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[COSTS ONLY]

Emily Grinsted (employee) brought multiple employment claims against Bunnings Limited (employer), succeeding on one unjustified disadvantage claim relating to an unpaid bonus but failing on the remaining claims. This determination deals solely with the reserved costs question from the earlier substantive decision. The Authority awarded Ms Grinsted the full daily tariff for a one-day investigation meeting ($4,500), finding that the evidence for her successful claim substantially overlapped with evidence for her unsuccessful claims.

Applicant: Emily Grinsted (employee)
Respondent: Bunnings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Penny Swarbrick, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Simon Lapthorne and Iqra Khan, counsel for the Respondent

Ms Grinsted brought five claims against Bunnings Limited, of which four were unsuccessful and one — an unjustified disadvantage claim relating to a bonus that Bunnings failed to pay her — was established. The substantive determination was issued on 21 April 2026 (Emily Grinsted v Bunnings Limited [2026] NZERA 236), with costs reserved and the parties encouraged to resolve the matter directly. The parties were unable to agree on costs. Ms Grinsted accepted that only one day's hearing time was appropriate for costs purposes, noting scheduling issues had extended the investigation across essentially two days. Ms Grinsted sought $4,500 (the one-day tariff), arguing the evidence across all claims largely overlapped. Bunnings argued either that costs should lie where they fall, that it should receive costs given the breadth of Ms Grinsted's failure, or at minimum that any award to Ms Grinsted should be reduced to reflect her limited success.

1. Whether costs should be awarded and, if so, to which party and in what amount — Status: Established (paras [7]-[11]).

The Authority applied the discretionary costs framework under cl 15 of the Second Schedule to the Employment Relations Act 2000, having regard to the principles in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808, including that an unsuccessful party will normally contribute to the successful party's actual legal costs, that costs are discretionary, and that awards should be modest. The Authority found that the evidence on the successful unjustified disadvantage claim substantially overlapped with the evidence on the unsuccessful claims, as both arose from Ms Grinsted's relationship with Ms Obeid. The Authority also found that the successful claim could alone have occupied a full day's investigation, and that Ms Grinsted would not have obtained the bonus payment or compensation without bringing her claim. Accordingly, it awarded Ms Grinsted the full one-day tariff of $4,500 without reduction, despite her partial success overall.

The costs application was upheld in full in favour of the applicant, with Bunnings Limited ordered to pay Ms Grinsted $4,500 as a contribution toward her legal costs.

Costs: $4,500 payable by Bunnings Limited to Ms Grinsted within 28 days of the date of this determination (22 July 2026). No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were addressed in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 236).

The New Zealand Nurses Organisation Incorporated (NZNO) and Health New Zealand (HNZ) are parties to a collective employment agreement containing a "safe staffing term." NZNO applied to the Employment Relations Authority seeking a declaration of breach, compliance orders, and penalties, asserting that the safe staffing term imposes an absolute obligation on HNZ to have sufficient experienced staff available at all times. The Authority resolved only the preliminary interpretive question, finding that the safe staffing term is qualified by a "reasonably practicable steps" standard rather than imposing an absolute standalone obligation, with the substantive breach, compliance, and penalty issues reserved for a future hearing.

Applicant: The New Zealand Nurses Organisation Incorporated (NZNO) (union/collective bargaining party)
Respondent: Health New Zealand (HNZ) (employer)

Applicant: Peter Craney and Machrus Siregar, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Megan Vant, counsel for the Respondent

NZNO and HNZ are parties to the Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand and the New Zealand Nurses Organisation Collective Agreement 31 March 2023–2024 (CA), which has nationwide coverage for nursing staff, midwives, health care assistants, and other qualified health professionals employed by HNZ. The CA contains at Appendix 1(b) a "Healthy Workplaces Agreement" including a section headed "Commitments and Enforceability," which sets out four bullet-point commitments including the safe staffing term: "Having a sufficient number of experienced staff available, including to cover any clinical area." NZNO filed a Statement of Problem in May 2025, supported by impact statements from thirteen Christchurch nurses, asserting short staffing at Christchurch Hospital, Christchurch Women's Hospital, and Hillmorton Hospital. NZNO argues the four bullet points are mandatory standalone obligations not limited by a reasonableness qualifier, while HNZ argues the prefacing language — requiring "all reasonably practicable steps to ensure this outcome" — qualifies all four bullet points. The Authority directed that the interpretive dispute be resolved first before any findings on breach, compliance orders, or penalties, and held an investigation meeting on 21 April 2026 hearing evidence from Mr David Wait (NZNO Industrial Advisor) and Mr Andrew Wilson (HNZ Lead Negotiator).

1. Whether the safe staffing term ("Having a sufficient number of experienced staff available, including to cover any clinical area") imposes an absolute, unqualified obligation on HNZ, or whether it is qualified by a "reasonably practicable steps" standard — Status: Resolved in favour of HNZ's interpretation (paras [24]–[36]).

The Authority applied an objective approach to contractual interpretation, consistent with the Supreme Court's test in Vector Gas v Bay of Plenty Energy Limited [2010] 2 NZLR 444 that ambiguity arises where language is capable of more than one meaning and the court must determine which meaning was intended. On the plain and ordinary meaning, the Authority found the four bullet points follow the prefacing commitment to take "all reasonably practicable steps to ensure this outcome," connected by the phrase "including by," meaning the bullet points are specific examples of those reasonably practicable steps rather than freestanding absolute obligations. This finding was further supported by internal context (the Escalation Pathway itself uses "reasonably practicable" language at its final stage) and external context — specifically the 2021 facilitation Recommendation, which recorded that the facilitated parties expressly rejected an absolute obligation on the basis it would be "unreasonable and unworkable" and inconsistent with health and safety obligations. The Authority concluded the safe staffing term is not absolute but must be assessed by reference to whether HNZ took all reasonably practicable steps, including following the Escalation Pathway.

2. Whether the Authority should proceed at this stage to determine whether HNZ breached the safe staffing term, and whether compliance orders and penalties should be awarded — Status: Not reached (paras [8]–[9], [37]).

The Authority directed at the outset that resolution of the interpretive dispute was a necessary precondition before any assessment of breach, compliance orders, or penalties could be made. Having resolved the interpretive question, the Authority noted the parties will be contacted regarding the progression of the application for a declaration of breach, compliance, and penalties, reserving these issues for a further hearing.

3. Whether NZNO is entitled to a declaration under s 134(1)(a)(i) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 that HNZ breached the CA — Status: Not reached (paras [2], [37]).

This issue was not determined at this stage because it depends on the substantive factual and legal assessment of HNZ's conduct against the interpretive standard now established. It will be addressed at a subsequent hearing.

4. Whether compliance orders should be issued, including orders requiring HNZ to identify safe staffing levels and a programme for implementation, and to comply with CCDM obligations, under s 134(1)(a)(i) and s 137(2) of the Act — Status: Not reached (paras [3], [37]).

These remedial issues are contingent on first establishing breach, and are expressly reserved for the next stage of the proceedings.

5. Whether penalties should be imposed on HNZ under s 134(1) of the Act for breach of the CA — Status: Not reached (paras [4], [37]).

The penalty question was deferred pending resolution of the breach question; the Authority indicated it will be addressed in subsequent proceedings.

6. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [38]).

The Authority noted that under the ERA Practice Direction, costs are not considered at this stage where the matter relates to interpretation of a collective agreement; costs were accordingly not addressed and are reserved.

The determination resolved only the preliminary interpretive question in favour of HNZ, finding the safe staffing term is qualified by a "reasonably practicable steps" standard; all substantive issues of breach, compliance, penalties, and costs are reserved for a further hearing.

None ordered at this stage. The matter is to be progressed to a further hearing on breach, compliance orders, penalties, and costs based on the interpretation now established.

Sheik Saheb, a spray painter employed by Delmist Holdings Limited, claimed unjustified dismissal, underpayment of wages, wrongful deduction of annual leave, and sought penalties against his employer. The key legal questions were whether Delmist dismissed Mr Saheb unjustifiably, whether it breached its obligation to provide 40 contracted hours per week, and whether penalties were warranted for statutory breaches. The Authority found in Mr Saheb's favour on dismissal, partially upheld his wage arrears claim, found annual leave was incorrectly deducted, and imposed a reduced penalty, awarding a total of approximately $36,135 plus interest and a $2,000 penalty.

Applicant: Sheik Saheb (employee, spray painter)
Respondent: Delmist Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: Gary Evans (for the Respondent)

Mr Saheb was employed by Delmist as a spray painter from 26 September 2023 under an employment agreement guaranteeing 40 hours of work per week at $30.00 per hour. He lacked certain trade certificates, which limited the tasks he could perform, and he worked principally from the workshop on more basic tasks. From November 2024, work slowed and Delmist began sending employees like Mr Saheb home when work was insufficient, without consulting him or following any restructure process. After returning from the Christmas break, Mr Saheb was repeatedly told there was no work for him from 13 January 2025 onwards; on 28 January 2025 he met with Mr Evans and received a letter stating his position had been terminated due to decreased workload. Mr Saheb maintained he did not resign and wanted to continue working; Delmist argued he had resigned and that he had previously chosen not to work all available hours throughout his employment.

1. Whether Mr Saheb was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [26]-[37]).

The applicable test under s 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act) is whether the employer's actions, and how it acted, were those of a fair and reasonable employer in all the circumstances. The Authority found that Delmist terminated the relationship by denying Mr Saheb work throughout January 2025 and reinforcing that position in the 28 January conversation, supported by the termination letter issued that day. Delmist conducted no identifiable process to seek Mr Saheb's views, no restructure consultation, and failed to establish a substantive reason for dismissal — conduct inconsistent with the duty of good faith under s 4 of the Act and the requirements of s 103A.

2. Whether Mr Saheb received payment for his contracted hours between the start of employment and November 2024 — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]-[45]).

The Employment Agreement obliged Delmist to provide 40 hours of work per week. Delmist's witnesses gave evidence that work was always available but Mr Saheb chose to leave early or start late; the Authority accepted this evidence on the balance of probabilities. The Authority found that Delmist made sufficient work available for Mr Saheb to work 40 hours if he had chosen to, and his claim for arrears for this period was not established.

3. Whether Mr Saheb was underpaid in November and December 2024, entitling him to wage arrears — Status: Established (paras [46]-[47]).

From November 2024, Delmist acknowledged it had insufficient work for employees without trade certificates and began sending them home. The Authority found Delmist failed to provide 40 hours of work as required by the Employment Agreement during November and December 2024. Wage arrears of $855.00 (gross) were ordered for this period.

4. Whether Mr Saheb was entitled to holiday pay (8%) on the arrears amount — Status: Dismissed (para [48]).

Mr Saheb claimed 8% holiday pay on the arrears. The Authority noted that being underpaid does not automatically mean holiday pay was incorrectly calculated, and the claim did not specify whether the additional holiday pay had actually been lost. The claim for this additional amount was therefore declined.

5. Whether Mr Saheb was unjustifiably disadvantaged in January 2025 by non-allocation of work — Status: Partially established/subsumed (paras [49]-[51]).

The Authority found that Delmist's failure to allocate work to Mr Saheb from 13 January 2025 was unjustified and in breach of the Employment Agreement. However, this conduct was treated as part of the course of action constituting the unjustified dismissal, and awarding separate remedies for it would amount to double recovery. Wage arrears for the period 13–28 January 2025 (excluding the paid public holiday of 27 January) of $1,680.00 (gross) were nonetheless ordered.

6. Whether annual leave was incorrectly deducted from Mr Saheb's leave balance in January 2025 — Status: Established (paras [52]-[53]).

Under s 18(3) of the Holidays Act 2003, annual holidays must be taken at a time agreed between employer and employee. The Authority found on the balance of probabilities that Mr Saheb had not agreed to take leave, and Delmist's deduction of annual leave after 13 January 2025 was therefore non-compliant. Orders were made for the leave to be reinstated to his balance (reflected in the arrears calculation at para [76]b).

7. Whether a penalty should be imposed for failure to produce time and wage records under s 130(2) of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]-[56]).

The Authority found that Delmist had provided wage and time records upon request, supplied payslips during employment, and indicated willingness to provide further information if asked. Delmist was therefore attempting to comply with its obligations, and no penalty under s 130(4) of the Act was imposed.

8. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of the Employment Agreement (s 134 of the Act) and/or s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 for underpayment — Status: Established (paras [57]-[62]).

The Authority applied s 133A of the Act and relevant case law (Borsboom (Labour Inspector) v Preet PVT Ltd [2016] NZEmpC 143; Nicholson v Ford [2018] NZEmpC 132) in assessing penalty. Delmist's failure to pay Mr Saheb his contracted wages during November–December 2024 and January 2025 was a serious breach that harmed Mr Saheb, was inconsistent with good faith obligations under s 3 of the Act, and treated guaranteed-hours employment as if hours were unilaterally adjustable. The breaches were globalised and assessed as negligent rather than wilful and not sustained over a long period. A penalty of $2,000 was imposed ($1,000 to the Crown, $1,000 to Mr Saheb).

9. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of the Holidays Act 2003 regarding the incorrect deduction of leave — Status: Dismissed (para [57]).

Although the annual leave deduction was found to be incorrect, Mr Saheb was paid for the leave that was deducted. The Authority considered this conduct did not rise to the level deserving a penalty in all the circumstances and declined to impose one under the Holidays Act 2003.

10. Whether Mr Saheb was entitled to lost wages following unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [63]-[68]).

Under ss 123 and 128 of the Act, the Authority may order reimbursement of lost wages up to three months' ordinary time remuneration, or a greater sum at discretion. The Authority found Delmist had not established the termination was a genuine redundancy and Mr Saheb demonstrated reasonable mitigation efforts, including obtaining a job offer that fell through allegedly due to a negative reference from Delmist. Thirteen weeks' lost wages of $15,600.00 (gross) were awarded (40 hours × $30.00 × 13 weeks).

11. Whether Mr Saheb was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [69]-[71]).

Applying Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113 and LMN v STC [2026] NZEmpC 137, the Authority assessed the harm caused by Delmist's unjustified actions. Mr Saheb gave evidence of feeling badly let down, difficulty sleeping, and reliance on family support. The Authority placed the harm in the mid-grouping of analogous cases and awarded $18,000.00 compensation.

12. Whether remedies should be reduced for Mr Saheb's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [72]-[75]).

Section 124 of the Act requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's blameworthy or wrongful conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance. The Authority found no such conduct: Mr Saheb's lack of qualifications and his history of not working full hours were issues Delmist had condoned by failing to address them at the time. Accordingly no reduction was made.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [79]-[81]).

Costs were reserved with parties encouraged to resolve the issue themselves. If unresolved, Mr Saheb may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Delmist having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual notional daily rate unless particular circumstances required adjustment.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, wage arrears claims partially established (November–December 2024 and January 2025 periods), annual leave deduction found non-compliant, penalty imposed for underpayment breaches, and remedies awarded; claims for arrears from the start of employment to November 2024, holiday pay on arrears, and penalties for time/wage record failures and Holidays Act breach were dismissed.

