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Ashkan Vakilipour Takaloo, a taxi driver, worked for Kaur Queens Trading Limited (trading as Mr Singh Taxis) under a written independent contractor agreement from January to March 2025. The central legal question was whether Mr Takaloo was in fact an employee, and if so, whether he was constructively dismissed and owed unpaid wages and holiday pay. The Authority found that Mr Takaloo was an employee, that he was constructively dismissed without justification, and ordered Kaur Queens Trading Limited to pay arrears of wages, holiday pay, reimbursement of lost remuneration, and compensation for hurt and humiliation.

Applicant: Ashkan Vakilipour Takaloo (employee/driver)
Respondent: Kaur Queens Trading Limited (employer, operating as Mr Singh Taxis)

Applicant: Ashkan Takaloo (self-represented at investigation meeting; previously represented when claim was lodged — representative not named)
Respondent: No appearance

Kaur Queens Trading Limited operates a taxi business trading as Mr Singh Taxis, with Jaspinder Singh as director and majority shareholder. Mr Takaloo worked as a driver from 20 January 2025 until 14 March 2025 under a written independent contractor agreement. Disputes arose about non-payment of wages and Mr Singh's aggressive and abusive behaviour, leading Mr Takaloo to resign; he later raised personal grievances for unpaid wages and unjustified dismissal. The respondent was properly served with all documents and participated briefly in a case management conference (where Mr Singh questioned jurisdiction), but did not lodge a statement in reply, provide documents, or appear at the investigation meeting. Mr Takaloo appeared, gave evidence on oath, and argued he was an employee entitled to wages arrears, holiday pay, and personal grievance remedies; the respondent advanced no evidence or submissions in defence.

1. Whether Mr Takaloo was an employee of Kaur Queens Trading Limited (real nature of the relationship) — Status: Established (paras [12]–[23]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 in its pre-21 February 2026 amended form, as the rights in question arose during employment between January and March 2025 (relying on s 33(1)(a) of the Legislation Act 2019 to preserve existing rights). The Authority applied the control test (Mr Takaloo worked under strict day-to-day control of the company), the integration test (fully integrated into the Mr Singh Taxis business), and the economic reality test (no invoicing, not GST-registered, did not manage earnings as a self-employed person), all pointing to employment. The contractual label of "independent contractor" was expressly disregarded per s 6(3)(b) of the Act; the common law tests confirmed by the Supreme Court in Rasier Operations BV v E Tu Incorporated [2025] NZSC 162 were applied. The Authority found Mr Takaloo was employed under a contract of service from 20 January 2025 until 14 March 2025.

2. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to determine the claim — Status: Established (paras [8], [12]).

The Authority has exclusive jurisdiction under s 161(1)(c) of the Act to determine employment relationship problems, including whether a person is an employee. The respondent questioned jurisdiction on the basis that Mr Takaloo was a contractor; the Authority confirmed that this very question (the real nature of the relationship) was within its jurisdiction to determine, and that if employment was found, it could then determine substantive claims.

3. Whether s 6 of the Act in its pre-amendment form applied to this dispute — Status: Established (paras [13]–[15]).

Section 6 was amended effective 21 February 2026, after the employment relationship ended and after the application was filed. Applying s 33(1)(a) of the Legislation Act 2019, the Authority held that the amendment does not affect completion of a matter relating to rights that existed before the amendment, and therefore applied the pre-amendment version of s 6.

4. Whether Mr Takaloo was owed arrears of wages — Status: Established (para [25]).

The Authority accepted Mr Takaloo's uncontested evidence that he was not paid his final wages. Kaur Queens Trading Limited was ordered to pay $2,045.00 gross in arrears of wages under s 131 of the Act.

5. Whether Mr Takaloo was owed arrears of holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [26]–[27]).

Mr Takaloo's total gross wages (paid and unpaid) were $3,575.56. Because the company had not deducted PAYE, payments were treated as gross earnings. Under s 23 of the Holidays Act 2023, holiday pay at 8% of gross earnings was required on termination. The Authority ordered $286.04 in holiday pay.

6. Whether Mr Takaloo had an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance — Status: Not reached as a standalone claim (paras [28]–[30]).

Mr Takaloo raised a disadvantage grievance based on non-payment of wages. The Authority declined to treat it separately because the same conduct formed a central part of the constructive dismissal grievance, and it would not be appropriate to assess separate remedies for the same conduct. The disadvantage claim was subsumed into the unjustified dismissal employment relationship problem under s 160(3) of the Act.

7. Whether Mr Takaloo was unjustifiably dismissed (constructive dismissal) — Status: Established (paras [31]–[35]).

Kaur Queens Trading Limited failed to pay Mr Takaloo $2,045 on 14 March 2025, and Mr Singh verbally abused and physically threatened him in the office, having previously been disrespectful and used inappropriate language. Together these constituted a very serious breach of the employer's duty. Mr Takaloo's resignation was caused by the breach and was reasonably foreseeable. Mr Singh deactivated Mr Takaloo's access card preventing him from working out his notice period. The Authority found constructive dismissal without justification and that Mr Takaloo had a personal grievance.

8. Whether Mr Takaloo was entitled to reimbursement of lost remuneration — Status: Established (paras [36]–[38]).

Under the Act, reimbursement is the lesser of actual loss or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Since the applicable ordinary time rate could not be established from the agreement or practice, the Authority applied the "all other cases" minimum wage rate under the Minimum Wage Order 2024, yielding $1,852.00 per fortnight and $12,038.00 for three months. The Authority was satisfied actual loss exceeded this amount despite Mr Takaloo finding some other work, and ordered $12,038.00 gross.

9. Whether Mr Takaloo was entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation and distress — Status: Established (para [39]).

The Authority accepted Mr Takaloo was upset by his grievance but found limited specific evidence of harm. Applying the range-of-harm framework from Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, the case was placed in the lower range, and compensation of $7,500.00 was ordered.

10. Whether any reduction for contributory conduct applied — Status: Dismissed (para [40]).

The Authority found no evidence that Mr Takaloo contributed in a blameworthy way to the circumstances of his personal grievance. No reduction was applied.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [44]).

Mr Takaloo was entitled to costs, but as his legal representation had not continued and there was no information about legal costs incurred, costs were reserved. Mr Takaloo may lodge an outline with proof of legal costs within 28 days; the respondent may respond within a further 14 days.

The claim was upheld in full: Mr Takaloo was found to be an employee who was constructively dismissed without justification, and all monetary claims for arrears of wages, holiday pay, lost remuneration, and compensation were established.

- Arrears of wages: $2,045.00 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Arrears of holiday pay: $286.04 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Reimbursement of lost remuneration (personal grievance): $12,038.00 (gross), payable within 28 days
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation and distress: $7,500.00 (no deduction), payable within 28 days
- Costs: Reserved (subject to further submissions from both parties)

Sione Afimeimounga, a fuel tanker driver employed by NPD Limited from March 2021, brought claims of constructive dismissal, unjustifiable dismissal, and unjustifiable disadvantage arising from his employer's failure to address longstanding workplace concerns and a subsequent summary dismissal following a text message dispute with a colleague. The Authority found that NPD constructively dismissed Mr Afimeimounga by failing to address his health, safety and scheduling concerns, and also unjustifiably dismissed him during his notice period following a flawed disciplinary process over text messages. The claims were substantially upheld, with remedies including lost wages, compensation (reduced 10% for contribution), and a penalty for failure to provide wage and time records.

Applicant: Sione Afimeimounga (employee — Fuel Tanker Driver)
Respondent: NPD Limited (employer — fuel distribution company)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: Nick Mason, counsel

Mr Afimeimounga commenced employment as a Fuel Tanker Driver for NPD Limited on 15 March 2021, delivering fuel throughout the North Island. From early in his employment he repeatedly raised concerns about scheduling, health and safety, workload, and the conduct of his South Island-based managers, but these were not meaningfully addressed. On 21 February 2025 Mr Afimeimounga resigned, giving a lengthy notice period until the end of May 2025. On 1 April 2025, during his notice period, he exchanged heated text messages with a colleague (Mr B) that included a threat of violence and a racist comment; Mr B also made homophobic and sexually offensive remarks. NPD suspended Mr Afimeimounga that same day and dismissed him on 4 April 2025 for serious misconduct, without showing him the full text exchange, without providing him a copy of Mr B's complaint, without interviewing Mr B before the disciplinary meeting, and without the CEO (the stated decision-maker) hearing from Mr Afimeimounga directly. NPD also failed to provide wage and time records when requested.

1. Whether Mr Afimeimounga was constructively dismissed by NPD — Status: Established (paras [58]-[77]).

The Authority applied the three-category framework from Auckland etc Shop Employees etc IUOW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd and the two-question test from Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial Local Authorities Officers IUOW: (i) whether there was a breach of duty by the employer causing resignation, and (ii) whether that breach was sufficiently serious that resignation was a reasonably foreseeable outcome. The Authority found NPD breached its duty to provide a safe workplace and to act in good faith by failing to meaningfully address Mr Afimeimounga's longstanding scheduling and health and safety concerns over several years; the visit by Mr Fitisemanu in March 2025 came only after Mr Afimeimounga had already resigned. The Authority also found that the resignation was reasonably foreseeable given the sustained and unresolved nature of the concerns, and that Mr Afimeimounga's long notice period reflected good faith rather than negating the seriousness of the breach. Constructive dismissal was accordingly established.

2. Whether Mr Afimeimounga was unjustifiably dismissed by NPD — Status: Established (paras [78]-[93]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test of justification, requiring both substantive and procedural fairness assessed by the standard of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. On substantive justification, applying the test from Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil New Zealand Ltd (conduct must deeply impair or destroy the essential trust and confidence), the Authority found that when the full text exchange was considered as a whole — including provocation by Mr B, his evident lack of concern about the threat, and Mr Afimeimounga's conciliatory closing message — a fair and reasonable employer could not have concluded the conduct amounted to serious misconduct. On procedural justification, multiple significant flaws were identified: Mr Afimeimounga was not shown the full text exchange or Mr B's complaint; NPD's consideration of his alleged gang connections was never disclosed to him for comment; Mr B was not interviewed before the disciplinary meeting; and the CEO, who was identified as the decision-maker, did not hear from Mr Afimeimounga before making the dismissal decision (contrary to the principle in Quinn v Bank of New Zealand). Unjustifiable dismissal was established on both substantive and procedural grounds.

3. Whether Mr Afimeimounga was unjustifiably disadvantaged by the suspension — Status: Established (paras [94]-[105]).

The Authority applied s 103(1)(b) of the Act, requiring an unjustifiable employer action that adversely affected the employee's employment. Although NPD's employment agreement (clause 18.1) permitted suspension for investigation or health and safety reasons, the Authority found neither basis applied: Mr Afimeimounga worked alone and rarely met Mr B in person, so his continued presence posed no health and safety risk or threat to the investigation. Additionally, the good faith obligation under s 4 of the Act required that Mr Afimeimounga be properly informed and able to give meaningful consent; given the allegations came as a shock in a letter read to him moments before he was asked to choose, the Authority was not satisfied he could give informed consent to the paid special leave option. Unjustifiable disadvantage was established.

4. Whether contribution by Mr Afimeimounga should reduce any remedy — Status: Established (paras [119]-[121]).

Under s 124 of the Act, the Authority must consider the employee's contributory conduct in assessing remedies. The Authority found Mr Afimeimounga contributed to the situation that led to his dismissal through the content of his text messages (including the threat and racist comment), and reduced the compensation award by 10%.

5. Whether NPD should pay a penalty for failing to provide wage and time records on request — Status: Established (paras [122]-[140]).

The Authority applied s 130(2) and s 133A of the Act and the penalty framework from Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited. NPD received a formal request for wage and time records on 16 April 2025 and a further request from the Authority on 5 June 2026, but provided the records in response to neither. The Authority found one statutory breach of moderate-to-serious severity, noting NPD was a larger employer with legal representation and should have been aware of its statutory obligations; the failure hampered Mr Afimeimounga's ability to substantiate his lost wages claim. A penalty of $4,000 was imposed, with half ($2,000) directed to Mr Afimeimounga via the Crown.

6. Whether separate compensation should be awarded for the unjustifiable suspension — Status: Dismissed (paras [117]-[118]).

The Authority determined that the suspension formed part of the broader events giving rise to the unjustifiable dismissal finding, for which compensation had already been awarded. No separate compensation was ordered for the unjustifiable suspension to avoid double recovery.

7. Whether Mr Afimeimounga's lost remuneration claim for 65 hours per week should be accepted — Status: Partially established (paras [107]-[110]).

Mr Afimeimounga claimed lost wages based on 65 hours per week, but his contractual hours were 40 per week and he provided no evidence substantiating that he consistently worked 65 hours. The Authority awarded lost wages based on 40 contractual hours per week for seven weeks (the period from dismissal to the commencement of alternative employment on 26 May 2025), totalling $13,608.00.

