 remark — dismissed, as it concerned appearance only, disclosed no medical condition on its face, and was apologised for. Possible passing references to tiredness were not found to amount to disclosure of confidential health information.

5. Whether Gokula unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Taylor by using derogatory remarks against him — Status: Established (paras [51]-[77]).

Assessed alongside the communications grievance. The Authority found that on 19 February 2025 Mr Masson demanded clinical information Gokula was not entitled to (exceeding the right to request a medical certificate), and in the same exchange told Mr Taylor to consider leaving — all in response to a certified sick absence. The following fortnight's communications were increasingly blunt and gratuitous. Applying the s 103A test, no fair and reasonable employer could have responded to a medical certificate in those terms. This grievance was established (characterised as unjustified disadvantage by the manner of communications rather than a specific derogatory remarks category), though the finding was expressly limited: it was not a finding of bullying or intentional targeting.

6. Whether Gokula unjustifiably disadvantaged Mr Taylor by taking reprisal actions following his complaint — Status: Dismissed (paras [78]).

The alleged instruction to TYQ to dismiss Mr Taylor was not established (TYQ did not give evidence). The instruction to remain away on 20 February 2025 was not reprisal — it was a legitimate response to a certified unfitness for work. This grievance was not established.

7. Whether Gokula failed to provide Mr Taylor with a safe workplace — Status: Dismissed (paras [79]-[80]).

To the extent the claim alleged breach of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, the Authority held it lacked jurisdiction over that Act. To the extent it alleged unjustified disadvantage from failure to maintain a psychologically safe workplace, it added nothing beyond the communications grievance already addressed. No harm to Mr Taylor's health attributable to his work was established separate from his personal circumstances.

8. Whether Mr Taylor is entitled to lost wages — Status: Dismissed (para [82]).

Lost wages were sought on the basis of constructive dismissal (13 weeks at contracted rate, totalling $10,140). Because constructive dismissal was not established, no lost wages award was made.

9. Whether Mr Taylor is entitled to compensation for hurt and humiliation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [83]-[86]).

Mr Taylor sought $20,000. The Authority required evidence of injury to feelings and confined the award to harm caused by the established conduct. It found the harm was real but limited: Mr Taylor was upset at being told his medical certificate was insufficient, asked his diagnosis, and invited to leave while unwell and without fault. There was no evidence of prolonged effect or treatment required. Compensation of $5,000 was assessed before contribution reduction.

10. Whether any remedy should be reduced for Mr Taylor's contributory blameworthy conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [87]-[91]).

The Authority applied considerations of causation and proportionality. It found Mr Taylor had on multiple occasions given very short notice of absence to a small employer who needed to arrange cover, and that this carelessness contributed to Mr Masson's frustration that produced the unjustified communications. Being unwell was not blameworthy, but the repeated late notification was. A 20% reduction was applied to the $5,000 award, reducing it to $4,000.

11. Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs of representation — Status: Reserved (paras [94]-[96]).

Costs were reserved. Parties were encouraged to agree. If not resolved, Mr Taylor's representative could file a costs memorandum within 14 days of the determination, with Gokula having 14 days to reply.

The claim was partially upheld: the constructive dismissal claim and four of five disadvantage grievances were dismissed; one disadvantage grievance (unjustified communications during sick leave) was established, with compensation reduced for contributory conduct.

Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i) — hurt and humiliation): $5,000 assessed, reduced by 20% for contributory conduct, resulting in an order of $4,000.00 payable by Gokula to Mr Taylor within 28 days.
Lost wages: None ordered (constructive dismissal not established).
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to agree; timetable set if Authority determination required.
Non-publication order: Issued at para [93] prohibiting publication of any information identifying the colleague referred to as TYQ.

Melanie Spielman, a Head Chef formerly employed by Ou La La Limited (OLL), brought a claim against Romain Sehili, OLL's director and shareholder, after OLL went into liquidation without paying her wage arrears and other employment entitlements. The central legal question was whether Mr Sehili could be held personally liable as a "person involved in breaches of employment standards" under ss 142W and 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found in Ms Spielman's favour and ordered Mr Sehili to pay $11,730 in unpaid wages and entitlements.

Applicant: Melanie Spielman (employee, former Head Chef)
Respondent: Romain Sehili (director and shareholder of Ou La La Limited, the employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: No appearance

Ms Spielman was employed by Ou La La Limited (OLL) as a Head Chef from 5 June 2025. During her employment she experienced issues including unpredictable hours, after-hours contact, and alleged harassment. She raised personal grievances and alleged breaches of her employment agreement; the parties attended mediation but could not resolve the dispute. Ms Spielman lodged a statement of problem against both OLL and Mr Sehili, covering unjustified disadvantage, sexual harassment, wage arrears, breach of contract, and breach of good faith. OLL went into liquidation on 26 November 2025, making recovery from the company impossible, so Ms Spielman pursued only the claim against Mr Sehili personally as a person involved in breaches of employment standards. Mr Sehili did not respond to the statement of problem, did not participate in case management, and did not attend the investigation meeting on 13 July 2026 despite having been served and warned that the matter would proceed in his absence.

1. Whether OLL breached employment standards resulting in unpaid amounts owed to Ms Spielman — Status: Established (paras [23]-[27]).

Employment standards under the Act include obligations arising from the Wages Protection Act 1983 and the Holidays Act 2003, requiring payment of full wages, sick leave, holiday pay, and public holiday entitlements. The Authority accepted Ms Spielman's uncontested evidence that OLL failed to pay wages for hours worked (including guaranteed minimum hours), shift cancellation compensation, ten days of sick leave, six public holidays, and accrued holiday entitlements at the end of employment. These failures collectively constituted breaches of employment standards, with total arrears calculated at $11,730.

2. Whether Mr Sehili was an "officer" of OLL for the purposes of s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (para [28]).

Section 142W(3)(a) treats a person occupying the position of director of a company as an officer of that entity for the purposes of personal liability for breaches of employment standards. Mr Sehili was a director of OLL at the time of the breaches, and the Authority found this element was straightforwardly satisfied on uncontested evidence.

3. Whether Mr Sehili knew the primary facts relevant to OLL's breaches of employment standards, making him a "person involved in the breach" under ss 142W(1)(c) and 142Y — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31]).

The Court of Appeal in A Labour Inspector v Southern Taxis Limited and Others [2021] NZCA 705 held that the effect of ss 142W and 142Y is to impose personal liability on a director who knows all the primary facts relevant to the company's breach, unless the director reasonably relied on third-party advice or took all reasonable steps to ensure compliance. The Authority found that Mr Sehili operated OLL effectively as its general manager/CEO, managed payroll, set Ms Spielman's hours, and personally made (or decided not to make) the relevant payments. He therefore had full knowledge of the primary facts underpinning OLL's breaches, and there was no evidence of reasonable reliance on advice or steps taken to ensure compliance.

4. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to proceed in Mr Sehili's absence — Status: Established (paras [7]-[11]).

Under clause 12 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority may proceed with an investigation meeting in a party's absence where that party was duly notified and chose not to attend. The Authority was satisfied that Mr Sehili had been properly served with the statement of problem, notified of the case management conference, and served with a notice of investigation meeting which expressly warned him the matter would be determined in his absence. No explanation was provided for his non-attendance, and the Authority proceeded accordingly.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [33]-[35]).

Costs were reserved. The Authority noted that because Ms Spielman was self-represented there may be limited basis for a costs award, but invited her to lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days if she had incurred costs in preparing her claim. Mr Sehili would then have 14 days to reply. Any costs determination would be assessed on the Authority's usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was upheld in full, with Ms Spielman entitled to recover $11,730 from Mr Sehili as a person involved in OLL's breaches of employment standards.

Wage arrears and entitlements (payable by Mr Sehili under ss 142W and 142Y): $11,730, comprising:
- Unpaid wages: $4,320
- Shift cancellation allowance: $840
- Ten days of sick leave: $2,400
- Six public holidays worked but not correctly paid: $270
- Accrued holiday entitlements at end of employment: $3,900

Costs: Reserved (Ms Spielman may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; no costs order made at this stage).
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Compensation for hurt and humiliation: None ordered (claim against OLL not pursued; only wage arrears claim pursued against Mr Sehili).

Two registered teachers, Rawinia Higgins and Vivienne Higgins, employed at Te Kura Kaupapa Motuhake O Tawhiuau (a Kura in Murupara), applied for interim reinstatement and an injunction to halt a workplace investigation after being kept off work on paid leave since November 2025 following allegations of serious misconduct. The key legal questions were whether the applicants had an arguable case for unjustified disadvantage by suspension, whether permanent reinstatement was practicable and reasonable, where the balance of convenience lay, and where overall justice fell. The Authority granted interim reinstatement but declined the injunction to stop the workplace investigation.

Applicant: Rawinia Makarena Manawa Higgins (First Applicant, registered teacher) and Vivienne Collette Te Rauhina Higgins (Second Applicant, registered teacher)
Respondent: Mercia-Dawn Yates as Limited Statutory Manager of Te Kura Kaupapa Motuhake O Tawhiuau (employer/Limited Statutory Manager)

Applicant: Drisana Sheely, counsel for the Applicants
Respondent: M N Steens, counsel for the Respondent

Ms V Higgins has been employed at the Kura since February 2016 as a senior teacher and leader; Ms R Higgins has been employed since March 2024 as a classroom teacher. On 12 November 2025, the Limited Statutory Manager (LSM), Ms Yates, wrote to each applicant individually, raising allegations of serious misconduct, proposing suspension on full pay under the Area School Teachers' Collective Agreement (ASTCA), and inviting responses before a decision was made. After meetings on 24 November 2025, Ms Yates decided not to make disciplinary findings but did not return the applicants to work; instead, she issued "Letters of Expectation" in December 2025, which the applicants signed on 19 December, on the understanding that a restorative process would follow. Efforts to conduct a restorative meeting broke down through February and early April 2026, after which the LSM commissioned a formal independent workplace investigation. The applicants denied agreeing that return to work was conditional on completing the restorative process, raised personal grievances for unjustified suspension and disadvantage, and in May 2026 lodged urgent applications for interim reinstatement and an injunction stopping the investigation; the LSM opposed both, asserting the applicants were on paid discretionary leave (not suspended) and that the investigation was necessary given the seriousness of the allegations.

1. Whether the applicants have an arguable case for unjustified disadvantage by way of suspension — Status: Established (paras [9]-[43]).

The applicable test for an arguable case is whether the claim is not frivolous or vexatious, meaning it has some serious or arguable prospects of success (per Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36; X v Y Ltd v New Zealand Stock Exchange [1992] 1 ERNZ 863). The Authority applied the section 103A fair and reasonable employer test to the LSM's decisions, noting the ASTCA's specific disciplinary and conflict resolution processes in clauses 2.4 and 2.5. The Authority found it seriously arguable that: remaining off work on pay constituted a disciplinary disadvantage; the special leave criteria under clause 5.8 were not met; the grounds for ongoing suspension were vitiated after the LSM decided not to proceed with disciplinary findings in November 2025; the LSM should have utilised the ASTCA's conflict resolution mechanism when the restorative process failed; and the decision to commission a workplace investigation into already-considered allegations was arguably flawed and non-compliant with the ASTCA's disciplinary principles. The arguable case threshold was met for both unjustified disadvantage by suspension and for the injunction regarding the workplace investigation.

2. Whether the applicants have an arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [44]-[52]).

Under section 125(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, reinstatement is the primary remedy where practicable and reasonable. The Authority considered both the practicability and reasonableness of reinstatement, citing Angus v Ports of Auckland [2011] NZEmpC 122, Air New Zealand Limited v Hudson (unrep), and Smith v Fletcher Concrete & Infrastructure Ltd [2020] NZEmpC 125. The Authority found that the LSM's concerns about practicability arose at least in part from their own arguably deficient decisions, that the applicants possessed the skills and experience for their roles, and that the ASTCA emphasised protecting the mana and dignity of teachers. It was not possible to say reinstatement would not be practicable or reasonable, and both applicants had an arguable case for permanent reinstatement (citing Christieson v Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited [2021] NZEmpC 142).

3. Whether an arguable case exists for a permanent injunction stopping the workplace investigation — Status: Established only as arguable case threshold; injunction ultimately declined at balance of convenience/overall justice stage (paras [43], [59], [66]).

The Authority found the arguable case threshold was met for the injunction application, consistent with its finding on unjustified disadvantage. However, at the balance of convenience and overall justice stages, the Authority declined to grant the injunction: the investigation was at an early stage, the opportunity remained for the LSM to rectify any deficiencies in its commissioning, and the applicants could still meaningfully participate in it. The injunction to stop the workplace investigation was therefore declined.

4. Where the balance of convenience lies regarding interim reinstatement — Status: Established in favour of applicants (paras [53]-[58]).

The balance of convenience required assessment of detriment to each party if interim reinstatement were granted or refused, and whether damages could adequately compensate. The LSM argued there was no detriment to the applicants as they were on pay, and that the serious investigation should not be disrupted. The Authority found that damages could not adequately compensate the applicants for reputational harm and wellbeing impacts given the nature of their roles and strong whānau and cultural connections to the Kura and community. The balance favoured granting interim reinstatement, with potential adverse impacts on third parties manageable by the LSM.

5. Where the balance of convenience lies regarding the injunction to stop the workplace investigation — Status: Dismissed (paras [59]).

The Authority found the balance of convenience did not favour halting the workplace investigation, as it was at an early stage with the opportunity for the LSM to address process deficiencies and for the applicants to participate fairly. The injunction on this issue was declined.

6. Whether overall justice supports granting interim reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [60]-[64]).

The overall justice assessment, described as a check on the earlier analysis (per NZ Tax Refunds Limited v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90), was found to support upholding the legal framework and obligations under the ASTCA and granting interim reinstatement. The Authority noted the investigation's early stage and that the applicants' participation could still benefit the process. Granting reinstatement was not inconsistent with the investigation continuing.

7. Whether overall justice supports granting an injunction to stop the workplace investigation — Status: Dismissed (paras [62]-[64]).

The LSM argued overall justice favoured allowing the investigation to continue due to the seriousness of the complaints. The Authority agreed the investigation should not be stopped, noting it was at an early stage and the applicants could still participate fairly. The injunction was declined on overall justice grounds as well.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [67]).

