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Barthi Devi, a Support Worker employed by St John of God Hauora Trust since November 2017, brought claims arising from SJOG's misclassification of her as a casual employee from February 2022 onwards, its failure to provide her agreed permanent part-time weekend hours from mid-2024, and its failure to comply with statutory obligations under the Employment Relations Act 2000 and Holidays Act 2003. The Authority found Ms Devi was at all times a permanent part-time employee, that her employment continues, and upheld her claims for unpaid remuneration, compensation for unjustified disadvantage, Holidays Act entitlements, and a penalty, while dismissing some penalty claims as out of time and one health and safety compliance claim for insufficient evidence.

Applicant: Barthi Devi (employee, Support Worker)
Respondent: St John of God Hauora Trust (employer)

Applicant: Simon Graham and Brad McMurtrie, counsel
Respondent: Nick Mason, counsel

Ms Devi commenced permanent employment with SJOG as a Support Worker in November 2017 for 30 hours per week. In February 2022, rather than accepting her resignation, the parties agreed she would work 6 hours per day (7am–1pm) on Saturdays and Sundays on a permanent part-time basis; however, this variation was never documented and SJOG incorrectly treated her as a casual employee from that point, paying 8% holiday pay alongside wages rather than recognising her statutory annual and sick leave entitlements. From approximately mid-2024, SJOG ceased routinely rostering Ms Devi on her agreed weekend shifts and instead required her to compete for ad hoc shifts through a multi-text system, including against newly recruited permanent employees. Ms Devi raised concerns about her employment status, shift allocation, and a health and safety issue regarding repositioning of a heavy patient, but SJOG failed to adequately resolve these issues. Ms Devi worked her last shift in September 2024 and raised a personal grievance in November 2024; neither party has formally ended the employment relationship.

1. Whether Ms Devi was a permanent part-time employee from February 2022 onwards — Status: Established (paras [44]-[48]).

The Authority applied the principle that the real nature of the employment relationship is determined by its substantive characteristics, not administrative labels. SJOG conceded the February 2022 agreement created a permanent part-time arrangement and that the agreed hours were fixed and regularly worked for over two years. The Authority rejected SJOG's argument that Ms Devi's September 2024 statements expressing a preference for casual employment changed her status, finding she did so because she had been told casual employees received work first — she was seeking to protect entitlements she already had. The Authority concluded Ms Devi was a permanent part-time employee at all times since February 2022.

2. Whether Ms Devi remains a current employee of SJOG and whether an order for a permanent part-time employment agreement is appropriate — Status: Established (paras [49]-[59]).

The Authority found that neither party had expressly ended the employment relationship: SJOG never terminated Ms Devi's employment and she never resigned, and her non-engagement with the multi-text system did not amount to abandonment or resignation. SJOG's removal of Ms Devi from the multi-text system was not a sufficiently unequivocal act of termination. The Authority ordered SJOG to provide written confirmation of her permanent part-time status, agreed hours, and existing terms, and directed the parties to engage in good faith about the future of the relationship, rather than requiring an entirely new employment agreement.

3. Whether Ms Devi is owed remuneration under the terms of her employment — Status: Established (paras [60]-[75]).

The Authority applied the common law principle that an employee is entitled to remuneration for agreed hours they were ready, willing and able to work even if the employer fails to provide the work. For 5 May to 22 September 2024, Ms Devi was entitled to 12 guaranteed hours per week except where she had specifically declined a shift; SJOG owed 24 unpaid hours totalling $779.52 (gross). For 23 September 2024 to 22 April 2026 (date of the Investigation Meeting), the Authority was satisfied Ms Devi remained ready, willing and able to work; her failure to respond to the multi-text system did not undermine this because she should not have been required to compete for her guaranteed hours. Her alternative employment did not conflict with her agreed weekend hours. SJOG was ordered to pay $31,960.32 (gross) for this period, totalling $32,739.84 (gross).

4. Whether Ms Devi suffered an unjustified disadvantage through failure to provide agreed hours of work — Status: Established (paras [76]-[86]).

The Authority characterised this as an unjustified disadvantage grievance under section 123(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. SJOG's treatment of Ms Devi as a casual employee, failure to automatically roster her agreed shifts, and allocation of those shifts to other employees (including newly recruited staff) was unjustified and disadvantaged her. The remuneration order addressed lost earnings; compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) was assessed for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings. The Authority found genuine but low-level distress and awarded $5,000 compensation.

5. Whether Ms Devi suffered an unjustified disadvantage through SJOG's failure to comply with health and safety obligations — Status: Dismissed (paras [87]-[88]).

The Authority found Ms Devi had not satisfied the balance of probabilities standard to show SJOG failed to comply with its obligations under section 35 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health and safety of workers. The evidence was insufficient to establish that SJOG's failure to provide additional resources constituted a breach of its statutory duty.

6. Whether Ms Devi suffered an unjustified disadvantage through SJOG's failure to adequately address her health and safety concerns — Status: Established (paras [87]-[93]).

Although raised outside the 90-day period in the Statement of Problem, SJOG did not raise a jurisdictional objection and impliedly consented to the grievance being heard. The Authority found SJOG failed to communicate the outcome of any care plan assessment to Ms Devi, did not respond to her requests for additional staff support or a tilting bed, and did not address her health and safety concern in its response to her CEO complaint. This disadvantaged her. The Authority awarded $2,000 compensation for loss of dignity and injury to feelings at a low level.

7. Whether Ms Devi's conduct contributed to the personal grievances under section 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [94]-[97]).

SJOG argued Ms Devi failed to communicate difficulties and did not engage in good faith. The Authority rejected this, finding she appropriately raised concerns about shift allocation and employment status, and she should not have been required to compete for her contracted shifts. There was no blameworthy conduct and no reduction in remedies was warranted.

8. Whether SJOG breached its statutory duty of good faith under section 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [98]-[101]).

The Authority found SJOG was not sufficiently active and constructive in maintaining the employment relationship: despite Ms Devi raising her understanding that she was a permanent part-time employee, SJOG made insufficient efforts to establish the true nature of the relationship, determine its obligations regarding guaranteed hours, or adequately address shift allocation concerns. However, the Authority declined to impose a penalty under section 4A, finding the breach did not attract penalty-level seriousness and the same conduct had already been addressed through the unjustified disadvantage findings and remedies.

9. Whether Ms Devi has outstanding annual leave entitlements under the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [102]-[105]).

SJOG breached sections 16 and 28 of the Holidays Act 2003 by paying 8% holiday pay alongside wages (without meeting statutory requirements for doing so) and by failing to provide annual holiday entitlements after each completed 12 months of continuous employment. SJOG accepted the outstanding value as $3,226.29 (gross). Because Ms Devi remains employed, the Authority could not simply order payment; instead it ordered SJOG to calculate her outstanding annual holiday entitlement as at the determination date and provide details to Ms Devi, accounting for the remuneration ordered up to the Investigation Meeting date.

10. Whether Ms Devi is owed unpaid sick leave under the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [106]-[107]).

SJOG breached sections 63 and 65 of the Holidays Act 2003 by not paying sick leave for absences on 18 and 31 December 2022. Ms Devi was entitled to sick leave regardless of her employment classification, and there was no evidence she had exhausted her entitlement. She was owed 12 hours at $32.48/hour = $389.76 (gross).

11. Whether the 1 January 2023 absence should be treated as sick leave or a public holiday — Status: Established (paras [108]-[109]).

The Authority applied section 61A of the Holidays Act 2003, which provides that where an employee who was required or agreed to work on a public holiday does not work due to sickness, the day is treated as a public holiday, not sick leave. Ms Devi was entitled to six hours' pay at her relevant daily pay under section 49 (without time and a half): $194.88 (gross).

12. Whether Ms Devi is entitled to an alternative holiday for working on 25 December 2022 — Status: Dismissed (paras [111]).

Ms Devi's witness statement and payslip confirmed she did not work on 25 December 2022 and was instead paid for the unworked public holiday. She was therefore not entitled to an alternative holiday under section 56(1) of the Holidays Act 2003, and SJOG did not breach that provision.

13. Whether SJOG failed to comply with sections 63A, 64 and 65 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 regarding documentation of employment variation — Status: Established (paras [112]-[117]).

The February 2022 variation to Ms Devi's hours constituted a variation to her individual employment agreement. Section 63A required SJOG to follow a bargaining process (provide the intended variation, advise of the right to seek independent advice, allow opportunity to do so, and consider any issues raised); SJOG did not comply, though non-compliance did not affect validity of the agreed variation. Section 64 required SJOG to retain a signed copy of current terms and provide a copy on request; SJOG failed to retain any such record and did not provide one when requested on 17 September 2024. Section 65 required the written agreement to specify current agreed hours; neither the original offer letter (which still referred to 30 hours) nor any updated document reflected the agreed weekend-only arrangement.

14. Whether penalty claims under the Holidays Act 2003 (sections 16 and 28 — annual holidays) were brought within the 12-month limitation period — Status: Partially established (paras [118]-[124]).

Under section 76(5) of the Holidays Act 2003, penalty proceedings must be commenced within 12 months of when the employee knew or should reasonably have known about the breach. The Authority found claims relating to 8% holiday payments made before 15 August 2024 were out of time (Ms Devi knew of the issue from May 2022). Claims relating to payments made on or after 15 August 2024 and the failure to recognise annual holidays at the November 2024 anniversary date were in time; earlier anniversary failures (November 2022, November 2023) were out of time.

15. Whether penalty claims under the Holidays Act 2003 relating to sick leave were within the limitation period — Status: Dismissed (paras [125]).

The sick leave failures occurred in December 2022 and January 2023, more than 12 months before the penalty claim was commenced in August 2025, and Ms Devi knew at the time that sick leave had not been recognised. The claims were out of time.

16. Whether the penalty claim for breach of section 63A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was within the limitation period — Status: Dismissed (paras [126]).

The section 63A breach occurred in February 2022 when the variation was agreed without the required process. The claim commenced more than 12 months after Ms Devi knew or should have known about the breach. The claim was out of time.

17. Whether the penalty claim for breach of section 64 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was within the limitation period — Status: Established (paras [127]-[128]).

The section 64 obligation to retain a signed copy of current terms and provide it on request was a continuing obligation. The breach continued beyond 15 August 2024 (including the failure to provide a copy on 17 September 2024 request). The claim was in time.

18. Whether penalties should be imposed for the surviving breaches and at what level — Status: Established (paras [130]-[139]).

The Authority applied the approach in Borsboom v Preet PVT Ltd [2016] NZEmpC 143, considering nature, number, severity, aggravating and mitigating factors, and purpose of deterrence. SJOG's breaches arose from a common course of conduct (misclassifying Ms Devi as casual) and were assessed globally. Aggravating factors included the extended period of non-compliance despite Ms Devi raising the issue from May 2022 and SJOG's inadequate record-keeping and follow-up. Mitigating factors included that the conduct arose from mistaken classification rather than deliberate evasion, SJOG accepted and calculated the outstanding annual leave entitlement, and no prior similar findings. A global penalty of $2,000 was imposed: 50% to Ms Devi and 50% to the Crown.

The claim was substantially upheld: Ms Devi's permanent part-time employment status was confirmed, SJOG was ordered to pay significant unpaid remuneration and compensation, statutory leave entitlements were recognised, penalties were imposed for in-time breaches, and written confirmation of employment terms was ordered; the standalone health and safety compliance claim and several penalty claims were dismissed or found out of time.

- Unpaid remuneration: $32,739.84 (gross) total, comprising $779.52 (gross) for 5 May–22 September 2024 and $31,960.32 (gross) for 23 September 2024–22 April 2026 (date of Investigation Meeting).
- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage — agreed hours): $5,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000.
- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage — health and safety concerns): $2,000 under s 123(1)(c)(i).
- Unpaid sick leave: $389.76 (gross).
- Unpaid public holiday pay (1 January 2023): $194.88 (gross).
- Annual leave: SJOG ordered to calculate outstanding annual holiday entitlement as at determination date and provide calculation to Ms Devi (acknowledged value approximately $3,226.29 gross, but not directly ordered paid as employment continues).
- Global penalty: $2,000 (50% = $1,000 to Ms Devi; 50% = $1,000 to the Crown).
- Written confirmation of permanent part-time status, agreed hours (7am–1pm Saturdays and Sundays), and existing terms to be provided to Ms Devi.
- Parties directed to engage in good faith within 28 days regarding resumption of work, variation of terms, or ending the employment relationship.
- Costs: Reserved. Ms Devi may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days; SJOG has 14 days to reply.

Li Wu, a construction worker who came to New Zealand on an accredited employer work visa, brought claims against his corporate employer (Awa 2001 Limited, formerly Mars Living Construction Limited, now in liquidation) and its associated individual Bo Zhang, seeking wage arrears, holiday pay, unpaid breaks, and personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal. The key legal questions were whether Mr Zhang personally employed Mr Wu, whether the personal grievance claims could proceed against a company in liquidation without liquidator consent, and whether wage arrears were owing. The Authority found Awa 2001 was the employer, personal grievance claims could not proceed without liquidator consent, and wage arrears of $529.92 (gross) plus unquantified termination holiday pay were owed by Awa 2001, with leave granted to bring further information on outstanding matters.