8. Costs — Status: Not reached (paras [141]-[149]).

The Authority reserved costs, encouraging the parties to resolve the matter themselves. A timetable was set for the filing of costs memoranda if agreement is not reached.

The claims were substantially upheld: constructive dismissal, unjustifiable dismissal, and unjustifiable disadvantage by suspension were all established; the claim for separate compensation for the unjustifiable suspension was dismissed; and a penalty for failure to provide wage and time records was imposed.

- Lost wages: $13,608.00 gross (calculated at $48.60 × 40 hours × 7 weeks), pursuant to s 28 of the Act.
- Compensation (hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $25,000.00 under s 123(1)(c)(i), reduced by 10% for contribution to $22,500.00.
- No separate compensation ordered for unjustifiable suspension (subsumed within dismissal remedy).
- Penalty for breach of s 130 of the Act (failure to provide wage and time records): $4,000.00 total — paid into a Crown Bank Account, with $2,000.00 remitted to Mr Afimeimounga and $2,000.00 retained by the Crown.
- Filing fee reimbursement: $71.56.
- All payments due within 28 days of the determination date.
- Costs: Reserved; timetable set for memoranda if not agreed between parties.

Franciscus Schouten, a security guard and orderly employed by Health New Zealand (HNZ), was dismissed on 7 November 2022 but did not file a personal grievance claim until July 2025 — approximately two years and eight months later. The key legal question was whether exceptional circumstances existed under sections 114 and 115 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to justify granting leave for the claim to proceed out of time. The Authority found no exceptional circumstances and declined to grant leave, dismissing the claim.

Applicant: Franciscus Schouten (employee/former security guard and orderly)
Respondent: Health New Zealand (employer)

Applicant: Franciscus Schouten, in Person
Respondent: Maria Green, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Schouten was employed by Health New Zealand as an orderly and was dismissed on 7 November 2022. Shortly before and after his dismissal, he contacted an employment advocate by filling in a client information form (dated 10 November 2022), but the advocate ultimately declined to act for him on a no-win no-fee basis, and Mr Schouten never formally instructed the advocate to raise a grievance. Mr Schouten had also ceased paying union membership fees before his dismissal for cost-of-living reasons and did not instruct the union to act on his behalf. He took no further steps to raise a personal grievance and filed his statement of problem with the Authority on 11 July 2025 — nearly two years and eight months after his dismissal. HNZ did not consent to the claim being raised out of time, and Mr Schouten applied for leave on the grounds of exceptional circumstances, citing trauma from the dismissal, reliance on the advocate, and lack of union support. The preliminary issue of whether exceptional circumstances existed was determined on the papers, without a hearing.

1. Whether Mr Schouten raised a personal grievance within the 90-day statutory timeframe under section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (not in dispute) (paras [1]-[3], [28]-[29]).

It was common ground between the parties that Mr Schouten had not raised a personal grievance within the 90-day period following his dismissal on 7 November 2022. HNZ confirmed it had no record of any personal grievance being raised prior to the statement of problem filed in July 2025. This finding was the foundation for the leave application under section 114(4).

2. Whether Mr Schouten was so affected or traumatised by the dismissal that he was unable to properly consider raising the grievance within the applicable 90-day period (section 115(a)) — Status: Dismissed (paras [34]-[38]).

Section 115(a) requires that the employee was unable to properly consider raising the grievance — a high threshold. The Authority found that Mr Schouten's own evidence demonstrated he had actively considered his options both before and shortly after dismissal: he contacted an employment advocate, completed a client information form, and received initial advice. There was no evidence his distress went beyond the usual shock of dismissal, and his conduct showed he was capable of considering his position. The Authority concluded no exceptional circumstances existed under this ground.

3. Whether Mr Schouten made reasonable arrangements to have the grievance raised by an agent who unreasonably failed to act (section 115(b)) — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[50]).

Section 115(b) requires that the employee made reasonable arrangements for an agent to raise the grievance and that the agent unreasonably failed to do so. The Authority found that Mr Schouten never became a client of the advocate and never instructed the advocate (or anyone else) to raise a personal grievance on his behalf. Merely filling in an inquiry form and receiving initial advice, after which Mr Schouten chose not to engage the advocate, did not constitute reasonable arrangements. Similarly, the union could not be treated as a failed agent because Mr Schouten had cancelled his union membership before dismissal and never instructed the union to act for him. The Authority applied the well-established principle that the exceptional circumstances ground under s 115(b) is intended for situations where an employee actually instructs an agent who then fails to act — not where no instructions are ever given.

4. Whether exceptional circumstances existed under sections 115(c) or 115(d) (missing dispute resolution clause in employment agreement or failure to provide reasons for dismissal) — Status: Dismissed (para [31]).

The Authority noted that neither of these grounds applied: the applicable collective agreement contained a compliant dispute resolution provision, and HNZ had not failed to provide a statement of reasons for dismissal. These grounds were dismissed without further analysis.

5. Whether, even if exceptional circumstances were established, it would be just to grant leave for the claim to proceed (section 114(4)(b)) — Status: Dismissed (paras [51]-[56]).

Even in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the Authority considered whether it would nonetheless be just to grant leave. It found it would not be just to do so. Mr Schouten had been able to raise a grievance and consciously chose not to, and he could not produce a copy of an alleged 2023 personal grievance letter despite being asked. The Authority accepted HNZ's submission that a delay of nearly two years and eight months would cause prejudice through difficulties with memory recall and information retention.

6. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [58]-[60]).

The Authority reserved costs, encouraging the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. The Authority indicated its preliminary view that no more than half a day's tariff would be appropriate. A process was set out for the respondent to file a costs memorandum within 28 days if the parties could not agree, with the applicant having 14 days to reply.

The claim was dismissed in full; leave to raise the personal grievance out of time was declined.

None ordered. Costs are reserved, with the Authority's preliminary indication being that no more than half a day's tariff would be appropriate. The parties are encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if unable to do so, the respondent may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination date.

[COSTS ONLY]

This determination resolves the reserved costs question arising from a substantive Employment Relations Authority decision dated 22 June 2026, in which Jaspreet Kaur was found to be owed monies by Patel Catering Limited (in liquidation), with secondary liability imposed on Chaitali Patel. Ms Kaur applied for a contribution to costs of $3,450.00 plus disbursements, arguing that the respondents' failure to provide statutory wage and time records significantly increased her preparation burden. The Authority upheld the costs application in full, ordering Patel Catering (and, to the extent it cannot pay, Ms Patel) to pay costs and disbursements totalling $3,643.47.

Applicant: Jaspreet Kaur (employee)
Respondent: Patel Catering Limited (In Liquidation) (First Respondent/employer); Chaitali Patel (Second Respondent); Nikunj Patel (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Susanne Lass, advocate (firm not stated)
Respondent: No appearance

The substantive dispute was resolved in an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 397, dated 22 June 2026) in which Ms Kaur was found to be owed monies by Patel Catering Limited, with Ms Chaitali Patel liable to make payments to the extent Patel Catering could not. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination to allow the parties to settle the issue between themselves, but they were unable to do so. The matter involved a half-day investigation meeting and a short AVL meeting on 5 June 2026. Ms Kaur argued that substantially greater case preparation was required than normal because the respondents failed to provide wage and time records or other relevant employment documents, forcing Ms Kaur to reconstruct wages calculations from primary sources such as bank statements, IRD records, and payslips. No appearance or submissions were filed by any respondent.

1. Whether Ms Kaur is entitled to a contribution to costs under Schedule 2, clause 15 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [6]-[10]).

The Authority's power to award costs arises from s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which permits the Authority to order any party to pay such costs and expenses as it thinks reasonable. The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event, noting Ms Kaur was the successful party. The Authority accepted that the respondents' failure to provide statutorily required records caused significantly greater preparation than usual and that Ms Kaur's detailed preparation assisted the Authority, justifying the uplift in costs sought. A contribution to costs of $3,450.00 was ordered against Patel Catering.

2. Whether disbursements claimed by Ms Kaur should be reimbursed — Status: Established (paras [11]-[12]).

Ms Kaur claimed $121.92 in disbursements supported by invoices. The Authority accepted these were reasonably incurred and ordered their reimbursement. No specific legal test beyond reasonableness was applied; the supporting invoices were sufficient.

3. Whether the filing fee for the costs application should be reimbursed — Status: Established (para [12]).

The Authority ordered reimbursement of the $71.55 filing fee in respect of the costs application as part of the overall costs award against Patel Catering.

4. Whether secondary (personal) liability for costs should attach to Chaitali Patel — Status: Established (para [13]).

Consistent with the approach taken in the substantive determination, the Authority ordered that to the extent Patel Catering (in liquidation) is unable to make the payments, Ms Patel is ordered to pay the costs and disbursements amounts. No separate analysis was undertaken; this mirrors the liability structure from the substantive determination.

The costs application was upheld in full, with the total award of $3,643.47 ordered against Patel Catering Limited, with secondary liability on Chaitali Patel to the extent Patel Catering cannot pay.

Costs contribution: $3,450.00 (ordered against First Respondent Patel Catering Limited, with secondary liability on Second Respondent Chaitali Patel to the extent Patel Catering cannot pay).
Disbursements: $121.92.
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55.
Total: $3,643.47.
No remedy ordered against Third Respondent Nikunj Patel.

Geneva Chan, a zookeeper employed by Hamilton City Council at Hamilton Zoo, claimed unjustifiable dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage arising from HCC's handling of her bullying complaint. The key legal questions were whether HCC's decision to summarily dismiss Ms Chan was substantively and procedurally justified under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and whether HCC's failure to investigate her bullying complaint constituted unjustifiable disadvantage. Both claims were dismissed in their entirety.

Applicant: Geneva Chan (employee, Zookeeper – Birds and Ectothermals, Hamilton Zoo)
Respondent: Hamilton City Council (employer)

Applicant: Allan Halse, advocate
Respondent: Tom Jarman, counsel

Ms Chan commenced employment with HCC as a Zookeeper (Birds and Ectothermals) at Hamilton Zoo on 18 March 2019, initially on a fixed-term basis and then permanently from March 2020. She worked in a team of seven reporting to Team Leader Grant Kother. Prior to the central incident, there had been two previous animal welfare incidents (a Hochstetter's frog death in January 2020 and a Princess Parrot death in May 2020) and a separate incident in February 2021 in which Ms Chan was found to have been dishonest with Mr Kother about a conversation with a colleague. In March 2021, a voluntary Guinea Fowl chick rearing project was underway; Ms Chan volunteered to be the point of contact on 20 March 2021, during which a chick died and others were distressed due to overheating. During subsequent investigation, inconsistencies emerged between Ms Chan's written account and what she had told her housemate (Mr Calero, the 2IC) regarding whether the incubator had been plugged in on arrival. HCC conducted a disciplinary process culminating in a disciplinary meeting on 27 April 2021 and, after a preliminary decision and Ms Chan's written response, summarily dismissed her on 11 May 2021 for dishonesty, misleading conduct, and failure to perform duties to the required standard. Ms Chan also alleged she had been bullied by management but had not raised a formal complaint with any member of management outside her immediate team.

1. Whether Ms Chan was unjustifiably dismissed by HCC — Status: Dismissed (claim dismissed; dismissal found justified) (paras [97]-[131]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test of justification, requiring that HCC's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. Substantively, the Authority found HCC was entitled to conclude Ms Chan understood the protocols for caring for the keets (including temperature checks), having confirmed this herself at the investigation meeting, and that her request to be in charge on 20 March 2021 placed particular responsibility on her. The Authority accepted HCC's view that Ms Chan provided inconsistent and misleading accounts of the incident — failing to disclose that the incubator had not been plugged in until directly confronted on 25 March 2021 — and that this, combined with a recent prior dishonesty incident involving Ms Morgan-Fish and previous animal welfare incidents, eroded trust and confidence. On procedural fairness under s 103A(3), the Authority found HCC conducted a thorough investigation (interviewing all relevant BAE team members), consulted with the Zoo Director and HR before proceeding, provided Ms Chan with full notice of allegations, opportunity to respond with a support person, issued a preliminary decision, considered her written response, and only then made a final decision. The Authority also noted the good faith obligations under s 4(1A)(c) of the Act were met. The dismissal was found justified both substantively and procedurally.

2. Whether Ms Chan was unjustifiably disadvantaged by HCC's handling of her bullying complaint — Status: Dismissed (paras [132]-[136]).

The Authority considered whether HCC's failure to investigate a bullying complaint constituted unjustifiable disadvantage. HCC had a Harassment, Bullying and Discrimination Policy enabling employees to raise concerns with any member of the management team, including outside the immediate team. The Authority found that Ms Chan never raised a formal bullying complaint with any member of management (including HR), even though she knew she could do so; accordingly, HCC had no knowledge of her concerns. The Authority applied the principle that an employer can only be expected to respond to issues of which it is aware, and determined HCC was not at fault in failing to investigate a complaint it had never received.

3. Whether HCC breached the good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act in the dismissal process — Status: Dismissed (paras [122]-[130]).

