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Kerry Shaw, a Trades Assistant/Spring Maker employed by Brightwater Engineering Limited, was summarily dismissed on 24 December 2024 after he left the worksite without permission and refused to undergo additional drug tests during an employer-initiated drug testing process. He claimed unjustified dismissal and sought lost wages, compensation for hurt and humiliation, and a penalty for breach of good faith. The Authority found the dismissal was both procedurally unfair and substantively unjustified, awarding lost wages plus holiday pay and compensation for hurt and humiliation (reduced for contribution), but declining to impose a penalty.

Applicant: Kerry Shaw (employee)
Respondent: Brightwater Engineering Limited (employer)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate
Respondent: Russel Drake, advocate

Kerry Shaw worked for Brightwater Engineering Limited (and its predecessor) at a Nelson engineering workshop from October 2014, with Brightwater engaging him from February 2019. On 20 December 2024, following reports from supervisors that Mr Shaw was displaying uncharacteristic behaviour and unusual physical presentation, Brightwater initiated a reasonable-cause drug test. Mr Shaw was given a letter that inaccurately referenced timekeeping concerns (a template error) and did not specify the supervisors' observations; he became agitated, left the worksite without permission to seek advice at home, returned, underwent a breath alcohol test (negative) and a urine drug test, but the sample was found to be outside the acceptable temperature range. He was asked to provide a second urine sample later that morning, again became agitated and briefly left the worksite again before returning; the second test returned a negative result but the tester formed a private suspicion that the samples may have been adulterated and communicated this to management. Management then asked Mr Shaw to consent to an oral fluid or hair follicle test; Mr Shaw refused and left the premises. Brightwater convened a disciplinary meeting on 24 December 2024 — the same day Mr Shaw was invited — without clearly identifying the decision-maker (the Chief Executive, Mr Bowman, who did not attend the meeting with Mr Shaw), without disclosing to Mr Shaw the tester's suspicion of adulteration, and without giving Mr Shaw the opportunity to be heard by the decision-maker. Mr Shaw was summarily dismissed that day. He raised a personal grievance in January 2025, which was unresolved after mediation, and he applied to the Authority in September 2025.

1. Whether Brightwater conducted a fair disciplinary process (procedural justification) — Status: Established (finding of unfairness) (paras [33]-[40]).

The Authority applied s 103A and s 4(1A) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, requiring proper investigation, clear communication of concerns to the employee, a genuine opportunity to respond to the decision-maker, open-minded consideration of responses, and adherence to applicable policies. The Authority identified multiple significant procedural failures: the investigation was conducted by witnesses who were themselves participants in the events; the letter of concern incorrectly cited timekeeping issues; the central concern — the tester's suspicion of sample adulteration — was never put to Mr Shaw (citing Smith v McCulloch & Partners [2003] 1 ERNZ 346); the decision-maker (Mr Bowman) was not identified and did not hear from Mr Shaw before deciding (citing Freightlines Ltd v Cross [1993] 1 ERNZ 424); the deliberation took only 15–20 minutes including drafting the dismissal letter; the direction to undergo saliva and hair follicle tests was not sanctioned by Brightwater's own drug policy (which only referenced urine testing); and the timeframe given to Mr Shaw to prepare for the disciplinary meeting was questionably short. The Authority concluded Brightwater did not follow a fair process.

2. Whether the decision to summarily dismiss Mr Shaw was substantively justified — Status: Not established (paras [41]-[42]).

The Authority applied the fair and reasonable employer test under s 103A, considering whether summary dismissal for serious misconduct was a response within the range of responses available. It found that the only potentially valid substantive ground — leaving the worksite without permission and refusing to comply with drug test instructions — was undermined because (a) the direction to take saliva/hair follicle tests fell outside the extant drug policy, making it neither a lawful nor a reasonable instruction (citing A v N Ltd [2009] ERNZ 301 and Electrical Workers Union 2001 Inc v Mighty River Power Ltd [2013] NZEmpC 197); (b) the adulteration suspicion, which underpinned the employer's view of serious misconduct, was never disclosed or put to Mr Shaw; (c) Mr Shaw had in fact passed the second urine test; and (d) Brightwater's own policy contemplated rehabilitation, not dismissal, following a positive test. The Authority found in the alternative that serious misconduct was not substantively established.

3. Whether Mr Shaw was entitled to lost wages under s 123(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [44]-[45]).

The Authority found that Mr Shaw had been unable to find alternative employment following his dismissal. It determined that 13 weeks' lost wages (three months) was appropriate, calculated at 40 hours per week at $34.60 per hour, totalling $17,992 gross, plus 8% holiday pay ($1,439.36), for a combined amount of $19,431.36 gross.

4. Whether Mr Shaw was entitled to compensation for hurt and humiliation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [46]-[48]).

The Authority considered Mr Shaw's evidence of abrupt dismissal at a difficult time of year, his low mood, loss of confidence, poor sleep, health deterioration requiring medical intervention, and the negative impact on his personal relationship (corroborated by his then partner Ms Coleman). The Authority found Mr Shaw suffered humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings at a level warranting a $25,000 award before any reduction for contribution.

5. Whether any remedy should be reduced due to Mr Shaw's contributory conduct under s 123(1)(c)(i) — Status: Established (paras [49]-[51]).

The Authority applied the factors summarised in Maddigan v Director General of Conservation [2019] NZEmpC 190. It found Mr Shaw contributed to the situation by acting in an initially confrontational manner, leaving the worksite without permission on more than one occasion, and overreacting and storming out when asked to take a third test — even accounting for the fact that the employer's process was flawed. The Authority noted there was no evidence of provocation by Brightwater's staff and that management attempted to de-escalate. A 20% reduction was applied to the s 123(1)(c)(i) compensation only (reducing the $25,000 to $20,000), not to the lost wages award.

6. Whether a financial penalty should be imposed for breach of good faith under s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [52]-[53]).

Mr Shaw claimed a penalty on the basis of Brightwater's alleged deliberate and sustained breach of good faith obligations. Although the Authority found significant elements of a lack of good faith process, it concluded the breaches were not deliberate and sustained so as to warrant a penalty. The Authority instead invited Brightwater to reflect on and improve its drug testing regime and disciplinary decision-making processes.

7. How costs are to be dealt with — Status: Reserved (paras [55]-[57]).

The Authority reserved costs and encouraged the parties to resolve costs themselves. It provided a process for filing costs memoranda if agreement could not be reached, and noted that costs would be assessed on the standard costs guidelines, with discretion to move up or down.

The claim was partially upheld: unjustified dismissal established; lost wages and hurt/humiliation compensation awarded (with 20% contribution reduction on compensation); penalty claim dismissed; costs reserved.

- Lost wages and holiday pay: $19,431.36 gross (13 weeks at $34.60/hr for 40 hrs/week = $17,992, plus 8% holiday pay = $1,439.36)
- Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) (hurt and humiliation): $20,000 (reflecting a 20% reduction from $25,000 for Mr Shaw's contributory conduct; no reduction applied to lost wages)
- Penalty: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; memorandum process set out if agreement not reached
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination being issued

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive ruling in which LUO was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed by BAZ and awarded $11,000 compensation. The parties could not agree on costs, and the Authority was asked to determine the appropriate costs contribution. The Authority ordered BAZ to pay LUO $6,000 towards legal costs plus $71.55 as reimbursement of the filing fee, balancing LUO's mixed success across claims against BAZ's conduct in delaying the investigation process.

Applicant: B LUO (employee)
Respondent: BAZ (employer)

Applicant: Matthew Hutcheson, counsel
Respondent: Angus Drumm, counsel

In a substantive determination dated 12 August 2026 ([2026] NZERA 549), the Authority found that LUO was unjustifiably dismissed and ordered BAZ to pay $11,000 compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. LUO was not successful on her other claims. Costs were reserved for the parties to negotiate, but no agreement was reached. The investigation meeting was held over two part-days (18 November 2025 and 8 May 2026), the second part-day being required because BAZ's representative director left the first hearing midway through, had not adhered to disclosure requirements in a timely manner, and had not obtained representation until after the first day. LUO's counsel sought costs of $8,000 on the basis of a two-day tariff, while BAZ argued costs should lie where they fall given LUO's mixed success, or alternatively that each session should be treated as a half-day.

1. Whether LUO is entitled to a costs award given her mixed success across claims — Status: Established (paras [5]-[11]).

The Authority applied the principles in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, which provide that costs are modest and normally follow the event, and are not to be used as punishment. The Court of Appeal principle confirmed in William Coomer v JA McCallum & Son Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 156 was applied: any success by an applicant is sufficient to justify a costs award, regardless of whether the applicant lost larger or more complex claims. As LUO succeeded on her unjustified dismissal grievance, the Authority found she should receive a costs award, though her failure on other claims warranted a downward adjustment.

2. Whether BAZ's conduct in delaying the investigation process should affect the quantum of costs — Status: Established (paras [12]-[13]).

The Authority found that BAZ's representative director failed to comply with disclosure requirements in a timely manner and left the investigation meeting partway through the first day, causing a six-month delay before the second part-day could be held. This unnecessarily increased LUO's costs by requiring her to return for a second hearing session. The Authority treated this as a factor justifying adjustment upward (or against a steeper reduction), balancing it against LUO's mixed success on her claims.

3. What is the appropriate quantum of costs, including whether each hearing date should be treated as a full day or a half-day — Status: Partially established (paras [8]-[14]).

The Authority applied the standard notional daily rate of $4,500 for the first day of an investigation meeting under its general tariff approach, with discretion to adjust. LUO sought $8,000 (two full days); BAZ argued for two half-days. The Authority determined that the two sessions should be treated as two part-days, and that the appropriate balancing of mixed success and BAZ's conduct resulted in a total contribution of $6,000, plus reimbursement of the $71.55 filing fee.

The costs application was partially upheld: LUO was awarded $6,000 as a contribution to legal costs and $71.55 as reimbursement of the filing fee, to be paid by BAZ within 28 days.

Costs contribution: $6,000 payable by BAZ to LUO within 28 days of this determination.
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55 payable by BAZ to LUO within 28 days of this determination.
(Note: The underlying substantive remedy of $11,000 compensation was ordered in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 549 and is not re-ordered here.)

The determination text provided contains no substantive content — it consists only of metadata, document identifiers, and classification markings, with no facts, legal issues, findings, or remedy information. Accordingly, a meaningful structured summary cannot be produced from the available material.

Applicant: Kuvarji Entertainment Limited (employer)
Respondent: Te Rangi (employee)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

No facts are discernible from the document provided. The full text of the determination appears to have been withheld or was not successfully extracted. The document contains only metadata fields (timestamps, classification labels such as "Privileged" and "IN-CONFIDENCE", and internal document identifiers). No background, chronology, arguments, or findings can be reported.