- Wage arrears (November–December 2024): $855.00 (gross), with interest from 28 January 2025 until paid in full
- Wage arrears (January 2025, 13–28 January, excluding paid public holiday): $1,680.00 (gross), with interest from 28 January 2025 until paid in full
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $18,000.00 (without deduction)
- Lost wages (s 128): $15,600.00 (gross) (13 weeks at 40 hours × $30.00/hour)
- Penalty: $2,000.00 total ($1,000 to the Crown; $1,000 to Mr Saheb)
- Annual leave: balance to be reinstated (reflected in the January 2025 arrears calculation)
- Costs: reserved; timetable set for memoranda if not resolved between parties
- All payments due within 28 days of the determination date (21 July 2026)

A Labour Inspector brought proceedings against The Godfather Private Limited (a pizza restaurant chain) and its two owner-directors, alleging breaches of minimum employment standards including an unlawful employment premium, underpayment of wages, and holiday/leave entitlement failures in respect of two migrant worker complainants. The key legal questions were whether a premium was received for employment contrary to the Wages Protection Act 1983, whether minimum wage obligations were met, whether variation agreements were enforceable, and whether the directors were personally liable for the breaches. The Authority upheld the premium claim, found wage arrears owing, dismissed the public holiday and sick leave claims, and held both directors personally liable to the extent TGP cannot pay.

Applicant: A Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Respondent: The Godfather Private Limited (First Respondent); Navjot Singh Rattanpal (Second Respondent); Ajmer Singh (Third Respondent)

Applicant: Rebecca Denmead, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Danny Gelb, advocate for the First, Second and Third Respondents

The Godfather Private Limited (TGP) operates a pizza restaurant in Northcote, owned and directed by Navjot Singh Rattanpal and Ajmer Singh. Following a complaint received on 30 October 2023, the Labour Inspector investigated and concluded that TGP had breached multiple minimum employment standards affecting two migrant employees — Jobandeep Singh and Navneet Kaur — who commenced employment on 17 April 2023 on Accredited Employer Work visas. The central dispute involved an allegation that the directors each received NZD $20,000 (totalling $40,000) from the father of Jobandeep Singh as a condition of employment; the directors denied this was a premium, claiming the funds were paid through them to an immigration agent named Amarjit Singh. A further dispute concerned whether the complainants were paid for all hours actually worked, given that their employment agreements provided for $25/hour for 40 hours per week ($1,000 gross/week) but payslips consistently showed payment of $28.18/hour for only 30 hours ($845.40 gross/week), purportedly under variation agreements signed on their first day of employment which the employees denied signing or having meaningful opportunity to review. TGP maintained that all entitlements had been remedied prior to the investigation hearing, but the Labour Inspector disputed the extent of any remediation and pressed claims for wage arrears, public holiday pay, sick leave, and reimbursement of the premium.

1. Whether TGP received an unlawful employment premium from Jobandeep Singh's family in breach of s 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [30]-[50]).

The Authority applied the two-part test from Holman v CTC Aviation Training (NZ) Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 60 and Labour Inspector v Tech 5 Recruitment Ltd [2016] NZEmpC 167: the payment must be a condition of obtaining employment, and it must confer no benefit on the employee other than obtaining employment. Both directors accepted receiving $20,000 each into their personal bank accounts from Jobandeep Singh's father, which they promptly paid to Amarjit Singh, claimed to be an immigration agent. The Authority rejected that explanation, finding no documentation of Amarjit Singh's involvement as a licensed immigration agent, no invoices, no verifiable evidence of immigration work, and contemporaneous WhatsApp messages linking the payment directly to employment commencement; the directors' own acknowledgement that normal immigration costs are around $4,000–$5,000 further undermined their explanation for a $40,000 sum. Both Holman tests were satisfied: the payment was a condition of Jobandeep Singh obtaining employment (the verbal offer remained conditional on a valid visa), and he received no benefit other than the job and resulting visa. The Authority ordered reimbursement of $39,250 (the $40,000 premium less a $750 visa application fee already paid by TGP).

2. Whether there was a premium sought or received in respect of Navneet Kaur in breach of s 12A WPA — Status: Dismissed (paras [15], [21]).

The Labour Inspector concluded during the investigation that there was insufficient evidence to indicate a premium was paid for Ms Kaur's employment; while she gave evidence that TGP originally requested $40,000 from each employee, only Jobandeep Singh's family ultimately paid, and the Authority proceeded on that basis. No further analysis was conducted, and no order was made in respect of Ms Kaur on this issue.

3. Whether the variation agreements reducing hours from 40 to 30 per week were enforceable — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]-[59]).

The Authority shared the Labour Inspector's concerns about the validity and timing of the variation agreements signed on the employees' first day of employment; both employees were new to the country and had no reasonable opportunity to consider the variations before signing. The Authority further noted that if the variations addressed a genuine error in the contract, TGP would have corrected it for subsequent hires — yet the same variation was used for later employees. The Authority declined to accept that the variations were enforceable or that the resulting pay rate and hours created an implied term.

4. Whether TGP paid at least the minimum wage to Jobandeep Singh and Navneet Kaur as required by s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 — Status: Established (paras [51]-[74]).

With the variation agreements unenforceable, wages fell to be calculated at the contractual rate of $25/hour for a minimum of 40 hours per week. Both employees were consistently underpaid by $154.60 per week for 37 weeks (totalling $5,720.20 each). The Authority also considered additional hours above 40 worked each week, applying a moderated approach given TGP's failure to maintain adequate wage and time records (in breach of s 130(1)(g) of the Employment Relations Act 2000) and relying heavily on documentary evidence including AT HOP card records, Google timelines, Uber records and chat messages. The Authority rejected the full additional hours claimed by the Labour Inspector (finding some AT HOP and Google location evidence unreliable and insufficient to confirm full 12-hour shifts), instead awarding an additional $1,525 to Jobandeep Singh and $1,225 to Ms Kaur for verified extra hours. Total wage arrears were $7,245.20 gross for Jobandeep Singh and $6,945.20 gross for Ms Kaur, plus 8% holiday pay on each amount.

5. Whether TGP breached s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 by making wage deductions without consent — Status: Established (paras [52]-[53], [73]).

The Labour Inspector identified the underpayment of contractual entitlements as a breach of s 4 WPA (citing Spotless Services (NZ) Ltd v Service and Food Workers Union [2008] NZCA 580). The Authority resolved this breach through the wage arrears calculation and noted that no separate penalties were sought in relation to this or the MWA breach; the wage arrears determination resolves the claims under both statutes.

6. Whether TGP failed to maintain accurate wage and time records in breach of s 130(1)(g) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [53]-[54]).

The Authority found that TGP failed to keep accurate wage and time records for both complainants, which prejudiced the employees' ability to bring accurate claims for arrears under s 131 of the Act. The Authority considered its power under s 132(2) of the Act to accept as proved all claims made by employees where records are inadequate, but exercised that discretion modestly given the evidentiary conflicts.

7. Whether TGP correctly paid public holiday entitlements to Jobandeep Singh under the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Dismissed (paras [75]-[76]).

The Authority found sufficient evidence (including TGP rosters) to verify Jobandeep Singh worked 5 hours each on the public holidays of 5 June 2023, 25 December 2023, and 1 January 2024. After accounting for alternative hours paid in his final pay and an additional amount noted by the Labour Inspectorate, the Authority was satisfied no further amount was owed.

8. Whether TGP correctly paid public holiday entitlements to Navneet Kaur under the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Dismissed (paras [75], [77]).

The Authority found sufficient evidence to verify Ms Kaur worked the claimed hours on five public holidays (23 October 2023, 25 December 2023, 26 December 2023, 1 January 2024 and 2 January 2024), and was satisfied she was paid correctly for those days in her final pay. No further amount was awarded.

9. Whether TGP correctly paid sick leave entitlements to the complainants — Status: Dismissed (para [78]).

The Labour Inspectorate claimed $112.72 and $253.62 for Jobandeep Singh and Ms Kaur respectively. Both complainants had initially told the Labour Inspector they were paid normal pay for sick days; while minor discrepancies may have existed given additional hours claimed, the Authority was satisfied TGP paid at least the contractual hourly rate on sick days and awarded nothing further.

10. Whether Navjot Singh Rattanpal and Ajmer Singh were personally liable as persons involved in breaches of employment standards under ss 142W and 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [79]-[81]).

The Authority was satisfied on review of the directors' involvement that both were "persons involved" in breaches of employment standards by TGP for the purposes of s 142W of the Act. Pursuant to s 142Y, to the extent TGP is unable to pay the ordered amounts, the Labour Inspector may recover payment on a joint and several basis from both directors personally. The Authority did not require proof of inability to pay before establishing this liability, consistent with the conditional nature of the personal liability provision.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [82]-[84]).

Costs were reserved, with the parties encouraged to resolve the issue themselves. If unresolved, the Labour Inspectorate may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, TGP then has 14 days to respond, and the Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was partially upheld: the premium claim and wage arrears claims were upheld; the public holiday, sick leave, and premium claims in respect of Ms Kaur were dismissed; both directors were held personally liable to the extent TGP cannot pay.

Premium reimbursement: $39,250 ordered to be paid by TGP to the Labour Inspectorate (designated under s 223 of the Act for payment to Mr Nishan Singh), being the $40,000 premium received less the $750 visa application fee.
Wage arrears (Jobandeep Singh): $7,245.20 gross plus 8% holiday pay on that amount.
Wage arrears (Navneet Kaur): $6,945.20 gross plus 8% holiday pay on that amount.
Public holiday entitlements: None ordered (claims dismissed).
Sick leave entitlements: None ordered (claims dismissed).
Personal liability: To the extent TGP cannot pay, the Labour Inspector may recover all ordered amounts jointly and severally from Navjot Singh Rattanpal and Ajmer Singh personally under s 142Y of the Act.
Time for payment: All amounts payable within eight weeks of the determination.
Costs: Reserved.

Philip Powell, a site foreman employed by OH & N Contracting Limited from November 2022 until January 2025, claimed unjustified dismissal following a summary redundancy process, along with unpaid wages and statutory penalties for breaches of minimum employment standards. The key legal questions were whether the redundancy was procedurally justified, what remedies flowed from any unjustified dismissal, and whether the company's sole director, Bradley Mooney, could be held personally liable for unpaid wages as a person involved in a breach. The Authority found the dismissal procedurally unjustified and awarded compensation, lost wages, and penalties, with leave granted to pursue Mr Mooney personally if OH & N could not pay.

Applicant: Philip Powell (employee, former site foreman)
Respondent: OH & N Contracting Limited (first respondent, employer) and Bradley Mooney (second respondent, sole director and shareholder)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Bradley & Chelsie Mooney for the Respondent

Philip Powell was employed as a site foreman by OH & N Contracting Limited from November 2022, working in forestry logging operations on a farm owned by the business. On 7 January 2025, Mr Mooney attended Mr Powell's home and informed him his employment was ending that day because the company was closing due to financial difficulties, with no prior consultation or information provided. Mr Powell disputed that he was aware the role was ending imminently and noted that work continued at the site after his departure, with another worker appointed as foreman for a further three months. OH & N accepted that it failed to pay notice wages correctly (paying out annual holiday instead) but argued the redundancy was genuine as the main logging work was nearing completion and the business was struggling. Mr Powell sought unjustified dismissal remedies, unpaid wages, penalties for statutory breaches, and personal liability for Mr Mooney under the Employment Relations Act 2000 provisions relating to persons involved in breaches of employment standards.

1. Whether Mr Powell was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [18]-[27]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, requiring an objective assessment of whether OH & N's actions and manner of acting were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. While the Authority accepted there was a genuine business reason for redundancy (work was ending and the business was not financially viable), it found the process was fatally deficient: OH & N did not consult Mr Powell before the decision was made, did not consider alternatives, did not provide him with relevant information or an opportunity to comment, and did not allow for a support person. The Authority held the dismissal was procedurally unjustified, citing the good faith obligations in s 4(1A)(c)(i)-(ii) of the Act.

2. Whether compensation for lost wages (unpaid notice/holiday pay) should be awarded under s 123(1)(b) — Status: Established (paras [29]-[30]).

OH & N incorrectly applied annual holiday pay during Mr Powell's notice period rather than paying ordinary wages, resulting in an underpayment on termination. OH & N accepted the amount claimed of $4,160.00 (gross), inclusive of 8% holiday pay, and the Authority ordered payment accordingly.

3. Whether further lost wages for the period of unemployment should be awarded — Status: Partially established (paras [31]-[33]).

The Authority considered whether the full period of unemployment (nearly one year) should be compensated, applying the principle from Gafiatullina v Propellerhead Ltd [2021] NZEmpC 146 that allowance must be made for the likelihood that a proper process would still have resulted in redundancy. The Authority concluded that a thorough process would not have saved Mr Powell's employment given the genuine business reasons, and limited the award to four additional weeks of lost wages at $40.00 per hour for 40 hours per week, totalling $6,400.00 (gross).

4. Whether compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [34]-[39]).

Applying the principle from Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield [1993] 1 ERNZ 344 that such compensation is not punitive, and Singh v McKee [2026] NZEmpC 146 that fair compensation must be grounded in evidential assessment and comparable authorities, the Authority accepted Mr Powell's evidence of financial and emotional hardship, mental strain on his family, difficulty finding work, and the abrupt and uncommunicative manner of the dismissal. The Authority fixed compensation at $15,000.

5. Whether Mr Powell's own conduct contributed to the situation warranting a reduction in remedies under s 124 — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[41]).

The Authority found no actions by Mr Powell contributed to OH & N's failure to follow its obligations to fairly consult him prior to termination. No reduction in remedies was applied.

6. Whether penalties should be awarded for breach of s 130(2) of the Act (failure to provide wage and time records) — Status: Established (paras [42]-[50], [52]).

The Authority found that OH & N failed to provide wage and time records when requested in writing on 21 February 2025, in breach of s 130(2) of the Act. Applying the four-step framework from Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited [2016] NZEmpC 143 as refined in Nicholson v Ford, and considering factors including OH & N's acknowledgement of the breach and its status as a small family business, the Authority imposed a penalty of $1,000, of which $1,000 was directed to the Crown.

7. Whether penalties should be awarded for breach of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (unlawful deduction/failure to pay notice wages and annual holiday on termination) — Status: Established (paras [43]-[52]).

The Authority found that paying annual holiday instead of notice wages constituted an unlawful deduction under s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983, citing Spotless Services (NZ) Ltd v Service and Food Workers Union [2008] NZCA 580. Applying the same penalty framework, and giving credit for OH & N's acknowledgement, the Authority imposed a penalty of $2,000, the entirety of which was ordered to be paid to Mr Powell given his financial vulnerability and difficulty during the period of non-payment.

8. Whether a penalty against Mr Mooney personally under s 142X of the Act should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (para [53]).

The Authority held it had no jurisdiction to award a penalty against Mr Mooney personally under s 142X(2) of the Act because such an application may only be made by a Labour Inspector, not by an employee. The claim was accordingly dismissed.