The Authority considered s 4(1A)(c) of the Act, which requires an employer proposing to make a decision likely to adversely affect the continuance of employment to provide the affected employee with access to relevant information and an opportunity to comment before a decision is made. The Authority found HCC complied with these obligations: Ms Chan was fully informed of concerns, given opportunity to respond at the disciplinary meeting, provided with a preliminary decision on which she was able to comment, and her feedback was genuinely considered before the final decision was made.

4. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [137]-[140]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter between themselves. If required, HCC may lodge a costs memorandum within 14 days of issue of the written determination, with Ms Chan having 14 days from service to reply. The Authority noted it would ordinarily apply the notional daily rate, citing PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135.

Both claims (unjustifiable dismissal and unjustifiable disadvantage arising from the bullying complaint) were dismissed in full; HCC's dismissal of Ms Chan was found justified.

None ordered. Costs reserved, with a timetable set for memoranda if the parties cannot agree.

Dr Gazi Mainul Hassan, a senior lecturer at the University of Waikato, was summarily dismissed in March 2024 for serious misconduct after signing an employment agreement with the United Arab Emirates University while employed full-time by the University without disclosure. Dr Hassan brought two personal grievances — unjustifiable dismissal and racial discrimination — arguing his mental health precluded meaningful participation in the disciplinary process. The Authority dismissed both grievances, finding the dismissal was justified and that no prohibited ground of discrimination was established.

Applicant: Gazi Mainul Hassan (employee, senior lecturer)
Respondent: University of Waikato (employer)

Applicant: David Luttig, advocate
Respondent: David France, counsel

Dr Hassan commenced employment with the University of Waikato on 7 September 2011 as an economics lecturer and was a senior lecturer in the Waikato Management School at the time of his dismissal. He disclosed a bipolar disorder at the start of his employment. On 21 November 2023, while still employed full-time by the University, Dr Hassan signed an employment agreement with the United Arab Emirates University (UAEU) for a visiting faculty role commencing January 2024; he did not disclose this to his manager, Professor Scrimgeour. In December 2023, Dr Hassan applied for a flexible working arrangement supported by a medical certificate citing "health and mental health issues," but neither the certificate nor his treating doctor's evidence identified an acute psychotic episode at that time. The University discovered the UAEU agreement in January 2024 and commenced a disciplinary process; Dr Hassan participated by telephone and email from overseas, sending both erratic correspondence and coherent, reasoned responses during the process. Dr Hassan was summarily dismissed on 21 March 2024, and then raised two personal grievances: unjustifiable dismissal (on grounds that an acute psychiatric episode affected both his signing of the UAEU agreement and his capacity to participate in the disciplinary process) and racial discrimination.

1. Whether Dr Hassan was unjustifiably dismissed by the University — Status: Dismissed (paras [44]-[72]).

The Authority applied the s 103A(2) justification test: whether the employer's actions and manner of acting were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances at the time of dismissal. Dr Hassan advanced three sub-arguments: (a) the UAEU agreement was signed during an acute psychiatric episode; (b) he was mentally incapable of meaningfully participating in the disciplinary process; and (c) the University should have paused the process and directed him to obtain a psychiatric assessment. On (a), applying FGH v RST [2022] NZEmpC 223 at [235], the Authority found the University did not know and had not been alerted to the possibility of an acute psychotic episode — the medical certificate referenced only general "health and mental health issues" and Dr Hassan's treating doctor confirmed there was no medical basis at the time of assessment to diagnose acute psychotic-related issues. On (b) and (c), while the University received some erratic and nonsensical communications, it also received coherent and constructive responses; Dr Hassan actively engaged with the process, proposed platforms for meetings, and advanced substantive defences. The Authority found the erratic correspondence was insufficient on its own to require the University to pause and seek a psychiatric assessment. The Authority concluded the University sufficiently investigated, gave Dr Hassan a reasonable opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered his responses before dismissing him for serious misconduct (signing and accepting overseas employment without disclosure, deeply impairing the trust relationship).

2. Whether Dr Hassan was discriminated against during his employment on the basis of race — Status: Dismissed (paras [73]-[77]).

Under s 103(1)(c) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, an employee has a personal grievance where they have been discriminated against in employment by reason of a prohibited ground, including race, in circumstances where other employees on comparable work would not be treated in the same way. The Authority found the University dismissed Dr Hassan because he breached the Code of Conduct and clause B.2 of the collective agreement — not by reason of any prohibited ground of discrimination. Dr Hassan did not establish that his dismissal was caused by race or any other prohibited ground, and the discrimination grievance was dismissed.

3. Whether Dr Hassan is entitled to remedies under s 123(1)(c)(i) and/or s 128 of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [11](c)).

As both personal grievances were dismissed, no grievance was established and the question of remedies did not arise.

4. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (para [11](d)).

Remedies were not ordered, so the question of reduction under s 124 did not arise.

5. Whether either party is entitled to an award of costs — Status: Conditional/reserved (paras [78]-[80]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, the University may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with Dr Hassan having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis, subject to adjustment upwards or downwards for relevant circumstances.

Both personal grievances (unjustifiable dismissal and racial discrimination) were dismissed in full.

None ordered. Costs reserved — parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if not resolved, the University may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination date, with a 14-day reply period for Dr Hassan.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from a successful enforcement action by a Labour Inspector against 7 Solutions Limited and its director, Kamal Jeet Singh, following a substantive determination issued on 29 May 2026. The Labour Inspector sought costs at the standard notional daily tariff rate. The Authority awarded costs of $8,000 plus the filing fee of $71.55 against 7 Solutions Limited, with an extended payment period of 90 days to account for the company's financial position.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Respondent: 7 Solutions Limited (First Respondent) and Kamal Jeet Singh (Second Respondent)

Applicant: Michelle Brown, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Linh Baillie for the Respondents

In a substantive determination dated 29 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 330), the Authority ordered 7 Solutions Limited (7SL) to pay $44,750 to the Crown for the benefit of a worker (Mr Gurdeep Singh), with personal liability falling on director Kamal Jeet Singh if 7SL failed to pay within 28 days. Mr Kamal Jeet Singh was also ordered to pay $8,000 directly to Mr Gurdeep Singh, and 7SL was ordered to pay $16,000 in penalties to the Crown. The Authority reserved costs in that determination and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. The parties were unable to agree, prompting the Labour Inspector to bring this costs application. The respondents did not contest entitlement to costs but raised 7SL's limited financial capacity to meet any costs award.

1. Whether costs should be awarded following the substantive determination, and if so, at what starting-point tariff — Status: Established (paras [4]–[5]).

The Authority's power to award costs arises under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Costs are discretionary but generally follow the event. The starting point is the notional daily tariff: the investigation meeting ran for two days, producing a starting-point tariff of $8,000. The Authority applied the principles set out in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135 and JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175. As the Labour Inspector succeeded in the substantive proceeding, costs were awarded in its favour.

2. Whether the notional daily tariff should be adjusted upward or downward — Status: Dismissed (paras [6]–[9]).

The Labour Inspector sought only the tariff rate plus filing fee and did not seek apportionment between the two respondents. The Authority found no basis to adjust the daily tariff in either direction, emphasising the ERA's unique, access-to-justice-focused approach to costs and the role of the daily tariff in giving parties predictability (citing Key Industries v Perrin [2023] NZERA 172 at [114]). No factors of unreasonable conduct, unnecessary costs, or unusual complexity were identified as warranting adjustment.

3. Whether 7SL's financial capacity to meet a costs award should affect the costs order — Status: Partially established (para [10]).

7SL's submissions focused on its ability to pay. The Authority took this into account not by reducing the costs figure but by extending the payment timeframe to 90 days from the date of the determination rather than the standard period, thereby accommodating the company's financial position while maintaining the full tariff award.

The costs application was upheld at the standard tariff rate; 7 Solutions Limited is ordered to pay $8,000 in costs plus the filing fee of $71.55 to the Crown (Labour Inspector).

Costs: $8,000 (notional daily tariff for a two-day investigation meeting), payable by 7 Solutions Limited to the Crown (Labour Inspector) within 90 days of the date of this determination.
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55, payable by 7 Solutions Limited within the same 90-day period.
No remedy ordered against Kamal Jeet Singh personally in respect of costs.

[COSTS ONLY]

Jennifer Jacobsen (employee) succeeded in a substantive unjustified dismissal claim against Cube Innovations Limited (employer) in a prior determination dated 5 June 2026. This determination concerns only the reserved costs issue and a request for a certificate of determination. The Authority awarded Ms Jacobsen $4,500 in costs and directed the issue of a certificate of determination to enable enforcement via the District Court.

Applicant: Jennifer Jacobsen (employee)
Respondent: Cube Innovations Limited (employer)

Applicant: Caroline Silk, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Dave Etchells, for the respondent

The substantive determination was issued on 5 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 356), finding that Ms Jacobsen's dismissal by Cube Innovations Limited was unjustified. Costs were reserved at that stage and the parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves but were unable to do so. Ms Jacobsen applied for a contribution of $4,500 toward her costs (her actual costs being $4,812.62 plus GST) and also sought a certificate of determination to facilitate enforcement. Cube's representative argued that the company had no money to pay any of the amounts already ordered or to contribute to costs, implying impecuniosity, but provided no supporting evidence. Prior to the investigation meeting, Ms Jacobsen had made a without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs settlement offer which, if accepted, would have left Cube in a materially better position than the Authority's ultimate orders.

1. Whether Ms Jacobsen is entitled to a contribution toward costs as the successful party — Status: Established (paras [3]-[11]).

The Authority's discretionary costs power derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Applying the principles in PBO Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 (affirmed in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] ERNZ 919), costs ordinarily follow the event, awards should be modest, and the notional daily tariff is used as a starting point. The investigation meeting lasted one day, making the notional daily tariff starting point $4,500. As the successful party following a finding of unjustified dismissal, Ms Jacobsen was entitled to a contribution toward her costs, and the amount sought was consistent with the tariff and did not exceed her actual costs.

2. Whether Cube's claim of impecuniosity should reduce or defeat the costs award — Status: Dismissed (paras [8]-[10]).

Cube's representative stated the company could not meet any orders already made, implying insolvency, but provided no evidence to substantiate this. The Authority noted the company was not in liquidation at the date of determination. Financial information previously provided by Mr Etchells during the substantive investigation had suggested the company may have been trading while insolvent, but that information did not withstand scrutiny and was not accepted as reliable. The Authority declined to treat unsubstantiated impecuniosity as a reason to reduce or deny the costs award.

3. Whether the rejection of a Calderbank-style settlement offer is relevant to the costs assessment — Status: Established (paras [7], [9]).

The Authority acknowledged the relevance of the without-prejudice-except-as-to-costs settlement offer made by Ms Jacobsen prior to the investigation meeting, consistent with the principle from Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 (CA) that rejection of such offers can be taken into account. Had Cube accepted the offer, it would have been in a materially better position than the outcome imposed by the Authority's orders. This reinforced the appropriateness of ordering costs at the full tariff amount.

4. Whether a certificate of determination should be issued to facilitate enforcement — Status: Established (paras [12]-[14], [16]).

Under s 141(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a party may enforce an Authority order by filing it in the District Court, and a certificate of determination is part of that process (citing Skoglund v FCL [2023] NZERA 104 at [12]). Given the strong likelihood that Cube would not voluntarily comply with orders, the Authority was satisfied that issuing a certificate of determination was in the interests of public policy and the administration of justice. Certificates were to be issued in respect of both the substantive determination and this costs determination.

The application for costs was upheld in full, and the request for a certificate of determination was granted.

Costs: $4,500.00 payable by Cube Innovations Limited to Ms Jacobsen within 28 days of the date of this determination (22 July 2026).
Certificate of determination: Issued to Ms Jacobsen in respect of both the substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 356) and this costs determination, to enable enforcement via the District Court under s 141(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

Girishchandra Nautiyal, a cook employed by Maa Kalinka & Rishiram Son's Pvt Limited (owned by Sunil Bailwal), brought claims of underpayment, wage repayment demands, statutory entitlement failures, and unjustified dismissal. The key legal questions concerned whether accurate time and wage records were kept, whether Mr Nautiyal was required to repay wages, whether he received his holiday and leave entitlements, and whether he resigned or was dismissed. The Authority partially upheld the claims, ordering wage arrears for an early period of inadequate record-keeping, but dismissing all other claims including the unjustified dismissal claim.