Applicant: Li Wu (employee)
Respondent: Awa 2001 Limited (formerly Mars Living Construction Limited) (in liquidation) (First Respondent / employer); Bo Zhang (Second Respondent)

Applicant: Paul Young, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Kiko Sun, representative for the Second Respondent (no appearance/representative noted for First Respondent)

Li Wu arrived in New Zealand in early 2023 on an accredited employer work visa to work for Mars Living Construction Limited as a construction worker, starting on 13 February 2023 and receiving his last pay on 30 September 2024. The company changed its name to Awa 2001 Limited on 12 August 2024 and was placed in liquidation on 8 May 2025. Mr Wu became severely unwell in mid-July 2024, was hospitalised in mid-August 2024, and communication between the parties broke down after his discharge; the employment relationship was treated as having ended by at least 28 October 2024. Mr Wu claimed Bo Zhang had become his direct employer and was personally liable for wage arrears and personal grievance remedies, while Mr Zhang denied any employment relationship with Mr Wu and rejected personal liability. The application, filed 14 November 2024, underwent extensive procedural history including two rounds of mediation, an abandoned interim reinstatement application, a name-change direction, and the company entering liquidation before the investigation meeting on 16 July 2026.

1. Whether Bo Zhang personally employed Li Wu — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[16]).

The Authority assessed whether indicia of employment pointed to Mr Zhang personally rather than the corporate entity. Mr Wu's work visa, written employment agreement, payslips, and bank account payments were all in the name of the corporate entity (Mars Living Construction Limited / Awa 2001), and Mr Wu acknowledged very little direct dealings with Mr Zhang. The WeChat messages Mr Wu relied upon were not sent by Mr Zhang and there was insufficient evidence linking Mr Zhang to their content. Mr Wu could not identify when or how Mr Zhang became his employer, and the claim was dismissed.

2. Whether personal grievance claims (unjustified disadvantage and unjustified constructive dismissal) can proceed against Awa 2001 Limited (in liquidation) — Status: Dismissed (paras [17]-[20]).

Section 248(1)(c)(i) of the Companies Act 1993 requires the liquidator's consent before proceedings can be brought against a company in liquidation. The Authority had informed Mr Wu of this requirement since 26 June 2025, but no liquidator consent was produced. Accordingly, both personal grievance claims were unable to proceed. The Authority nonetheless recorded the factual circumstances of the employment ending, noting that by 28 October 2024 the employment relationship appeared exhausted.

3. Whether Mr Wu can pursue claims against "Mars Living Construction Limited" as a separate or distinct entity — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[22]).

The Authority found Mars Living Construction Limited and Awa 2001 Limited are the same legal entity, differing only by name change registered on 12 August 2024. There is no separate "Mars Living Construction Limited" against which claims can be brought; the entity is Awa 2001 (in liquidation), and Mr Wu cannot pursue claims against it by the former name as if it were a different company.

4. Whether Mr Wu contributed to the circumstances of any personal grievances (s 124 of the Act) — Status: Not reached (para [14]).

This issue was listed for investigation but was not reached because the personal grievance claims could not proceed without liquidator consent.

5. Whether Mr Zhang can be liable for personal grievance remedies under s 123 of the Act if he is not the employer — Status: Not reached (para [14]).

This issue was listed as an identified question but was not addressed given the dismissal of the personal grievance claims and the finding that Mr Zhang was not Mr Wu's employer.

6. Whether arrears of wages, public holiday pay, and unpaid meal and rest breaks are owed — Status: Partially established (paras [23]-[29]).

The Authority reviewed Mr Wu's payslips and confirmed he received all payments shown. Public holiday pay in 2023 and 2024 was found to have been paid. A wage underpayment of $529.92 (gross) was established for the pay period 1–31 October 2023 due to an incorrectly loaded pay rate. Termination holiday pay was also found to be owing but had not been quantified. The $190 PTE fee claim was withdrawn. Claimed meal break arrears were not established, as meal breaks under the employment agreement and law were unpaid. Mr Wu could not identify specific uncompensated breaks. One week of wage arrears raised in September 2024 had already been paid and confirmed.

7. Whether interest should be ordered on any sum awarded — Status: Not reached (para [14]).

Listed as an issue but not addressed in the determination, likely because quantification of all amounts remains incomplete and the matter is subject to further hearing.

8. Whether Mr Zhang is personally liable for wage arrears as a "person involved" under s 142Y of the Act — Status: Dismissed/Conditional (paras [30]-[32]).

Mr Zhang ceased to be a director of Awa 2001 on 9 January 2021. While he was involved in the day-to-day business, the evidence was insufficient to establish his role in the specific underpayments. Leave was granted to Mr Wu to bring further information before the Authority on this question. The Authority also noted that Mr Wu had not registered as a creditor with the liquidator, and Awa 2001 might still be able to meet the wage obligations through the liquidation process.

9. Whether obligations owed to Mr Wu were breached (s 4 good faith, employment agreement compliance, minimum employment standards) — Status: Not reached (para [14] and footnote 5).

This issue was noted as unclear in its factual basis on the face of the statement of problem and was not substantively addressed in the determination.

10. Whether a penalty should be ordered against Mr Zhang for breach of minimum employment standards — Status: Not reached (para [14] and footnote 6).

The Authority noted two unresolved threshold questions: whether such a penalty is available if Mr Zhang is not the employer, and whether any penalty claim would be time-barred. These questions were not resolved as the issue was not substantively reached.

11. Costs and disbursements — Status: Conditional (para [35]).

The Authority found that the claims against Mr Zhang were not upheld but that Ms Sun's evidence was relevant. It indicated a costs order did not appear appropriate but directed parties to file memoranda within 14 days if they disagreed. The matter is subject to further directions on application.

The claim was partially upheld: wage arrears of $529.92 (gross) and unquantified termination holiday pay were established against Awa 2001 (in liquidation); all claims against Mr Zhang personally (as employer or person involved) were dismissed or deferred; personal grievance claims could not proceed without liquidator consent; and leave was granted for further information on holiday pay quantification and any s 142Y claim.

Wage arrears: $529.92 (gross) owed by Awa 2001 Limited (in liquidation) — final.
Termination holiday pay: Owed by Awa 2001 Limited (in liquidation) — amount not yet quantified; subject to further information to be provided to the Authority (conditional/interim).
Personal grievance remedies (lost wages, hurt and humiliation): None ordered — claims could not proceed without liquidator consent.
Penalties: None ordered.
Interest: Not addressed.
Reinstatement: Not ordered (application abandoned).
Costs: Not determined; parties directed to file memoranda within 14 days if they seek a costs order.
Other: Leave granted to Mr Wu to bring further information on (a) quantification of termination holiday pay and (b) a s 142Y persons-involved claim against Mr Zhang. A copy of the determination to be sent to the liquidator.

[CONSENT]

ZKP (applicant/employee) and SQU (respondent/employer) were parties to an employment relationship dispute investigated by the Employment Relations Authority. During the investigation meeting, the parties resolved their dispute by agreement and jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination recording their settlement. The settlement terms are confidential and subject to a non-publication order.

Applicant: ZKP (employee)
Respondent: SQU (employer)

Applicant: DFJ (representative for the Applicant)
Respondent: YMI (representative for the Respondent)

ZKP (applicant) brought an employment relationship problem against SQU (respondent) before the Employment Relations Authority, Christchurch. An investigation meeting was held on 31 August 2026 in Dunedin. During that meeting, the parties were able to reach a resolution of their employment relationship problem. They jointly requested the Authority issue a consent determination to record the terms of their settlement agreement. The specific nature of the underlying employment dispute, the facts in contention, and the settlement terms are not disclosed in the published determination, as they are subject to a non-publication order under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

1. Whether the parties' settlement agreement should be recorded as a consent determination of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [1]-[3]).

The parties jointly requested, pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, that the Authority record their settlement agreement as a consent determination, thereby giving the terms the force of orders of the Authority. The Authority accepted this request and issued the determination by consent. No contested legal issues were determined on the merits.

2. Whether non-publication orders should be made over the settlement terms and party identities — Status: Established (para [3]).

Pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority made a non-publication order over the contents of the settlement agreement and prohibited publication of the parties' names and identities. Both parties and their representatives are referred to only by random three-letter strings in the published determination.

The claim was resolved by consent during the investigation meeting; the Authority issued a consent determination recording the parties' settlement agreement as orders of the Authority.

The specific remedies agreed upon by the parties are contained in the settlement agreement annexed to the determination, which is subject to a non-publication order and is not disclosed in the published text. No remedy details are available for reporting.

GSL, a Corrections Officer employed by the Department of Corrections since February 2024, brought a personal grievance claim alleging unjustified disadvantage arising from his transfer to a different unit within his facility following an external investigation, and also alleged a breach of the statutory duty of good faith. The key legal questions were whether the transfer constituted an unjustified disadvantage, and whether Corrections' failure to disclose the existence of the external investigation breached good faith obligations. Both the personal grievance and the penalty claim failed, though a technical breach of the duty of good faith was acknowledged; costs were reserved.

Applicant: GSL (employee — Corrections Officer)
Respondent: Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: John Dustow, advocate
Respondent: Nikki Farrell and Zara Melville, counsel

GSL commenced employment as a Corrections Officer with the Department of Corrections in February 2024, working primarily in Unit A at a Waikato facility, though he also performed secondment duties as a Senior Corrections Officer. In August 2025, an external investigation was conducted involving GSL, which ultimately found no wrongdoing on his part. Shortly after the investigation, GSL met with the former General Manager and his union delegate, following which he was transferred to Unit B within the same facility. GSL claimed he was not given adequate reasons for the transfer, that the real reason related to the external investigation, and that he suffered humiliation and loss of mana as a result. Corrections maintained the transfer was not disciplinary, was operationally and safety-motivated, that GSL was consulted prior to the decision, and that his pay, role, secondment, and roster were unaffected. A non-publication order sought by Corrections was declined, but the determination was written to minimise reference to the external investigation and GSL's name was anonymised.

1. Whether the non-publication order sought by Corrections should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [5]-[8]).

Corrections sought a non-publication order regarding the external investigation. The Authority declined it on the basis that insufficient evidence was provided in support. However, the determination was written to minimise reference to the investigation and GSL's name was anonymised as a practical accommodation.

2. Whether Corrections was required to consult with GSL prior to transferring him to Unit B — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[36]).

GSL argued that consultation was required before his transfer, relying on AJY v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2023] NZEmpC 168, which held that Corrections must at least communicate before making and implementing transfer decisions. The Authority found that Corrections did communicate with GSL prior to confirming the transfer — the meeting with the former General Manager and union delegate included discussion of the proposed transfer, an adjournment for consideration, and an adjustment in response to GSL's objection (avoiding a transfer to Unit C). The minimum threshold of communication set out in AJY was met.

3. Whether GSL was unjustifiably disadvantaged in his employment by the transfer to Unit B and/or restrictions on his duties — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[47]).

The Authority applied the test from Bilkey v Imagepac Partners [2002], which requires actual disadvantageous consequences to the employee, not merely subjective dissatisfaction. GSL accepted that his pay, role, secondment, and roster were unchanged; there was no disciplinary finding or adverse assessment against him; and the claim that his duties were restricted was unsupported by evidence. The Authority found Corrections acted consistently with the Collective Agreement and that its actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done under s 103A(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. No unjustified disadvantage was established.

4. Whether GSL was entitled to compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Not reached (para [48]).

As the personal grievance was not established, the Authority was not required to consider remedies, including compensation for hurt and humiliation.

5. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for GSL's contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (para [48]).

Contributory conduct was not considered because the personal grievance was not established and no remedy arose.

6. Whether Corrections breached the statutory duty of good faith under s 4 of the Act by failing to provide adequate explanation for the transfer and/or not disclosing the existence of the external investigation — Status: Partially established (technical breach only, no penalty) (paras [49]-[63]).

The Authority considered whether Corrections' failure to disclose the existence of the external investigation, and the adequacy of the explanation given for the transfer, constituted a breach of good faith. The Authority found that Corrections did provide GSL with an adequate (if unsatisfying) explanation for the transfer. However, it acknowledged that to the extent Corrections failed to disclose the existence of the investigation, this may constitute a "technical breach" of the duty of good faith, given that someone within Corrections was likely aware of the investigation before it occurred. The Authority noted uncertainty as to which limb of s 4(4)(a)-(g) applied. Importantly, the conditions for a penalty under s 4A of the Act were not met — there was no evidence the breach was deliberate, serious, and sustained, or intended to undermine the Collective Agreement or the employment relationship.

7. Whether a penalty should be imposed for the breach of the duty of good faith — Status: Dismissed (paras [59]-[63]).

The Authority noted that the imposition of a penalty is discretionary and the threshold is high. Applying s 4A of the Act, even where a technical breach of good faith was found, there was no evidence of deliberate, serious, or sustained conduct, nor any intention to undermine the Collective Agreement or employment relationship. There was also no evidence that the former General Manager or Acting General Manager deliberately misled or deceived GSL. The penalty threshold was not met.

8. Whether either party is entitled to costs — Status: Reserved (paras [66]-[68]).

The Authority reserved costs, noting GSL achieved a modest measure of success insofar as a technical breach of good faith was acknowledged. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, GSL may file a memorandum within 28 days; Corrections has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff basis unless circumstances require adjustment.

The personal grievance claim was dismissed, the penalty claim was dismissed, and a technical breach of good faith was acknowledged but attracted no penalty; costs were reserved.

None ordered at this stage. Costs are reserved — the parties are encouraged to agree costs, failing which GSL may file a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination date.

Tsui-Ling Fan, a cook employed by Klinh Limited (trading as Buns n Rolls Westfield Albany), brought multiple claims following her dismissal on 30 September 2024, including unjustified dismissal, wage arrears, unpaid holiday and leave entitlements, and penalties for statutory breaches. The key legal questions concerned the fairness of the dismissal process, the quantum of unpaid entitlements, and whether the sole director Linh Thi Thuy Vu was personally liable for employment standard breaches. The Authority upheld the unjustified dismissal claim and most wage/entitlement claims, awarding substantial remedies against KL but dismissing personal claims against Ms Vu.