1. All legal issues — Status: Not reached (no paragraph references available).

No substantive content was present in the extracted document. The determination text is entirely absent, replaced by metadata and classification tags. It is therefore impossible to identify, describe, or resolve any legal issue addressed by the Authority Member Andrew Harris in [2026] NZERA 716.

No outcome can be reported — the determination text was not available in the document provided.

None reported — the determination text was not available in the document provided.

Donette Kupenga, a caretaker employed by Te Aka Ora Charitable Trust, was dismissed in May 2025 following a disciplinary process that commenced in February 2025. This preliminary determination addresses the sole jurisdictional question of whether Ms Kupenga raised her personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage within the statutory 90-day timeframe under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found that two unjustified disadvantage grievances (relating to the disciplinary process and the availability provision in her employment agreement) were raised in time, while a standalone grievance based on failure to observe tikanga was out of time.

Applicant: Donette Kupenga (employee/caretaker)
Respondent: The Board of Trustees, Te Aka Ora Charitable Trust (employer)

Applicant: Alison Bendall, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Beverley Edwards, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Kupenga was employed by Te Aka Ora Charitable Trust as a Te Aka Ora Rangatahi Whare Kaitautoko (caretaker). The Trust commenced an informal meeting with Ms Kupenga on 13 February 2025, followed by a formal disciplinary meeting on 5 March 2025, which led to a preliminary finding of serious misconduct on 18 March 2025. On 7 April 2025, Ms Kupenga (through counsel) wrote a six-page letter to the Trust expressly raising a claim of unjustified disadvantage in relation to the disciplinary process, alleging breaches of good faith, procedural unfairness, and non-disclosure of information; the letter also raised concerns about wage arrears and the availability provisions in her employment agreement under s 67D of the Act. Ms Kupenga was ultimately dismissed in May 2025. The Trust initially disputed that any personal grievance had been raised within the 90-day timeframe, but during this preliminary investigation conceded that the unjustified dismissal grievance was raised in time; it maintained that the unjustified disadvantage grievance was not. Ms Kupenga also brought claims for unpaid wages and holiday pay, which she subsequently withdrew, and a claim for breach of the duty of good faith.

1. Whether the personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage relating to the disciplinary process was raised within the statutory 90-day timeframe under s 114 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [31]-[33]).

Under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a personal grievance must be raised within 90 days of the action occurring or coming to the employee's notice. The Authority applied the principles from Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132 and Creedy v Commissioner of Police [2006] ERNZ 517, which require no particular formula of words but sufficient communication of the substance of the complaint. The Authority found that Ms Kupenga's 7 April 2025 letter — although framed partly as a breach of good faith — clearly conveyed the nature of a personal grievance about the Trust's disciplinary process within the meaning of s 103 of the Act, and was sent within 90 days of the disciplinary process commencing in February 2025. The grievance was therefore raised in time.

2. Whether the personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage relating to the availability provision (s 67D of the Act) was raised within the 90-day timeframe — Status: Established (paras [35]-[37]).

The Authority applied the principle from Premier Events Group Limited v Beattie (No 3) [2021] NZEmpC 79 that where conduct is continuing, the 90-day period runs from the most recent occurrence. Ms Kupenga's 7 April 2025 letter raised the claim that her employment agreement did not comply with the availability provision requirements of s 67D of the Act, constituting continuing conduct. The Authority found this grievance was raised within 90 days of the most recent occurrence, and therefore in time. The Authority noted some uncertainty as to whether Ms Kupenga still intended to pursue this claim, but made the finding regardless.

3. Whether a standalone personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage arising from the Trust's failure to observe tikanga was raised within the 90-day timeframe — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[42]).

The Authority accepted the Trust's submission that Ms Kupenga's 7 April 2025 letter made no reference to tikanga, even though her statement of problem mentioned the Trust's failure to observe tikanga during the disciplinary process. Because the letter was the operative communication for the purposes of s 114, and it was silent on tikanga, no standalone grievance on this basis was raised in time. The Authority noted, however, that Ms Kupenga may rely on tikanga obligations as part of her broader unjustified disadvantage grievance (disciplinary process) or her unjustified dismissal grievance at the merits stage.

4. Whether the personal grievance for unjustified dismissal was raised within the 90-day timeframe — Status: Established (by concession) (para [15]).

The Trust conceded during the preliminary investigation that Ms Kupenga's personal grievance for unjustified dismissal was raised within the statutory 90-day timeframe. No further analysis was required on this issue, and it was not in dispute.

5. Whether the duty of good faith under the Act was breached — Status: Not reached (paras [8], [34]).

The Authority determined that a breach of the duty of good faith is not a personal grievance and therefore falls outside the 90-day limitation framework in s 114. This claim did not require consideration as part of this preliminary determination. The merits of the good faith claim were expressly left to a future substantive hearing.

6. Whether claims for arrears of unpaid wages and holiday pay should be considered — Status: Not reached (paras [4], [35]).

Ms Kupenga withdrew her claims for unpaid wages and holiday pay prior to the determination being issued. Accordingly, the Authority was not required to consider these claims.

7. Whether leave to raise a personal grievance out of time under s 114(3)-(4) of the Act should be granted — Status: Not reached (para [30]).

Ms Kupenga did not file an application for leave to raise a personal grievance out of time; her position throughout was that her grievances were raised within the statutory timeframe. The Authority therefore had no occasion to exercise its discretion under s 114(4) to grant leave in exceptional circumstances.

8. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [48]).

The Authority reserved the question of costs without making any order at this stage.

The preliminary claim was substantially upheld: two unjustified disadvantage grievances (disciplinary process and availability provision) and the unjustified dismissal grievance were found to have been raised in time; the standalone tikanga-based unjustified disadvantage grievance was found to be out of time.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary jurisdictional determination only. No remedies have been assessed or awarded. Costs are reserved. The parties were directed to advise the Authority within 14 days of their views on attendance at further mediation to attempt resolution of all outstanding matters.

[COSTS ONLY]

William David Manning (employee) and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) both sought costs following two earlier determinations: one declining Mr Manning's interim reinstatement application, and a substantive determination finding unjustified dismissal but awarding no remedies due to 100% contributory conduct. The key legal questions concerned which party should bear costs given the mixed outcomes across both proceedings, and whether reductions were appropriate for withdrawn claims and unhelpful witness evidence. The Authority awarded Mr Manning a net costs payment of $3,500.00 plus the filing fee, after setting off costs owed to MBIE for the interim reinstatement application.

Applicant: William David Manning (employee)
Respondent: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (employer)

Applicant: John Goddard, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Peter Chemis, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Manning was employed by MBIE and was dismissed. In a determination dated 13 May 2025, the Authority declined his application for interim reinstatement, with costs reserved. In a substantive determination dated 14 August 2026, the Authority found Mr Manning had been unjustifiably dismissed but also found he had contributed 100% to the situation giving rise to his dismissal, resulting in no remedies being awarded. The parties were unable to agree on costs following the substantive determination. Mr Manning sought costs of $20,689.18, while MBIE sought costs of $1,553.44. Both parties advanced competing arguments about who succeeded in each phase of the proceedings, the significance of claims withdrawn at the investigation meeting, and whether the evidence of Mr Manning's witness (Mr St Peter) should be separately compensated.

1. Whether costs on the interim reinstatement application should be awarded to MBIE — Status: Established (paras [18]-[20]).

The Authority applied the standard principle that costs follow the event. Mr Manning's interim reinstatement application was unsuccessful for several reasons, including difficulties in the parties' relationship, outstanding allegations, and MBIE's access concerns — not merely the scheduling reason Mr Manning relied on. Applying the daily tariff for a one-day investigation meeting, the Authority awarded MBIE $4,500.00, finding no circumstances warranting upward or downward adjustment.

2. Whether costs on the substantive determination should be awarded to Mr Manning — Status: Established (paras [21]-[27]).

The Authority confirmed the starting point that costs follow the event: Mr Manning succeeded on his primary claim of unjustified dismissal and was entitled to tariff costs for a three-day investigation meeting of $11,500.00. Citing the Court of Appeal's holding in White v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 451, the Authority confirmed that a 100% contributory conduct finding cannot be used to reduce costs. The Authority also applied the principle from Coomer v JA MacCallum and Son Limited [2017] NZEmpC 156 that mixed success is still success, rejecting MBIE's argument that costs should be reduced because most of Mr Manning's claims failed.

3. Whether costs to Mr Manning should be reduced due to withdrawal of three claims during the investigation meeting — Status: Established (paras [26]-[27]).

The Authority accepted that a reduction was justified because Mr Manning withdrew three claims late in the process — a penalty claim against Ms Schofield personally, an unjustified disadvantage claim relating to a privacy breach, and a claim for permanent reinstatement — after MBIE had prepared evidence and submissions to answer them. While the withdrawals may have reduced hearing time, the late timing justified a reduction. The tariff starting point of $11,500.00 was reduced to $8,000.00.

4. Whether Mr Manning should be reimbursed for the costs of witness Mr St Peter's report and attendance — Status: Dismissed (para [28]).

The Authority found that Mr St Peter's evidence did not assist the Authority in any material way. Additionally, no invoices were produced to support the claimed costs. As Mr Manning called Mr St Peter, it was appropriate for Mr Manning to bear those costs himself.

5. Whether MBIE's alternative submission that costs lie where they fall should be accepted — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[27]).

The Authority did not adopt the "costs lie where they fall" approach it had foreshadowed as a preliminary view in the substantive determination. The application of standard costs-follow-the-event principles and the daily tariff approach was considered appropriate, subject to the reduction for withdrawn claims.

6. Whether the filing fee should be reimbursed to Mr Manning — Status: Established (para [30]).

MBIE agreed Mr Manning was entitled to reimbursement of the Authority's filing fee. The Authority ordered reimbursement of $71.56.

7. Set-off of costs awarded to each party — Status: Established (para [29]).

The Authority set off MBIE's costs award of $4,500.00 against Mr Manning's costs award of $8,000.00, resulting in a net award to Mr Manning of $3,500.00.

The claim for costs was partially upheld in favour of Mr Manning: after set-off, MBIE was ordered to pay Mr Manning a net costs contribution of $3,500.00 plus the filing fee.

Costs awarded to Mr Manning on substantive determination: $8,000.00 (reduced from tariff of $11,500.00 due to late withdrawal of three claims).
Costs awarded to MBIE on interim reinstatement application: $4,500.00.
Set-off applied: $8,000.00 minus $4,500.00 = net payment to Mr Manning of $3,500.00.
Filing fee reimbursement: $71.56.
Total ordered payable by MBIE to Mr Manning: $3,571.56, within 28 days of the determination.
Costs for Mr St Peter's report and witness attendance: not awarded (Mr Manning to bear these himself).