Applicant: Girishchandra Nautiyal (employee, cook)
Respondent: Maa Kalinka & Rishiram Son's Pvt Limited (First Respondent, employer); Sunil Bailwal (Second Respondent, owner/director)

Applicant: Susanne Lass, advocate
Respondent: Luke Meys, counsel for the First and Second Respondents

Mr Nautiyal, a citizen of India, came to New Zealand on a work visa sponsored by Maa Kalinka to work as a cook at Mr Bailwal's restaurant in Rotorua from approximately 2 January 2023. The parties had close family ties — Mr Bailwal was married to the sister of Mr Nautiyal's wife — and Mr Nautiyal lived rent-free in a house rented by Mr Bailwal alongside other employees. Mr Nautiyal claimed he was consistently underpaid, required to repay wages to Mr Bailwal, denied statutory holiday and leave entitlements, and unjustifiably dismissed; Maa Kalinka disputed each claim and maintained it kept accurate records, paid Mr Nautiyal correctly, and that he resigned by email on 14 April 2024. The Authority found Mr Nautiyal's evidence to be significantly inconsistent and unreliable in multiple respects, particularly regarding hours worked, the emails he sent, and his alleged wage repayments. The Authority accepted that Maa Kalinka's record-keeping was inadequate for the initial period before Mr Nautiyal obtained a New Zealand bank account (2 January 2023 to 28 March 2023), giving rise to a limited wage arrears order, but otherwise preferred the respondents' evidence.

1. Whether Mr Nautiyal was underpaid for hours worked during the period 2 January 2023 to 28 March 2023, and whether wage arrears are owed — Status: Established (paras [33]-[36], [24]-[26]).

Under s 130(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA), employers must keep wage and time records including hours worked and pay calculations. Under s 132, an employer may rely on its own evidence as a defence where records are absent, but the Authority found it could not accept Mr Bailwal's evidence as a sufficient defence in the absence of compliant records for this period. Maa Kalinka's record-keeping prior to 28 March 2023 was found to be informal and non-compliant with s 130(1)(h) of the ERA (failure to record wages paid and method of calculation), even if informal cash payments were likely made. Accordingly, wage arrears were ordered for that period, less the amounts credited to Mr Nautiyal's family bank account in India.

2. Whether Mr Nautiyal was underpaid for hours worked beyond those recorded in timesheets after 28 March 2023 — Status: Dismissed (paras [27]-[32]).

The Authority assessed the credibility and reliability of the competing time records. The timesheets signed by Mr Nautiyal or maintained by Mr Fondani were preferred over Mr Nautiyal's own records, which the Authority found were not detailed or persuasive. Mr Nautiyal's pattern of unreliable explanations regarding documents, and the contradictions between his claims and those of co-workers, meant he had not established on the balance of probabilities that he was underpaid for hours worked beyond those recorded.

3. Whether Mr Nautiyal was required to pay wages back to Mr Bailwal, in breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[44]).

The Wages Protection Act 1983 prohibits unlawful deductions or requirements to repay wages. Mr Nautiyal relied on bank withdrawals and transfers to support his claim that he was required to return wages above $400 per week to Mr Bailwal. The Authority found that those financial transactions were explicable for various other reasons, including a personal loan of $5,000 (supported by corroborating evidence from co-workers), and that the co-workers' evidence directly contradicted Mr Nautiyal's claim. The Authority was not persuaded that any wage repayments were made as alleged.

4. Whether Mr Nautiyal received his entitlements under the Holidays Act 2003 (annual leave and public holidays) — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[37]).

Mr Nautiyal claimed he never took or was paid for annual leave (except April 2024) and was not paid correctly for public holidays. The Authority preferred the respondents' evidence, which included timesheets recording leave taken and public holiday payments, and emails sent by Mr Nautiyal himself recording his weekly hours at approximately 41 hours per week. Mr Nautiyal's denial that he sent those emails — attributing them to a roommate or fabrication — was not accepted, and this denial further damaged his overall credibility. The claim was not established.

5. Whether Mr Nautiyal was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[52]).

The question was whether Mr Nautiyal resigned or was dismissed. Mr Nautiyal denied sending the resignation email of 14 April 2024, suggesting it was fabricated or sent by someone else, while acknowledging he sent other emails from the same account and device. The Authority found, on the balance of evidence, that Mr Nautiyal did send the resignation email and therefore resigned from his employment. No unjustified dismissal was established.

6. Whether a penalty should be imposed on Maa Kalinka for breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Dismissed (para [53]).

While certain informalities in Maa Kalinka's record-keeping were acknowledged, the Authority found the overall evidence did not establish a basis for imposing penalties. No penalties were imposed.

7. Whether Sunil Bailwal was a person involved in a breach of employment standards under s 142W of the ERA and whether recovery orders should be made against him personally under s 142Y — Status: Dismissed (para [56]).

The Authority declined to make any orders against Mr Bailwal personally under s 142Y of the ERA. The Authority's reasoning was that the quantum of arrears awarded was relatively low and there was no evidence that Maa Kalinka was unable to make the payment itself, making a personal recovery order unnecessary in the circumstances.

8. Whether either party should contribute to the other's costs of representation — Status: Not reached (paras [57]-[59], [84]).

Costs were reserved, with the parties encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. A timetable was set for memoranda should a determination on costs be needed, with the Authority noting it would apply its usual notional daily rate unless particular circumstances required adjustment.

The claims were partially upheld: wage arrears for the initial period of inadequate record-keeping were established, but all other claims (underpayment, wage repayments, holiday/leave entitlements, unjustified dismissal, penalties, and personal liability of Mr Bailwal) were dismissed.

Wage arrears: $4,662.40 (gross) payable by Maa Kalinka & Rishiram Son's Pvt Limited to Girishchandra Nautiyal within 28 days of the determination date, representing arrears for the period 2 January 2023 to 28 March 2023 less amounts already credited to Mr Nautiyal's family account.
Compensation (hurt/humiliation): None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
Penalties: None ordered.
Personal recovery against Sunil Bailwal (s 142Y): None ordered.
Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves, with a timetable set for cost memoranda if required.

Richard Wood, a founding director/shareholder of Three Sixty Capital Partners Limited, claimed he was an employee who was unjustifiably dismissed when his system access and directorship were removed in March 2025. The respondents — Three Sixty and its three other director/shareholders — denied that any employment relationship existed, contending Wood was an owner-operator in a quasi-partnership structure. The Authority determined on a preliminary basis that Wood was not an employee and therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate his claims.

Applicant: Richard Wood (alleged employee/founding director-shareholder)
Respondent: Three Sixty Capital Partners Limited (First Respondent); Mark Smitheram (Second Respondent); Peter Jeffs (Third Respondent); Gregory Young (Fourth Respondent)

Applicant: Blair Edwards and William Buckley, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Carter Pearce, counsel for the Respondents

Three Sixty Capital Partners Limited is a boutique mergers and acquisitions firm incorporated in 2012. Richard Wood was a founding "partner" (director and 25% shareholder) and served as Managing Partner from incorporation until March 2021. The other three principals — Smitheram, Jeffs and Young — each also held 25% shareholdings. There was no written employment agreement between Wood and Three Sixty at any point; the shareholder agreements (the earlier one prior to 2016 and the 2019 version) expressly excluded an employment relationship. In March 2025, Three Sixty disabled Wood's system access and subsequently removed him as a director, which Wood characterised as unjustified dismissal. Wood argued that from October 2015 he and the other principals had transitioned from contractors to employees, pointing to remuneration by way of shareholder salary, references to "shareholder-employee" in various documents, ACC levy payments, and 2016 legal advice treating performance issues as employment matters. The respondents maintained Wood was an owner-operator bearing economic risk alongside his fellow principals, with no reporting lines, no performance reviews, no leave entitlements taken, and full autonomy over his work.

1. Whether Mr Wood was in a qualifying employment relationship with Three Sixty (i.e., whether the Authority has jurisdiction to hear his claims) — Status: Dismissed (paras [4]-[5], [19]-[65]).

The Authority applied the s 6(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 test, which requires determination of the "real nature of the relationship" by reference to all relevant matters, following the framework in Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd and the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Rasier Operations BV v E Tū Inc [2025] NZSC 162. The three-step analysis required consideration of the parties' intentions, how the relationship operated in practice, and application of the control, integration, and fundamental tests. On intention, both shareholder agreements expressly excluded employment and Wood acknowledged operating with a high degree of autonomy inconsistent with a master-servant relationship; the Authority found the parties intended a partnership-style owner-operator relationship, not employment. On the control test, Wood set his own hours, was not supervised, faced no KPIs or reporting lines, operated a separate tax advisory business from Three Sixty's premises during business hours, and took leave without seeking approval (paras [41]-[45]). On the integration test, the Authority found this test unhelpful in the circumstances because Wood's integration was explained entirely by his status as a founding owner-operator rather than being indicative of employee status (paras [46]-[54]). On the fundamental test, Wood bore the economic risk of Three Sixty's profitability, stood to gain or lose based on its commercial success, and was effectively operating the business for his own reward; the Authority found this test clearly pointed against employee status (paras [55]-[62]). Overall, Wood was found to be an owner-operator akin to a partner, not an employee, and the Authority had no jurisdiction.

2. Whether Three Sixty breached the duty of good faith — Status: Not reached (paras [4]-[5], [65]).

This claim was not investigated or determined because the Authority concluded it had no jurisdiction, as Wood was not found to be in a qualifying employment relationship. Remedies and substantive claims were only available to Wood as an employee.

3. Whether Three Sixty breached its record-keeping obligations under s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Not reached (paras [1], [4]-[5], [65]).

As above, this claim was not investigated because the jurisdictional threshold was not met; no employment relationship was established, removing the statutory basis for any s 130 obligations.

4. Whether Wood was unjustifiably dismissed (personal grievance claim) — Status: Not reached (paras [1], [4]-[5], [65]).

The personal grievance claim was not investigated for the same reason: the Authority lacked jurisdiction in the absence of an employment relationship.

5. Whether Smitheram, Jeffs, and Young aided and abetted Three Sixty's alleged breaches (penalties sought against them personally) — Status: Not reached (paras [2], [4]-[5], [65]).

These penalty claims against the individual respondents were also not reached, as they were contingent on first establishing an employment relationship, which Wood could not do.

6. Whether a party is entitled to an award of costs — Status: Conditional/Reserved (paras [66]-[68]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, the respondents may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Wood having 14 days to reply. Costs, if determined by the Authority, would be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis, subject to any relevant adjustment factors.

The claim was dismissed in full on a preliminary basis; the Authority found it had no jurisdiction because Wood was not in a qualifying employment relationship with Three Sixty.

None ordered. The Authority made no awards of compensation, lost wages, reinstatement, or penalties, as it lacked jurisdiction. Costs are reserved pending resolution between the parties or further submissions.

A Labour Inspector brought penalty proceedings against A Dharni Enterprises Limited (a supermarket operator) and its director Jaswinder Singh for breaches of s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983, which prohibits employers from demanding or receiving premiums (payments) in connection with employment. The respondents admitted liability for requiring two Indian migrant workers to each pay $60,000 in order to obtain employment, and contested only the quantum of penalties. The Authority imposed penalties of $32,000 on the company and $12,000 on Mr Singh personally, with a portion apportioned to the affected employees, plus costs.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Respondent: A Dharni Enterprises Limited (First Respondent, employer/supermarket operator) and Jaswinder Singh (Second Respondent, director and controlling mind of the company)

Applicant: Tim Gray, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Aaron Kashyap, counsel for the First and Second Respondents

A Dharni Enterprises Limited operates a Four Square supermarket in Thames, with Jaswinder Singh as its sole director and 100% shareholder (jointly with his wife). In 2023, the company recruited two Indian nationals on Accredited Employer Work Visas, each of whom commenced full-time work in July/August 2023 but had their employment ended in early October 2023 when the respondents alleged they had misrepresented their English ability. Between February and May 2023, Mr Singh arranged for payments totalling $125,000 (of which $120,000 was a premium — $60,000 per employee) to be received via family intermediaries in India, in breach of s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983, which prohibits demanding or receiving premiums as a condition of employment. The employees complained to the Labour Inspectorate on 25 September 2023, prompting a formal investigation. Both respondents admitted liability but disputed the quantum of penalties; repayment of the $120,000 premium occurred in July 2025, after the Labour Inspector filed in the Authority in September 2024. The respondents had also maintained a false narrative about the payments until the evening before the scheduled investigation meeting, when an Agreed Statement of Facts was filed.

1. Whether penalties should be imposed on A Dharni Enterprises Limited for breaches of s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [1]-[2], [28]-[46]).

Liability was admitted by the company. The Authority applied the penalty factors in s 133A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (nature and extent of breach, intentionality, loss suffered, mitigation, vulnerability of employees, and prior conduct) as well as case law principles of deterrence, culpability, consistency, ability to pay, and proportionality (citing Borsboom v Preet PVT Ltd, Nicholson v Ford, and Daleson Investment Ltd). The Authority found the breaches were deliberate and intentional, exploited vulnerable migrant workers whose visas were tied to the employer, and involved concealment through intermediaries and a false narrative. Treating each breach on a per-employee basis with a maximum of $20,000 per breach, and allowing some mitigation for eventual repayment and acceptance of the ASF, the Authority set the penalty at $16,000 per breach, totalling $32,000.

2. Whether penalties should be imposed on Jaswinder Singh personally as a person involved in the breaches under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [1]-[2], [47]-[49], [54]).

