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[CONSENT]

CZA (applicant/employee) brought employment relationship claims against GLE Limited (first respondent), QVT (second respondent), and TPF (third respondent). The parties resolved all issues by agreement and jointly asked the Authority to issue a consent determination reflecting their settlement. The determination records those agreed terms as final, binding, and enforceable orders of the Authority, with a non-publication order protecting the confidential settlement terms.

Applicant: CZA (employee)
Respondent: GLE Limited (first respondent/employer), QVT (second respondent), TPF (third respondent)

Applicant: Alexander Brown, Advocate for the Applicant
Respondent: Jo Baguley, Counsel for the Respondents

CZA brought employment relationship claims against GLE Limited and two other respondents arising from their employment relationship and/or the ending of it. The nature of the specific claims and underlying facts are not described in the determination. The parties reached a negotiated settlement, documented in a Record of Settlement signed by the first respondent's director (on behalf of all three respondents) and by the applicant on 6 July 2026. They jointly applied to the Authority to have those agreed terms recorded as consent orders. The matter was dealt with on the papers (no hearing). The settlement was stated to fully and finally resolve all issues between the parties up to and including the date of the determination.

1. Whether the Authority should issue a consent determination recording the parties' agreed settlement terms as binding orders of the Authority — Status: Established (paras [2]-[5]).

The Authority may issue a consent determination under the Employment Relations Act 2000 where parties have resolved their employment relationship problems by agreement and request that their terms of settlement be recorded as orders of the Authority. The Authority was satisfied the parties had agreed on terms that fully and finally settled all issues between them. Accordingly, the agreed terms in the Record of Settlement were converted into final, binding, and enforceable orders. The determination notes that failure to comply may be addressed by a compliance order application, but no further action may be taken regarding any connected matters.

2. Whether a non-publication order should be made protecting the confidential terms of settlement — Status: Established (paras [6]-[7]).

The Authority has power under clause 10 of the Second Schedule to the Employment Relations Act 2000 to prohibit publication of information where confidentiality is warranted. The parties agreed the terms of the Settlement were to remain confidential to them and their professional advisors. The Authority was satisfied there was no countervailing public interest requiring publication of the settlement terms, and accordingly made a non-publication order prohibiting publication of those terms, subject to the condition that the order does not apply to the employment institutions.

The claim was resolved by consent; the settlement terms were recorded as final and binding orders of the Authority, and a non-publication order was made protecting the confidential settlement terms.

The specific terms of the settlement (including any financial or other remedies agreed between the parties) are subject to a non-publication order and are not disclosed in the determination. The agreed terms of the Record of Settlement have been made final, binding, and enforceable orders of the Authority. No remedy details are publicly available.

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from two earlier substantive determinations in which Dongyan Lin (employee) successfully established she was an employee who had been unjustifiably disadvantaged by Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation) and Yook Insulation Limited, with Yanfen Wang also involved. The Authority exercised its discretionary costs jurisdiction under Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, applying the daily tariff approach. Ms Lin was awarded $4,500 in costs plus the $71.55 application fee, payable jointly and severally by all three respondents.

Applicant: Dongyan Lin (aka Chloe Lin) (employee)
Respondent: Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation) (First Respondent); Yook Insulation Limited (Second Respondent); Yanfen Wang (Third Respondent)

Applicant: John Wood, advocate
Respondent (First): Not represented
Respondents (Second and Third): Yanfen Wang, self-represented

This determination addresses costs only, following two substantive determinations issued on 3 October 2025 and 15 May 2026. In those earlier decisions, the Authority found Ms Lin was an employee, had been unjustifiably disadvantaged by both respondent companies, and ordered compensation and repayment of PAYE deductions wrongly withheld, with leave granted to recover PAYE amounts from Ms Wang if the companies could not pay. The investigation meeting was held in two sessions (half a day on 30 September 2025 and approximately two-thirds of a day on 19 March 2026), with written submissions lodged shortly after. Costs were reserved in the substantive determinations and the parties were given the opportunity to resolve costs between themselves, which they could not. Ms Lin applied for costs; the respondents did not respond to the application. The liquidators of Yoke Insulation Limited advised they would abide by the Authority's costs determination, which the Authority treated as agreement to proceed.

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to determine costs notwithstanding the pending Employment Court challenge — Status: Established (paras [3]–[4]).

The Authority noted that Ms Wang and Yook Insulation Limited had filed a challenge in the Employment Court regarding the second substantive determination. The Authority found no reason why costs could not nonetheless be determined at the Authority level concurrently. The liquidators' indication that they would abide by the costs outcome was treated as sufficient agreement to proceed under s 248(1)(c) of the Companies Act 1993. No jurisdictional impediment was found.

2. Whether Ms Lin is entitled to a costs award as the successful party — Status: Established (paras [9], [12]).

The Authority applied the principle that costs generally follow the event under its equitable and good conscience jurisdiction in clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, consistent with the principles in PBO Limited v Da Cruz [2005] 1 ERNZ 808 and Faggotti v Acme & Co Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. Although Ms Lin did not succeed on all claims (her breach of employment agreement claim and penalty claims were declined), she was the overall successful party and thus entitled to costs, subject to adjustment for partial success.

3. Quantum of costs using the daily tariff — Status: Established (paras [6], [10], [12]–[13]).

The Authority's daily tariff provides $4,500 for the first day and $3,500 for each subsequent day. The investigation meeting totalled more than a full day across two sessions. Ms Lin's representative submitted a starting point of $5,060 (based on one and a half sessions), but sought no uplift. The Authority rounded the starting point to $5,000 but, taking into account that Ms Lin did not succeed on all claims and the time taken to investigate those unsuccessful claims, reduced the award to the full-day tariff of $4,500. No uplift was warranted.

4. Whether the application fee should be recovered — Status: Established (para [13]).

The Authority found it appropriate to include the Authority application fee of $71.55 in the costs award, in addition to the daily tariff contribution.

5. Whether costs should be inflated or uplifted due to any party's conduct — Status: Dismissed (para [11]).

No uplift was sought by Ms Lin and the Authority independently confirmed none was warranted on the facts.

The costs application was partially upheld: Ms Lin was awarded $4,500 (daily tariff, reduced from the starting point to reflect partial success) plus $71.55 (application fee), payable jointly and severally by all three respondents within 14 days.

Costs: $4,500 (daily tariff contribution) plus $71.55 (application fee) = $4,571.55 total, ordered against Yoke Insulation Limited (in liquidation), Yook Insulation Limited, and Yanfen Wang jointly and severally, payable to Ms Lin via her representative within 14 days of 15 July 2026.
No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were addressed in the two prior determinations).

Qi Sun, an apprentice builder employed by Keene Construction Limited (KCL) from June 2023 to October 2024, claims he was unjustifiably dismissed by text message from KCL's director, Jeremy Smith, on 3 October 2024. The key legal questions were whether the text message exchange constituted a dismissal and, if so, what remedies Mr Sun was entitled to. The Authority found the dismissal both substantively and procedurally unjustified, and awarded lost wages, compensation for humiliation, wage arrears, and costs.

Applicant: Qi Sun (employee/apprentice builder)
Respondent: Keene Construction Limited (employer)

Applicant: Greg Lloyd, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

Mr Sun was employed by KCL as an apprentice builder from June 2023, working 32 hours per week under a written employment agreement. KCL had agreed to pay Mr Sun's apprenticeship costs, but in September 2024 failed to pay $300 in training costs. On 3 October 2024, a text exchange between Mr Sun and KCL director Jeremy Smith, arising from Mr Sun's query about the unpaid training costs, culminated in Mr Smith telling Mr Sun "don't bother coming into work," which Mr Sun reasonably interpreted as dismissal. Mr Smith later claimed he had only stood Mr Sun down for one day and that Mr Sun had chosen not to return, but no evidence was presented to support this. Mr Sun's representative raised a personal grievance on 15 October 2024; KCL disputed the claims and indicated a representative would engage, but no further contact was made and mediation did not occur. KCL did not participate in the Authority's investigation at any stage, and the investigation meeting proceeded as formal proof in KCL's absence.

1. Whether KCL's text message exchange on 3 October 2024 constituted a dismissal — Status: Established (paras [24]-[34]).

The Authority applied the objective test under s 103A(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the Act): whether KCL's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances. Citing Cornish Truck & Van Limited v Gildenhuys [2019] NZEmpC 6, the Authority applied the objective test of whether it was reasonable for someone in Mr Sun's position to conclude that employment had been terminated. In the absence of any evidence from KCL rebutting Mr Sun's account, the Authority accepted Mr Sun's evidence and found the text messages constituted a sending away amounting to dismissal. The Authority further found that even if KCL had not intended permanent dismissal, Mr Smith had the opportunity to clarify this on 3 October 2024 but failed to do so.

2. Whether the dismissal was substantively and procedurally unjustified under s 103A(3) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [25]-[34]).

The Authority considered the four procedural requirements in s 103A(3): whether KCL sufficiently investigated any allegations, raised concerns with Mr Sun, gave him an opportunity to respond, and genuinely considered his explanation. KCL provided no evidence of compliance with any of these requirements. Mr Sun had received no prior warnings about performance or conduct, and the dismissal was carried out without any process. The Authority found the dismissal both procedurally and substantively unjustified.

3. Whether KCL breached its good faith obligations under s 4 of the Act — Status: Established (para [27]).

Section 4(1A)(b) requires parties to be active, constructive, responsive, and communicative. The Authority noted this provision was relevant to its inquiry, and KCL's failure to engage with Mr Sun or the Authority's process was inconsistent with these obligations. No separate remedy was carved out specifically for this finding, but it informed the overall assessment.

4. Whether Mr Sun was entitled to compensation for lost wages under s 123(1)(b) of the Act, subject to his duty to mitigate — Status: Established (paras [36]-[40]).

Under ss 123(1)(b) and 128, the Authority must order payment of the lesser of actual lost remuneration or three months' ordinary time remuneration, subject to the employee's duty to mitigate. The Authority accepted Mr Sun's evidence of active efforts to find work (approaching approximately 10 building companies) and that the building industry was slow at the time. Mr Sun earned $2,834.13 gross after his employment ended before starting his own company in March 2025. The Authority ordered 11 weeks' lost wages at $48.00/hour for 32 hours per week, less the $2,834.13 earned, totalling $14,061.87 gross.

5. Whether Mr Sun was entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act — Status: Established (paras [41]-[45]).

Compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) is not punitive but is designed to quantify harm caused by humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings. The Authority referred to Employment Court guidance in Stormont v Peddle Thorp Aitken Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 71, Waikato District Health Board v Archibald [2017] NZEmpC 132, and Richora Group Ltd v Cheng [2018] NZEmpC 113. The Authority accepted Mr Sun's evidence of significant distress, financial hardship, and having to borrow from family and friends. An award of $15,000 was considered appropriate.

6. Whether remedies should be reduced for Mr Sun's contributory conduct under s 124 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (para [47]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's own conduct contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the grievance and reduce remedies accordingly. The Authority found no evidence of any contributory conduct by Mr Sun; in fact, Mr Sun had actively sought clarification from Mr Smith about his employment status. No reduction was applied.

7. Whether Mr Sun was entitled to wage arrears for his final week of work, unpaid annual holidays, and notice pay — Status: Established (paras [48]-[50]).

Mr Sun claimed 32 hours' unpaid wages for his final week, 1.79 weeks of unpaid annual holidays (evidenced by a final payslip), and two weeks' notice pay. The Authority rejected a claim for backdating of a wage increase to 1 April 2024, finding no persuasive evidence of such an agreement. The Authority calculated the total at 153.28 hours at $48.00/hour = $7,357.44 gross in wage arrears, plus $588.60 (8% holiday pay), totalling $7,946.04 gross.