Applicant: Tsui-Ling Fan (employee)
Respondent: Klinh Limited (First Respondent, employer); Linh Thi Thuy Vu (Second Respondent, sole director and shareholder of Klinh Limited)

Applicant: David Kim, advocate
Respondent: Thomas Tran, counsel

Tsui-Ling Fan was employed as a cook by Klinh Limited (trading as Buns n Rolls Westfield Albany), with the employment relationship found to have commenced on 15 November 2022 when a written individual employment agreement was signed, and ending on 30 September 2024. An altercation on 30 May 2024 between Ms Fan and a colleague led to an informal resolution; KL later alleged a further incident on 3 September 2024, which Ms Fan denied. On 11 September 2024, Mr Nguyen (managing director) met with Ms Fan and issued a dismissal letter, without providing her prior information about the allegations, advising her of her right to a support person, or giving notice the meeting was disciplinary in nature. Ms Fan disputed receiving a verbal warning or the termination letter, and challenged multiple aspects of her pay including unpaid hours, holiday pay, sick leave, and public holiday entitlements. KL accepted annual leave was owed but disputed most other claims, asserting the dismissal was for serious misconduct. Ms Fan raised personal grievances on 7 October 2024 through her representative.

1. When did the employment relationship commence? — Status: Established (paras [11]-[19]).

The Authority applied the test from Raiser Operations BV v ETU Inc [2025] NZSC 162, requiring consideration of the real nature of the relationship including all relevant matters. Ms Fan provided rosters showing her name with allocated shifts from November 2022, correspondence from October 2022, and a photo in work uniform dated 11 October 2022. Despite KL's argument that the agreement was signed only to assist with a work visa and no work was performed until February 2023, the Authority found on the balance of probabilities that the employment relationship was on foot from 15 November 2022.

2. Is Ms Fan owed arrears of wages? — Status: Partially established (paras [20]-[27]).

The Authority applied s 132(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and Rainbow Falls Organic Farm Limited v Rockell [2014] NZEmpC 136, requiring sufficient evidential basis for wage arrears. Ms Fan's claim for approximately eight additional unpaid hours per week between 15 November 2022 and 24 December 2023 was not supported by sufficient evidence. However, based on roster analysis, the Authority found Ms Fan was not paid for 408 hours worked between 15 November 2022 and 16 January 2023, and ordered KL to pay $11,424 (gross).

3. Is Ms Fan owed annual holiday pay? — Status: Established (paras [28]-[30]).

KL conceded this entitlement. Ms Fan did not take any annual leave during employment. The Authority analysed the sum claimed and ordered KL to pay $8,795.47 (gross).

4. Is Ms Fan owed payment for unpaid sick leave? — Status: Established (paras [31], [94]).

The Authority found Ms Fan was not paid for sick leave in September 2024, constituting a breach of the Holidays Act 2003. KL was ordered to pay $280 (gross) for unpaid sick leave.

5. Did Ms Fan raise personal grievances for unjustified disadvantage within the 90-day statutory period? — Status: Partially established (paras [32]-[40]).

The Authority applied s 114(7) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to assess whether each grievance was raised within the employee notification period. The personal grievances for failure to provide a written employment agreement (crystallised 15 November 2022), incorrect wage payments (crystallised 16 January 2023), and incorrect public holiday payments (crystallised 3 June 2024) were all raised outside the 90-day period and were dismissed. Two grievances were established: failure to pay sick leave correctly in September 2024 and failure to pay annual holiday pay at the conclusion of employment, both raised within time.

6. Is Ms Fan owed payments for public holidays? — Status: Partially established (paras [41]-[45]).

The Authority analysed rosters and found Ms Fan worked on two (not ten) public holidays for which she was not correctly paid and did not receive alternative holidays, ordering $672 (gross). Additionally, the Authority found thirteen public holidays fell on days that would otherwise have been working days between 26 December 2022 and 28 June 2024, ordering a further $2,912 (gross).

7. Was Ms Fan unjustifiably dismissed? — Status: Established (paras [46]-[69]).

The Authority applied the s 103A(2) test — whether the employer's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances — and the four considerations in s 103A(3). KL failed on all four: the alleged incident of 3 September 2024 was not investigated and not referenced in the termination letter; Ms Fan was given no information about the allegations before the meeting; she was not advised of her right to a support person or that the meeting was disciplinary; and KL made no genuine findings about her conduct. Citing Gorrie Fuel Limited v Marlow [2005] NZEmpC 132 and Angus v Ports of Auckland Limited [2011] NZEmpC 160, the Authority held the dismissal was unjustified.

8. Did KL breach s 130(2) of the Act (wages and time records) and should a penalty be imposed? — Status: Breach established, penalty dismissed (paras [70]-[73]).

KL was required to provide wages and time records but failed to provide payslips for July 2022 to 24 December 2023. Applying s 133A of the Act and Borsboom v Preet PVT [2016] NZEmpC 143, the Authority found the breach was inadvertent, Ms Fan had not claimed particular loss from it, and declined to impose a penalty.

9. Did KL breach s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 and should a penalty be imposed? — Status: Established (paras [74]-[80]).

The Authority found KL intentionally failed to pay Ms Fan for 408 hours of work between 15 November 2022 and 16 January 2023, breaching s 4 of the WPA. Considering the considerable financial loss, Ms Fan's vulnerability as a migrant worker, the intentional nature of the breach, no evidence of inability to pay, and deterrence objectives, the Authority fixed a penalty of $2,500 payable to Ms Fan.

10. Did KL breach clause 12.1 of the individual employment agreement (notice) and should a penalty be imposed? — Status: Dismissed as a separate claim (paras [81]-[85]).

KL argued it had grounds for summary dismissal (serious misconduct) under clause 12.4 and thus was not required to give notice. Although KL did provide three weeks' notice, the Authority found no breach of clause 12.1 because the serious misconduct clause applied. However, because the dismissal was unjustified, any entitlement to notice pay was incorporated into the lost remuneration award.

11. Did KL breach s 65 of the Act by not providing a written individual employment agreement? — Status: Dismissed (paras [86]-[88]).

The Authority found that Ms Fan's employment was governed by a signed written individual employment agreement from 15 November 2022, and therefore KL did not breach s 65(1) of the Act.

12. Did KL breach s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (good faith)? — Status: Dismissed (paras [89]-[93]).

Under s 4A of the Act, a penalty for breach of good faith requires the failure to be deliberate, serious and sustained. The Authority found no grounds beyond the WPA breach to establish a s 4 ERA breach and dismissed this claim.

13. Compensation for hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Established (paras [96]-[104]).

Applying the test from Pyne v Invacare New Zealand Limited [2023] NZEmpC 179 (nature and extent of harm) and Lim v Meadow Mushrooms Limited [2015] NZEmpC 192 (meaning of humiliation and injury to feelings), and referencing Rimple v NZ-Kebabs Limited [2026] NZERA 128 for comparable cases, the Authority awarded $14,000 for the unjustified dismissal, $1,500 for the unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to annual leave, and $500 for the sick leave grievance.

14. Reimbursement of lost wages (s 128) — Status: Established (paras [105]-[108]).

The Authority found Ms Fan took reasonable steps to find alternative employment following dismissal, supported by IRD records showing no wages received after 31 October 2024, and citing Maddigan v Director-General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190. Ms Fan was awarded 13 weeks' lost wages totalling $14,560 (gross).

15. Should any remedy be reduced under s 124 of the Act (contribution)? — Status: Dismissed (paras [109]-[112]).

Applying Yang v Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand [2025] NZEmpC and requiring consideration of whether the employee's conduct contributed to the dismissal situation and was culpable, the Authority found no evidence that Ms Fan's conduct contributed to her dismissal. KL had not investigated the allegations or made any findings against Ms Fan, so no reduction was made.

16. Did KL breach employment standards? — Status: Established (para [113]).

The Authority found KL breached the minimum entitlement and payment provisions of the Holidays Act 2003 and s 4 of the WPA, both of which qualify as employment standards under s 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000.

17. Was Ms Vu personally involved in the breaches of employment standards (s 142W of the Act)? — Status: Dismissed (paras [114]-[118]).

The Authority applied A Labour Inspector v Southern Taxis Limited [2021] NZCA 705, which requires knowledge of the essential facts establishing the employer's contravention. Although Ms Vu is the sole director and shareholder of KL, Mr Nguyen's uncontested evidence that he was the de facto managing director during the employment period was accepted, and the Authority found insufficient evidence that Ms Vu had the requisite knowledge of the essential facts to establish personal involvement.

18. If Ms Vu were found personally involved, should leave be granted to recover wages from Ms Vu under s 142Y(2)(b) of the Act? — Status: Not reached (para [119]).

This issue was considered only in obiter. The Authority stated that even if Ms Vu had been found personally involved, it would not have granted leave to recover from Ms Vu because there was no evidence KL was unable to pay the arrears owed.

19. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [121]-[123]).

Costs were not determined. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs themselves; if unable to do so, Ms Fan may lodge a memorandum on costs within 28 days. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if required to determine costs.

The claims were partially upheld: the unjustified dismissal, most wage and entitlement arrears, two personal grievance claims for unjustified disadvantage, and a penalty for the WPA breach were established; the claims against Ms Vu personally, the good faith penalty, the s 130(2) penalty, the notice breach claim, the s 65 breach claim, and the out-of-time unjustified disadvantage grievances were dismissed.

- Wage arrears (15 Nov 2022 – 16 Jan 2023): $11,424 (gross)
- Annual holiday pay: $8,795.47 (gross)
- Unpaid sick leave (September 2024): $280 (gross)
- Public holiday underpayment (worked on 2 public holidays): $672 (gross)
- Public holiday entitlements (13 holidays falling on working days): $2,912 (gross)
- Penalty for breach of s 4 WPA: $2,500 (payable to Ms Fan)
- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage – sick leave grievance, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $500
- Compensation (unjustified disadvantage – annual leave grievance, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $1,500
- Compensation for hurt, humiliation and injury to feelings (unjustified dismissal, s 123(1)(c)(i)): $14,000
- Lost wages (unjustified dismissal, 13 weeks, s 128): $14,560 (gross)
- Total ordered against KL: $56,643.47 (plus penalty)
- All sums payable within 28 days of the determination
- No reinstatement ordered
- No remedy awarded against Ms Vu
- Costs: Reserved

[COSTS ONLY]

Amanda Bradley (employee) brought proceedings against Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) arising from a dispute about access to a workplace superannuation scheme (FireSuper) under a collective agreement. In the substantive determination (2 July 2026), the Authority found in Ms Bradley's favour on good faith grounds only, awarding $5,000 compensation, while her primary claim regarding collective agreement interpretation failed. This costs determination resolves the reserved question of costs, with the Authority ordering that costs lie where they fall.

Applicant: Amanda Bradley (employee)
Respondent: Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) (employer)

Applicant: Tim Cleary
Respondent: Tanya Kennedy

Ms Bradley brought a claim against FENZ involving a dispute about whether a collective agreement provision allowed her access to the FireSuper restricted workplace savings scheme. In the substantive determination of 2 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 441), the Authority found that FENZ had breached good faith obligations through poor communication and unjustified actions during the employment relationship, awarding Ms Bradley $5,000 compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. However, her predominant claim — that the collective agreement entitled her to join FireSuper — was unsuccessful. Costs were reserved and the parties were encouraged to agree, but could not do so. Ms Bradley's counsel sought a costs contribution of approximately $8,463.95; FENZ sought an uplifted costs award of approximately $9,709.15 in its favour, arguing Ms Bradley's shifting approach had caused unnecessary cost.

1. Whether costs should be awarded, and if so to which party and in what amount — Status: Established (costs to lie where they fall) (paras [3]–[9]).

The Authority applied the well-established costs principles from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and confirmed in Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] ERNZ 919, including that costs generally follow the event but are not to be used as punishment, that the nature of the case influences the approach, and that in disputes involving the interpretation or application of a collective agreement there is a presumption that the standard daily tariff approach is not appropriate and costs should lie where they fall. The Authority acknowledged Ms Bradley had only mixed success — she succeeded on good faith grounds but failed on her predominant collective agreement claim — and noted some criticism of the shifting presentation of the claim. However, it also noted FENZ initially prolonged its own decision-making process. Taking all factors into account, and given the matter predominantly involved a disputed collective agreement interpretation with potentially wider application for both parties, the Authority exercised its discretion under s 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to order that costs lie where they fall.

The costs application was resolved by ordering that costs lie where they fall, with no costs awarded to either party.

None ordered. Each party bears their own costs.

JXU, an interior design intern employed by AEC Design Studio Limited for a single exhibition weekend, was summarily dismissed mid-way through her engagement after a dispute with the sole director, Cheng Tih Lee, over photographing a business card. The Authority considered whether the dismissal was unjustifiable and whether JXU was owed unpaid wages, holiday pay, and other remedies, as well as whether statutory penalties applied for employment standards breaches. The Authority upheld the unjustifiable dismissal claim, awarded compensation (reduced by 25% for contributory conduct), ordered unpaid wages and holiday pay, and imposed a penalty on AEC, with Mr Lee made jointly and severally liable for monetary remedies if AEC fails to pay.

Applicant: JXU (employee, interior design intern — name suppressed)
Respondent: AEC Design Studio Limited (First Respondent, employer); Cheng Tih Lee (Second Respondent, sole director of AEC)

Applicant: Felix Lee, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

JXU, a recent interior design diploma graduate, was engaged by AEC Design Studio Limited as a casual intern to assist at an exhibition stand over the weekend of 12–14 September 2025. She was to be paid minimum wage for approximately 19 agreed hours across three days. On Saturday 13 September 2025, a dispute arose when a visitor's business card was handed to Mr Lee (the director) rather than being photographed by JXU per her instructions; JXU insisted on photographing the card as proof of her work, Mr Lee refused and asked her to leave, and when she refused he had her escorted from the venue by security. JXU received no payment for any of her work. AEC was served with proceedings but did not file a reply, did not attend the case management conference, and did not appear at the investigation meeting. The investigation proceeded on the applicant's uncontested evidence under clause 12 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA).