Mr Singh accepted he was a "person involved" within s 142W(1) of the Act, having facilitated and received the premium payments as the company's controlling mind. The Authority applied the same s 133A factors as for the company, additionally acknowledging reputational and community consequences Mr Singh had already suffered, his acceptance of the ASF, and the repayment of premiums. No financial evidence was lodged to support an ability-to-pay discount. The Authority set the penalty at $6,000 per breach, totalling $12,000, recoverable from Mr Singh personally as a debt under s 142Y of the Act.

3. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to consider premium payments made outside New Zealand — Status: Established (para [39]).

The Labour Inspector flagged that, in some cases, the Authority has found it lacks jurisdiction where premiums were paid outside New Zealand. The Authority considered recent case law (citing Arushi v Isher Enterprises Limited [2024] NZERA 615) and the relevant facts, and concluded that no such jurisdictional exclusion applied on the facts of this case. The issue was addressed briefly without extended analysis.

4. Whether the $120,000 penalty should be globalised across both employees rather than assessed per employee — Status: Dismissed (para [31]).

The Labour Inspector submitted that globalisation of penalties was not appropriate where only two employees were involved, consistent with the approach in Borsboom v Preet PVT Ltd. The Authority agreed and assessed penalties on a per-employee, per-breach basis, producing a maximum liability of $40,000 for the company and $20,000 for Mr Singh.

5. Whether a portion of the penalties should be apportioned to the affected employees under s 136(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [50]-[53]).

The Authority has a discretion under s 136 to direct that all or part of any penalty be paid to affected employees rather than into the Crown Bank account. Both parties supported some apportionment. The Authority ordered $2,000 ($1,000 per complainant) from the company's penalty to be paid to the two employees to cover money transfer fees and the personal impact of the breach, with the remainder going to the Crown.

6. Whether Mr Singh's stated intention (to use the premium funds to pay the employees' wages) constituted a mitigating factor — Status: Dismissed (para [35]).

Mr Singh argued his conduct was not motivated by personal enrichment. The Authority rejected this as a mitigating factor, finding that using the employees' own premium payments to fund their wages provided a financial advantage to the company by freeing up funds that would otherwise have been required for wages.

7. Whether costs should be awarded to the Labour Inspectorate, and in what amount — Status: Established (paras [55]-[58]).

The Labour Inspectorate sought transcription and translation costs of $4,120.20, two-thirds of the Authority's notional daily tariff, and reimbursement of the filing fee. The respondents did not oppose disbursements or the filing fee. The Authority awarded the full transcription costs (as early acknowledgment of breach would have avoided this expense), $3,000 as two-thirds of the Authority's notional daily tariff (reflecting that full preparation was completed before the eleventh-hour ASF was filed), and the filing fee of $71.55, totalling $7,191.75, payable jointly and severally by both respondents.

The claims were upheld: penalties were imposed on both respondents (liability having been admitted), with the quantum determined at $32,000 against the company and $12,000 against Mr Singh personally, a portion apportioned to affected employees, and costs awarded to the Labour Inspectorate.

Penalties — A Dharni Enterprises Limited: $32,000 (payable to the Crown within 28 days), of which $1,000 is to be paid to each of the two complainants ($2,000 total apportionment to employees).
Penalties — Jaswinder Singh: $12,000 (payable to the Crown within 28 days).
Personal liability: To the extent the company cannot pay the employee portions of the penalty, Mr Singh is personally liable under s 142Y of the Act.
Costs: $7,191.75 (comprising $4,120.20 transcription/translation costs, $71.55 Authority filing fee, and $3,000 as two-thirds of the notional daily tariff), payable jointly and severally by A Dharni Enterprises Limited and Mr Jaswinder Singh to the Labour Inspectorate within 28 days.

Nirali Bhatt, an Indian national employed as a supervisor by Prishal Limited (trading as Juice Heist), claimed wage arrears, unpaid holiday pay, unpaid public holiday entitlements, unjustifiable disadvantage, and related remedies against her employer and its director and shareholder. The key legal questions concerned whether Ms Bhatt was paid for all hours worked, what monies she was owed under statute and contract, whether she was unjustifiably disadvantaged, and whether Prishal Limited should be penalised for failing to maintain and provide wage and time records. The Authority upheld the claims, ordering Prishal Limited to pay wage arrears, holiday pay, public holiday pay, compensation for unjustifiable disadvantage, a penalty, interest, and the filing fee.

Applicant: Nirali Bhatt (employee)
Respondent: Prishal Limited (First Respondent, employer); Utkarsh Deota (Second Respondent, director and shareholder); Vishal Patel (Third Respondent, shareholder)

Applicant: Robert Morgan, advocate
Respondent: Mitali Bhatt (representing the Respondents)

Ms Bhatt, residing in India and seeking to leave an unhappy marriage, was offered employment by Prishal Limited (through its director Utkarsh Deota, the partner of Ms Bhatt's half-sister Mitali Bhatt) as a supervisor at a new store called Juice Heist. She signed an employment agreement on 23 November 2023, with a rate of $29.66 per hour and up to 45 hours per week, and arrived in New Zealand with her two children at the end of December 2023. Ms Bhatt commenced work from approximately 8–12 January 2024 and raised concerns during employment that she was not being paid for all hours worked and that tax was not being deducted. Juice Heist proved financially unviable; Ms Bhatt was made redundant on 15 June 2024 and returned to India on 17 July 2024. Prishal Limited's position was that some wages were paid in cash at Ms Bhatt's request, and that she was paid for all hours worked; Ms Bhatt denied receiving cash as part of her wages. No wages or time records were ever produced by Prishal Limited.

1. Whether Ms Bhatt is owed wage arrears — Status: Established (paras [43]-[56]).

The Authority considered s 132(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which allows it to accept an employee's claims regarding wages and hours worked where the employer fails to produce wages and time records, though this is a discretion subject to the evidence. The Authority found the timesheets prepared by Ms Bhatt's advocate were approximate only, and that the actual hours were variable due to childcare flexibility; it therefore adopted an average of 45 hours per week across the employment period, producing a total gross wages figure of $34,702.20. Although the Authority accepted it was credible that some cash payments were made given the family context, it found no evidence that cash payments formed part of Ms Bhatt's remuneration, and Ms Bhatt denied receiving them as wages. Prishal Limited was ordered to pay $34,702.20 gross less any wages already paid, with leave to revert to the Authority if the parties could not agree on the calculation.

2. Whether Ms Bhatt is owed holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [57]-[58]).

Under s 24 of the Holidays Act 2003, employees are entitled to holiday pay calculated at 8% of gross earnings. The Authority ordered Prishal Limited to pay Ms Bhatt $2,776.18 gross (calculated as 8% of $34,702.20) for the period 8 January to 17 July 2024.

3. Whether Ms Bhatt is owed unpaid public holiday entitlements — Status: Established (paras [59]-[64]).

Under ss 50 and 56 of the Holidays Act 2003, employees working on public holidays are entitled to time and a half pay plus an alternative holiday (day in lieu). Ms Bhatt's evidence that she worked on public holidays lacked specific detail, but her schedule showed she worked three of the six public holidays occurring during her employment. The Authority found she was owed half a day extra pay for each of the three days worked plus three days in lieu (4.5 days total), and ordered payment of $667.35 gross (22.5 hours × $29.66 per hour).

4. Whether Ms Bhatt was unjustifiably disadvantaged by Prishal Limited — Status: Established (paras [70]-[80]).

The Authority applied s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (unjustifiable disadvantage). It found that Ms Bhatt's wages were not paid in full as required by her employment agreement, that she raised the issue with Mr Deota and Mr Patel without resolution, and that this caused her distress and stress — particularly given she had relocated two children to New Zealand in reliance on being paid properly. The family relationship context did not excuse non-compliance with employment obligations. Compensation of $10,000.00 was awarded under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act.

5. Whether lost wages should be awarded as a remedy — Status: Dismissed (paras [75]-[77]).

The Authority noted that Ms Bhatt returned to India on 17 July 2024 and that there was no evidence she actively sought employment that would allow her to remain in New Zealand after the closure of Juice Heist was confirmed. In all circumstances, no order for lost wages was made.

6. Whether Ms Bhatt contributed to the situation warranting a reduction in remedies under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [81]-[83]).

The Authority was required under s 124 to consider contributory conduct. Despite the employment arising from a family connection, the Authority found Ms Bhatt was an employee entitled to be paid on contractual terms and identified no contribution on her part. No reduction was made to the remedies awarded.

7. Whether interest should be awarded on unpaid wages and entitlements — Status: Established (paras [65]-[69]).

The Authority found that wages and entitlements should have been paid as they fell due, and that interest compensates for the loss of use of money owed. Interest was awarded on all amounts ordered, payable in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016, from the date of the determination until paid in full.

8. Whether Prishal Limited should be penalised for failing to provide wages and time records under s 130 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [85]-[101]).

Under s 130(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, employers must provide wage and time records to an employee on request; failure renders the employer liable to a penalty up to $20,000.00. Applying the framework in Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited and Warrington Discount Tobacco Limited [2016] NZEmpC 143 and the s 133A factors, the Authority identified one breach, noting the aggravating factor that non-compliance prejudiced Ms Bhatt's ability to calculate her entitlements, and the ameliorating factor that a written employment agreement was provided. The Authority applied a 50% reduction from the maximum, then further calibrated for proportionality, no financial information from Prishal Limited, no prior conduct, and deterrence purposes, ordering a penalty of $1,000.00 payable to the Crown.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [102]-[105]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue themselves. A timetable was set for the lodging of a costs memorandum (within 14 days of the determination) and any reply (14 days after service), with the usual notional daily rate as the expected basis.

The claims were substantially upheld: wage arrears, holiday pay, public holiday pay, compensation for unjustifiable disadvantage, interest, and a penalty were all ordered; the claim for lost wages was dismissed and contribution was not established.

- Wage arrears: $34,702.20 gross less wages already paid during employment (parties to calculate; leave to revert to Authority if unable to agree)
- Holiday pay: $2,776.18 gross (8% of gross wages under the Holidays Act 2003)
- Public holiday pay: $667.35 gross (22.5 hours × $29.66, covering three public holidays worked)
- Compensation (unjustifiable disadvantage, hurt and distress): $10,000.00 (s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act)
- Interest: Payable on all amounts ordered, from date of determination until paid in full, per Schedule 2 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016
- Filing fee reimbursement: $71.56
- Penalty: $1,000.00 payable to the Crown (for breach of s 130 of the Act — failure to provide wages and time records)
- Lost wages: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not ordered (not sought)
- Costs: Reserved
- All payment orders to be paid within 28 days of the determination date

[COSTS ONLY]

Bobby Manase and Marley Manase (employees) previously succeeded in a substantive determination against Trevor Marshall, Peter Hale, and Adam Jacques (directors of their former employer, Future Energy Solutions Limited), who were ordered to pay unpaid wages and penalties. This determination deals solely with the reserved costs issue following that substantive hearing. The Authority awarded costs at the standard daily tariff rate plus reimbursement of the filing fee, with joint and several liability imposed on all three respondents.

Applicants: Bobby Manase and Marley Manase (employees)
Respondents: Trevor Marshall (First Respondent), Peter Hale (Second Respondent), and Adam Jacques (Third Respondent) (directors of Future Energy Solutions Limited)

Applicants: Kim Ahern, advocate
First Respondent: Self-represented (in person)
Second Respondent: No appearance
Third Respondent: Self-represented (in person)

In the underlying substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 374), the Authority found that Bobby Manase and Marley Manase were dismissed from their employment with Future Energy Solutions Limited (FES) on 5 December 2024 and were owed unpaid wages, KiwiSaver contributions, and holiday pay up to 12 December 2024. FES went into liquidation on 17 July 2025, making recovery from the company impossible. The three respondents, as directors of FES, were found to be personally involved in breaches of employment standards and were ordered to pay the arrears ($7,515.02 to Bobby Manase and $9,532.59 to Marley Manase, both with interest) plus penalties. Costs were reserved at the conclusion of the substantive hearing, with a timetable set for memoranda if the parties could not resolve costs between themselves. The applicants' advocate filed a costs memorandum on 6 July 2026 advising that the respondents had not replied to correspondence regarding costs or payment of the amounts ordered. None of the three respondents filed any reply to the costs application despite being advised of the opportunity to do so by 21 July 2026.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to the successful applicants at the Authority's standard daily tariff rate — Status: Established (paras [6]-[8]).

The Authority applied the well-established principles under Schedule 2, clause 15(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, namely: that a successful party should receive a contribution to reasonably incurred costs; costs should be modest and not punitive; and the Authority's notional daily rate is the starting point. Applying the "costs follow the event" principle, the Authority found the applicants were the successful party, having established their entitlement to arrears and penalties against the respondents. No factors warranting upward or downward adjustment from the daily tariff were identified. Costs were awarded at the standard daily tariff of $4,500 for the one-day investigation meeting.