Changhui Gong, a former massage therapist assistant employed by Chongqing Rich Overseas Health Services NZ Limited, sought to bring a personal grievance of unjustified dismissal. The central legal question in this preliminary determination was whether Ms Gong raised her personal grievance within the 90-day notification period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and if not, whether exceptional circumstances existed making it just to grant leave to bring the grievance out of time. The Authority found that reasonable steps were not taken to notify the employer, and while exceptional circumstances existed under s 115(b), it was not just to grant leave — so the personal grievance claim was declined. A separate wages arrears claim remains to be heard.

Applicant: Changhui Gong (employee, former massage therapist assistant)
Respondent: Chongqing Rich Overseas Health Services NZ Limited (employer)

Applicant: Sakura Ikeda
Respondent: Zong-Pei Zhao, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Gong, a Chinese national, signed an individual employment agreement with Chongqing on 10 August 2022 and held an accredited employer work visa to work in Auckland as a massage therapist. Her employment ended on 9 February 2024 due to serious misconduct. Ms Gong's representative, Ms Ikeda (a personal friend and non-lawyer advocate), allegedly posted a personal grievance letter to Chongqing on 16 April 2024 — within the 90-day window — but did not use any tracked, registered, or signature-required postal service. Chongqing denied receiving the letter, and the first time it was brought to the company's attention was when Ms Ikeda emailed the HR manager on 9 August 2024, three months after the 90-day period had expired on 9 May 2024. Ms Ikeda's explanation for the delay in following up was that she was waiting for Immigration New Zealand to conclude its investigation of the company, believing follow-up could be perceived as pressuring a settlement, advice the Authority found lacked a reasonable basis. Ms Gong also claims she is owed wage arrears of $38,273.27, which will proceed to a substantive hearing regardless of this preliminary determination's outcome.

1. Whether Ms Gong raised her personal grievance of unjustified dismissal within the 90-day employee notification period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [15]-[20]).

Section 114(2) of the Act requires that an employee either make, or take reasonable steps to make, the employer or its representative aware of an alleged personal grievance within 90 days of the action giving rise to it. The Authority accepted the veracity of evidence from Ms Ikeda and her friend Ms Li that a letter was posted on 16 April 2024, but found this insufficient: the letter was untracked, there was no metadata evidence of the letter's provenance (Ms Ikeda's computer had since been replaced), no post-tracking or independent delivery evidence existed, and Ms Gong had no personal involvement or oversight in the posting. Weighing these factors cumulatively, the Authority concluded that reasonable steps to make Chongqing aware of the grievance had not been established under s 114(2).

2. Whether exceptional circumstances exist under s 115(4) and s 115(b) of the Act to permit the personal grievance to be raised out of time — Status: Established (paras [21]-[23]).

Section 115(4) allows the Authority to consider a grievance raised out of time where there are exceptional circumstances and it is just to do so. Section 115(b) identifies as a relevant circumstance that an employee made reasonable arrangements for an agent to raise the grievance on their behalf and the agent unreasonably failed to ensure it was raised in time. The Authority found that Ms Ikeda's failure to take responsible measures to monitor delivery of the letter — an untracked posting of a legally significant document — constituted an unreasonable failure by Ms Gong's agent, satisfying the threshold for exceptional circumstances. However, the existence of exceptional circumstances alone is not sufficient; the Authority must also be satisfied it is just to grant leave.

3. Whether it is just to grant leave under s 115(4) for Ms Gong's personal grievance to be considered out of time — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]-[27]).

Even where exceptional circumstances exist, the Authority must separately assess whether it would be just to consider the grievance. The Authority found it would not be just to grant leave for several reasons: Ms Ikeda's advice not to follow up (based on the INZ investigation) lacked any reasonable foundation because Ms Gong had no involvement in that investigation, meaning there was no plausible basis for the concern that follow-up could be perceived as pressuring a settlement; a reasonable person in Ms Gong's position would have taken further steps to confirm that an untracked letter of significant legal importance had been received; and the employer had played no part in the mistaken decision not to follow up and should not be required to bear that cost. The application for personal grievance was accordingly declined.

4. Whether the wages arrears claim of $38,273.27 under s 131 of the Act would proceed — Status: Established as a matter requiring further hearing (paras [2], [28]).

The Authority noted that Ms Gong's wages arrears claim under s 131 of the Act is a separate matter that requires a substantive investigation meeting regardless of the outcome of this preliminary determination. No findings were made on the merits of this claim; it was simply confirmed that it would proceed. Costs were reserved pending the outcome of this claim.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [28]).

The Authority reserved costs pending the outcome of Ms Gong's wages arrears claim, meaning no costs order was made at this stage.

The personal grievance claim of unjustified dismissal was dismissed; the wages arrears claim will proceed to a substantive hearing.

None ordered at this stage. The personal grievance claim has been declined. The wages arrears claim ($38,273.27 sought) will proceed to a further substantive investigation meeting. Costs are reserved pending the outcome of that claim.

The Labour Inspector brought claims on behalf of 12 former employees of a Wellington nail salon (Amy's Hair and Nail Design) operated by Ngoc Tuyet Uyen Huynh (Amy), alleging unlawful wage deductions, minimum wage breaches, holiday pay failures, rest and meal break failures, and the collection of illegal employment premiums, with secondary claims against four other respondents for aiding and abetting those breaches. Amy was declared bankrupt during proceedings, staying all claims against her personally. The Authority found insufficient evidence to establish that any of the remaining respondents (the salon manager and three associates) were knowingly involved in the unlawful deductions or premium collection, and dismissed all claims against them.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector (on behalf of 12 former employees)
Respondent: Ngoc Tuyet Uyen Huynh (Amy) – First Respondent (nail salon owner/employer); Thanh Tuyen Nguyen (Tina) – Second Respondent (salon manager); Quoc Hien Tran – Third Respondent; Trung Tran – Fourth Respondent; Van Minh Tran – Fifth Respondent

Applicant: Greg La Hood and Petrina Siania, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Myles Norris, representative for the First Respondent (no representatives noted for other respondents)

Amy operated a nail salon in Wellington employing 12 nail technicians, many of whom had been recruited from Vietnam and required to pay substantial sums (approximately NZD $30,000 each) to secure employment and visas, payments allegedly constituting illegal premiums under the Wages Protection Act 1983 (WPA). An unannounced Labour Inspectorate site visit on 5 December 2023 uncovered significant concerns, including wage deductions made without written consent (Amy claiming she was entitled to offset loans and living expenses), minimum wage shortfalls, holiday pay failures, and breaches relating to public holidays and rest/meal breaks. Amy did not dispute that deductions had been made but believed she was entitled to offset debts owed by employees. Following the investigation meeting (8–12 September 2025), Amy was adjudicated bankrupt, causing proceedings against her to be stayed under s 76(1) of the Insolvency Act 2006. The remaining respondents (Tina as manager and three associates allegedly involved in receiving premium payments in Vietnam) denied involvement, and the Labour Inspector sought findings that they had aided and abetted unlawful deductions and/or the collection of illegal premiums.

1. Whether Amy (First Respondent) breached ss 4, 5, and 5A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 by making unlawful wage deductions — Status: Established in findings (para [50], [52]), but proceedings stayed due to bankruptcy (para [10], [52]).

The Authority accepted the employees' evidence and the Labour Inspector's calculations as correctly reflecting the amounts unlawfully deducted by Amy. Amy's purported justification — that she was owed money for loans, rent, and living expenses — was found to provide no lawful basis for the deductions. However, because Amy was adjudicated bankrupt after the investigation meeting, all proceedings against her were stayed under s 76(1) of the Insolvency Act 2006, and no orders could be made against her personally.

2. Whether Amy breached s 12A(1) of the Wages Protection Act 1983 by seeking and obtaining illegal premium payments from employees as a condition of employment — Status: Established in findings against Amy (paras [23], [28]-[29], [39]), but proceedings stayed due to bankruptcy (para [52]).

Evidence from multiple employees established that payments of approximately NZD $30,000 were required to secure employment, constituting illegal premiums under the WPA. The Authority found on the evidence that any premium ultimately intended for Amy could not be the subject of orders given her bankruptcy. No specific finding was made that the premiums reached Amy's hands beyond reasonable doubt on the balance of probabilities given intermediaries, but the nature of the payments was found to be unlawful in character.

3. Whether Amy breached s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 by failing to pay the applicable minimum wage — Status: Established in findings (para [50], [52]), but proceedings stayed due to bankruptcy.

The Labour Inspector's calculations of minimum wage arrears (totalling over $130,000 across 11 employees) were accepted by the Authority as correct. Amy's conduct in deducting amounts from wages meant employees received below the minimum wage. Proceedings were stayed as against Amy due to bankruptcy.

4. Whether Amy breached s 130 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to keep accurate wage and time records — Status: Not resolved on its merits (paras [3], [10]).

This claim was noted in the statement of problem but, given Amy's bankruptcy and the determination's focus on the remaining respondents, no separate finding or order was made in respect of this breach.

5. Whether Amy breached s 81 of the Holidays Act 2003 by failing to maintain proper holiday and leave records — Status: Not resolved on its merits (paras [3], [10]).

Similarly noted but not separately determined, as the determination narrowed its focus to claims against the non-bankrupt respondents and the issue of illegal premiums and aiding and abetting.

6. Whether Amy failed to provide rest and meal breaks to employees — Status: Not resolved on its merits (paras [4], [10]).

Noted as an allegation but not separately adjudicated given the bankruptcy stay and the determination's limited scope.

7. Whether Amy failed to correctly calculate and pay annual holiday pay — Status: Established in findings (para [50]), but proceedings stayed; individual arrears listed at para [9].

Holiday pay arrears accepted as correctly calculated by the Labour Inspector across 11 employees, but no enforceable orders made against Amy due to bankruptcy.

8. Whether Amy failed to pay employees for working on public holidays and failed to pay time-and-a-half and alternative holidays — Status: Established in findings (para [50]), but proceedings stayed; individual amounts listed at para [9].

The Authority accepted the Labour Inspector's figures for public holiday pay failures. No enforceable orders made against Amy due to bankruptcy.

9. Whether Thanh Tuyen Nguyen (Tina) (Second Respondent) was directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or a party to the unlawful wage deductions under the WPA — Status: Dismissed (para [51]).

The applicable test under the WPA requires that a person be directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to a breach. The Authority found the evidence affirmatively established that Tina was not in this position — Amy was the controlling force and instigator of the deductions. While Sandy's evidence mentioned Tina requesting cash paybacks, this was insufficient to establish knowing involvement in unlawful deductions.

10. Whether Quoc Hien Tran (Third Respondent), Trung Tran (Fourth Respondent), and Van Minh Tran (Fifth Respondent) were engaged by Amy to seek and receive illegal premium payments and thereby aided and abetted breaches of the WPA — Status: Dismissed (paras [24], [34], [45], [48], [53]).