9. Whether Mr Mooney is a "person involved in a breach" of employment standards under s 142W, and whether leave should be granted under s 142Y to recover unpaid wages from him personally — Status: Established (paras [54]-[61]).

The Authority applied s 142W, which defines "person involved in a breach" as including an officer of the employer entity who was knowingly concerned in the breach. The Authority found that Mr Mooney, as sole director with direct knowledge of Mr Powell's pay arrangements and day-to-day control of the business, was knowingly concerned in the Wages Protection Act 1983 breaches. Leave was granted under s 142Y for Mr Powell to recover $4,160.00 (gross) from Mr Mooney personally to the extent OH & N is unable to pay.

10. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Reserved (paras [65]-[67]).

Costs were reserved, with the parties encouraged to resolve the issue between themselves. The Authority noted the investigation meeting lasted half a day and that, if a determination on costs was required, it would apply the standard daily tariff basis subject to any relevant factors.

The claim was upheld in substantial part: the unjustified dismissal grievance was established on procedural grounds, remedies of unpaid wages, lost wages, and humiliation compensation were awarded, statutory penalties were imposed, and leave was granted for recovery against Mr Mooney personally; the claim for a personal penalty against Mr Mooney was dismissed.

- Unpaid wages (notice period/holiday pay): $4,160.00 (gross), ordered against OH & N Contracting Limited
- Lost wages (additional process period — 4 weeks): $6,400.00 (gross), ordered against OH & N Contracting Limited
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings: $15,000.00, ordered against OH & N Contracting Limited
- Penalties: $3,000.00 total ($2,000 for Wages Protection Act breach, paid to Mr Powell; $1,000 for failure to provide wage and time records, paid to the Crown), ordered against OH & N Contracting Limited
- Leave granted under s 142Y for Mr Powell to recover $4,160.00 (gross) from Mr Mooney personally to the extent OH & N is unable to pay
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves
- All monetary orders due within 28 days of the determination date

[COSTS ONLY]

Devon Whitham (employee) successfully obtained a costs award against Brutalitees Limited (employer) following an earlier substantive determination in which she was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed. The sole question in this determination is the quantum of costs, including whether an uplift on the standard daily tariff was warranted. The Authority awarded $3,750 plus the filing fee, applying a partial uplift based on the public interest in early settlement.

Applicant: Devon Whitham (employee)
Respondent: Brutalitees Limited (employer)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: No appearance

Devon Whitham was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed by Brutalitees Limited in a substantive determination dated 26 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 325), in which remedies were awarded. That determination encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves, noting the Authority's usual practice of applying the daily tariff if asked. The parties were unable to agree on costs, and only the applicant filed submissions. The investigation meeting had been held in New Plymouth and occupied half a day, giving a starting-point daily tariff of $2,250. Ms Whitham sought an uplift to a full day ($4,500), citing the respondent's disengagement (which required courier service of evidence) and a February 2025 settlement offer that was less than the remedies ultimately awarded. Brutalitees Limited did not participate in the costs determination.

1. Jurisdiction and applicable principles for awarding costs — Status: Established (paras [4]).

The power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, guided by the Authority's Practice Direction and principles set out in JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175. Costs are discretionary, generally follow the event, use the notional daily tariff as the starting point, and may be adjusted upward or downward for factors such as unnecessary or unreasonable conduct, complexity, or conduct that increases costs. The Authority confirmed these principles applied and that costs would follow the event in favour of Ms Whitham.

2. Whether the starting-point daily tariff should be set at a half-day rate — Status: Established (para [5]).

Because the investigation meeting occupied only half a day, the starting-point tariff was $2,250 (half the full daily rate of $4,500). This was not in dispute.

3. Whether the respondent's disengagement (necessitating courier service of evidence) justified an uplift on the daily tariff — Status: Dismissed (paras [7](a), [8]).

The Authority declined to adjust the tariff on this basis, finding that the respondent's disengagement had not caused the investigation meeting to be adjourned, delayed, or part-heard. The Authority also noted that reasonable administrative costs are already included within the notional daily tariff, so no separate uplift was warranted.

4. Whether the applicant's February 2025 settlement offer justified an uplift on the daily tariff — Status: Partially established (paras [7](b), [9]–[12]).

The Authority first considered whether the offer constituted a valid Calderbank offer, noting that the correspondence did not include the words "without prejudice – save as to costs" and therefore was not a valid Calderbank offer. However, applying Stevens v Hapag-Lloyd (NZ) Limited [2015] NZEmpC 137 at [24], the Authority recognised the public interest in encouraging early resolution of employment disputes. Because the substantive remedies awarded were considerably more favourable to Ms Whitham than the February 2025 offer — meaning BL had a genuine opportunity to resolve matters more cheaply and declined it — the Authority found a partial uplift of $1,500 was appropriate, balanced against the principle that costs orders in the Authority should remain modest.

The costs claim was partially upheld: the Authority awarded $3,750 (a partial uplift of $1,500 on the half-day tariff of $2,250) plus reimbursement of the filing fee.

Costs contribution: $3,750 payable by Brutalitees Limited to Devon Whitham within 28 days of the date of this determination.
Reimbursement of Authority filing fee: $71.55.
No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were addressed in [2026] NZERA 325).

Conner Powell, a forestry worker employed by OH & N Contracting Limited from November 2022, was dismissed on the grounds of redundancy in January 2025 without any genuine consultation process. He brought claims for unjustified dismissal, lost wages, compensation for humiliation, statutory penalties for minimum entitlement breaches, and personal liability against sole director Bradley Mooney. The Authority found the dismissal procedurally unjustified, awarded compensation and lost wages, imposed penalties for employment standards breaches, and granted leave for Mr Powell to recover unpaid wages from Mr Mooney personally if OH & N cannot pay.

Applicant: Conner Powell (employee)
Respondent: OH & N Contracting Limited (first respondent, employer) and Bradley Mooney (second respondent, sole director)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Bradley & Chelsie Mooney for the Respondent

Conner Powell was employed as a forestry worker by OH & N Contracting Limited from November 2022 under a written individual employment agreement, performing logging, machinery operation, and general forestry work on a farm. On 7 January 2025, sole director Bradley Mooney attended Mr Powell's home and informed him his employment was ending that day due to the company not making money and being closed down, with no prior consultation, no access to relevant information, and no opportunity to respond before the decision was made. Mr Powell contended the process was entirely absent of good faith restructuring obligations; OH & N countered that Mr Powell was aware the work was running out, that the business was struggling, and that alternative wood-processing work had been offered but declined. After his dismissal, another employee (Mikey) was promoted to foreman and the remaining logs were cleared over approximately three more months. Mr Powell secured new employment in February 2025, approximately six weeks after his dismissal. He also alleged that OH & N improperly paid out annual holiday pay in lieu of his contractual notice period wages, failed to provide his employment agreement and wage/time records on request, and sought penalties and personal liability against Mr Mooney as a person involved in breaches of employment standards.

1. Whether Mr Powell was unjustifiably dismissed (personal grievance for unjustified dismissal) — Status: Established (paras [16]-[24]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test, requiring that an employer's actions and manner of acting were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. The Authority accepted there were genuine business reasons for the redundancy (work was nearing completion, no new logging contracts, business declining), but found the process entirely deficient: OH & N failed to consult with Mr Powell before the decision was made, failed to provide relevant information, failed to explore alternatives, and failed to give Mr Powell an opportunity to respond with a support person present. The Authority found Mr Mooney had already made his decision before meeting Mr Powell on 7 January 2025, and the text message the prior day could have been used to at least begin a proper process. The dismissal was found to be procedurally unjustified.

2. Whether Mr Powell's actions contributed to the grievance, warranting a reduction in remedies under s 124 — Status: Dismissed (paras [36]-[37]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to reduce remedies where an employee's own conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance. The Authority found no actions of Mr Powell contributed to OH & N's failure to follow its consultation obligations, and no reduction was warranted.

3. Compensation for lost wages (s 123(1)(b)) — unpaid wages from incorrect application of annual holiday pay during notice period — Status: Established (paras [26]-[27]).

OH & N unlawfully applied Mr Powell's annual holiday balance during the notice period rather than paying ordinary wages, resulting in an underpayment on final pay. OH & N accepted the amount claimed of $2,592.00 (gross) inclusive of 8% holiday pay in closing submissions, and the Authority ordered payment accordingly.

4. Compensation for lost wages (s 123(1)(b)) — six weeks' lost wages between dismissal and new employment — Status: Partially established (paras [28]-[30]).

The Authority considered that even a proper process would likely still have resulted in Mr Powell's redundancy given the genuine ending of the work and pending business closure, citing Gafiatullina v Propellerhead Ltd [2021] NZEmpC 146 for the proposition that lost wages must be discounted for the likelihood that a fair process would still have resulted in dismissal. The Authority awarded four weeks' lost wages (rather than six) at $30.00 per hour, 40 hours per week, totalling $4,800.00 (gross).

5. Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)) — Status: Established (paras [31]-[35]).

The Authority applied the principle that compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) must be grounded in an evidential assessment of the specific harm caused and is not punitive, citing Paykel Ltd v Ahlfield [1993] 1 ERNZ 344 and Singh v McKee [2026] NZEmpC 146 for the requirement that fair compensation be supported by evidence and comparable authorities. Mr Powell gave evidence of financial stress, abrupt and confusing dismissal without warning, and the need to access Work and Income assistance. The Authority fixed compensation at $15,000.

6. Whether OH & N breached s 64(2) and s 130(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to provide the employment agreement and wage/time records on request — Status: Established (para [41]).

Mr Powell's representative requested these documents in writing on 26 February 2025, shortly after dismissal. While the documents were eventually provided to the Authority, OH & N could not satisfactorily explain the delay. The Authority found a breach of both provisions, which require immediate provision of employment agreements and records on request.

7. Whether OH & N breached the Wages Protection Act 1983 by paying annual holiday pay instead of contractual notice wages — Status: Established (paras [42]-[43]).

The Authority applied the principle from Spotless Services (NZ) Ltd v Service and Food Workers Union [2008] NZCA 580 that any failure to make full or part payment of wages owed under an employment agreement constitutes an unlawful deduction and a breach of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act 1983.

8. Whether penalties should be awarded for statutory breaches, in what quantum, and to whom — Status: Established (paras [38]-[48]).

The Authority applied the four-step penalty framework from Borsboom v Preet PVT Limited [2016] NZEmpC 143, as refined in Nicholson v Ford, weighing factors including the objects of the Act, nature/extent of breach, intent, loss suffered, mitigation, vulnerability, deterrence, culpability, consistency, and proportionality. A penalty of $1,000 was imposed for failing to provide the employment agreement and wage/time records, and $2,000 for the Wages Protection Act breach, with a discount applied for OH & N's acknowledgment of the breaches. Of the $3,000 total penalty, $2,000 was ordered to be paid to Mr Powell (given his difficulty quantifying arrears and loss of use of funds) and $1,000 to the Crown.

9. Whether a penalty could be awarded against Mr Mooney personally under s 142X as a person involved in a breach of minimum employment standards — Status: Dismissed (para [49]).

The Authority held that under s 142X(2) of the Act, an application for a penalty against a person involved in a breach may be made only by a Labour Inspector, not by an employee. Accordingly, no penalty against Mr Mooney personally could be awarded.

10. Whether Mr Mooney is a person involved in a breach of employment standards (s 142W) and whether leave should be granted for Mr Powell to recover unpaid wages from Mr Mooney personally under s 142Y — Status: Established (paras [50]-[57]).

The Authority applied s 142Y, requiring: (a) a default in payment of wages; (b) the default is due to a breach of employment standards; and (c) the person against whom leave is sought was involved in the breach. The relevant monies were the unpaid wages of $2,592.00 (gross). The Authority found the Wages Protection Act 1983 breach constituted a breach of employment standards under s 5 of the Act, and that Mr Mooney as sole director satisfied the officer requirement under s 142W(3). The Authority further found Mr Mooney was knowingly concerned in the breaches by virtue of his day-to-day role in the business and direct knowledge of Mr Powell's pay arrangements under s 142W. Leave was granted for Mr Powell to recover $2,592.00 (gross) from Mr Mooney personally to the extent OH & N cannot pay.

11. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [61]-[63]).

The Authority reserved costs, encouraging the parties to resolve costs between themselves. The investigation meeting lasted half a day. If unresolved, Mr Powell may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days, with the respondent having 14 days to reply. Costs, if determined by the Authority, would be on the standard daily tariff basis subject to any adjustment factors.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, remedies awarded for lost wages, humiliation compensation ordered, statutory penalties imposed, and leave granted for recovery of unpaid wages from Mr Mooney personally.

- Unpaid wages (incorrect final pay): $2,592.00 (gross), inclusive of 8% holiday pay — payable by OH & N within 28 days
- Lost wages (lost employment period): $4,800.00 (gross) (4 weeks at $30/hr, 40 hrs/week) — payable by OH & N within 28 days
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $15,000.00 — payable by OH & N within 28 days
- Penalty (paid to Mr Powell): $2,000.00 — payable by OH & N within 28 days
- Penalty (paid to Crown): $1,000.00 — payable by OH & N within 28 days
- Personal liability of Mr Mooney (s 142Y): Leave granted for Mr Powell to recover $2,592.00 (gross) from Mr Mooney personally, to the extent OH & N is unable to pay
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following an earlier substantive decision in which employee Ying Yin was partially successful against her employer, Grand Harbour Investments Limited. The central question was which party should be regarded as "successful" for costs purposes, and at what level costs should be awarded. The Authority found Ms Yin to be the successful party and ordered the respondent to pay her $4,500 toward legal costs.

Applicant: Ying Yin (employee)
Respondent: Grand Harbour Investments Limited (employer)

Applicant: May Moncur, advocate
Respondent: Michael Kim, counsel

In a substantive determination issued on 4 May 2026 (Ying Yin v Grand Harbour Investments Limited [2026] NZERA 272), the Authority found that Ms Yin was a permanent employee and that her personal grievance had been raised on time, but dismissed her unjustified dismissal claim. A minimum wage claim was withdrawn by Ms Yin on the first day of the investigation meeting. Grand Harbour made a concession on the second day regarding incorrectly paid holiday pay, and that payment was made prior to the substantive determination, so the holiday pay issue was withdrawn and not formally determined. A penalty was imposed on Grand Harbour for failing to produce wage and time records, with half apportioned to Ms Yin. The substantive determination noted that the holiday pay was likely only paid because Ms Yin had brought proceedings. Costs were reserved, and parties were unable to reach agreement, leading to written submissions — Ms Yin seeking $4,500 (a reduction from the two-day notional tariff of $8,000 to reflect partial success), and Grand Harbour seeking $8,000 on the basis it was the successful party given the dismissal of the unjustified dismissal claim.

1. Which party should be treated as the "successful party" for costs purposes — Status: Established in favour of applicant (paras [3]-[8], [11]).