2. Whether reimbursement of the Authority's application filing fee should be ordered — Status: Established (para [9]).

The Authority found reimbursement of the $71.55 filing fee appropriate as a straightforward ancillary matter following the successful outcome for the applicants. No specific legal test was separately articulated beyond the general costs principles already applied.

3. Whether liability for costs and fee reimbursement should be joint and several across all three respondents — Status: Established (para [10]).

Consistent with the approach taken in the substantive determination regarding liability for arrears, the Authority ordered that costs and fee reimbursement liability be joint and several. This means each of Marshall, Hale, and Jacques is individually liable for the full amount if either of the others fails to pay.

The costs application was upheld in full, with costs and filing fee reimbursement awarded to the applicants.

Costs: $4,500 (Authority daily tariff for one-day investigation meeting)
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55
Total: $4,571.55, payable within 28 days of the date of the determination, jointly and severally by Trevor Marshall, Peter Hale, and Adam Jacques to Bobby Manase and Marley Manase.

[COSTS ONLY]

XDC (a protected employee whose identity is subject to a non-publication order) applied to reopen an earlier costs determination made against them in favour of their former employer, Allied Investments Limited (trading as Allied Security). The key questions were whether there were valid grounds to reopen the costs determination, whether a stay of costs pending the reopening should be granted, and whether the filing fee for the reopening application could be waived. All three applications were unsuccessful.

Applicant: XDC (employee)
Respondent: Allied Investments Limited (t/a Allied Security) (employer)

Applicant: Tyrone-Jay Barugh
Respondent: Richard Roil

XDC had brought personal grievance claims against Allied Security which were declined by the Authority in December 2025. XDC's subsequent application for a stay of costs pending a challenge to the Employment Court was also unsuccessful. In April 2026, the Authority ordered XDC to pay Allied Security $6,000 as a contribution towards costs (reduced from a starting point of $8,000, having regard to XDC's financial hardship). XDC then applied to reopen the costs determination, arguing that it contained a material factual error: the determination had stated there was "no financial evidence attached to the affidavit," when in fact XDC's affidavit did include screenshots of myMSD weekly benefit payments and an ASB bank balance. XDC also sought a stay of costs pending the reopening and asked that the $150 filing fee for the reopening application be waived. Allied Security opposed the reopening, arguing the threshold test was not met and that the Authority had in fact taken XDC's financial circumstances into account. The matter was determined on the papers.

1. Whether the costs determination should be reopened on the ground of a material factual error — Status: Dismissed (paras [4]-[17]).

The Authority applied the principles from Employment Court decisions (including Davis v Commissioner of Police [2015] NZEmpC 38 and Young v Board of Trustees of Aorere College [2013] NZEmpC 111), which require that a special or unusual circumstance exist, and that there be a real or substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice if the determination stands. XDC argued that the costs determination's statement that "no financial evidence was attached to the affidavit" was a material factual error, since bank account and myMSD screenshots were in fact attached. The Authority found, however, that reading the relevant paragraphs in full, the financial evidence had been considered — the determination referenced XDC and their partner being on emergency benefits, acknowledged the implication of limited financial resources, and had already reduced costs accordingly. There was no new evidence for the purposes of a reopening, and with a challenge already before the Employment Court, the threshold for reopening was not met.

2. Whether a stay of costs should be granted pending determination of the reopening application — Status: Dismissed (para [26]).

The Authority declined the stay of costs as a necessary consequence of declining the reopening application. No separate analysis of the stay test was required or undertaken, as the primary application had failed.

3. Whether the Authority had power to waive or postpone the filing fee for the reopening application — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]-[25]).

XDC relied on RDJ v SGF [2025] NZEmpC 146, in which the Employment Court Chief Judge held the Court could waive a fee in the interests of access to justice despite no empowering regulation, and submitted that ss 157(3) and 160(1)(f) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and reg 4(1) of the Employment Relations Authority Regulations gave the Authority similar power. The Authority rejected this argument, holding that s 157(3) expressly prohibits acting inconsistently with the Act or regulations, and that the Authority's powers to follow its own procedure and act in equity and good conscience do not extend to overriding the legislative scheme. Regulation 27 and Schedule 2 prescribe the $150 fee for lodging a reopening application, and the Authority found it had no power to waive it. (The filing fee had in any event already been paid.)

4. Whether the authority McLeod v Sun Court Hotel Limited [2024] NZERA 17, raised by XDC on costs quantum, needed to be considered — Status: Not reached (para [18]).

The Authority noted there was no need to address whether it should follow the authority raised by XDC regarding costs quantum, because the reopening application itself was unsuccessful.

5. Costs of the reopening application — Status: Reserved (paras [27]-[29]).

Costs were reserved and the parties were encouraged to resolve the matter between themselves. If not resolved, Allied Security may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days; XDC has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff approach unless adjusting factors are present.

All three applications — to reopen the costs determination, to stay costs pending reopening, and to waive the filing fee — were dismissed.

None ordered. Costs of this application are reserved pending further memoranda from the parties.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from an earlier substantive decision ([2026] NZERA 410) in which Neil Hall (employee) successfully established an unjustified dismissal grievance against Consultex Company Limited (employer). The central question was what costs, if any, should be awarded given that the applicant had rejected Calderbank offers — including one that exceeded the amount ultimately awarded. The Authority ordered a reduced costs contribution of $2,071.55 to the applicant, reflecting his success but discounting for the unreasonable rejection of the respondent's final Calderbank offer.

Applicant: Neil Hall (employee)
Respondent: Consultex Company Limited (employer)

Applicant: John Dustow, advocate
Respondent: Mark Beech and Kirsten Lombard, counsel

Neil Hall had previously succeeded in an unjustified dismissal grievance against Consultex Company Limited in a substantive determination dated 25 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 410). Costs were reserved in that determination and the parties were encouraged to resolve the issue between themselves but could not. The applicant sought costs at the notional daily tariff rate for a one-day investigation meeting plus reimbursement of the filing fee as the successful party. The respondent argued costs should lie where they fall, or alternatively be awarded in its favour, on the basis that the applicant had unreasonably rejected three Calderbank offers made on 22 January 2026, 23 January 2026, and 31 March 2026 — all after evidence had been lodged by both sides. The 31 March 2026 offer was the most significant, as it offered more compensation than the applicant ultimately received through the Determination, plus a contribution to costs.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to the applicant as the successful party, and in what amount, taking into account the respondent's Calderbank offers — Status: Partially established (paras [1]-[13]).

The Authority applied the discretionary costs framework under clause 15 of the Second Schedule to the Employment Relations Act 2000, guided by the principles set out in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808, which provide that an unsuccessful party normally contributes to the successful party's costs, that costs are discretionary, and that awards should be modest. The Authority also applied the well-settled law on Calderbank offers (referencing Bluestar Print Group (NZ) Ltd v Mitchell [2010] NZCA 385), noting that their key policy purpose is to reduce the burden on the judicial system by encouraging settlement. The Authority found that Mr Hall's rejection of the 31 March 2026 offer — which would have placed him in a better financial position than the Determination achieved — warranted a reduction in the costs he would otherwise have received as the successful party. However, the Authority moderated the discount because the offers were made at a relatively late stage of proceedings, after evidence had already been prepared and lodged. A reduced costs award of $2,000.00 plus reimbursement of the filing fee ($71.55) was considered just, totalling $2,071.55.

The claim for costs was partially upheld; the applicant was awarded a reduced costs contribution of $2,071.55, reflecting his success tempered by his unreasonable rejection of a Calderbank offer that exceeded his eventual award.

Costs contribution: $2,071.55 (comprising $2,000.00 toward legal costs plus reimbursement of the filing fee of $71.55), payable by Consultex Company Limited to Neil Hall within 28 days of the date of this determination.

[COSTS ONLY]

Wei Gao (employee) successfully established wage arrears claims against JRL Corporation Limited (in liquidation), Liming Zhou, and Wenhong Liu in an earlier determination. This costs determination addresses Mr Gao's application for a costs award following that successful substantive outcome. The Authority awarded $3,500.00 in costs plus $71.55 in lodgement fees, applying a reduction from the standard daily tariff due to evidential gaps caused by Mr Gao's own failure to provide complete AT Hop card records, and declining the uplift sought due to the respondents' non-engagement.

Applicant: Wei Gao (employee)
Respondents: JRL Corporation Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent); Liming Zhou (Second Respondent); Wenhong Liu (Third Respondent)

Applicant: May Moncur, advocate
Respondents: No attendance

Wei Gao was employed for more than four years by JRL Corporation Limited, and in a substantive determination dated 30 June 2026 ([2026] NZERA 423), the Authority found he was owed wage arrears, holiday pay on those arrears, and interest, with personal liability imposed on Liming Zhou and Wenhong Liu under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The first respondent company was removed from the Companies Register, rendering any cost order against it impossible. The respondents did not participate meaningfully in the Authority's investigation, lodging only a statement in reply. During the investigation, the Authority required Mr Gao to produce complete AT Hop card records to support his evidence about hours worked; these records were eventually obtained via an Official Information Act request but only after a second investigation meeting was convened. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves, prompting Mr Gao to seek $8,000.00 in costs, which the Authority declined to award in full.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to Mr Gao as the successful party — Status: Established (paras [4]-[5]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and is discretionary and must be exercised in a principled manner, citing PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Faggotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. The general principle that costs follow the event applied, and as Mr Gao was the successful party in the substantive matter, the Authority confirmed he was entitled to a costs consideration. The starting point was set at $4,500.00, being the Authority's notional daily tariff for one full day.

2. Whether an upward adjustment to the daily tariff was warranted due to the respondents' failure to engage — Status: Dismissed (paras [9], [16], [26]).

Mr Gao submitted that the respondents' lack of engagement should give rise to an increased (uplifted) costs award. The Authority found no evidence that any party's conduct unreasonably increased the costs of another, and on that basis declined to award the uplift sought by Mr Gao. The principle that costs are not to be used as a punishment for an unsuccessful party's conduct was applied.

3. Whether a downward adjustment to the daily tariff was warranted due to Mr Gao's own incomplete evidence — Status: Established (paras [18]-[25]).

The Authority found that Mr Gao had failed to provide his complete AT Hop card records at the time he lodged his evidence, despite having been employed for over four years and relying on those records to substantiate his hours-worked claim. This necessitated an additional investigation meeting and further submissions, costs that could have been avoided had the evidence been provided at the outset. Applying the principle that conduct unnecessarily increasing costs can be taken into account, the Authority reduced the award below the full daily tariff to $3,500.00 as fair and appropriate, noting also that the initial hearing concluded earlier than the allocated time.

4. Whether no costs order could be made against JRL Corporation Limited (in liquidation) — Status: Established (para [7]).

The first respondent company had been removed from the Companies Register, meaning no orders could be made against it. No further analysis was required; cost orders were directed solely against Liming Zhou and Wenhong Liu personally.

5. Whether the respondents should be jointly and severally liable for costs — Status: Established (paras [30]-[32]).

Following the approach taken in A Labour Inspector v Indian Cuisine NZ Ltd (in Liq) [2021] NZERA 72, the Authority ordered that Liming Zhou and Wenhong Liu are jointly and severally liable for the costs and lodgement fee awards in full, leaving apportionment between them as a matter for those parties.

6. Whether Mr Gao should be reimbursed for the Authority's lodgement fee — Status: Established (paras [29]-[30]).

The Authority found it appropriate to reimburse Mr Gao for the $71.55 lodgement fee paid to file his application, in addition to the costs contribution.

The costs application was partially upheld: Mr Gao was awarded $3,500.00 in costs (reduced from the $4,500.00 daily tariff and well below the $8,000.00 sought), plus $71.55 reimbursement of the lodgement fee.

Costs contribution: $3,500.00 payable to Wei Gao by Liming Zhou and Wenhong Liu (jointly and severally) within 28 days of the determination.
Lodgement fee reimbursement: $71.55 payable to Wei Gao by Liming Zhou and Wenhong Liu (jointly and severally) within 28 days of the determination.
Total: $3,571.55.
No remedy ordered against JRL Corporation Limited (in liquidation).

Carol Chesmar, a labourer employed by Rooney Earthmoving Limited for over nine years, was dismissed in October 2024 following the disestablishment of her position, which the employer attributed to a lack of ongoing work. Mrs Chesmar claimed unjustified dismissal, arguing the redundancy process was procedurally deficient, while Rooney Earthmoving maintained the dismissal was a genuine and justified redundancy. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified due to failures in disclosure, consultation, and process, and ordered lost remuneration and compensation totalling $39,471.60.