8. Whether costs should be awarded and at what level — Status: Established (paras [52]-[55]).

The Authority applied its standard daily tariff methodology for costs. Taking into account the less-than-half-day hearing and the complexity of the matter, the Authority awarded $2,000 as a contribution to costs. Mr Sun was legally aided and KCL had not participated meaningfully in any proceedings.

The claim was upheld in full: unjustified dismissal was established, all remedies sought were awarded (with the exception of the backdated wage increase claim), no contributory reduction was applied, and costs were awarded.

- Lost wages (s 123(1)(b)): $14,061.87 gross (11 weeks at $48.00/hour × 32 hours, less $2,834.13 earned post-employment)
- Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings (s 123(1)(c)(i)): $15,000.00
- Wage and holiday pay arrears (final week + 2 weeks' notice + 1.79 weeks' annual holidays): $7,946.04 gross (inclusive of $588.60 holiday pay)
- Costs contribution: $2,000.00
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination date (14 July 2026)
- Reinstatement: Not ordered
- Claim for backdated wage increase: Not upheld

Blue Hunt, a farm assistant, brought claims against Lance Wakelin, his former employer and farm manager, following his dismissal on 2 September 2024 after approximately five months of employment. Mr Hunt alleged unjustified dismissal, failure to pay minimum wages, unlawful accommodation deductions, failure to maintain wage and time records, and absence of a written employment agreement. The Authority upheld all substantive claims, finding the dismissal unjustified due to a complete absence of fair process, and ordered compensation, lost wages, wage arrears, reimbursement of unlawful deductions, a penalty, and interest.

Applicant: Blue Hunt (employee/farm assistant)
Respondent: Lance Wakelin (employer/farm manager)

Applicant: Tim Vogel, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: No appearance

Blue Hunt was employed as a farm assistant by Lance Wakelin from 2 April 2024, having previously worked on the same farm for the property owners (Damian and Anna Hopkins). The parties verbally agreed to 60 hours per week at a salary of $70,000 per annum, with a $300 per week accommodation deduction, but Mr Hunt says he never received or signed a written employment agreement. On 2 September 2024, after a heated exchange in the cow shed, Mr Wakelin sent Mr Hunt a text message stating "the ship has sailed, your employment is over and you have 2 weeks in which to move out." Mr Hunt claimed unjustified dismissal, unpaid minimum wages, unlawful accommodation deductions (amounting to approximately 22% of his weekly pay rather than the statutory maximum of 5%), failure to keep wage and time records, and no written employment agreement. Mr Wakelin contested several claims, asserting that a signed employment agreement existed (which Mr Hunt denied, saying the signature was not his), that the farm was operated by a partnership so he was not the sole employer, and that Mr Hunt's dismissal was justified by cumulative conduct issues — though he acknowledged the process could have been more formal. The investigation meeting proceeded on 12 January 2026 in Mr Wakelin's absence after multiple adjournment requests, including disputed medical certificates, were declined.

1. Whether Mr Wakelin was the employer (sole liability) — Status: Established (paras [36]-[37]).

Mr Wakelin argued the farm was operated by a partnership and he was therefore not the sole employer. The Authority found no evidence of a partnership had been provided, and noted that if a partnership existed, Mr Wakelin could seek contribution from other partners under joint and several liability principles. The Authority was satisfied that Mr Wakelin had employed Mr Hunt and dismissed him, and was accordingly the employer for the purposes of this claim.

2. Whether Mr Hunt was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [38]-[46]).

The Authority applied the s 103A test, which requires assessing whether the employer's actions were what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances, including whether concerns were investigated, raised with the employee, and whether the employee was given a reasonable opportunity to respond. Mr Wakelin followed no dismissal process whatsoever — he dismissed Mr Hunt by text after a heated confrontation, with no investigation, no formal raising of concerns, no opportunity to respond, and no consideration of whether dismissal was proportionate. The Authority found the dismissal unjustified.

3. Whether Mr Wakelin breached his good faith obligation — Status: Established (paras [2], [28](b), [47], [62]).

The Authority identified failure to comply with good faith obligations as a discrete issue and found that Mr Wakelin's conduct — including failure to follow any dismissal process and non-compliance with employment standards — was inconsistent with the good faith obligations under the Act, as discussed in the penalty and wage-records analysis. The determination did not separately elaborate on s 4 good faith beyond framing the standards breaches in those terms.

4. Whether Mr Wakelin failed to keep and/or provide wage and time records — Status: Established (paras [48]-[49]).

Mr Wakelin acknowledged no wage and time records were kept, attributing partial blame to Mr Hunt for refusing to fill in time sheets. Under s 132 of the Act, where an employer fails to keep wage and time records and that failure prejudices the employee's ability to bring an accurate claim, the Authority may accept the employee's claims as proven unless the employer proves otherwise. The Authority applied s 132 and accepted Mr Hunt's evidence that the agreement was for 120 hours per fortnight, calculating remedies on that basis.

5. Whether unlawful deductions were made from Mr Hunt's wages for accommodation — Status: Established (paras [58]-[59]).

Section 7 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 limits deductions for lodging to no more than five per cent of the employee's wages. The $300 per week deduction represented approximately 22% of Mr Hunt's weekly pay of $1,346, far exceeding the statutory cap. Additionally, no tenancy agreement or signed employment agreement authorising the deduction existed. The Authority found the deductions were unlawful and ordered reimbursement of amounts exceeding the 5% statutory maximum.

6. Whether Mr Hunt was paid below the minimum wage — Status: Established (para [56]).

The minimum wage at the relevant time was $23.15 per hour. At 60 hours per week on a $70,000 annual salary, Mr Hunt's effective hourly rate was $22.44, below the statutory minimum. Under s 131(1)(b) of the Act, the Authority ordered payment of the shortfall of $0.71 per hour for 1,320 hours worked, totalling $937.20 (gross), plus holiday pay.

7. Whether Mr Hunt is entitled to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings — Status: Established (paras [50]-[52]).

The Authority assessed compensation under s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act. Mr Hunt had to live in his car for months after dismissal, suffered financial stress, and experienced shame and loss of dignity as the dismissal was known to others on the farm including the farm owners. Applying the banding approach used by the courts and comparable Authority cases, and noting Mr Hunt was able to return to employment in December 2024, the Authority awarded $20,000.

8. Whether Mr Hunt is entitled to lost wages — Status: Established (paras [53]-[55]).

The Act permits reimbursement of lost remuneration up to three months' ordinary time pay. Mr Hunt was out of work from 2 September until mid-December 2024 and had difficulty finding accommodation and employment. The Authority awarded the equivalent of three months' wages calculated at the applicable minimum wage rate, amounting to $18,057.

9. Whether penalties should be awarded against Mr Wakelin — Status: Established (paras [60]-[66]).

The Authority found multiple breaches warranting penalties: (a) failure to retain and provide a signed employment agreement (ss 64(1) and (3) of the Act); (b) failure to provide wage and time records on request (s 130(2)); (c) making deductions without written consent (s 5 of the Wages Protection Act 1983); (d) failure to pay minimum wage (s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983); and (e) lodging deductions exceeding 5% of wages (s 7 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983). Applying s 133A factors, and noting a prior finding against Mr Wakelin for unjustified dismissal, the Authority imposed a total penalty of $1,000. Under s 136 of the Act, the Authority exercised its discretion to direct $500 of that penalty to Mr Hunt, with the balance paid to the Crown.

10. Whether remedies should be reduced for Mr Hunt's contributory conduct (s 124 of the Act) — Status: Dismissed (para [67]).

Section 124 requires the Authority to consider whether the employee's actions contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance. The Authority found that Mr Wakelin had failed to follow any process remotely compliant with the s 103A fair and reasonable employer standard, meaning the deficiencies went well beyond minor procedural flaws. In these circumstances, Mr Hunt had not contributed to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance, and no reduction was made.

11. Whether interest should be awarded on wage and holiday arrears — Status: Established (paras [68]-[69]).

The Authority has discretion to award interest on money claims under Schedule 2, clause 11 of the Act. Interest was ordered on the wage and holiday arrears from the date of dismissal (2 September 2024) until the date of full payment, to be calculated using the civil debt interest calculator.

12. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Reserved (paras [71]-[72]).

Costs were reserved. The parties were encouraged to resolve costs between themselves. If unresolved, Mr Hunt may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days of the determination, with Mr Wakelin having 14 days to reply. The Authority indicated costs would be determined on its usual daily tariff basis unless circumstances warranted adjustment.

The claim was substantially upheld: unjustified dismissal established, wage breaches and unlawful deductions established, penalties awarded, and all heads of remedy granted except contributory reduction (dismissed) and costs (reserved).

- Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings): $20,000.00 (s 123(1)(c)(i) of the Act)
- Lost wages: $18,057.00 (s 123(1)(b) and s 128 of the Act; equivalent to three months at applicable minimum wage)
- Wage arrears: $937.20 (gross) under s 131 of the Act, plus 8% holiday pay to be calculated and paid
- Reimbursement of unlawful accommodation deductions: amounts deducted in excess of 5% of wages for lodging (quantum to be calculated)
- Interest: on wage and holiday arrears from 2 September 2024 until date of full payment (civil debt interest calculator)
- Penalty: $1,000.00 total — $500.00 paid to Mr Hunt; $500.00 paid to the Crown
- All amounts payable within 28 days of the determination
- Costs: Reserved

William James (employee) brought personal grievance claims against Christchurch Glass Limited (CGL), his employer, for unjustified constructive dismissal, disadvantage, and breach of good faith arising from an allegedly unfair investigation into his bullying complaint against his manager. This determination deals solely with a preliminary issue: whether leave should be granted to join DB & PA James Limited (DB&PA), the head franchisor entity, as a "controlling third party" (CTP) under s 103B of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The application was dismissed on the grounds that statutory notice to DB&PA under s 115A was not given within the required 90-day period, and additionally that DB&PA's actions did not arguably cause or contribute to Mr James's personal grievances.

Applicant: William Peter James (employee/Franchise Manager)
Respondent: Christchurch Glass Limited (employer, trading as Novus Glass – Christchurch West franchise)

Applicant: Anna Dao, representative for the Applicant
Respondent: Ashley-Jayne Lodge and Georgina Anderson Brooks, counsel for Respondent

Mr James was employed by CGL (trading as Novus Glass) from October 2017, most recently as Franchise Manager from June 2023. DB&PA James Limited (trading as Novus New Zealand) is the head franchisor entity, co-directed by Mr James's father and uncle (who are also CGL directors), and its managing director Mr Armstrong was appointed to investigate Mr James's bullying complaint against his manager, Mr Krammer, who was employed by DB&PA but worked on CGL's premises. Mr James resigned on 20 March 2025, alleging constructive dismissal, and claimed the investigation was not conducted fairly or independently. He lodged Authority proceedings before resigning and later amended his claims. Mr James sought to join DB&PA as a CTP, motivated in part by concerns that CGL had ceased operating the franchise and a new entity (Christchurch West Glass Limited) now operated it. DB&PA and CGL opposed the joinder application on two grounds: (1) that statutory notice under s 115A was not given within the 90-day period; and (2) that DB&PA was not a CTP and its actions did not cause or contribute to the grievances.

1. Whether Mr James had raised a personal grievance and applied to the Authority to resolve it, as a precondition to applying under s 103B — Status: Established (para [21]).

Section 103B(1) requires that the employee must have raised a personal grievance under s 114 and asked the Authority to resolve it before applying to join a CTP. The Authority was satisfied without detailed analysis that Mr James had met this precondition, given his existing proceedings and grievance notice. No further reasoning was required on this point.