1. Whether a non-publication order suppressing JXU's name should be granted — Status: Established (paras [9]-[14]).

The Authority applied the open justice principle from MW v Spiga Ltd [2024] NZEmpC 147 and the Supreme Court's guidance in Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135, which requires sound reasons to depart from open justice. The Authority accepted that JXU has a history of psychiatric illness and that publication of her name risked causing real and ongoing harm to her mental health and prospects. An order was made under Schedule 2, clause 10(1) of the ERA suppressing her name, with the pseudonym "JXU" (letters bearing no relation to her name) used throughout.

2. Whether JXU was unjustifiably dismissed by AEC — Status: Established (paras [30]-[34]).

The Authority applied the s 103A ERA test of justification, requiring that the employer's actions, both substantively and procedurally, were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. AEC provided no substantive reason for dismissal and followed no process — JXU was simply escorted out by security following the altercation. The Authority found the dismissal was both substantively and procedurally unjustifiable.

3. Whether JXU was owed unpaid wages — Status: Established (paras [36]-[37]).

JXU was contracted to work 19 hours across three days and was ready and willing to do so; the dismissal prevented her from completing the engagement. The Authority found she was entitled to payment for all contracted hours and ordered $446.50 gross in unpaid wages pursuant to s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA).

4. Whether JXU was owed holiday pay on unpaid wages — Status: Established (para [38]).

Pursuant to s 81 of the Holidays Act 2003, JXU was entitled to holiday pay on the wages ordered. The Authority ordered $35.72 as holiday pay on the wages amount.

5. Whether JXU was entitled to compensation for lost remuneration beyond the contracted weekend — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[40]).

JXU gave evidence she had been unable to find employment after her dismissal. However, the Authority noted she was engaged for a specific period (one weekend only) with no suggestion of ongoing employment beyond that, and therefore made no order for lost remuneration.

6. Whether JXU was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) ERA — Status: Established (paras [41]-[47]).

The Authority accepted JXU found the manner of dismissal — being escorted from the venue in front of the public — extremely humiliating and distressing, and that it caused her acute stress, anxiety, and affected her self-confidence. JXU's evidence that she experienced suicidal ideation and required police attendance, counselling, and specialist mental health support was noted; however, the Authority also noted AEC was unaware of her pre-existing psychiatric vulnerability, and that a tortious "thin skull" argument was outside ERA jurisdiction. Considering the circumstances and comparable awards, the Authority set compensation at $12,000 before any contribution reduction.

7. Whether JXU was unjustifiably disadvantaged (as a separate claim) — Status: Dismissed (para [48]).

JXU claimed unjustifiable disadvantage separately, but the Authority found the circumstances giving rise to the disadvantage were intrinsically linked to the unjustifiable dismissal for which compensation had already been awarded, and made no separate compensatory award.

8. Whether JXU's conduct contributed to the situation, warranting a reduction in compensation under s 124 ERA — Status: Established (paras [49]-[52]).

The Authority found that while Mr Lee's instruction not to photograph the business card once he held it was reasonable, JXU's persistent refusal to accept that instruction escalated the altercation and contributed to the dismissal. The Authority reduced the compensation award by 25%, from $12,000 to $9,000.

9. Whether AEC breached minimum employment standards, warranting penalties — Status: Established (paras [53]-[72]).

The Authority identified five statutory breaches: (a) s 4 WPA (failure to pay wages due); (b) s 81 Holidays Act 2003 (failure to pay annual leave); (c) s 130 ERA (failure to provide wage and time records on request); (d) s 65 ERA (failure to provide a written employment agreement); and (e) s 4 ERA (failure to act in good faith). Applying the s 133A ERA factors and Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited and Warrington Discount Tobacco Limited [2016] NZEmpC 143, the Authority grouped the five breaches into two global penalties, assessed the breaches as at the lighter end of the scale given the short engagement, and ordered a total penalty of $2,000 to be paid to the Crown.

10. Whether a penalty could be awarded against Mr Lee personally as a person involved in AEC's breaches under s 142W ERA — Status: Dismissed (paras [73]-[77]).

The Authority found Mr Lee, as sole director, was a person involved in all identified employment standards breaches per s 142W. However, it determined that under s 142X ERA only a Labour Inspector (not a private applicant) may bring a penalty claim against an involved person, so no penalty could be ordered against Mr Lee.

11. Whether Mr Lee could be held personally liable to fulfil the remedies ordered under s 142Y ERA — Status: Established (paras [78]-[80]).

The Authority found Mr Lee was knowingly concerned in the breaches of minimum employment standards. Under s 142Y(2)(b) ERA, with the Authority's leave, he may be held liable for unpaid wages and other monies to the extent AEC is unable to pay. The Authority ordered AEC and Mr Lee jointly and severally liable to ensure all monetary orders are met, with Mr Lee personally liable if AEC fails to pay.

12. Whether costs should be ordered — Status: Established (paras [83]-[85]).

Assessed on the standard half-day tariff, the Authority ordered AEC to pay JXU $2,250 as a contribution to costs, plus the filing fee of $71.56.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustifiable dismissal established, unpaid wages and holiday pay ordered, compensation awarded (reduced by 25% for contribution), statutory penalties imposed on AEC, and costs and filing fee ordered; the separate unjustifiable disadvantage claim and the penalty claim against Mr Lee personally were dismissed.

- Unpaid wages: $446.50 gross (pursuant to s 4 WPA)
- Holiday pay: $35.72 (pursuant to s 81 Holidays Act 2003)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings: $9,000.00 (pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) ERA — reduced from $12,000 by 25% for contributory conduct)
- Lost remuneration: None ordered
- Penalty: $2,000.00 (to be paid to the Crown/Crown Bank Account)
- Costs: $2,250.00 (to JXU)
- Filing fee: $71.56 (to JXU)
- Joint and several liability: Mr Lee is ordered to satisfy the monetary remedies ordered (wages, holiday pay, compensation) if AEC is unable or unwilling to pay
- All payments due within 28 days of the determination date
- Non-publication order: JXU's name suppressed

[COSTS ONLY]

Avinash Singh (employee) brought personal grievances of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal against Windcave Limited (employer). Both grievances were dismissed in the primary determination dated 5 May 2026, and the employer's counterclaim — that Singh had unlawfully accessed and disseminated confidential company information — was upheld. This costs determination resolves the sole remaining issue of costs, resulting in an order that Singh pay Windcave $8,000.

Applicant: Avinash Singh (employee)
Respondent: Windcave Limited (employer)

Applicant: David Fleming, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondent: Scott Wilson and Nicole Meech, counsel (firm not stated)

Avinash Singh was employed by Windcave Limited and brought personal grievances of unjustified disadvantage and unjustified dismissal against the company. By determination dated 5 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 279), Authority Member Peter Fuiava dismissed both grievances and upheld Windcave's counterclaim that Singh had accessed the company's confidential information without authority and emailed it to herself and her husband. The investigation meeting comprised a full day on 30 July 2025, a 1.5-hour session on 5 August 2025 to retrieve digital information from Singh's work laptop, and a half-day on 22 October 2025 for oral closing submissions. Costs were reserved in the primary determination. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves, requiring this determination. Windcave sought $15,000 (tariff starting point of $8,000 plus a $7,000 uplift for Singh's conduct increasing costs unnecessarily), while Singh's newly engaged counsel submitted costs of $4,750 was appropriate, accounting for Singh's own costs in responding to the counterclaim.

1. Whether Windcave Limited, as the successful party, is entitled to a costs award — Status: Established (paras [7]).

The Authority applied the principle that costs generally follow the event, as established in PBO Ltd v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808. Given Windcave's success on both the dismissal of Singh's grievances and the counterclaim (including orders protecting the company's confidential information post-employment), the Authority was satisfied that Windcave was entitled to a costs award.

2. What is the appropriate tariff starting point for costs? — Status: Established (paras [8]–[9]).

The Authority applied the notional tariff rates set out in the Authority's Practice Note and Practice Direction: $4,500 for the first day of an investigation meeting, and $3,500 per additional day (with a half-day calculated at $1,750). Combining the first full day ($4,500) with the additional half-day equivalent of meeting time ($1,750) yielded a notional starting point of $6,250.

3. Whether an uplift from the tariff starting point is warranted due to Singh's conduct unnecessarily increasing costs — Status: Established (paras [9]–[10]).

Applying PBO Ltd v Da Cruz, the Authority noted that while costs are not to be used as punishment, conduct that unnecessarily increases costs can justify an upward adjustment. Singh's unlawful access and dissemination of Windcave's confidential information — carried out while she was represented by counsel — necessitated the additional meeting on 5 August 2025 to retrieve that data, and but for the Authority's intervention she would have faced a penalty. The Authority found an uplift from $6,250 to $8,000 appropriate, consistent with the principle that Authority costs awards remain modest. Windcave's requested uplift to $15,000 was not accepted.

4. Whether Singh's position as a largely unrepresented party during the investigation warranted a reduction in costs — Status: Dismissed (paras [9]).

The Authority acknowledged that Singh was largely unrepresented during the investigation but did not apply a reduction on this basis, noting that the unlawful conduct forming the basis for any uplift occurred when Singh was represented by counsel.

The costs claim was partially upheld: Windcave is entitled to costs, awarded at $8,000 — less than the $15,000 sought but more than the $4,750 proposed by Singh.

Costs: $8,000 payable by Avinash Singh to Windcave Limited within 28 days of the date of this costs determination (31 August 2026), as a contribution toward the company's actual and reasonable costs. No other remedies ordered (this is a costs-only determination following dismissal of all substantive claims).

A Labour Inspector brought enforcement action against SSM Investments Limited (a restaurant and takeaway operator) and its sole director and shareholder, Shazneen Shariza Khan, following a labour standards investigation into breaches of minimum employment entitlements affecting five migrant workers. The key legal questions concerned the appropriate globalisation of multiple statutory breaches and the quantum of penalties to be imposed on both the company and the director as a person involved in those breaches. The Authority ordered penalties of $90,000 against SSM Investments Limited and $40,000 against Mrs Khan, with arrears having already been resolved by a prior consent determination.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Respondent: SSM Investments Limited (First Respondent, employer) and Shazneen Shariza Khan (Second Respondent, sole director and shareholder)

Applicant: Amy Webster and Shimal Sataiya-Calderwood, counsel
Respondent: Cathy Fisher and Matthew Orange, counsel

SSM Investments Limited operated a restaurant and takeaway business in Cromwell, with Mrs Khan as its sole director and shareholder. Five migrant employees (all holding work visas restricted to the Cromwell restaurant, three of whom were related to Mrs Khan) were employed, with two later directed by Mrs Khan to work at an Auckland takeaway shop operated under another company (Chicken Bites Limited, also owned by Mrs Khan), though SSM remained their employer throughout. A labour standards investigation identified widespread breaches of minimum wage, wage payment, record-keeping, and holiday entitlement obligations, with total arrears of $147,001.19. The parties reached an agreed resolution on arrears through a consent determination ([2026] NZERA 194), and both SSM and Mrs Khan admitted the breaches and Mrs Khan's involvement as a person involved; the remaining issue for determination was the quantum of penalties. The parties agreed the matter could be determined on the papers, submitting an agreed statement of facts, Mrs Khan's affidavit, and written submissions.

1. Whether the record-keeping breaches under s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and s 81 of the Holidays Act 2003 should be globalised, and at what penalty level — Status: Established (paras [22]-[25], [47]-[50]).

The Authority held that separate statutory breaches arising from a single course of conduct (failure to properly maintain employment records) should be globalised into one breach affecting five employees, citing Shah Enterprise NZ v Labour Inspector [2022] NZEmpC 177 at [59]. The maximum penalties were $20,000 for SSM and $10,000 for Mrs Khan. The Authority set the starting point at 30% of maximum (as proposed by the respondents), resulting in provisional penalties of $6,000 for SSM and $3,000 for Mrs Khan, finding no reason to distinguish between their levels of culpability for this category.

2. Whether the failure-to-pay-full-wages breaches (Minimum Wage Act 1983 s 6 and Wages Protection Act 1983 ss 4 and 5) should be globalised per employee, and at what penalty level — Status: Established (paras [26]-[28], [51]-[57]).

The Authority accepted the LI's and respondents' agreed approach of globalising all wage payment breaches into one breach per employee (five breaches total), with a maximum of $100,000 for SSM and $50,000 for Mrs Khan. Drawing on Labour Inspector v FWP [2025] NZERA 93 and Labour Inspector v Matangi Berry Farms Limited [2020] NZEmpC 43, the Authority adopted a 50% starting point per employee rather than 80% as sought by the LI, yielding provisional penalties of $50,000 for SSM and $25,000 for Mrs Khan, with Mrs Khan's penalty reduced to $20,000 in recognition of her having personally met the arrears liability (though late and pursuant to court-ordered freezing measures).

3. Whether the annual holiday breaches under the Holidays Act 2003 (ss 22, 23–25, 27, 71) should be globalised per employee, and at what penalty level — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31], [58]-[62]).

The Authority accepted globalisation into one breach per employee (five breaches), with a maximum of $100,000 for SSM and $50,000 for Mrs Khan. The Authority adopted the respondents' proposed 40% starting point rather than the LI's 70%, yielding provisional penalties of $40,000 for SSM and $20,000 for Mrs Khan, with Mrs Khan's penalty reduced to $16,000 to recognise her having met the arrears liability.

4. Whether the public holiday breaches under the Holidays Act 2003 (ss 49, 50, 56, 60(2)) should be globalised per employee, and at what penalty level — Status: Established (paras [32]-[34], [63]-[66]).