The Authority reserved the question of costs without making any order at this stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was upheld and the application for an injunction to stop the workplace investigation was dismissed; costs were reserved.

Interim Reinstatement: Granted — the suspension is to be lifted with immediate effect, and the parties are to resume mediation forthwith to agree how the applicants can be reinstated to their positions or ones no less advantageous than those held at the date of suspension. If agreement cannot be reached by 27 August 2026, further directions may be sought from the Authority (conditional/interim order, subject to further hearing if mediation fails).
Injunction to stop workplace investigation: Declined.
Costs: Reserved.

Lee Mark Pownall, a former chief executive of Hutt Valley Youth Health Trust (Vibe), brought claims alleging that Vibe breached a Record of Settlement (RoS) entered into on 7 June 2024, and also that the RoS was voidable for duress. The key legal questions were whether Vibe breached the RoS terms (regarding a certificate of service, a reference, bad faith/fraud, and Privacy Act misuse) and whether the RoS could be set aside for duress. All of Mr Pownall's claims failed, with the Authority finding Vibe had complied with the RoS and that no duress was established.

Applicant: Lee Mark Pownall (former employee/chief executive)
Respondent: Hutt Valley Youth Health Trust (employer, trading as "Vibe")

Applicant: Lee Pownall, self-represented
Respondent: Frances Lear, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Pownall commenced employment with Vibe as its chief executive in February 2024. Concerns were raised about his leadership, communication, and management style, leading to negotiations between the parties. On 7 June 2024, the parties signed a Record of Settlement, which was certified by an MBIE mediator under s 149 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act). In November 2024, Mr Pownall claimed Vibe had not provided the agreed certificate of service and demanded damages exceeding $80,000, despite Vibe's evidence that the certificate had been sent on 8 July 2024. Mr Pownall advanced claims for breach of the RoS (delayed certificate, refusal of written reference, bad faith, fraud, and misuse of the Privacy Act provision), as well as a claim that he signed the RoS under duress. Vibe denied all claims, asserting full compliance with the RoS and that duress was not raised until October 2025.

1. Whether the Record of Settlement is final and binding and limits the Authority's jurisdiction to enforcement only — Status: Established (paras [10]-[12]).

Under s 149(3) of the Act, certified Records of Settlement are final and binding on the parties and generally come before the Authority or Court for enforcement purposes only. The Authority confirmed this general principle applies, while acknowledging that narrow exceptions exist (e.g., duress) where it may be permissible to go behind a settlement agreement. The Authority applied this framework to assess each of Mr Pownall's specific claims accordingly.

2. Whether Vibe breached the RoS by delaying provision of the certificate of service — Status: Dismissed (paras [14]-[18]).

The RoS provided that Vibe would supply a certificate of service if requested. The evidence showed the certificate was sent to Mr Pownall on 8 July 2024, and between that date and November 2024, Mr Pownall made no contact with Vibe to say he had not received it. When he later claimed non-receipt, Vibe resent it. The Authority found no breach of the RoS on this issue.

3. Whether Vibe breached the RoS by refusing to provide an agreed written reference — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]-[21]).

Clause 7 of the RoS only required Vibe to provide a verbal reference if requested; there was no obligation to provide a written reference. No evidence was produced that a formal request for a verbal reference had ever been made. By 29 November 2024, Mr Pownall had in any event stated he no longer required a written reference. The Authority found no breach on this ground.

4. Whether Vibe acted in bad faith or committed fraud in relation to the RoS — Status: Dismissed (paras [22]-[25]).

Mr Pownall alleged bad faith and fraud primarily based on the delay in sending the certificate and the claimed refusal to provide a reference. The Authority found no evidence of misrepresentation by Vibe; the email record confirmed the certificate was sent, and when Mr Pownall said he had not received it, Vibe resent it without objection. No fraud or bad faith was established.

5. Whether Vibe misused the RoS to cover a breach of the Privacy Act 2020 — Status: Dismissed (paras [26]-[29]).

Mr Pownall argued that clause 14 of the RoS, which released liability for his earlier Privacy Act request, unlawfully restricted his statutory rights. The Authority found the clause only settled the specific Privacy Act request made prior to the RoS and did not prevent Mr Pownall from making future requests. On the plain reading of clause 14, there was no offence to the Privacy Act 2020.

6. Whether the RoS was voidable for duress — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[36]).

Applying McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Limited [2009] NZCA 329, duress requires: (i) exertion of illegitimate pressure, and (ii) that pressure compelling the party to enter the agreement. Mr Pownall was given the opportunity to take advice before signing, did not raise duress at the time or afterwards, accepted payments under the RoS without protest, and only raised duress for the first time in October 2025. The "without prejudice" letter he relied upon as evidence of duress was found insufficient. The Authority held that Mr Pownall had affirmed the RoS through his subsequent conduct and there was no credible evidence of duress.

7. Whether the RoS should be set aside — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[38]).

Following the dismissal of the duress claim, and given that Mr Pownall had expressly sought compliance with the RoS terms after signing it, the Authority concluded there were no grounds to set aside the RoS. The settlement remained final and binding.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved.

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, Vibe may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Pownall having 14 days to respond. Costs will be assessed on the Authority's standard daily tariff unless circumstances require adjustment.

All of Mr Pownall's claims were dismissed; the Record of Settlement remains final and binding and Hutt Valley Youth Health Trust was found to have complied with its terms.

None ordered. Costs are reserved pending agreement between the parties or a further determination on the standard daily tariff basis.

Sky Kahuroa (employee) applied to the Employment Relations Authority for leave to raise a personal grievance against her former employer, Beard Brothers Limited (BBL), outside the 90-day employee notification period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The grievance arose from Ms Kahuroa's dismissal for serious misconduct on 8 May 2025, but was lodged one day late due to her advocate's personal circumstances involving caring for an unwell family member. The Authority granted leave, finding that exceptional circumstances existed under s 115 of the Act, and directed the parties to mediation.

Applicant: Sky Kahuroa (employee)
Respondent: Beard Brothers Limited (employer)

Applicant: Tania Waterhouse, advocate
Respondent: Kristy Elstone and Lance Peterson, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Kahuroa was employed by Beard Brothers Limited (BBL) and was dismissed for serious misconduct on 8 May 2025 following a workplace incident involving conflict with another employee. Her advocate, Tania Waterhouse, had been engaged to represent Ms Kahuroa from before the dismissal, attending an employment investigation meeting with BBL on 15 April 2025. A personal grievance was raised with BBL on 6 August 2025, which both parties agreed was one day outside the 90-day employee notification period. BBL declined to accept the grievance and opposed the application for leave. Ms Waterhouse explained the delay by reference to personal circumstances: she had been caring for an unwell family member over a prolonged period, during which the family member's health sharply declined, and she returned to work around the time the 90-day period expired. BBL argued the late filing was a simple miscalculation rather than exceptional circumstances, and pointed to Ms Waterhouse having acted for another client during the same period as inconsistent with her claimed personal difficulties.

1. Non-publication order in respect of the name and identifying details of the other employee involved in the workplace incident — Status: Established.

The Authority's discretion to grant non-publication orders is set out in clause 10 of schedule 2 of the Act. While the principle of open justice is strong and requires evidence of specific adverse consequences before departure from it, the Authority noted that non-publication orders are generally appropriate for individuals peripheral to the proceedings who do not give evidence and whose involvement is merely contextual. The other employee was not a party, did not give evidence, and their personal information would not otherwise be in the public arena. The Authority was satisfied that the presumption of open justice was outweighed and made the non-publication order.

2. Whether leave should be granted under s 114(7) of the Act for Ms Kahuroa to raise her personal grievance outside the 90-day employee notification period on the ground of exceptional circumstances under s 115(b) — Status: Established.

Section 115(b) provides that exceptional circumstances include a situation where the employee made reasonable arrangements to have the grievance raised by an agent, and the agent unreasonably failed to ensure the grievance was raised in time. The Authority found that Ms Kahuroa had made reasonable arrangements: Ms Waterhouse had been engaged from an early stage (via a referral from Citizens Advice Bureau before dismissal), was present at the investigation meeting, and ultimately did raise the grievance (albeit one day late). On the question of whether Ms Waterhouse's failure was "unreasonable," the Authority relied on Goldie v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2023] NZEmpC 30, which recognised that an agent's failure may not be unreasonable where, for example, a serious accident or sudden illness prevented timely filing. The Authority found the cumulative circumstances — long-term family caregiving, a sharp decline in the family member's health, and a return to work that coincided with the expiry of the notification period — were analogous, and that s 115's list of exceptional circumstances is not exhaustive. The Authority was satisfied exceptional circumstances existed even if the failure was not strictly "unreasonable."

3. Whether it is just to grant leave — Status: Established.

Even where exceptional circumstances are found, the Authority must also consider whether it is just to grant leave. The Authority noted the grievance was filed only one day late, meaning BBL could not claim significant prejudice from long delay. The policy rationale underpinning the 90-day employee notification period was unlikely to be engaged given such a minimal overrun. In these circumstances, the Authority was satisfied it was just to grant leave.

4. Direction to mediation under s 114(5) of the Act — Status: Established.

Having granted leave, the Authority is required by s 114(5) to direct the parties to use mediation to seek to mutually resolve the grievance. Such a direction was made. A further case management conference was reserved to timetable the matter for investigation if mediation does not resolve it.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved.

Costs were reserved, with the parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. A timetable was set: Ms Kahuroa may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with BBL having 14 days to reply from service. If costs are determined by the Authority, the standard daily tariff basis will apply unless circumstances require adjustment.

The application was upheld: leave was granted for Ms Kahuroa to raise her personal grievance outside the 90-day employee notification period, and the parties were directed to mediation.

No monetary remedy ordered at this stage (the determination deals only with the threshold leave application). The parties are directed to mediation; a further case management conference will be convened to timetable any investigation hearing if mediation does not resolve the matter. Costs reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Modern Transport Engineers Limited (MTE) and Kyle Spencer were parties to dual proceedings before the Employment Relations Authority — MTE's claim for payment for work done on Mr Spencer's personal property, and Mr Spencer's personal grievance for unjustified dismissal — both partially resolved in a February 2026 determination. This costs determination deals solely with how the costs of those proceedings should be allocated, following the parties' failure to agree. The Authority found that neither party was sufficiently successful to justify a costs award, and ordered costs to lie where they fall.

Applicant (in costs proceedings / primary applicant in 3313360): Modern Transport Engineers Limited (employer)
Respondent (in costs proceedings / applicant in 3373684): Kyle Spencer (employee)

Applicant (MTE): Scott McKenna and Brett Edwards, counsel for Modern Transport Engineers Limited
Respondent (Spencer): Toby Braun and Alex Davis, counsel for Kyle Spencer

Modern Transport Engineers Limited (MTE) and Kyle Spencer were parties to two interrelated proceedings in the Authority. MTE brought a claim against Mr Spencer for the cost of labour and materials relating to work carried out on Mr Spencer's boat and caravan by MTE employees. Mr Spencer separately brought a personal grievance claim for unjustified dismissal. On 5 February 2026, the Authority issued a substantive determination (Modern Transport Engineers Limited v Spencer [2026] NZERA 60) ordering Mr Spencer to pay MTE for the work carried out (offset against withheld final pay), and ordering MTE to pay Mr Spencer $12,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 for unjustified dismissal. The substantive determination reserved costs. Neither party filed costs memoranda within the 28-day timetabling period, though both filed late submissions which the Authority accepted. MTE argued it was the more successful party and sought $7,000 in costs, pointing to Mr Spencer's dishonest conduct and the greater quantum he owed. Mr Spencer argued that his pre-proceedings settlement offer (made 24 May 2024) would have yielded MTE a better result than the determination, and sought $11,500 in costs from MTE.

1. Whether either party filed costs memoranda within the required timetabling period, and whether late memoranda should be accepted — Status: Established (paras [2], [4]).

The substantive determination required costs memoranda within 28 days (by 4 March 2026). MTE filed on 19 March 2026 and Mr Spencer on 15 May 2026 — both outside the timetabling. The Authority noted this was "unfortunate" but accepted and considered both late memoranda in the interests of determining costs.

2. Whether MTE was entitled to a costs award as the substantially more successful party — Status: Dismissed (paras [5]-[8], [14]-[15], [20]).

The Authority applied the established costs principle that costs generally follow the event, but requires a holistic assessment of the overall outcome rather than an arithmetic comparison of individual findings. The Authority found that neither party obtained the remedies they sought to the extent advanced, and the outcome was materially more limited than either anticipated. MTE was therefore not characterised as the substantially successful party, and its claim for $7,000 in costs was declined.

3. Whether Mr Spencer's pre-proceedings settlement offer (24 May 2024) should weight the costs determination in his favour — Status: Dismissed (paras [16]-[17]).

The Authority considered whether Mr Spencer's offer of $10,000 in full settlement (made before MTE lodged its claim) should reduce or eliminate any costs award against him or support an award in his favour. The Authority found the offer did not offer a complete solution to the employment relationship problems: it was made at an early stage, it did not address the personal grievance in monetary terms, and it was never renewed, refined, or updated as proceedings progressed and evidence crystallised. The offer accordingly carried "little, if any, weight" in the costs assessment.

4. Whether Mr Spencer's contributory conduct (reducing his personal grievance remedy in the substantive determination) should be taken into account for costs purposes — Status: Dismissed (para [19]).

The Authority explicitly confirmed it did not take Mr Spencer's contribution reduction (applied to his personal grievance remedy in the substantive determination) into account when assessing costs. This is consistent with the principle that costs are not a punishment for conduct, though conduct that unnecessarily increases costs may be relevant.

5. Whether the parties' conduct throughout proceedings justified a departure from the usual approach to costs in a mixed-outcome case — Status: Dismissed (para [18]).

The Authority assessed the conduct of both parties throughout the proceedings and found no conduct of sufficient significance to warrant a departure from the standard approach. No party's behaviour was found to have unnecessarily increased costs to a degree that would justify an award.

6. Whether Mr Spencer was entitled to a costs award as the substantially more successful party — Status: Dismissed (paras [12], [14]-[15], [20]).

Mr Spencer sought $11,500 based on the full tariff for three investigation days, relying on the settlement offer argument and the net outcome being close to his offer. The Authority rejected this for the same reasons it rejected MTE's costs claim: neither party achieved a level of success sufficient to justify a costs award in their favour. The issues were closely interconnected and costs could not readily be separated by outcome.