2. Whether it is arguable that DB&PA was a "controlling third party" under s 5 of the Act — first limb (contract or arrangement under which employee performed work for DB&PA's benefit) — Status: Established (paras [25], [27]).

The Authority applied the two-part statutory definition of CTP in s 5 of the Act. On the first limb, the Authority found it arguable (though with some weakness) that there was a franchise arrangement under which Mr James performed work for the benefit of DB&PA as head franchisor. The Authority accepted that head franchise support arrangements — including HR and payroll administration — could satisfy this element, but noted Mr James was clearly aware CGL was his employer and that the "all one and the same" argument was unpersuasive.

3. Whether it is arguable that DB&PA exercised employer-like control or direction over Mr James — second limb of the CTP definition — Status: Partially established (paras [26]-[27]).

On the second limb, the Authority found this only "weakly arguable." Mr Krammer, DB&PA's employee, was recorded as Mr James's direct manager in his IEA and worked on the same premises; his conduct is the subject of Mr James's complaint. However, the Authority accepted that the arrangement was administrative and practical (avoiding family conflict in management) and did not amount to day-to-day employer-type control by DB&PA itself. The Authority concluded it was weakly arguable but not strongly so.

4. Whether it is arguable that DB&PA's actions caused or contributed to Mr James's personal grievances — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[34]).

Under s 103B(3)(b)(ii), the applicant must show an arguable case that the proposed CTP's actions caused or contributed to the grievance. The Authority found it could not conclude that DB&PA as an entity arguably contributed to or caused the grievances. The grievances centred on Mr Krammer's conduct and Mr Armstrong's alleged lack of independence as investigator — individuals connected to DB&PA but acting in capacities related to CGL's internal processes. The Authority found the application was more likely motivated by enforcement concerns (CGL no longer operating the franchise) than by genuine contribution by DB&PA to the grievances. No binding authorities were cited on this point beyond the statutory text.

5. Whether the statutory notice requirements under s 115A of the Act were satisfied — Status: Dismissed (paras [35]-[40]).

Section 115A requires the employee to notify the proposed CTP, within the 90-day employee notification period (as defined in s 114(7)), that the employee considers the CTP's actions caused or contributed to the personal grievance. The Authority held notice was a threshold requirement (not merely an "arguable case" matter) and that the 90-day period ran from the date of resignation (20 March 2025), giving a deadline of approximately 18 June 2025. The Authority reviewed nine separate communications between January and October 2025 and found none constituted valid notice to DB&PA under s 115A — none specifically stated that Mr James considered DB&PA to be a "controlling third party" whose actions contributed to his grievance; most focused on individuals (directors, Mr Armstrong) rather than the entity DB&PA. The first communication that could be characterised as seeking to join DB&PA occurred in October 2025, well outside the notice period. As notice was not given, the s 103B requirements were not met and leave could not be granted.

6. Whether the application to join DB&PA as a controlling third party should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[41]).

As the threshold notice requirement under s 115A was not met, and the arguable case on contribution was also not established, the Authority refused to grant leave to join DB&PA under s 103B. The Authority also noted the substantive grievances can be adequately resolved through proceedings against CGL alone.

7. Whether costs should be determined — Status: Not reached (para [43]).

Costs were reserved until resolution of the substantive matter. No costs determination was made at this stage.

The preliminary application to join DB&PA James Limited as a controlling third party under s 103B of the Employment Relations Act 2000 was dismissed; the substantive proceedings against CGL are to continue.

None ordered at this stage. The application to join DB&PA was refused. Costs are reserved until resolution of the substantive matter. An Authority Officer will contact the parties to schedule the hearing of the substantive claims.

Five seafarers employed by Holcim (New Zealand) Limited on the MV Buffalo sought interim reinstatement after being made redundant on 14 January 2026, following Holcim's decision to cease maritime cement transport and switch to road and rail. The key legal questions were whether the seafarers had a serious arguable case for unjustifiable dismissal and permanent reinstatement, and where the balance of convenience and overall justice lay. The Authority found a serious question to be tried on unjustifiable dismissal but declined interim reinstatement on the grounds that permanent reinstatement was not arguable and the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Holcim.

Applicants: Ezaiah Unasas, Hare Clark, Manoj Perera, Vincent Lee, and Eric Phillips (employees/seafarers)
Respondent: Holcim (New Zealand) Limited (employer)

Applicants: Simon Mitchell KC and Angus Drumm, counsel for the applicants
Respondent: Sherridan Cook and Sianatu Lotoaso, counsel for the respondent

The applicants were seafarers employed by Holcim on the MV Buffalo, a vessel that transported cement around the New Zealand coast. From late 2024, Holcim entered discussions to sell the Buffalo and explored various options including chartering back arrangements and a replacement pneumatic cement carrier. In late November 2025 the seafarers were given redundancy notices effective 28 December 2025, but were ultimately dismissed on 14 January 2026 (after a December 2025 interim injunction obtained by a related group of colleagues delayed matters). A Ministerial authorisation sought by Nova Marine/Alton Shipping to operate a foreign vessel with a foreign crew was declined in December 2025, collapsing the charter-back arrangement. A related determination ([2026] NZERA 452) had already found, in respect of a similar group of seafarers, that Holcim breached its good faith obligations, inadequately consulted, and breached clause 39 of the collective agreement (protection from disadvantage), making the redundancy unjustifiable. The applicants sought interim and permanent reinstatement; Holcim opposed on the grounds it no longer owned or operated any vessel and had no prospect of maritime operations in the foreseeable future.

1. Whether there is a serious question to be tried that the applicants were unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [29]-[30]).

The test for a serious question to be tried requires an arguable case on the merits. The Authority applied findings from the closely related determination [2026] NZERA 452, which concluded that Holcim had breached its good faith obligations, inadequately consulted, and breached clause 39 of the collective agreement (protection from disadvantage), rendering the redundancy unjustifiable. On the evidence available, the Authority found the same conclusion applicable to this group of applicants, and accordingly the serious question threshold was met without detailed re-analysis.

2. Whether there is a serious question to be tried that the applicants should be permanently reinstated — Status: Dismissed (paras [31]-[36]).

The arguable-case test for reinstatement requires that reinstatement be arguably reasonable and practicable. There were no concerns about the seafarers' capacity or workplace conduct. However, since the investigation meeting, commercial negotiations between Holcim and Nova Marine's New Zealand-related company had concluded without agreement, and enquiries with a local bulk shipping provider confirmed no vacancies existed for Holcim crew. With no evident prospect of Holcim or a contractor on its behalf employing additional maritime crew in the foreseeable future, the Authority concluded there was no arguable case that permanent reinstatement was reasonable or practicable.

3. Where does the balance of convenience lie — Status: Established in favour of the respondent (paras [37]-[45]).

The balance of convenience requires weighing the detriment to each party. The Authority acknowledged that loss of employment is itself disadvantageous (financially and otherwise), and noted the limited New Zealand seafarer job market. It cited Chief Judge Inglis's observations in Vegepod NZ Ltd v Lowe that reinstatement is the primary remedy and that routinely declining interim reinstatement monetises the employment relationship and incentivises unlawful conduct. However, the applicants had received redundancy and other payments covering at least three to four months' pay (in some cases more), and financial loss could potentially be covered by damages. On the other side, ordering interim reinstatement where Holcim had no maritime work to offer would impose a not insignificant financial burden of paying wages for crew who could not be assigned duties. The Authority concluded the balance of convenience somewhat favoured Holcim.

4. Where does the overall justice lie pending substantive determination — Status: Established in favour of the respondent/against interim reinstatement (paras [46]-[48]).

Drawing back to consider the overall picture, the Authority noted that circumstances had firmed up since the application was lodged: Holcim was now using road and rail transport with some external provider support, which the union did not dispute and which had no capacity to employ the applicant seafarers. The overall justice assessment did not alter the earlier conclusions, and the application for interim reinstatement was declined.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [49]).

The Authority reserved the question of costs to be addressed at a later stage.

6. Next steps regarding substantive investigation — Status: Conditional (para [50]).

The Authority noted that if any of the applicants wished to proceed with a substantive investigation meeting, they were required to notify the Authority, and that referral to mediation would likely be the next step.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full; the serious question on unjustifiable dismissal was established but permanent reinstatement was not arguable, and both the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Holcim.

None ordered. Costs reserved. Substantive proceedings may proceed if the applicants notify the Authority; mediation likely to be directed as the next step.

Rebecca Francis-Clothier applied for paid parental leave (PPL) after resigning from her employment and relocating to Australia for medical and family reasons, but Inland Revenue declined her application on the basis she had only completed 24–25 qualifying weeks of work, falling short of the 26-week statutory threshold. The key legal questions were whether she met the eligibility threshold under s 2BA(4) of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, and whether the Authority should exercise its discretion to grant PPL in any event. The Authority confirmed the Inland Revenue decision, finding she did not meet the statutory threshold and that no basis existed to exercise a discretion in her favour.

Applicant: Rebecca Francis-Clothier (employee/PPL applicant)
Respondent: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (government agency administering PPL)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Kate McKenzie-Bridle, counsel for the respondent

Ms Francis-Clothier had worked as a service delivery co-ordinator in New Zealand for approximately three years. Upon discovering she was pregnant with her third child, and following medical advice related to her pregnancy history, she decided to resign and relocate to Australia to join her partner. She gave notice of resignation on 29 October 2025, with her last day of work being 26 November 2025. On that date her employer paid out over seven weeks of accrued annual leave and holiday pay in her final pay, rather than her taking it as leave before termination. Her baby was due on 11 June 2026, making the relevant 52-week qualifying period run from 11 June 2025. Inland Revenue calculated she had worked only 24 qualifying weeks (or 25 at the most generous interpretation), rather than the required 26, and declined her PPL application on 11 March 2026. Ms Francis-Clothier argued the treatment of her accrued annual leave and the payment of four statutory public holidays over Christmas 2025/New Year 2026 should be counted toward her qualifying period, and alternatively that her exceptional medical and family circumstances warranted a discretionary grant of PPL.

1. Whether Ms Francis-Clothier met the 26-week qualifying work threshold under s 2BA(4) of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 — Status: Dismissed (paras [28]-[47]).

The threshold test requires an employee to have been employed for an average of at least 10 hours per week for any 26 weeks of the 52-week period immediately preceding the expected date of delivery. The qualifying period ran from 11 June 2025 to 11 June 2026, and Ms Francis-Clothier worked full-time only until 26 November 2025 — giving her 24 weeks on Inland Revenue's count, or at best 25 weeks even under the most generous interpretation. The hours test was clearly met; the 26-week duration test was not. The Authority found no sound basis to treat either the paid-out annual leave or the statutory holiday payments as extending her employment or as weeks worked.

2. Whether accrued but paid-out annual leave should count as qualifying working weeks — Status: Dismissed (paras [32]-[35], [46]-[47]).

Ms Francis-Clothier believed her six-plus weeks of accrued annual leave would count toward her qualifying period, but it was paid out in her final pay on her last day of employment rather than taken as leave. The Authority found that paid-out leave does not extend the period of employment or constitute weeks worked for PPL qualifying purposes. The Authority noted that had she taken her annual leave (rather than having it paid out), her situation might have been different, but she did not make that arrangement with her employer.

3. Whether the "absent from work" provision in s 72A(2)(f) of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 applied to treat Ms Francis-Clothier as still employed — Status: Dismissed (paras [40]-[42]).

Section 72A(2)(f) can treat an employee as still employed during an absence if the absence does not disrupt the normal pattern of their employment. MBIE itself considered this provision but concluded it did not apply. The Authority agreed, finding it was difficult to regard Ms Francis-Clothier as having a "normal pattern of employment" after she had resigned and finished work; the accrued annual leave was not paid in respect of a period when she was normally at work.