Applicant: Carol Chesmar (employee)
Respondent: Rooney Earthmoving Limited (employer)

Applicant: Emma Brankin, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Rachel Webster, counsel for the Respondent

Mrs Chesmar was employed as a labourer by Rooney Earthmoving from April 2015, based in Ashburton but working across multiple sites. In 2024, she was deployed to the Taiko landfill construction project (a Timaru branch job), and on 30 August 2024 she and other Ashburton staff were told they were no longer required at the site. On 6 September 2024, the general manager Mr Dixon met briefly with the three Ashburton labourers, including Mrs Chesmar, to discuss the lack of upcoming work and raised the possibility of redundancy. A letter followed on 9 September 2024 offering three options: casual employment, leave, or voluntary redundancy. Without holding the promised follow-up meeting, Mr Dixon phoned Mrs Chesmar on 2 October 2024 to inform her that her employment would end that Friday. A formal letter dated 1 October confirmed the disestablishment of her position, with two weeks' pay in lieu of notice. Mrs Chesmar raised a personal grievance of unjustified dismissal on 30 October 2024; mediation did not resolve the matter.

1. Whether Mrs Chesmar was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [34]-[54]).

The statutory test under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 requires an objective assessment of whether Rooney Earthmoving's actions and manner of acting were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority applied the Court of Appeal's confirmation in Grace Team Accounting Ltd v Brake [2014] NZCA 541 that explicit disclosure and consultation obligations apply equally to redundancy dismissals. The Authority found that Rooney Earthmoving failed to provide Mrs Chesmar with access to relevant financial or operational information before ending her Taiko landfill deployment or disestablishing her position, failed to sufficiently investigate the situation having regard to its resources, and conducted only apparent rather than genuine consultation — the decision to disestablish had effectively been made by 6 September and Mrs Chesmar was never given a meaningful opportunity to respond before the final decision on 2 October. The Authority concluded Rooney Earthmoving's actions were not what a fair and reasonable employer could have done, establishing an unjustified dismissal.

2. Whether Rooney Earthmoving provided Mrs Chesmar with access to relevant information under s 4(1A)(c) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (breach found) (paras [38]-[43]).

Section 4(1A)(c) requires employers to provide employees with access to relevant information about proposed decisions and an opportunity to comment before a decision is made. Rooney Earthmoving did not share the financial information underpinning the redundancy decision with Mrs Chesmar at any stage; Mr Dixon confirmed this in evidence. Citing Grace Team Accounting at [81], the Authority held that if financial information was necessary to justify the redundancy, it should have been disclosed to Mrs Chesmar at the time. The Authority found a clear breach of this good faith obligation.

3. Whether Rooney Earthmoving sufficiently investigated the matter under s 103A(3) — Status: Established (breach found) (paras [44]-[47]).

Section 103A(3) requires employers to sufficiently investigate matters, having regard to available resources. Rooney Earthmoving was described as a substantial regional business with access to adequate internal and external resources. The Authority found the investigations relating to both the end of Mrs Chesmar's Taiko landfill deployment and the decision to disestablish her position were insufficient, leaving her with unaddressed and understandable (though ultimately unfounded) concerns that she had been personally targeted.

4. Whether Rooney Earthmoving raised its concerns and gave Mrs Chesmar a reasonable opportunity to respond before dismissing her — Status: Established (breach found) (paras [48]-[51]).

Section 103A(3) also requires that concerns be raised with the employee and a reasonable opportunity to respond be given before dismissal. The Authority found that the consultation was more apparent than real: by 6 September the decision to disestablish was effectively made; the promised follow-up meeting never occurred; and the final dismissal decision was communicated by phone on 2 October with employment ending two days later. This sequence did not afford Mrs Chesmar a genuine or reasonable opportunity to respond.

5. Whether Mrs Chesmar's conduct contributed to the grievance, warranting a reduction in remedies under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [61]-[63]).

Rooney Earthmoving argued that Mrs Chesmar failed to engage with the options offered and did not raise concerns, relying on Spratt v Clan Construction Limited [2012] NZERA Christchurch 190. The Authority distinguished Spratt on the basis that it involved a justified dismissal, making it of little assistance here. The Authority found that Mrs Chesmar's passivity was understandable given that the decision appeared already made when options were first presented to her, and that her conduct was not blameworthy and did not contribute to the grievance. No reduction was applied.

6. Reimbursement of lost remuneration — Status: Established, capped at three months (paras [55]-[57]).

Under s 128(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, lost remuneration is capped at three months' ordinary time earnings unless the Authority exercises discretion under s 128(3) to order more. Mrs Chesmar was found to have mitigated her loss by seeking and obtaining part-time work. Although her actual losses exceeded three months, the Authority accepted that Rooney Earthmoving might have been able to justify a proper redundancy process (given it did not recruit labourers until later in 2025), and found no sufficient reason to exceed the s 128(2) cap. Reimbursement was fixed at $14,471.60 (being $27.83 × 40 hours × 13 weeks).

7. Compensation for hurt, humiliation, and distress — Status: Established (paras [58]-[60]).

Mrs Chesmar gave compelling evidence, supported by her husband and daughter, of significant emotional and physical harm, deterioration in personal relationships, and financial stress. The Authority accepted this evidence, noting the effects were significant and some persisted, even though no medical or professional support was required. Applying the Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113 framework, the Authority placed this case at around the midpoint of the middle range of harm and fixed compensation at $25,000.00.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [66]-[67]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to agree on costs between themselves. A process was set out: if costs cannot be agreed, the claiming party may lodge a memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with the other party having 14 days to reply.

The claim was upheld: Mrs Chesmar was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed and is entitled to remedies totalling $39,471.60.

- Reimbursement of lost remuneration: $14,471.60 (gross), being three months' ordinary time earnings at $27.83/hour for 40 hours/week.
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation, and distress: $25,000.00 (without deduction).
- Both amounts payable within 28 days of the determination.
- Reinstatement: Not ordered (not sought).
- Contribution reduction: None applied.
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; memorandum process prescribed if costs not agreed.

FVC, a Reefer Care worker employed by Port of Napier Limited (PNL) from January 2022, was dismissed in April 2024 after PNL discovered he had not declared a serious Australian criminal conviction on his pre-employment application form. FVC brought claims of unjustified dismissal and breach of good faith, arguing the process was predetermined and his explanations were not genuinely considered. The Authority dismissed both claims, finding PNL's process met the statutory test of justification and making no remedies orders.

Applicant: FVC (employee)
Respondent: Port of Napier Limited (employer)

Applicant: FVC in Person (self-represented)
Respondent: Andrew Caisley, counsel for the Respondent

FVC was employed by PNL as a Reefer Care worker from January 2022. In April 2024, PNL's Head of Landside Operations, Mr Robert van Rooyen, became aware of media articles reporting that FVC had been convicted of serious offences in Australia in 2015 and sentenced to six years' imprisonment (serving four years plus two years' parole ending in 2021). FVC's 2021 pre-employment application form had asked whether he had any court convictions in the last 10 years, to which he answered "No," and the form warned that false or misleading answers could result in dismissal. PNL invited FVC to a disciplinary meeting; he attended with his father and union representative, acknowledged the conviction, but explained he had answered "No" in reliance on advice from his parole officer that his New Zealand criminal record was clean. Following two meetings, PNL dismissed FVC on 12 April 2024 (a dismissal letter was misdated "5 March 2024," which PNL attributed to a typographical error). FVC argued the misdating, removal from rosters, and the short timeframe over a weekend between meetings evidenced predetermination, and that PNL failed to genuinely consider his explanations.

1. Whether FVC was unjustifiably dismissed under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [18]-[40]).

The applicable test under s 103A requires consideration of whether PNL sufficiently investigated, raised concerns with FVC, gave him a genuine opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered his explanations, with the overall question being whether dismissal was within the range of options open to a fair and reasonable employer. The Authority found PNL met all four limbs: it investigated upon discovering the media articles, clearly communicated its concerns in writing, gave FVC two meetings including support from his father and union representative, and genuinely considered his explanation that he relied on parole officer advice. The Authority rejected FVC's predetermination arguments, accepting Mr van Rooyen's evidence that the wrong date was a typographical error, that roster changes were not evidence of predetermination, and that the short weekend timeframe was sufficient given the uncomplicated single-issue nature of the matter. The Authority found the pre-employment form was not limited to New Zealand convictions on its plain wording, and while FVC may not have intended to mislead, PNL was entitled (but not obliged) to treat non-disclosure of serious convictions as grounds for dismissal — which was explicitly flagged in the application form itself.

2. Whether PNL breached its duties of good faith and whether a penalty should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (paras [2]-[3], [7]).

FVC alleged PNL's actions constituted a breach of good faith under the Act, including a failure to communicate with him following dismissal. The Authority listed this as an issue to determine (para [7](d)) but, having found the dismissal was justified and the process was fair, made no findings establishing any breach of good faith and made no orders or penalty. No separate analysis of the good faith claim or penalty was set out beyond identifying it as an issue; the dismissal of the unjustified dismissal claim disposed of the matter without a further standalone remedy.

3. Whether remedies (lost wages and s 123(1)(c)(i) compensation) should be awarded — Status: Not reached (para [7](b)).

Remedies were only to be considered if PNL's actions were found unjustified. Because the unjustified dismissal claim was not established, no remedies were awarded and the question of quantum did not arise.

4. Whether remedies should be reduced for FVC's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [7](c)).

A reduction for blameworthy conduct was only relevant if remedies were to be awarded. Because the claim was dismissed entirely, this issue did not arise and was not addressed.

5. Costs of representation — Status: Reserved (paras [41]-[43]).

The Authority reserved costs, encouraging the parties to resolve the matter themselves. If unresolved, the respondent may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with the applicant having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis unless circumstances required adjustment.

6. Non-publication order in respect of the applicant's name — Status: Established (para [6]).

FVC applied for a non-publication order to protect third parties connected to him who were not involved in the proceedings and who might suffer adverse impacts if his name were published. The application was not opposed by PNL. The Authority granted the limited order sought, substituting a randomly chosen three-letter acronym (FVC) throughout the determination.

The claim was dismissed in full — both the unjustified dismissal claim and the good faith/penalty claim were not established, and no remedies were ordered.

None ordered. Costs are reserved pending negotiation between the parties or, if necessary, a formal costs memorandum process.

Stephen Stokes, a Housing Navigator employed by Emerge Aotearoa Limited (EAL), claimed that EAL breached the terms of his collective employment agreement (CEA) by wrongly requiring him to be vaccinated against COVID-19 under the COVID-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Order 2021, and by the process it followed in doing so. The key legal questions were whether EAL correctly identified Mr Stokes as an "affected person" under the Order, whether various alleged contractual breaches were established, and whether damages were available. All claims were dismissed: while the Authority found EAL had incorrectly classified Mr Stokes as an affected person under the Order and had acted inconsistently with good faith, no contractual breach of the CEA was established.

Applicant: Stephen Stokes (employee, Housing Navigator)
Respondent: Emerge Aotearoa Limited (employer)

Applicant: Erika Whittome and Liz Lambert, advocates
Respondent: Penny Shaw, counsel

Mr Stokes commenced employment with EAL in October 2013 as a Community Support Worker, later transitioning in November 2020 to a Housing Navigator role based at "the Hub" on Kennedy Place in Christchurch, working under a collective employment agreement with the Public Services Association. In October 2021, the New Zealand Government expanded the COVID-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Order 2021 to cover health and disability workers, and EAL determined — without specific role-by-role analysis — that all Hub-based roles, including Housing Navigator, fell within the Order's scope and required vaccination. Mr Stokes objected, raised detailed concerns about the vaccination requirement and EAL's application of the Order to his role, and asked questions EAL never substantively answered, but ultimately received both vaccinations (and a COVID-19 infection later exempted him from the booster). Mr Stokes claimed EAL breached the CEA by: incorrectly classifying him as an affected person under the Order; failing to act in good faith; unilaterally varying his employment; threatening repudiation of suspension and termination clauses; breaching various clauses of the CEA; and breaching health and safety obligations. EAL's position was that it was required to comply with the Order as a legislative instrument, that its process was reasonable, and that it had consulted with the PSA throughout.

1. Whether Mr Stokes was an affected person under Schedule 2, Part 7, group c) of the Order (workers at premises of certified providers) — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]-[60]).

Group c) required the employer to be a "certified provider" under the Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001. No evidence was provided that EAL held the relevant certification, and EAL's own communications distinguished Hub-based roles from roles at certified service premises. The Authority was therefore unable to find Mr Stokes was an affected person under group c).

2. Whether Mr Stokes was an affected person under Schedule 2, Part 7, group b) of the Order (workers within 2 metres of a health practitioner or member of the public for 15 minutes or more) — Status: Dismissed (paras [61]-[71]).

Group b) required four cumulative elements: health services provided at the Hub, to members of the public, by a health practitioner, and the role must have involved being within 2 metres of a health practitioner or member of the public for 15 minutes or more. The Authority adopted the Employment Court's "broad and precautionary approach" (Young v Ports of Tauranga; GF v Comptroller, NZ Customs Service) and was satisfied the first three elements were met. However, the evidence showed Mr Stokes' desk was not within 2 metres of health practitioners or public clients, his role did not require such interaction, and any contact was at most incidental. Even on a broad approach, the proximity element was not established, so Mr Stokes was not an affected person under group b).