7. Overall costs allocation — Status: Established (paras [14]-[15], [20]-[21]).

Applying the equity and good conscience jurisdiction under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and considering the overall outcome, interconnection of issues, mixed success, the settlement offer's limited weight, and the absence of sufficiently significant conduct warranting departure, the Authority determined that costs should lie where they fall.

Both parties' applications for costs were dismissed; costs lie where they fall.

None ordered. Each party bears their own costs.

Christo Joost, a former COO of Aether Pacific Pharmaceuticals Limited (APP), sought to recover unpaid salary and accrued holiday entitlements from three non-executive directors of APP (Cataldo Miccio, Peter Win, and Bruce Whall) after APP went into liquidation and the liquidators refused consent for his claim to proceed against the company. The key legal questions were whether the directors were "persons involved in breaches of employment standards" under ss 142W and 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether any defences under s 142ZD applied. The Authority dismissed all claims against all three directors, finding they lacked knowledge of the primary facts relevant to APP's payment failures and, in any event, could rely on the s 142ZD defence of having taken reasonable steps and relied on accountants' advice.

Applicant: Christo Joost (employee/former COO)
Respondents: Cataldo Miccio (First Respondent, director/acting CEO), Peter Win (Second Respondent, director), Bruce Whall (Third Respondent, director)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate
Respondent (First and Second): Scott McKenna and Brett Edwards, counsel
Respondent (Third): Self-represented

Christo Joost was employed by Aether Pacific Pharmaceuticals Limited (APP) from 4 November 2022, initially as Process and Operations Manager and then as COO from early 2024. Cataldo Miccio and Peter Win were non-executive directors appointed in December 2018; Miccio also became acting CEO in a limited capacity during 2024. Bruce Whall was appointed as a non-executive director in June 2024. APP, a startup in the medicinal cannabis sector, experienced serious funding difficulties in mid-to-late 2024, entered voluntary administration on 20 November 2024, and went into liquidation on 4 February 2025. Mr Joost's employment was terminated on 23 October 2024, and he alleged that APP failed to pay his final two salary payments (net $4,732.55 and $1,051.35) and his accrued but untaken holiday entitlements (approximately $12,944.14 gross). After the liquidators refused consent to continue against APP, Mr Joost pursued the three directors personally as persons involved in the employment standard breaches. The directors disputed liability, with Mr Miccio contending he believed payment had been made based on payslips, and all three pointing to reliance on accountants' advice about APP's financial position.

1. Preliminary issue — whether Mr Joost could proceed against the individual directors without liquidator consent to proceed against APP — Status: Established (paras [12]-[13]).

The Authority resolved this point by reference to Lawton v Steel Pencil Holdings Ltd (in liquidation) [2021] NZEmpC 199, in which the Employment Court held that a claim under s 142W could proceed against an individual director even where the company was in liquidation and liquidators had not consented to the claim against the company. Counsel for Mr Miccio and Mr Win accepted this point and the investigation proceeded.

2. Whether APP breached employment standards by failing to pay Mr Joost his final two salary payments — Status: Established (paras [22]-[30]).

The Authority found that non-payment of wages or salary constitutes a breach of employment standards under the Wages Protection Act 1983 and the Employment Relations Act 2000. Mr Joost gave credible oral evidence that he did not receive the two payments despite payslips showing payment had been made; the Authority preferred his evidence, noting he had made appropriate concessions about payments he did receive, and that it was improbable he would pursue a false claim given the cost implications. The Authority found APP did not pay Mr Joost $4,732.55 in salary and $1,051.35 for the final pay period.

3. Whether APP breached employment standards by failing to pay accrued but untaken holiday entitlements — Status: Partially established (paras [29]-[30]).

The Authority accepted that Mr Joost had not received any payment for accrued holiday entitlements at the end of employment, but found the precise amount could not be established on the evidence. Mr Miccio gave evidence that APP had undertaken a reconciliation of unrecorded leave taken by Mr Joost, which may have reduced or eliminated the accrued balance, and the Authority could not determine the correct amount owing.

4. Whether Mr Miccio, Mr Win, and Mr Whall were officers of APP for the purposes of s 142W of the Act — Status: Established (para [31]).

All three respondents were directors of APP at the time of the breaches. Under s 142W(3)(a), a person occupying the position of director of a company is treated as an officer for the purposes of the provision. This element was not in dispute.

5. Whether Mr Win and Mr Whall had knowledge of the primary facts relevant to APP's failure to pay Mr Joost — Status: Dismissed (para [32]).

Drawing on A Labour Inspector v Southern Taxis Limited and Others [2021] NZCA 705, the Authority held that a director must know the primary facts relevant to the breach. Mr Win and Mr Whall were non-executive directors not involved in APP's day-to-day operations; they did not know what individual employees were to be paid or whether payments were being made. Awareness of APP's general financial position and reliance on accountants' advice was insufficient to establish knowledge of the specific payment failures.

6. Whether Mr Miccio had knowledge of the primary facts relevant to APP's failure to pay Mr Joost — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[35]).

Although Mr Miccio was acting CEO and authorised salary payments, the Authority found he did not know the payments had not actually been made. He relied on payslips showing payment had been processed and on accountants' advice that APP had sufficient funds to meet its obligations. He did not know the details of the holiday entitlement reconciliation and was not privy to or involved in approving it. The Authority concluded he lacked knowledge of the primary facts.

7. Whether Mr Miccio, Mr Win, and Mr Whall could rely on the s 142ZD defence (reasonable reliance on third-party advice or taking all reasonable steps to ensure compliance) — Status: Established (paras [36]-[37]).

The Authority found, as an alternative and conditional conclusion, that all three directors received advice from accountants regarding APP's funding, cashflow, and outgoings during the period of financial difficulty. This constituted reasonable reliance on third-party information within the meaning of s 142ZD of the Act, as interpreted in Southern Taxis. Accordingly, even if the knowledge element had been satisfied, the s 142ZD defence would have been available to all three respondents.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [39]-[41]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. If agreement is not reached, the respondents may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Joost having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff basis unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in full; all three respondents (Mr Miccio, Mr Win, and Mr Whall) were found not liable for APP's breaches of employment standards.

None ordered. The employment relationship problem was resolved in favour of all three respondents. Costs are reserved, with a process prescribed for future determination if the parties cannot agree.

Mandeep Singh, a delivery driver employed by PR Kahlon Limited, brought claims arising from his dismissal in June 2024 and a range of wage-related complaints. The key legal questions were whether his dismissal and suspension were unjustified, whether he was underpaid during employment, and whether various penalties were warranted. The Authority found the dismissal and one period of suspension unjustified but rejected all wage underpayment and penalty claims, awarding compensatory remedies reduced by 25% for contribution.

Applicant: Mandeep Singh (employee, delivery driver)
Respondent: PR Kahlon Limited (first respondent, employer) and Satpal Singh (second respondent, director/owner-operator)

Applicant: John Wood, advocate
Respondent: Nikkii Flint, counsel

Mandeep Singh was employed as a Class 1 delivery driver by PR Kahlon Limited from 4 September 2023 (the employer's position) or 21 July 2023 (the applicant's position), based in Palmerston North, working for Mainfreight. From October 2023, Kahlon raised persistent performance concerns including incomplete deliveries, failure to scan freight, unsafe driving, and vehicle damage, resulting in a PIP and written warnings. In May–June 2024, further concerns were raised and a formal meeting was held on 10 June 2024; Mr Singh was dismissed by letter on 18 June 2024. Mr Singh claimed he was paid a flat 30 hours per week regardless of hours actually worked, that unlawful deductions were made from his wages, that he worked an unpaid training period before 4 September 2023, and that he was suspended without pay and without consultation. Kahlon and Satpal Singh denied all claims, maintaining pay was based on timesheets completed by Mr Singh himself, that deductions related to an agreed training fee, and that dismissal followed prolonged documented poor performance. Mr Singh also raised claims for holiday pay, penalties under the Wages Protection Act 1983, and sought personal liability orders against Satpal Singh as a person involved in minimum standard breaches.

1. Whether Mr Singh was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [54]-[65]).

The Authority applied the s 103A Employment Relations Act 2000 test of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances, considering adequacy of investigation, whether concerns were raised, whether a reasonable opportunity to respond was given, and genuine consideration of explanations. The Authority found sufficient investigation and that concerns were communicated, but concluded Kahlon failed to give Mr Singh a genuine and clear opportunity to respond, partly because it continued to communicate performance matters primarily in English despite being fully aware of his limited English proficiency and their shared Punjabi fluency, and partly because the invitation to provide further comment after the 10 June meeting was not clearly communicated. The dismissal was accordingly found unjustified on process grounds, though performance concerns themselves were substantiated.

2. Whether Mr Singh suffered an unjustified disadvantage by being suspended without pay (first period, 26 May–10 June 2024) — Status: Dismissed (paras [67]).

The Authority found that during this period Mr Singh was on ACC-related sick leave and that the claim for unpaid sick leave or unpaid suspension was not made out on the documents before it.

3. Whether Mr Singh suffered an unjustified disadvantage by being suspended without consultation (second period, 11–18 June 2024) — Status: Established (paras [68]-[73]).

The Authority assessed whether the suspension complied with the employment agreement's requirement that suspension be on full pay and follow consultation. The email from Satpal Singh on 12 June directing Mr Singh to stay away from work contained no consultation, no opportunity for feedback, and no indication the situation could be reconsidered, despite Mr Singh's advocate having confirmed he was fit to return. The suspension was unjustified for lack of consultation, and the final payslip confirmed no ordinary pay was recorded for that final week, supporting the wage claim for that period.

4. Whether Mr Singh was entitled to unpaid wages for an alleged training period from 21 July to 3 September 2023 — Status: Dismissed (paras [9]-[15]).

The Authority applied the principle that wages are owed for work performed at the employer's request or direction. Mr Singh conceded the arrangement to accompany another driver was his own initiative, not authorised or requested by Kahlon, and there was no evidence it benefited Kahlon's business. Pay records and work chat records confirmed the employment started on 4 September 2023. The claim was not made out.

5. Whether Mr Singh was systemically underpaid for hours worked beyond a flat 30-hour weekly rate — Status: Dismissed (paras [16]-[32]).

The Authority examined the employment agreement (which provided for an hourly rate, not a 30-hour flat rate), payslips (showing hours ranging from 35.5 to 47 per week), and timesheets completed by Mr Singh himself. The foundational premise of the claim — a flat 30-hour weekly payment — was found to be simply incorrect. The Authority also found Mr Singh's reliance on vehicle logbooks to be contradictory, as he simultaneously claimed the logbooks were falsified and yet sought to rely on them as accurate records of his hours when favourable to him. Evidence from his co-worker was found to be hearsay and inconsistent with Mr Singh's own account. The claim was dismissed.

6. Whether unlawful deductions were made from Mr Singh's wages — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[35]).

The Authority found the deduction of $283.59 related to repayment of a Class 5 driver's licence course that Kahlon had paid up-front by agreement, with repayment to be made by Mr Singh. Mr Singh accepted this at the hearing. The claim was not made out.

7. Whether final holiday pay was owing — Status: Dismissed (paras [36]).

The Authority noted Kahlon had provided a final payslip showing holiday pay was paid. The remaining claim was premised on 8% holiday pay calculated on top of any unpaid wage arrears; as no wage arrears were found, no additional holiday pay was owing.

8. Whether remedies should be reduced for contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [78]-[80]).

The Authority found Mr Singh's own actions contributed to the situation giving rise to his dismissal. Documented performance failings, admitted driving incidents, being banned from customer sites, and persistent failure to improve in fundamental job requirements (safe driving, parcel scanning) over many months were all matters not attributable to language difficulties. A 25% reduction was applied to all compensatory remedies.

9. Whether penalties should be awarded under the Wages Protection Act 1983 for failure to pay wages and/or unlawful deductions — Status: Dismissed (paras [81]).

These claims depended on the wage underpayment and unlawful deduction findings, both of which were dismissed. Accordingly, no penalties were available.

10. Whether penalties should be awarded for breach of the employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (paras [81]).

The Authority found no breach of the employment agreement in relation to wages; remedies for the suspension matter had already been separately ordered. No further orders were made.

11. Whether penalties should be awarded for breach of good faith — Status: Dismissed (paras [82]).

The Authority noted the threshold for good faith penalties is high. The specific alleged breaches were either withdrawn, not made out, or had been remedied by other awards already made. The Authority found penalties either unavailable or inappropriate where other remedies had already been granted. No orders made.

12. Whether Satpal Singh was a person involved in a breach of minimum employment standards under s 142Y of the Act, and whether leave should be granted to recover holiday pay from him personally under s 142W — Status: Not reached (paras [83]).

The Authority did not reach this issue because no breaches of minimum standards were found (the wage underpayment and holiday pay claims having been dismissed). No orders were made.

13. Whether interest on wage arrears was payable — Status: Dismissed (paras [84]).

As no wage arrears were found, it followed that no interest was payable.

14. Whether Mr Singh was entitled to reimbursement of his filing fee — Status: Established (paras [85]).

The Authority found that, having achieved success in the matter, Mr Singh was entitled to reimbursement of his filing fee of $71.55.

15. Non-publication order in respect of Kahlon's commercial and financial information — Status: Established (paras [86]-[87]).

The Authority made a non-publication order in respect of business and financial information filed by the respondents, finding it to be commercial-in-confidence information. The applicant is directed not to publish, use, or share that information in any other forum or matter.

16. Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs of representation — Status: Reserved (paras [90]-[92]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, the applicant may lodge a memorandum within 28 days, with the respondent having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would assess costs on the standard daily tariff basis if required.

The claims of unjustified dismissal and unjustified suspension were upheld; all wage underpayment, holiday pay, unlawful deduction, and penalty claims were dismissed; remedies were reduced by 25% for contribution.

- Wages lost due to unpaid suspension (11–18 June 2024), after 25% contribution reduction: $934.29 gross
- Lost remuneration (equivalent to 3 months' ordinary time remuneration under s 128 of the Act), after 25% contribution reduction: $10,121.48 gross
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) (comprising $17,000 for unjustified dismissal and $1,000 for unjustified suspension, totalling $18,000 before reduction), after 25% contribution reduction: $13,500
- Reimbursement of filing fee: $71.55
- All payments to be made within 28 days of the determination date.
- Costs: Reserved (parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; applicant may lodge memorandum within 28 days if unresolved).
- Reinstatement: Not ordered.
- No penalties ordered.
- No interest ordered.