The Authority applied the well-established costs principles from PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808, which include that an unsuccessful party will normally be required to contribute to the successful party's costs. While Ms Yin did not establish unjustified dismissal, the Authority regarded her as the successful party overall because she established permanent employee status, succeeded on the timeliness of her grievance, obtained payment of holiday pay arrears (which were only paid due to her proceedings), and the penalty for failure to produce records was obtained in her favour. The Authority expressly noted that Grand Harbour's costs memorandum failed to acknowledge Ms Yin's successful issues, and declined to treat the employer as the successful party.

2. The appropriate quantum of a costs award — Status: Established at $4,500 (para [12]).

The Authority noted the notional tariff for a two-day investigation meeting is $8,000. Ms Yin sought $4,500, representing a reduction to reflect her partial success (equivalent to the daily tariff for a single day's in-person investigation). The Authority accepted this figure without further adjustment, finding it appropriate given the partial but genuine nature of Ms Yin's success and the circumstances, including that the holiday pay payment and production of records were directly attributable to the proceedings.

The claim for costs was upheld in favour of the applicant; Grand Harbour Investments Limited is ordered to pay Ms Yin $4,500 as a contribution toward her legal costs.

Costs: $4,500 payable by Grand Harbour Investments Limited to Ying Yin within 28 days of the date of this determination (23 July 2026).

Andrew Martin, a long-serving Principal Instructor (Catering/Laundry) at Northland Regional Corrections Facility, was dismissed by the Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections for serious misconduct relating to the unauthorised removal of food from the prison kitchen for an off-site staff Christmas event. He applied for interim reinstatement, initially to his former role and later alternatively to Corrections' payroll pending a substantive grievance hearing. The Authority found only a weakly arguable case for both unjustified dismissal and permanent reinstatement, and declined interim reinstatement on all bases, directing the parties to mediation.

Applicant: Andrew Martin (employee, Principal Instructor)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: Mark Ryan, counsel for the applicant
Respondent: Karen Radich and Zara Melville, counsel for the respondent

Andrew Martin worked for Corrections for approximately 20 years, most recently as Principal Instructor (Catering/Laundry) at Northland Regional Corrections Facility (NRCF), a supervisory role involving staff management, prisoner management, and financial delegations for kitchen supplies. In late November 2024, food (including an estimated 18kg of scotch fillet) was removed from the prison kitchen for an off-site staff Christmas function held at Mr Martin's home; CCTV footage confirmed his involvement in or proximity to the removal. No written approval was obtained under Corrections' Sensitive Expenditure Policy, and no manager accepted having given verbal approval, though Mr Martin maintained he believed approval had been delegated and obtained. Following an internal investigation conducted by a manager from a different facility and a disciplinary process handled by another senior manager, Mr Martin was dismissed on notice on 3 February 2026 for serious misconduct, the three upheld allegations being: arranging the food removal, authorising it without required approval, and providing inaccurate information to a colleague about the existence of approval. Mr Martin filed for interim reinstatement, arguing a weakly arguable case of unjustified dismissal based on procedural and investigative flaws, disparity of treatment, and that he had reasonably believed approval was in place; Corrections opposed reinstatement on grounds of lost trust and confidence, the unique prison environment, and the risk to its operations.

1. Whether Mr Martin has an arguable case for unjustified dismissal — Status: Partially established (weakly) (paras [52]-[69]).

The test applied was the low threshold of whether there is an arguable case that Corrections did not act as a fair and reasonable employer could have in all the circumstances (s 103A of the Act). The Authority acknowledged undisputed facts supporting Corrections' position — Mr Martin's awareness of the Sensitive Expenditure Policy, his prior unsuccessful written application for approval, and his involvement in the removal — but accepted that a number of contested matters (the "stuffed up" admission dispute, whether the Manager Industries gave or implied verbal approval, adequacy of the investigation's treatment of conflicting evidence, disparity arguments, and procedural criticisms of the investigator) created a weakly arguable case. The Authority concluded only a weakly arguable case existed that Corrections failed to act as a fair and reasonable employer.

2. Whether Mr Martin has an arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Partially established (very weakly) (paras [70]-[79]).

The Authority assessed the feasibility or practical workability of re-imposing the employment relationship, citing Angus v Ports of Auckland [2011] NZEmpC 122 and Air New Zealand Ltd v Hudson (unrep, AC 46/05, 17 August 2005). Relevant factors included that the Principal Instructor role had been filled by another person (circumstances unclear), Corrections' expressed loss of trust and confidence, the unique security requirements of a prison, Mr Martin's direct prisoner contact and financial delegations, concerns about his ongoing non-acceptance of responsibility, the absence of suitable alternative roles in the Kaikohe location, and unresolved questions about whether the health and safety role mentioned would be "no less advantageous" under s 123(1)(a) of the Act. The Authority found at most a very weakly arguable case for permanent reinstatement.

3. Whether the balance of convenience favours granting interim reinstatement to Mr Martin's former position — Status: Dismissed (paras [80]-[94]).

The Authority weighed the detriment to each party. Mr Martin's evidence was primarily financial (mortgage, loss of income, bank statements), but the Authority found damages could be an adequate remedy given the limited financial evidence presented, and noted Mr Martin had been on ACC following surgery (thus on earnings-related compensation) and had already been away from the workplace since his suspension in December 2024. Against this, Corrections demonstrated serious concerns: the risk that prisoners would exploit Mr Martin's vulnerable position, the person occupying his former role, and the significant impact of forcing reinstatement in a position requiring complete trust. The balance of convenience on reinstatement to the former position favoured Corrections.

4. Whether the balance of convenience favours granting interim reinstatement to Corrections' payroll (a modified form of reinstatement sought during submissions) — Status: Dismissed (paras [90]-[95]).

The Authority assessed this alternative, noting Corrections' valid concern about the use of taxpayer resources (salary of over $100,000 per year), the risk of non-repayment if Mr Martin's grievance ultimately fails (supported by the bank account evidence showing limited funds), and that a payroll-only reinstatement provides the employer no work in exchange for wages. The Authority found the balance still somewhat favoured Corrections, particularly given Mr Martin's current inability to work while on ACC.

5. Whether the overall justice of the case supports granting interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [97]-[100]).

Standing back to assess overall justice (applying the framework from X v Y Ltd and the NZ Stock Exchange [1992] 1 ERNZ 863 and Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36), the Authority concluded that the weakly arguable merits and the balance of convenience both favoured Corrections. There was nothing in the overall justice assessment that would warrant granting interim reinstatement in any form. The application was declined.

6. Whether the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2026 applies to this matter — Status: Not reached (para [6]).

The Authority raised the potential application of recent amendments given the timing of Mr Martin's dismissal. Corrections confirmed it did not seek to argue those amendments applied, and no response was received on Mr Martin's behalf. The issue was therefore not considered further.

7. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [103]).

Costs were reserved and not determined in this interim proceeding.

The application for interim reinstatement (whether to the former position or to the payroll) was dismissed in full.

None ordered at this stage. The application for interim reinstatement was declined. Costs are reserved. The parties were directed to attend mediation within 20 working days of the determination, after which, if unresolved, Mr Martin may contact the Authority to pursue his substantive grievance and a case management conference will be arranged.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following the Authority's earlier decision of 9 March 2026 (NZERA 145), which declined Jasem Al Machael's application for a declaration that he was an employee of South Waikato Property Renovators Limited. The respondent, as the successful party, sought either full solicitor-client costs or a significant uplift to the standard tariff, relying on a rejected Calderbank offer and the complexity of the matter. The Authority declined to award an uplift and ordered the applicant to pay $2,500.00 as a contribution toward the respondent's legal costs.

Applicant: Jasem Al Machael (claimant in underlying employee status dispute)
Respondent: South Waikato Property Renovators Limited (employer in underlying dispute)

Applicant: Mikail Steens, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Christie McGregor, counsel for the Respondent

On 9 March 2026, the Authority issued a determination (NZERA 145) declining Mr Al Machael's application for a declaration that he was an employee of South Waikato Property Renovators Limited; costs were reserved at that time. The parties were unable to resolve costs by direct negotiation. The respondent sought full solicitor-client costs, or a significant uplift to the on-papers tariff rate, on the basis that the applicant had unreasonably rejected a Calderbank offer and that the matter involved complex legal issues including limitation periods, parallel proceedings, and the need for affidavit evidence. The applicant argued that costs should not be determined until a challenge to the underlying determination was resolved in court, and alternatively that costs should lie where they fall or be awarded at a modest level only, with no uplift. The matter was dealt with on the papers, and the Determination had signalled that half the daily tariff ($2,250.00) might be appropriate.

1. Whether costs should be deferred pending the applicant's challenge to the underlying determination in the Employment Court — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]).

The Authority held that a pending challenge to the underlying determination does not justify departing from the general principle that costs follow the event. The Authority confirmed it was appropriate for costs to be determined at this stage, and that any party wishing to challenge that costs determination may do so in court. No authority was cited specifically on this point.

2. Whether the respondent was entitled to an uplift to the tariff rate on the basis of the applicant's rejection of the Calderbank offer — Status: Dismissed (paras [8]-[10]).

The Authority applied the well-settled principle that reasonable Calderbank offers (made without prejudice except as to costs) that are unreasonably rejected can support an uplift to a costs award, citing Bluestar Print Group (NZ) Ltd v Mitchell [2010] NZCA 385. The Authority found that the Calderbank offer in this case did not offer a material compromise to the applicant — it merely required him to pay amounts already awarded against him in the Disputes Tribunal, discontinue other Disputes Tribunal proceedings, and withdraw his Authority claim in exchange for the respondent not seeking costs. Given the legally technical and jurisdictionally complex nature of the proceedings, the Authority concluded it could not be said that the rejection was unreasonable so as to justify an uplift.

3. Whether the respondent was entitled to full solicitor-client costs or a significant uplift on the basis of the complexity of the matter — Status: Dismissed (paras [5]-[7], [12]).

The Authority applied the costs assessment principles established in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808, including that costs awards should be modest and that unsuccessful parties normally contribute (but not fully reimburse) actual legal costs. The Authority adopted its standard notional tariff-based approach, noting this was well publicised. The respondent's arguments about unique legal issues and complexity were not sufficient to justify departing from the tariff framework or awarding full solicitor-client costs.

4. Determination of the appropriate quantum of costs — Status: Established (paras [7], [16]).

Applying the tariff-based approach, the Authority had signalled in the underlying determination that half the daily tariff ($2,250.00) would be appropriate given the matter was dealt with on the papers. The Authority ordered $2,500.00 (a modest amount marginally above half the daily tariff of $2,250.00) as a contribution toward the respondent's legal costs, consistent with the principle that costs follow the event in favour of the successful party.

The claim for a costs uplift was dismissed; the respondent was awarded $2,500.00 as a standard contribution toward its legal costs.

Costs: $2,500.00 ordered to be paid by the applicant (Jasem Al Machael) to the respondent (South Waikato Property Renovators Limited) within 21 days of the date of the determination. No other remedies ordered.

Jia Jia, a Chinese national employed as a retail sales assistant by TBS Trading Limited from July to September 2024, raised personal grievances of unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage, along with claims for unpaid wages, unpaid annual holiday pay, and statutory breaches relating to the failure to provide an employment agreement and late wage payments. The Authority found in Ms Jia's favour on the dismissal and disadvantage grievances and established several statutory breaches, awarding lost wages, compensation for hurt and humiliation, penalties, and costs. The second respondent, sole director Helen Han, was found potentially personally liable for the penalty amounts if the company cannot pay.

Applicant: Jia Jia (employee)
Respondent: TBS Trading Limited (First Respondent, employer); Helen (also known as Guiju) Han (Second Respondent, sole director of TBS Trading Limited)

Applicant: Aimee Cai, advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Helen Han, Second Respondent in person and company director for the First Respondent

Jia Jia responded to a job advertisement on Skykiwi on 1 July 2024, was interviewed on 2 July, and commenced full-time employment as a retail sales assistant with TBS Trading Limited on 3 July 2024. She was never provided with a written employment agreement, which Ms Han admitted was her fault. Ms Jia was paid fortnightly but not always on time; Ms Han acknowledged she sometimes lacked funds in her account. Ms Jia's employment ended on 15 September 2024 — approximately two and a half months after commencement — when Ms Han ceased offering her work, although there was no explicit dismissal. Ms Jia took two months to find alternative employment and raised a personal grievance with TBS by letter dated 4 October 2024. At the investigation meeting, Ms Jia confirmed that all outstanding wages had ultimately been paid by Ms Han, though late. Neither TBS nor Ms Han filed a statement in reply or witness statements, and Ms Han had limited engagement with the proceedings, attending the investigation meeting only by AVL.

1. Whether Ms Jia was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [15]-[18]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test, requiring an objective assessment of whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as TBS did. TBS failed entirely to comply with the procedural fairness factors in s 103A(3): no process was followed, Ms Jia was not given information about the business's financial difficulties, not consulted about moving to part-time work, and Ms Han effectively went "radio silent" after 15 September 2024. The Authority found these procedural defects were not minor and treated Ms Jia unfairly, establishing unjustified dismissal.

2. Whether Ms Jia was unjustifiably disadvantaged — Status: Established (paras [15]-[18]).

Applying the same s 103A framework, the Authority found the failure to provide a written employment agreement throughout the entirety of her employment, combined with the late payment of wages, constituted unjustified disadvantage. TBS's obligations under good faith provisions (ss 4(1) and 4(1A)(b) of the Act) required more responsive and communicative conduct, and a fair and reasonable employer would have ensured Ms Jia had an employment agreement and was paid on time.

3. Whether Ms Jia was owed outstanding wages — Status: Dismissed (para [12]).

Although Ms Jia originally pleaded that wages were owed, she conceded at the investigation meeting — confirmed twice by the Authority through a Mandarin interpreter — that Ms Han had eventually repaid all outstanding wages. Accordingly, no wages remained owing.

4. Whether TBS breached s 65 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 by failing to provide a signed employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [10], [22]-[24]).

Ms Han admitted at the investigation meeting that TBS did not provide Ms Jia with an employment agreement. This was TBS's second such breach, a prior penalty having been awarded in Jasper Wong v TBS Trading Limited [2024] NZERA 744. The Authority found the breach warranted a penalty under s 133A of the Act.

5. Whether TBS breached the Holidays Act 2003 by failing to pay annual holiday pay — Status: Not reached (para [7]).

This issue was listed among the issues for investigation but was not expressly addressed or resolved in the determination. The Authority addressed the HA breach in the issues list but made no specific findings or orders in relation to annual holiday pay in the substantive analysis or remedy section, and appears to have subsumed it into the global compensation approach without separately determining it.

6. Whether TBS breached the Minimum Wage Act 1983 by paying below the minimum wage — Status: Not reached (para [7]).

Similarly, the breach of the MWA was identified as an issue but was not expressly determined or remedied in the Authority's analysis. No specific finding or remedy regarding minimum wage underpayment is made in the determination.

7. Whether there was a breach of s 4 of the Wages Protection Act (WPA) for late payment of wages — Status: Established (paras [22]-[25]).

The Authority found that Ms Han's late payment of Ms Jia's fortnightly wages breached s 4 of the WPA. Although wages were eventually paid, the obligation is to pay wages when they become due. This was found to be TBS's first such penalty and a penalty of $750 was imposed, payable to Ms Jia under s 136 of the Act.

8. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction regarding the failure to pay PAYE — Status: Dismissed (para [1]).

The Authority noted it has no jurisdiction over PAYE matters, which fall under the Tax Administration Act 1994 and the Income Tax Act 2007 and are a matter for the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. This claim was expressly excluded from the investigation.

9. Quantum of remedies: lost wages — Status: Established (para [19]).

Under s 128(2) of the Act, Ms Jia was awarded two months' lost wages, reflecting the time taken to find comparable full-time employment. Precise calculation was not possible due to TBS's failure to provide wage and time records; the figure was based on full-time fortnightly pay multiplied by four.

10. Quantum of remedies: compensation for hurt and humiliation — Status: Established (paras [20]-[21]).

The Authority took a global approach to compensation for both unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act. Ms Jia's evidence of emotional insecurity from lacking a written agreement, and the financial impact of dismissal on her dependent child in China, placed the award at the top end of Band 1. The Authority awarded $12,500.

11. Whether Ms Jia contributed to her own grievance under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [21]).

The Authority considered whether any reduction was warranted under s 124 but found Ms Jia did not contribute to her grievances in any blameworthy way, and accordingly made no reduction to the compensation award.

12. Whether penalties should be imposed for the employment agreement and wage payment breaches — Status: Established (paras [22]-[25]).

Applying s 133A of the Act, the Authority awarded a penalty of $1,500 against TBS for the s 65 breach (the company's second such offence; maximum is $20,000), and $750 for the WPA late payment breach (first such offence). Both penalties were directed to be paid entirely to Ms Jia under s 136 of the Act.

13. Whether Ms Han is personally liable as "a person involved" under ss 142W and 142Y of the Act — Status: Established (paras [26], [29]).

The Authority granted Ms Jia leave under ss 142W and 142Y. However, citing Chen v Chen [2026] NZEmpC 133 at [21]-[22], it held that s 142Y does not extend to compensation awards (hurt and humiliation) or s 123 remedies. Ms Han's personal liability was therefore limited to the two penalties totalling $2,250, payable only if TBS fails to pay.

14. Costs — Status: Established (para [27]).

Ms Jia was the successful party and entitled to costs on a "costs follow the event" basis. Given the half-day investigation meeting (12pm–3:30pm), the Authority awarded one half of the daily notional tariff ($2,250) plus reimbursement of the filing fee of $71.55.

The claims were substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal and unjustified disadvantage were established, statutory penalties were imposed, and compensation and costs were awarded; the outstanding wages claim was dismissed as all wages had been repaid.

- Lost wages: Two months' lost wages (precise amount not calculable from the determination; based on full-time fortnightly pay × 4)
- Compensation for hurt and humiliation: $12,500
- Penalty (s 65 ERA breach — no employment agreement): $1,500 (payable to Ms Jia)
- Penalty (s 4 WPA breach — late payment of wages): $750 (payable to Ms Jia)
- Costs: $2,250
- Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55
- Total calculable ordered payments (excluding unquantified lost wages): $16,521.55 plus two months' lost wages
- Personal liability of Ms Han: Limited to penalties of $2,250 (contingent on TBS's inability to pay), by order under ss 142W and 142Y
- Payment deadline: 21 August 2026
- Reinstatement: Not ordered

Julia Celine Nysse, a self-employed applicant, sought review of a decision by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) declining her application for parental leave payments (PLP) in respect of a second pregnancy. MBIE declined her application because fewer than six months had elapsed between the end of her previous PLP period (which arose following a stillbirth) and the expected due date of her second child, as required by s 71F(a) of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 (PLEPA). The Authority confirmed MBIE's decision, finding no legal basis to override the statutory eligibility criteria or exercise discretion in Ms Nysse's favour.

Applicant: Julia Celine Nysse (self-employed person/applicant for parental leave payments)
Respondent: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) (administering agency)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Jessica Ellison for the Respondent

Ms Nysse is self-employed and suffered a stillbirth in August 2025, in respect of which she received PLP. That PLP period ended on 6 February 2026. During her PLP period she became pregnant again, with an expected due date (EDD) of 4 July 2026. On 23 April 2026, Ms Nysse applied for PLP for her second pregnancy with a requested start date of 4 May 2026. IRD (acting on behalf of MBIE) declined the application on the basis that fewer than six months had elapsed between the end of the first PLP period (6 February 2026) and the EDD of the second child (4 July 2026), as required by s 71F(a) of the PLEPA. Ms Nysse argued her circumstances were exceptional, that the outcome was unfair and effectively penalised her for becoming pregnant again after a stillbirth, and proposed various accommodations (repaying the last four weeks of the first PLP, accepting a reduced entitlement, or delaying the start). MBIE maintained those arrangements were not available under the PLEPA and that its discretion under s 71IA could not be used to override substantive eligibility requirements, relying on the Employment Court's decision in Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Duan [2023] NZEmpC 232. The matter was determined on the papers following an agreed statement of facts and written submissions.

1. Whether MBIE was correct in declining Ms Nysse's PLP application on the basis that fewer than six months had elapsed between the end of her previous PLP period and the EDD of her second child under s 71F(a) of the PLEPA — Status: Established (paras [13]-[29]).

Section 71F(a) of the PLEPA provides that a person is not entitled to PLP in respect of a child if fewer than six months have elapsed after the end of a PLP period received for another child. The Authority found that this requirement was not met: only approximately five months elapsed between 6 February 2026 and 4 July 2026. Ms Nysse herself acknowledged the factual position. The Authority confirmed MBIE's application of the statutory provision was correct.

2. Whether MBIE was entitled to exercise its discretion under s 71IA of the PLEPA to approve Ms Nysse's application notwithstanding the six-month gap requirement — Status: Dismissed (paras [24]-[29]).

Section 71IA confers a discretion on MBIE to approve PLP despite an "irregularity" in an application, but s 71IA(5) defines "irregularity" as limited to matters of form (e.g., late application, incorrect manner of applying, missing documents). The Employment Court in MBIE v Duan [2023] NZEmpC 232 confirmed that this discretion cannot be exercised in relation to matters of substance. Because Ms Nysse's ineligibility arose from a substantive statutory bar (s 71F(a)), not a procedural irregularity, MBIE had no power to exercise discretion in her favour. The Authority accepted this analysis and confirmed MBIE was correct not to exercise the discretion.

3. Whether the proposed accommodations suggested by Ms Nysse (repaying part of her first PLP, accepting a reduced entitlement, delaying PLP start, or returning to work) were available options under the PLEPA — Status: Dismissed (paras [23]).

MBIE submitted, and the Authority accepted, that none of the arrangements proposed by Ms Nysse were available to her under the PLEPA. Specifically, delaying the start of PLP payments is not available to a self-employed person, and returning to work after the birth of the second child would render her ineligible for PLP under s 71D(1)(b)(i) of the PLEPA. The Authority made no further analysis but confirmed MBIE's position.

4. Whether the Authority should exercise its own discretion under s 71ZB of the PLEPA (read with s 157(3) of the Employment Relations Act 2000) to modify or reverse MBIE's decision — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[39]).

The Authority has a statutory discretion under s 71ZB to confirm, modify, or reverse a PLP decision, and s 157(3) of the ERA 2000 allows it to act "as it thinks fit in equity and good conscience." However, the Authority noted from prior decisions (including NRT v MBIE [2024] NZERA 421, Malhi v MBIE [2023] NZERA 663, Foo v MBIE [2024] NZERA 386, Don v MBIE [2024] NZERA 163, and McClure v MBIE [2022] NZERA 654) that this discretion must be exercised in a principled manner consistent with the legislation, cannot be used to rewrite the legislation or approve applications not meeting eligibility criteria, and has only been exercised in favour of applicants who were otherwise eligible but suffered some injustice preventing them from meeting the threshold. The Authority found Ms Nysse's circumstances did not constitute such an injustice, as she simply did not meet the eligibility requirements of s 71F(a). No prior Authority decisions had reversed or modified a MBIE decision on grounds comparable to Ms Nysse's; cases such as Faulkner v MBIE [2023] NZERA 748, Lillas v MBIE [2023] NZERA 535, and VIZ v MBIE [2025] NZERA 826 pointed in the opposite direction. Accordingly, the Authority declined to modify or reverse MBIE's decision.

5. Costs — Status: Not reached/No order made (para [40]).

The Authority noted that, per the Employment Relations Authority's Practice Direction (February 2024, paragraph 6(viii)), PLP review proceedings are a category in which parties should generally bear their own costs. No costs order was made.

The application was dismissed in full; MBIE's decision to decline Ms Nysse's PLP application was confirmed.

None ordered. Each party is to bear their own costs in accordance with the ERA Practice Direction.

Saoirse Nesbit (employee/applicant) and Fire Rescue and First Response Limited (employer/applicant in cross-claim), a company directed by Philip Nesbit, each alleged the other breached the same Record of Settlement (ROS) signed in December 2025 and certified by a mediator in January 2026. The key legal questions were whether Fire Rescue had breached its obligations to clear vehicle encumbrances and pay statutory leave entitlements, and whether Ms Nesbit had breached obligations to return company property and comply with confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses. The Authority found Fire Rescue in breach of the vehicle transfer clause, found no outstanding leave entitlements owed to Ms Nesbit, found Ms Nesbit had belatedly complied with the property return clause, and dismissed Fire Rescue's confidentiality and non-disparagement claims.

Applicant: Saoirse Nesbit (employee)
Respondent: Fire Rescue and First Response Limited (employer)

Note: Fire Rescue and First Response Limited also brought a separate cross-claim as applicant against Ms Nesbit as respondent (heard together).

Applicant: Saoirse Nesbit (self-represented)
Respondent: Philip Nesbit for Fire Rescue and First Response Limited (self-represented / director)

Saoirse Nesbit was employed as an instructor and trainer by Fire Rescue and First Response Limited from 10 February 2025, ceasing employment on 25 October 2025. The parties — who were also husband and wife — signed a Record of Settlement (ROS) on 17 December 2025, which was certified by a mediator on 8 January 2026; the ROS purported to resolve all issues relating to the employment relationship. Ms Nesbit brought a claim alleging Fire Rescue had not paid her statutory leave entitlements and had failed to transfer an agreed vehicle to her free from encumbrances as required by the ROS. Fire Rescue brought a separate cross-claim alleging Ms Nesbit failed to return company property in time, and had breached the confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses of the ROS. Both matters were heard together at an investigation meeting on 10 June 2026, with supplementary submissions received up to 22 June 2026.

1. Whether Fire Rescue breached clause 6 of the ROS by failing to transfer the vehicle free from encumbrances — Status: Established (paras [14]-[18]).

The ROS required Fire Rescue to transfer a vehicle into Ms Nesbit's name free from any encumbrance. Fire Rescue admitted it had not done so, citing financial difficulty and an intention to pay off balances when funds were available. The Authority held that the ROS is a legally binding agreement whose terms do not permit partial compliance, and that it is not the Authority's role to redefine agreed terms. A compliance order was issued under s 137(1)(a)(iii) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act), and under s 137(2) the Authority additionally required Philip Nesbit, as sole director, to take steps to put the company in funds to meet this obligation, citing DFN v BTL Group Ltd [2022] NZERA 170 and Broadley-Ryan v Mount Bricklayers Ltd [2026] NZERA 383.

2. Whether Fire Rescue breached clauses 2 and 11 of the ROS by failing to pay statutory leave entitlements (holiday pay) — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[32]).

Ms Nesbit claimed annual leave was wrongly deducted for two periods: a July overseas holiday and an October bereavement period. The Authority applied the relevant leave entitlement framework under the Act and assessed her total annual leave entitlement at 80.64 hours over the employment period, finding she had taken 81.60 hours of annual leave. The Authority found the July trip was a genuine holiday (albeit leave data was incorrectly entered, her total pay remained unchanged), and that in the October period she had received generous extended bereavement leave beyond contractual requirements, with insufficient evidence she worked during the disputed days. No further statutory entitlements were found to be owed.

3. Whether Ms Nesbit breached clause 3 of the ROS by failing to return company property within three working days — Status: Established (paras [19]-[20]).

Ms Nesbit admitted she had not returned company property (fuel card, debit card, SIM card, and work laptop) within the agreed timeframe, constituting a breach. However, by 13 July 2026 Fire Rescue confirmed it had received the items. The Authority found that while the items may have been damaged in transit, the ROS specified no condition of return, and there was no evidence Ms Nesbit caused damage. Accordingly, Ms Nesbit was found to have achieved compliance with clause 3, albeit belatedly; no further order was made on this issue.

4. Whether Ms Nesbit breached clauses 7 and 8 of the ROS (confidentiality and non-disparagement) — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[35]).

Fire Rescue alleged Ms Nesbit had made disparaging communications to clients and breached confidentiality. The Authority found clear evidence that disparaging messages were sent to clients, but attributed this conduct to another employee, not Ms Nesbit. While the Authority accepted Ms Nesbit likely criticised Mr Nesbit personally in conversations with friends and colleagues, it distinguished personal relationship commentary from disparagement of Mr Nesbit in his capacity as director of Fire Rescue; and found no sufficient causal link between Ms Nesbit's conversations and breaches of confidentiality or disparaging external communications. No breach of clauses 7 or 8 was established.

5. Whether penalties should be imposed against Fire Rescue for breach of the ROS under s 149(4) of the Act — Status: Conditional/adjourned (paras [40]-[42]).

The Authority acknowledged Fire Rescue's admitted breach of the ROS and noted that under s 149(4) of the Act Fire Rescue is liable to penalty. However, the Authority adjourned the penalty application without making a final determination, to allow the compliance order time to be fulfilled. The Authority noted that Ms Nesbit's own belated compliance with clause 3 would be taken into account in any future penalty assessment.

6. Whether the Authority should require Philip Nesbit personally (as sole director) to ensure Fire Rescue meets its ROS obligations under s 137(2) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [17]-[18], [38]).

Although Ms Nesbit did not formally join Mr Nesbit as a party, the Authority exercised its power under s 137(2) of the Act to require him, as sole director, to take the steps necessary to put Fire Rescue in funds to clear the vehicle encumbrances. The Authority found no substantive evidence that Mr Nesbit personally would be unable to meet the obligation, and was not persuaded that requiring compliance against him would be unreasonable.

7. Costs — Status: Dismissed/No order (para [43]).

The Authority ordered that costs lie where they fall, making no award of costs to either party.

The claim was partially upheld: a compliance order was issued against Fire Rescue regarding the vehicle transfer, no statutory leave entitlements were found owing to Ms Nesbit, Ms Nesbit's breach of the property return clause was resolved by her belated compliance, and Fire Rescue's confidentiality and non-disparagement claims were dismissed; the penalty issue was adjourned.