The Authority accepted globalisation into one breach per employee (five breaches), with a maximum of $100,000 for SSM and $50,000 for Mrs Khan. As with the annual holiday category, the Authority adopted a 40% starting point (respondents' position), yielding provisional penalties of $40,000 for SSM and $20,000 for Mrs Khan, with Mrs Khan's penalty again reduced to $16,000 for the same reasons.

5. Whether sick leave and bereavement leave breaches under Holidays Act 2003 s 71 attracted additional standalone penalties — Status: Dismissed (paras [35]-[37]).

The LI proposed globalising these breaches into the broader Holidays Act breaches already captured, and the respondents agreed. The Authority confirmed no further penalties accrued from these breaches as they were absorbed into the globalised holiday pay categories.

6. Whether the breaches were intentional, negligent, or inadvertent, and how this affected penalty severity — Status: Established as negligent (paras [41]-[42]).

The LI submitted the breaches were intentional; the respondents characterised them as failures of a small, poorly run business. The agreed statement of facts did not directly address intent. The Authority concluded the breaches were negligent rather than intentional, noting that while certain factors pointed toward intentionality, those same factors indicated the respondents should have known their legal obligations, and the conduct did not reach the deliberate exploitation found in Labour Inspector v Preet PVT [2016] NZEmpC 143. This characterisation informed starting points below the higher percentages sought by the LI.

7. Whether penalties should be reduced to reflect the respondents' ability to pay — Status: Partially established (paras [69]-[72]).

The Authority applied a 20% reduction to SSM's provisional penalties based on its inability to pay (the Cromwell business sold at a $100,000 loss; SSM no longer trading), reducing SSM's total from $136,000 to $108,800. The LI's revised position supported a 20% discount for SSM but no discount for Mrs Khan, as funds from her house sale proceeds were held subject to court order and were sufficient to cover the assessed penalties and her credit card debt. The Authority accepted this distinction and left Mrs Khan's penalties at $55,000.

8. Whether penalties should be adjusted for proportionality and consistency with comparable cases — Status: Established (paras [73]-[82]).

The Authority compared the case to Labour Inspector v FWP [2025] NZERA 93, where penalties of $91,000 and $45,500 were imposed on a company and director respectively in materially similar circumstances, later reduced on challenge to $30,000 and $15,000 solely due to ability to pay (St Arnaud Alpine Store 2019 Limited v Labour Inspector [2026] NZEmpC 86). The Authority reduced penalties to $90,000 for SSM and $40,000 for Mrs Khan to achieve consistency with FWP, reflecting also that Mrs Khan (not SSM) paid the arrears. The respondents' submission that the Shah Enterprise apportionment approach should cap combined penalties at $60,000 was rejected; the Authority instead followed Labour Inspector v Sampan Restaurant Ltd [2018] NZEmpC 69 and cases following it, finding the Shah/Preet circumstances were not sufficiently analogous.

9. Whether Chicken Bites Limited should be joined as a party to cover the two employees who worked in Auckland — Status: Not reached (paras [5]-[6]).

The Authority amended the claim to include the Auckland period and gave the respondents an opportunity to join Chicken Bites Limited if they contended it was the employer in Auckland. The respondents did not seek joinder, so SSM remained the employer for the Auckland period. No legal determination on Chicken Bites Limited's status was required or made.

10. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [85]).

The Authority reserved costs but encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. The LI may lodge a memorandum within 28 days if costs are not resolved, with the respondents having a further 14 days to reply.

The penalty claims were upheld in part: penalties were imposed on both SSM Investments Limited ($90,000) and Shazneen Shariza Khan ($40,000), with the amounts determined after globalisation of breaches, assessment of severity, ability-to-pay adjustments, and proportionality review.

Penalties against SSM Investments Limited: $90,000 (payable to the Labour Inspector within 28 days).
Penalties against Shazneen Shariza Khan: $40,000 (payable to the Labour Inspector within 28 days).
Leave granted for parties to apply within 28 days if a court order is required to authorise payment from funds held.
Wage arrears: Previously resolved by consent determination ([2026] NZERA 194) totalling $147,001.19 gross — not part of this determination.
Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to agree; memorandum process set out if not resolved.

The New Zealand Tertiary Education Union (TEU) applied to the Employment Relations Authority for referral to facilitation under s 50B of the Employment Relations Act 2000, in the context of multi-employer collective agreement (MECA) bargaining with 11 polytechnics and institutes of technology. The key legal questions were whether any statutory grounds for facilitation under s 50C(1) existed — specifically whether the respondents had failed to comply with the duty of good faith in a serious and sustained manner that undermined bargaining, and/or whether bargaining had become unduly protracted with extensive efforts (including mediation) having failed. The Authority declined the application on all grounds, finding neither condition was satisfied at this stage of bargaining.

Applicant: New Zealand Tertiary Education Union Te Hautū Kahurangi o Aotearoa Incorporated (union)
Respondents: Ara Institute of Canterbury (First), Manukau Institute of Technology and Unitec Auckland (Second), Eastern Institute of Technology (Third), Nelson Marlborough Institute of Technology (Fourth), Otago Polytechnic (Fifth), The Open Polytechnic of New Zealand (Sixth), New Zealand Institute of Skills and Technology (Seventh), Waikato Institute of Technology (Eighth), Southern Institute of Technology (Ninth), Toi Ohomai Institute of Technology (Tenth), Universal College of Learning (Eleventh) — all employers/polytechnics

Applicant: Peter Cranney, counsel for the Applicant
Respondents: Hamish Kynaston and Sherridan Cook, counsel for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents; Craig Smith, counsel for the Ninth Respondent; David France, counsel for the Tenth Respondent; Alastair Hall, counsel for the Eleventh Respondent

The TEU and the Respondents (formerly operating under NZIST/Te Pūkenga) were parties to a collective agreement that expired on 31 March 2026. The TEU initiated MECA bargaining on 5 February 2026, and the parties met only twice (1 May and 12 June 2026) before the TEU filed its facilitation application on 2 July 2026. No bargaining process agreement had been reached, no mediation had occurred, and no settlement offers had been made. The TEU argued the Respondents had undermined bargaining by refusing to engage in a MECA and had breached the duty of good faith, making bargaining unduly protracted. The Respondents denied undermining bargaining, maintained they had reasonable grounds for preferring single-employer collective agreements (citing operational and financial differences between institutions and alignment with the Education and Training Act 2020), and argued that the statutory grounds for facilitation had not been met.

1. Whether the Respondents' preference for single-employer collective agreements constituted a serious and sustained failure to comply with the duty of good faith under s 4 of the Act that undermined bargaining (s 50C(1)(a)) — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[17]).

The Authority applied s 33(1) and s 33(3) of the Act, which provide that a party's opposition to a MECA is a genuine reason not to conclude a MECA if based on reasonable grounds, and that this does not constitute a failure to bargain in good faith. The Authority relied on Service & Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota v Auckland District Health Board [2007] ERNZ 553, in which the Employment Court held that s 33 does not mandate conclusion of a MECA. The Authority found that a stated preference for single-employer CAs is not a breach of good faith, and that even if it were, such a breach would still need to be "serious and sustained" and to have "undermined the bargaining" — additional requirements that were also not met on the facts.

2. Whether bargaining had been unduly protracted and extensive efforts (including mediation) had failed to resolve difficulties, justifying facilitation under s 50C(1)(b) — Status: Dismissed (paras [18]-[20]).

Section 50C(1)(b) requires both that bargaining has been unduly protracted and that extensive efforts including mediation have failed to resolve difficulties. The Authority found that bargaining initiated on 5 February 2026, with only two meetings held before the July 2026 application, could not be characterised as unduly protracted. Further, no mediation had taken place and efforts to resolve differences had not been extensive. Both limbs of s 50C(1)(b) were therefore unmet.

3. Whether the Authority should direct the parties to mediation as sought by the TEU — Status: Dismissed (para [23]).

The TEU, acknowledging that mediation had not occurred, sought a direction to mediation as an alternative. The Authority declined to make such a direction, noting that all parties appeared willing (or at least not opposed) to mediation, making a formal direction unnecessary. The Authority nonetheless encouraged the parties to consider mediation and noted a further facilitation application could be made if appropriate avenues were explored.

4. Costs — Status: Not ordered (para [25]).

The Authority applied its standard practice for facilitation referral proceedings, as stated in the February 2024 ERA Practice Direction, that parties bear their own costs. No costs order was made.

The application for referral to facilitation was dismissed in full; no grounds under s 50C of the Employment Relations Act 2000 were established.

None ordered. Parties directed to bear their own costs in accordance with the ERA Practice Direction (February 2024). The Authority encouraged the parties to pursue mediation and noted a further facilitation application remains available if circumstances change.

Tracey McMillan, a former Community Practice Manager at SILC Limited, brought personal grievance claims for unjustified disadvantage and constructive dismissal after resigning on 24 January 2025. The preliminary issue was whether her unjustified disadvantage grievances were raised within the 90-day statutory timeframe under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, given that her formal Authority application was lodged on 25 July 2025 — well outside that window. The Authority found that most of the unjustified disadvantage grounds were out of time, but upheld the timely raising of the constructive dismissal grievance and one unjustified disadvantage ground relating to the addition of new allegations during the investigation.

Applicant: Tracey McMillan (employee)
Respondent: SILC Limited (employer)

Applicant: Pamela Greenlee, advocate
Respondent: Jeremy Sparrow, counsel

Tracey McMillan was employed by SILC Limited as a Community Practice Manager from October 2022 until her resignation on 24 January 2025. On 15 January 2025, SILC raised concerns that Ms McMillan had not distributed Christmas gift cards to all team members and sought to meet with her about the matter. On 16 January 2025, SILC suspended her; on 20 January 2025, it raised additional expenditure allegations during the ongoing investigation. Ms McMillan resigned on 24 January 2025, stating she had no choice because her explanations were not being considered and the new allegations were unfair. Her representative sent two emails on 24 January 2025 — one advising of the resignation and intention to file for mediation, and a second explicitly asserting constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage. Ms McMillan did not lodge her formal application with the Authority until 25 July 2025, outside the 90-day period, and no application for leave under s 114(3) was made. SILC opposed the grievances as out of time, while Ms McMillan argued that her earlier communications — particularly the 24 January 2025 emails — constituted valid raising of the grievances within the statutory period.

1. Whether the unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to the unreasonable suspension was raised within the 90-day period under s 114 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]–[23]).

Section 114(1) requires a personal grievance to be raised with the employer within 90 days of the action occurring or coming to the employee's notice. The Authority found that Ms McMillan had provided written feedback on the proposed suspension and had agreed in writing that it was probably best she stayed away from the workplace during the investigation. There was no evidence of any communication before the Authority application in July 2025 raising a disadvantage grievance specifically about the suspension. Accordingly, this ground was not raised within the statutory timeframe.

2. Whether the unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to the refusal to permit remote work during suspension was raised within the 90-day period — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]–[23]).

Applying the same s 114(1) test, the Authority noted that while Ms McMillan suggested working from home, SILC declined and she expressed she did not understand that decision, but the issue was not raised again until the Authority application. No further reference appeared in any correspondence prior to the SOP, and accordingly this ground fell outside the statutory period.

3. Whether the unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to a flawed disciplinary process (gift voucher investigation) was raised within the 90-day period — Status: Dismissed (paras [19]–[23]).

The Authority found that Ms McMillan had confirmed in writing she understood the reasons for SILC's concerns about the gift cards and why an explanation was required. When she later questioned the process, she referred only to the nature of the investigation beyond the Christmas vouchers. No further reference to any specific flawed process grievance appeared before the SOP. This ground was not raised within time.

4. Whether the unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to a predetermined investigation outcome was raised within the 90-day period — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]–[38]).

The Authority found that the 24 January 2025 emails did not specify any conduct with sufficient particularity to enable SILC to respond to a predetermined-outcome allegation, as required by s 114(2) and the principles in Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132. As the substance of this grievance was not adequately communicated, it was not validly raised within time.

5. Whether the unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to the addition of new allegations during the investigation was raised within the 90-day period — Status: Established (paras [25]–[36], [39]).

Applying the test in Creedy v Commissioner of Police [2006] ERNZ 517 and Zivaljevic, the Authority assessed whether the totality of the 24 January 2025 emails conveyed the substance of this grievance to SILC sufficiently for it to respond. The second email stated that the "ongoing and malicious nature of this investigation" and the addition of new allegations was unfair and unjustified, and that a grievance for constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage would be filed. The Authority, by reference to Coy v Commissioner of Police (unreported, 19 November 2007) and Hutchison v Nelson City Council [2012] NZERA 208, concluded that this ground shared the same factual matrix as the constructive dismissal claim and was raised in time.

6. Whether the constructive dismissal grievance was raised within the 90-day period under s 114 — Status: Established (paras [30]–[35], [39]).

The Authority applied the principles from Creedy and Zivaljevic, examining the totality of the 24 January 2025 emails. The second email clearly stated that Ms McMillan considered she had been constructively dismissed, explained that trust and respect had been destroyed by the investigation, and notified SILC that a grievance would be lodged. The Authority concluded this conveyed the substance of the constructive dismissal complaint under s 103(1)(a) of the Act and met the s 114(2) requirements. The grievance was raised within time, though the burden of proof for establishing constructive dismissal will rest with Ms McMillan at the substantive hearing.

7. Whether the 17 January 2025 email could constitute the raising of a personal grievance — Status: Not reached (para [26]).

SILC maintained the 17 January 2025 email was without prejudice or mediation communication. This type of communication is subject to established confidentiality protections, was removed from the file by Authority officers, and was therefore not considered in this determination.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [41]).

Costs were reserved pending the substantive determination of the matter or until the matter is no longer before the Authority.