[COSTS ONLY]

This determination concerns a costs order following an earlier substantive determination in which Debbie Watkins's employment claims against Tautoko Mai Sexual Harm Support Services Trust were dismissed. The parties reached agreement on costs between themselves, and those agreed terms are now formalised as orders of the Authority by consent. The sole outcome is a costs payment by the applicant to the respondent.

Applicant: Debbie Watkins (employee)
Respondent: Tautoko Mai Sexual Harm Support Services Trust (employer)

Applicant: Mark Beech, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Stephen Corlett, counsel for the Respondent

Debbie Watkins brought employment claims against Tautoko Mai Sexual Harm Support Services Trust. On 9 June 2026, the Authority issued a substantive determination dismissing all of Ms Watkins's claims. In that earlier determination, the Authority encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves and noted its usual practice of applying the daily tariff. The parties subsequently conferred and agreed on a costs figure. At their joint request, those agreed terms are now formalised as Authority orders by consent. No further details of the underlying claims or their merits are addressed in this determination.

1. Whether costs should be ordered following dismissal of the applicant's claims, and in what amount — Status: Established (paras [1]-[4]).

The Authority had previously invited the parties to resolve costs themselves, referencing the daily tariff as its usual approach. The parties agreed on a costs figure equivalent to the Authority's daily tariff for a hearing of one-and-a-quarter days. That agreed figure of $5,373 is adopted and formalised as an order of the Authority by consent, with provision for any outstanding issues regarding method or timing of payment to be remitted to the Authority if needed.

The determination was resolved by consent, with the applicant ordered to pay costs of $5,373 to the respondent.

Costs: $5,373 payable by Ms Watkins to Tautoko Mai Sexual Harm Support Services Trust (equivalent to the Authority's daily tariff for a one-and-a-quarter day hearing), agreed by the parties and formalised as an Authority order by consent. Any outstanding issues regarding method or timing of payment may be remitted to the Authority as needed.

[COSTS ONLY]

John Huntley-Byrne (employee) successfully claimed unjustifiable dismissal against Dallison 2021 Limited (employer) in an earlier substantive determination. This costs-only determination resolves a dispute over the quantum of costs following the parties' failure to agree. The Authority applied the standard daily tariff and ordered the respondent to pay $4,500 plus the filing fee of $71.55, rejecting all grounds advanced for a reduction.

Applicant: John Huntley-Byrne (employee)
Respondent: Dallison 2021 Limited (employer)

Applicant: Dave Cain, advocate
Respondent: Kylie James

In a substantive determination dated 5 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 354), the Authority found that Huntley-Byrne had been unjustifiably dismissed by Dallison 2021 Limited, and a 10% reduction in remedies was applied for the applicant's contributory conduct. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves but were unable to do so, resulting in the applicant filing costs submissions. The investigation meeting occupied most of a full day; leave was given for two further witnesses for the respondent to appear via AVL, but this did not eventuate. The applicant's representative sought the full one-day daily tariff of $4,500 plus the $71.55 filing fee, with no uplift. The respondent sought a reduction to $2,500, arguing the applicant's contributory conduct, the mixed outcome, a pending challenge to the substantive determination, the respondent's financial circumstances, and alleged unsupported allegations in the applicant's memorandum justified a lower award.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to the applicant as the successful party — Status: Established (paras [8]-[13]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, guided by the Authority's Practice Direction and principles set out in JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175. The general principle is that costs follow the event, with the daily tariff as the starting point, subject to adjustment for relevant factors. As the applicant was the substantively successful party, the Authority confirmed he was entitled to a contribution toward costs.

2. Whether the applicant's contributory conduct (10% reduction applied in the substantive determination) justified a reduction in the costs award — Status: Dismissed (paras [10]).

The Authority held that contributory conduct had already been addressed in the substantive determination through the 10% reduction in remedies, as required. Additionally, costs are not to be used as an expression of disapproval of a party's conduct, and therefore the same conduct could not also reduce the costs award.

3. Whether the "mixed outcome" of the substantive proceedings justified a reduction in costs — Status: Dismissed (para [14]).

The Authority found that although the respondent characterised the outcome as mixed, the applicant was overall the successful party. A degree of mixed success does not negate the general rule that costs follow the event when the applicant has succeeded overall.

4. Whether a pending challenge to the substantive determination justified a reduction in costs — Status: Dismissed (para [11]-[12]).

The Authority held that any challenge to the substantive determination is irrelevant to a costs award. A costs award is concerned only with the time and conduct of the investigation meeting, not with subsequent proceedings.

5. Whether the respondent's financial circumstances justified a reduction in costs — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[16]).

The Authority noted that its published practice requires affidavit evidence of considerable hardship to support a reduction on financial grounds. No such affidavit evidence was provided by the respondent, so this ground was rejected.

6. Whether unsupported allegations in the applicant's memorandum justified a reduction or adjustment — Status: Dismissed (para [6]).

The respondent pointed to allegedly unsupported allegations in paragraph 10 of the applicant's costs memorandum. The Authority noted that the applicant's representative also referenced at times unreasonable conduct by the respondent, but this was not particularised; accordingly neither matter was taken into account in either direction.

7. Whether there was any basis to depart from the one-day daily tariff rate — Status: Dismissed (para [18]).

Having considered all grounds raised by the respondent, the Authority found no reason to depart from the standard one-day daily tariff of $4,500. The tariff reflects the Authority's focus on access to justice and modest, predictable costs awards.

The applicant's costs claim was upheld in full; the respondent was ordered to pay the full daily tariff of $4,500 plus the $71.55 filing fee.

Costs: $4,500 (one-day daily tariff), payable within 28 days of the determination date (3 August 2026).
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55.
Total: $4,571.55 payable by Dallison 2021 Limited to John Huntley-Byrne.

Ashleigh Sanders, a former zookeeper at Hamilton Zoo (operated by Hamilton City Council), brought unjustifiable disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal grievances arising from her employment between 2017 and 2020. The key legal questions were whether HCC unjustifiably disadvantaged Ms Sanders (including through the conduct of a senior manager referred to as "T") and whether her December 2020 resignation constituted an unjustified constructive dismissal. The disadvantage grievance relating to T's conduct was established and $18,000 compensation awarded, but the constructive dismissal grievance was dismissed.

Applicant: Ashleigh Sanders (employee/former zookeeper)
Respondent: Hamilton City Council (employer, operator of Hamilton Zoo)

Applicant: Allan Halse, advocate
Respondent: Karina McLuskie, Tom Jarman and Jake Russ, counsel

Ms Sanders was employed as a zookeeper at Hamilton Zoo from November 2017 until her resignation on 1 December 2020, working part-time for most of that period before moving to full-time. During her employment she raised concerns about micromanagement, short-staffing, rostering issues, animal welfare, and the conduct of a senior operations manager/Zoo Director referred to as "T," who engaged in unsolicited personal contact, sought information about other staff, and allegedly withheld career opportunities from Ms Sanders when she resisted his intrusive behaviour. T left HCC in October 2019, after which Ms Jordan was appointed as acting Zoo Director and took various remedial steps; Dr Fleming was appointed as Zoo Director from September 2020. Ms Sanders suffered a panic attack at work in October 2019 and her mental health deteriorated during and after her employment, though personal factors (a relationship breakdown, flatting difficulties, family illness) also contributed. She resigned citing severely compromised mental health and later required intensive mental health intervention. Ms Sanders raised a personal grievance by letter dated 28 March 2021, and the matter proceeded to an investigation meeting in December 2023 following delays relating to access to representative files.

1. Non-publication order regarding Ms Sanders' mental health impacts — Status: Established (paras [4]-[10]).

The Authority applied clause 12(1) of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, starting from the presumption of open justice and weighing specific identified risks of harm against that principle, per MW v Spiga Limited [2024] NZEmpC 147. The risk of significant negative impact on Ms Sanders from exposure of her mental health history was found to meet the threshold. A permanent non-publication order was made covering mental health impacts on Ms Sanders during and after her employment.

2. Non-publication order regarding the AUT staff survey — Status: Established (paras [6]-[10]).

Applying the same open justice balancing test under clause 12(1) of Schedule 2, the Authority found that disclosure could undermine the confidentiality of participating staff and damage the Council's ability to conduct future surveys, justifying displacement of the open justice presumption. A permanent non-publication order was made covering the AUT staff survey.

3. Application for witness summons for Ms Thomson (re: access to case files) — Status: Dismissed (paras [13]-[14]).

The Authority received submissions from both parties on this procedural application but determined that it already held the documents necessary for its investigation. As no further documents were required, the application to issue a witness summons to Ms Thomson was declined.

4. Unjustifiable disadvantage grievance — failure to follow bullying investigation procedures and provide a safe working environment — Status: Established (paras [57]-[73]).

The Authority noted its power under s 122 of the Act to find a personal grievance of a type other than that alleged, and recharacterised this grievance around T's conduct rather than limiting itself to the precise framing advanced. The Authority found T's behaviour — including unsolicited personal contact outside work hours, pressuring Ms Sanders for information about colleagues, implying her career progression depended on her relationship with him, and retaliating by withholding opportunities when she resisted — was unacceptable and unjustifiably disadvantaged Ms Sanders. The Council was aware of difficulties during T's tenure but did not act until it had a firmer foundation; however, T's behaviour as the Zoo's most senior manager was itself the established unjustifiable disadvantage. The grievance was established.

5. Unjustifiable disadvantage grievance — failure to respond to grievances raised during employment — Status: Dismissed (paras [74]-[75]).

It was confirmed at the investigation meeting that this grievance related to events after Ms Sanders' employment ended, with her grievance formally raised by letter on 28 March 2021. The Authority noted that while employers are encouraged to respond to post-employment grievances, personal grievances must relate to events occurring during the employment relationship. This grievance was not made out.

6. Unjustified constructive dismissal — Status: Dismissed (paras [76]-[87]).

The Authority applied the three-category Woolworths test (Auckland, etc Shop Employees, etc IUOW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372, CA) and the two-part breach-of-duty test from Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland provincial District Local Authorities IUOW [1994] 1 ERNZ 168. Ms Sanders relied on the third category (serious breach of duty causing resignation). However, T had left the Zoo over 14 months before her resignation, and the Authority could not identify events in the year before resignation that caused her to resign. Post-T management provided support; the new Zoo Director found Ms Sanders performing reasonably well. There was no solid medical foundation connecting the pre-October 2019 events to her December 2020 departure. Additionally, her resignation was not sudden (she had sought references weeks beforehand), so a substantial risk of resignation was not reasonably foreseeable to HCC. The constructive dismissal grievance failed on both limbs.

7. Remedy — compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Established (paras [88]-[92]).

Because only a disadvantage grievance (not dismissal) was established, lost wages were not available. Under s 123(1)(c)(i), the Authority awarded $18,000 compensation, taking into account the isolation, intrusive questioning, injury to dignity and feelings, and the observable deterioration in Ms Sanders' presentation caused by T's conduct. The Authority found it necessary to isolate the impacts attributable to the established grievance from other personal and work factors.

8. Contributory conduct reduction (s 124) — Status: Dismissed (para [92]).

The Authority found that Ms Sanders did not contribute in a blameworthy and causative way to the situation giving rise to T's conduct. No deduction under s 124 was warranted.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [94]-[95]).

The parties are encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Ms Sanders may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; HCC then has 14 days to reply. An extension may be granted on request.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustifiable disadvantage grievance relating to T's conduct was established and compensation awarded; the failure-to-respond-to-grievances disadvantage grievance and the unjustified constructive dismissal grievance were both dismissed.

Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i) — humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings): $18,000, payable within 28 days of the date of the determination, without deduction.
Lost wages: None ordered (no dismissal established).
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves. If unresolved, memorandum process applies as set out in paras [94]–[95].

KCY (a beauty sales manager of Russian ethnicity) brought claims against her retail employer XSH for unjustified disadvantage (workplace bullying, procedurally unfair investigation, unlawful suspension, and unilateral transfer) and unjustified dismissal following her summary termination for alleged serious misconduct in May 2024. The key legal questions concerned whether XSH's responses to KCY's bullying complaints and its subsequent disciplinary process met the s 103A justification standard under the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority upheld several disadvantage claims and the dismissal claim, awarding compensation totalling $40,000 plus lost wages and annual leave reimbursement, with contribution reductions applied to two of the remedies.

Applicant: KCY (employee — beauty sales manager)
Respondent: XSH (employer — retail company)

Applicant: Mark Donovan, counsel
Respondent: Matthew McGoldrick, counsel

KCY, a Russian-born employee, worked for XSH from 7 October 2019 until her summary dismissal on 20 May 2024, most recently as a beauty sales manager. From November 2022 she raised concerns with the regional HR manager about alleged bullying and racial harassment by her store manager (who reportedly made comments about the Russia/Ukraine war in KCY's presence), but follow-up was inadequate until a formal complaint in September 2023 triggered an internal investigation. The investigation concluded with recommendations but no significant disciplinary action against the store manager; KCY was then transferred to another store in December 2023 without proper consultation. On 29 December 2023, while shopping at her former store, KCY collected two expired GWP (Gifts with Purchase) promotional items without management authorisation and gave a door-code to a restricted area to a beauty counter staff member — conduct that XSH treated as serious misconduct warranting summary dismissal. KCY alleged the disciplinary process was flawed because XSH failed to investigate whether there was a common practice of non-compliance with GWP guidelines and did not properly consider the deceptive actions of beauty counter staff who misled KCY about the availability of a promotional item.

1. Non-publication order — Status: Established (paras [1]–[4]).

The Authority applied the two-step Employment Court test from MW v Spiga [2024] NZEmpC 147: first, whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected from publication; second, whether those consequences are significant enough to displace open justice. The Authority was satisfied that KCY's history of depression, extended unemployment, and desire to return to work met both limbs. A permanent non-publication order was granted for KCY's name and identifying details including ethnicity references, store names, and witness identities; a consent order was also made for video footage and third-party receipts.