The Authority assessed each employee's evidence individually and found that, although payments were made to some of these individuals (notably to Van Minh Tran's bank account and Trung Tran's account), there was insufficient evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities that those individuals knew the nature of the payments or were knowingly aiding and abetting the receipt of illegal premiums. The intermediary and agency structures (involving La Quoc Phong and others not named as respondents) made it impossible to safely conclude the named respondents were aware of the unlawful character of funds passing through their accounts.

11. Whether the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Respondents were directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the unlawful wage deductions — Status: Dismissed (para [53]).

The Authority concluded there was no evidence placing any of the three as knowing participants in the wage deduction scheme. Amy was identified as the sole knowing instigator.

12. Costs — Status: No order made (para [54]).

The Authority declined to award costs against Amy given her bankruptcy, and held that costs should lie where they fall. No costs were ordered against any respondent.

All claims against the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Respondents were dismissed; findings of breach were made against the First Respondent (Amy) in respect of wage deductions, minimum wage, and holiday entitlements, but all proceedings against her are stayed due to her bankruptcy and no enforceable orders were made.

None ordered. Proceedings against Amy (First Respondent) were stayed by virtue of s 76(1) of the Insolvency Act 2006 following her adjudication of bankruptcy; all claims against the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Respondents were dismissed. No costs were awarded; costs lie where they fall.

This determination is a follow-up to an earlier ERA decision ([2026] NZERA 430) in which Gurdev Singh Arora, a former employee of PA Service 2018 Limited (in liquidation), was found to have a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage. The earlier determination left open the quantum of wage and holiday pay arrears owing to Mr Arora because the calculations had not been adequately evidenced; this determination resolves that outstanding issue by accepting Mr Arora's subsequently provided calculations and ordering payment of $60,656.60 in total, with the company's directors jointly liable to the extent the company cannot pay.

Applicant: Gurdev Singh Arora (employee)
Respondent: PA Service 2018 Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent/employer); Amandeep (Second Respondent/director); Harpreet Singh Luthra (Third Respondent/director)

Applicant: Arunjeev Singh, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Harpreet Singh Luthra, in person (no appearance noted for Amandeep or PA Service)

Gurdev Singh Arora was employed by PA Service 2018 Limited from approximately mid-October 2022 to mid-February 2024. In an earlier determination dated 1 July 2026 ([2026] NZERA 430), the Authority found Mr Arora had a personal grievance for unjustified disadvantage and also found that PA Service had committed employment standards breaches relating to underpayment of wages and holiday entitlements. The Authority accepted Mr Arora's handwritten timesheets, corroborated by documentary evidence, as reliable proof that he worked more hours than he was paid for, but was unable to quantify the shortfall at that stage due to insufficient calculation evidence. Leave was granted to recover wage and holiday pay arrears from the company's directors, Amandeep and Harpreet Singh Luthra, as persons involved in the employment standards breaches. PA Service was placed into liquidation on 4 February 2026 by the High Court on the petition of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, and the liquidators consented to the proceedings continuing. Mr Arora subsequently provided a memorandum and spreadsheet detailing his calculations, which was served on the respondents; neither director responded.

1. Quantum of shortfall in wages, time-and-a-half payments, and alternative holidays owed to Mr Arora — Status: Established (paras [7]-[13], [15]-[16]).

The Authority applied s 132 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (which allows the Authority to determine wages owed) and s 83 of the Holidays Act 2003 (relating to alternative holidays). Having already found in the earlier determination that Mr Arora worked more hours than he was paid for, the Authority accepted the calculations provided by Mr Arora in his memorandum and spreadsheet. The total shortfall in wages, time-and-a-half payments, and alternative holidays was accepted as $56,103.32, covering the period mid-October 2022 to mid-February 2024. Neither respondent director contested or responded to Mr Arora's calculations.

2. Quantum of annual holiday pay owed to Mr Arora — Status: Established (paras [7], [14]-[16]).

Also applying s 132 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and s 83 of the Holidays Act 2003, the Authority accepted Mr Arora's calculation of annual holiday pay for one year and four months (November 2022 to February 2024) as $4,553.28. The Authority was satisfied this amount was owing and ordered payment accordingly.

3. Personal liability of directors Amandeep and Harpreet Singh Luthra for employment standards breaches — Status: Established (paras [2], [17]).

Leave to recover wage and holiday pay arrears from the directors as persons involved in employment standards breaches had already been granted in the earlier determination. This determination quantifies those amounts and confirms that both directors are liable to pay the same sums ($56,103.32 and $4,553.28) to the extent PA Service is unable to pay them, reflecting their secondary/contingent liability for the company's obligations.

4. Costs — Status: Not reached (paras [18]-[20]).

Costs were reserved. The parties are encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Arora may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; respondents then have 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if required to determine costs.

The claim was upheld: the Authority ordered payment of $56,103.32 in wage arrears, time-and-a-half, and alternative holidays, and $4,553.28 in annual holiday pay, with the directors jointly and contingently liable.

- Wages/time-and-a-half/alternative holidays: $56,103.32 payable by PA Service 2018 Limited (in liquidation) within 28 days of the determination date (subject to income tax).
- Annual holiday pay: $4,553.28 payable by PA Service 2018 Limited (in liquidation) within 28 days of the determination date (subject to income tax).
- Total ordered: $60,656.60.
- Directors' liability: Amandeep and Harpreet Singh Luthra are each liable to pay the same amounts to the extent PA Service is unable to pay them (contingent/secondary liability), within the same 28-day timeframe.
- Reinstatement: Not ordered.
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; memorandum process outlined if not resolved.

[CONSENT]

CRC Limited brought two interim injunction applications against former employees (and others) arising from concerns about competition, misuse of confidential information, and solicitation of clients and staff. The parties reached a negotiated resolution of the interim applications before the scheduled investigation meeting, and the Authority recorded the agreed terms as consent orders. The substantive matters remain to be heard and determined.

Applicant: CRC Limited (employer)
Respondents: Anne-Marie McNicol (First Respondent, File 3480985); Cornerstone Health Limited (Second Respondent, File 3480985); Shaun McNicol (First Respondent, File 3485025); Nina Freeman (Second Respondent, File 3485025); Cornerstone Health Limited (Third Respondent, File 3485025)

Applicant: Amy Keir, counsel for CRC Limited
First Respondent (Anne-Marie McNicol): Scott Wilson, counsel
First Respondent (Shaun McNicol): Samuel Deavoll, counsel
Second Respondent (Nina Freeman): Andrew McInnes, counsel
Respondent (Cornerstone Health Limited): James Pullar, counsel

CRC Limited filed two separate proceedings that were consolidated into one matter, seeking interim injunctions against Anne-Marie McNicol and Shaun McNicol (and others, including Cornerstone Health Limited). The applications appear to arise from concerns about competition with CRC Limited in Canterbury, misuse of CRC's confidential information, and solicitation of CRC's clients and staff, presumably following the departure of the two individual respondents from employment with CRC Limited. An investigation meeting was scheduled for Monday, 21 September 2026, but on Friday, 18 September 2026, all parties advised the Authority that they had resolved the interim injunction applications by agreement. The parties requested that the terms of their agreement be recorded as consent orders by the Authority, without prejudice to the substantive matters still to be determined. No factual findings were made by the Authority.

1. Whether interim injunctive orders should be made against Anne-Marie McNicol restraining her from misusing confidential information, competing with CRC Limited, soliciting clients, and soliciting staff or contractors — Status: Established by consent (determination, orders for Anne-Marie McNicol).

The parties reached agreement on the terms of interim restraints without contested determination on the merits; accordingly, no legal test was applied by the Authority. The consent orders prohibit Anne-Marie McNicol from using CRC's confidential information, being involved in any competing business in Canterbury (including Cornerstone Health Limited) before 14 October 2026, soliciting or diverting CRC clients before 14 January 2027, and soliciting or engaging CRC employees or contractors before 14 January 2027. These orders were made on an interim basis only and are without prejudice to the substantive proceedings.

2. Whether interim injunctive orders should be made against Shaun McNicol restraining him from misusing confidential information, competing with CRC Limited, soliciting clients, and soliciting staff or contractors — Status: Established by consent (determination, orders for Shaun McNicol).

As with the orders concerning Anne-Marie McNicol, no contested legal test was applied; the terms were agreed between the parties. The consent orders prohibit Shaun McNicol from using CRC's confidential information, being involved in any competing business in Canterbury (including Cornerstone Health Limited) before 2 December 2026, soliciting or diverting CRC clients before 2 March 2027, and soliciting or engaging CRC employees or contractors before 2 March 2027. These orders are also interim only and without prejudice to the substantive proceedings.

3. Costs — Status: Not reached (determination, costs paragraph).

Costs were expressly reserved by the Authority and will be addressed at the conclusion of the substantive investigation. No determination on costs was made at this stage.

4. Substantive claims underlying the interim applications — Status: Not reached (determination, para 2).

The determination expressly states that the interim applications were resolved without prejudice to the substantive matters still to be heard and determined by the Authority. No findings on the merits of the underlying claims were made.

The interim injunction applications were resolved by consent, with agreed restraint orders made against both Anne-Marie McNicol and Shaun McNicol; the substantive matters and costs remain to be determined.

Interim consent orders against Anne-Marie McNicol: (a) prohibition on using CRC Limited's confidential information (no time limit stated); (b) prohibition on involvement in any competing business in Canterbury (including Cornerstone Health Limited) until 14 October 2026; (c) prohibition on soliciting or diverting CRC clients until 14 January 2027; (d) prohibition on soliciting or engaging CRC employees or contractors until 14 January 2027.
Interim consent orders against Shaun McNicol: (a) prohibition on using CRC Limited's confidential information (no time limit stated); (b) prohibition on involvement in any competing business in Canterbury (including Cornerstone Health Limited) until 2 December 2026; (c) prohibition on soliciting or diverting CRC clients until 2 March 2027; (d) prohibition on soliciting or engaging CRC employees or contractors until 2 March 2027.
All orders are interim only and without prejudice to the substantive investigation.
Costs: Reserved, to be addressed at the conclusion of the substantive investigation.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from an earlier Employment Relations Authority proceeding in which the applicant, VLN, successfully obtained removal of their statement of problem to the Employment Court. The Authority considered the appropriate quantum of costs against the three respondents and resolved a preliminary time extension issue. Costs were awarded jointly and severally against all three respondents at half the daily tariff, plus lodgement fees.

Applicant: VLN (employee/applicant)
Respondent: Elizabeth Rose Dotcom (First Respondent), Kim Dotcom (Second Respondent), and Contractors Only Limited (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Tyrone-Jay Barugh, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

VLN lodged a statement of problem in the Authority and sought its removal to the Employment Court, which was granted in an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 508). Costs were reserved at that stage, and the Authority subsequently received submissions on costs from VLN only; the respondents did not file any reply within the time allowed. VLN's costs submission was filed five days late due to counsel's oversight, and VLN sought a time extension. The applicant is legally aided, which limits billable costs but does not alter the application of ordinary costs principles. VLN's submissions referred to comparable determinations in which the Authority had adopted 50% or 75% of the daily tariff as a starting point, and claimed disbursements for printing, copying, mileage, and courier charges, as well as lodgement fees.