4. Whether payment of statutory/public holidays under s 40 of the Holidays Act 2003 extended Ms Francis-Clothier's period of employment or qualifying weeks — Status: Dismissed (paras [43]-[46]).

The employer paid out four statutory holidays over Christmas 2025/New Year 2026 under s 40 of the Holidays Act 2003, which entitles a departing employee to be paid for public holidays that would have fallen during untaken annual leave. The Authority applied the Employment Court's reasoning in Parker v Auckland Regional Council [1993] ERNZ 152, which held that the same payment obligation under the predecessor Holidays Act 1981 did not alter or extend the date of termination of employment. The Authority concluded that neither the annual holiday payout nor the statutory holiday payments extended Ms Francis-Clothier's employment or the period she was regarded as having worked.

5. Whether the Authority should exercise its discretion under s 71ZB of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 and s 157(3) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 to confirm, modify or reverse the Inland Revenue decision — Status: Dismissed (paras [48]-[53]).

The Authority has power to act in equity and good conscience and to confirm, modify or reverse IR's decisions, and has previously reversed decisions where incorrect IR advice caused loss of entitlement (Murphy v MBIE [2022] NZERA 211) or where unlawful employer conduct affected eligibility (Fitzek v MBIE [2021] NZERA 28). However, the Authority has also declined to exercise discretion merely because an applicant worked slightly less than 26 weeks, holding it is not the Authority's role to rewrite legislation (Don v MBIE [2024] NZERA 163). Here, IR's decision was correctly based on the statutory criteria, no fault lay with any third party, and while Ms Francis-Clothier's medical and family circumstances were genuinely difficult, the Authority found they did not provide a sufficient basis to override the statutory eligibility requirements.

6. Costs — Status: Not awarded (para [55]).

In accordance with the Employment Relations Authority's Practice Direction applicable to parental leave applications, no costs order was made in favour of either party.

The application was dismissed in full; the Inland Revenue decision declining paid parental leave was confirmed.

None ordered. No costs awarded to either party, in accordance with the Authority's Practice Direction for parental leave applications.

Moshe Sheleg, an IT developer, brought claims against HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited (HA) relating to a first period of work from August 2017 to April 2018, in addition to claims already determined for a second period (2020–2022). The key legal questions were whether the Authority had jurisdiction to hear personal grievance claims and other employment claims relating to the first period, given the applicable time limits under the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found it lacked jurisdiction: no personal grievance had been raised within the 90-day limit, leave to extend time would not have been granted, and no non-personal-grievance claim had been brought within the six-year limitation period.

Applicant: Moshe Sheleg (aka Moses Sheleg) (employee/IT developer)
Respondent: HealthAlliance N.Z. Limited (employer/business support services provider)

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Richard Upton, counsel for the respondent

HA provided business support services to four northern district health boards and is now part of Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand. Mr Sheleg worked as an IT developer for HA during two periods: August 2017 to April 2018 (first period) and August 2020 to approximately June 2022 (second period). In a prior determination dated 20 December 2024, the Authority found Mr Sheleg was an employee during the second period, and HA's subsequent challenge to that finding in the Employment Court was discontinued. Mr Sheleg then sought to bring claims relating to the first period, potentially including a personal grievance and arrears of wages or holiday pay. All of Mr Sheleg's prior filings — his May 2022 Statement of Problem, January 2023 District Court statement of claim, and May 2023 further Statement of Problem — focused exclusively on the second period; the first period was not mentioned in any substantive claim until a March 2024 witness statement. HA opposed jurisdiction on the basis that no claims relating to the first period had been raised within the required timeframes, and it did not consent to any out-of-time claims.

1. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to hear personal grievance claims relating to the first period (August 2017 – April 2018) — Status: Dismissed (paras [9], [16]-[25], [30]-[31]).

Under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, an employee must raise a personal grievance with their employer within 90 days of the action alleged to constitute the grievance (or when it came to the employee's notice). The Authority found no evidence that Mr Sheleg raised a personal grievance with HA relating to the first period within the 90-day limit at any relevant time. His March 2024 witness statement, even if treated as a grievance, was years out of time, and no application for leave to raise a grievance out of time under s 114(4) had been made. The Authority concluded Mr Sheleg had not raised a personal grievance relating to the first period at all.

2. Whether, if a personal grievance was raised (in March 2024), leave to raise it out of time under s 114(4) should be granted — Status: Dismissed (paras [18]-[25], [30]).

For leave to be granted under s 114(4), three matters must be established: exceptional circumstances, a causal link between the exceptional circumstances and the delay, and that it is just to allow the out-of-time claim. The Authority noted that s 115(c) might in principle have provided an exceptional circumstance (HA's contract documentation lacking the required s 65 explanation), but found the delay of approximately four years — during which Mr Sheleg had also received legal advice confirming employment status in relation to the second period — was inordinate and unexplained and could not reasonably have been caused by the missing explanation. It further found it would be unjust to grant leave given the entire course of litigation, settlement discussions, and mediation had focused solely on the second period, and allowing first-period claims would significantly prejudice HA by substantially expanding the scope of the dispute. Leave would not have been granted even if an application had been made.

3. Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to hear non-personal-grievance claims (e.g. arrears of wages or holiday pay) relating to the first period under s 142 of the Act — Status: Dismissed (paras [10], [26]-[29], [30]-[31]).

Section 142 of the Act provides that no action in relation to an employment relationship problem that is not a personal grievance may be commenced more than six years after the cause of action arose. The first period of work ended on or about 24 April 2018, meaning any such claim had to be brought by 24 April 2024. The Authority found Mr Sheleg could not point to any document within the six-year window in which a non-personal-grievance claim in relation to the first period was raised or brought. His various filings all focused on the second period, and his March 2024 witness statement merely mentioned the first period without constituting anything resembling a pleaded non-personal-grievance claim.

4. Whether Mr Sheleg's May 2022 rejected Statement of Problem or subsequent filings raised claims relating to the first period — Status: Dismissed (paras [11]-[14], [28]-[29]).

The Authority examined Mr Sheleg's May 2022 attempted Statement of Problem (rejected by an Authority Officer as appearing to be a contractor claim), his January 2023 District Court statement of claim, and his May 2023 further Statement of Problem. All three focused exclusively on the second period (2020–2022); no reference to the first period appeared in any of them. The Authority found that even if the May 2022 filing had been accepted, it contained no claim relating to the first period, and therefore could not assist Mr Sheleg in establishing jurisdiction for first-period claims.

5. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [33]).

The Authority reserved costs without making any order at this stage, indicating the issue may be addressed in a future proceeding.

The claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds: the Authority found it has no jurisdiction to hear or determine any claims Mr Sheleg may have relating to the first period of work (August 2017 – April 2018), and his remaining claims and potential remedies are confined to the second period.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination on jurisdiction only. Costs are reserved. An Authority officer is to contact the parties regarding next steps in relation to the second period of work.

[CONSENT]

Albert Hoi Dun Tung (applicant/employee) brought a claim against Reach International Holdings Limited (respondent/employer). Following an investigation meeting on 7 July 2026, the Authority member proposed a settlement, which both parties accepted. The matter was resolved by consent determination, with the respondent ordered to pay $900 in full and final settlement.

Applicant: Albert Hoi Dun Tung (employee)
Respondent: Reach International Holdings Limited (employer)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Sean Zhang, company director

Albert Hoi Dun Tung filed an employment-related claim against Reach International Holdings Limited. The nature of the underlying dispute and the specific claims advanced are not detailed in the determination. An investigation meeting was held on 7 July 2026. At the conclusion of that meeting, Authority Member Peter Fuiava proposed an alternative resolution to the parties. Mr Zhang, as company director representing the respondent, indicated his assent to the proposal at the meeting, and Mr Tung confirmed his acceptance by email the following morning (8 July 2026). The parties requested that their terms of settlement be made orders of the Authority by consent determination.

1. Whether the parties' agreed terms of settlement should be recorded as orders of the Authority by consent determination — Status: Established (paras [1]-[2]).

The Authority member proposed a resolution at the conclusion of the investigation meeting. Both parties consented to the proposed terms, and at the parties' request, the Authority formalised those terms as a consent determination under its powers to make orders by consent. No contested legal issues were adjudicated; the matter was resolved entirely by agreement.

The claim was resolved in full by consent determination, with the respondent ordered to pay $900 to the applicant in full and final settlement.

Settlement payment: $900 (full and final settlement of all claims), to be paid by direct credit into the applicant's bank account within seven days of the determination (8 July 2026).
Additional condition: Both parties acknowledged that the opportunity remains for them to resume working together in the future should they both wish to do so.
Costs: None ordered.

GLM, a former Advisor Placement Rehousing employed by Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities, sought interim reinstatement after being dismissed in May 2026 following their arrest and bail conditions that prevented them from attending work. The key legal questions were whether GLM had an arguable case for unjustified dismissal, an arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and whether the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured interim reinstatement. The Authority found an arguable case for unjustified dismissal but declined interim reinstatement, finding GLM had not established an arguable case for permanent reinstatement and that the balance of convenience and overall justice favoured Kāinga Ora.

Applicant: GLM (employee — name suppressed)
Respondent: Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities (employer)

Applicant: Mark Ryan, counsel
Respondent: Saadi Radcliffe and Frances Lear, counsel

GLM was employed as an Advisor, Placement Rehousing (APR) — a frontline, field-based role involving direct and largely unsupervised engagement with vulnerable community members — until their employment was terminated in May 2026. On 28 February 2026, GLM was arrested and charged with wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and unlawful possession of a firearm (a cut-down shotgun), and was placed on a 24-hour curfew as a bail condition. Kāinga Ora became aware of GLM's situation progressively from 1 March 2026 onwards, conducted a formal disciplinary process including a meeting on 17 March 2026 and a preliminary outcome letter on 27 March 2026, and granted multiple extensions of time for GLM to respond and to seek a bail variation. GLM's counsel proposed office-based alternative duties and sought paid suspension pending the criminal trial (expected mid-2027), but Kāinga Ora found no suitable alternative duties and determined there was no viable timeframe for GLM to resume the role. On 6 May 2026, Kāinga Ora dismissed GLM effective immediately with payment in lieu of notice; later that same day the District Court granted a bail variation allowing GLM to travel directly to and from work, but Kāinga Ora declined to withdraw the termination. GLM then applied for interim reinstatement, which Kāinga Ora opposed on the grounds that GLM could not perform the inherent requirements of the field-based role, that reputational and operational risks were significant, and that the recently enacted s 123C of the Employment Relations Act 2000 raised further complications around remedy.

1. Whether GLM is entitled to an interim non-publication order — Status: Established (paras [3]-[4]).

The Authority found there were grounds justifying a temporary non-publication order to preserve the status quo pending the substantive determination. Pursuant to cl 10(1) of the Second Schedule to the Employment Relations Act 2000, GLM's name and identifying details are suppressed on an interim basis until further order. The Authority noted this should not be taken as an automatic indication that a permanent non-publication order will follow.

2. Whether GLM has an arguable case for unjustified dismissal — Status: Established (paras [34]-[41]).

The threshold at the interim stage is low: GLM need only show arguments that are not frivolous or vexatious and have a possible (but not necessarily certain) prospect of success. GLM argued that Kāinga Ora acted prematurely by treating unproven allegations as established fact, that the presumption of innocence applied, that alternative measures such as paid suspension were available, and that the bail variation granted on the same day as dismissal had not been considered. Kāinga Ora argued dismissal was within the range open to a fair and reasonable employer given the nine-week absence, serious charges, field-based role, operational pressures, and trust and confidence concerns. The Authority found GLM's arguments, while undeveloped, were not frivolous or vexatious and raised questions of both procedural fairness and substantive justifiability sufficient to meet the arguable case threshold.