2. Unjustified disadvantage — failure to follow up on 2022 bullying complaint — Status: Established (paras [37]–[45]).

The test under s 103A of the Act required assessment of whether XSH's inaction was what a fair and reasonable employer could have done. The Authority preferred KCY's account of the November 2022 meeting (in the absence of a contemporaneous file note) and found XSH was put on notice of bullying allegations but failed to take adequate follow-up steps after the regional HR manager's unanswered December 2022 text. This failure allowed the bullying conduct to continue, culminating in a serious panic attack in September 2023. Compensation of $10,000 was awarded under s 123(1)(c)(i); no contribution reduction applied under s 124 as KCY had not contributed to this grievance.

3. Penalty under s 134(1) for breach of employment agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [46]).

The Authority considered both the statutory criteria in s 133A and relevant case law. It found the regional HR manager's failure to follow up was an oversight rather than deliberate conduct, and that the behaviour was not of the kind warranting a penalty. The application for a penalty was declined.

4. Unjustified disadvantage — procedural unfairness in investigation of bullying complaint — Status: Dismissed (paras [47]–[54]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test to XSH's investigation process. It found that despite not formally interviewing KCY, investigators had her written complaint and notes; that insufficient evidence of bias or partiality by internal investigators was demonstrated; that an undisclosed file note did not prejudice the investigation; that the regional HR manager's pre-investigation email to investigators was not shown to have influenced the outcome; and that some witnesses were spoken to before KCY's formal statement without demonstrated prejudice. No procedural unfairness was found and this claim was declined.

5. Unjustified disadvantage — unlawful suspension (30 November – 5 December 2023) — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]–[59]).

The Authority applied s 103A and preferred the regional HR manager's contemporaneous file note over KCY's account. The file note showed the absence from work was agreed leave, not an imposed suspension. The subsequent request for a medical certificate before return to work was also found to be what a fair and reasonable employer could have done given the preceding threatening text messages and panic attack.

6. Unjustified disadvantage — unlawful suspension (12–19 December 2023, paid special leave) — Status: Established (paras [60]–[63]).

The Authority found that while the store Regional Manager had legitimate concerns about the reference in KCY's medical certificate to a "toxic work environment," he was required to consult with KCY and offer her an opportunity to comment before placing her on further paid special leave. Failing to do so was procedurally unjustified under s 103A(3)(c). Compensation of $3,000 was awarded under s 123(1)(c)(i); no contribution reduction applied under s 124.

7. Unjustified disadvantage — unilateral transfer to another store — Status: Established (paras [64]–[70]).

The Authority found the transfer was implemented as a fait accompli with no prior consultation and with an implicit threat of unpaid leave if KCY refused, falling well short of the employer's obligation under s 103A(3)(c) to give the employee a reasonable opportunity to respond before taking action. Although the employment agreement permitted relocation, the manner of transfer was unjustified. Compensation was assessed at $10,000 (low-to-mid range) but reduced by 70% under s 124 because KCY's distressing text messages to the store manager were a significant contributing cause of the transfer, resulting in a net award of $3,000.

8. Unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [71]–[92]).

The Authority applied the two-step serious misconduct test (Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUOW v Northland Area Health Board [1991]; Emmanuel v Waikato District Health Board [2019]; Morris v Fire and Emergency New Zealand [2025]) and the s 103A justification test. It found that XSH's decision maker and HR Manager Operations failed to genuinely consider KCY's explanation: they dismissed as irrelevant her request for the beauty counter manager's transaction records that could have evidenced a common practice of GWP non-compliance — a potentially significant mitigating factor. The Authority also found that the dismissal decision letter was factually incorrect in stating KCY did not qualify for any GWP (she did qualify for one having spent over $20 on an Elizabeth Arden product). The provision of the door code was unusual but, viewed in context of the staff deception about the yellow bag's availability, was insufficient of itself to constitute serious misconduct. On balance, a fair and reasonable employer could not have summarily dismissed KCY on these facts.

9. Compensation for unjustified dismissal — quantum and contribution — Status: Established with partial contribution reduction (paras [93]–[94]).

The Authority assessed the effects of dismissal in the mid-to-high range of $30,000, noting KCY's clean disciplinary record, consistently positive reviews, status as a single mother, severe financial and mental health consequences, and the need to seek alternative housing. A 20% reduction was applied under s 124 because, while staff deception contributed to the situation, giving the passcode was a misconceived choice that partially contributed to the dismissal. Net award: $24,000.

10. Lost wages — quantum and contribution — Status: Established with reduction (para [95]).

The Authority applied s 128 of the Act and the principle from Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190 that the question is what mitigation could reasonably have been expected in the particular circumstances. KCY did not seek alternative employment until November 2024, six months after dismissal. The Authority declined to disentitle her entirely, adopting the default of three months' lost remuneration, reduced by 20% for contribution under s 124.

11. Reimbursement of annual leave — Status: Established (paras [96]–[97]).

The Authority found the payroll records were incorrect: for 28–29 November 2023 KCY was at work, not on annual leave; for 5–12 December 2023 she was on paid special leave, not annual leave. KCY was entitled to reimbursement of annual leave for those periods.

12. General damages for non-economic loss — Status: Dismissed (para [98]).

The Authority declined to award general damages, finding that the remedies already awarded under the Act would subsume any other non-economic losses KCY had suffered.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [101]–[103]).

Costs were reserved with the parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, the applicant may file a memorandum within 21 days of the determination, with the respondent having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would determine costs on the standard daily tariff basis if asked.

The claims were partially upheld: several unjustified disadvantage claims and the unjustified dismissal claim were established, while the claims for procedural unfairness in the investigation, the first suspension, the penalty, and general damages were dismissed.

- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage — bullying complaint failure): $10,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) (no contribution reduction)
- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage — unlawful paid special leave 12–19 December 2023): $3,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) (no contribution reduction)
- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage — unilateral transfer): $3,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) and s 124 (reduced from $10,000 by 70%)
- Compensation (unjustified dismissal): $24,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) and s 124 (reduced from $30,000 by 20%)
- Reimbursement of lost remuneration: Three months' lost wages less 20% under ss 128 and 124 (exact dollar amount not specified — subject to KCY's actual weekly wage)
- Reimbursement of annual leave: For periods of 28–29 November 2023 and 5–12 December 2023 (exact amount not specified)
- General damages: None ordered
- Penalty: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved
- All sums payable by Monday 31 August 2026

Selectlok New Zealand Limited (employer) applied for an interim injunction against its former Sales Area Manager, Colin Pearce, and his associated company Keyless Solutions Limited, alleging breaches of employment agreement obligations including fidelity, confidentiality, and non-solicitation, and seeking to restrain Keyless from trading pending resolution of substantive claims. The key legal questions were whether Selectlok had an arguable case on these claims, and whether the balance of convenience and overall justice supported interim injunctive relief. The Authority declined the interim injunction application in its entirety, finding that while there was an arguable case of a fidelity breach during employment, Selectlok failed to provide sufficient evidence of post-employment restraint breaches, and the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured maintaining the status quo.

Applicant: Selectlok New Zealand Limited (employer)
Respondent: Colin Pearce (first respondent, former employee) and Keyless Solutions Limited (second respondent, associated company)

Applicant: Collette Fenton, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Tony Sung and David Graham, counsel for the Respondents

Colin Pearce was employed by Selectlok New Zealand Limited from 2002, working as Sales Area Manager from 13 October 2003 until his retirement on 31 March 2026. His employment agreement (dated 1 July 2012) contained clauses on employee fidelity, confidential information, intellectual property, and non-solicitation, but notably did not include a post-employment non-competition or non-dealing restraint. In March 2023, while still employed, Mr Pearce incorporated Keyless Solutions Limited — registered in his name — which he described as his son Jonathan's business, set up in his name only to avoid affecting Jonathan's mortgage application. Selectlok discovered documents on Mr Pearce's former work computer in May 2026 suggesting Keyless had received approximately $111,047.27 from two of Selectlok's customers and further amounts from other potential clients, leading Selectlok to claim over $200,000 in diverted sales. Selectlok applied for an urgent interim injunction to restrain both respondents from operating Keyless; the respondents opposed, denied all substantive claims, and Mr Pearce voluntarily undertook to comply with his post-employment confidentiality and non-solicitation obligations. The matter was determined on the papers without an oral hearing, following a failed mediation.

1. Whether the post-employment restraints in clauses 18 (confidentiality) and 34.1 (non-solicitation) of Mr Pearce's employment agreement were reasonable and enforceable — Status: Established (paras [47]-[53]).

The Authority applied the principle from Gallagher Group Ltd v Walley that restraint of trade provisions are prima facie unenforceable unless reasonably necessary to protect proprietary interests, with the onus on the party asserting reasonableness. The Authority found Selectlok had a legitimate proprietary interest in protecting its client, customer, and supplier relationships for a limited post-employment period, and in preventing misuse of its confidential information. The six-month non-solicitation restraint was found reasonable for someone in Mr Pearce's senior role, and the indefinite confidentiality restraint was reasonable given the nature of his position. Accordingly, clauses 18 and 34.1 were held to be enforceable.

2. Whether there was an arguable case that Mr Pearce breached the Employee Fidelity clause (clause 5) during his employment — Status: Established (paras [54]-[66]).

The Authority assessed the plain wording of clause 5, which broadly prohibited employees from carrying out work of the "type" performed for Selectlok for others, and required disclosure of competing external activities. The Authority was satisfied that both Selectlok and Keyless operated in the broader lock supply industry, meaning it was arguable that Mr Pearce was carrying out the same "type" of work. Critically, Mr Pearce had not disclosed his directorship and shareholding of Keyless to Selectlok before it was incorporated, depriving Selectlok of the ability to assess whether a conflict existed as it was entitled to do under clause 5.2. However, the Authority confirmed this duty of fidelity ended when Mr Pearce's employment concluded on 31 March 2026.

3. Whether there was an arguable case that Mr Pearce breached the confidential information clause (clause 18) post-employment — Status: Dismissed (paras [67]-[79]).

Applying the three-category framework from Faccendia Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724, as adopted in New Zealand, the Authority held that a mere assertion of breach is insufficient — Selectlok was required to identify what specific confidential information Mr Pearce allegedly used or disclosed, why it was confidential, and how and when the breach occurred. Selectlok's five affidavits entirely failed to particularise any confidential information alleged to have been misused. The IT search of Mr Pearce's former work computer found no evidence of removal of confidential material. The Authority concluded Selectlok had not established an arguable case of breach of clause 18.

4. Whether there was an arguable case that Mr Pearce breached the non-solicitation clause (clause 34.1) post-employment — Status: Dismissed (paras [80]-[92]).

The Authority applied Skids Programme Management Ltd v McNeill [2012] NZCA to confirm the non-solicitation clause cannot be stretched to cover potential or theoretical competition — it is limited to actual solicitation. The Authority found that Selectlok failed to identify any specific solicitation by Mr Pearce, any specific customer, supplier, or employee solicited, or the time or manner of any alleged solicitation. Keyless operated via a passive website and referrals from Jonathan Pearce's contacts, not active marketing. The Authority also found the products and markets of Selectlok (commercial/industrial hardware) and Keyless (residential smart locks) were materially different, so there was no overlap in customers or suppliers that could attract the clause. Selectlok failed to establish an arguable case of non-solicitation breach.

5. Whether there was an arguable case that Keyless aided and abetted Mr Pearce in breaching clause 5 (fidelity) during employment — Status: Partially established (paras [93]).

The Authority found that Selectlok's claim that Keyless aided and abetted the pre-employment-ending breach of clause 5 was not frivolous or vexatious, and therefore cleared the low arguable-case threshold. However, the fidelity obligation did not survive the end of Mr Pearce's employment on 31 March 2026, limiting the scope of any potential claim against Keyless based on this ground.

6. Whether there was an arguable case that Keyless aided and abetted Mr Pearce's breaches of his post-employment restraints (clauses 18 and 34.1) — Status: Dismissed (paras [94]-[95]).

Because Selectlok failed to establish an arguable case that Mr Pearce himself had breached his post-employment confidentiality or non-solicitation obligations, it correspondingly could not establish that Keyless had aided and abetted such breaches. The same evidentiary deficiencies that defeated the direct claims against Mr Pearce also defeated the derivative claims against Keyless.

7. Where does the balance of convenience lie regarding the interim injunction application — Status: Resolved against the applicant (paras [99]-[114]).

The Authority applied the balance of convenience test, finding multiple factors weighed against granting the injunction: Mr Pearce had voluntarily undertaken to comply with his post-employment obligations; the IT search revealed no removal of confidential information; Mr Pearce was retired with no income from Keyless; Selectlok had not identified any specific confidential information at risk; any remaining confidential information held in Mr Pearce's memory would likely be outdated four months after retirement; the non-solicitation restraint was due to expire on 30 September 2026 (before the substantive hearing could occur); and Selectlok had not demonstrated it sold any of the same products as Keyless. The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

8. Where does the overall justice of the situation lie — Status: Resolved against the applicant (paras [115]-[128]).

The Authority conducted an objective balancing of parties' and third parties' rights and interests. It found that Keyless was effectively Jonathan Pearce's business, operated actively by Jonathan and his wife Erin Thompson; granting the injunction would harm these third parties who had no contractual obligations to Selectlok and who were selling different products to different markets. Granting the injunction would be anti-competitive in circumstances where Selectlok had chosen not to include a post-employment non-competition clause in Mr Pearce's agreement. The Authority found the overall justice strongly favoured maintaining the status quo.

9. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to order the respondents to provide the undertakings sought by Selectlok — Status: Dismissed (para [129]).

The Authority determined it had no jurisdiction to compel the respondents to give the undertakings Selectlok sought. Mr Pearce had voluntarily provided undertakings to comply with his post-employment restraints, which the Authority noted he could be held to.

10. Whether an interim injunction restraining operation of Keyless should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [131]-[132]).

Having found only a limited arguable case (fidelity breach during employment), no post-employment arguable case, an unfavourable balance of convenience, and overall justice favouring the status quo, the Authority declined the interim injunction. Damages were noted as likely to be an adequate remedy if Selectlok established its claims at a substantive hearing.

11. Costs — Status: Conditional/Reserved (paras [133]-[136]).

The respondents, as the successful parties, were held to be entitled to a contribution towards their actual legal costs. The matter was assessed as equivalent to a half-day investigation meeting, giving a notional starting tariff of $2,250. The parties were encouraged to agree costs; if not, the respondents had 28 days to lodge a costs application and Selectlok 14 days to respond.