Compliance order: Fire Rescue ordered to clear all encumbrances on the vehicle within 28 days of the determination and notify Ms Nesbit accordingly (s 137(1)(a)(iii) of the Act).
Director obligation: Philip Nesbit (sole director) required under s 137(2) to take steps to put Fire Rescue in funds to comply with the compliance order.
Lost wages/leave entitlements: None ordered (no further entitlements found owing).
Penalties: Adjourned without final determination; Ms Nesbit may return to the Authority if the compliance order is not met within the timeframe.
Costs: None ordered — costs to lie where they fall.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.

Ilfaaz Hussain, a former employee of Sharp Service Limited, brought a claim to recover unpaid holiday pay after his employment ended on 4 October 2025 following approximately three years of service. The key legal questions concerned the calculation of annual holiday entitlements and accrued holiday pay under the Holidays Act 2003, entitlement to public holiday pay after termination, and whether Sharp could rely on a contractual deductions clause to withhold payment. The Authority found in Mr Hussain's favour on all substantive issues and ordered Sharp to pay arrears of holiday pay, interest, and filing costs.

Applicant: Ilfaaz Hussain (employee)
Respondent: Sharp Service Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Samantha Mills (director of Sharp Service Limited)

Mr Hussain worked for Sharp Service Limited for approximately three years, commencing 4 July 2022, and resigned on notice, with his last day of work being 4 October 2025. Sharp paid his regular wages up to the end of his employment but did not pay him any holiday pay — neither for untaken annual holidays nor for accrued holiday pay for his final part year of service. Mr Hussain lodged an application with the Employment Relations Authority to recover those amounts. Sharp did not file a statement in reply or its own statement of problem despite being directed to do so by 29 June 2026, and failed to provide payslip information directed during the investigation meeting. During preliminary proceedings, Sharp's director raised potential counter-claims and referred to a contractual deductions clause in Mr Hussain's employment agreement, and also mentioned the possibility of Sharp going into liquidation.

1. Whether Sharp failed to pay holiday pay when the applicant's employment ended, in breach of s 27 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [16]-[19]).

Section 27 of the Holidays Act 2003 requires an employer to pay an employee for untaken annual holidays and accrued holiday pay on termination of employment. Sharp paid Mr Hussain his regular wages up to the end of employment but made no payment for his untaken annual holiday entitlement or for 8% accrued holiday pay since his last anniversary date. The Authority found this constituted a clear breach of s 27 of the Holidays Act 2003.

2. What arrears of annual holiday pay are owed under ss 24, 25, and 26 of the Holidays Act 2003 — Status: Established (paras [20]-[26]).

Under ss 24 and 25 of the Holidays Act 2003, an employee is entitled to payment for untaken annual holidays (calculated at ordinary weekly pay) and to 8% of gross earnings since the last entitlement date. Mr Hussain had accrued 60 days' entitlement over three complete years and had taken 33.75 days, leaving 26.25 days untaken; at his hourly rate of $39.31 for 40 hours per week, this yielded $8,255.10 under s 24. His gross earnings for the final part year totalled $22,328.08 (including Labour Day pay), yielding $1,786.25 under s 25. Total arrears under ss 24, 25, and 26 were $10,041.35.

3. Whether s 40 of the Holidays Act 2003 applied to entitle Mr Hussain to payment for Labour Day (27 October 2025) and Show Day (14 November 2025) — Status: Partially established (paras [27]-[29]).

Section 40(3) of the Holidays Act 2003 provides that an employee is entitled to payment for a public holiday that falls within the period covered by their untaken annual holiday entitlement after termination. The Authority found that Mr Hussain's untaken entitlement period was 26.25 days (not the 30+ days he had claimed), meaning only Labour Day (27 October 2025) fell within that period. Show Day (14 November 2025) fell outside that period. Mr Hussain was entitled to $314.48 for Labour Day based on his relevant daily pay ($39.31 × 8 hours), but not for Show Day.

4. Whether ss 5(1A) and/or 5A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 prevented Sharp from relying on the contractual "Deductions" clause to set off amounts against or withhold holiday pay — Status: Not reached (paras [14], [30]-[37]).

Sharp did not file a statement in reply or its own claim, so no formal set-off or deduction claim was before the Authority and no findings were required. However, the Authority provided useful commentary: s 5(1A) of the Wages Protection Act 1983 would have rendered any deduction from holiday pay unlawful because Sharp did not consult with Mr Hussain before making any deductions; and s 5A would have provided a further obstacle as deductions reconsidering wages already paid months earlier (the earliest entry in Sharp's table being 7 March 2023) were likely to be unreasonable and therefore unlawful. The Authority noted Sharp's claimed vehicle damage but likewise declined to assess it without a formal claim.

5. Whether interest should be ordered on the arrears — Status: Established (paras [38]-[39]).

The Authority found it appropriate to award interest to compensate Mr Hussain for being deprived of the use of his holiday pay since the date of termination. Using the civil debt interest calculator, interest on the total arrears of $10,355.83 from 4 October 2025 to 24 July 2026 was calculated at $311.89.

6. Whether costs should be awarded to Mr Hussain — Status: Established (para [40]).

Mr Hussain was self-represented but had incurred a filing fee to commence his claim. As the successful party, the Authority ordered Sharp to reimburse him for that expense of $71.55.

7. Whether Samantha Mills should be joined to the claim under Part 9A and s 142Y of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Not reached (para [15]).

This issue was raised because Ms Mills referred to the possibility of Sharp going into liquidation. The Authority found it was not necessary to make findings at this stage but reserved the issue. Mr Hussain was granted leave to lodge a Part 9A application if Sharp is unable to pay the amounts ordered.

The claim was upheld in full, with arrears of holiday pay, interest, and filing costs ordered against Sharp Service Limited.

Holiday pay arrears: $10,355.83 (gross) (comprising $8,255.10 under s 24, $1,786.25 under s 25/26, and $314.48 for Labour Day under s 40);
Interest: $311.89;
Costs (filing fee reimbursement): $71.55;
All amounts payable by Friday 24 July 2026.
Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered.
Part 9A joinder of Ms Mills: Reserved; Mr Hussain may apply under Part 9A if Sharp cannot pay.

Regina Rasheed, a principal of 14 years at Zayed College for Girls (an Islamic special character secondary school), was dismissed on 17 June 2025 following a lengthy disciplinary process. She claimed unjustified disadvantage (arising from an unresolved 2022 disciplinary investigation and two suspensions) and unjustified dismissal, and sought reinstatement, lost wages, compensation, sick leave reimbursement, and penalties against both the employer and the proprietor Trust. The Authority found all personal grievances established, upheld reinstatement, awarded $40,000 compensation, reimbursement of lost wages and sick leave, and imposed a $6,000 penalty against the Trust for aiding and abetting breaches of the employment agreement.

Applicant: Regina Rasheed (employee/principal)
Respondent: Commissioner of Zayed College for Girls (First Respondent/employer); Aotearoa Charitable Foundation Trust (Second Respondent/proprietor)

Applicant: Richard Harrison, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Joseph Williams, counsel for the First Respondent; Tim Clarke, counsel for the Second Respondent

Mrs Rasheed was employed as principal of Zayed College for Girls from June 2011 until her summary dismissal on 17 June 2025 — a tenure of approximately 14 years. In August 2022, the Board of Trustees (BoT) commenced a disciplinary investigation into alleged misconduct by Mrs Rasheed via a subcommittee; however, the process was never formally concluded, partly due to the Trust withdrawing its BoT representatives and the BoT's subsequent dissolution. On 28 March 2023, Lynley Myers was appointed Commissioner, who initiated a Personal Assistance and Guidance (PAG) programme and eventually closed the 2022 disciplinary matter in December 2023. In June 2024, during Mrs Rasheed's sabbatical, acting principal Mrs Shea wrote to the Commissioner raising concerns about Mrs Rasheed's leadership; this triggered a workplace investigation, two suspensions (1 July 2024 and 15 September 2024), and ultimately dismissal on 17 June 2025 after the investigator found 30 of 47 allegations proven. Mrs Rasheed contended the entire process breached the collective agreement's disciplinary provisions, that the two suspensions were unjustified, and that her dismissal was unjustified; the Commissioner maintained all actions were those of a fair and reasonable employer, and the Trust denied liability and opposed reinstatement on grounds of irretrievable breakdown.

1. Whether Mrs Rasheed suffered unjustified disadvantage through the employer's failure to investigate and conclude the 2022 disciplinary process in a fair and timely manner — Status: Established (paras [79]-[84]).

The Authority applied the s 103A justification test and the collective agreement's requirements (clauses 6.1.1, 6.3) that disciplinary processes protect the principal's mana and dignity and be concluded as soon as reasonably practicable. The Authority rejected the Commissioner's submission that Mrs Rasheed knew by November 2022 the investigation posed no threat; it found the prolonged delay — compounded by the Commissioner's initial non-engagement and subsequent re-surfacing of closed complaints through the workplace investigation — caused Mrs Rasheed quantifiable disadvantage including harm to her health. The duty to be open and constructive under s 4(1A)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was also breached. A personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage was established.

2. Whether the first suspension (1 July 2024) constituted unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [85]-[88]).

The Authority applied clause 6.1.1(a) of the collective agreement (requiring informal discussion before formal action unless inappropriate) and clause 6.4 (suspension only available once a disciplinary process under clause 6.3 is underway). The Authority found no practical impediment to an informal discussion occurring; the themes in Mrs Shea's letter mirrored matters already addressed in the PAG programme; the Commissioner had not yet formed a view on whether the allegations were competence or discipline matters and was appointing the investigator to "ascertain the precise nature of what is alleged." These deficiencies were not minor or technical, and Mrs Rasheed's refusal of paid special leave did not constitute blameworthy conduct. A personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage was established.

3. Whether the second suspension (15 September 2024) constituted unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [89]-[92]).

Applying the same collective agreement provisions, the Authority found that on receipt of the workplace investigator's 171-allegation table, the Commissioner's obligation under clause 6.1.1(a) was again triggered. The Commissioner was equipped, given her prior knowledge of the PAG programme and earlier engagement, to assess which matters were stale, closed, or performance-related before resorting to suspension. The broad characterisation of "health and safety risk" and "culture of fear" without specific notified incidents under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 did not justify bypassing the collective agreement process. A personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage was established.

4. Whether Mrs Rasheed was unjustifiably dismissed on 17 June 2025 — Status: Established (paras [93]-[105]).

The Authority applied s 103A and the collective agreement (clauses 6.1.1, 6.3.3) and cited FMV v TZB [2021] NZSC 102, Simpsons Farms Ltd v Aberhart [2006] ERNZ 825, Edwards v Board of Trustees of Bay of Islands College [2015] NZEmpC 6, and Campbell v Commissioner of Salford School [2015] NZEmpC 122. The dismissal process was flawed from the outset by the failure to apply informal discussion mechanisms. The Commissioner had not reviewed any underlying interview evidence compiled by the investigator, in breach of clause 6.3.3's requirement to be satisfied as to the facts. Specific upheld findings were each found unjustified: four "yelling" allegations lacked specificity or were contradicted by available evidence; the management units finding contained a significant mathematical error; the warrant of fitness allegation was unsupported by failure to interview the affected staff member (who in Authority proceedings denied the allegation); and PAG programme matters had "leaked" into the disciplinary process without disclosure to Mrs Rasheed. Dismissal based on an accumulation of findings, several of which were unjustified, could not itself be justified.

5. Whether reinstatement should be ordered — Status: Established/Ordered (paras [107]-[117]).

Reinstatement is the primary remedy under s 123(1)(a) and must be ordered where practicable and reasonable (s 125(2)), and availability of a vacancy is not a requirement (Walker v Firth Industries [2014] NZEmpC 60). The Authority found no professional body barrier, the Teaching Council had not proceeded further on mandatory reporting, and conflicting staff evidence weighed in favour of reinstatement, particularly evidence from community members including an expert in Islamic dispute resolution. The Authority acknowledged the appointment of a new principal was made with full notice of reinstatement proceedings. Reinstatement was granted conditionally: immediate reinstatement to payroll and, within 21 days, the parties to agree a process for Mrs Rasheed to return to the position of principal.

6. Whether lost wages from 17 June 2025 to reinstatement should be reimbursed under s 123(1)(b) — Status: Established (para [118]).

Mrs Rasheed had not sought other work and had been pursuing reinstatement while undertaking professional development, which the Authority found appropriate in the circumstances. The order was granted as sought, with leave for parties to return on calculation.

7. Whether compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [119]-[124]).

The Authority considered the evidence of Dr Aamina Ali (a clinical psychologist and family member who observed Mrs Rasheed's deterioration over three years), Mrs Rasheed's own account of humiliation from the suspensions and dismissal, and the broader damage to her standing in the Islamic community. Given the ongoing and overlapping nature of multiple personal grievances, a global award was considered appropriate. A sum of $40,000 was awarded, having regard to the particular circumstances and comparable cases.

8. Whether 23 days of sick leave taken should be reimbursed — Status: Established (para [125]).

The Authority was satisfied the sick leave was taken due to workplace stress arising from the established personal grievances. The remedy was granted as sought, with leave for parties to return on calculation.

9. Whether any remedy should be reduced for Mrs Rasheed's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [126]-[132]).

The Authority considered each grievance separately. On the delay grievance, Mrs Rasheed could not be held responsible for delays in a process wholly in the employer's control. On the suspensions, her refusal of paid special leave was not blameworthy as she was under no contractual obligation to accept. On dismissal, the deficiencies arose from the employer's own failures; Mrs Rasheed had repeatedly sought to assist the process and comply with the collective agreement. The Authority acknowledged Mrs Rasheed accepted some performance matters needed addressing, but in the absence of a fair process these could not be characterised as blameworthy. No reduction was applied.

10. Whether the employer (Commissioner) breached good faith obligations (s 4 of the Act) and the employment agreement — Status: Established (para [133]).

Breaches of the collective agreement and the statutory obligation of good faith (s 4) were found to be established through the findings on unjustified disadvantage and dismissal. However, the Authority determined that a penalty award against the employer would not be appropriate in this matter, and declined to order one.

11. Whether a penalty should be ordered against the employer — Status: Dismissed (para [133]).

Although breaches were established, the Authority exercised its discretion against ordering a penalty against the Commissioner/employer, finding it not appropriate in the circumstances.

12. Whether the Trust aided and abetted breaches of Mrs Rasheed's employment agreement — Status: Established (paras [134]-[138]).

The Authority found the Trust's application was not time-barred, as the cause of action for penalty arose on 1 April 2024 (date of application) and the claim was lodged within 8 months. On the merits, the Trust's representatives (including Mr Elidrissi as BoT chair) were the majority on the disciplinary subcommittee and, before that process was complete, acted in ways that instigated and aided the employer's breach — specifically, participating in a meeting where Mrs Rasheed's resignation was sought in exchange for payment, raising concerns with the Ministry threatening to withdraw from the integration agreement, and not reporting these actions to the BoT. The Trust was found to have been aware of, or likely aware of, its obligations under the collective agreement and that its actions would impede compliance.

13. Whether a penalty should be ordered against the Trust — Status: Established (para [139]).

Having regard to s 133A factors and comparable cases, a penalty of $6,000 was ordered against the Trust, with half payable to Mrs Rasheed as compensation for inconvenience and resources expended in pursuing statutory entitlements (i.e., $3,000 to Mrs Rasheed). The penalty is to be paid within 21 days.