The claim was partially upheld: the constructive dismissal grievance and one unjustified disadvantage ground (addition of new allegations) were found to have been raised in time; four other unjustified disadvantage grounds were found to be out of time and cannot proceed.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination on jurisdiction/timeliness. The matter proceeds to a substantive investigation on the surviving grievance grounds (constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage relating to addition of new allegations on 20 January 2025). An Authority Officer will contact the parties regarding next steps. Costs are reserved until the substantive determination or until the matter is no longer before the Authority.

Vicky Hau, a general manager employed by Mangere Town Centre Bid Incorporated, was made redundant on 12 June 2026 following a restructure. She applied for interim reinstatement, arguing her dismissal was unjustified due to improper motivation, lack of genuine commercial grounds, and the engagement of a contractor to perform her former duties immediately after her termination. The Authority granted interim reinstatement, finding serious questions to be tried on both unjustified dismissal and permanent reinstatement, and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured reinstatement.

Applicant: Vicky Hau (employee, former general manager)
Respondent: Mangere Town Centre Bid Incorporated (employer, business association)

Applicant: Ben Anderson, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Gerard Elwell, counsel for the Respondent

Vicky Hau commenced employment as general manager with Mangere Town Centre Bid Incorporated (a BID programme business association) on 16 July 2024. Her employment was terminated by redundancy on 12 June 2026, following a proposal dated 14 April 2026 to disestablish her position on financial grounds, specifically a working capital shortfall identified by an independent auditor in February 2026. Ms Hau disputed the genuineness of the redundancy, pointing to a complaint she had raised against the chairperson of the executive committee in November 2025, a subsequent personal grievance in February 2026, and governance concerns she had raised — all predating the restructure proposal. She also noted that a contractor, Campaignz Limited, was formally engaged on 13 June 2026 (the day after her final day) to perform the full scope of management services she had previously undertaken. On 3 July 2026, Ms Hau applied to the Authority for interim reinstatement. The matter was heard on the papers via AVL on 19 August 2026, with all evidence consisting of untested affidavits.

1. Whether there is a serious question to be tried regarding unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [13]–[22]).

The Authority applied the two-part test for interim reinstatement from Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, requiring first that a serious question exists as to unjustified dismissal. The Authority found that the sequence of events — including Ms Hau's prior grievances against the chairperson, the immediate engagement of a contractor performing identical duties, the lack of financial information provided to Ms Hau, and the failure to explore redeployment or alternatives — raised genuine questions about whether there were genuine commercial grounds for the redundancy (Grace Team Accounting Limited v Brake [2014] NZCA 541), whether the position was truly disestablished (Waikato District Health Board v Archibald [2017] NZEmpC 132), and whether alternatives to dismissal were genuinely considered (Gafiatullina v Propellerhead Limited [2021] NZEmpC 146). The Authority concluded a serious question to be tried was established.

2. Whether there is a serious question to be tried regarding permanent reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [23]–[40]).

The society advanced five grounds why permanent reinstatement was not reasonably practicable: the position was disestablished, the office had closed, financial viability concerns, Ms Hau's alleged bad faith, and relationship breakdown (Hong v Auckland Transport [2019] NZEmpC 54). The Authority rejected each ground: it found the society was already paying a contractor to do the same work so could afford reinstatement (saving approximately $2,000 per month compared to Ms Hau's salary, with further savings of $48,270 from other expenses); closure of the physical office was not an impediment; there was no evidential basis that reinstatement threatened financial viability; allegations of bad faith (relating to handover obligations, a March 2026 financial update email, and a May 2026 email to Auckland Council) were not substantiated on the evidence; and relationship difficulties could be managed through an employment sub-committee or key liaison person (Beck v Heart of the City Incorporated [2026] 301). A serious question to be tried on permanent reinstatement was established.

3. Whether the balance of convenience favours interim reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [41]–[45]).

The Authority considered adequacy of damages, preservation of the status quo, and relative strength of the parties' cases (Stellar Elements New Zealand Limited v Amesbury [2024] NZEmpC 136). It found that Ms Hau's salary was her primary income, her professional standing and mana in the community had been harmed by sudden job loss, and that money was a poor substitute for loss of employment (Genesys Telecommunications Laboratories Limited [2019] NZEmpC 113; Vice Chancellor of Lincoln University v Cheng [2024] NZEmpC 227). The society's financial hardship argument was insufficient given the savings it had made and its ongoing contractor payments. The balance of convenience strongly favoured Ms Hau.

4. Whether overall justice favours interim reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [46]–[52]).

The Authority found that Ms Hau was not at fault, that she genuinely valued her role and suffered emotional and reputational harm from its loss, that the circumstances of the restructure raised serious concerns, and that reinstatement — while challenging — was achievable with constructive engagement. Noting that the executive committee is elected and a new election was due in October, and that supporting successful employment relationships is central to the Act, the Authority concluded overall justice also favoured interim reinstatement (Vegepod NZ Limited v Lowe [2025] NZEmpC 76).

5. Procedural matter — costs — Status: Not reached/reserved (para [57]).

The Authority reserved the question of costs, to be determined at a later stage.

The application for interim reinstatement was upheld in full; all grounds for the serious question test, balance of convenience, and overall justice were established in Ms Hau's favour.

Interim reinstatement to payroll: from Tuesday 1 September 2026.
Interim reinstatement to the position of general manager: from Tuesday 8 September 2026 (pursuant to s 123(1)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 2000).
Mediation: directed within 21 days of the determination.
Case management conference: to be convened following mediation to progress to a substantive investigation meeting.
Costs: reserved.
Note: This is an interim order only; all findings are made on the basis of untested affidavit evidence and are provisional pending a substantive hearing.

[COSTS ONLY]

Sione Afimeimounga (employee) successfully established an unjustified dismissal claim against NPD Limited (employer) in a prior determination ([2026] NZERA 506). This determination concerns only the quantum of costs following the parties' failure to agree on costs between themselves. The Authority awarded $6,500.00 in costs to the applicant, taking into account a Calderbank offer made before the investigation meeting.

Applicant: Sione Afimeimounga Martins (employee)
Respondent: NPD Limited (employer)

Applicant: Dave Cain, advocate
Respondent: Dean Kilpatrick, counsel

In a determination dated 29 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 506), the Authority found that Mr Afimeimounga had been unjustifiably dismissed by NPD Limited. Costs were reserved in that determination to allow the parties to settle the issue themselves, but they were unable to do so. On 23 September 2025, Mr Afimeimounga made a Calderbank offer to NPD proposing settlement for $14,500.00 (comprising $10,000.00 to Mr Afimeimounga and $4,500.00 plus GST in costs), which NPD did not accept. The matter had involved a one-day investigation meeting. NPD submitted that Mr Afimeimounga's contribution (as noted in the substantive determination) should be taken into account in any costs award, though the Authority noted that contribution had already been factored into the remedies awarded.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to the applicant as the successful party, and at what level — Status: Established (paras [6]-[15]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from section 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which confers a discretionary power to order payment of reasonable costs and expenses. The applicable principles are drawn from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, including that costs follow the event but are not to be used as punishment, and are to be consistent with the Authority's equity and good conscience jurisdiction (also citing NZ Automobile Association Inc v McKay [1996] 2 ERNZ 622). The Authority took a one-day investigation meeting as the starting point for calculation and awarded $6,500.00 in costs.

2. Whether the applicant's Calderbank offer should influence the level of costs awarded — Status: Established (paras [10]-[12], [14]).

The Authority applied the principle from Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 (CA) that a genuine pre-hearing settlement offer, not accepted by the opposing party, is a relevant factor in costs assessment. The Calderbank offer of $14,500.00 was made after mediation but well before the investigation meeting, and the amount ultimately awarded to the applicant in the substantive determination exceeded the offer. The Authority found this represented a genuine attempt to resolve matters early at a lesser sum and applied an uplift to the costs award to reflect NPD's unreasonable rejection of the offer.

3. Whether the applicant's contributory conduct should reduce the costs award — Status: Dismissed (para [13]).

NPD submitted that Mr Afimeimounga's contributory conduct (as found in the substantive determination) should reduce the costs award. The Authority acknowledged that some contribution had been found but declined to apply a further reduction, noting that the contribution had already been taken into account in determining the remedies in the substantive determination. No further deduction from costs was warranted on this basis.

The costs claim was upheld; NPD Limited was ordered to pay $6,500.00 in costs to Mr Afimeimounga.

Costs: $6,500.00 ordered against NPD Limited pursuant to clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. No other remedies were addressed in this determination (substantive remedies were dealt with in [2026] NZERA 506).

SZL, a young temporary employee, brought personal grievance claims against OMC Limited following the abrupt ending of a brief seasonal employment in December 2024. The key legal questions were whether a 90-day trial period shielded OMC from a dismissal claim, and whether SZL was unjustifiably disadvantaged and dismissed. The Authority found the trial period invalid, upheld both grievance claims, and awarded lost wages of $2,527 and hurt and humiliation compensation of $12,000, with costs reserved.

Applicant: SZL (employee)
Respondent: OMC Limited (employer)

Applicant: William Lynch, advocate
Respondent: Self-represented

SZL was employed by OMC Limited in a temporary seasonal role at a leisure-related facility from 27 November 2024, at $26 per hour with a guaranteed minimum of 60 hours per fortnight. The employment ended in disputed circumstances on or around 14 December 2024, after a turbulent two-week period during which OMC withdrew SZL's promised operational training, sought to reduce SZL's pay rate unilaterally, and held a meeting on 9 December 2024 at which dismissal was communicated subject to SZL signing away personal grievance rights. Following the employment ending, OMC's Director sent threatening texts to SZL warning of social media exposure if proceedings continued. SZL raised a personal grievance on 19 December 2024, alleging unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage, and filed an application with the Authority on 15 August 2025 after OMC did not respond. OMC argued that SZL was subject to a valid 90-day trial period and could be dismissed without justification, while SZL contended the trial period was invalid and the dismissal was procedurally and substantively unfair.

1. Whether a permanent non-publication order should be made for both parties — Status: Established (paras [1]-[10]).

The Authority applied the two-part test from the full Employment Court decision in MW v Spiga Ltd [2024] NZEmpC 147, affirming the Supreme Court's approach in Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135: first, whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected to occur; second, whether those consequences justify departing from the principle of open justice. The Authority was satisfied that publication would expose health-related information and create real risk of harm to SZL's career prospects and wellbeing, and that the respondent's social media threats aggravated this risk. The Authority also accepted that naming the respondent (who operates in a small community) could identify SZL. A permanent non-publication order was granted for both parties, with pseudonyms assigned.

2. Whether SZL agreed to a valid 90-day trial period under s 67A(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, barring an unjustified dismissal claim — Status: Dismissed (paras [37]-[39]).

Section 67A(1) requires the employee to have agreed to a trial period before commencing employment. The Authority found SZL did sign the IEA prior to starting work and was aware of the trial period. However, the trial period was invalidated because OMC made payment of notice (and garden leave) conditional on SZL agreeing not to pursue a personal grievance, rendering the dismissal effectively summary and the notice ambiguous. The Authority relied on Ioan v Scott Technology NZ Ltd t/a Rocklabs [2018] NZEmpC 4, finding s 67B was not operative as a shield to a personal grievance.

3. Whether the concurrent probation period in the IEA invalidated the 90-day trial period, per Lewis v Immigration Guru Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 141 — Status: Not reached (para [38]).

Because the trial period was already found invalid due to inadequate and conditional notice, the Authority declined to conclusively resolve whether the simultaneous probation and trial provisions were incompatible under Lewis v Immigration Guru Ltd. The point was noted but left undecided as it was unnecessary to the outcome.

4. Whether OMC engaged in unfair bargaining when providing the IEA — Status: Dismissed (para [37]).

SZL submitted OMC did not adequately inform them of the right to seek independent legal advice. The Authority found SZL had sufficient time between receiving the IEA on 24 October 2024 and signing it on 28 October 2024, and that SZL did in fact seek advice from their father (an experienced former business owner). The submission of unfair bargaining was not accepted.

5. Whether SZL was unjustifiably disadvantaged during employment under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [40]-[47]).

Applying the s 103A justification test, the Authority found OMC failed to give SZL sufficient time or support to demonstrate capability, withdrew the commitment to operational training in a humiliating manner, sought a unilateral pay reduction without proper process, and withheld work after 9 December 2024 without explanation. These failures breached good faith obligations. The Authority found SZL was unjustifiably disadvantaged throughout the brief employment.

6. Whether SZL was unjustifiably dismissed under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [40]-[47]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test (procedural and substantive fairness). Substantively, OMC had no adequate reason to dismiss SZL, having based the decision on a very brief observation. Procedurally, OMC failed to properly investigate concerns, raise them fairly with SZL, allow genuine response, or consider SZL's proposal to compromise before dismissing. OMC also attempted to condition SZL's entitlement to notice pay on waiving personal grievance rights. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified.

7. Whether SZL is entitled to reimbursement of lost wages under s 123(1)(b) — Status: Established (para [49]).

The Authority found the loss of remuneration was attributable to the personal grievance. Given the gap between SZL's dismissal and commencement of alternative employment was 13 days (work starting 23 December 2024), the Authority awarded three weeks' lost wages (inclusive of one week's unpaid notice), calculated at 30 hours per week at $26 per hour plus 8% holiday pay, totalling $2,527.00 gross.

8. Whether SZL is entitled to compensation for hurt, humiliation, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [50]-[51]).

The Authority found SZL suffered genuine humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings from the manner of dismissal, which impacted their self-confidence and wellbeing. The Authority also considered the Director's post-dismissal threatening text messages and social media threats as aggravating factors, citing Sisson t/a Edgware Law v Lewis [2004] 1 ERNZ 200 as authority for including significant post-dismissal employer conduct in the compensation assessment. An award of $12,000 was made under s 123(1)(c)(i).