The interim injunction application was dismissed in its entirety; the respondents successfully defended the application.

None ordered at this stage. Costs: The notional starting point is $2,250 (half-day tariff), but the quantum is reserved pending agreement between the parties or a formal costs application process. No reinstatement sought or ordered (not applicable — this is an employer-applicant injunction proceeding). No damages, penalties, or other remedies ordered at this preliminary stage; substantive claims remain to be determined at a future investigation meeting.

Suraj Goswami, a car groomer and detailer employed by Moto Kare Limited (MKL), brought claims for wage arrears, public holiday pay, and annual holiday pay after MKL was placed into liquidation. The key legal questions concerned whether MKL breached its employment obligations and various statutory provisions, and whether the company's director Mansha Chopra and her husband Jagmeet Singh could be held personally liable for those breaches. The Authority found substantially in Mr Goswami's favour, ordering Mr Singh personally to pay wage arrears, holiday entitlements, and a penalty totalling $55,392.43.

Applicant: Suraj Goswami (employee)
Respondent 1: Moto Kare Limited (in liquidation) (employer)
Respondent 2: Mansha Chopra (director of MKL)
Respondent 3: Jagmeet Singh (husband of Ms Chopra, managed MKL operations and payroll)

Applicant: Susanne Lass, advocate
Respondents: No appearance

Mr Goswami commenced employment with MKL on 14 June 2023 as a car groomer and detailer under an individual employment agreement guaranteeing 40 hours per week at $29.70 per hour — conditions also required by his work visa. MKL was placed into court liquidation on 26 March 2026, with unsecured creditor debt of approximately $950,582. Mr Goswami alleged MKL consistently paid him less than the contracted rate (sometimes only $23 per hour), failed to provide 40 hours of work per week, and failed to pay wages on time or in full. He supported his claims with contemporaneous phone notes, bank statements, and WhatsApp messages (including exchanges with Mr Singh) demonstrating underpayment and delayed payment. The respondents filed a statement in reply but did not attend the case management conference or the investigation meeting. Mr Goswami sought wage arrears, public holiday pay, and annual holiday pay against MKL, personal liability orders against Ms Chopra and Mr Singh under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act), and penalties against both individuals for aiding and abetting breaches of his employment agreement and employment standards.

1. Whether MKL owed Mr Goswami wage arrears — Status: Established (paras [18]-[31]).

The Authority applied s 132(2) of the Act, which permits reliance on the employee's own evidence where the employer has failed to produce wages and time records. MKL never supplied its wages and time records, prejudicing Mr Goswami's ability to bring an accurate claim under s 131. Relying on Mr Goswami's phone notes, bank statements, and WhatsApp messages (including references to payments at $23 rather than the contracted $29.70), the Authority accepted all of Mr Goswami's evidence as proved. Wage arrears of $39,440.69 were established.

2. Whether MKL breached s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA) — Status: Established (paras [32]-[34]).

Section 4 of the WPA requires wages to be paid when they become payable. The Authority found that MKL frequently failed to pay wages on time and paid less than the contractual rate. This breach also constituted a breach of an employment standard within the meaning of s 5 of the Act.

3. Whether MKL breached the individual employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [35]).

The employment agreement required 40 hours of work per week (clause 7.2) and payment at $29.70 per hour (clause 8.1). Based on the accepted evidence, MKL breached both provisions by frequently failing to offer the guaranteed hours and paying at a lower rate.

4. Whether Ms Chopra aided and/or abetted breaches of the individual employment agreement, and whether a penalty should be issued against her — Status: Dismissed (paras [36]-[39]).

Under s 134(2) of the Act, a penalty may be imposed on an individual who aids or abets a breach of an employment agreement. Although Ms Chopra was MKL's director, the evidence established she had minimal involvement — Mr Goswami met her on only two or three occasions. There was insufficient evidence to establish she instigated, aided, or abetted the breaches. No penalty was imposed on Ms Chopra.

5. Whether Mr Singh aided and/or abetted breaches of the individual employment agreement, and whether a penalty should be issued against him — Status: Established (paras [36]-[50]).

The Authority was satisfied that Mr Singh directed Mr Goswami's work, managed the business, and managed payroll. WhatsApp messages confirmed Mr Singh's direct involvement in pay arrangements. Applying the penalty analysis framework from Borsboom v Preet PVT Ltd [2016] NZEmpC and the statutory factors in s 133A of the Act, the Authority set a provisional starting point of 10% of the $10,000 maximum per breach, found no mitigating factors, and referenced a comparable determination (Jiao v Construct Ltd [2024] NZERA 530). A penalty of $1,500 per breach (two breaches) was ordered, totalling $3,000 payable to Mr Goswami within 28 days.

6. Whether MKL breached s 82(2) of the Holidays Act 2003 (HA03) by not providing access to the holiday and leave record — Status: Established (paras [51], [53]-[54]).

Section 82(2) of the HA03 requires employers to provide employees access to their holiday and leave records. MKL failed to provide this access, preventing Mr Goswami from bringing an accurate claim. This breach was also found to constitute a breach of an employment standard under s 5 of the Act.

7. Whether MKL breached s 130 of the Act by not providing wages and time records upon request — Status: Established (paras [21]-[22], [53]-[54]).

MKL failed to supply its wages and time records to the Authority or to Mr Goswami, as required by s 130. This failure prejudiced Mr Goswami's ability to bring an accurate claim and was treated as a breach of an employment standard.

8. Whether MKL breached s 27(2) and/or s 55 of the HA03 in respect of annual holiday pay and public holiday payments — Status: Established (paras [51]-[52]).

After accepting Mr Goswami's evidence (given MKL's failure to provide holiday and leave records), the Authority found that MKL owed $7,717 in unpaid annual holiday pay and $5,234.63 in public holiday payments. These failures also constituted breaches of employment standards.

9. Whether MKL breached employment standards — Status: Established (paras [53]-[54]).

The Authority found MKL breached the following employment standards as defined in s 5 of the Act: s 4 of the WPA; minimum entitlement provisions of the HA03 (annual holiday and public holiday pay); and the requirements of ss 81 and 82 of the HA03 (holiday and leave record obligations).

10. Whether Ms Chopra was a person involved in breaches of employment standards under s 142W of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]-[59]).

Section 142W requires that to be a "person involved in a breach," the individual must have aided, abetted, counselled, or procured the breach, with knowledge of the essential facts establishing the contravention (citing A Labour Inspector v Southern Taxis Limited [2021] NZCA 705). The Authority found insufficient evidence to establish Ms Chopra's knowledge or involvement in the employment standard breaches.

11. Whether Mr Singh was a person involved in breaches of employment standards under s 142W of the Act — Status: Established (paras [55]-[59]).

Applying the knowledge test from Southern Taxis, the Authority found Mr Singh managed payroll, directed Mr Goswami's work, and knew Mr Goswami was not being paid at the contractual rate. WhatsApp messages corroborated his awareness of underpayments and late payments. Mr Singh was found to be a person involved in all employment standard breaches.

12. Whether leave should be granted to recover arrears from Ms Chopra personally under s 142Y(2) of the Act — Status: Dismissed (not explicitly stated but follows from the dismissal of issues 4 and 10).

Given that the Authority found Ms Chopra was neither a person who aided or abetted breaches of the employment agreement nor a person involved in employment standard breaches, no leave was granted to recover any sums from Ms Chopra.

13. Whether leave should be granted to recover arrears from Mr Singh personally under s 142Y(2) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [60]-[62]).

The Authority found MKL unable to pay the sums owed, given its liquidation and the $950,582 owed to unsecured creditors. Leave was granted to Mr Goswami to recover all wage arrears and holiday entitlements directly from Mr Singh, pursuant to s 142Y(2) of the Act (applying Lawton v Steel Pencil Holdings Limited (in liquidation) [2021] NZEmpC 199).

14. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [64]-[66]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a memorandum process set out if agreement could not be reached. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was substantially upheld: all monetary claims were established against MKL and recoverable personally from Mr Singh; a penalty of $3,000 was ordered against Mr Singh; claims against Ms Chopra were dismissed in their entirety.

- Wage arrears: $39,440.69 (gross), payable by Mr Singh within 28 days
- Public holiday pay: $5,234.63 (gross), payable by Mr Singh within 28 days
- Annual holiday pay: $7,717.11 (gross), payable by Mr Singh within 28 days
- Penalty: $3,000 (two breaches of the employment agreement at $1,500 each), payable by Mr Singh to Mr Goswami within 28 days
- Total ordered against Mr Singh: $55,392.43
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to agree; memorandum process provided if required
- No remedy ordered against MKL (in liquidation) or Ms Chopra

QWS (an applicant whose identity is subject to a non-publication order) brought claims against the Director General of Health seeking a declaration of employee status, wage and holiday pay arrears, personal grievances, and penalties arising from the care they provided to their profoundly disabled child. The central legal question was whether the Authority had jurisdiction to hear the matter given the six-year limitation period under s 142 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority determined it had no jurisdiction because the application was filed outside the six-year limit and there is no discretion to extend that period.

Applicant: QWS (carer/applicant — identity subject to non-publication order)
Respondent: Director General of Health (government health authority)

Applicant: Jane Carrigan, advocate
Respondent: Bronwyn Heenan and Tim Bremner, counsel

QWS provided full-time care and disability support to their profoundly disabled child from birth. The child died on 16 May 2016, at which point QWS's day-to-day caring work ended. On 7 June 2022 — more than six years after the child's death — QWS filed an application in the Authority seeking a declaration of employment status, wage and holiday pay arrears, personal grievances (said to have been raised on multiple occasions over 19 years), and penalties for statutory breaches. QWS argued that the employment relationship was not reasonably discoverable until after 16 May 2016, because they did not and could not have known the relationship was capable of being one of employment until confirmed by the Supreme Court, and that their extraordinary personal, emotional, and physical circumstances were relevant. The respondent opposed jurisdiction on the basis that the application was filed outside the six-year limitation period and there is no power to extend it. The matter was investigated on the papers by consent and had previously been stayed pending resolution of related proceedings (Fleming v Attorney-General [2025] NZSC 188).

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to investigate and determine QWS's employment relationship problem, given the six-year limitation period in s 142 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [4]–[17]).

Section 142 of the Act bars any action relating to an employment relationship problem that is not a personal grievance more than six years after the cause of action arose. The Authority confirmed there is no express power to extend this limit and that the time extension discretions in ss 219 and 221(c) are not available in a s 142 consideration, citing Blue Water Hotel Ltd v VBS [2018] NZEmpC 128 and Maharaj v Wesley Wellington Mission Inc [2016] NZEmpC 129. The asserted employment relationship necessarily ended on 16 May 2016 when QWS's caring work ceased, and the application filed on 7 June 2022 was therefore outside the six-year window. The Authority concluded it has no jurisdiction to investigate or determine the matter.

2. Whether the cause of action was reasonably discoverable within the six years preceding the filing of the application — Status: Dismissed (paras [12]–[15]).

The Authority applied the reasonable discoverability test from Labour Inspector v Temple [2026] NZEmpC 109, under which the six-year clock starts when a claimant has actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts making up the claim. The Authority distinguished QWS's circumstances from those in Temple, where plaintiffs were indoctrinated within a community, unable to access legal advice, and prohibited from complaining to external authorities. On the evidence before it, QWS was aware of the material facts of the employment relationship during the relevant period — including seeking funding under the disability framework, understanding that employer-type control was being exercised through funding mechanisms, and having raised multiple personal grievances with the putative employer during the years of caregiving. The Authority found QWS's circumstances did not impair their ability to acquire knowledge of the material facts of their employment relationship problem.

3. Whether QWS's personal grievance claims are time-barred — Status: Dismissed (para [16]).

The Authority held that the personal grievance and penalty claims were also barred because they are dependent on the declaration of employment status. No separate analysis was conducted; the dismissal followed as a consequence of the finding on employment status jurisdiction.

4. Whether QWS's penalty claims for statutory breaches are time-barred — Status: Dismissed (para [16]).

As with the personal grievance claims, the penalty claims were dismissed on the same basis — they are dependent on the declaration of employment status, which the Authority has no jurisdiction to grant.

5. Non-publication order relating to QWS's identity — Status: Established (para [3]).

The interim non-publication order dated 23 June 2026 relating to the name and identity of the applicant was confirmed to remain in place under clause 10, schedule 2 of the Act. Leave was granted for the parties to apply for the order to be made permanent.

6. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [18]).

Costs were reserved and no decision was made on them at this stage.

The claim was dismissed in its entirety — the Authority determined it has no jurisdiction to investigate and determine QWS's employment relationship problem because the application is time-barred under s 142 of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

None ordered. Costs are reserved.

Hasmat Shaikh, a chef employed by Ikia Limited from January to October 2025, brought a claim for unpaid holiday pay and alternative holiday pay owed at the end of his employment. The key legal questions were whether arrears were owed and in what amount, which respondents were liable, and whether interest and filing fee reimbursement should be awarded. The Authority found in Shaikh's favour against Ikia Limited, ordering payment of $3,957.00 (gross) in arrears, plus interest and the filing fee, while dismissing claims against Pusvik Limited and deferring personal liability for Gupta pending any default by Ikia.

Applicant: Hasmat Shaikh (employee, chef)
Respondent: Ikia Limited (First Respondent, employer); Pusvik Limited (Second Respondent); Anurag Gupta (Third Respondent, sole director of Ikia Limited and Pusvik Limited)

Applicant: Mohammed Shahadat, counsel
Respondent: Anurag Gupta, in person and as director of the Second and Third Respondents

Hasmat Shaikh worked as a chef for Ikia Limited from 15 January 2025 to 19 October 2025, employed under an individual employment agreement (IEA) at $25 (gross) per hour for 30 hours per week. Upon the end of his employment, Shaikh was not paid termination holiday pay or alternative holiday pay for the seven public holidays he worked during his employment. Shaikh filed a statement of problem with the Authority on 16 May 2026, having sought payment of arrears since his employment ended. The respondents did not file statements in reply in the required form; however, Anurag Gupta acknowledged by email that holiday pay was owing, disputing only the quantum on the basis that the parties had agreed from around June 2025 to reduce Shaikh's hours by three per week due to business decline. Shaikh denied agreeing to a reduction; the evidence showed his actual pay did not decrease and that the employer had unilaterally used his holiday pay entitlement to top up his wages. The matter was determined on the papers following affidavit evidence and correspondence exchanged by the parties.