14. Whether the Authority had jurisdiction to hear the personal grievances raised — Status: Established (preliminary matter, para [4]).

In a preliminary determination issued on 16 April 2025 ([2025] NZERA 213), jurisdictional matters raised by the Commissioner regarding the scope of Mrs Rasheed's personal grievances were resolved in Mrs Rasheed's favour. This issue was not re-litigated in the substantive determination.

15. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Reserved (paras [142]-[144]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves; if unable to do so, Mrs Rasheed may file a memorandum within 14 days of the determination, with replies due within 14 days of service.

The claims were upheld substantially in full: unjustified disadvantage (three separate heads) and unjustified dismissal were all established; reinstatement, lost wages, compensation and sick leave reimbursement were ordered; the Trust was penalised; no contributory reduction was applied; and the employer penalty claim was dismissed.

- Reinstatement: Yes — immediate reinstatement to payroll; parties to agree a process for return to the position of principal within 21 days of determination.
- Lost wages: Reimbursement of lost wages from 17 June 2025 to date of reinstatement to payroll under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 (quantum to be calculated; parties have leave to return).
- Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $40,000 global award for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings across all established personal grievances, payable within 21 days.
- Sick leave reimbursement: 23 days sick leave reimbursed under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 (quantum to be calculated; parties have leave to return).
- Penalty against the Trust: $6,000 total penalty under s 133A, with $3,000 payable to Mrs Rasheed (half the penalty), payable within 21 days.
- Penalty against employer: None ordered.
- Costs: Reserved.

Regina Rasheed, principal of Zayed College for Girls for 14 years, applied for interim reinstatement after being suspended on 1 July 2024 pending an investigation into staff concerns about her leadership. The key legal questions were whether she had an arguable case for unjustified disadvantage, an arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and where the balance of convenience and overall justice lay. The Authority granted interim reinstatement, finding all three criteria satisfied and ordering the suspension lifted with immediate effect.

Applicant: Regina Rasheed (employee — principal)
Respondent: Commissioner of Zayed College for Girls (employer)

Applicant: Richard Harrison, counsel
Respondent: Joseph Williams and Rosie Davison, counsel

Mrs Rasheed has been principal of Zayed College for Girls, a state integrated special character Islamic secondary school, since 2011 — a tenure of 14 years. In 2022–2023 there was disharmony in management and governance; a disciplinary investigation was commenced by the Board of Trustees but left unresolved, and in mid-2023 a Commissioner (Ms Myers) was appointed. The Commissioner initiated a competency programme under the collective agreement which was concluded satisfactorily in April 2024, and Ms Rasheed went on approved sabbatical leave from 29 April to 5 July 2024. While she was on sabbatical, the acting principal Ms Shea wrote to the Commissioner on 19 June 2024 raising staff concerns about Ms Rasheed's leadership, health and safety, and professional standards. Following receipt of that letter and Mrs Rasheed's opposition to suspension, the Commissioner suspended her on 1 July 2024 under clause 6.4 of the Secondary Principals' Collective Agreement (the collective agreement). Mrs Rasheed argued the suspension was unlawful because the Commissioner had not first initiated informal discussions under clause 6.1.1(a) or commenced a formal disciplinary process under clause 6.3, a pre-condition she argued was required before clause 6.4 suspension could be accessed. The Commissioner argued the suspension was fair and reasonable given the seriousness of the health and safety concerns and the need to protect the integrity of the investigation.

1. Whether Mrs Rasheed has an arguable case for unjustified disadvantage by way of suspension — Status: Established (paras [10]-[32]).

The test for an arguable case requires only that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious, i.e., has some serious but not necessarily certain prospects of success (Western Bay of Plenty District Council v McInnes [2016] NZEmpC 36). The substantive test is the s 103A objective justification test — whether the College's actions and process were what a fair and reasonable employer could do in all the circumstances. Mrs Rasheed argued, relying on Campbell v The Commissioner of Salford School [2015] ERNZ 844, that clause 6.4 suspension was only accessible after initiating informal discussions (clause 6.1.1(a)) and a disciplinary process under clause 6.3, neither of which occurred. The Commissioner conceded the low threshold was met but argued the suspension was substantively justified, relying on XYZ v ABC [2017] NZEmpC 40. The Authority found it was seriously arguable that the Commissioner failed to comply with the collective agreement requirements, particularly given the broad and unformulated nature of the concerns and the absence of any prior inquiry or attempt to raise matters with Ms Rasheed informally, and held the arguable case threshold was met.

2. Whether Mrs Rasheed has an arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Established (paras [33]-[41]).

The Authority considered whether reinstatement was practically and reasonably achievable, noting s 125(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 makes reinstatement the primary remedy where practical and reasonable. The Commissioner argued reinstatement was impracticable given Ms Rasheed's senior role, the risk to third parties, and the need to preserve the integrity of the investigation. The Authority found that the Commissioner's concerns were partly the product of the arguably deficient suspension process itself, that the Commissioner had previously managed similar concerns about Ms Rasheed's leadership successfully, that the complaints did not involve protected disclosures or serious misconduct of the kind in XYZ v ABC, and that given the conflicting untested evidence it could not be concluded reinstatement was impractical or unreasonable. The arguable case for permanent reinstatement was established.

3. Where the balance of convenience lies — Status: Resolved in favour of the applicant (paras [42]-[47]).

The balance of convenience requires weighing the detriment or injury each party will suffer if the interim order is granted or not, including whether damages can adequately compensate harm. The Commissioner argued that compensation was adequate, that Ms Rasheed was on full pay, that she had arguably breached her direction not to communicate with staff, and that the investigation's integrity would be undermined. The Authority found that damages would not adequately compensate Ms Rasheed for reputational harm given her central role in a small, faith-based school and her deep cultural and community ties. It also found that the Commissioner — with access to Ministry of Education resources, having previously managed the relationship successfully, and with existing College structures — could craft a managed return-to-work arrangement minimising any risk to third parties or the investigation. The balance of convenience favoured granting interim reinstatement.

4. Where the overall justice of the case lies — Status: Resolved in favour of the applicant (paras [48]-[52]).

The overall justice assessment is a check on the earlier analysis, as described in NZ Tax Refunds Limited v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90. Mrs Rasheed submitted that upholding the lawfulness of the collective agreement framework and preventing ongoing harm was critical, and also raised potential mandatory Teaching Council reporting obligations if the suspension continued. The Commissioner submitted overall justice favoured declining reinstatement to protect the investigation, and that mandatory reporting was irrelevant at this early stage. The Authority found that the overall justice supported upholding the legal framework and obligations under the collective agreement, and declined to accept that the risk to the investigation outweighed this consideration.

5. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [55]).

The Authority reserved costs without deciding the matter, as the substantive employment relationship problem remains to be heard.

The application for interim reinstatement was upheld in full; the suspension is lifted immediately and the parties are directed to resume mediation to agree the terms of Mrs Rasheed's return to work.

Interim reinstatement: Granted — the suspension is lifted with immediate effect.
Conditions: (i) The parties are to resume mediation forthwith to seek agreement on how Mrs Rasheed can be reinstated to her position or one no less advantageous than that held at the date of suspension; (ii) if agreement is not reached by Thursday 5 September 2024, further directions may be sought from the Authority.
A case management conference to be convened to timetable the substantive investigation meeting.
Compensation: None ordered at this stage (interim determination only).
Costs: Reserved.

FEC, a school principal at a small rural school operated by HES (the School), claimed constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage arising from a series of events culminating in her resignation in August 2023. The key legal questions were whether the School's conduct amounted to constructive dismissal and whether FEC was unjustifiably disadvantaged in her employment. The claim for constructive dismissal was dismissed, but a limited disadvantage grievance was established in relation to the presiding member of the Board of Trustees making two unannounced visits to FEC's home after work hours, resulting in an award of $10,000 compensation.

Applicant: FEC (employee, school principal)
Respondent: HES (employer, school/Board of Trustees)

Applicant: Fiona McMillan, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: John Unsworth & Jack Unsworth, counsel for the Respondent

FEC was employed as a beginning principal at a small rural school operated by HES, acting in the role from March 2022 through to January 2024. She alleged that from late 2022 the Board of Trustees was dysfunctional, failed to support her, and increased her workload, causing high stress levels. The key trigger for her resignation was an incident on 11 August 2023 when a parent was confrontational at a school speech competition; FEC called an urgent Board meeting that day and sought a trespass notice against the parent, which the Board declined to issue, instead agreeing the presiding member would speak to the parent first. On 12 and 14 August 2023 the presiding member made unannounced visits to FEC's home to deliver a written list of parent complaints and to discuss school matters, conduct that FEC found confrontational and distressing. FEC resigned by email on 15 August 2023, citing her partner's health as the reason; she later argued at investigation that her true reason was the Board's failure to provide a safe work environment. The School denied any breach of duty and relied on the stated reason in the resignation letter. No personal grievances (other than the constructive dismissal claim) had been formally raised by FEC with the School during employment.

1. Whether the constructive dismissal claim was established — Status: Dismissed (paras [28], [37]–[50], [51]–[55]).

The Authority applied the three-limb test from Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Limited [1985] 2 NZLR 372, focussing on whether a breach of duty by the employer caused FEC's resignation. The Authority found FEC's written resignation letter stated her partner's health as the reason, and that evidence from the Police Constable (who was present at the 11 August incident) directly contradicted FEC's account that the Police had directed the Board to trespass the parent. The Authority preferred the Constable's evidence as more reliable, found no breach of duty by the School in respect of the health and safety complaint, and held the Board was entitled to rely on the written reason for resignation. Accordingly, the constructive dismissal grievance was not made out.

2. Whether the disadvantage grievances relating to lack of Board support, workload, and general health and safety concerns were established — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]–[28], [38]).

The Authority applied s 103(1)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and s 103A's objective test of what a fair and reasonable employer would do. The evidence showed FEC had not formally raised health and safety issues or personal grievances with the School; her communications to the Board were characterised as keeping the Board informed rather than raising grievances. There was no compelling evidence the School was made aware of these matters in a way requiring a formal response, and no Board-initiated issues (other than the parent incident) were raised as complaints. These disadvantage claims were not made out.

3. Whether the presiding member's unannounced home visits on 12 and 14 August 2023 constituted an unjustified disadvantage — Status: Established (paras [44]–[50], [53]–[54]).

Applying s 103A's objective fair and reasonable employer standard, and relying on the secretly recorded comments made by the presiding member immediately before the visits (which revealed a hostile frame of mind towards FEC), the Authority preferred FEC's account of those interactions. It found the visits were entirely inappropriate: the presiding member should not have attended FEC's home without prior consent to discuss the parent complaint matters, particularly when FEC had raised concerns about an abusive parent. The Authority accepted these visits caused FEC to feel unsupported, unsafe at home, and had a detrimental effect on her, and held the School's actions in this respect unjustifiably disadvantaged FEC.

4. Whether the Authority should re-characterise the personal grievance under s 122 of the Act — Status: Established (paras [39]–[40]).

Section 122 of the Act permits the Authority to find a personal grievance is of a different type from that alleged. The Authority used this provision to find that, while the constructive dismissal claim failed, the circumstances surrounding the presiding member's home visits gave rise to an unjustified disadvantage grievance, and awarded remedy on that basis.

5. Whether any remedy should be reduced under s 124 of the Act for blameworthy contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (para [7](d)).

The issue was identified for investigation but the Authority made no explicit finding of contributory conduct by FEC and no reduction was applied, though FEC's own conduct in not formally raising grievances and giving a different reason for resignation was noted factually. No s 124 reduction was applied to the remedy awarded.

6. Whether penalties should be imposed for breaches of the Employment Relations Act 2000, including s 4 (good faith), and/or damages for breach of the Employment Agreement — Status: Dismissed (para [55]).

FEC sought penalties and/or damages for alleged breaches of her employment agreement and s 4 of the Act. The Authority concluded the circumstances of the case did not warrant the imposition of a penalty and made no penalty order. No reasoning beyond that conclusion was provided on this issue.

7. Whether lost remuneration and loss of superannuation contributions were payable — Status: Not reached / Dismissed (para [7](c)).

These remedies were sought but the Authority made no award of lost wages or superannuation, and did not address them in the remedies discussion, consistent with the constructive dismissal claim being dismissed and the disadvantage finding being limited to the home visit incidents.

8. Whether non-publication orders should be made — Status: Established (paras [3]–[4]).

The Authority granted permanent non-publication orders under clause 10 of the Second Schedule of the Employment Relations Act 2000, prohibiting publication of names or identifying information about FEC, staff, the school, pupils, parents, and others involved. The application was unopposed, and FEC gave evidence of potential harm from publication; the small rural community context meant witness identification would likely lead to her identification. No public interest in the information was identified.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (final paras).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, FEC may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination; HES then has 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be determined on its usual daily tariff basis absent special circumstances.

The claim was partially upheld: the constructive dismissal and most disadvantage claims were dismissed, but a limited unjustified disadvantage grievance relating to the presiding member's unannounced home visits was established, resulting in compensation of $10,000.

Compensation (s 123(1)(c)(i) — humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $10,000, to be paid within 28 days of the determination date.
Lost wages: None ordered.
Superannuation contributions: None ordered.
Penalties: None ordered.
Reinstatement: Not sought / not ordered.
Costs: Reserved.

OAS, a chef employed by JIK Limited (a small Auckland hospitality business), claimed unjustified dismissal after he was removed from the roster following absences related to a family violence situation involving his ex-partner and children. The key legal questions were whether OAS resigned/abandoned his employment or was unjustifiably dismissed, and whether JIK breached its good faith obligations. The Authority found OAS was unjustifiably dismissed, that JIK breached its good faith duty (though without penalty), and awarded him reduced compensation for lost wages and distress.

Applicant: OAS (employee, chef)
Respondent: JIK Limited (employer, hospitality business)

Applicant: Claudia Serra, advocate
Respondent: Arvind Nair, counsel

OAS was employed by JIK Limited as a chef from approximately July 2023 under an employment agreement that included family violence leave provisions. In early February 2024, OAS had an unauthorised absence after his dog died (despite his leave request being declined), and on 10 February 2024 a family violence incident occurred involving his ex-partner, his current partner, and his children. From 12 February 2024, OAS notified JIK he needed time away to keep his children safe, obtain a protection order, and deal with court proceedings; he offered to return the following week and to provide supporting evidence. JIK's owner, PVK, construed OAS's messages as a resignation, citing his recent pattern of unauthorised absences, and on 16 February 2024 the next roster was circulated without OAS being allocated any shifts. OAS maintained he had not resigned and that his employment ended when JIK stopped rostering him. A property-return dispute between the parties was resolved at the investigation meeting. JIK argued OAS had either resigned, abandoned his employment, or that any dismissal was justified.