9. Whether remedies should be reduced due to SZL's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [52]-[55]).

The Authority applied the factors from Maddigan v Director General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190. It found SZL did not contribute to the events giving rise to the grievance; OMC's own actions deprived SZL of meaningful agency. While SZL's father may have engaged in robust or threatening advocacy during the 9 December meeting, the Authority declined to attribute this conduct to SZL. No reduction was applied.

10. Whether a penalty should be imposed under s 130 of the Act for OMC's failure to promptly provide time and wage records — Status: Dismissed (para [56]).

The Authority acknowledged the breach but found that the remedies already awarded adequately addressed the employment relationship problem as a whole. No penalty was awarded, though the breach was noted and viewed in the context of OMC's overall belligerent response.

11. How costs are to be dealt with — Status: Reserved (paras [58]-[61]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unable to do so, SZL may file a memorandum on costs within 28 days, with OMC having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would ordinarily be assessed on the standard daily tariff basis.

The claims were upheld: the 90-day trial period defence was dismissed, SZL was found to have been unjustifiably disadvantaged and unjustifiably dismissed, and remedies were awarded; the penalty claim was dismissed and costs were reserved.

Lost wages: $2,527.00 gross (three weeks' wages at 30 hours per week at $26 per hour, inclusive of one week's notice and 8% holiday pay).
Compensation for hurt and humiliation: $12,000.00 (under s 123(1)(c)(i), without deduction).
Penalty (s 130): None ordered.
Contribution reduction: None applied.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
Costs: Reserved — parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; memorandum process available if needed.
All payments due within 28 days of the determination being issued.

[CONSENT]

NQM (applicant/employee) and IZT (respondent/employer) were parties to an employment relationship dispute brought before the Employment Relations Authority in Christchurch. During the investigation meeting the parties reached a negotiated settlement, and the Authority issued a consent determination recording that resolution. A non-publication order was made to protect the parties' identities in accordance with their agreed confidentiality obligations.

Applicant: NQM (employee — identity suppressed)
Respondent: IZT (employer — identity suppressed)

Applicant: Katherine McDonald and Samantha Welsh, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Janet Copeland and Kate Sinclair, counsel for the Respondent

NQM brought an employment relationship problem against IZT before the Employment Relations Authority. The nature of the underlying dispute is not disclosed in the determination. The investigation meeting was held on 27 August 2026 in Invercargill. During that meeting, the parties were able to resolve their dispute by reaching agreed terms of settlement. As part of the settlement the parties agreed to confidentiality obligations, and both parties consented to the Authority issuing a consent determination and making non-publication orders. No detail of the substantive claims, facts in dispute, or settlement terms is recorded in the determination.

1. Whether the parties' employment relationship problem was resolved by agreement — Status: Established (paras [1]–[2]).

The Authority recorded that during the investigation meeting the parties reached terms of settlement resolving their employment relationship problem. No legal test was applied as the matter was resolved by consent before any merits determination was made. The Authority noted there is no issue as to costs.

2. Whether non-publication orders were appropriate to uphold the parties' agreed confidentiality obligations — Status: Established (para [3]).

Pursuant to clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority made non-publication orders preventing publication of the parties' names and identities. The Authority found it appropriate to make these orders given the parties had agreed confidentiality obligations as part of their settlement. The parties are referenced in the determination by randomly generated letter codes rather than their actual names.

The matter was resolved by consent, with the Authority recording the settlement and making non-publication orders; no merits determination was made.

The terms of settlement are confidential and not disclosed in the determination. No costs were ordered (the parties agreed there is no issue as to costs). Non-publication orders were made preventing publication of the parties' names and identities.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following the Employment Relations Authority's substantive decision of 26 May 2026 (Xu v Aurora Developments Limited [2026] NZERA 320), in which Junchen Xu succeeded against his employer Aurora Developments Limited (ADL) on multiple employment claims. The parties were unable to agree on costs, and Mr Xu applied for a costs award. The Authority awarded $5,500 (inclusive of GST) in costs plus a filing fee reimbursement of $71.55, applying an uplift on the standard daily tariff due to a Calderbank offer that ADL had not accepted.

Applicant: Junchen Xu (employee)
Respondents: Aurora Developments Limited (First Respondent/employer); Wenfeng Su (Second Respondent); Zhengyu Zhang (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Aimee Cai, advocate
Respondents: Amy De-La Cruz, advocate

The substantive determination dated 26 May 2026 found in favour of Mr Xu on multiple claims against ADL, including minimum wage entitlements for March 2021, outstanding annual holiday leave, wage arrears, compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, remuneration lost due to dismissal, and a penalty payable to the Crown. The Authority reserved costs at the conclusion of the substantive hearing and encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves. The parties were unable to reach agreement, prompting Mr Xu to file this costs application. On 12 February 2026, prior to the investigation meeting, Mr Xu had sent ADL a Calderbank offer seeking $34,000 in compensation and $4,500 plus GST towards legal costs. ADL did not accept the offer and submitted that some of the evidence supporting Mr Xu's claims was not available at the time the offer was made.

1. Whether costs should be awarded to Mr Xu, and if so, on what basis — Status: Established (paras [4]–[10]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, guided by the principles set out in the Authority's Practice Direction and case law (Fagotti v Acme & Co Ltd [2015] NZEmpC 135; JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175). Costs are discretionary, generally follow the event, and begin from a notional daily tariff of $4,500 for a one-day investigation meeting, with adjustments for relevant factors. Because Mr Xu succeeded in the substantive determination, the general principle that costs follow the event applied.

2. Whether the Calderbank offer justified an uplift on the daily tariff — Status: Established (paras [6]–[10]).

A Calderbank offer may be taken into account in assessing costs, but costs in the Authority should remain modest (Reid v Ngati Rangi Trust [2021] NZEmpC 110). The Authority recognised the public interest in encouraging early resolution of employment disputes (Stevens v Hapag-Lloyd (NZ) Limited [2015] NZEmpC 137). ADL's submission that some of Mr Xu's evidence was not available at the time the offer was made was considered but did not preclude the uplift. Balancing these considerations, the Authority applied an uplift of $1,000 on the daily tariff (Rimple v NZ-Kebabs Ltd [2026] NZERA 334), resulting in a total costs award of $5,500 inclusive of GST.

3. Whether the filing fee should be reimbursed — Status: Established (para [13]).

In addition to the costs award, the Authority ordered ADL to reimburse Mr Xu's filing fee of $71.55, payable within 28 days. No separate legal analysis was required; this follows as a standard component of a costs order in favour of the successful party.

The costs application was upheld; ADL was ordered to pay Mr Xu $5,500 (inclusive of GST) in costs and $71.55 in filing fees.

Costs: $5,500 (inclusive of GST) payable by Aurora Developments Limited to Mr Xu within 28 days of the determination (27 August 2026).
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55 payable by Aurora Developments Limited to Mr Xu within 28 days of the determination.
No other remedies ordered in this determination (all substantive remedies were dealt with in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 320).

Kelsie Jamieson, a part-time shop assistant employed by Sandrey Holdings Limited from September 2022 until March 2025, brought a claim for unpaid holiday pay after her employment ended by redundancy. The key legal question was whether Ms Jamieson had been paid her statutory holiday entitlements during her employment. The Authority found in Ms Jamieson's favour, ordering Sandrey Holdings Limited to pay $3,446.36 in unpaid holiday pay plus costs, with a secondary order permitting recovery from the sole director personally if the company could not pay.

Applicant: Kelsie Jamieson (employee)
Respondent: Sandrey Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: No appearance

Ms Jamieson was employed as a part-time shop assistant by Sandrey Holdings Limited from September 2022 until 24 March 2025, when her employment ended by redundancy. Sandrey Holdings Limited is controlled by its sole director, Brenda Sandrey, who is Ms Jamieson's stepsister. Although Ms Jamieson initially indicated a potential unjustified dismissal claim, she confirmed at the investigation meeting that she wished only to pursue a claim for unpaid holiday pay. A chartered accountant who had performed payroll services for Sandrey Holdings Limited wrote to Ms Jamieson confirming she had never been given the opportunity to take annual leave nor been paid the statutory 8% in lieu, and calculated the total holiday pay owing at $5,446.36 on gross earnings. Ms Jamieson acknowledged receiving a $2,000 advance from Ms Sandrey after her employment ended, leaving a balance of $3,446.36. Neither Sandrey Holdings Limited nor Ms Sandrey participated in the proceedings, contested the accountant's calculation, or provided documentation showing holiday pay had been paid.

1. Whether Ms Jamieson was owed unpaid holiday pay and, if so, the quantum — Status: Established (paras [8]-[11]).

The applicable framework is the Holidays Act 2003, which requires employers to either grant annual leave or pay 8% of gross earnings in lieu to employees. The Authority relied on a chartered accountant's payroll calculation and Ms Jamieson's pay slips, which confirmed no holiday pay had been included in her remuneration. With the respondent offering no contrary evidence or documentation, the Authority accepted the accountant's figure of $5,446.36 and deducted the $2,000 already advanced, ordering payment of the outstanding balance of $3,446.36 gross.

2. Whether Brenda Sandrey was personally liable as a person involved in the breach under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [10], [12]).

Under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a person who is involved in a breach and fails to take reasonable steps to prevent it can be held personally liable. The Authority found that Ms Sandrey, as sole director, was a person responsible for the breach because she failed to ensure Ms Jamieson was paid her holiday entitlements. Prior leave was granted for Ms Jamieson to recover the monies from Ms Sandrey personally if Sandrey Holdings Limited was unable to meet the orders.

3. Whether Ms Jamieson's initial unjustified dismissal claim should be determined — Status: Not reached (para [2]).

Ms Jamieson indicated at the investigation meeting that she did not wish to pursue the unjustified dismissal/redundancy claim and confined her application to unpaid holiday pay only. Accordingly, the Authority made no findings on this issue.

4. How costs should be dealt with — Status: Established (para [13]).

The Authority exercised its discretion on costs, noting Ms Jamieson was self-represented at the investigation meeting but had engaged an advocate to prepare her personal grievance letter and application. The Authority ordered Sandrey Holdings Limited to pay $750 as a contribution to Ms Jamieson's costs plus the Authority filing fee of $71.55, both payable within 28 days.

The claim was upheld, with Sandrey Holdings Limited ordered to pay unpaid holiday pay and a costs contribution, and prior leave granted to recover those amounts from the sole director personally if necessary.

- Unpaid holiday pay: $3,446.36 gross (being $5,446.36 calculated by the chartered accountant less $2,000 already advanced), payable within 28 days.
- Costs contribution: $750, payable within 28 days.
- Authority filing fee: $71.55, payable within 28 days.
- Personal liability order: Prior leave granted under s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 for Ms Jamieson to recover all amounts from Brenda Sandrey personally if Sandrey Holdings Limited is unable to pay.
- Reinstatement: Not ordered.

Ziyue Wang, a chef de partie employed by LSG Sky Chefs New Zealand Limited from January 2024 until January 2025, raised a personal grievance for constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage following his resignation, alleging excessive workload, inadequate rest and meal breaks, and mishandling of a workplace complaint. The Authority found Mr Wang was unjustifiably disadvantaged due to LSG's failure to take reasonable steps to address his workload concerns, but dismissed his constructive dismissal claim, found LSG complied with rest and meal break obligations, and found several other claims were out of time or not made out. Mr Wang was awarded wage arrears, unpaid sick leave, and compensation for humiliation totalling $12,429.70.

Applicant: Ziyue Wang (employee, former chef de partie)
Respondent: LSG Sky Chefs New Zealand Limited (employer)

Applicant: Vivian Xu, advocate
Respondent: Parvez Akbar, advocate

Mr Wang commenced employment with LSG as a chef de partie on 22 January 2024 and resigned on 1 January 2025, with his final day being 29 January 2025. Mr Wang raised a personal grievance for constructive dismissal on 25 March 2025, alleging LSG failed to address his excessive workload concerns, did not comply with rest and meal break obligations, and did not properly investigate a workplace complaint he made in May 2024 about a colleague who verbally abused him. LSG's position was that it had investigated and resolved the May 2024 complaint (the colleague apologised at a meeting arranged by management), that Mr Wang did not raise rest and meal break concerns during employment, and that it had engaged with Mr Wang about his workload following his December 2024 text message. Mr Wang's resignation letter cited ongoing health issues and physical toll from overwork, and he did not raise further workload concerns after his meeting with management before resigning approximately two weeks later. The investigation meeting took place on 7–8 July 2026 and heard oral evidence from Mr Wang, LSG's People and Culture Manager, Production Manager, and Executive Chef.

1. Whether Mr Wang raised a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage regarding the 10 May 2024 workplace incident (colleague's verbal abuse) within the 90-day statutory period — Status: Dismissed (paras [9]-[20]).

The Authority applied the principles in Sharma v Rodney Farm 'n' Machinery Limited [2025] NZEmpC 64, noting that not every complaint amounts to a personal grievance and that communications must convey the substance of a grievance within 90 days. The Authority found Mr Wang's 10 May 2024 email to LSG was an inquiry about steps to be taken rather than the raising of a personal grievance within the meaning of s 103 of the Act. LSG took reasonable steps to resolve the complaint (arranging a meeting, obtaining an apology, and following up), and Mr Wang raised no further concerns about his colleague after 24 May 2024, so this claim did not meet the threshold.

2. Whether Mr Wang raised a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage regarding his heavy workload within the 90-day statutory period — Status: Established (paras [21]-[25]).

The Authority found that Mr Wang's text message to his manager on 18 December 2024 — raising burnout, long hours (10–11 hours per day), and understaffing on the Asian bench — was sufficient to constitute raising a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage concerning his workload, applying the principle that the process is informal and no particular formula of words is required.