1. Whether Hasmat Shaikh was owed holiday pay arrears under the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [8]-[14]).

Under ss 23 and 27 of the Holidays Act 2003, employees are entitled to termination holiday pay calculated at 8% of total earnings. There was no dispute that Shaikh had not been paid termination holiday pay. The Authority calculated total earnings at $29,777 (being $29,250 from IRD records plus $525) and awarded 8% of that figure, amounting to $2,382.00 (gross). The respondents' argument that Shaikh's hours and pay had been reduced from June 2025 was rejected because the IEA required any variation to be in writing, the email relied on by Gupta recorded only a proposal rather than an agreed change, and Shaikh's actual pay did not in fact reduce.

2. Whether Hasmat Shaikh was owed alternative holiday pay for public holidays worked — Status: Established (paras [8]-[14]).

Under s 60 of the Holidays Act 2003, employees are entitled to alternative holidays and time-and-a-half pay for public holidays worked. The Authority was satisfied Shaikh worked seven public holidays and had not been paid the public holiday loading or alternative holidays. The employer's practice of applying accrued public holiday entitlements to top up weekly wages was found inconsistent with the IEA and the Holidays Act, which requires alternative holidays to be a whole working day off (s 57). Alternative holiday pay of $1,575.00 (gross) was awarded (comprising $525 in time-and-a-half loading plus 7 alternative holiday days at $150 per day).

3. Whether the variation of Shaikh's hours and pay was validly agreed — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[13]).

The IEA expressly required any variation to be in writing and agreed by both parties. Gupta relied on an email dated 8 June 2025, but the Authority found this email recorded only a proposal by the employer and did not evidence Shaikh's agreement to reduce his hours or pay. The absence of any subsequent written record of agreement, and the fact that Shaikh's pay did not actually reduce, led the Authority to find it was more likely than not that Shaikh did not agree to the reduction. The Authority also doubted the lawfulness of using alternative holiday entitlement to maintain agreed weekly pay.

4. Whether Pusvik Limited was jointly and severally liable for the arrears — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[16]).

Shaikh argued that because his IRD records showed Pusvik Limited had paid his wages between April and July 2025, Pusvik may have become his employer. The Authority rejected this, finding the employing entity remained Ikia Limited as identified in the IEA, which also paid the balance of wages. In the absence of clear evidence that Pusvik Limited acted as an employer, the claim against it was unestablished.

5. Whether Anurag Gupta was personally liable for the arrears under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Conditional (paras [17]-[19]).

Section 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 permits recovery of minimum entitlements (such as holiday pay) from a "person involved" where the employing company defaults. The Authority found Gupta — as sole director of Ikia Limited, signatory to the IEA, and directly involved in correspondence about Shaikh's pay — may well meet the requirements of a "person involved." However, as Ikia Limited continues to trade and remains on the companies register, default had not yet been established. Accordingly, Gupta's personal liability was held in reserve: if Ikia Limited fails to pay, Shaikh has leave to seek recovery from Gupta personally.

6. Whether interest should be awarded on unpaid arrears — Status: Established (paras [20]-[21]).

The Authority has power to award interest under the second schedule, clause 14 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority held it is appropriate to award interest where a person has been deprived of the use of money to which they are entitled. Ikia Limited was ordered to pay interest on the total arrears of $3,957.00 (gross) calculated from 20 October 2025 (the day after employment ended) until the date of full payment, using the civil debt interest calculator.

7. Whether Shaikh was entitled to reimbursement of the Authority filing fee — Status: Established (para [23]).

The Authority found the filing fee of $71.55 was an amount Shaikh could reasonably recover from Ikia Limited and ordered payment within 14 days.

8. Whether a penalty should be imposed for failure to provide wage, time, and leave records under s 130(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Not reached (para [8]).

The Authority noted that Ikia Limited did not appear to have provided wage, time, and leave records on request as required by law, but recorded that no penalty was sought by Shaikh. Accordingly, no penalty was considered or imposed.

The claim was substantially upheld against Ikia Limited; the claim against Pusvik Limited was dismissed; personal liability of Gupta was reserved pending any default by Ikia Limited.

- Holiday pay arrears: $2,382.00 (gross) payable by Ikia Limited within 14 days.
- Alternative holiday pay: $1,575.00 (gross) payable by Ikia Limited within 14 days.
- Total arrears: $3,957.00 (gross) payable by Ikia Limited within 14 days.
- Interest: On the total arrears of $3,957.00 (gross) from 20 October 2025 until date of payment in full, calculated using the civil debt interest calculator, payable within 14 days.
- Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55 payable by Ikia Limited within 14 days.
- Reinstatement: Not ordered/not sought.
- Personal liability of Gupta: Conditional — Shaikh has leave to seek recovery from Gupta personally if Ikia Limited defaults on the ordered payments.
- Claim against Pusvik Limited: Dismissed; no remedy ordered against second respondent.

Paul Adams, founder and CEO of EverEdge Global Limited, brought personal grievance claims after the company stopped paying his salary for three consecutive pay cycles while he was working from Amsterdam, ultimately forcing his resignation in May 2024. The key legal questions were whether the non-payment constituted a constructive dismissal, whether EverEdge breached its good faith and statutory wage payment obligations, and what remedies were appropriate. The Authority upheld both the constructive dismissal grievance and statutory breach claims, ordering significant compensation in lost remuneration, humiliation damages, salary arrears, and a good faith penalty, with no reduction for contribution.

Applicant: Paul Adams (employee/former CEO)
Respondent: EverEdge Global Limited (employer)

Applicant: Scott Worthy, counsel for Paul Adams
Respondent: Michael O'Brien, counsel for EverEdge Global Ltd

Paul Adams founded EverEdge Global Limited in 2013 and served as CEO under a 2014 individual employment agreement, with a 2024 updated agreement later signed by himself and co-director Tyler Capson. In September 2023, Adams' family trust and Capson sold shares to Singaporean company Meyzer360Holdings Pte Ltd (Meyzer), controlled by Way Siong (Max) Goh; the SPA required a new employment agreement keeping Adams as CEO until at least 31 March 2026. Adams relocated with his family to Amsterdam in early 2024, a move he asserts was known and accepted by Meyzer and Mr Goh from at least August 2023. After Meyzer took control of EverEdge in February 2024, the company stopped paying Adams' salary from 29 March 2024 without explanation, ignoring his repeated requests for payment over three fortnightly pay cycles. Adams resigned on 1 May 2024, citing fundamental breach of his employment contract, and filed constructive dismissal and disadvantage grievances; EverEdge filed a counterclaim alleging contractual and statutory duty breaches by Adams, but withdrew that counterclaim at the start of the investigation meeting. EverEdge argued Adams had resigned as director (not CEO), moved to Amsterdam without approval, failed to perform adequate work, was "contract staff," or had acted in bad faith by not disclosing the 2024 employment agreement to Meyzer — all of which the Authority rejected.

1. Whether EverEdge acted unjustifiably to Mr Adams' disadvantage by failing to pay his salary from 15 March 2024 until his resignation — Status: Established, but no separate remedy ordered (paras [69]).

The Authority found the failure to pay salary was clearly an unjustifiable action causing disadvantage to Adams. However, because the constructive dismissal grievance was established on the same factual basis, the Authority declined to award separate remedies for the disadvantage grievance to avoid double recovery.

2. Whether Mr Adams was constructively dismissed by EverEdge on the basis of a fundamental breach of duty (non-payment of salary) — Status: Established (paras [49]-[59], [66]-[68]).

The applicable test requires that (i) the resignation was caused by the employer's breach of duty, and (ii) the breach was sufficiently serious that it was reasonably foreseeable the employee would not continue working in those conditions (citing Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provisional District Local Authorities IUOW [1994]). The Authority found that EverEdge was contractually and statutorily obliged to pay Adams' salary, that cessation of payment across three pay cycles was deliberate, and that Adams' extensive communications put EverEdge on notice. The resignation was plainly caused by non-payment, and it was reasonably foreseeable that Adams would not continue unpaid. The constructive dismissal on this ground was established.

3. Whether Mr Adams was constructively dismissed on the alternative basis that EverEdge followed a course of conduct with the deliberate and dominant purpose of coercing him to resign — Status: Established (paras [60]-[66]).

The test applied was whether the employer acted, without reasonable and proper cause, in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence (citing Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] and Woods v WM Car Services [1981]). The Authority accepted Mr Capson's evidence that Mr Goh had instructed operations staff not to pay Adams' salary in order to pressure him into resigning, rather than following a formal employment process. Multiple inconsistent and late-raised explanations, supported by absence of contemporaneous documentation and evidence of similar conduct toward other employees, led the Authority to conclude this ground was also made out.

4. Whether the constructive dismissal was unjustifiable under s 103A of the Act — Status: Established (paras [67]-[68]).

The Authority applied the objective standard of whether a fair and reasonable employer could have taken the same actions. It concluded that no fair and reasonable employer could cease salary payments completely without raising and investigating concerns with the employee, and that deliberately coercing resignation through non-payment was plainly unjustifiable.

5. Whether EverEdge breached its duty of good faith under the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [100]-[105]).

The Authority found EverEdge breached its active and constructive communication obligations by failing to raise concerns about Adams' Amsterdam move, failing to respond to his repeated queries about non-payment, and failing to properly engage with any concerns about his work performance. These failures were serious, sustained, and intentional, striking at the heart of the employment relationship. A penalty of $7,500 was imposed (all payable to Adams) under s 133A of the Act, informed by Boorsboom v Preet PVT Ltd [2016] and Nicholson v Ford [2018].

6. Whether EverEdge breached s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 by failing to pay Adams' entire wages — Status: Established but no separate penalty ordered (paras [53], [98]-[99]).

Section 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 requires employers to pay the entire amount of wages without deduction when payable. The Authority found EverEdge was in breach, but declined to impose a separate penalty given that the non-payment was the core factual basis for the successful constructive dismissal grievance, and any penalty for agreement and statutory breach would have been considered globally as one.

7. Whether EverEdge breached its contractual obligation to pay Mr Adams — Status: Established but no separate penalty ordered (paras [53], [98]-[99]).

Both the 2014 and 2024 employment agreements obligated EverEdge to pay Adams' salary. The Authority found that obligation was clearly breached by three consecutive missed pay cycles. No separate penalty was imposed for the contractual breach, for the same reasons as the Wages Protection Act breach.

8. Whether EverEdge's argument that the 2024 employment agreement was invalid (because it was not disclosed to Meyzer/Mr Goh) should succeed — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[43], [87]-[93]).

The Authority found that at the time of signing (4 February 2024), Adams and Capson were the only EverEdge directors, so the EverEdge board was aware of and agreeable to the agreement. Meyzer had not yet taken control, and the content of the agreement had not been rejected. The Authority also found no causal link between non-disclosure of the 2024 agreement and the decision to stop paying Adams, since Meyzer/Mr Goh were unaware of the agreement when they made that decision.

9. Whether EverEdge's argument that Adams moved to Amsterdam without approval should succeed — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[43]).

The Authority accepted that Adams' relocation was known and effectively agreed to by Meyzer and Mr Goh from August 2023, supported by Mr Capson's evidence and Mr Goh's own communications. Even if there had been concern about the duration or terms, EverEdge should have raised this with Adams rather than simply stopping payment.

10. Whether EverEdge's argument that Adams failed to perform adequate work in Amsterdam should succeed — Status: Dismissed (paras [44]-[48]).

The argument was raised late at the investigation meeting. The Authority found sufficient evidence of Adams performing CEO duties — including Outlook calendar entries, over 1,000 work emails, and strategic planning documents — to satisfy itself that work was being undertaken. Any concerns about performance should have been raised with Adams at the time; they could not justify unilateral cessation of salary.

11. Whether Adams' actions constituted subsequently discovered misconduct under the Salt v Fell principle, justifying reduction or elimination of remedies — Status: Dismissed (paras [94]-[95]).

EverEdge relied on Salt v Fell [2008] NZCA 128 to argue that Adams' non-disclosure of the 2024 agreement was serious misconduct warranting a 100% remedy reduction. The Authority distinguished Salt v Fell, finding that the employer and its incoming controlling shareholder were aware of and agreeable to the Amsterdam relocation, and that signing the agreement was necessary for immigration purposes and had been put to Meyzer for approval without rejection. No serious misconduct was established.

12. Whether Mr Adams' contribution under s 124 of the Act should reduce his remedies — Status: Dismissed (paras [86]-[93]).

EverEdge argued 100% contribution reduction based on Adams' non-disclosure of the 2024 employment agreement and alleged bad faith. The Authority found Adams' actions in arranging the 2024 agreement were not blameworthy given the immigration necessity, the agreement's consistency with the proposed agreement already put to Meyzer, and Mr Capson's co-signing as the only other director. Critically, there was no causal connection between non-disclosure of the 2024 agreement and EverEdge's decision to stop paying Adams, since Meyzer/Mr Goh did not know of the agreement when they ceased payment. No contribution deduction was made.

13. Whether Mr Adams was entitled to salary arrears for the unpaid period from 16 March to 1 May 2024 — Status: Established (paras [96]-[97]).

The Authority found Adams was owed six weeks' unpaid salary (three fortnightly payments) plus employer KiwiSaver contributions. EverEdge was ordered to pay $40,625.01 gross salary and $1,218.75 gross in employer KiwiSaver contributions.

14. Whether Mr Adams was entitled to lost remuneration for three months after dismissal under s 128(2) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [72]).

Section 128(2) provides for three months' mandatory lost remuneration except in limited circumstances. The Authority calculated this at $81,250 gross plus 3% employer KiwiSaver contributions for the period 1 May to 1 August 2024, as part of the overall lost remuneration award.

15. Whether Mr Adams was entitled to extended lost remuneration beyond three months under s 128(3) of the Act — Status: Partially established (paras [73]-[77]).

Under s 128(3) the Authority has discretion to extend lost remuneration beyond three months, applying a broad-brush counterfactual approach with allowance for contingencies (citing Sam's Fukuyama Services Ltd v Zhang [2011] NZCA 608). The Authority accepted that Adams' foreign location, lack of local networks, and language barriers made job-seeking particularly difficult, justifying extension beyond three months. However, it declined to award through to March 2026 due to uncertainties about the EverEdge/Meyzer relationship and the challenges of a CEO based in Amsterdam. A reasonable period was assessed as 1 May to 1 November 2024 (six months total).