3. Whether GLM has an arguable case for permanent reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [42]-[54]).

Under s 125 of the Act, reinstatement must be ordered where practicable and reasonable. Practicability requires that reinstatement be feasible and capable of successful implementation (applying Christieson v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Limited [2021] NZEmpC 142). The Authority found GLM's bail conditions — even as varied — did not permit the travel across multiple community locations inherent in the frontline APR role; no suitable alternative duties existed; the role had already been converted to a fixed-term position; Kāinga Ora faced significant reputational risk given the serious charges and its public-sector obligations to maintain public trust and confidence; and the newly enacted s 123C of the Act (inserted 21 February 2026) meant that a later finding of employee contribution to the situation would bar reinstatement entirely. The Authority concluded the current evidence did not support an arguable case for permanent reinstatement.

4. Whether the balance of convenience favours interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [55]-[63]).

The Authority weighed GLM's economic hardship and loss of income against Kāinga Ora's operational, reputational, and third-party risks. GLM argued the balance fell decisively in their favour and that garden leave reinstatement to the payroll would cause Kāinga Ora no operational prejudice. The Authority found, however, that the prejudice to Kāinga Ora if interim reinstatement were ordered — including reputational harm, risk to vulnerable community members, and the compulsion to pay for a role GLM could not in fact perform — was immediate, substantial, and not capable of redress by damages. GLM's affidavit evidence was also noted as being inconsistent with an ability to pay on any undertaking as to damages. The balance of convenience was found to favour Kāinga Ora.

5. Whether the overall justice of the case favours interim reinstatement — Status: Dismissed (paras [64]-[73]).

The overall justice assessment functions as a global check on the conclusions reached on the earlier issues (applying NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Limited [2013] NZCA 90 at [47]). GLM submitted that refusing reinstatement would force a long-serving employee with a good track record into severe financial destitution before the substantive case could be heard. The Authority accepted that GLM's delays in filing (employment ended 6 May, application lodged 20 May, affidavit not filed until 5 June 2026) were not in themselves significant. However, the Authority agreed with Kāinga Ora that the practical utility of any reinstatement order was weak given the bail conditions, that GLM's prejudice was essentially economic and remediable if successful, and that Kāinga Ora's reputational, operational, and third-party risks could not be repaired by damages. Overall justice was found to point against interim reinstatement.

6. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [76]).

Costs were reserved for determination following the substantive investigation meeting and its outcome, or until the matter otherwise ceased to be before the Authority.

The application for interim reinstatement was declined in full, though the substantive personal grievance proceeding remains on foot and will be scheduled for hearing.

None ordered at this stage. Interim reinstatement declined. Costs reserved pending the substantive investigation meeting and its outcome. Non-publication of GLM's name and identifying details ordered on an interim basis until further order. Parties to be contacted to schedule the substantive hearing.

Steven David Mitchell, CEO of Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated (TRU), was summarily dismissed for serious misconduct on 20 March 2026 after a disciplinary process that followed an organisational review. He applied for interim reinstatement pending substantive resolution of his unjustified dismissal claim. The Authority found a strongly arguable case for unjustified dismissal (including predetermination), and ordered interim reinstatement to the payroll only — not to active duties — given the breakdown in the working relationship, with costs reserved.

Applicant: Steven David Mitchell (employee/former CEO)
Respondent: Tasman Rugby Union Incorporated (employer)

Applicant: Callum Osborne and William Rasburn, counsel for Applicant
Respondent: Brian Nathan and Sari Robb, counsel for Respondent

Mr Mitchell was employed as CEO of TRU from June 2024. In late November 2025, TRU obtained an independent organisational review which identified concerns about leadership visibility and communication. On 17 December 2025, TRU wrote to Mr Mitchell raising performance concerns and other concerns about absences, travel expenses, and attendance. Further allegations of serious misconduct were raised on 19 December 2025 — including intimidatory behaviour toward a staff member, disclosing confidential information to staff and delegates about a potential replacement CEO, and failing to follow a Board instruction regarding fixed-term contracts. Mr Mitchell was placed on paid suspension and responded through counsel; a Privacy Act disclosure made after his dismissal revealed a series of internal Board communications that Mr Mitchell argues demonstrate predetermination. TRU confirmed its proposal to summarily dismiss without change on 20 March 2026. Mr Mitchell sought interim reinstatement, compensation, lost wages, permanent reinstatement, penalties for breach of good faith, and penalties for an unlawful wage deduction, with this determination addressing only the interim reinstatement application.

1. Whether the recent Employment Relations Act 2000 amendments (ss 123B and 123C restricting remedies where employee contribution is found) apply to this matter — Status: Established (paras [59]-[62]).

The new amendments commenced 21 February 2026. Both the dismissal (20 March 2026) and the lodging of proceedings (10 April 2026) occurred after that commencement date. Mr Mitchell submitted the amendments should not apply because the alleged predetermination predated the commencement date, but the Authority rejected this as inconsistent with the statutory transitional provisions (Schedule 1AA, clause 15). The Authority concluded the new amendments apply on their face to this matter, meaning any contribution finding could restrict reinstatement, and a finding of serious misconduct contribution could extinguish all remedies.

2. Whether it is seriously arguable and not frivolous or vexatious that Mr Mitchell was unjustifiably dismissed — Status: Established (paras [63]-[75]).

The threshold requires a serious or arguable prospect of success that is not frivolous or vexatious (X v Y Limited v New Zealand Stock Exchange [1992] 1 ERNZ 863). Both parties agreed this threshold was met. The Authority went further and assessed arguable strength, finding Mr Mitchell had a strongly arguable case of predetermination: the internal Board communications revealed derisive personal views of Mr Mitchell formed before findings were put to him, an incorrect paraphrase of the review ("leadership must be replaced" vs "must be addressed"), a misattribution of the "missing in action" phrase to Mr Mitchell personally, and language potentially conflating a single travel expense issue into a dishonesty finding without sufficient investigation. The Authority found TRU's disciplinary process arguably merged with the review in a way inconsistent with TRU's submission that they were separate.

3. Whether it is seriously arguable that permanent reinstatement is practicable and reasonable — Status: Established (arguable) (paras [76]-[77]).

Under s 125 of the Act, reinstatement is the starting point remedy where practicable and reasonable (Humphrey v Canterbury District Health Board [2021] NZEmpC 59, [41]). TRU submitted that uncontested evidence established serious misconduct by Mr Mitchell sufficient to exclude reinstatement under the new amendments, and that the relationship breakdown made reinstatement impracticable. The Authority declined to make definitive findings of serious misconduct at this interim stage across each allegation (travel expenses, delegate disclosure, failure to follow instruction, Marfell interaction), finding in each case that the evidence was insufficiently tested to reach the required level of comfort. The Authority also declined to find that the discomfort experienced by staff on 20 January 2026 — when they understood Mr Mitchell had been suspended — rendered permanent reinstatement impracticable, noting that situation was arguably created by TRU's own communications. The Authority found it arguable that permanent reinstatement remained available.

4. Whether the balance of benefit and detriment favours interim reinstatement — Status: Established in favour of applicant, subject to condition (paras [78]-[82]).

TRU argued the balance favoured refusal because: (a) contribution findings under the new amendments made permanent reinstatement very unlikely; and (b) loss of trust and the outward-facing nature of the CEO role made return untenable. The Authority rejected the first argument, having found reinstatement remains arguable; accepted that the working relationship breakdown and the pivotal nature of the CEO role meant return to actual duties was unworkable in the interim. However, the Authority found a more significant detriment weighing toward Mr Mitchell: loss of income to support a wife unable to work, and the reputational difficulty of obtaining comparable employment in senior sport administration during interim proceedings. The balance of convenience favoured interim reinstatement on condition that it be reinstatement to the payroll only, not to active duties.

5. What is the overall justice of the matter — Status: Established in favour of applicant (para [83]).

Taking together the strongly arguable case for unjustified dismissal (including predetermination), the arguable case for permanent reinstatement, and the balance of convenience favouring Mr Mitchell, the Authority found overall justice required immediate reinstatement to the payroll pending substantive determination.

6. Whether costs should be awarded — Status: Not reached/Reserved (para [85]).

The Authority reserved costs to the conclusion of the substantive stage. No determination on costs was made in this interim decision.

7. Substantive claims (unjustified dismissal, compensation, lost wages, penalties under s 4 and s 133A of the Act, unlawful wage deduction under the Wages Protection Act 1983, permanent reinstatement) — Status: Not reached (paras [1]-[2], [58]).

This determination expressly dealt only with the interim reinstatement application. All substantive claims — including unjustified dismissal, disadvantage grievances (including the suspension grievance), penalty claims for breach of good faith, and the unlawful deduction claim — are to be determined at a substantive investigation meeting currently scheduled for the week of 12 October 2026 in Nelson.

The interim reinstatement application was upheld on condition; Mr Mitchell is reinstated to the TRU payroll only (not to active duties) pending substantive determination, with costs reserved.

Interim reinstatement to payroll only: Mr Mitchell is reinstated to the TRU payroll at his CEO salary rate as at 20 March 2026. Payment is backdated from 21 March 2026 to the current pay period end as a taxed lump sum, then continuing at the existing salary payment frequency until the matter is substantively determined. Return to active duties: Not ordered (found unworkable given relationship breakdown and nature of the role). Permanent reinstatement, compensation, lost wages, and penalties: Not determined — reserved for substantive hearing (week of 12 October 2026, Nelson). Costs: Reserved to conclusion of substantive stage.

MGJ, a Clinical Dental Technician employed by Denture Care Services Limited (DCSL), claimed unjustified constructive dismissal after resigning during a proposed restructure process that included the potential disestablishment of their role. MGJ also claimed unjustified disadvantage arising from an unpaid pay rise, miscalculated sick leave, and incorrect annual holiday payments. The Authority dismissed all claims, finding that MGJ resigned voluntarily before the restructure process concluded, DCSL did not breach its good faith obligations, and no disadvantage was established on any of the three grounds advanced.

Applicant: MGJ (employee, Clinical Dental Technician)
Respondent: Denture Care Services Limited (employer, denture clinic operator)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Craig Metcalfe for the Respondent

MGJ commenced employment with DCSL as a Dental Technician in March 2019 and was promoted to Clinical Dental Technician in December 2019, working 24 hours per week at the Paraparaumu clinic. On 18–19 November 2024, MGJ received notice of a proposed restructure, and at a group meeting on 26 November 2024 learned that their role was among those proposed for disestablishment. Following the meeting, MGJ worked on an alternative proposal with colleagues and communicated it to management, but early the next morning (27 November 2024) resigned by email effective 31 January 2025, citing the restructure proposals as financially unviable. DCSL responded on 4 December 2024, noting that the restructure was still a proposal, that feedback was still open until 6 December, and expressing disappointment that MGJ had removed themselves from the process. MGJ subsequently raised concerns about a promised pay rise not delivered, sick leave entitlement calculation, and annual holiday payments. DCSL denied any pay rise had been promised for 2024, maintained that sick leave was capped at 20 days under the employment agreement, and provided records showing all annual holidays were correctly paid out.

1. Whether a non-publication order should be granted in respect of MGJ's name and identity — Status: Established (paras [8]-[13]).

The Authority applied the test of identifying specific risks of harm and weighing the reasonable likelihood of that harm against the open justice principle, citing Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 1335 and MW v Spiga Limited [2024] NZEmpC 147. Substantial evidence of MGJ's health history and personal life was heard at the investigation, and there were reputational concerns. The Authority was satisfied that a non-publication order was appropriate for MGJ's name and identifying details, including health history, which was not necessary for determining the employment relationship problem. Accordingly, MGJ was referred to by randomly chosen letters with no bearing on their actual name or initials.

2. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably constructively dismissed — Status: Dismissed (paras [30]-[41]).

The Authority applied the established three-limb test for constructive dismissal from Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd (1985) and Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUOW Inc [1994] 2 NZLR 415 (CA), requiring a serious breach of duty where a substantial risk of resignation was reasonably foreseeable. While the Authority accepted that DCSL could have provided more detail to impacted employees prior to the 26 November 2024 meeting, it found this was not fatal. Mr Metcalfe actively engaged with MGJ individually, offered to consider MGJ's alternative proposal, and made clear the restructure was not finalised. The Authority concluded that MGJ voluntarily resigned before the process concluded and other avenues remained open, so no constructive dismissal was made out, citing DBM Medical Ltd v Gaarkeuken [2025] NZEmpC 209.

3. Whether DCSL breached its good faith obligations under s 4(1A)(c) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [39]-[41]).

Section 4(1A)(c) of the Act requires an employer proposing decisions likely to affect an employee's continued employment to provide relevant information and an opportunity to comment before a decision is made. The Authority found that DCSL enabled sufficient avenues to meet this obligation: employees were invited to submit feedback by 6 December, Mr Metcalfe met individually with MGJ, entertained MGJ's alternative proposal, and emphasised no final decision had been made. DCSL had not made any unilateral decisions regarding the disestablishment of MGJ's role, and MGJ acknowledged under questioning that they could have waited for the process to conclude. No breach of good faith was established.

4. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably disadvantaged by DCSL's failure to deliver a promised pay rise — Status: Dismissed (paras [44]-[47]).

The test for unjustified disadvantage under s 103A of the Act is whether a fair and reasonable employer could have acted as DCSL did in all the circumstances. MGJ claimed a pay increase was promised at an annual appraisal in March 2024 to take effect from 1 April 2024. DCSL's evidence was that no pay adjustments were made for anyone in 2024 due to the company's financial situation, and MGJ confirmed awareness that no other employees received adjustments. The Authority found DCSL's position more credible, noting no other witnesses were called to support MGJ's claim, and that MGJ took no formal action at the time. No disadvantage was established on this ground.

5. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably disadvantaged by DCSL's sick leave calculation and payments — Status: Dismissed (paras [48]-[53]).

MGJ contended that accrued sick leave of 32 days (referenced in a May 2024 email from Mr Brugh) should have been paid until 31 January 2025. The employment agreement capped sick leave accumulation at 20 days, and DCSL calculated MGJ's paid sick leave entitlement to 7 January 2025. The Authority found that while DCSL may have exercised a discretion to allow more than 20 days' sick leave during the employment, it was not obliged to provide paid sick leave beyond the statutory minimum once an employee has resigned. The extended notice period was at MGJ's election, and no obligation arose for DCSL to fund it through sick leave. No disadvantage was established on this ground.

6. Whether MGJ was unjustifiably disadvantaged by incorrect annual holiday calculations and payments — Status: Dismissed (paras [54]-[59]).

The Authority reviewed DCSL's complete wage, time, holiday, and leave records including MGJ's final payslip. The records showed 5 days of annual holidays were owing, which were paid out on 6 February 2025 as 40 hours at 8 hours per day. Payment for one public holiday was also made in accordance with s 40(3) of the Holidays Act 2003. MGJ was given an opportunity to comment specifically on the records but chose not to do so. The Authority was unable to identify any discrepancy and no disadvantage was established.

7. Whether MGJ was owed any unpaid wages or other entitlements — Status: Dismissed (para [63]).

Following the review of all records and the dismissal of all disadvantage claims, the Authority found that MGJ was not owed any wage or holiday arrears. No further analysis beyond the preceding findings was required.

8. Whether either party should be awarded costs of representation — Status: Dismissed (paras [64]-[65]).

Neither party was represented by a paid agent or lawyer at the investigation meeting. The Authority applied the principle (citing the ERA's own guidance) that the costs of personal representation and one's own time in preparing and attending an investigation are not costs the Authority can award. Accordingly, no costs order was made.

All claims were dismissed in full; MGJ's personal grievance claims for unjustified constructive dismissal and unjustified disadvantage were not made out, and no wages, entitlements, or costs were ordered.

None ordered.

TEST - will revert

Alan Hung Lun Au, a bus driver employed by Tranzit Coachlines (Central) Limited, raised personal grievances relating to his suspension, a warning, and changes to his terms and conditions of employment following a passenger complaint in July 2025. The sole preliminary issue was whether Mr Au had raised those personal grievances within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found that all three grievances were raised in time, allowing the substantive proceeding to proceed.

Applicant: Alan Hung Lun Au (employee, bus driver)
Respondent: Tranzit Coachlines (Central) Limited (employer)

Applicant: Tyler Hobbs and Fred Hills, counsel for the Applicant
Respondent: Michael Gould, counsel for the Respondent

Mr Au has been employed by Tranzit as a bus driver based in Te Awamutu. In July 2025, Tranzit received a passenger complaint about Mr Au and suspended him while it investigated. Following the investigation, Tranzit decided Mr Au would not return to the Te Awamutu service, issued him a warning on 14 August 2025, and proposed changes to his working arrangements including a transfer to Cambridge on a 60-hour fortnight. Mr Au, through himself, his sister-in-law (Dona Hobbs), his wife (Tracy Au), and an employment representative, communicated objections to the suspension at a meeting on 4 July 2025, during a telephone call on 4 August 2025, and at a meeting on 6 August 2025; objections to the warning via his representative's email of 15 August 2025; and objections to the changed terms via correspondence and meetings in early-to-mid August 2025. Tranzit denied any personal grievance had been raised in time, arguing that the communications used the language of an "employment relationship problem" rather than a personal grievance, and that Mr Au's dissatisfaction was directed primarily at the Waikato Regional Council rather than Tranzit. A case management conference on 17 March 2026 directed that the 90-day notification issue be dealt with as a preliminary matter, and the investigation proceeded on the papers.

1. Whether Mr Au raised a personal grievance about his suspension within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [32]-[37]).

Section 114(1) requires a personal grievance to be raised within 90 days of the act complained of or when it came to the employee's notice. Under section 114(2), a grievance is raised as soon as the employee has made, or taken reasonable steps to make, the employer aware that the employee alleges a personal grievance and wants it addressed. The Authority applied the principles from Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132 — that the process is informal and accessible, grievances may be raised orally or in writing, no formula of words is required, and a series of communications may be considered together. At the 4 July 2025 meeting, Mr Au's sister-in-law challenged the suspension process as unfair and unjust and sought correction; the August communications reinforced that Mr Au objected to his continued removal from work and wanted to return to Te Awamutu. Even accepting that the WRC's position formed part of the background, Mr Au's complaints were sufficiently directed at Tranzit's employment decisions to communicate a personal grievance. The Authority found the grievance about suspension was raised in time.

2. Whether Mr Au raised a personal grievance about the warning within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [38]-[42]).

The warning was issued on 14 August 2025, so any grievance about it could only crystallise from that date. Applying the same section 114(2) test and the Zivaljevic principles, the Authority focused on the representative's email of 15 August 2025, which identified the warning, stated Mr Au considered it unjustified (as he had not refused to lower the ramp and had not breached any known policy), identified that an employment relationship problem existed, and indicated Mr Au wished to attend mediation. The Authority rejected Tranzit's argument that a represented employee's failure to use the words "personal grievance" should be treated as significant — the Act imposes no higher formal threshold because an employee has representation; the question remains one of substance. The Authority found the grievance about the warning was raised in time.

3. Whether Mr Au raised a personal grievance about changes to his terms and conditions of employment within the 90-day period required by section 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [43]-[45]).

Again applying section 114(2) and the Zivaljevic principles, the Authority considered the communications of 7 August 2025, 12 August 2025, and 15 August 2025 together. Those communications identified the proposed transfer to Cambridge and the 60-hour fortnight as disadvantageous (in terms of additional travel, financial cost, and loss of time), sought specific remedies (reimbursement, meal allowance, guaranteed hours, and recognition of existing contractual terms), and indicated Mr Au wanted Tranzit to address the matter. The Authority rejected Tranzit's argument that framing the matter as an "employment relationship problem" rather than a "personal grievance" was determinative. The grievance about changed terms and conditions was found to be raised in time.

4. Whether Tranzit's agreement to attend mediation was itself sufficient to establish that a personal grievance had been raised — Status: Dismissed (paras [46]-[47]).

The Authority accepted Tranzit's submission that agreement to mediate does not, by itself, prove a personal grievance was raised, because mediation can address employment relationship problems more broadly. However, the agreement to mediate was treated as relevant context confirming that Tranzit was aware the matters at issue were concrete disputes about employment decisions that Mr Au said had disadvantaged him and which he wanted resolved.

5. Costs — Status: Not reached (para [50]).

Costs were reserved to be determined following the substantive proceeding. No costs award was made at this stage.

6. Merits of the substantive personal grievance claims (unjustified disadvantage, breach of employment agreement, breach of good faith, breach of implied duty of trust and confidence) — Status: Not reached (paras [5], [49]).

This determination was explicitly a preliminary determination only. The Authority expressly stated that it does not deal with the substance of any grievances or Mr Au's other claims, and that nothing in the determination should be construed as forming views on the merits. Those matters are to be determined in the substantive proceeding.

The preliminary issue was resolved entirely in Mr Au's favour: all three personal grievances (suspension, warning, and changes to terms and conditions) were found to have been raised within the 90-day statutory period, and the matter will proceed to a substantive investigation.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination only. The substantive grievances and all remedies will be determined in the subsequent substantive proceeding. Costs are reserved.

[COSTS ONLY]

Lyon Kawhaaru (employee) successfully pursued an unjustified dismissal claim against The Deck Tahuna Limited (employer) in an earlier determination dated 8 May 2026. The parties were unable to agree on costs, leading to this costs-only determination. The Authority applied the standard daily tariff and ordered the respondent to pay $4,500 plus the filing fee.

Applicant: Lyon Kawhaaru (employee)
Respondent: The Deck Tahuna Limited (employer)

Applicant: Miranda Anderson, advocate
Respondent: Debbie Wilkes

Mr Kawhaaru was found to have been unjustifiably dismissed by The Deck Tahuna Limited in a substantive determination dated 8 May 2026 ([2026] NZERA 288). Following that determination, the Authority encouraged the parties to resolve costs between themselves, referencing its usual daily tariff approach. The parties were unable to reach agreement on costs, and Mr Kawhaaru's representative filed submissions seeking the full daily tariff of $4,500 plus the $71.55 filing fee, with no uplift sought. The respondent opposed any costs award. The Authority then determined costs on the basis of written submissions received on 2 June 2026 (applicant) and 23 June 2026 (respondent).

1. Whether costs should be awarded to the successful applicant, and if so, at what level — Status: Established (paras [6]-[11]).

The Authority's power to award costs derives from clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, guided by its Practice Direction and principles set out in JCE v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZERA 175. The key principles are that costs are discretionary, generally follow the event, and are assessed by reference to the notional daily tariff, which may be adjusted upward or downward based on factors such as complexity, unnecessary or unreasonable conduct, and the overarching objective of modest, access-to-justice-focused awards. The investigation meeting was held in Nelson and occupied a full day, making the starting-point tariff $4,500; the Authority found no reason to adjust that figure upward or downward. Accordingly, the respondent was ordered to pay $4,500 as a contribution toward the applicant's costs, together with reimbursement of the $71.55 filing fee, within 28 days.