1. Whether time should be extended for VLN to file their costs submission out of time — Status: Established (paras [4]-[5]).

The Authority applied the general principle that a short delay may be excused where no prejudice is demonstrated and an adequate explanation is provided. The respondents pointed to no prejudice and the delay was short. Counsel's oversight was accepted as a sufficient explanation, and time was extended.

2. Whether VLN, as the successful party, was entitled to a contribution towards legal costs — Status: Established (paras [6]-[8]).

The ordinary principle that a successful party is entitled to a contribution to their legal costs applied. VLN's legal aid status limits billable costs but does not displace this principle. VLN was successful and therefore entitled to costs.

3. What daily tariff rate was appropriate given the nature of the proceeding — Status: Established (paras [9]-[10]).

The Authority applies a daily tariff approach even for paper determinations. Although comparable defended matters attracted 50–75% of the daily tariff, this application was unopposed. Counsel nonetheless had to ensure proper service and comply with directions under urgency. The Authority fixed costs at half the daily tariff as a reasonable account of these factors, resulting in a figure of $2,250.00.

4. Whether standard office-type disbursements (printing, copying, mileage, courier) should be awarded in addition to the daily tariff — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[12]).

The Authority held it would be exceptional to add standard office-type disbursements on top of a figure reached by the daily tariff approach, and declined to do so.

5. Whether lodgement fees should be added to the daily tariff figure — Status: Established (para [13]).

Lodgement fees are standard additions to the daily tariff figure in Authority proceedings. They were awarded in the amount of $224.88.

6. Whether costs liability should be apportioned differently among the three respondents — Status: Dismissed (para [14]).

The Authority found no basis to distinguish between the respondents as to their liability for costs, and ordered joint and several liability.

The costs application was upheld in part: VLN was awarded costs at half the daily tariff plus lodgement fees, with disbursements for printing, copying, mileage, and courier charges declined.

Costs: $2,250.00 (half the daily tariff) payable jointly and severally by Elizabeth Rose Dotcom, Kim Dotcom, and Contractors Only Limited.
Expenses (lodgement fees): $224.88.
Total payable: $2,474.88, due by Friday 23 October 2026.
No remedy for lost wages, reinstatement, or hurt and humiliation — this is a costs-only determination.

[COSTS ONLY]

SGS (applicant) successfully obtained removal of its employment relationship problem to the Employment Court in an earlier determination, with costs reserved. This determination resolves the costs of the Authority proceedings, awarding SGS costs against the three respondents — Kim Dotcom, Elizabeth Rose Dotcom, and Contractors Only Limited — jointly and severally. The Authority applied a daily tariff approach, capped at the amount actually incurred by SGS, plus lodgement fees.

Applicant: SGS (employee/applicant)
Respondents: Kim Dotcom (First Respondent), Elizabeth Rose Dotcom (Second Respondent), Contractors Only Limited (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Tyrone-Jay Barugh, counsel (firm not stated)
Respondents: No appearance

SGS lodged a statement of problem in the Authority and sought its removal to the Employment Court, which was granted in an earlier determination ([2026] NZERA 554). Costs were reserved at that time. SGS subsequently filed costs submissions on 31 August 2026; the respondents did not file any reply within the time allowed. The application for removal was unopposed. Counsel for SGS was required to ensure service and take procedural steps in accordance with directions under urgency to bring the matter to the respondents' attention. SGS limited its costs claim to $2,164.30 (the actual costs incurred), plus claimed disbursements for printing, copying, courier charges, and lodgement fees.

1. Whether SGS is entitled to a costs award as the successful party — Status: Established (paras [4]-[5]).

The Authority applied the general principle that the successful party is ordinarily entitled to a contribution to their legal costs. SGS succeeded in obtaining removal to the Employment Court and was therefore entitled to costs. No authorities beyond the Authority's own practice were cited.

2. What quantum of costs is appropriate, applying the daily tariff approach — Status: Established (paras [6]-[8]).

The Authority noted that previous determinations had applied either 50% or 75% of the daily tariff for a one-day meeting. Because this application was unopposed (unlike those earlier defended matters), but recognising that counsel still had to ensure service and take procedural steps under urgency, the Authority fixed costs at half the daily tariff as a reasonable figure. The award was further capped at the amount actually claimed by SGS — $2,164.30 — as that figure did not exceed what the tariff approach would produce.

3. Whether standard office disbursements (printing, copying, courier charges) should be awarded in addition to the daily tariff figure — Status: Dismissed (para [10]).

The Authority held it would be exceptional to add standard office-type disbursements on top of the daily tariff figure, and declined to do so. No specific authorities were cited; this reflects the Authority's standard practice.

4. Whether lodgement fees should be awarded in addition to the daily tariff figure — Status: Established (para [11]).

The Authority confirmed that lodgement fees are standardly added on top of the daily tariff figure and awarded lodgement fees of $224.88 accordingly.

5. Whether liability for costs should be apportioned differently between the three respondents — Status: Dismissed (para [12]).

The Authority found no basis to distinguish between the respondents as to their liability for costs and ordered them to be jointly and severally liable.

The costs claim was upheld in part: costs awarded at $2,164.30 plus lodgement fees of $224.88, with standard office disbursements declined.

Costs: $2,164.30 (capped at actual costs incurred, applying half the daily tariff approach), payable jointly and severally by all three respondents.
Lodgement fees/expenses: $224.88.
Total payable: $2,389.18, due by Friday 23 October 2026.
Printing, copying, and courier disbursements: declined.
Reinstatement: None ordered.

Lisa Ward, a full-time office administrator employed for only five working days, claims she was unjustifiably dismissed by Property Force Limited (PFL) after PFL relied on a 90-day trial period provision in her individual employment agreement. Ms Ward challenged the trial period's validity on two grounds: first, that she signed the agreement after commencing employment; and second, that PFL failed to give the requisite 14 days' notice. The Authority rejected both grounds, finding the trial period was validly entered into before Ms Ward commenced work duties, and that adequate notice was given, meaning her personal grievance could not proceed.

Applicant: Lisa Ward (employee, full-time office administrator)
Respondent: Property Force Limited (employer, plumbing and gasfitting business)

Applicant: Paul Brown, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Tim McGinn, counsel for the Respondent

Property Force Limited, a small family-run plumbing and gasfitting company in Christchurch, advertised for a full-time experienced administrator in July 2025. Ms Ward applied, was interviewed at the Gerrands' home on 23 July 2025, and verbally accepted the role. She commenced at the workplace on Monday 28 July 2025 at 8.00am and worked four days before a conversation with Mr Gerrand on Friday 1 August 2025 about things "not working out." The parties disputed whether that conversation amounted to a summary dismissal or a mutual acknowledgment pending formal notice; on Sunday 3 August 2025, Mr Gerrand sent a formal termination letter offering Ms Ward 14 days' notice to work out. Ms Ward declined to work the notice period, asserting the IEA required payment in lieu, raised a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal, and later added the alternative ground that she had signed the employment agreement containing the 90-day trial period only after commencing work. Mediation was unsuccessful. PFL maintained throughout that the 90-day trial period was valid, that notice was properly given, and that in any event, any failure to work the notice was Ms Ward's own choice.

1. Procedural issue: Whether Ms Ward should be permitted to raise, belatedly, the ground that the 90-day trial period was invalid because she signed the IEA after commencing employment — Status: Established (paras [27]).

The Authority exercised its investigator's discretion to allow the expanded claim because both parties had been given the opportunity to provide evidence and submissions on the point, and a fair process had been followed. The Authority noted it would nonetheless weigh this issue in context. No statutory test was cited; the decision was a procedural fairness assessment.

2. Whether the identity of the respondent as Property Force Limited was confirmed — Status: Established (para [10]).

The parties agreed through counsel at the outset of the investigation meeting that the correct respondent was Property Force Limited. This was necessary because the initiating documents and IEA referenced different names or trade names for the employer.

3. Whether the 90-day trial period was invalid because Ms Ward signed the IEA after commencing employment on 28 July 2025 — Status: Dismissed (paras [27]-[36]).

Under ss 67A and 67B of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA), and applying the strict "quid pro quo" approach from Smith v Stokes Valley Pharmacy (2009) Limited [2010] NZEmpC 111, Blackmore v Honick Properties Ltd [2011] NZEmpC 152, and Senate Investment Trust Through Crown Lease Trustees Ltd v Cooper [2021] NZEmpC 45, a 90-day trial period is invalid if the employee commences work before signing the IEA. The Authority preferred the Gerrands' evidence that Ms Ward herself had indicated she would review the MBIE-template agreement on Monday morning, found that Ms Ward had not commenced any work duties before the IEA was signed (digital timestamp on the document was 8.37am, with Mr Gerrand arriving around 8.30am), and found Ms Ward's variable and sometimes implausible evidence on this point undermined by her extensive HR experience and knowledge of 90-day provisions. The Authority concluded it was likely Ms Ward signed the IEA before commencing work duties.

4. Whether the 90-day trial period was invalid due to PFL's failure to give 14 days' notice — specifically, whether employment was ended without notice on Friday 1 August 2025 — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[42]).

The ERA requires that notice be given within the trial period for a valid dismissal under ss 67A and 67B. The Authority found the Friday conversation was initiated by Mr Gerrand and amounted to PFL seeking to end the employment, but that Mr Gerrand did not use language of summary dismissal — rather, there was a mutual misunderstanding about what had been agreed. Ms Ward's farewell email later that day, which expressed no dissatisfaction and gave recruitment advice, was consistent with her understanding that she would not be returning, while Mr Gerrand believed there had been a mutual agreement. The Authority found it was PFL that sought to end the employment, not Ms Ward.

5. Whether the situation regarding notice was rectified when PFL communicated a two-week notice period on Sunday 3 August 2025 — Status: Established (paras [39]-[42]).

The Authority found that Mr Gerrand's Sunday evening email and attached termination letter, sent before the next working Monday, did give Ms Ward 14 days' notice as required under the trial period provision. Notice does not have to be given at the moment of the dismissal conversation; clarification before the next working day was sufficient in the circumstances. The Authority rejected Ms Ward's argument that, because PFL did not offer to pay notice in lieu, no valid notice had been given.

6. Whether PFL was contractually bound to pay notice in lieu (rather than requiring Ms Ward to work out the notice period) — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[41]).