16. Whether Mr Adams was entitled to notice pay — Status: Dismissed (paras [70]).

The Authority noted that neither party gave the other a notice period, and that this was part of the constructive dismissal facts. No separate notice payment was awarded.

17. Whether Mr Adams was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings — Status: Established, at $30,000 (paras [78]-[85]).

The Authority found Adams suffered genuine hurt, humiliation, and distress from being forced out of the company he founded, the deliberate manner of non-payment, reputational damage (including NBR reporting), difficulties finding work, and the abrupt loss of staff relationships. Moderating factors included pre-existing tensions in the SPA relationship and his partner's income reducing financial pressure. A figure of $30,000 was awarded.

18. Whether penalties should be imposed for breach of the employment agreement and/or the Wages Protection Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [98]-[99]).

The Authority considered but declined to impose penalties for these breaches, finding that the non-payment was already the core basis of the successful constructive dismissal grievance and that a penalty was not warranted in the circumstances. It noted that, had one been awarded, the contractual and statutory breaches would have been treated globally as one.

19. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of the duty of good faith — Status: Established, at $7,500 (paras [100]-[105]).

The Authority imposed a penalty of $7,500 for EverEdge's sustained failure to communicate actively and constructively with Adams about his move, his non-payment, and any performance concerns. The penalty was assessed under s 133A of the Act, guided by Boorsboom v Preet PVT Ltd and Nicholson v Ford, reflecting the intentional and serious nature of EverEdge's conduct. The entire penalty was directed to Adams.

20. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [107]-[108]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve this between themselves. If unresolved, Adams may file a costs memorandum within 28 days, with EverEdge having 14 days to reply.

21. EverEdge's counterclaim for damages for alleged breaches of Mr Adams' contractual and statutory duties — Status: Not reached (paras [7]-[8]).

EverEdge's counterclaim was withdrawn at the start of the investigation meeting before any evidence was heard, so the Authority did not consider it further.

The claim was substantially upheld: constructive dismissal and unjustifiable dismissal established, disadvantage grievance established but no separate remedy ordered, statutory breach claims established with a good faith penalty, salary arrears awarded, and extended lost remuneration and humiliation compensation ordered; no contribution reduction applied.

- Salary arrears: $40,625.01 gross (16 March–1 May 2024) plus employer KiwiSaver contributions of $1,218.75 gross
- Lost remuneration (grievance): $182,812.55 gross (1 May–1 November 2024) plus employer KiwiSaver contributions of $5,484.38
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings: $30,000
- Good faith penalty: $7,500 (all payable to Mr Adams)
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Notice pay: Not ordered
- Penalties for Wages Protection Act and employment agreement breach: Not ordered
- Costs: Reserved (parties to attempt agreement; if not resolved, memoranda process specified)
- All payments due within 28 days of the determination date (29 July 2026)

VLN (an applicant seeking employee status) brought claims against Elizabeth Dotcom, Kim Dotcom, and Contractors Only Limited arising from a short engagement in early 2026. The key legal questions were whether the matter should be removed urgently to the Employment Court and whether VLN's identity should be protected by a non-publication order. The Authority granted both the interim non-publication order and the removal application, transferring the substantive proceedings to the Employment Court without investigation.

Applicant: VLN (worker/applicant, identity suppressed)
Respondent: Elizabeth Rose Dotcom (First Respondent), Kim Dotcom (Second Respondent), Contractors Only Limited (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Tyrone-Jay Barugh, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

VLN was engaged between late January/early February and late March 2026 by Contractors Only Limited, providing services at properties associated with Kim Dotcom and Elizabeth Dotcom. In April 2026, VLN lodged an application claiming to be an employee of the Dotcoms as a homeworker and/or on the basis of the real nature of the relationship, and sought personal grievances, unpaid wages, and minimum statutory entitlements. Alternatively, if Contractors Only Limited was the employer, VLN sought orders under Part 9A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 against Elizabeth Dotcom as a person involved in breaches of employment standards. None of the respondents filed a statement in reply or otherwise engaged with the Authority. On 22 July 2026, VLN applied urgently to remove the entire matter to the Employment Court, citing the risk that Kim Dotcom's imminent potential extradition would frustrate resolution of the claims. The investigation meeting was conducted on the papers, with urgency assigned by the Authority Member.

1. Whether an interim non-publication order should be made suppressing VLN's name and identifying particulars — Status: Established (paras [1]–[5]).

The Authority considered whether there were appropriate grounds to depart from the open justice principle. The Member accepted that intense media interest was likely given Kim Dotcom's high-profile extradition proceedings, that there was little public interest in VLN's identity specifically, and that publication would likely cause lasting harm to VLN's career and expose them to hostile online commentary that they were poorly placed to cope with. The order was made on an interim basis, pending further order.

2. Whether the removal application should be granted urgency — Status: Established (paras [10]–[14]).

The Member assigned urgency to the removal application upon it being placed before them, directed service on the respondents, and abridged the time for reply. The Authority was satisfied that service had been effected in accordance with those directions and that it was appropriate to decide the matter on the papers given the respondents' failure to engage.

3. Whether the matter should be removed to the Employment Court under s 178(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [15]–[19]).

The statutory test under s 178(2) requires that the case be of such a nature and urgency that it is in the public interest to be removed immediately to the Court. The Authority accepted VLN's submission that the risk of Kim Dotcom's extradition before the matter could be finally resolved would significantly disadvantage VLN, particularly given that minimum employment standards (for the period prior to 21 February 2026, before a recent amendment to s 6 took effect) remained at issue. The Authority found that there was little prospect of the claims being resolved quickly at Authority level, and that the situation fell within the framework described in Jackson v The Aorere College Board of Trustees [2012] NZEmpC 109 and Hendy v Vice-Chancellor of the University of Auckland [2021] NZERA 586. Removal of the entire file number 3459484 was ordered.

4. Effect of the recent amendment to s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and transitional provisions in Schedule 1AA on VLN's claims — Status: Not reached (para [17]).

The Authority noted that part of VLN's claim might be prevented by the recent amendment to s 6 and the transitional provisions, but did not resolve this issue, as it was relevant only as context for the removal decision and the substantive employment relationship question has not yet been investigated.

5. Whether VLN was an employee of Kim Dotcom and/or Elizabeth Dotcom (as a homeworker or by virtue of the real nature of the relationship under s 6(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000) — Status: Not reached (para [7], [9]).

The substantive employee/employer status question was not investigated or determined by the Authority, as the matter has been removed to the Employment Court before any investigation took place.

6. Personal grievances, unpaid wages, and minimum statutory entitlements if VLN is found to be an employee — Status: Not reached (para [7]).

These remedial claims depend on the prior determination of employee status and were not investigated or decided, having been removed to the Employment Court.

7. Whether Elizabeth Dotcom is liable as a person involved in breaches of employment standards under Part 9A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (in the alternative, if Contractors Only Limited is found to be VLN's employer) — Status: Not reached (para [7]).

This alternative claim was not investigated, having been transferred along with the whole matter to the Employment Court.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [21]).

Costs were reserved. VLN may apply by memorandum within 28 days; respondents have a further 14 days to reply. Costs will be determined on the papers.

The removal application was upheld in full, with the entire matter (file number 3459484) removed to the Employment Court; the interim non-publication order was also granted; all substantive claims remain unresolved and are now before the Employment Court.

None ordered at this stage. The substantive claims (employee status, personal grievances, unpaid wages, minimum entitlements, and Part 9A liability) have been transferred to the Employment Court for determination. Costs are reserved, to be determined on the papers following memoranda from the parties.

Ashkan Vakilipour Takaloo, a taxi driver, worked for Kaur Queens Trading Limited (trading as Mr Singh Taxis) under a written independent contractor agreement from January to March 2025. The central legal question was whether Mr Takaloo was in fact an employee, and if so, whether he was constructively dismissed and owed unpaid wages and holiday pay. The Authority found that Mr Takaloo was an employee, that he was constructively dismissed without justification, and ordered Kaur Queens Trading Limited to pay arrears of wages, holiday pay, reimbursement of lost remuneration, and compensation for hurt and humiliation.

Applicant: Ashkan Vakilipour Takaloo (employee/driver)
Respondent: Kaur Queens Trading Limited (employer, operating as Mr Singh Taxis)

Applicant: Ashkan Takaloo (self-represented at investigation meeting; previously represented when claim was lodged — representative not named)
Respondent: No appearance

Kaur Queens Trading Limited operates a taxi business trading as Mr Singh Taxis, with Jaspinder Singh as director and majority shareholder. Mr Takaloo worked as a driver from 20 January 2025 until 14 March 2025 under a written independent contractor agreement. Disputes arose about non-payment of wages and Mr Singh's aggressive and abusive behaviour, leading Mr Takaloo to resign; he later raised personal grievances for unpaid wages and unjustified dismissal. The respondent was properly served with all documents and participated briefly in a case management conference (where Mr Singh questioned jurisdiction), but did not lodge a statement in reply, provide documents, or appear at the investigation meeting. Mr Takaloo appeared, gave evidence on oath, and argued he was an employee entitled to wages arrears, holiday pay, and personal grievance remedies; the respondent advanced no evidence or submissions in defence.

1. Whether Mr Takaloo was an employee of Kaur Queens Trading Limited (real nature of the relationship) — Status: Established (paras [12]–[23]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 in its pre-21 February 2026 amended form, as the rights in question arose during employment between January and March 2025 (relying on s 33(1)(a) of the Legislation Act 2019 to preserve existing rights). The Authority applied the control test (Mr Takaloo worked under strict day-to-day control of the company), the integration test (fully integrated into the Mr Singh Taxis business), and the economic reality test (no invoicing, not GST-registered, did not manage earnings as a self-employed person), all pointing to employment. The contractual label of "independent contractor" was expressly disregarded per s 6(3)(b) of the Act; the common law tests confirmed by the Supreme Court in Rasier Operations BV v E Tu Incorporated [2025] NZSC 162 were applied. The Authority found Mr Takaloo was employed under a contract of service from 20 January 2025 until 14 March 2025.

2. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to determine the claim — Status: Established (paras [8], [12]).

The Authority has exclusive jurisdiction under s 161(1)(c) of the Act to determine employment relationship problems, including whether a person is an employee. The respondent questioned jurisdiction on the basis that Mr Takaloo was a contractor; the Authority confirmed that this very question (the real nature of the relationship) was within its jurisdiction to determine, and that if employment was found, it could then determine substantive claims.

3. Whether s 6 of the Act in its pre-amendment form applied to this dispute — Status: Established (paras [13]–[15]).

Section 6 was amended effective 21 February 2026, after the employment relationship ended and after the application was filed. Applying s 33(1)(a) of the Legislation Act 2019, the Authority held that the amendment does not affect completion of a matter relating to rights that existed before the amendment, and therefore applied the pre-amendment version of s 6.

4. Whether Mr Takaloo was owed arrears of wages — Status: Established (para [25]).

The Authority accepted Mr Takaloo's uncontested evidence that he was not paid his final wages. Kaur Queens Trading Limited was ordered to pay $2,045.00 gross in arrears of wages under s 131 of the Act.

5. Whether Mr Takaloo was owed arrears of holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [26]–[27]).

Mr Takaloo's total gross wages (paid and unpaid) were $3,575.56. Because the company had not deducted PAYE, payments were treated as gross earnings. Under s 23 of the Holidays Act 2023, holiday pay at 8% of gross earnings was required on termination. The Authority ordered $286.04 in holiday pay.

6. Whether Mr Takaloo had an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance — Status: Not reached as a standalone claim (paras [28]–[30]).

Mr Takaloo raised a disadvantage grievance based on non-payment of wages. The Authority declined to treat it separately because the same conduct formed a central part of the constructive dismissal grievance, and it would not be appropriate to assess separate remedies for the same conduct. The disadvantage claim was subsumed into the unjustified dismissal employment relationship problem under s 160(3) of the Act.

7. Whether Mr Takaloo was unjustifiably dismissed (constructive dismissal) — Status: Established (paras [31]–[35]).

Kaur Queens Trading Limited failed to pay Mr Takaloo $2,045 on 14 March 2025, and Mr Singh verbally abused and physically threatened him in the office, having previously been disrespectful and used inappropriate language. Together these constituted a very serious breach of the employer's duty. Mr Takaloo's resignation was caused by the breach and was reasonably foreseeable. Mr Singh deactivated Mr Takaloo's access card preventing him from working out his notice period. The Authority found constructive dismissal without justification and that Mr Takaloo had a personal grievance.

8. Whether Mr Takaloo was entitled to reimbursement of lost remuneration — Status: Established (paras [36]–[38]).

Under the Act, reimbursement is the lesser of actual loss or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Since the applicable ordinary time rate could not be established from the agreement or practice, the Authority applied the "all other cases" minimum wage rate under the Minimum Wage Order 2024, yielding $1,852.00 per fortnight and $12,038.00 for three months. The Authority was satisfied actual loss exceeded this amount despite Mr Takaloo finding some other work, and ordered $12,038.00 gross.

9. Whether Mr Takaloo was entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation and distress — Status: Established (para [39]).

The Authority accepted Mr Takaloo was upset by his grievance but found limited specific evidence of harm. Applying the range-of-harm framework from Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, the case was placed in the lower range, and compensation of $7,500.00 was ordered.

10. Whether any reduction for contributory conduct applied — Status: Dismissed (para [40]).

The Authority found no evidence that Mr Takaloo contributed in a blameworthy way to the circumstances of his personal grievance. No reduction was applied.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [44]).

Mr Takaloo was entitled to costs, but as his legal representation had not continued and there was no information about legal costs incurred, costs were reserved. Mr Takaloo may lodge an outline with proof of legal costs within 28 days; the respondent may respond within a further 14 days.

The claim was upheld in full: Mr Takaloo was found to be an employee who was constructively dismissed without justification, and all monetary claims for arrears of wages, holiday pay, lost remuneration, and compensation were established.

- Arrears of wages: $2,045.00 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Arrears of holiday pay: $286.04 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Reimbursement of lost remuneration (personal grievance): $12,038.00 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation and distress: $7,500.00 (no deduction), payable within 28 days
- Costs: Reserved (subject to further submissions from both parties)