The costs claim was upheld in full at the standard daily tariff rate.

Costs: $4,500 (full daily tariff, no uplift or reduction applied), payable within 28 days of the date of this determination; Filing fee reimbursement: $71.55. No other remedies ordered in this determination (substantive remedies were dealt with in the earlier determination [2026] NZERA 288).

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination arising from an unsuccessful employment grievance brought by Luboslava Kecer against her former employer Spectrum Care Limited. Ms Kecer's substantive claims — relating to dismissal, unjustifiable disadvantage, breach of employment agreement, and good faith breaches — were all dismissed. The key questions were whether costs should be stayed pending a challenge to the Employment Court, and what level of costs contribution Spectrum should receive. Spectrum was awarded $5,500 in costs.

Applicant: Luboslava Kecer (employee)
Respondent: Spectrum Care Limited (employer)

Applicant: Erika Whittome and Liz Lambert, advocates
Respondent: Saadi Radcliffe and Paul McBride, counsel

Ms Kecer was employed by Spectrum Care Limited as a Community Support Worker – Residential for intellectually disabled people from September 2018 until 23 December 2021, when her employment ended because she declined mandatory COVID-19 vaccination, had no valid exemption, and no redeployment opportunities were available. She brought multiple substantive claims against Spectrum, including unjustifiable dismissal, unjustifiable disadvantage, breach of employment agreement clauses, unilateral variation of terms, failure to provide a safe workplace, and breach of good faith. All substantive claims were unsuccessful. Several claims were withdrawn or abandoned by Ms Kecer on 12 November 2025, including common law damages claims, foreseeable damages, and claims under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015. Following the unsuccessful substantive determination, Spectrum sought a costs award of $10,500; Ms Kecer opposed this and sought a stay of costs pending her challenge to the Employment Court.

1. Whether costs should be stayed pending the Employment Court challenge — Status: Dismissed (paras [14]-[16]).

The Authority applied the general principle that an Employment Court challenge does not operate as a stay of Authority proceedings or orders. No other ground for a stay was advanced by Ms Kecer. The Authority held that the principle "costs follow the event" applies and that the investigation process needed to be finally concluded, given the claims dated back to December 2021. Ms Kecer's argument that she should not be "further financially penalised for exercising her right to seek justice" was not accepted as a basis for a stay. The stay application was dismissed.

2. What is the appropriate starting point (notional daily tariff) for costs — Status: Established at $4,500 (paras [17]-[19]).

The Authority applied its standard tariff-based approach under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, referencing the principles in PBO Limited (formerly Rush Security Limited) v Da Cruz [2005] ERNZ 808 and Fagotti v Acme & Co. Limited [2015] NZEmpC 135. A one-day in-person investigation meeting was held in January 2026, setting the notional starting point at $4,500. Spectrum's argument that the tariff should be increased to $6,750 because post-hearing written submissions were lodged was rejected, as the tariff is designed to include costs associated with submissions whether oral or written. Neither party submitted the tariff should be decreased, and no reason was identified to do so.

3. Whether the notional starting tariff should be increased due to the conduct of Ms Kecer's case — Status: Established (paras [20]-[22]).

The Authority considered whether Ms Kecer's conduct had unreasonably increased Spectrum's actual legal costs, consistent with the principles in PBO v Da Cruz. Six factors were identified as warranting an upward adjustment: (a) claims were unclear from the outset and required significant Authority resources to clarify; (b) disputed jurisdiction issues were flagged at the outset; (c) Ms Kecer's position on what personal grievance was raised and when materially changed across multiple stages of proceedings; (d) new claims were raised and previously withdrawn claims were reactivated in post-hearing submissions; (e) problems with the applicant's advocate regarding production of an Agreed Statement of Facts and chronology; and (f) Ms Kecer pursued novel claims with no prospect of success. The Authority increased the notional tariff by $1,000, resulting in a costs award of $5,500.

The claim for a stay of costs was dismissed and Spectrum's costs application was partially upheld, with Ms Kecer ordered to pay $5,500 (below the $10,500 sought).

Costs: $5,500.00 ordered against the applicant (Ms Kecer) in favour of Spectrum Care Limited, payable within 28 days of the date of determination (1 July 2026). No other remedy ordered.

Brendan David Powell-Sykes, a former CCTV Off-Sider employed by Hydrotech Limited trading as TDG Environmental, brought a personal grievance claim for unjustified disadvantage arising from a workplace injury. The central preliminary question was whether Mr Powell-Sykes had raised a personal grievance against TDG within the statutory 90-day notification period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The Authority found that his formal written complaint letter of 30 October 2023 did constitute the raising of a personal grievance within the required period, and the matter will proceed to a full investigation.

Applicant: Brendan David Powell-Sykes (employee, former CCTV Off-Sider)
Respondent: Hydrotech Limited t/a TDG Environmental (employer)

Applicant: Paul Matthews, advocate
Respondent: Rachel Skavantzos

Mr Powell-Sykes commenced employment with TDG Environmental on 26 June 2023 as a CCTV Off-Sider under an Individual Employment Agreement. On 2 October 2023, he suffered injuries to both forearms while performing cesspit truck offsider work — a role he says was outside the scope of his employment contract. He alleges that after the injury his manager reprimanded him for late filing of an incident report, failed to provide him with duty of care, did not take him to a work-appointed doctor, and placed him under unreasonable pressure to return to work before he was medically fit. On 30 October 2023, Mr Powell-Sykes wrote a formal written complaint to his branch manager raising concerns of breach of contract, lack of duty of care, causing unnecessary distress, and lack of communication. The preliminary issue before the Authority was whether that letter constituted the raising of a personal grievance within the 90-day notification period. TDG acknowledged receipt of the letter and accepted that no particular formula of words is required to raise a personal grievance, but the matter was put before the Authority for determination on the papers following a case management teleconference on 28 January 2026.

1. Whether Mr Powell-Sykes raised a personal grievance against TDG within the 90-day notification period under s 114 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [7]–[17]).

Section 114 of the Act requires an employee to raise a personal grievance within 90 days from the date the action alleged to amount to the grievance occurred, or from when it came to the employee's notice, whichever is later. The Authority applied the principles from Creedy v Commissioner of Police [2006] ERNZ 517 and Chief Executive of Manukau Institute of Technology v Zivaljevic [2019] NZEmpC 132, which hold that no particular formula of words is required, the grievance may be raised orally or in writing, and the key question is whether the employer was made sufficiently aware of the nature of the complaint to be able to respond to it on its merits. Objectively considered, Mr Powell-Sykes's letter of 30 October 2023 — sent just 28 days after the incident on 2 October 2023 — conveyed the substance of a complaint of unjustified disadvantage, raising issues of breach of contract, failure of duty of care, causing distress, and inadequate communication following his workplace injury. The Authority found that the letter constituted the raising of a personal grievance within the 90-day period, and also noted that the claim was filed in the Authority on 13 April 2025, well within the three-year limitation period under s 114(6).

2. Whether the substance of Mr Powell-Sykes's complaint amounts to an established personal grievance of unjustified disadvantage — Status: Not reached (para [16]).

The Authority noted that the complaint is in the nature of an unjustified disadvantage personal grievance but expressly reserved this question for the substantive investigation, stating that "whether he is correct about this remains to be seen" and that TDG will have the opportunity to defend itself. This issue was not determined at the preliminary stage.

3. Costs — Status: Reserved (para [19]).

The Authority reserved costs without making any finding or order at this stage, leaving costs to be addressed following the substantive investigation.

The preliminary claim was upheld: Mr Powell-Sykes raised a personal grievance within the 90-day statutory notification period, and the matter will proceed to a full investigation on the merits.

None ordered at this stage. This is a preliminary determination only. Costs are reserved. The parties may contact the Authority Officer if they wish to be directed to mediation; otherwise the investigation will continue.

BDN applied under s 71ZB of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 (PLEPA) to review a decision by IRD (acting on behalf of MBIE) refusing to allow a second transfer of parental leave payments (PLP) back to her after her husband returned to work. The central legal question was whether IRD correctly applied PLEPA's restriction limiting PLP to one transfer between partners, and whether IRD's failure to advise BDN of that limitation provided grounds to reverse the decision. The application was dismissed and IRD's decision was confirmed.

Applicant: BDN (employee/PLP recipient — anonymised)
Respondent: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (government agency administering PLP through IRD delegates)

Applicant: Self-represented (applicant in person)
Respondent: Jessica Ellison, counsel for the Respondent

BDN was approved for parental leave payments commencing 22 September 2025, and IRD simultaneously approved a transfer of PLP to her husband. On 20 October 2025 BDN returned to work and PLP was transferred to her husband under s 71E PLEPA. On 29 October 2025 BDN's husband accepted a new job commencing 2 February 2026, and on 30 January 2026 BDN requested a second transfer of PLP back to herself. IRD refused on 30 January 2026, advising that only one transfer of PLP is permitted under PLEPA. On 2 February 2026 BDN's husband returned to work and PLP ceased, leaving seven weeks of entitlement unused. BDN argued that IRD failed to inform her at the time of the first transfer — and again when her husband notified IRD of his intention to return to work — that only one transfer was permitted, and that this lack of advice caused her and her husband to make decisions that were detrimental to them. MBIE contended that IRD's decision correctly reflected the express statutory provisions and that ignorance of the limitation was not a basis for reversal.

1. Whether IRD correctly declined BDN's application for a second transfer of PLP — Status: Established (paras [16]-[20]).

Section 71J PLEPA provides that PLP is payable for one continuous period not exceeding 26 weeks, or where a transfer has been made under s 71E, for one continuous period per person, provided the two periods together do not exceed 26 weeks. The Authority interpreted this as permitting only one transfer of PLP across the duration of the entitlement. The Authority cited Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment v Duan [2023] NZEmpC 332 in support of BDN's initial eligibility and confirmed the statutory framework. It concluded that because a first transfer had already occurred from BDN to her husband, a second transfer back to BDN was not permitted, and IRD's refusal was correct.

2. Whether BDN's circumstances — specifically IRD's failure to advise her of the transfer limitation — provided grounds for the Authority to modify or reverse IRD's decision — Status: Dismissed (paras [21]-[27]).

The Authority acknowledged that PLEPA grants it a review jurisdiction under s 71ZB but noted that prior ERA determinations have consistently declined to override decisions that correctly apply the statute: Hood v MBIE [2021] NZERA 215; Anaru v MBIE [2022] NZERA 375; Liu v MBIE [2022] NZERA 512; Faulkner v MBIE [2023] NZERA 748; and Tennent v MBIE [2025] NZERA 649. The Authority found that IRD was not legally obliged to advise BDN of the limitation on transfers, and that her lack of awareness of the statutory restriction, together with IRD's silence on the point, did not constitute a legal basis for reversing a decision that was correct in law. The Authority expressed sympathy for BDN's situation but held that the statutory provisions are clear and must be applied.

3. Costs — Status: Dismissed (para [29]).

The Authority applied the Practice Direction of the Employment Relations Authority, under which parties are presumed to bear their own costs in PLP review proceedings. No order for costs was made.

The application was dismissed in full; IRD's decision declining the second transfer of PLP was confirmed.

None ordered. No costs awarded; parties bear their own costs in accordance with the applicable Practice Direction.

Lita Beattie, a qualified chef, claimed she was employed by Matthew Roberts at his food business (Matt's Kitchen/The Food Project) from March to August 2024 and was not properly paid wages during that time. The key legal questions were whether Ms Beattie was an employee or independent contractor, whether her resignation amounted to constructive dismissal, and what remedies were appropriate. The Authority found Ms Beattie was an employee, that her resignation was a constructive dismissal, and ordered Mr Roberts to pay wage arrears, lost wages, holiday pay, and compensation totalling over $56,000.