The IEA stated the employer "might" pay the employee not to work, giving the employer a discretion, not an obligation, to pay in lieu of notice. Ms Ward's plain reading of the IEA, combined with her employment law experience, meant she could not reasonably have taken the view that payment in lieu was mandatory. The Authority found her position objectively unreasonable.

7. Whether, if the 90-day trial period was invalid, PFL's dismissal of Ms Ward was substantively justified under s 103A of the ERA — Status: Not reached (para [11](b)).

The Authority found the 90-day trial period was valid, so this issue did not arise. The question of whether PFL's reasons for dismissal (including alleged misrepresentation of skills) would meet the justification test under s 103A was not considered.

8. What remedies should be awarded for compensation and lost wages under the ERA if unjustified dismissal was established — Status: Not reached (para [11](c)).

Given the 90-day trial period was found valid and no personal grievance could proceed, no remedies fell to be considered.

9. Whether any remedies should be reduced under s 124 of the ERA due to Ms Ward's contribution to the circumstances giving rise to the grievance — Status: Not reached (para [11](d)).

PFL had alleged Ms Ward misrepresented her skills, which would have been relevant to contribution. However, because the grievance was dismissed at the threshold stage, this issue was not reached.

10. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [44]-[45]).

The Authority reserved costs, encouraging the parties to resolve the issue between themselves. If unresolved, PFL may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Ms Ward then having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be determined on the usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was dismissed in full; the Authority found PFL ended Ms Ward's employment under a valid 90-day trial period and her personal grievance for unjustified dismissal cannot proceed.

None ordered. Costs reserved — to be determined on the Authority's standard daily tariff if the parties cannot resolve costs between themselves, following a memorandum process.

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Dr Bodhi Wimalasena, a Senior Medical Officer employed by Health New Zealand (HNZ), sought urgent interim relief in two forms: a permanent injunction to halt an external investigation into workplace conduct complaints made against her by seven colleagues, and reinstatement of her right to attend Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events. The key legal questions were whether there were serious questions to be tried on her unjustified disadvantage grievances, and where the balance of convenience and overall justice lay. The Authority declined the injunction but granted reinstatement to Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events, ordering HNZ to restore access within two working days.

Applicant: Dr Bodhi Wimalasena (employee, Senior Medical Officer)
Respondent: Health New Zealand (employer)

Applicant: Kate Tennent and William Buckley, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Rebecca Rendle and Clara Evans, counsel for the Respondent

Dr Wimalasena has been employed by HNZ as a Senior Medical Officer (SMO) and physician in General Medicine at Auckland Hospital. On 29 April 2026, HNZ received a complaint from the Association of Salaried Medical Specialists (ASMS) on behalf of seven SMO colleagues, alleging that Dr Wimalasena's conduct was threatening, intimidating and harassing, creating an unhealthy work environment. Dr Wimalasena had been on medical leave since 16 March 2026 following a workplace incident, and from 8 June 2026 was working in a different department (Older People's Health) rather than returning to General Medicine. On 24 July 2026, HNZ wrote to Dr Wimalasena formalising interim working arrangements, including removal of her supervisory duties for a registrar and an instruction not to attend General Medicine meetings including Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events. Dr Wimalasena contends these measures were retaliatory responses to a protected disclosure she made to HNZ on 10 February 2025 and to prior unresolved grievances, while HNZ maintains the measures were necessary to limit interactions between Dr Wimalasena and the complainants pending an external investigation and were supported by its health and safety obligations.

1. Interim non-publication order — names and identifying details of complainant SMOs — Status: Established (paras [23]-[38]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from MW v Spiga Ltd [2024] NZEmpC 147, first assessing whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected from publication, and second whether those consequences justify a departure from open justice. The complainants are non-parties who had not been notified of the proceedings and had a legitimate privacy interest in their identifying information; their identities had less relevance to this urgent interim application than to the substantive hearing. The Authority accepted that publishing their names could discourage participation in employment processes and cause prejudice disproportionate to any public interest in disclosure. Non-publication of the names and identifying details of the complainant SMOs was granted.

2. Serious question to be tried — unjustified disadvantage personal grievance arising from HNZ's decision to proceed with the external investigation — Status: Partially established (weakly arguable) (paras [46]-[58]).

The test requires only that the claim is not vexatious or frivolous, a low threshold acknowledged by both parties. Dr Wimalasena argued disparity of treatment (HNZ investigated the SMOs' complaint but not her own complaints or protected disclosure) and retaliation under the Protected Disclosures Act 2022. The Authority declined to determine at this stage whether the February 2025 correspondence was a protected disclosure under s 9 PDA or whether HNZ's conduct constituted retaliation under s 21 PDA. The grievance was found to be only weakly arguable because HNZ has statutory obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 and contractual obligations under the ASMS collective agreement to maintain a psychologically safe workplace, and the investigation's terms of reference require the investigator to consider Dr Wimalasena's concerns about context and motive. This meant the claim cleared the low threshold but without strength.

3. Serious question to be tried — unjustified disadvantage personal grievance arising from removal of supervisory duties and instruction not to attend Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events — Status: Partially established (weakly arguable) (paras [59]-[67]).

HNZ conceded the low threshold was met on the Grand Rounds/hospital-wide events instruction. The Authority applied the principle from E TU Incorporated v Singh [2024] NZEmpC 84 that an employer is generally required to give notice of a proposal to suspend and seek the employee's view, with the adequacy of opportunity depending on circumstances. The Authority accepted it was at least arguable that HNZ did not provide Dr Wimalasena with all relevant information before instructing her not to attend Grand Rounds, and that supervisory duties were removed without consultation on or about 17 July 2026. Overall, the personal grievance was assessed as weakly arguable.

4. Serious question to be tried — whether a permanent injunction restraining HNZ from proceeding with the investigation should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [68]-[72]).

The Authority noted that orders restraining an employer from proceeding with a workplace investigation are rare (Savage v Wai Shing Limited [2019] NZEmpC 141), because intervention risks prejudicing the outcome of the process (Zhao v Public Service Commission [2026] NZEmpC 188). Dr Wimalasena herself indicated willingness to participate if the investigation could proceed; HNZ had provided terms of reference and invited her comment; and HNZ was aware of its s 4 Employment Relations Act 2000 obligations to provide relevant information. The Authority concluded there was no serious question to be tried on this head, and the application for an injunction could not succeed at this stage.

5. Serious question to be tried — permanent reinstatement to attend Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events — Status: Established (paras [73]-[81]).

The Authority applied the test from Christieson v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Limited [2021] NZEmpC 142 that reinstatement must be practicable and feasible. With only six remaining complainants among approximately twenty-seven physicians in the General Medicine team, and Grand Rounds being an educational forum rather than a clinical working environment, the Authority accepted Dr Wimalasena's submission that she could attend without direct interaction with the complainants. The educational benefit to Dr Wimalasena was also noted. A serious question to be tried was established on reinstatement to Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events.

6. Balance of convenience — permanent injunction to halt investigation — Status: Dismissed (paras [82]-[93]).

The Authority applied the balance of convenience framework from Stellar Elements New Zealand Limited v Amesbury [2024] NZEmpC 36, considering adequacy of damages, preservation of the status quo, and relative case strength. The balance favoured HNZ: the investigation was ready to proceed; HNZ had provided terms of reference; HNZ's s 4 obligations provided a safeguard; and a substantive investigation meeting could be scheduled for December 2026. The balance of convenience did not favour restraining the investigation.

7. Balance of convenience — reinstatement to attend Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events — Status: Established (paras [82]-[93]).

Applying the same framework, the Authority found that possible incidental interaction with a complainant in an educational setting is materially different from working together in a clinical setting, and rejected HNZ's argument that such attendance could compromise the investigation. With six complainants in a large group and no requirement for direct interaction at Grand Rounds, the balance of convenience favoured reinstatement.

8. Overall justice of the case — permanent injunction — Status: Dismissed (paras [94]-[102]).

Applying Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 (CA), the Authority stood back and considered whether it was just to restrain the investigation. It noted that the investigation's terms of reference require recommendations for a safe working environment and resumption of working relationships, serving a constructive purpose. The delay between HNZ receiving the complaint (April) and notifying Dr Wimalasena (July) was explained by the complainants taking time to consider their options and Dr Wimalasena's absence, and was treated as a neutral factor. Overall justice favoured the investigation proceeding.

9. Overall justice of the case — reinstatement to Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events — Status: Established (paras [103]-[106]).

Consistent with the balance of convenience findings, overall justice favoured reinstating Dr Wimalasena's attendance at Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events. The order was made on a pending basis, to remain until the outcome of HNZ's investigation and the Authority's substantive investigation.

10. Whether the delay in notifying Dr Wimalasena of the complaint (April to July 2026) constituted relevant misconduct by HNZ — Status: Not reached as a substantive finding (paras [97]-[99]).

The Authority reviewed correspondence explaining the complainants' deliberations and noted Dr Wimalasena's absence from the workplace during that period. It characterised this as a neutral factor at the interim stage and declined to make any substantive finding, reserving the matter for the substantive hearing.

11. Whether Dr Wimalasena's February 2025 correspondence constituted a protected disclosure under s 9 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2022 — Status: Not reached (paras [53]-[54]).

The Authority expressly declined to determine this at the interim stage, as it turned on untested evidence and is a substantive matter for the full hearing.

12. Whether HNZ acted in a retaliatory manner under s 21 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2022 — Status: Not reached (paras [53]-[54]).

As with the protected disclosure question, this was reserved for the substantive hearing; the Authority could not make findings on untested evidence at the interim stage.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [108]).

The Authority made no costs order at this stage, reserving the issue for later determination.

The application was partially upheld: the claim for a permanent injunction restraining the investigation was dismissed, but the application for reinstatement to attend Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events was granted as an interim order pending the substantive hearing.

Reinstatement (interim): HNZ ordered to allow Dr Wimalasena to attend Grand Rounds and hospital-wide events within two working days of the determination, pending the outcome of HNZ's investigation and the Authority's substantive investigation.
Injunction: None ordered (application declined).
Monetary compensation: None ordered.
Costs: Reserved.
Substantive hearing: Authority to contact parties to set a timetable and date for a substantive investigation meeting in December 2026.

Yuhan Lu, a chef employed by Reunion Food Service (NZ) Limited (RFS) for approximately six weeks from February 2025, brought claims for unpaid wages, holiday pay, and KiwiSaver arrears against RFS and its director Tshunloong Ho personally. The key legal question was whether Mr Ho could be held personally liable as a "person involved in the breach" of employment standards under ss 142W and 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found that wage arrears and holiday pay totalling $1,015.33 gross were owed by RFS, but dismissed all personal liability claims against Mr Ho on the basis that he lacked the requisite actual knowledge of the breaches.