1. Whether OAS resigned, abandoned his employment, or was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (unjustified dismissal) (paras [43]-[53]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test of whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as JIK did in all the circumstances. It found OAS's communications, read as a whole, could not properly be construed as a resignation; references to potentially resigning were conditional and he consistently said he was willing to return. JIK's decision not to roster OAS was a dismissal at JIK's initiative, driven by frustration at his absences. Because OAS was entitled to family violence leave under both the Employment Agreement and Subpart 5 of the Holidays Act 2003 (which incorporates the Family Violence Act 2018 definition), JIK's failure to engage with his situation and dismissal of him for absences covered by that entitlement were not actions a fair and reasonable employer could have taken. The unjustified dismissal claim was established.

2. Whether OAS was entitled to family violence leave in the week of 12 February 2024 — Status: Established (paras [44]-[48]).

The Authority referred to Subpart 5 of the Holidays Act 2003 and s 9 of the Family Violence Act 2018 (which covers physical and psychological abuse by a former partner) and s 72B HA 2003 (covering an employee who lives with a child against whom family violence is being inflicted). OAS had communicated to JIK that he needed time to protect his children and obtain a protection order; JIK did not ask any questions or seek supporting documents and so was taken to have accepted his account at face value. The Authority found OAS was entitled to family violence leave for that week.

3. Whether JIK breached its duty of good faith under s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [54]-[58]).

Under s 4 of the Act, parties must be active and constructive in maintaining a productive employment relationship. The Authority found JIK failed to properly engage with OAS about his family violence situation, took an unfavourable interpretation of his messages, and concluded he had resigned despite him saying he would return. These failures were inconsistent with the duty of good faith.

4. Whether a penalty should be imposed on JIK for its breach of good faith under s 4A of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [55], [59]-[60]).

Under s 4A of the Act, a penalty may be imposed where a good faith breach was serious, sustained and deliberate, or intended to undermine the employment relationship. The Authority found that while JIK breached good faith, its behaviour was driven by genuine frustration at OAS's non-attendance and pressure on its small team; it was not deliberate, serious and sustained, nor intended to undermine the employment relationship. A penalty was not warranted.

5. Whether the Employment Relations Act 2000 amendments (ss 123B, 123C and amended s 124), which came into force on 21 February 2026, applied to the remedies assessment — Status: Dismissed (paras [62]-[63]).

JIK's counsel submitted the new provisions should apply. The Authority rejected this, relying on s 33 of the Legislation Act 2019, which provides that amendment of legislation does not affect proceedings that commenced before the amendment. OAS lodged his claim before 21 February 2026, so the law at the time of filing applied. This was confirmed by The Board of Trustees v LGY [2026] NZEmpC 46.

6. Whether OAS should be awarded compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [64]-[67]).

The Authority applied the test from Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113, requiring quantification of harm caused by the unjustified actions. OAS gave evidence of feeling humiliated by JIK's indifference, suffering depression and sleep difficulties, and losing purpose and independence after dismissal. The Authority acknowledged other personal factors (family situation) would also have affected his mental health and were not attributable to JIK. An award of $15,000 was assessed as appropriate before any contribution reduction.

7. Whether OAS should be awarded lost wages — Status: Partially established (paras [68]-[74]).

OAS claimed $14,300 gross (13 weeks at $27.50/hr × 40hrs/week). The Authority, applying the discretionary and individualised approach confirmed in Sam's Fukuyama Food Services Ltd v Zhang [2011] NZCA 608, considered OAS's limited mitigation efforts, his poor pre-dismissal attendance record, the short tenure of just over six months, and the likelihood that his pattern of unreliable attendance would have continued. The Authority awarded 8 weeks' lost wages ($8,800 gross) as the amount reflecting actual loss, before contribution reduction.

8. Whether OAS's own conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to his grievance under s 124 of the Act, and if so what reduction should apply — Status: Established (paras [75]-[80]).

Under s 124, the Authority must consider the extent to which the employee's blameworthy or wrong conduct contributed to the grievance situation and may reduce remedies accordingly. OAS's unauthorised absence the week before (after his dog's death, despite the leave request being declined) was found to be blameworthy conduct that coloured JIK's response to his subsequent family violence leave request. However, this contribution was not significant given JIK's own failure to observe its contractual and statutory family violence leave obligations. A 10% reduction was applied to all remedies.

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [82]-[84]).

Costs were not determined. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If not resolved, OAS may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination; JIK then has 14 days to reply. The Authority noted it would apply its standard notional daily rate absent special circumstances.

The claim of unjustified dismissal was upheld; the good faith breach was established but no penalty was imposed; remedies were awarded subject to a 10% contribution reduction.

- Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) (hurt/humiliation/distress): $13,500.00 (being $15,000 reduced by 10% for contribution)
- Lost wages under s 128: $7,920.00 gross (being $8,800 reduced by 10% for contribution)
- Both amounts payable within 28 days of the determination date
- Penalty: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; timetabling directions given if Authority determination required

DGZ (an employee) applied to the Employment Relations Authority for orders to anonymise her name and prohibit publication of her identifying details in two earlier publicly available determinations — one dismissing her personal grievance for unjustified dismissal by redundancy, and one ordering her to pay costs. The key legal question was whether specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected from continued publication, sufficient to justify departing from the principle of open justice. The Authority declined the application, finding DGZ's evidence fell short of the required standard.

Applicant: DGZ (employee/former employee)
Respondent: WXU (employer, a company)

Applicant: Self-represented (Applicant in person)
Respondent: Kelly Rowell, counsel for the Respondent

DGZ was formerly employed by WXU and was made redundant. A first determination issued on 24 September 2025 declined her personal grievance claim for unjustified dismissal, and a second determination issued on 13 November 2025 ordered her to pay costs to WXU. Both determinations were published on the Authority's publicly accessible online database. DGZ filed a challenge to the first determination in the Employment Court on 21 October 2025 but discontinued those proceedings on 23 March 2026 after a confidential judicial settlement conference resolved the costs issue; the substantive findings of the Authority were unchanged. On 12 May 2026 DGZ applied for orders anonymising her name and prohibiting publication of her identifying details in both earlier determinations, asserting that the public availability of the determinations had caused disproportionate prejudice to her employment opportunities (including an alleged withdrawn job offer), that a confidential settlement justified privacy protection, and that her status as a refugee heightened her privacy needs. WXU opposed the application, disputing the extent of the alleged prejudice and the characterisation of any settlement agreement.

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction/power to make anonymisation and non-publication orders in respect of determinations already published — Status: Established (paras [9]-[10]).

Under clause 10 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act), the Authority may order that names, evidence, or pleadings not be published. The Authority confirmed, following JKL v Stirling Anderson Limited [2022] NZEmpC 107, that there is no temporal limit on this power and it may be exercised even after proceedings have concluded and determinations have been published. The Authority therefore accepted it had jurisdiction to consider the application.

2. Whether DGZ established specific adverse consequences reasonably expected to result from publication of her name, sufficient to justify departure from the open justice principle — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[13], [23]-[41]).

The applicable test, drawn from the Supreme Court in Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135 and applied by the Employment Court in MW v Spiga Limited [2024] NZEmpC 147, requires an applicant to establish, by evidence and reasonable inference, that specific adverse consequences could reasonably be expected to occur, and that those consequences justify departing from the fundamental rule of open justice. The Authority assessed DGZ's four grounds — harm to employment prospects, outweighing of public interest, confidential settlement, and refugee status — against the seven Spiga factors (circumstances of the case, interests of the applicant, interests of the respondent, interests of third parties, public interest, equity and good conscience, and tikanga). The Authority found DGZ's evidence was too limited and speculative: the alleged job withdrawal was unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, DGZ had obtained two other jobs since publication, there was no confidential settlement covering the substantive findings, and no evidence supported heightened vulnerability from her refugee background. The application was accordingly declined.

3. Whether the alleged confidential settlement of DGZ's employment relationship problem justified a non-publication order — Status: Dismissed (paras [21], [26]).

DGZ argued that her withdrawal from the Employment Court proceedings was on confidential terms that should protect her identity. WXU denied any confidential settlement of the substantive personal grievance; it said only the costs issue was resolved at a confidential judicial settlement conference. The notice of discontinuance expressly recorded no costs issues between the parties but contained nothing indicating the substantive findings were resolved confidentially or that the earlier determinations had lost their status as public documents. The Authority accepted WXU's account and rejected this basis for the order.

4. Whether DGZ's status as a refugee heightened her need for privacy and constituted a relevant factor justifying a non-publication order — Status: Dismissed (paras [22], [27]-[28]).

DGZ submitted her background as a refugee made privacy and personal security particularly important. The Authority acknowledged that refugee or migrant status could in some circumstances create increased vulnerability, but found no evidence that this was a relevant factor here. DGZ had lived in New Zealand for more than 20 years, had New Zealand-born children, owned property in New Zealand, and had worked in her professional field for more than 15 years. The ground was not made out.

5. Whether costs should be ordered in relation to the determination of this application — Status: Dismissed (para [43]).

No costs were sought by either party. The Authority made no order as to costs.

The application was dismissed in full; DGZ's request for anonymisation and non-publication orders in respect of the two earlier determinations was declined, and no costs were ordered.

None ordered. No anonymisation or non-publication orders were made in respect of the earlier determinations. No costs were ordered in relation to the determination of this application. The parties' names were anonymised in this third determination only (for procedural reasons relating to DGZ's potential challenge rights), but the two earlier determinations remain publicly accessible and unchanged.

Anthea Andrew, a long-serving Medical Laboratory Technician and Quality Co-ordinator employed by Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (HNZ) since 1996, challenged HNZ's 2024 decision to regrade her position and cease her higher duties allowance, arguing this constituted an unjustified unilateral variation of her employment terms and an unlawful wage deduction. The key legal questions were whether HNZ breached her collective agreement and/or the Wages Protection Act 1983, and whether HNZ unjustifiably disadvantaged her by implementing the regrading without adequate prior consultation. The Authority dismissed all substantive claims, finding HNZ's regrading was legitimate under the collective agreement and not unjustified, though it recommended a further formal grading review and reserved costs.

Applicant: Anthea Andrew (employee)
Respondent: Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora (employer)

Applicant: Bradley McDonald, counsel
Respondent: Jack Brown and Ashley-Jayne Lodge, counsel

Anthea Andrew has been employed by HNZ and its predecessors since December 1996 as a Medical Laboratory Technician, latterly also holding a Quality Co-ordinator and Point of Care Testing Co-ordinator role. From 2015 onwards, she was paid an additional allowance (described variously as a higher duties allowance or, from 2017, as a split salary across two pay scales) to recognise the additional responsibilities she undertook. Following a collective agreement restructure in late 2023 arising from a pay equity settlement, HNZ conducted a grading review at Ms Andrew's own request and in September–October 2024 determined she should be placed on Designated 2 of the new Designated Position Salary Scale, ceasing the previous allowance arrangement. Ms Andrew declined this outcome, contending HNZ had acted unilaterally without her consent and had failed to properly consult her, particularly by implementing the change on 31 October 2024 before a scheduled further meeting had occurred. HNZ maintained the regrading was conducted pursuant to the collective agreement, after extensive consultation over nine months, and resulted in a single consolidated salary covering her full responsibilities.

1. Whether HNZ unilaterally breached Ms Andrew's employment agreement by varying her remuneration without consent — Status: Dismissed (paras [33]-[38]).

The Authority framed the test as whether the solution implemented was one a fair and reasonable employer could have taken. It found the regrading was not a unilateral variation but a response to Ms Andrew's own request for a grading review, conducted pursuant to clause 5.1.2(b) and (c) of the collective agreement, which expressly authorised the employer to review roles not in designated positions and to determine the appropriate band. Because the collective agreement authorised the process and the outcome, no breach of the employment agreement was established.

2. Whether cessation of the higher duties allowance constituted an unauthorised deduction in breach of s 5 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 — Status: Dismissed (paras [38]).

The Authority held that because the collective agreement terms had not been breached, and because s 16 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 preserves the primacy of a collective employment agreement, no breach of s 5 of the Act arose. The finding that the regrading was legitimately effected under the collective agreement was determinative of this issue.

3. Whether HNZ unjustifiably disadvantaged Ms Andrew by implementing the regrading on 31 October 2024 without first hearing further from her about her job description and responsibilities — Status: Partially established (paras [39]-[42]).

The Authority applied the good faith obligations under the Employment Relations Act 2000 (including Schedule 1B, Code of good faith for the public health sector). It found that while the overall process was extensive and Ms Andrew had ample opportunity to engage, HNZ committed an omission at the final stage by failing to make further efforts to arrange a meeting after Ms Andrew explained she could not attend on 1 November 2024. However, the Authority found this omission did not cause Ms Andrew any detriment to her rights, because a formal internal salary review process was available and remained open to her, which she inexplicably chose not to utilise. Accordingly, no compensatory remedy was awarded for this element.

4. Whether the Authority could fix or correct Ms Andrew's salary or grading — Status: Not reached/dismissed as outside jurisdiction (paras [37]).

The Authority noted it cannot independently review or alter a grading decision, as this would constitute wage fixing, which is expressly prohibited under s 161(2)(b) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Wage fixing is also not among the remedies available for personal grievance under s 123 of the Act. No interpretation dispute under s 129(1) of the Act was raised in the alternative.

5. Whether remedies (including compensation for hurt, humiliation and distress and/or lost wages) should be awarded — Status: Dismissed (paras [41]-[43]).

Because no unjustified disadvantage personal grievance or breach was established, no compensatory remedy under s 123 of the Act was available. The Authority acknowledged Ms Andrew's understandable frustration but found HNZ had acted with patience and tolerance in unwinding a complex remuneration history of its own making.

6. Whether any remedy should be reduced for contributory conduct — Status: Not reached (paras [32](d)).

This issue was listed as a question to be determined but was not reached because no remedy was awarded.

7. Whether a penalty should be imposed for breach of good faith obligations — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]).

The Authority noted that Ms Andrew had not sought a penalty for good faith breaches in a timely manner, effectively declining to impose one. Although a good faith omission was found at the final consultation stage, no penalty was considered appropriate.

8. Whether the Authority should make a recommendation for a further grading review — Status: Established (paras [43]).

Pursuant to s 123(1)(cc) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Authority recommended (not ordered) that HNZ formally review Ms Andrew's grading again to allow further input from her, noting the lengthy employment relationship, her significant commitment and skills, and the fact that the regrading appeared to have reduced her base salary from approximately $94,218.80 to $91,749 per annum (though overall remuneration did not decrease when the higher overtime base rate was accounted for).

9. Costs — Status: Reserved (paras [44]-[46]).

Costs were reserved. If unresolved, HNZ's counsel may lodge a memorandum within 28 days and Ms Andrew may reply within 14 days of service. The Authority indicated it would apply the standard daily tariff, with possible adjustment, and flagged the question of whether costs should lie where they fall given the lengthy and unblemished employment relationship.

The claims were dismissed in their entirety; no remedies or penalties were ordered, though the Authority made a non-binding recommendation that HNZ undertake a further grading review.

None ordered. A non-binding recommendation was made pursuant to s 123(1)(cc) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 that HNZ formally review Ms Andrew's grading with further input from her. Costs reserved pending further memoranda from the parties.