3. Whether Mr Wang was unjustifiably disadvantaged by LSG in respect of his workload — Status: Established (paras [27]-[41]).

The Authority applied the principles in FGH v RST [2018] NZEmpC 60 (employer's failure to provide a workplace meeting health and safety requirements may ground an unjustified disadvantage claim) and Attorney-General v Gilbert [2002] 2 NZLR 342 (duty to maintain a safe workplace implied into employment contracts). The employment agreement anticipated up to 90 hours per fortnight as reasonable, but Mr Wang averaged 96.5 hours per fortnight over three months. LSG acquiesced by not querying timesheets, failed to take further reasonable steps beyond discussing future menu cycle changes, and did not explore additional leave or bench cover. The Authority concluded LSG breached its duty to provide a healthy and safe work environment.

4. Whether Mr Wang was constructively dismissed by LSG — Status: Dismissed (paras [42]-[61]).

The Authority applied the two-part test from Auckland Shop Employees' Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 and Spotless Facility Services NZ Limited v Mackay [2016] NZEmpC 153: (1) whether a breach of duty caused the resignation, and (2) whether the breach was sufficiently serious that it was reasonably foreseeable the employee would not continue. While the workload breach was a material cause of resignation, the Authority found it was not sufficiently serious to make the resignation reasonably foreseeable — Mr Wang raised no further concerns after his meeting with management, worked through his notice period, and his resignation letter reflected multiple personal factors including health issues unrelated to LSG's conduct.

5. Whether Mr Wang was alternatively unjustifiably disadvantaged in respect of his employment concluding with LSG (under s 122 of the Act) — Status: Dismissed (paras [57]-[61]).

Because the constructive dismissal claim and this alternative claim relied on the same factual matrix (workload), and the Authority had already found the breach was not sufficiently serious to make the resignation reasonably foreseeable, it declined the application under s 122. The Authority had, however, separately upheld an unjustified disadvantage grievance on the workload issue under a different limb.

6. Whether Mr Wang is owed wage arrears pursuant to s 131 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [62]-[67]).

The employment agreement entitled Mr Wang to payment at the rate of salary/2080 per hour for hours worked in excess of 90 in any fortnightly pay period. Reviewing LSG's wages and time records and Mr Wang's payslips, the Authority identified 13 shifts where Mr Wang worked in excess of 90 hours per period but was not fully paid. Mr Wang was found entitled to 109.75 hours of unpaid wages and was awarded $3,429.70 (gross).

7. Whether Mr Wang was paid sick leave correctly — Status: Established (paras [68]-[71]).

Mr Wang submitted an ACC medical certificate for the period from 20 January 2025 to his final day (29 January 2025) and was not paid for six days of sick leave. The Authority ordered LSG to pay $1,500 (gross) for this unpaid sick leave.

8. Whether Mr Wang was unjustifiably disadvantaged by LSG regarding an alleged unilateral variation to his roster on or about 28 January 2025 — Status: Dismissed (paras [72]-[73]).

Mr Wang was on ACC-related medical leave during his final week of employment and was therefore entitled to be paid sick leave for that period. As he was not required to work due to this entitlement, no disadvantage arose from any purported roster variation, and the claim was dismissed.

9. Whether Mr Wang brought his penalty claim pursuant to s 4 of the Act in time — Status: Dismissed (paras [74]-[77]).

Section 135(5) of the Act requires penalty claims to be commenced within 12 months of when the cause of action first became known (or should have become known). Mr Wang's statement of problem was lodged on 20 October 2025, and the alleged breaches (failure to investigate May 2024 complaint, sick leave alteration in October 2024, pay increase promise in June 2024, overtime offset in October 2024) all pre-dated the limitation period. The Authority found Mr Wang was time-barred from bringing these penalty claims, applying Jin v Precision NZ Limited [2026] NZEmpC 121.

10. Whether LSG complied with rest and meal break provisions in the Act, and if not, whether a penalty should be issued — Status: Dismissed (paras [78]-[83]).

The Authority noted that employees were discouraged from working through breaks and that a manual timesheet process existed for claiming compensation if they did. Mr Wang was aware of his entitlements and the timesheet process, self-managed his breaks during shifts, and raised no concerns about rest and meal breaks with LSG during employment. The Authority found LSG complied with its statutory obligations regarding rest and meal breaks.

11. Whether any remedy should be reduced pursuant to s 124 of the Act (contributory conduct) — Status: Dismissed (para [94]).

The Authority found no factual basis to conclude Mr Wang contributed to the situation giving rise to his personal grievance, and accordingly made no reduction to the remedies awarded.

12. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [96]-[98]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves, with a process set out for lodging memoranda if agreement could not be reached, and the Authority indicating it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if required to determine costs.

The claim was partially upheld: the unjustified disadvantage grievance regarding workload was established, and wage arrears and sick leave claims succeeded, but the constructive dismissal claim, the alternative unjustified disadvantage claim regarding resignation, the rest and meal break penalty claim, the other s 4 penalty claims, and the roster variation claim were all dismissed.

Compensation (hurt, humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings): $7,500 pursuant to s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act.
Wage arrears: $3,429.70 (gross) pursuant to s 131 of the Act (109.75 unpaid hours).
Unpaid sick leave: $1,500 (gross).
Total ordered: $12,429.70 (gross), all payable within 28 days of the determination date.
Reinstatement: Not ordered.
Penalties: None ordered (claims time-barred and rest/meal break breach not established).
Costs: Reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Lucky Daryll Haitana (employee) brought a personal grievance claim against Carters Tyre Service Limited (employer), which was dismissed in an earlier determination on the ground that the grievance was raised out of time and no exceptional circumstances justified the delay. This determination addresses Carters' subsequent claim for costs. The Authority declined to award any costs to Carters.

Applicant: Lucky Daryll Haitana (employee)
Respondent: Carters Tyre Service Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Alex MacDonald (Chief Financial Officer, NTAW Holdings (NZ) Limited)

Mr Haitana brought a personal grievance claim against his former employer, Carters Tyre Service Limited. In a prior determination ([2026] NZERA 583), the Authority found that Mr Haitana had not raised his grievance within the statutory time limit and that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify the delay, meaning the substantive claim could not be investigated. Costs were reserved at that stage to allow both parties to make submissions once the substantive matter was resolved. Both parties provided timely submissions. Carters sought recovery of its representative's one-day salary plus travel and accommodation expenses incurred in attending the Authority's investigation meeting. Mr Haitana opposed the costs claim.

1. Whether Carters is entitled to costs for its representative's time (salary) — Status: Dismissed (paras [5]–[7]).

The Authority's starting point is that a successful party is ordinarily entitled to a contribution toward professional representation costs, typically assessed by a daily tariff approach. However, the Authority found that Alex MacDonald, Carters' representative, was the CFO of Carters' parent company (NTAW Holdings (NZ) Limited) and not a professional legal representative; no fee was charged to Carters for his services. The Authority confirmed that while a party may be represented by a manager, the Authority's costs regime does not extend to recognition of a manager's time or salary. Accordingly, the salary component of the claim was declined.

2. Whether Carters is entitled to costs for its representative's travel and accommodation expenses — Status: Dismissed (paras [6], [8]).

Carters produced receipts for Mr MacDonald's travel and accommodation expenses related to attending the investigation meeting, which the Authority accepted as genuine. However, the Authority noted that Mr MacDonald was not a witness and applied the general principle that the Authority does not order an unsuccessful party to contribute to travel and accommodation costs of an out-of-town representative. The travel and accommodation claim was therefore also declined.

Carters' costs claim was dismissed in its entirety; no costs were ordered against Mr Haitana.

None ordered. Carters' application for costs (comprising its representative's salary and travel and accommodation expenses) was declined in full.

Sean Logan sought recovery of a $3,500 deduction made from his final pay by his former employer Spacetech Limited (in liquidation), claiming breaches of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA). Because Spacetech is in liquidation, Logan pursued Daniel Billings — its director and shareholder — as a person involved in those breaches, and also sought a penalty against Billings for alleged breach of the individual employment agreement. The Authority found Spacetech breached the WPA, granted conditional leave to recover $3,500 from Billings (only to the extent Spacetech cannot pay), awarded interest, but dismissed the penalty claim.

Applicant: Sean Logan (employee)
Respondent: Daniel Billings (director and shareholder of former employer Spacetech Limited, in liquidation)

Applicant: Hamish Burdon, advocate for the applicant
Respondent: Daniel Billings, in person

Sean Logan was employed as a Cabinet Maker, initially with Aubrey Capital Limited and then with Spacetech Limited from 2024 under an individual employment agreement (IEA) containing a general deductions clause (clause 8.2) that purported to satisfy the written consent requirement of s 5 of the WPA. Logan resigned on 18 June 2025, citing workplace treatment concerns. Billings responded the same day asserting Logan's immediate departure was a breach of the four-week notice period and reserved the right to deduct damages from final pay. On 1 July 2025, Billings emailed Logan informing him of an intended $3,500 deduction for rework costs, referencing clause 8.2, and inviting a written dispute by close of business 2 July 2025. Logan emailed on 2 July 2025 expressly withdrawing consent and disputing the deduction, but on 3 July 2025 Billings processed the pay run including the deduction. Both Spacetech and Aubrey were placed in liquidation and struck out as parties (with liquidators not consenting to the claims continuing against those entities), leaving Billings as the sole respondent. Billings acknowledged holding a "person involved" position under s 142W of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act) but denied a substantive WPA breach and argued that any order against him personally was premature pending liquidation outcomes.

1. Whether Spacetech breached ss 4 and 5 of the WPA by failing to adequately consult before making the deduction — Status: Established (paras [24]-[28]).

Section 5(1A) of the WPA requires an employer to consult an employee before making a specific deduction pursuant to a general deductions clause. The Authority found that while Billings' email of 1 July 2025 provided an itemised account and identified the contractual clause, it gave no meaningful detail about how the $3,500 figure was calculated from losses attributable to Logan's conduct. The Authority therefore held that Spacetech had not adequately consulted Logan as required by s 5(1A), establishing a breach of ss 4 and 5 of the WPA.

2. Whether Spacetech breached s 5(2) of the WPA by proceeding with the deduction after Logan withdrew consent — Status: Established (para [26]).

Section 5(2) of the WPA provides that an employee may withdraw consent to a deduction by giving written notice to the employer. The Authority found that Logan's 2 July 2025 email constituted effective written withdrawal of consent, and that although it may have arrived after nominal "close of business," Billings confirmed it was received and considered before the pay run was processed on 3 July 2025. Spacetech had sufficient time to adjust the pay run but did not do so, thereby breaching s 5(2).

3. Whether the deduction was unreasonable under s 5A of the WPA — Status: Partially established/conditional (para [27]).

Section 5A prohibits an employer from making a deduction from wages if it is unreasonable. The Authority stated it "would not have been satisfied" the deduction was reasonable given the uncertainty around what losses were attributable to Logan and noting Spacetech itself had acknowledged alternative remedies (such as an application to the Authority once losses were quantified). This finding was made in addition to the primary ss 4 and 5 findings, with the Authority noting the likely breach of s 5A.

4. Whether Daniel Billings was a "person involved" in Spacetech's WPA breaches under s 142W of the Act — Status: Established (paras [29]-[31]).

Under s 142W of the Act, a "person involved" includes someone directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or a party to a breach of an employment standard. Billings conceded he met this definition. The Authority confirmed the finding and rejected Billings' reliance on the s 142ZD defence, finding he had not proved either limb of that defence under s 142ZD(2)(a) or (b).

5. Whether leave should be granted to recover the deduction amount from Billings personally — Status: Established (conditional) (paras [29]-[32], [35]).

Under s 142Y(2)(b) of the Act, the Authority may grant leave to recover from a person involved to the extent the employer cannot pay. The Authority acknowledged the unknown prospects of recovery from Spacetech in liquidation and granted conditional leave, limiting Billings' personal liability to the amount Spacetech is unable to pay. Billings' argument that any order was premature was effectively resolved by structuring the order as conditional rather than dismissing the claim.

6. Whether interest should be awarded on the deducted amount — Status: Established (para [33]).

The Authority confirmed it is appropriate to award interest where a person has been unlawfully deprived of money to which they are entitled. Interest is to be calculated using the Civil Debt Interest Calculator from 4 July 2025 (inclusive) and continues to accrue until the full amount is paid.

7. Whether Billings incited, instigated, aided, or abetted a breach of the IEA under s 134(2) of the Act, and whether a penalty should be imposed — Status: Dismissed (para [34]).

Section 134(2) of the Act imposes liability to a penalty on a person who incites, instigates, aids or abets a breach of an employment agreement. The Authority noted Logan's submissions did not identify which specific term of the IEA had been breached, and that if clause 8.2 was relied upon it was not clear how that clause had itself been breached (as distinct from the statutory WPA obligations). Absent a clearly articulated contractual breach, the Authority declined to impose a penalty, and the claim was dismissed.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [36]-[38]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter between themselves. If unresolved, Logan may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with Billings having 14 days to reply. The Authority noted any costs award would be adjusted downward from the standard daily tariff given no investigation meeting was held.

The claim was partially upheld: the WPA breach claims were established, conditional leave to recover $3,500 from Billings was granted with interest, but the penalty claim for breach of the IEA was dismissed.

Recovery of deduction: $3,500 (less any applicable tax), recoverable from Daniel Billings conditionally — only to the extent Spacetech Limited (in liquidation) is unable to pay that amount (s 142Y(2)(b) of the Act).
Interest: Awarded, calculated using the Civil Debt Interest Calculator from 4 July 2025 (inclusive) until the sum is fully paid; exact dollar amount not specified.
Reinstatement: Not ordered and not sought.
Penalty: None ordered (claim dismissed).
Costs: Reserved.