Applicant: Yuhan Lu (employee/chef)
Respondent 1: Reunion Food Service (NZ) Limited (in Liquidation) (employer)
Respondent 2: Tshunloong Ho (director of RFS)

Applicant: Self-represented (Yuhan Lu appearing for herself)
Respondent 1: No appearance
Respondent 2: Tshun Ho (self-represented)

Yuhan Lu commenced employment as a chef with RFS on 17 February 2025, working for approximately six weeks at a newly established restaurant. During her employment, Ms Lu alleged RFS failed to pay her correctly for all hours worked in her first week, failed to pay holiday pay, and failed to remit KiwiSaver contributions to the IRD. RFS was placed into liquidation on 24 June 2026, after the investigation meeting, preventing proceedings against the company from continuing without liquidator consent or a High Court order. Ms Lu therefore pursued her claims against Mr Ho personally under s 142W and s 142Y of the Act, arguing he was a director involved in the breaches of employment standards during her employment (3 March 2025 to 11 May 2025). Mr Ho maintained he was responsible only for front-of-house operations and was unaware of the payroll failures, with payroll and kitchen administration managed by director Mr Li. The investigation was hampered by a lack of documentary evidence, and two of RFS's witnesses (director Li and manager Xu) did not attend the hearing, meaning their written statements were afforded reduced weight.

1. Whether Ms Lu's KiwiSaver employer contributions were paid — Status: Established in part, resolved prior to determination (paras [9], [15]).

RFS's payroll system recorded KiwiSaver deductions and employer contributions, but these were not reflected in Ms Lu's IRD summary. The Authority found this was more than an administrative oversight given the automated payroll system used. However, the outstanding KiwiSaver entitlements were paid upon lodgement of the matter with the Authority, so no further order was required on this point.

2. Whether Ms Lu was correctly paid holiday pay — Status: Established (paras [17], [20], [26]).

Mr Ho conceded that a shortfall of $289.45 in holiday pay remained outstanding, calculated as 8% of total earnings less the amount already paid in Ms Lu's final pay. The Authority accepted this figure as correctly reflecting the arrears owed, and this amount forms part of the total wage arrears finding.

3. Whether Ms Lu was correctly paid for hours worked in her first week of employment — Status: Established (paras [18], [20], [26]).

Based on RFS's own record of hours matched against payslip evidence, Ms Lu worked 62 hours but was paid for only 20.74 hours in her first week, leaving a gross balance of $725.88 outstanding (less relevant deductions). The Authority found RFS was in breach of its obligation under s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 to pay a worker their entire wages when due without deduction.

4. Whether there was a breach of employment standards within the meaning of s 142Y of the Act — Status: Established (paras [19]–[20]).

"Employment standards" under s 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 includes the Wages Protection Act 1983. Section 4 of that Act requires payment of full wages when payable. The Authority found RFS breached employment standards by failing to pay Ms Lu for all hours worked in her first week and by failing to pay her holiday pay entitlement. Subsections 142Y(1)(a) and (b) were established.

5. Whether Mr Ho was a person involved in the breach under s 142W of the Act, making him personally liable under s 142Y — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]–[25], [27]).

Section 142W requires that the person aided, abetted, counselled, procured, induced, was knowingly concerned in, or conspired to effect the breach. Citing Labour Inspector v Southern Taxis Ltd [2021] NZCA 705, the Authority confirmed that a director must have actual knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the breach. Following Lawton v Steel Pencil Holdings Ltd (in liq) [2021] EmpC 199, being "knowingly concerned" requires both participation in the conduct and knowledge that it was wrong. The Authority found no evidence that Mr Ho was involved in or aware of the payroll failures — Mr Ho's role was limited to front-of-house operations, payroll and administration were managed by Mr Li, and Mr Ho only became aware of the arrears after Ms Lu's employment ended.

6. Whether Ms Lu's personal grievance claim could be determined under s 142Y against Mr Ho — Status: Not reached (para [22]).

Section 142Y liability does not extend to personal grievance remedies. Accordingly, the Authority expressly declined to consider Ms Lu's personal grievance claim in this determination, citing Tomas v Sanders [2024] NZERA 538 and Li v Creative Nursery (in liquidation) & Anor [2024] NZERA 379.

7. Compliance with s 64(3) of the Act (provision of a copy of the employment agreement) — Status: Not reached (para [10]).

This compliance matter was investigated at the investigation meeting but, following RFS's liquidation, the Authority did not proceed to make orders against the company; no findings or orders were made against Mr Ho on this issue.

8. Compliance with s 69ZD of the Act (provision of entitled rest and meal breaks) — Status: Not reached (para [10]).

As with s 64(3), this was investigated at the meeting but no orders were made given the liquidation and the dismissal of personal liability against Mr Ho.

9. Compliance with s 130 of the Act (provision of wage and time records upon request) — Status: Not reached (para [10]).

Investigated at the meeting but not proceeded to orders, for the same reasons as above.

10. Costs — Status: No order made (para [28]).

The Authority ordered costs to lie where they fall, making no award of costs to either party.

The claims against Mr Ho personally were dismissed in full; the wage arrears and holiday pay totalling $1,015.33 gross are owed by RFS but cannot be pursued against the company without liquidator consent or a High Court order. No remedy was ordered against either respondent.

Wage arrears (first week underpayment): $725.88 gross — found owed by RFS (in liquidation; no enforceable order made).
Holiday pay: $289.45 — found owed by RFS (in liquidation; no enforceable order made).
Total wage arrears and holiday pay: $1,015.33 gross — owed by RFS but proceedings cannot continue against RFS without liquidator consent or High Court order; no order made against Mr Ho.
KiwiSaver arrears: Resolved prior to determination; no order required.
Personal grievance: Not considered in this determination.
Costs: None ordered; costs to lie where they fall.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.

I cannot produce a meaningful summary of this determination because the document text provided does not contain any substantive content from the ERA determination. The text field contains only what appear to be metadata artifacts, classification tags, UUID identifiers, and version numbers — there is no actual determination text (no facts, no legal reasoning, no outcome, no parties named in the body, no remedy).

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Dr Samadhi Wimalasena, a Senior Medical Officer employed by Health New Zealand (HNZ) at Auckland Hospital, sought urgent interim relief: an injunction preventing HNZ from progressing an external investigation into a workplace conduct complaint made against her by seven colleague SMOs, and interim reinstatement to the Emergency Department while on paid discretionary leave. The key legal questions were whether there was a serious question to be tried on her unjustified disadvantage claims, whether the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured granting the interim orders, and whether the complainants' names should be suppressed. The Authority declined all relief sought by Dr Wimalasena, finding the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured the investigation proceeding and the status quo being preserved, while granting non-publication of the complainants' identities.

Applicant: Dr Samadhi Wimalasena (employee — Senior Medical Officer, General Medicine, Auckland Hospital)
Respondent: Health New Zealand (employer)

Applicant: Kate Tennent and William Buckley, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Rebecca Rendle and Clara Evans, counsel for the Respondent

Dr Wimalasena has been employed by HNZ as a Senior Medical Officer and physician in General Medicine at Auckland Hospital (Te Toka Tumai). On 29 April 2026, the Association of Salaried Medical Specialists (ASMS) lodged a complaint on behalf of seven SMO colleagues alleging Dr Wimalasena had engaged in threatening, intimidating and harassing conduct contributing to an unhealthy work environment; Dr Wimalasena denies these allegations and characterises the matters as historical interpersonal issues raised professionally. Dr Wimalasena had been on leave since 19 March 2026; an occupational health report dated 12 June 2026 found her ready to begin a graduated return to work from 22 June 2026, but HNZ directed her to continue on paid discretionary leave pending resolution of two pending recommendations from the report and later pending the external investigation. HNZ formally notified Dr Wimalasena of the complaint on 7 July 2026, consulted her on proposed leave arrangements, and on 24 July 2026 confirmed she would remain on paid discretionary leave (reviewed every four weeks) while an external independent investigation was conducted. Dr Wimalasena lodged a statement of problem on 27 July 2026, alleging two unjustified disadvantage grievances — one arising from the decision to investigate and one arising from the decision to keep her on discretionary leave — and applied for urgent interim relief seeking an injunction halting the investigation and reinstatement to the ED.

1. Whether interim non-publication orders should be granted protecting the names and identifying details of the seven SMO complainants — Status: Established (paras [23]-[38]).

The Authority applied the two-step test from MW v Spiga Ltd [2024] NZEmpC 147 and FDE v UWV [2024] NZEmpC 179: first, whether specific adverse consequences from publication could reasonably be expected; second, whether those consequences justify departure from the principle of open justice. The Authority found the complainants had a legitimate privacy interest as non-parties who had not been notified of or given the opportunity to participate in these proceedings, and that the material contained private information about them. Weighing the public interest in publication against the prejudicial consequences to these third parties (applying C v Air Nelson Ltd (No 2) [2010] NZEmpC 29 and Scott v Damar Industries Limited [2025] NZEmpC 215), and noting the non-publication application was proportionate and targeted, the Authority granted the order suppressing the complainants' names and identifying details.

2. Whether there is a serious question to be tried on the unjustified disadvantage claim arising from HNZ's decision to conduct an external investigation — Status: Partially established (weakly arguable only) (paras [46]-[59]).

The threshold for a serious question to be tried requires only that the claim not be vexatious or frivolous (Jung v Asian Savour World Pty Limited [2026] NZEmpC 82). Dr Wimalasena argued disparity of treatment (HNZ not investigating her own complaints with the same vigour) and that the investigation was retaliatory following her protected disclosure of 10 February 2025 under the Protected Disclosures Act 2022 (PDA). The Authority declined to determine at this interim stage whether the correspondence constituted a protected disclosure (s 9 PDA) or whether HNZ acted retaliatorily (s 21 PDA). The claim was found weakly arguable only, because HNZ has statutory obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA) and contractual obligations under the ASMS collective agreement to maintain a psychologically safe workplace, and the investigation's terms of reference include consideration of Dr Wimalasena's own concerns about the complaint's context and motives.

3. Whether there is a serious question to be tried on the unjustified disadvantage claim arising from HNZ's decision to keep Dr Wimalasena on paid discretionary leave — Status: Partially established (weakly arguable only) (paras [60]-[68]).

HNZ conceded there was a sufficient evidential basis to meet the low threshold on this claim. The Authority accepted it was at least arguable that HNZ did not provide Dr Wimalasena with all the information relied on when deciding to continue her on paid discretionary leave, referencing the principle from E TU Incorporated v Singh [2024] NZEmpC 84 that an employer is generally required to give notice and seek the employee's view before suspending. However, the grievance was found weakly arguable only because HNZ followed a process, considered alternative arrangements, sought and considered Dr Wimalasena's feedback, and a question arises (per XYZ v ABC [2017] NZEmpC 40) about the extent to which s 4(1A)(c) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act) applies to suspension decisions.

4. Whether there is a serious question to be tried in support of a permanent injunction restraining the investigation — Status: Dismissed (paras [69]-[73]).