Applicant: Lita Beattie (employee/former head chef)
Respondent: Matthew Roberts (employer/business owner)

Applicant: Hayley Johnson, advocate
Respondent: Matthew Roberts in person

Ms Beattie, a qualified chef, began working for Mr Roberts at his food business (Matt's Kitchen) on Easter Saturday, 30 March 2024, as Head Chef/Kitchen Manager, following a phone call in January 2024 in which they agreed she would be paid $27 per hour. Mr Roberts admitted Ms Beattie did work for him but maintained they had a contracting arrangement — under a "living contract" that went missing — and claimed payments were capped at $200 per week partly to offset a debt she owed him; he also characterised the arrangement as business mentoring. Ms Beattie said she was paid sporadically, rarely at the agreed rate, and worked very long hours (50–60 hours per week), receiving only occasional cash payments and some bank transfers. Both parties had discussed a WINZ Flexi Wage subsidy scheme, which contemplated a formal employment relationship with Ms Beattie receiving wages of $27 per hour. On 12 August 2024, Mr Roberts told Ms Beattie he would only ever pay her $20 per hour (below the then minimum wage of $23.15) and only if money was left after his own bills, prompting her to resign on 14 August 2024. A personal grievance was raised on 2 September 2024, mediation did not resolve the matter, and the case proceeded to investigation.

1. Whether Ms Beattie was an employee or independent contractor under s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Established (paras [21]–[43]).

The Authority applied s 6 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which requires determination of the "real nature of the relationship" having regard to all relevant matters, including the parties' intentions, but not treating any statement describing the relationship as determinative. The Authority found strong indicators of employment: both parties had applied for a WINZ Flexi Wage subsidy contemplating formal employment; Ms Beattie was integrated into the business as the sole head chef; she worked exclusively for Mr Roberts during the period; she did not invoice him or work for others; and Mr Roberts directed her hours. The absence of payroll, PAYE, and KiwiSaver was attributed to Mr Roberts' failure to comply with minimum employment standards rather than evidence of contracting. The Authority accepted Ms Beattie's evidence as credible and consistent, and rejected Mr Roberts' business mentoring narrative as unsupported by text communications. Ms Beattie was found to be an employee.

2. Whether Ms Beattie's resignation on 14 August 2024 constituted constructive dismissal — Status: Established (paras [44]–[54]).

The Authority applied the tests from Auckland Shop Employees v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA) and Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUW [1994] 1 ERNZ 168 (CA), requiring either deliberate coercion to resign or a sufficiently serious breach of duty that foreseeably compelled resignation. The Authority found that the sustained failure to pay wages from the outset of employment, combined with Mr Roberts' statement in August 2024 that he would only pay $20 per hour (below minimum wage) and only if funds permitted, constituted a serious and ongoing breach of the obligation to pay remuneration. It was reasonably foreseeable that Ms Beattie would resign in those circumstances, and her resignation was found to be a constructive dismissal.

3. Whether penalty should be awarded for breaches of minimum employment standards under s 133A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (paras [62]–[65]).

The Authority considered the factors in s 133A, including the nature of the breaches, the existence of one prior Authority determination involving Mr Roberts (which related to compliance with a settlement rather than the same underlying breaches), Mr Roberts' apparent financial difficulties, health issues of close family members, and the fact the business had wound up. The Authority declined to impose penalties, treating this as an isolated example and noting that a public determination was itself a form of accountability. No penalties were ordered on top of the other remedies.

4. Whether compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings under s 123(1)(c)(i) was warranted and at what level — Status: Established (paras [55]–[59]).

The Authority accepted both Ms Beattie's evidence about her significant emotional and mental health deterioration and the evidence of her health practitioner, Ms Lane, who observed worsening distress, increased support needs, and an urgent referral to the Mental Health Team. The Authority acknowledged Ms Beattie's pre-existing vulnerabilities (financial hardship from Covid-19, prior health challenges) and noted Mr Roberts was responsible only for harm caused by his own failings during the employment period. A compensation award of $18,000 was ordered.

5. Whether a globalised compensation award was appropriate across the constructive dismissal claim and separate disadvantage claims (failure to pay wages, failure to make KiwiSaver contributions, paying below minimum wage, failure to provide a written employment agreement) — Status: Established (paras [59]).

The Authority determined that all disadvantage claims were factually connected to the same course of conduct (non-payment of wages and associated failures) as the constructive dismissal, and that a single globalised compensation figure of $18,000 was appropriate rather than separate awards for each.

6. Whether wage arrears were owing and at what amount — Status: Established (paras [60]–[62]).

The Authority invoked s 132 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, which allows the Authority to accept an employee's claim for unpaid wages as proven where the employer has failed to keep wage and time records and that failure has prejudiced the employee's ability to bring an accurate claim. No payroll records were kept by Mr Roberts. Ms Beattie's estimated hours table, deducting payments received, produced a figure of $23,050.00 gross in wage arrears. The Authority accepted this figure and ordered payment under s 131 of the Act.

7. Whether lost wages were payable following constructive dismissal and at what amount — Status: Established (paras [63]–[64]).

The Authority noted that the Act limits lost wages to the lesser of actual lost remuneration or three months' ordinary time remuneration. Ms Beattie did not find new employment until 15 October 2025 and gave evidence that her ability to find local work was hindered by the breakdown with Mr Roberts. The Authority awarded lost wages equivalent to three months' remuneration, calculated at $27 per hour, amounting to $14,040.00.

8. Whether annual holiday pay arrears were owed — Status: Established (para [65]).

Following from the finding that Ms Beattie was an employee, she was entitled to holiday pay under the Holidays Act at 8% of gross earnings. Ms Beattie calculated this at $1,844.00, and the Authority ordered payment of that amount under s 131 of the Act.

9. Whether PAYE deductions and KiwiSaver employer contributions were owing — Status: Established (para [65]).

The Authority held that PAYE deductions and KiwiSaver employer contributions must be accounted for and paid as a consequence of the employment relationship finding, but did not specify dollar amounts in the determination.

10. Whether interest on wage and holiday arrears should be awarded — Status: Established (paras [66]–[67]).

The Authority exercised its discretion under Schedule 2, clause 11 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, finding it appropriate to award interest to compensate Ms Beattie for being deprived of the use of money to which she was entitled. Interest was ordered using the civil debt interest calculator on the wage and holiday arrears from the date of this determination until full payment.

11. Whether Ms Beattie's conduct contributed to the situation giving rise to the personal grievance under s 124 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 — Status: Dismissed (para [68]).

The Authority considered s 124, which requires it to assess whether any remedy should be reduced due to the employee's own contribution to the situation. The Authority found that Mr Roberts had justified his conduct on the basis that Ms Beattie was a contractor, which was rejected. Ms Beattie had not contributed to the situation giving rise to the grievance and no reduction was applied.

12. Whether certain late evidence submitted by Mr Roberts should be admitted and considered — Status: Partially established (paras [4]–[7]).

Mr Roberts submitted six additional documents the day before the investigation meeting. Only the text messages with Ms Beattie were found relevant and admitted. A late witness statement was excluded because that witness did not attend to give in-person evidence and Ms Beattie had no opportunity to cross-examine. An undated and unsigned repayment schedule was rejected as unreliable and also immaterial given the employment finding. Other documents (Himatangi Beach invoice, Kitchen totals email chain, settlement discussions, and equipment references) were found irrelevant to the employment period in question.

13. Costs — Status: Reserved.

The Authority reserved the question of costs and encouraged the parties to resolve it between themselves. A process was set out: Ms Beattie may lodge a costs memorandum within 28 days; Mr Roberts has 14 days from service to file a reply. The Authority indicated it would apply its usual daily tariff basis if asked to determine costs.

The claim was substantially upheld: Ms Beattie was found to be an employee, her resignation was a constructive dismissal, and she was awarded wage arrears, lost wages, holiday pay, and compensation for humiliation and distress; penalties were declined and costs were reserved.

- Compensation (humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings) under s 123(1)(c)(i): $18,000.00
- Lost wages under ss 123(1)(b) and 128 (three months): $14,040.00
- Wage arrears under s 131: $23,050.00 (gross)
- Annual holiday arrears under s 131: $1,844.00
- PAYE deductions and KiwiSaver employer contributions: to be accounted for and paid (amounts not specified)
- Interest on wage and holiday arrears: from date of determination until paid in full (calculated using civil debt interest calculator)
- Penalties: None ordered
- Reinstatement: Not sought or ordered
- Costs: Reserved; parties encouraged to resolve between themselves; process set out for determination by the Authority if required
- All monetary amounts payable within 28 days of the determination

[COSTS ONLY]

This is a costs determination following a substantive remedies determination issued on 9 March 2026 in favour of employees Duane Farrell and the Corrections Association of New Zealand (CANZ) against the Department of Corrections. The parties were unable to agree on costs and filed memoranda. The Authority awarded $4,500 in costs to the applicants, applying the standard daily tariff with an uplift for factual complexity.

Applicant: Duane Farrell (employee) and Corrections Association of New Zealand (union, second applicant)
Respondent: The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (employer)

Applicant: Jim Roberts and Kirby Kleingeld, counsel for Applicants
Respondent: John Rooney and Pema Gyeltshen, counsel for the Respondent

The Authority had previously issued a substantive remedies determination on 9 March 2026 ([2026] NZERA 143), finding that Corrections had failed to keep Mr Farrell safe at work and had breached the relevant collective agreement, with six established personal grievances. Costs were reserved at that stage, with a timetable set for memoranda if the parties could not agree. The parties were unable to resolve costs between themselves and filed submissions. The applicants sought $12,000 as a contribution toward actual costs of $16,494.57 (or $19,064.70 including related correspondence), citing factual complexity, multiple grievances, complex payroll calculations, and the fact that they were wholly successful. Corrections submitted that costs should be $2,250 (half the notional daily tariff), arguing the claimed amount was excessive and that factual complexity in submissions was not a basis for departure from the tariff.

1. Whether costs should follow the event in favour of the successful applicants — Status: Established (paras [2], [5]).

The Authority confirmed the general principle that costs follow the event under clause 15 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Relations Act, consistent with its equity and good conscience jurisdiction. As Mr Farrell and CANZ were wholly successful in the underlying proceeding, Corrections was required to contribute to their costs. The Authority noted that costs awards are discretionary, must be principled, are not punitive, and are generally modest.

2. Whether the appropriate starting point for costs is the standard daily tariff of $2,250 — Status: Established (para [5]).

The Authority applied the standard daily tariff approach as the notional starting point, arriving at $2,250 for the remedies investigation conducted on the papers. This was consistent with the approach signalled in the substantive determination and accepted as the baseline by both parties.

3. Whether the factual complexity of the matter warranted an uplift above the standard daily tariff — Status: Established (para [6]).

The Authority accepted that factual complexity in determining remedies — given the number and discrete nature of the matters, including six personal grievances, complex payroll calculations involving allowances, KiwiSaver, overtime, call-out payments, and ACC interactions — justified increasing the starting point. The Authority doubled the tariff to $4,500, rejecting the applicants' submission for $12,000 (equivalent to three notional days) as too high, while rejecting Corrections' submission that no uplift was warranted.

The costs claim was partially upheld; the applicants were awarded $4,500 in costs, being the standard daily tariff doubled to reflect factual complexity, rather than the $12,000 sought.

Costs: $4,500 ordered to be paid by the Respondent (Corrections) to the Applicants within 21 days of the date of this determination (6 July 2026). No other remedy ordered (this determination addresses costs only; substantive remedies were dealt with in [2026] NZERA 143).