3. Whether the statutory duty of good faith under section 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was an incorporated or implied term of the CEA — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[46], [82]).

The Authority considered whether the statutory obligation of good faith was incorporated or implied into the CEA so as to be enforceable as a contractual term. Citing Kazemi v RightWay Limited, Johnston v The Fletcher Construction Company Limited, FMV v TZB (Supreme Court), and Harte v Midwifery Employee Representation and Advisory Service, the Authority held that statutory obligations do not automatically become incorporated contract terms, that the CEA's good faith clause (clause 5) was between the employer and PSA only, and that no CEA provision expressly required EAL to comply with section 4 as a contractual obligation owed to individual employees. The Authority was not satisfied good faith was incorporated or implied into the CEA.

4. Whether EAL's actions were consistent with good faith (findings recorded in the alternative) — Status: Partially established (paras [47]-[81]).

Although no contractual duty was found, the Authority recorded substantive findings for completeness and in case its conclusion on contractual good faith was wrong. The Authority found EAL did not properly assess whether the Housing Navigator role fell within the Order's scope (it applied a blanket Hub-based rule without conducting the specific proximity analysis required by group b)), and failed to meaningfully respond to Mr Stokes' detailed questions and concerns about why the Order applied to him and whether alternative roles existed. EAL's actions were therefore inconsistent with good faith in these two respects. However, as no contractual duty existed, this finding did not support a claim for breach of the CEA.

5. Whether reliance on section 61 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA) provided a basis for a contractual good faith duty — Status: Dismissed (para [39]).

Mr Stokes sought to use section 61 of the HSWA as the basis for a contractual good faith obligation. The Authority rejected this, noting that section 61 is confined to worker participation practices, not the broader contractual employment relationship, and so could not support a general contractual duty of good faith.

6. Whether sections 68(2)(a)(v) and 68(2)(c) of the Act (unfair bargaining in individual employment agreements) were breached — Status: Dismissed (para [84]).

These provisions apply only to individual employment agreements. As the parties agreed Mr Stokes was employed under a CEA at all material times, these provisions had no application. The claim was dismissed on this threshold basis.

7. Whether EAL unilaterally varied Mr Stokes' terms and conditions of employment by requiring vaccination — Status: Dismissed (paras [85]-[88]).

Mr Stokes argued that mandating vaccination without varying the CEA constituted a unilateral contractual variation. The Authority held that EAL was entitled to rely on the Order as a legislative instrument that overrides inconsistent contractual terms, and that even though EAL was mistaken in applying the Order to Mr Stokes' role, a mistaken application of a statutory instrument does not transform the requirement into a contractual variation.

8. Whether EAL threatened repudiation of clauses 34 (termination) and 35 (suspension) of the CEA — Status: Dismissed (paras [89]-[96]).

Mr Stokes claimed EAL's communications threatening stand-down and termination for non-vaccination breached or repudiated the CEA's termination and suspension clauses. The Authority held that the threatened consequences never eventuated in Mr Stokes' case, that EAL's communications reflected its (mistaken) understanding of a statutory obligation rather than an assertion of a contractual right to suspend or terminate, and that a mistaken application of a statutory instrument does not constitute repudiation of the CEA.

9. Whether a precedence clause from an earlier individual employment agreement was breached — Status: Dismissed (paras [97]-[98]).

Mr Stokes relied on a clause stating that the employment agreement would prevail over EAL's policies in the event of conflict. The Authority found this clause was from an individual employment agreement that was not in effect at the relevant time. The claim was dismissed.

10. Whether EAL breached clause 9 of the CEA (Policies and Procedures) by imposing a vaccination requirement — Status: Dismissed (paras [99]-[100]).

Mr Stokes argued that EAL breached clause 9 by applying the vaccination requirement to him when he was not an affected person. Clause 9 permits EAL to amend policies provided it consults the PSA. The Authority found EAL had consulted with the PSA, which supported EAL's approach. A mistaken application of the Order did not constitute a breach of clause 9.

11. Whether EAL breached health and safety obligations incorporated into the CEA via clause 46 (and sections 58–61 of the HSWA) — Status: Dismissed (paras [101]-[112]).

Mr Stokes raised multiple health and safety sub-claims: failure to take reasonable steps to ensure his health and safety (clause 46.1); breach of employee wellness obligations under clause 24; failure to investigate concerns and ensure worker participation (clause 46.2); failure to engage under sections 58–61 of the HSWA; displaying vaccination signage; failure to treat vaccination as a hazard; failure to monitor vaccination efficacy; and failure to test workplace surfaces/air for COVID-19. The Authority held that EAL's actions were motivated by a genuine desire to protect employees; that the safety and efficacy of vaccines was a government and regulatory matter and EAL was not required to conduct independent safety investigations; that providing government-approved vaccination information complied with health and safety obligations; that clause 46.2 addressed structural participation mechanisms, not responsiveness to individual concerns; that EAL had provided employees with information and a reasonable opportunity to express views satisfying sections 58–61; that clause 24 addresses wellness leave, not vaccination requirements; and that testing workplace surfaces was not a reasonably practicable step. All health and safety claims were dismissed.

12. Whether damages of $75,000 were available for breaches of the CEA — Status: Dismissed (paras [115]-[117]).

Mr Stokes sought $75,000 in general damages. The Authority noted that damages may be awarded for breach of an employment agreement (citing Cronin-Lampe v The Board of Trustees of Melville High School) but, having found no breach of the CEA, there was no basis to award damages.

13. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to direct EAL to engage an independent investigator into its health and safety processes under section 123(1)(ca) of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [116]).

Mr Stokes sought a direction under section 123(1)(ca) requiring an independent investigation of EAL's health and safety processes. The Authority held it lacked jurisdiction: section 123(1)(ca) applies only where workplace conduct is found to be a significant factor in a personal grievance, and this proceeding involved a breach of employment agreement claim, not a personal grievance.

14. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [118]-[121]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. EAL may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days if the parties cannot agree, with the other party having 14 days to reply. Costs will be determined on the Authority's usual daily tariff basis if required.

All of Mr Stokes' claims were dismissed in their entirety.

None ordered. Damages claim of $75,000 dismissed on the basis that no breach of the CEA was established. The direction under section 123(1)(ca) was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Costs reserved, with a process set out for the parties to resolve or litigate costs.

Jeffrey Ferguson, a Senior Firefighter employed by Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) since 1990, raised personal grievance claims of unjustified disadvantage arising from events in July–August 2022 when he contracted Covid-19 and disputed whether he had been promised paid special leave, was owed overtime, was denied engagement from his employer, and was subjected to an unsafe workplace. FENZ denied all claims and argued they were raised outside the 90-day statutory period and, in any event, were statute-barred under the Accident Compensation Act 2001. The Authority found that Mr Ferguson did not raise any personal grievances within the prescribed period, that no promise of special leave had been made, and that his claims were not established on the merits.

Applicant: Jeffrey Ferguson (employee/Senior Firefighter)
Respondent: Fire and Emergency New Zealand (employer)

Applicant: Myriam Mitchell, Counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Tanya Kennedy, Counsel for the Respondent

Mr Ferguson has been employed as a Senior Firefighter at Johnsonville Fire Station since 1 October 1990. On 22 July 2022, he attended work to perform a callback (overtime) shift but tested positive for Covid-19 and was sent home before his 8am shift commenced; he had no sick leave remaining. Mr Ferguson claims he was promised paid special leave by Assistant Fire Commander Martin Wilby, but on 29 July 2022, Wilby advised him that special leave would not be paid and suggested he use alternative leave such as annual leave; Mr Ferguson strongly objected. FENZ's position throughout was that no such promise was made, that special paid leave was not payable under the applicable Covid-19 policy, and that any annual leave erroneously applied was reinstated after Mr Ferguson objected. Mr Ferguson's ACC claim for a work-related mental injury — connected to a traumatic incident in 2015 — was accepted in 2023 and backdated to 21 July 2022, effectively superseding many of his pay-related complaints. Mr Ferguson formally notified FENZ of personal grievances via his representatives on 19 October 2023, well after the events in question.

1. Whether personal grievances were raised within the 90-day statutory period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[59]).

Section 114 of the Act requires a personal grievance to be raised within 90 days of the date the action occurred or came to the employee's notice. The Authority reviewed Mr Ferguson's communications with FENZ in July–August 2022 and found that, while some of his language — particularly regarding the special leave dispute and the annual leave issue — could in other circumstances have comprised a grievance, Mr Ferguson himself acknowledged in evidence that he did not raise personal grievances because he felt he had no need to, given his length of service. The Authority found no personal grievances were formally raised within the 90-day period, and that formal notification only occurred on 19 October 2023 in relation to events from mid-2022.

2. Whether leave should be granted to raise personal grievances out of time on the basis of exceptional circumstances — Status: Dismissed (paras [33], [49]-[52], [59]).

The Act allows the Authority to grant leave to raise a grievance out of time if exceptional circumstances exist and it is just to do so. The Authority considered evidence from Lynda Zampese regarding Mr Ferguson's mental state but found it did not establish exceptional circumstances, noting that Mr Ferguson was capable of raising concerns and chose not to raise grievances not because he was unable to, but because he believed FENZ was resolving matters and he saw no need to. No exceptional circumstances were established.

3. Whether FENZ promised Mr Ferguson paid special leave for the week of 22 July 2022 — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[42], [59]).

The Authority applied a factual analysis of the evidence, including the evidence of Martin Wilby, the applicable Covid-19 policy (under which sick leave — not special paid leave — applied), and documentary evidence including an email from the Union effectively agreeing that special leave was not payable. The Authority found there was no contractual provision or established understanding entitling Mr Ferguson to special paid leave, and no promise had been made by FENZ to pay him on that basis.

4. Whether Mr Ferguson was unjustifiably denied callback (overtime) pay for 22 July 2022 — Status: Dismissed (paras [17]-[18], [36], [59]).

The evidence established that Mr Ferguson arrived before and left before his 8am shift start time, so his attendance was not entered into the station management system and he was not formally rostered on for the shift. FENZ's evidence was that overtime would not have been payable in these circumstances. Notwithstanding this, FENZ had already without admission of liability paid Mr Ferguson a one-day overtime shift at current Senior Firefighter rates (a higher rate than applicable in 2022), and the ACC acceptance and backdating rendered the remaining claims moot.

5. Whether FENZ failed to engage with Mr Ferguson on employment matters he raised — Status: Dismissed (paras [53], [60]).

The Authority found there was significant engagement by FENZ, including contact from Lisa MacDonald (Wellbeing Adviser) and Martin Wilby, approval of funding for Mr Ferguson to see a psychologist, welfare checks by the Wellbeing Manager Andrew Chappell, and special approval obtained for full pay of sick leave. The engagement claim was not made out on the evidence.

6. Whether FENZ breached its duty to ensure Mr Ferguson's safety under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 — Status: Dismissed (paras [35], [49], [52], [58]).

The Authority has jurisdiction to investigate HSWA matters to the extent they constitute employment relationship problems. The safety claim was primarily related to a 2015 traumatic incident, but no personal grievance in respect of this was raised within the statutory period. The Authority further found that even had a grievance been properly raised, the evidence did not disclose any failure by FENZ to comply with its safety, health, and welfare obligations to Mr Ferguson.

7. Whether FENZ breached the Employment Agreement (Collective Agreement) — Status: Dismissed (paras [40], [48], [60]).

A claim relating to the interpretation of clause 16.1 of the Collective Agreement (regarding medical expenses not covered by ACC) was withdrawn at the hearing because ACC was reviewing its decision; Mr Ferguson retained rights to raise this at a future date if necessary. The remaining breach of Employment Agreement claims were not made out on the evidence.

8. Whether penalties should be imposed for breach of the Collective Agreement and breach of good faith — Status: Not reached (para [61]).

Because the Authority found that no personal grievances had been established and no breaches of the Employment Agreement were made out, there was no basis on which to consider penalty claims, and these were not further examined.

9. Whether a remedy of hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (paras [59]-[60]).

As all personal grievance claims failed, there was no basis for compensatory remedies under this head. No award was made.

10. Whether remedies including annual leave reinstatement, payment for the period 22–29 July 2022, superannuation contributions, future PCA payments, and an order that penalties be paid to Mr Ferguson should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]-[60]).

All monetary remedies sought were dependent on the personal grievances or employment agreement breach claims succeeding. Having found none established, the Authority declined to award any of these remedies. Additionally, many pay-related claims were rendered moot by the ACC backdating to 21 July 2022.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [62]-[64]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter themselves. If unresolved, FENZ may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, and Mr Ferguson may reply within 14 days of service. Costs, if determined by the Authority, will be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis, subject to adjustment for relevant factors.

The claims were dismissed in full; Mr Ferguson did not establish any personal grievances or breaches of the Employment Agreement, and no remedies were ordered.

None ordered. Costs are reserved, with a process established for either party to seek a costs determination from the Authority if the parties cannot resolve costs between themselves.