The Authority applied the principle from Savage v Wai Shing Limited [2019] NZEmpC 141 and Zhao v Public Service Commission [2026] NZEmpC 188 that orders restraining an employer's investigative process are rare because judicial intervention risks prejudicing the process endpoint. The Authority found no serious question to be tried for a permanent injunction: Dr Wimalasena was willing to participate if given relevant information; HNZ had provided terms of reference and invited comment; HNZ was aware of its s 4 Act obligations to provide relevant information; and Dr Wimalasena's concerns about motive and context were properly matters for the investigator and the substantive hearing.

5. Whether there is a serious question to be tried in support of permanent reinstatement (to the ED) — Status: Dismissed (paras [74]-[82]).

The test for practicable reinstatement from Christieson v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Limited [2021] NZEmpC 142 requires feasibility and the potential for successful re-imposition of the employment relationship. The Authority found reinstatement to the ED was not practicable or reasonable given the high level of operational interaction between the ED and General Medicine teams, the physical connection of the Clinical Decision Unit to the ED, the fast-paced handover environment, and the patient safety risks of communication breakdown between Dr Wimalasena and the complainants during clinical handovers. The Authority accordingly concluded there was no serious question to be tried on permanent reinstatement.

6. Whether the balance of convenience favoured granting a permanent injunction and/or reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (in favour of HNZ) (paras [83]-[101]).

The balance of convenience analysis (applying Stellar Elements New Zealand Limited v Amesbury [2024] NZEmpC 36) considers adequacy of damages, preservation of the status quo, and relative strength of the parties' cases. The Authority rejected the analogy to FJS v Te Whatu Ora (Health New Zealand) [2025] NZERA 151 as distinguishable on the facts, and noted that clinical interaction concerns here (patient handover context) distinguished this case from general workplace interpersonal tension cases (Du Fall v The Mokoia Intermediate School Board [2025] NZEmpC 258; The Board of Trustees v LGY [2026] NZEmpC 46). Damages were accepted as an adequate remedy: HNZ had explored alternative placements; HNZ offered to support continuing medical education; and the substantive hearing could be scheduled for December 2026. Dr Wimalasena's own health concerns about working in General Medicine, which predated the complaint, further weighed against reinstatement. Balance of convenience favoured HNZ.

7. Whether the overall justice of the case favoured granting interim orders — Status: Dismissed (in favour of HNZ) (paras [102]-[111]).

Applying the broad overall justice assessment from Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 (CA), the Authority acknowledged Dr Wimalasena's concerns about potential retaliatory investigation but noted that, on untested evidence, such substantive findings could not be made at this stage. Key factors favouring the investigation proceeding included: the investigation terms of reference required examination of the context and motives behind the complaint including HNZ's handling of Dr Wimalasena's prior complaints; the delay in notifying Dr Wimalasena of the complaint (April to July) was found to be a neutral factor given the complainants' deliberation time and Dr Wimalasena's absence from the workplace; HNZ committed to four-weekly reviews of the leave arrangement; and a substantive hearing was available in December 2026. Overall justice favoured the investigation continuing and Dr Wimalasena remaining on paid temporary discretionary leave.

The application was dismissed in full — all interim relief sought by Dr Wimalasena (injunction and reinstatement) was declined, and the matter was directed to a substantive hearing scheduled for December 2026.

None ordered in Dr Wimalasena's favour. Non-publication order granted protecting the names and identifying details of the seven SMO complainants. Costs reserved (para [115]). Substantive investigation meeting to be scheduled for December 2026.

The determination text provided contains only metadata and classification information, with no substantive content about the parties, facts, legal issues, or outcome of the case. The document appears to be a partially extracted or corrupted file that does not include the body of the ERA determination in the matter of O'Neil-Moschetti v Presbyterian Support Central. A meaningful legal summary cannot be produced from the available text.

Applicant: O'Neil-Moschetti (role not determinable from available text)
Respondent: Presbyterian Support Central (role not determinable from available text)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

The full text of the determination was not provided in the document supplied. Only metadata fields (document identifiers, classification tags, member name, and date) are present. No facts, chronology, arguments, or procedural history can be extracted. The case was heard or determined by Member Claire English. No further factual content is available from the supplied text.

1. All legal issues — Status: Not determinable (no paragraph references available).

The body of the determination was not included in the supplied document. No legal issues, tests applied, authorities cited, or conclusions can be identified or summarised. It is not possible to confirm what claims were advanced, what statutory provisions were considered, or how the Authority resolved any issue.

The outcome cannot be determined from the supplied document text, as the substantive content of the determination is absent.

None determinable from the supplied text.

The determination text provided contains no substantive content — only metadata, classification markings, and document identifiers. The actual body of the ERA determination in Labour Inspector v Arise Church and Ors [2026] NZERA 694 has not been included in the document provided. Accordingly, no meaningful legal summary can be produced.

Applicant: Labour Inspector (enforcement body)
Respondent: Arise Church and Others (employer/s)

Applicant: Not provided
Respondent: Not provided

The full text of the determination was not provided. The document supplied contains only metadata fields (timestamps, classification tags such as "Privileged" and "IN-CONFIDENCE", and internal document identifiers). No factual background, chronology, arguments, or findings are accessible from the content provided.

1. All legal issues — Status: Not determinable (no paragraph references available).

The determination body was not included in the document provided. No statutory tests, evidence, authorities, findings, or conclusions can be identified or summarised. It is not possible to report on any issue without the full text.

No outcome can be stated — the substantive determination text was not provided.

None determinable from the document as provided.
Note to reader: The document submitted appears to be a metadata shell or a protected/encrypted file wrapper rather than the full ERA determination. To obtain a proper structured summary, please supply the complete, readable text of [2026] NZERA 694. The determination may be accessible at: https://determinations.era.govt.nz/determination/view/21664

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[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive decision ([2026] NZERA 552) in which FHE's unjustified dismissal claim against Auckland Transport (AT) was dismissed but a limited unjustifiable disadvantage claim relating to a suspension was upheld. The key question was which party should bear costs given this mixed outcome and FHE's conduct throughout the proceedings, including admitted dishonesty and falsification of facts. The Authority awarded costs to AT in the sum of $14,000.00, finding this was an unusual case where justice required costs to follow the substantially successful party despite FHE's limited success.

Applicant: FHE (employee — name suppressed)
Respondent: Auckland Transport (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in Person)
Respondent: Charlotte Parkhilland Luke JI, counsel for the Respondent

In the substantive determination ([2026] NZERA 552) dated 13 August 2026, the Authority found that FHE had not been unjustifiably dismissed but had been unjustifiably disadvantaged in respect of a suspension. The matter involved a three-and-a-half-day investigation meeting and a substantial volume of documents. Costs were reserved in the substantive determination in the hope the parties could settle the issue, but they were unable to do so. FHE submitted that his limited success entitled him to a costs award of $1,000.00 in his favour under the principles in Coomer v JA McCallum, while AT sought costs of $17,200.00 including uplifts, on the basis that it had succeeded on almost all claims, FHE had rejected reasonable settlement offers including a Calderbank offer, and FHE had engaged in admitted falsification of facts and dishonesty that substantially inflated AT's costs. FHE contended his rejection of the Calderbank offer was reasonable because it was made less than two days before the investigation meeting, and he claimed financial hardship, though without supporting documentation.

1. Whether FHE's limited success entitled him to a costs award in his favour under the Coomer principles — Status: Dismissed (paras [5], [9], [20]-[22]).

The Authority noted the principle from Coomer v JA McCallum & Sons Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 156 that limited success can ground a costs award in favour of a partially successful claimant. However, the Authority was not persuaded that FHE's very limited success (upholding one out of seven or more claims) warranted treating him as entitled to costs, having regard to the overall outcome, the volume of the proceedings, and his own unreasonable conduct. The Authority distinguished Coomer on the basis that there was no agreed statement of facts and FHE's admitted dishonesty and fabrications were a significant feature of this case, unlike in Coomer.

2. Whether AT was entitled to costs as the substantially successful party — Status: Established (paras [20]-[23], [27]).

The Authority applied the well-settled costs principles from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808, which confirm that costs are discretionary and made consistent with the Authority's equity and good conscience jurisdiction, and are not to be used as punishment. Noting that FHE succeeded on only one narrow aspect of the suspension claim while failing on every other claim, and drawing on LMN v STC [2026] NZEmpC 137 where an employer was awarded costs despite an employee establishing a personal grievance in a case of very limited success, the Authority found this was an unusual case in which justice was best served by awarding costs to AT.

3. Whether the Calderbank/settlement offer should be taken into account to justify an uplift in costs — Status: Established (paras [6], [8](a), [14]-[16], [23], [26]).

AT sought a 20% uplift on the basis that FHE unreasonably rejected settlement terms recorded in the Authority's minute of 26 November 2025 and a further updated Calderbank offer made on 11 May 2026. The Authority accepted that the settlement offers, including those recorded in its own minute, should be treated as forming part of an ongoing process of trying to resolve the matter and given weight in the costs assessment. FHE's argument that rejection of the offer was reasonable due to timing was not accepted by AT, and the Authority gave weight to the settlement offers without expressly awarding the full 20% uplift sought.

4. Whether an uplift in costs was warranted for FHE's egregious conduct and dishonesty — Status: Partially established (paras [8](b)-(c), [12]-[13], [24]-[26]).

AT sought a further 20% uplift on the basis that FHE's falsification of facts, intentional misrepresentation and admitted dishonesty to AT, the Authority, and the Employment Court significantly inflated AT's costs, including causing AT to prepare over 1,000 pages of background documents and 140 pages of witness statements that would not have been necessary had FHE been honest. The Authority accepted this conduct was relevant to the overall costs award but expressly noted that costs are not to be used as punishment, and therefore declined to apply the full further 20% uplift as a separate penalty component. Instead, these matters were factored into the overall award amount.

5. Whether FHE's claimed financial hardship should reduce the costs award — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[29]).

FHE referred in submissions to seeking legal aid and experiencing financial difficulties. The Authority noted that no documentation was provided in support of claims of financial impecuniosity or legal aid having been granted, and declined to reduce the costs award on that basis without such evidence.

6. Quantum of costs to be awarded — Status: Established (paras [24]-[27], [30]).

AT sought $17,200.00 calculated on the basis of the full three-and-a-half-day investigation meeting, minus a half-day for FHE's successful disadvantage claim, plus two 20% uplifts. The Authority awarded $14,000.00 as a contribution to AT's costs, acknowledging FHE's limited success and giving weight to the settlement offers, while declining to apply the full egregious conduct uplift as a punitive measure.

The costs claim was upheld in favour of the Respondent (AT); FHE is ordered to pay AT $14,000.00 in costs.

Costs awarded to Respondent (Auckland Transport): $14,000.00, ordered pursuant to clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. No other remedy ordered in this costs determination.